NOTES ON BOOK ZETA

OF

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

being the record

by MYLES BURNYEAT and others

of a seminar held in London, 1975-1979

Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, 10 Merton Street,

Oxford,

1979

(reprinted 1986)

PREFACE

Once a month on winter Saturdays a group of scholars converges on New York City by car , train and aircraft to discuss some Greek philosophical text . On his return to Britain the group ' s founder , G . E . L .Owen , set up a daughter house in London, which first met at the British Academy in Piccadilly on Sth February 1975 and began discussion of Aristotle ' s Metaphysics book z. M . F . Burnyeat took minutes of the meeting , which he later wrote up and circulated. The record was continued , by Burnyeat and others , at every subsequent meeting until , on 17th March 1979, we reached the end of Z .

This volume contains those minutes , together with two previously unpublished papers, by G . E .L . Owen and G .J.Hughes , which we had before us during our discussions of Z7-9 and Zl3 respectively. The proposal to publish was made in May 1979 , whenit was decided to leave all the material in the form in which it had originally been circulated, with only minor editorial deletions and clarifications . What follows , thereforeis a record of the London group ' s discussions , now and then embellished (as will appear) , but for the most part merely organized , ' by the subsequent labours of the recorders. In comparison with a commentary our record must lack unity and comprehensiveness; but we offer it in the belief that others will find value in an account of what a number of people , working together , thought about this difficult text.

We express our cordial thanks to the British Academy for making their premises available to us from 1975 to 1977 , and to the Ins itute of Classical Studies in Gordon Square for extending the same favour since October 1977 .

Nearly half the minutes are by Myles Burnyeat , the rest by Julia Annas , Lesley Brown , Christopher Kirwan , Alan Lacey , Gwilym Owen , Malcolm Schofield , Bob Sharples and Michael Woods . Others who attended meetings (many not often) were Elizabeth Anscombe , Jonathan Barnes , David Charles , James Dybikowski , Theodor Ebert, Gail Fine , Peter Geach , Gerald Hughes , Edward Hussey, Terence Irwin , Barrington Jones , Anthony Kenny ,

i

ll

Geoffrey Lloyd , Anthony Long , Brian McGuinness , Richard McKirahan , Gareth Matthews , Richard Sorabj i , Christopher Taylor , David Wiggins and Kathleen Wilkes .

C .A . Kirwan

October 1979 '

ABBREVIATIONS

The works of Aristotle are referred to as follows :

An . Pos:t

Cat .

De An:

EN

GC

Met .

PA

Phys .

Pol .

Rhet .

SE

Top.

Posterior Analytics

Categories

De Anima

Nicbmachean Ethics

De Generatione et Corruptione

Metaphysics

De Partibus Animalium

Physics

Polictics

Rhetoric

De Sophisticis Elenchis

Topics

Capital Greek letters refer to rooks of the Metaphysics unless otherwise specified .

Unprefixed page numbers , as in ' 1002b 10 ' , refer to the Metaphysics .

. . .

- ii

Other references :

Apostle

Asclepius

Barnes

Bohn

Bonitz

Jaeger

Oxford translation

Ps . Alexander

Reale

Ross

Aristotaes Metaphysics , translated with commentaries by Hippocrates G . Apostle , Indiana 1966

In Aristotelis Metaphysioorurtt

i 1L

Note to 2nd Impression

The text is revised only by the correction of a misprint on

page 1. I shall be happy to receive further corrections and comments from readers, for the benefit of future impressions.

iv

C.A. Kirwan

Exeter College,

Oxford.

March 1986.

Zl -

8th February 1975

CHAPTER 1

1028a 10 :t:o v ;>.,(ye:l:aL n:oA.A.axk. that would least suggest a definite the thesis says there is nonewhile

We looked for a rendering unitary subject, since it would be misleading

to take a linguistic expression as the subject. Perhaps )\, ' whatever we call ov', manufacturing a class by reference

to the expression.

1028a i1 anua(ve:L. Supply as subject a linguistic expression from i;(J v. We discussed, but failed to illuminate ,

/ the sense of onuaLve:Lv tiere We also debated the issue of complete vs . incomplete e:'tva L. The incomplete , suggested to some by 1 0 28a 15-18 , where Aristotle deals with sentences like ' This is a man/warm ' , foundered on the abstract nouns in a 19-20 illustrating ,(x A.A.a va (a 18) = i:othwv (a 14) = the i3'vi:a signified at a ll-l3 . Thereafter we often translated ' exists ' .

10 28a 11-!2 {-6ignifiesl what a thing is and ( that it is) a this something, a subject . It was suggested that the ua( joins the two marks of oo(a that will later get pressed , indeed overpressed , in different directions : form and subjecthood (matter) .

1028a 14 anua(ve:L. Again supply a linguistic subj ect from ' ( "!oi: L via the answers that question collects: these are

/ ' ,, ,,., what onuaLve:L nv ooLav.

, / 10 28a 15-18 . The parenthesis explains not why .()IJOLa is - /, . / n:pchov ov but why ( the answer to) l:L e:al:L signifies otoLa.

To perform this role it evidently presupposes (a ) we know that a man or a god are substances, . (b ) that the 'this ' about which the questions l:( n:o1ov !al:L1 etc . are asked is a substantial individual , not e . g. a colour.

l.

1028a 18 NOTES ON ZETA

1028a 18-20 was thought to yield a two stage analysis for e . g .

'Heliotrope exists ' : (a) H i s a quality, (b) H qualifies some substance. (Uninstantiated qualities are not 6(.i;a.) By contrast , 'Socrates exists' says that Socrates is a substance and that is all - there is no analogue to (b) in the analysis of what it is for a substance to exist. But : -

t'\ C/ l028a 18 i:ou oui:wb ?fvi:oi;; . The substance mentioned in (b) will, in its own right, but should we infer that of course, be an ts'v

an account for what it is for a substance to exis.t must be included in the analysis of what it is for a quality to be an 7fvr Such a requirement is made for i:ci,6ya:e:L'il in r2 , but here at least it seems otios e . &i:wi;; : in a 18 is ambiguous on the point: if it is read as part of the analysis of ?fvi:a, we get the parallel with r , but it might equally be Aristotle's way of designating ( from outside the analysi s , so to speak) the sort of v which the qualities , etc . mus t qualify if they are to exist.

1028a 20-2 . The rtop(a arises. from the dependent nature of non-sub&tantiaL existence : : if . ;1.;\.a are .not npc;;i;wi;; '>ovi:a but only '6vi:a in the dependent way described , maybe they are not vi;a at all.

l028a 21

).I. No great anxiety was felt about the readings ona(ve: L

g\,. With either it was thought that ifu.aai:ov d'ui;f;N should be taken as subject ( contra Ross) : and that the sense of the point was not affected .

1028a 23 rte:q>uu.&'i;;. Here, on the other hand , there was some inclination to bracket the word , with Jaeger against Ross , on the ground that the usual expansion for u.aa 'ai:o is ;\.e;yc(e;vov ; this to be weighed against texts where non substantial items are u.aa' ani:&' ;\.e;yc{e;va .

' ,,. l028a 24-25 i:o 13a5L!:ov etc . refer to particulars (cf . a 2 7 ) ,.. specimen walkers and the like . Hence :

2

CHAPTER 1 10 28a 2 6

10 2 8a 26-9 The point being made is that with 'the walker', 'the sitter' , etc . a reference to a definite sub j ect is manifest (ta(vEaL) in the expres sion itself, - Kaana8aL equally requires a subject, but when we speak of sitting we

,,, may not have any determinate subject in view . For xanyopLa = designation cf . 1047a 34 .

1028a 29-31 Various construals of this sentence were canvassed . / / ,,,,, It became clear, first that aunv = ouaLa a 2 7 , not xanyopLa

since it would not be because of their designation that KE(vwv C/ " ,, ,,, . Exaoov EOLvi second that EKELvwv most likely refers to the

' ,;. ' ::> "' more remote o aaoLELV, etc . a 20-2 1 , rather than o aya8ov, "' . , ' ">/ xa8nEvov a 28-29 1 if the latter, "' L ov makes the point

' ,; ' " that o aaeLOV must always be o aaoLOV L1 eg, the walking man, whereas ' the man' is complete as it stands and does not require to be backed by an answer to the question ' The man what? ' . This reading of o . was felt to need excess ive ingenuity , SO we settled for\KEVWV = o aaofELV, etc. O .1 v was then construed in the light of a 18-20 : these items can only be said to be. in that they are actions, etc . of what is nptwc - for them to be is to be something, an action, quality etc . of a substance, whereas a substance, in that it is nWG, just is c&n}..(;iG). All the same , this is not unproblematic in a text purportedly dealing with the complete -'S' ELvaL. Why should Aristotle suddenly turn his contrast between

,,.. primary and dependent uses of the complete ELVaL into one between a complete. and an incomplete.use? At this point the suggestion was made that, xa\ o -i:( 8.nA.lG is parenthetica l , explaining precisely that the in np-CWG v i s intended as the complete one, not the incomplete. Not only is this the contrast more usually associated Wi th anG VS,.V L but -

"' it preserves the chapter's concentration on the complete ELvaL and still yields the sense we want without difficulty : within v-r:a (complete use) substance i s primary . The meeting closed before this suggestion could be properly aired .

3

l.028a: ;30

8th March 19 75

NOTES ON ZETA

1028a 30 -1 We adopted the suggestion that "tL v ?:i.A.A.' Jv &nA.wb is epexegetic to "tv rather than npfu'"twb, specifying it as the complete e't'vaL as opposed to the incomplete ( see previous note) . For "tL dnA.b with e'i'vaL,_y {yvEcr8aL, c f . SE 166b 37 ff, Phys . 19 0 a 3 2 ; more in Bonitz .

10 28a 31-3 priority in time . Since priority in definition is explained 34-6 and priority in knowledge 36-b 2, 33-4 is left, by elimination, as the explanation of priority in time. How does it work? 11 is not much help . 'Substance is separable, accidents are not' cannot mean that whi le accidents cannot exis t without substance, substance can exist without (any) accidents , whether-s.ubstance is .taken. as.'..individual or kind . To meet this constraint, 3 types of solution were canvas sed : -( 1) ( a ) An individual substance could exist without the accidents, e.g . qualities, it has . Ob jection : the qualities in question could exist without the substance, in other individuals . No asymmetry emerges unless the qualities are taken as particularized to the individual, and it is controversial whether Aristotle believed in particularized qualities . (b) A kind o f subs tance, e . g . animals, can exist without

exhibiting a given quality, e . g . baldne s s ; but baldness can-not exist without some animal having i t . Ob jection : this works for determinate qualities but not for ( all) determinable ones ; e . g . bodies could exist without any being pink but not without any being coloured. So to maintain this account we would need to fi ll out Aris totle's brief sentence with a story about the dependence of determinable s on determinates . ( 2 ) We looked at the idea that Aristotle h ad in mind something les s precise , arising out of the context.of traditional debate which is in his mind at the end of the chapter ( 28b 2 ff) and in Z 2 . The idea was that Aristotle represents his que stion 'What is substance? ' as a sharpened version of the tradi tional search for ( one or more ) primary beings . These had been primary in several senses, most notably in explanation and often also in time, and prior or antecedent, if not to all qualities and accidents, still to mos t; hence separable from these, as Aristotle claims his substance is . ( In this connection we alluded to

4

CHAPTER 1 10 28a 31

10 38b 26-9, which agrees with Zl that accidents cannot be prior in time because priority in time entails separability; but the outcome was inconclusive . ) The troub le wi th this idea, however, is, first, that in order to see how Aristotle's substance does meet the relevant criterion of primacy, we still have to understand a precise Aris totelian sense in which substance is prior in time to accidents; second, that priority in definition is explained 35-6 in such entirely Aristotelian terms that there seems to be no point of contact with anything in the tradi tion . ( 3 ) Finally, we tried approaching the question through a context of change . accidents what they quality you like to

Subs tances are the . things that change, come to have by changing . So, for any take, its existence (its being . the quality

of some substance) is to be looked on as the result of a change involving a .pre-existing substance (which does not imply that that substance had no other attributes beforehand) In this connection reference was made ... to An. Post. 83a 4 ff; [But the objection under ( 1) (b) seems to apply. ]

1028a 34-6 priority in definition. The.firs t.question was whether the AbYOG G c?ua(aG included in the A6YoG Kaaou mus t be an actual definition or whether .a . simple reference I to ( the) substance would suffi ce . The Greek demands that it be a definition, since the immediately preceding AbYOG Kcrou obvious ly is that. This is confirmed by 10 7 7b 3-4, and it settles a point left open on . 8 Feb . ( see . . note to 10 2 8a 18) . This result has an important bearing .. on the next question, which concerns the range of (a) Ka'cnou , . (b) G o?icr(aG.

1 2 3 A . planet body substance

A' . ( surface)

(, B . yellow colour quality

& / /' The maximum range for I:Kacrou would include \.Al as wel l as Bl, and then the point would be that in either case definition mus t include a definiton from A2 or A3 . If an A2 definition

5

1028a 34 NOTES ON ZETA

is an indispensable part of any Bl definition, Aristotle is collllllitted to the intem;ting claim that any non-substance item is associated with a definite kind of substance in such a way that a definitional understanding of the former involves a (definitional) understanding of the kind of substance it inheres in . However, including Al rather hinders the emergence of a clear a&Illllletry between substance and accident . More important, it is not Aristotle 's. practice, when defining items from Al O.c Bl, to include a definition of the relevant A2 i tern or of substance itself (A3 ) . Nor, confining ourselves to Bl, does it help to replace the route Bl-B2- (A' 2 ) -A2-A3 by the route Bl-B2-B3-A3 : when defining qualities Aristotle does not include a definition of the category quality itself, let alone a definition of substance. We are left, therefore, with B 3 and A3 : Kou = @v Awv Kanyopnctwv a 3 3, and the point is

/ / that a AOYOG of quality must include a AOYOG of substance . I f i t i s asked what a A6YoG o f such categories as substance or quality would look like, one may draw on Zl itsel f : o'ua(a is

' , 2 ' , o L Ecr L KaL OoE L (a 11-12 ) . And it was suggested that in r Aristotle is anyway collllllitted to the idea of a AYOG of quality, etc . (The internal connection with the preceding part of Z l would be closer if Aristotle is thinking in terms of explaining E'tva L for non-substances - a suggestion that was made but...lost from sight.) Given, then, that only B3-A3 seem to fit both the strong A6YOG -within-A6YOG claim and Aristotle's practice, we must, and can, accept that Kaoov

CHAPTERS l , 2 10 28a 36'

fact a man or a fire . (b) The adjectives in o . . nocrov and T noL6v b 2 are accusatives relating grammatically to the individual man or fire, being repeated from a 37-b 1 , i . e. the phrases do not stand here for the categories quantity and quality. The problem itself was left over for the next meeting .

llth Apri l 1975

1028b 2-7 It was suggested that Aristotle, given . his views on the focal meaning of ift'!va.L, can claim only that.the question

"" "' / . ' .!: ... TL TO ov ; includes the question T LC 11 oucrLa. ; , not that the inves tigations come to the same thing . ( 1) It was proposed that two senses of T(c ota(a.; could be dis tinguished: (a) what conditions have to be fulfi lled for there to be ocr(a? (b) what items fulfi l these conditions? and that the ques tion Tr TO v coincides with ( al but not (b) Difficulty was fe lt over dis tinguishing ( a) and (b) sharply ( distinctions like " formal/material" were found unsatisfactory ) ; a theoryladen answer to (b) (e . g . " forms ", or - more disputed - " atoms " ) might restrict possible answers to ( a ) . It was felt, however, that some such .. distinction would answer wel l to the way Z 2 discusses candidates previously put forward as otcr(aL whereas Z3 is to fulfil the requirement of sketching Tnv ocrCav . . TL OTLV ( 10 28b 3 2 ) and discusses the oo(a . txa'."crTou ( 10 28b 35 ) . ( 2 ) It was also suggested that Aristotle is not in 1028b 4 talking about the Aristote lian question TC TO v ; but referring to this question in the philosophical tradition . This would perhaps do more justice to the parenthesis b 4-6, which does not provide very plausible answers to either the ( a ) or the (b) . question.

1028b 8-15 'Ari stotle is here apparently putting forward the C"ommonsense opinion that th-e best examples of o-?icr(a.L are

:pe:rce:ptible bodies ; t):l;ts is suggested by ( i ) his summing-

up of the p:roJ:ilems of. Z 2 at .!:> 28-31, ( i i ) contrasts with the

apparently simi l.ar .c.8 , 1017b 10-14, which does include a

characterization of t:llese items which goes beyond common- : 7

1028b 8 NOTES ON ZETA

sense (not being predicated of a subject) and which includes oaLlJ.OVLa which are not perceptible- (unless they are the heavenly bodies , c f . 10 28b 1 3 . )

10 28b 12 We decided that there was not sufficient ground for accepting (with Jaeger) Lvwv instead of lJ.Op{wv (accepted by Ros s ) , although rni'vwv is rather awkward as an alternative

, to lJ.OP LCJl\I.

1028b 15 ,,, We were indifferent between Jaeger's aAlw>v and Ross's

1028b 16-18 This looks like an argument about the limits of perceptible bodies ( cf . 1090b 5-13) ; hence LOL (b 16 ) are usually taken to be Pythagoreans . But (a) this bizarre view is mentioned by Aristotle in different versions ( 9 88a 7-19, 10 76a 38 - b 11) but never as an argument that nepaa have a better claim to be o&oCaL than bodies . So llAAOV fb 17 ) is

.... _..r..\. ._ ' ' ' unexplained. (b) In 17-18 o uw.u. MaL o on;pe;ov, MaL is presumably explicative , which suggests that the argument is not limited to perceptible bodies . ( c) At 1002b 10 Aristotle refers to mathematicals as n(paa without implying that they be long to perceptible things . The argument i s thus probably directed at the Academy argument that planes are "naturally prior" to solids , lines to planes , points to lines and units to points . The doctrine itself is somewhat obscure : see 10 17b 17-2 1 , 1019a 1-4 , and the references and discuss ion in de S trycker , p . 9 3-8 in Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century (edd . I . During and G . E . L . Owen, G8teborg 1960 ) . The Academy ' s use of natural priority in this argument would contras t with Aristotle ' s own attempts to characterize the priority of oOoCa (discussed last time ) . I f this is right then Aristotle has shifted from oGi.La = perceptible body to oGi.La = (mathematical) solid. But he is capable of this confusion in a rather similar context ( 10 7 7 a 14-20 , a 31-36 . )

. 102 8b 18-27 This refers to the different Academy theories

"deriving" numbers and geometrical objects from . two ultimate principles . (A few informative references are appended. )

8

CHAPTER 2 1028b 18

Given that i"vLoL 5(, in b 24 are presumably Xenocrates , together with what Theophrastus tells us (Metaphysics 6a. 2 3-b 2 2 ) about Xenocrates ' s inclusion of the perceptible world in his

" derivation" , the references to the perceptible world here (b 2 1 , 2 7 ) are probably incidental information to identi fy the theories ; what concerns Aristotle . about these derivation theories is that they give numbers , etc . primacy as o:acr(aL , as against perceptible things . The priority conferred by

" derivation" is again obscure, but (probabJ;y) quite different from the " natural priority" of b 16- 18 ; Aristotle would thus be distinguishing different arguments put forward by the same group of . people.

Passages .where 'derivation from principles" in the Academy is discussed :

1 .

2 .

3 .

1080b 4-36, 1083a 17-b 8

1085a 7-20 (cf. 992a 10-19 ) a 3 1-b 2 3

b 2 7-1086a 18 .

10 87b 4-33 10 88a 15-b 35 .

Plato, Speusippus &. Xenocrates compared on number .

Derivation of geometrical magnitudes

Variation.s on the principles within the Academy .

4 . 10 9-0b 13- 109la 9 , Relation of entities produced ;

5.

cf . de Anima 404b 16-.30 . different versions of the Alexander, in Met . 2 2 8 10-2 8 , 7 7 7 . 162 1 . See H . D . Saffrey , Le Peri

Phi losophias d 'Aristote

. ( Leiden 19 5 5 ) and review by Cherniss , Gnomon 1959

1090b 19-20 . 10 75b 37-. 10 76a 3

principles .

Speusippus ' s division of the material principle

9

1028b 18

6 .

7 .

8 .

9 .

NOTES ON ZETA

10 84a 29- b 2

Alexander, in Met . SS. 20 ff Sextus , Adversus Mathematicos. X 2S9 ff . See de Voge l , Philosophia part 1 pp . 283-S . cf . 992a 20-4

Derivation of entities "with in the dekad" .

Problems over points .

Theophrastus , Metaphysics 6a 2 3b 22 .

Derivation systems compared .

Sextus Adversus Mathematicos X . 2S8 . c f . 1036b 1 2 , b 2 2 , 1044a 13 .

Plato ' s . " reduction of Forms to numbers" in Theophras tus .

10 . 1088b 3S- 1090a 2 . The principles as being and not being .

11 . 988a 14- lS , 109la 2 9 - 1092a 17 Eudemus (Gaiser , Platens ungeschriebene Lehre pp. 5 36-7

12 . 992a . 13-19 , 10 8Sa 7-20 a 31- 10 8Sb 4 .

The principles as good a.nd evi l .

Aristotle ' s objection to the derivation of magnitudes .

1028b 19 " nA.e: Lc.> could mean "more in number" , which would be a reference to the difficult argument at 10 78b 3S-6 ( c f . 9 9 0b 4 ) . But in view of b 2 0 and 2 4 is more likely to mean :"more in kind" . aA.A.ov .aoLa. I f ftA.A.ov goes with .a then we must suppose

., ; ,, oucrLaG understood ; more serious ly , aLoLa i then grammati cally awkward . A conuna after 'aAA.ov would make t5'va &oLa give a reason for the supposition in question ( c f . also 1028a 2 4 ) . It was also sugge sted that a may have fallen out by haplo-

. 10

>/ graphy after ovTa .

CHAPTERS 2 , 3

10 28b 27-32 We discussed the distinction Aristotle is

10 28b 19

drawing between the ques tions of b 28-9 and b 30 . The obvious answer is that he is distinguishing the claims of candidates for

!> / ouaLaL just discussed (e . g. numbers) from arguments for the Prime Mover. This was questioned, on the grounds that the

l> ,,. singular ouaLa can be used of numbers and mathematicals (cf . 10 37a l0.;.13., 1076a 8 ) and that Aristotle. may be separating the question of whether there are any non-perceptible o&,(a L from the question (cf . 1076a 32-7) . construction in b

' / separate ouaLa as of non-perceptible

For lOth May 1975

of whether they have separate existence / .,,, However this falls foul of the noTEpov n

30-31, which presents the existence of the only alternative to the non-existence

, ,, ouaLaL .

Preliminaries on Z 3 : the following issues among others suggest themselves.

" I Why is 1029b 1-3 given as the reason for investigating TO ,; /;'\ /';'- . TL nv E LVaL rather than the Z3 conclusion in 10 29a 26-3 3 , viz .

that given ( a) the elimination of ifin as serious candidate / for ouaLa, (b ) the posteriority of the concrete substance ,

15' it is now proper to examine E L 8oc ( and look for it in per-ceptible substances - this justified in 1029b 3 - 12 ) ? For

\ / ,,-:. /';'\ . . TO TL nv E LVaL = E L 8oc . cf . e . g . 1032b.l-2 , 1035b 32 , 1044a 36 ,.f"i/t. "' . (cf . 1033b 5-8 , 15-16 ) 1 for argument that TL nv E LVaL is

V'. / confined to E L 8n YEVouc;; cf . 10 30a 11..,14 . Some possible answers : (i ) Opening of Z4 ( =1029b 1-3) written before present Z3 and 10 29a 26-331 hence non-appearance of l?tter in summary of Z

it has not yet been be) a i:C \I Etvcu.

NOTES ON ZEll'A

q. shown that only the &LOOG Hence argument of Z 3 that

can have ( or """ &Looi; must be

,. ,.. investigated gives no warrant for investigating l:L nv & .vcu: . , that warrant comes from 1028b 34 = 1029b 1-3, and the AOYLxn inquiry of Z 4 does not assume the conjoint introduction of r,. ,, UAT.l and &L5oi;; -opT.J in the analysis of the physical individual at 1029a 2-5 .

II Z3 1-2)

treats ifAT.l as (one In two other sorts

I> ... -type of) unou&L&vov npwi:ov ( 10 2 9 a o f context Aristotle connects these

expressions; the question is what light if any these others throw on the connection here . (a) At A 10 22a 16-17 and 18-19 c et. ' ""' - .,,,,. ( ,,,. ' n UAT.l &Kacri:ov uaL i:o unoK&L&vov &Kacri: nti!'tov is what Aristotle elsewhere explains as the primary recipient of some attribute or primary . sub j ect of .the corresponding predicate_: his example is surface and colour (e . g . Top . 13lb 33-3, 134a 18-25,

.. 2 4 8b 2 1-2 4!J?a 3 ) . As colour epithets reach through to an ultimate subject, surface, so on a more general. scheme all descriptions transfer to an ultimate subject, matter ( 1029a 2 1-2 4 ) : wi'll this do? The surface is Ka31a6i:nv white ( 1022a 30-31) , matter

c ... is not Ka3.aui:o anything ( 10 2 9 a 24-25 ) - if we claim these for different uses of Ka31cYcan we make the analogy work? (b) At Phys . 192a 3 1-32 Aristotle says that matter is the primary substrate of any. gven thing, that from which the thing comes to be ( i ) with the substrate s ti ll surviving in it and (b) not

' . ... Kai:a crua&anuoi;; ( i . e . not as it' comes from its contrary or privation, l.9lb 14-16 ) . Does Z 3 presuppose an analysis of change?

lOth.May 1975

Method We start from the ordinary . materials of dialectical discussion: AY&l:aL 10 28b 3 3 , l029a 2, . . . 00K&'i: 10 2 8b 35, 1029a 1 (cf . the question at 10 2 8b 278 , and 1042a 12-15 , where it is

not Aristotle but the AOYOL that argue for genus and universal as substance) . The most prevalent view (taking &'ALcri:a in

> / 1029a 1 with 5ou&'i:, although it could go with oucr.La), viz that substance is . the primary substrate, comes out . of these . . : discussions ; it connects , presumably , . with . the traditional

12

CHAPTER 3

debate about physis and what underlies change , but Ari stotle formulates it as the thesis that substance is the primary or ultimate subject, that which of all else is said and which i s not itself said o f anything further ( 10 28b 2 6 - 7 ; n . b . ' said of' here does not contrast with being in ' , as in the .e:!:.; that distinction disappears already Phys . 185a 3 1-2 ) . Our own debate largely took . the form . of.a dialectical confrontation of two readings of the argument which follows against equating substance with primary substrate . . It i s common ground between the two readings that the objection to the equation is that it makes matter substance and matter fai ls to meet the condition that. substance be OOPLC:n6v and i:ooe: 1:

NOTES ON ZETA

substance is>.nbt. prime matte:i: , , nbt-be" pi:ima.i:y .. substrat.s . According to (B) ( for which cf . M. Schofield in PP,rones:ii;; ::19.72.'),, the stripping operation really strips , i . e . it remove s both determinate and determinable properties . I t i s undertaken in search of T L G K>..>..n (ll.029.a :Ul : given that substance is the primary substrate , it must be matter , for what else remain s , when predicates are removed, that could be subject to them all? Answer: nothing at all , for the stripping leave s nothing ( 1029a 12 , where (A) understands ' nothing but matter' i 1029a 18 , where (B) does not think i:o 8p LCdevov indicates a live option ) . Conclusion: so ( 10 29a 18 : c:i&i:e) matter is left, by elimination , as the primary substrate , and so (on the present hypothes is) as substance , to which equation the objection is the same as before .

Problems (B) was thought to run into diffi culty at 1029a 2 0 A.eyro B' ll'>..nv Ki:A.: given that on (B) 's reading of 119 the stripping does not put us in touch with matter , the only grip we have on b">..n as yet is the examp1e of the bronze of the statue ( 1029a 4 ) . I f this is not what is referred to at 1029a 19 and explained at 1029a 2 0 , the sequence of thought is j arred: we suddenly get an explanation of matter which does not seem to fit the example of bronze , though it is the explanation needed to allow the ob jection at 1029a 27-8 to go through . I f , on the other hand, the example is what is referred to and explained

/ at 1920 , we get Aristotle saying that bronze is not Ka3'auo l: L . But is he ready for .that before Z l 6 ? And is not bronze one of the things o'fG crPLCJl:aL. i:Cl V :(1029.a"'21) ? On the other side , (A) !lad to . say. that the if>..n 1n 1029a 30-2 is .. not , as one might have expected, . the bronze of the earlier example but prime matter i the passage gives no opinion on whether the bronze is .. i:c56e i: L , because , since it can be melted down , etc . , the bronze is not a serious enough candidate for being a primary substrate . Sibft\'1! pol.nts: 011!

'CHAPTER 3 1029a 5

1029a 5 i:e; if the three candidates for the primary substrate are A, b, and the compound (A + B ) , then, if A is prior to B or B to A, it is a fortiori prior to the complex (A + B ) .

1029a 6 prior : presumably in some or j.n Zl. ualA.ov = : has more right to

all of fue ways distinguished be called an 3

1029a 27

l

NOTES ON ZETA

7th June 1975

1029a 27-8 E:'tooG and i: E '.'".P"v are bettC' car - date s c:han An for oOoLa since they satisfy the criteria of being i:o i:L

/ and XlllPLoi:ov. Compare 10 42a 26 ff. It was thought (a) that these criteria were connected, not independent and (b) that

f$\ ..... "" . Loo!; strictly i s xwp Loi:ov AOY only . But if, as appears from "' . . ' / , ,. 1042a 29, LOO!; being xwp Loi:ov AOY is i:oo i:L, would not the

c/ . same be true of uAn? No, uAn, though separable in thought / . perhaps, is not separable Aoyw if this requires that a speci"

fication can be given of it.

0 / ' /. 1029a 30-32 the concrete is uoi:Epa xaL onAn . Does this mean ( i ) posterior and clear in itself, ( ii ) posterior and (will: be)

cl'. I'>\ clear (when the other two are ; uAn i s, so go on to LOO!;), or ( iii) clearly posterior? ( i ) was preerred.

1029a 32 What is meant by calling matter cpavEpct? perhaps that unlike that of form1.. the'-'conc1;!pt of .. matter is easily grape, e . g . by consideration of substantial change. The objection that a grasp of the concept of matter must go hand in hand with a grasp of that of form was not thought weighty .

1029b 3-12 This passage was thought to have no special relevance to its context (whether placed at the end of Z3 with Jaeger or left in Z 4 ) and was not discus sed .

1029b 1-2 The problem raised under I in ' Preliminaries on Z 3 ' (above ) was e laborated by adding to reasons ( a ) and (b) a further one, from a 30-3 2,ignored by Z 4 introduction, viz . that 1.'ooG is the only one .of the three candidates for oo(a that i s not " clear" . Of the solutions suggested in .. ' Preliminarie s ' ( iii) found most favour : investigation of i: i:( v E"E'vaL is a

. fresh start; only later ( Z 7 ) is the close connection between llJ\ ' , ,.. t9I EtooG and i:o i:L nv LVnL e stablished .

16

CHAPTER 4

1029b 13 A.OYLKOOG . The question of the chapter 's s tructure was left for later discuss ion,

c. / " dd ' c / 1029b 14 e:Ka.oi:ce; e:Ka.OTov, co Though an emendation, e:Ka.oi:ce was preferred, the dative. being so frequent in this context . Even if we keep a.oi:ov the most natural interpretation (each thing that is said Ka.ea.fii:o' is the i;('ifv e:'t'va.L (of the thing of which it is so said) ) gives the same sense as reading ' / e: KO.Ol:W , \J

1029b 14-16 You are not Ka.i: oa.ui:v musical . Despite the oddity of the example (y9u) the point seems clear : musical does not apply to you in virtue of your being just that individual you are ; you could cease to be musical without ceasing to be .

l029b 13

1029b 16-18 The sense of Ka.ea.5i:6 in Which a surface isKa.ea.ti:6 white (Al8, first recipient) is not that required to give the i:C v e:'t'va.L . To be white i s not the essence of surface, for reasons analogous to the above .

1029b 18-22 There was an inconclusive discuss ion of this passage. I select, without great confidence, the following as the main questions arising and points emerging. Outline It seems that in this passage a second sugge stion about surface and essence is objected to ( 182 0 ) , a third suggestion is made and (perhaps ) a consequence -is .thereof drawn ( 2 1-22 ) . , ( I ) .What is the second suggestion? We agreed with M . J . Woods ( ' Substance and essence in Aristotle ' , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 19 74-5 ) against Ross that it is that being white , while not the es sence of surface , is the es sence of white surface . (Ross : that being a white surface is essence of surface . ) ( 2 ) What is the objection to it? One on grounds of repetiton

/ - / or circularity . a.?no = white, npooe:oi: Lv = is in the de finiens as well as the definiendum . What is . wrong with repeti tion? Perhaps snub-type difficulties . ( 3 ) ' What is the third suggestion? Ros s : being a smooth surface is the es sence of white surface. Woods : being smooth is the essence of a white surface

17

I

1.P2!lb 18 NOTES ON ZETA

r d . d "' ' ,,- , ,.. 4!> .. ' ;>" \. ,, C/ -,u11 erstan ing e:nuq:ia.ve:1.'C A:e:uxv e:1.t-va.LL a4:ter 't'o a.ui;o xa. e:v and translating 'being whate .and (therefore) smooth will be one and the same as being a white surface ' . ( 4 ) What is the fate of the third suggestion? (a) On woods ' view it.-.is . allowed to stand, since it is not open to the repetition obgectidn to the second suggestion . It will be ruled out by the succeeding lines wliii@h. deny_ that oU"v17e:i;a. xa.i; i;i; A:A:a.i; xanlYOP (a.i; have an essence . (b) Suppose we read b 21-22 in the more natural way as ; bei\'.}g white and being smooth will be one and the same ' . Is this a reductio of the second suggestion? If so, is this (i) because the conclusion is clearly false , or (ii) because if being white and being smooth _are_the same the objection on the grounds of repetition has not really been circumvented? i . e . if A has been ruled out as the essence of AB , and C = A, there will be the same objections to the claim that C is the essence of AB. There was some support for (ii) ; none was voiced for (i) . Against (ii) it was objected that this line of argument would involve paradox of analy$sis type objections which would prevent anything being the essence, of anything . Consensus on the overall strategy of the passage was not reached . On

i. ,.. ... , .. , / b 19-20 e:v a.pa etc : (i) apa. is difficult , (ii) A:e:yovi;L: a strong sense , roughly define , ( iii) there is use/mention confusion

.,, "' in b 2 0 : the first a.ui;o the expression ' x ' , the second = the thing x.

18th October 1975

1029b 18-20 We started by going back to 19-20 , which sets two ,. conditions for a A:oyoi; stating the essence of something : (i)

" . the A:oyoi; must state the definiendum, not something else , (ii) the definiendum (sc . its name) must not appear in the definiens . With a view to making sense of the a.pa (1029b 19) , we looked for a justification of the 2 conditions in the preceding 17-19 . It was suggested that (i) arses out of 17-18 (being a surface is not being white , i . e . 'white' does not say what surface is at all) , (iil out of 18-19 , read as saying that neither is being a surface being a white surface , because the definiendum, surface , reappears in the definiens 'white surface ' . (n . b . some MS support

7 ,, for aui;nl. This , of course , involves going against Woods ' suggestion 18

CHAPTER 4 1028b 18

(see previous note) that 17-18 says not that ' white surface ' does not give the essence of surface (as Ross and above ) , but that ' white ' does not give the essence of white surface .

We considered, .. in fact, 3 interpretations of the sentence 18-19 : (a ) Nor is it (.!!E_ .being a surface - understood.: subject carried over from previous line ) being a white surface , because it (aCrtil'aDi:n = surface ) .'_ is ::repeated.:..in .the "defJ.nii;ins - the first interpretation described above . (b) Nor is it (.!! being white - subject understood from the complement in previous line , though it was also pointed out that in 17-18

\. "' /5' d . ... , , ,,. Ii' i:o AEUX ELVaL coul be Sub)ect, i:o EnL

If 1029b l'S

I I

NOTES ON ZETA

give the essence o f the subject but which fail to do so for the reasons given in 17-18 and 18-19 respectively. By this test it might seem that (a) fares best, but also that we went wrong in discussing the issue as one concerning examples of definiton rather than of per se predication .

10 29b 21-2 should give an example which does meet the 2 conditions set in 19-20 . What is it? We considered the following: (d) being smooth is the essence of a white surface - Woods ' : view, requirang us to supply ttniaveC A&UKD eva after - alnb Kal rv I Which many found tOO hard 1 but in recompense holding constant the definiendum of interpretation (b) from. 18-19 . (e ) being smooth is the essence of white (shades of Democritus ) - to arrive at this one supposes ( 21 : t?i.i that being a white surface is being a smooth surface (condition (i) is met) , deletes the common factor , surface (to. meet condition (ii) ) , and infers the identity of the remaining factors; white and smooth . But the student is left

, . . to reconstruct the actual AOYO for himself, and he would need to be cautious about generalizing the principle of his inference ( from '4 is 2 doubled' and 14 is 2 squared' it does not follow that ' doubled ' = '.1

CHAPTER 4 1029b 25

breakfast, landmark . note ..

... On KLV.1')01.!G as a category name , see Ross' s

1029b 29 We tended to prefer the .__ ' " "" '?' and took OuO = o LCl L E LV

1029b 30

i ll

NOTES ON ZETA

/ ( 32-3) could not mean a AOYOG consisting o the phrase 'white

man ' . ) No, the fault in (i ) is that the definiendum (white , a3i;o' 31) is attached to something else (man , ((AA 31) in the definiens , while in (ii) the something else (man; f{AAO 33) is attached to it (white , aii; 33 ) in the definiendum. Which of these is u npocr{}toEii.lG! It was dbUbteQ. (but cf . Woods op . ci t pp . 175-6 ) that the phrase imported the concerns of Z5 - , ' ' Lai; Lov is not comparable to snubness , a term such that even when you have said what it is hollowness , you have to add ' in a nose ' . So it must. be explained out of 30-4 itself, and the verb pocruEtcr{}aL occurs in both ( i ) and (ii) (explicitly in 31, understood in 33 ) . Our only suggestion was that ( i ) involves addition be.c.ause .you define more than was set, (ii ) does not because you define less than was set . (This is close to Ross ' s notes on 30 and 31-3) . The, choice between (ii) a and ( ii )b turns on 30a. 12 , which we did not reach . More important, we have not yet reached a . clear picture of Aristotle ' s strategy in this opening paragraph of Z 4 .

Sth November 1975

,.. I" 1030a 2-7 Boni tz ' s insertion of ce in a. 2 and . i;o5E in a 3 seemed unnecessary , but we agreed that in a 3 K should be olllli.tted before AW{;. Here Aristotle assumes that ( 1) a i; ( TYv EtvaL i s a i;65E "t'. L ( a 3 ) : i f something i s the essence of F then being it is just what it is (d'rtEP) for something to be a particular F . : ( 2 ) ' only a subsji.ance' ls '-a' t6aE "t'. L (a 5-6 ) . Given. these we conclude in a 3-5 that something which is such that one thing is said of another (a:AAOU uai; ' &AAOU) is not a

/ ' I" i;o5E "t'.L (because not a substance) The reason . why e . g . J.ai; Lov ( = white man) is not a substance has to be sought in the diffic.ult phrase &AAO uai;' ?i"AAOU. Four possible interpretations of this . were rej.ected in favour of a .fifth which itself turned out to create problems later in the chapte:r:. . ( 1.) 'White man ' involves . a . predication , viz . predicating white of some men. But this would rule out substances too: ' rational' is predicable of animals . ( 2 ) 'White man ' involves a nonessential predication (cf . here a 14 ) But this may also rule out to.o much 1 a differentia predicated essentially of substances might also be

22

CHAPTER 4 1030a 2

predicated nonessentially . (But exampJ.es of this were un-convincing . ) ( 2 ) also depends on understanding somel:hing not in the Greek , viz . ' nonessentially ' . ( 3 ) White is not exclusive to men , so here something is predicated of what is not identical with it. But if substances are not to be ruled out this implies that the genus has to be identical with the differentia . ( 4 ) White is something other than white man (not ) , since some non-white-men are white . This does not rule out substances if we suppose Aristotle to have in mind here his doctrine .of "the. unity qf genus and differentia in the species . So AAO Ka ' AAou = the differentia is not logically equivalent to the species . Doubt was felt about this on the grounds that this confines the subjects of pre-

. . . w dications that are not aAAO Ka ' aAAou to species whereas the doctrine should allow for the inclusion of particulars (in ' Socrates is a man ' etc . ) Also unhappiness. was felt about the

'II ,, fact that while the aAAo = white , the aAAou = white man , given . ,,, .,, . -?, the previous remarks on ouv3ETa. (5 ) aAAO = white and ttAAou

= man , and the trouble is that these are items from different categories . i . e . otiK r{AAO Ka ' AAOU rules out cross category compounds; t J.10'.'T L ov was introduced above as such a crosl"-

' :a ./ category hybrid. The argument would be : it isn ' t an uoLa because only part of it is; something else has been added . This fits better than (4 ) the previous points about definitions misfiring by addition. But it does involve reading a point

'I ?/ about categories into the phrase aAAo Ka ' aAAou . And if it is not to rule out substances it requires that differentiae be in the . category of substance .

C/ . 1030a 6-7 The ooo.E-cd.ause does not follow from what has gone before , bt anticipates the following discussion to Show that only substances can have definitions .

, 1090a 7.:-g A negative point about definitions . It ' s not a ' / " sufficient condition for a OPLOJ.10' that there be a AOYO' with

the same sense as an i'fvo).1a; a single word can always be introduced and stipulated to mean the same as a Ayo, , so there is no guarariteet11at there is anything that the vo).1a defines . VOJ.la here = ' word ' , not ' name ' . The nearest parallel to the use

23

1030a 7 NOTES ON ZETA

. .... of the Iliad example here is An . Post. 9 2b 26ff . ' n IALab ' here is not, contra some accounts , used as an rfvoua stipulated to mean the same as ' MV LV e Loe , eec{ etc . ; it denotes the A6Yob which is the Iliad.

10 30a 9-11 A ( more problematic) positive point about definitions . A AOYOb is a definition if it means the same as

' a word denoting some primary object . Fs are primary if a thing is called an F not C{AAO xa ' &'.S..Aou . So the force of the passage rests on a:'AAO xa< ' e(AAOU again. If it is to be taken as in a 4 , it rules out cross-category compounds like white man . But since there are 8pLoo(, in a derivative . sense , of non-substances , it should here rule out also subjects of c. / ' . --OP LoUOL in non-substance categories . But this gives us an

not one thing (excessively? ) weak sense for npwob , merely : predicated of another .

10 30a 11-17 Aristotle needs to argue here : if anything is primary it is a specie s . But he argues instead : if anything is a species it isn ' t xa

CHAP.TER 4 10 30a 11 -

species are not accidents of things . I f what is ruled out here is (a ) , then we don' t get the required conclusion (c ) , unless a: 6 and a 10 can be taken as ruling out (b) examples . Al terna.,,. tively , ( c ) is not the required conclusion , since (b ) is not ruled out until the following lines on the derivative senses of " / opLaoG . There was inconclusive discussion on whether these lines should be read as ruling out (b ) , or as quali fying a previous ruling-out by ruling (b) back in again in a derivative sense . Two other points : ( 1) genera are not ruled out so far , at least not i f they are species of a further genus . ( 2 ) i f ' species ' i s taken i n a narrowly biological sense then items like numbers , artefacts etc . which have an essence are rather arbitrarily ruled out .

1030a 14-17 Doubt was felt about the syntax of thI!'r sentence. Should i: ( ana (ve: L be excised as an intrusive glos? In the end it .was thought that it could s tand , understood as a

.,,. ' .:S/ ' / nominal;i. za tion of the ph.rase A.e:ye::v i:a aA.A.a i:L anaL ve: L ' . There is-use/iention. confuson. in .i:a aA.A.a : ( i ) things o.f . .

which there is a A.QYOG (ii ) items subdividing into 5vai:a / .>' (;'\ ,,, and A.oyoL . Hence- e:av n ovoa can be read ( i ) ' i f there is _a

name ' , (ii ) ' if i t is a name ' . What are i:a ?!.A.A.a anyway? (A) They are .cross-category compounds , e . g . white man , for which

(.. / / one can give a name ( L.ai; Lov , e . g . ) or a longer A.oyoi;; . The A.6yoi;; L i;boe: i;oe: crrcdPXE L Will presumably say that White is found in man. (B) They are non-substance i tems , and the A.tyoi;; v ' "' c / . oi:L i:ooe: i:oe: unapxe: L will say that for an item to be white , something e . g. smoothness , is found in something e lse e . g . surface .

13th December 19 75

10 30a 17-27 The structure of the argument is two e:p sentences 17-18 , ' 21- 3 : (ai;L is said

' ,,, ,. ' way , therefore so is '? i:L e:ai:L , therefore so Our problem was with the st!!P from the first

made clear by the in more than one also is 5pLa6i;; . to the second .

(Not that the next step could not be queried too, but given that c5pLad'G is defined in terms of the i;( ai:L question , it is intelligible that Aristotle should think that being said

25

IP I 1030a 17

--

MOTES ON ZETA

in more than one way transfers from the definiens to definiendum . ) 18""20 .specifies , without arguing_ for, the several senses o f .

' ,,. ,, o L ecrL , so the only assistance we have for the problematic step is the explanation and analogy offered in 23- 2 7 . One half of the analogy is clear: ,b '8v L is (at least) mis leading as it stands (anA ) and can only be accepted with the qualification added d crL v . But what would be the parallel for noL 6v? What needs qualification to avoid misleadingness , (i ) . noL1iv Ya L , ( ii ) . noL v ta( L , or .( iii) ,'Q no Lv tcrL v :r( crL? Here (ii) was based on reading crL as the main verb in the ti&,e clause of 2 4 : ' so that . noL6v also is wv ,( . To this th objection W

CHAPTER 4 l0 30a 1 7

stem from the derivative or qualified character o f 'White is ' , we were not at all sure how the connection could actually be spelled out . One suggestion was that to say what a man i s is to specify what is when a man i s , whereas to say what white is is not in the same way to specify what is when white is (since i t is misleading to say that white is &n:A. ) , but rather to specify what is a quality of some substance when white is a quality of some substance . But it cannot be claimed that this is evident in the text, and it was objected that the suggestion attaches the qualification in the derivative cases of ' , ( crTL to the ,( rather than the crTL (with respect to quality , the question becomoas e . g . what quality is white? ) and thus spoils the argument from the ways . in which lcrT L is said. Finally we noted that the thesis that ,( CTT L is said in as many ways as there are categories , however it is to be argued for , appears to involve some departure from the doctrine of Top . 10 3b 2 7 ff.

1030a 27-29 On nw!; oe:t A.ty e: cv see Woods op . cit . pp . 170- 1 : it refers pot right back to A.oy Lx!ai; a t 1029b 13 but to the

c. \ immediately preeeaing . remarks to the e ffe ct that opccro!; n:A.e;ovo.xtk A.{ye:To.L i the same reference , therefore , for T A.e:yc5'e:vov Ql0.ve:p6v at 28-9 . n fxe: L re fers forward as far as b 3 . The sense of contrast , as opposed to which sections it refers to , is , however, less clear .

l0 30a 29-32 " on TO 10 30a 17-27 , third

" ""' T L nv e: LVO.L - anticipated above in note on paragraph .

... ,, c 1030a 32-b 6 Two options are rejected, that Ta.oo. are OvTo. o-/ 0 / c/ . wvuWb and that they are so (J)Q'O.UTW!; = xo.a' e; v . The addition-

subtraction option remains , illustrated by the tl'crn:e;p-clause 33-4 and its preferabilij::y e;icplainey .. the lne: C-clauae 34-b 1 . The additi_on aspect is clear enough , but what is the subtraction? Ross suggests that adding a qualification to e:tvaL subtracts from its full . meaning, but this assigns a different type of object to the adding and the subtracting . The same ho.lds if it

IS! is the .implications- of unqualified e; LVO.L which are subtracted. I f , then, linguistic i terns are to be subtracted, the possibilities

27

If 1030a 132 NOTES ON ZETA

are two : (a ) in speaking of a substance ' s xistence one subtracts the qualifications which need to be added in speaking of a qualit ' s existence (so Alexander) ; (b) given ' Socraes is a man ' , one subtracts ' a man' to bring out the way Socrates is . On either, the reference of i;aOa 32 must include substances , which was not so on Ross ' s version . The analogy illustrates qualification by addition: ' ad.d. that it is unknowable ' , as Rhet 1 402a 6 where the example is coupled with crL . n Bv " ov .

l0 30b 6:.. 12 Jaege r ' s insertion of }fvoa . in 8 can be avoided by the usual allowance for use-mention indifference . Will the

" meanings of e v rule out what Aristotle wants ruled out? Elsewhere these meanings include , and do not contrast with, one by continuity and by being bound together . The argument requires some strong favoured sense of ' one ' in each category, excluding e . g . a complex of qualities such as round and red .

l030b 12-13 cnt is hardly j ustified by the immediate ly preceding section , P,E>r indeed by the chapter as a whole , which spent much e ffort countering the thesis now conceded with a mild qualification and no . exp;J.ication . .

lOth January 19 76

1030a J2 ff A different interpretation of these lines was mooted: the addition-subtraction option is different from the ' focal rneaning ' option of 34 . Aristotle is re jecting the two

' " . . "' "' c:. , optio.ns that "t'ClU"t'Cl are ova OIJ,W).!UCJJ!; , and that they are so &aa6"t00l;; ( = xa ' lfv) but with the possibility of qualifying

';' the statement containing & LVClL by addition and subtraction ; his own favoured alternative is then brought in (b 34 ) . On this interpretation lne ( in 34 is adversative , and what follows it replaces , rather than illustrates , the addition-subtraction ppt:hon . (Examples of this usage can be found . ) On this reading t'he addition and subtraction do not qualify the sense of e'tvaL itself, which remains the. Sarl!Ei! , that .in wh.:l.ch s.ubs tances exist; qualifications have to be added to use e'tvaL of the existence of a non- substance i tern . The farnili ar prob lern remains of

28

CPTEI

l0 30b 16 NOTES 01!1 ZETA

to have no , grounds for distinguishing KOLA6nG from AguKcfv as is done in 20ff .

.CHAPTER 5 l030b, 2 8

the first option) . But this gives us

h ,, \ . / Rat er OL).IT) is identical \dth P LG KO LAT) . C:\ / "' C.. \ only the single move PLG OL).IT) = PLG PLG

,, KO LAn . How do we get a regress to infinity (b 35) , and how do we get another Aristotle assume.s

"' / PLG QJ.JJ.!1. turning up (b 35-a l) ? Perhaps that OLJ.lrl1 while not identical in meaning

,,. with KO L AT)1 is implied by it, and can replace it in the , definiens . This accounts for b 35-a l and permits the _

/ .. , ,, replacement of OLJ.ln by PLG KO LAn to proceed indefinitely . Against this interpretation the main points were : ( i ) given the regress , why is it harmful? Aristotle must be given the assumption that definitions are finitely specifiable . (ii ) the sentence b 35-a l has to be used twice over, as showing us how the infinite regress works (which we would not guess from the previous lines ) and as providing a reductio of it . (iii) e:'t o'E: fl at b 35 has to be taken as giving a somewhat

artificial line of thought: i f it is not absurd for these items to have essence s , their having them leads to an infinite regress . But this phrase gave trouble to all interpretations . ( 2 ) The argument i s articulated into not two but three parts . (a) 28:-:30 re jects the option that OLJ.l = KO{ATI (a"' above ) .

,; c;. \ .... . (b) 30-35:.. r!'!Jects the option that OL J.ITI = PLG KOLAT) . For i f s o , then 8t,; OLJ.ln' = p\,; SLG KO(AT) , and this repe tition is absurd (b 34 ) . (c ) 35-6 rejects the option that OLJ.ln = l ,; OLJ.ln, on the ground that this leads to an infinite regress (which on this interpretation is confined to (c) , and plays no pp.rt in (b) .) For the regress all that is needed are the

4\ / , assumptions ( i ) that one can say PLG OLJ.ITI and (ii ) that OLJ.IT) means \,; aLi{. Against this the main points are ( i ) (c) is still puz zling because it makes no use of KOLAn, and there seems no reason why anyone would defend this option . ( ii ) e:t B { at b 35 has to be taken as rejecting any equation of OLJ.lrl and

/. KOLAn , rather than the immediately preceding conclusion . ( 2a) Agrees with the main analysis o f ( 2 ) , but takes (c ) not as a separate piece of argument but as an extra consequence of the principle stated in 30-31 ; OLJ.ltl cannot be said on its own, so every time we use it we should add l,; , but this leads to

' infinitely many uses of PLG A major difference between ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) i s that ( l ) takes the impossibility to be that of

' ./ , """ defining PLG aLn ( reading e: LTtE: LV in b 32 as ' define ' ) whereas 31

l0 30b 28

I' ll

NOTES . ON ZETA

" ,,. ( 2 ) treats the alleged definiendum as TO OLUOV (reading the > ,.., E LnELV as ' say ' ) . l03la 6- ff suggests that both preceding

aporiai have been concerned with TO a Lu6'v, and the point is then applied to terms like ' odd number ' , which are called

,, auvouaouEva. The issue is clouded, however, by the fact that ,, O LUOTnG is introduced at the beginning of the chapter as an

example of a auv5E5uaauefvov. If the second aporia is read as denying the definability of T6 a Lu6'v rather than that of , , ,,.. \ PLG OLn, its ove rall strategy can be read as follows : The first option ( 28-30) rejects the idea that a Lbv and xoAov mean the same . The second option ( 30-35) shows that if their meanings are supposed different we still get an absurdity . C \ .,-( as under ( 2 ) ) . Then (b 35-a l ) no explanation of P LG OLUn

,,,. can be given ; it can be defined if a Lun can be , but the latter . C.\ / can only be explained as PLG a Lun. The message o f the argument

is that i f you try to define TO OLU6v you. will get into trouble with ordinary phrases like 6\G aLun.

l03la 5 ff . How far does Aristotle have to extend his a.rgument here to get the conclusion that only substances can be defined? Apparently he must regard all adjectives as being like ' snub '

in importing a reference to a more basic subject . What happens with sortals is less obvious . But a basic problem here is

/ that often there will be no property analogous to KO LAoTnG : a shape ( in general) which in noses is snubnes s .

7th February 19 76

The thesis to be argued for is given in full at i0 3lb 19 -20 : each thing is identical not accidentally with its essence . The scope of ' each ' here and at l0 3la 1 6 is unrestricted, referring to i terns in the categories genera lly . The most plausible restriction would be to universals , allowing a contrast with the case of Socrates at the end o f the chapter, but that would mean . taking a 20 ' s white man as a universal , in face of the fact that the argument for its non-identity with the corresponding essence turns crucially on a premise

32

CTERS 5 , 6

concerning the identity of a man and a white man (2 2-3 ) ; beside s , white man in Aristotle is s tandardly an example

-io3la is

of substance plus. attribute , and when we get to examples of things said pe.r se , these are introduced as substances such that no other substance is prior to them.

10 3la 16-17 is all that Aristotle offers to explain why the thesis should be discussed at all . The sequel does little to illuminate the motives that might lead someone to take a stand for or against the thesi s . In Z 7 - t 10 32b 1-2 Aristotle says ' By form I mean essence ' , so one might say that Z 6 establishes for later use the thesis that forms at least mus.t be identical with the corresponding essence , otherwise absurdities result .

10 3 la 17-18 . A general observation to the e ffect that thing and essence would seem to be the same (because each thing = its oGa (a , which in turn = its essnce ) , set off against an initial (possib ly also final - see be low on the unclarity

as to Aristotle ' s ultimate verdict) supposition that. the thesis does not hold for things said per accidens (19-20 ) .

103la 21-4 supposition

gives a reductio: that a whi.te man f'

argument in favout- of the the essence of white man .

We were unable to improve on Ross ' s account of -the reasoning ; Suppose they are the same ( 2 1 : Et ab), that i s , suppose ( l ) A white man = the essence of white man . That will

' ' , / ' commit you to the conclusion ( 2 1-2 : xaL o avepc.ince o > ,,.

auo) ( 3 ) The essence of man = the essence of white man . For we have available as second prmise :{24-3 : . aOo ydp

vepwrtoG) ( 2 ) A man = a white man, this being something that anyone will be ready to say ( 2 3 : cpa.aLv, referring to the ordinary man , not a theorist with .an interest in the thesis under discussion) , and ( l ) and ( 2 ) together yield the

' ' 0/ conclusion ( 3 ) (repeated in the waE- clause , 23- 4 ) . So runs the argument in the text, and we are left to suppl- , with Ross , the further premise ( l ' l a man = the essence of man ,. given simply as a further application of the thought behind ( l ) . We must further supply the thought that ( 3)

33

103la 21 NOTES ON ZETA

is absurd and hence ( 1 ) must be re jected.

103la 24-5 . Now comes an objection or reservation to the reductio which in the end we construed, with Ros s , as follows : Perhaps it is not necessary that the essence of accidental unities should be the same as that of the simple terms [ i . e . ( 3 ) , which says that the essence of the accidental unity white man is the same as the essence of, the simple term man, is not a necessary consequence of ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) ] , because the extreme terms [. the extreme terms in ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) , vi z . man and the essence of white man] are not identical with the middle term [white man] in the same way [ i .e . the identity in ( 1) is a necessary one , that in ( 2 ) only accidental and this change of modality ' invalidates the inference ] . But before accepting this account we investigated alternatives : (a) does oK &v

CHAPTER 6 103la 2 5

' perhaps seem to follow' is the identij:y o f a new pair o f Kpa , the essence of white and the essence o f musical , and as the argument for this conclusion .we can supply :

The musical man = the essence of musical man

The man = the musical man) or, _ more simp ly , The ) musical man = ) the white man

The white man = the man -

The ssence of white man = the white man

So , the essence of white man = the essence of musical man

So , the essence of white = the essence of musical

If the trouble before was the reliance on accidental identity , it is not easy to see how this argUJllE3nt improves the situation , and in any case the las t step commits a fallacy of subtraction ( compare : ' To be an equalateral triangle = to be an equiangular triangle , so to be equalateral = to be equiangular ' . ) . We tried anoth_er line : de lete 0:6. in 2 7 , so as to let the conclusion be that the extremes become identical [sc . with each other]

. ,; per accidens , and take the KaL in 2 7 as ' or ' , introducing a ' - '>' second independent illustration on a par with ;;o A.e:uKc.i e: LvaL ...

rather than the two to.gather constituting the new pa; but the essence of white was not one of the previous r1Kpa , so if the Kpa have to change it is. much . . theeasies.t .course to " let them be the essence of white and the essence of musical , and we are back , in e ffect, with Ross ' s reconstruction .

103la 2 8 . c5oite: o'e: off could state ( a ) that the conclusion does not seem to follow, hence the reductio does not work ; (b) that the conclusion seems to be false , hence the reductio does work .

/. ,\ ( a) is recommended by the SE . passage and by c5oEe: Le:v av / ouaLve: Lv in 26 . But i t leaves Aristotle without any argument

standing against the thesis that accidental unities are identical with their essence , and given earlier doubts about whether such

35

10 3la 28 . . NOTES ON ZETA

things have an essence , this is surpris-1.ng.

l0 3 la 28- 3 1 He moves t9 things said per se, taking as the case to work with a class of substances speci fied as substances such that no other substances or natures are prior to them. Thi s specification does , as his more usual specification of subsance as sub ject would not, allow him to include the Forms ; for 103lb 15- 18 points out that i f there are Forms ,

"' ,,. ' these and not the unoKELEvov will be subs tance .

10 3la 31-b 3 , The argument is condiional on es sence being oo(a. , Does this come from 10 3la 18? But that did not mean the essence is a substance , a nature . Rather , it is the .Platonist who will think that is the only way to conceive a separate essence . Likewise , the argument assumes that i f essence i s separate it i s prior, in explanation at least, and hence for the Platonist in being too , a more ultimate ,, . " L5Ea. ( 10 3 lb l) . The argument uses Platonist machinery to extract a conclusion the Platonist will have to accept i f he once says that Forllk and es sence are distinct. But would the Platonist dis tinguish Form and essence like thi s? No indication is given that he would, so that the passage is not a direct attack on the Forms . But there might be an issue between Aristotle and the Platonist i f the ques tion is not whether the Forms are distinct from their essences but whether, i f they exist, they are to be distinguished from what Aristotle calls essence . The argument would be : let the Platonist take his favourite examp le of something said per se ; if he dis tinguishes it from what I call essence he will be in trouble ; so far , then , essences must be identical with the things said per se whose essences they are .

Textual points '(,EP

CHAPTER 6 103lb 3

' .

ehat they a nc>t on'ly df&b4no.t bUt. tiha: assen does. not be long to the Form nor the characte r represented by the Form to the essence ( 4- 6 ; for &noAEAU{vaL as connoting a separation implying non-predicability c f . Phys . 185a 2 8 ) . So strong a divorce is not immediately entaled by mere di stinctness . so, either the argi.unent was to be followed by a complementary one dealing with the possibi li ty that Form. and essence , while distinct, have some sort of marriage partnership , .2.f Aristotle is pi ling absurdi ty on absurdity because he thinks that, if the essences can be shown to become a second lot of o3o(aL once they are dis tinguished from the Forms , this amounts to se tting them up as independent householders on their own , i . e . to the divorce s i tuation .

10 3lb 3-4 It turns out in the seque l that ,(Jv (v = Forms , ' 5 ' = essences . For 9-10 shows the essences are not 't/v,a, 6-9 shows the Forms are not knowab le because they have no essence to be known. The result of divorce is thus that the things that exist are not knowab le , those that are knowable do not exist .

' ' , / 10 3lb 11 ff We adjourned whi le discussing o ayaeov , etc . in 12 : is it still the Form or can Aristotle begin to app ly his identity thesis to his own b fiyae6'v , vi z . that about which, even

,... I / ' ., . / ' though it is nOAAax AeyoEvov , one asks L o ayaeov?

6th March 1976

' > ... ..... /. 1 0 3 lb 11-15 . Aristotle asserts that o ayaeov xaL xaAoV are the same as their essences , and then generalizes the assertion

' ' ... i i over al l xae aua KaL npwa . This nterpretat on presupposes xa in b 13 , but without the insertion tfoa is unintell igible .

'" / " / ( 1 ) Are o ayaeov xaL KaAOV P laton ic Forms? In favour we noted that ( a) pa in b 11 seems to draw a conclusion from a 28-b 1 1 which .was about Forms , and (b) i f they are not Forms they are men and so perhaps not among tba . . .. . . . np@a ( see ( 2 ) ) ; nevertheless we thought it more l ike ly that Aristotle is speaking here in his own person . ( 2 ) What is included in

c.. " " ""' xa.e a.ua xaL npwa? We assumed that the Platonic viewpoint 37

103lb 11

I I, .

NOTES ON ZETA

i s abandoned her iif not before ) . The question was : are non'.'"substances among np&-m.? ( a) On . the one hand . npf:ha might refer to npbEpat. oo(a1. of a 3 0 1 on the other npa might =

c ,. " Ka3 ' aua (Kat. explicative ) , and c f . 10 30a 10- 1 . (b) I t was suggested that in b 22-3 . A.Euxov and o uouot. Kv are examples

' ' ,, 0 " of xaa ou.j3EnxoG A.EyoEva, so not Ka3 ' aua . Against this b 24-8 assert that O A.Eux6'v is the same as its essence when it signifies a ou.j3Enxc!G = n3o i so it is only in its other sense , the white thing , that o AEUKov is an example of a K .

' / . / a . AEYOUEVOV , and the SubJect of onuaLVE LV in b 2 3 and f I / , d . ' , ' re erence of auo in b 24 an b 26 is o A.&uxov , not o K .o .

AEY6u&vov . ( 3 ) What does :Av mean in b 14? E and J read 'a.v . This suggested the sense ' to make a thing F i t is enough if F belongs to i t ' , conveying that ,'b ( x being) ya3ov etc . is

\, ? :>. -no more than o (belonging to x) E LVaL aya etc . (cf . Anscombe and Geach , Three Philosophers , B lackwe l l 19 6 1 , pp . 24- 6 ) . The alternative , with !v uncontcacted, was ' this would be sufficiently established I . ( 4 ) Kav un 1;' g'(on . We . .. considered three interpretations : ( i ) ' even i f they ( s c . o ya36v etc . ) are not Platonic F.orms ' i then they would be

/ / _-r; " na3n , so that na3n would have to be among the rtua , see ( 2 ) ) . ( ii ) ' Even if there are no.t P latoni c Forms ' . The difficulty

with ( i ) and ( ii ) is that the only arguments for the identity of npwa with their essences , a 31-b 11, apparently relied on special features of Forms i but this difficulty arises in any case with Ka\ O'oa in b 13 . ( i ii ) ' Even if they are not (Aristotelian) forms ' i the point would then be that (..:though

.. , some non-substantial Ka3 ' aua are forms) not all Ka3 ' are forms . Against (iii) it was sugges ted that b 15-6

" " > , E t.O L V at. L5Ea t. , ' if there really are ideas ' , may refer to this phrase . ( 5 ) uaA.A.ov 5 I '(o(l)b K({V We were not

" aua g:i'(ng p back attracted

by Ross ' s ' or rather even i f ' ( " Aristotle contemptuously adds" ) , preferring ' and more also i f ' , i . e . ' and even more i f ' . But then we found no easy pas sage between the Scylla that Aris totle ' s arguments up to this point apply only to Forms and the Charybdis that they apply equal ly to non-Forms . Perhaps , if ( i ) or ( ii ) is right under ( 4 ) , Aristotle thought that the price for nonidentity is one which every one should, and Platonists do, regard as excess ive .

38

C;-iAP'l.':o;;t 6 1Q3lb 11

, ' .. ) / 103lb 15-8 , parantheseis . The premiss is e:-Lcnv aL LoEa L , ti:\.e conclusion o;t l'crt"cu 'to f>nc;-:e:l'.'JJ.e:vov oto(a. How does the aryument . 90? We canvassed three interpretaions of aov't"c:t L xa JJ.:3i.:f L v . ( .i) I t rreans ' subjects will exist by cour tesv of their pa:i;tici;,-:ation in :a'ormr:i ' , from whici1 it follows that subjects are not rcp!:i''t"c:t, hence r.ot oo(a.L , A;ainst this (a) the purpose of the arguraent is unexplained , since Platonists

c. / . ,. will not assert that uTto'KE Le:vov is ouoLa (but pernaps they should , ,. f.l,oss) , and if Aristotle is using Platonists to help him show that it is not oOo(a , we need Hal g, L

If l03lb 18

------

NOTES ON ZETA

thing with. its essence .

( ' ' ,, cases Kau nv EK3EcrLv On one view the new way is taking

in the first sense of Ross ' s note on 922b 10 ) . 8, L YE n(cracr3aL explains why this way works . But (a) the syntax then seems to require 8, L YE

CHAPTER 6 103lb 18

interpretation :'(i ) ' -in j:he pa:evious J;l.ote , . ' it is provable .by taking cases also that ' Against the minuted ob jection that this does not explain c:i'cre we suggested ' so that an 8&crLb will es tab lish (the truth of the tf, L claus e , that knowing each thing is the same as knowing its essence , and thereby ) the thesis that each thing is its essence' .

10 3lb 22-8 , parenthesis . This recurs to the subject of l03la 19-28 . Two interpretaions had been canvassed on 6th March 1976 (v. on 10 3lb 11-5 ( 2 ) ) : ( i ) ,6 Ka. cruf3el3nK2>b >..eyoevov is equivocal , as >..euKov etc . are ; . ( i i ) it is univocal , picking out just the non-nctaob sense of A.&UKov etc . Since b 28 asserts that nan are the same as their es sences ( and hence otK &>..nab etne'i':v in b 24 mus t mean ' not unequii!TocalJy' true 'c:to sa:Y-' ) , the dispute affects whether ( i ) some or ( i i ) perhaps no K . cr . >..& yQ'eva. are the . same as their essences . Two things favoured ( i ) : syntax , which seems to require . K . cr .>..eyc5'evov as subject of crna.f ve Lv in b 2 3 arid re ference of a.Oo in b 24 and

.,,, b 26 ; and a 27- 8 , which seems to treat oucrLKO\J and >..&uKov as , . , K .cr .>..eyoeva. even when those words refer to no.an . We noted

that 10 32a 2 is going to identi fy v with i ts essence , even . . , though ev is neither a substance nor a na.aob in some other

category . We a lso noted that the equivocation of . >..&uKtv is exceptional ( Cat. 2a 2 7-9 , wv n>..e (a,oov) and does not extend

' , , e . g . to o 13a.5 L 6ov , where the na.80 is o $a.OL 6& Lv .

103lb 28-1032a 4 . This contains four . subsidary arguments for the identity of thing and essence . ( 1) b 28-30 . The absurdity is said to follow from gi v:ing the essence of x a name , sc . other than ' x ' , as Aristotle presumably thinks. would be required by non-identity . What is t.he .al55Uf'dity? , (i) Ross ' s translation : ' there will be another essence bes ides that of x , e . g . another essence than. the essence of horse ' . (ii) ' there will be another. name besides ' x ' , e . g . another name for-whatit-is- to-be (=for) essence o f horse (sc . than ' horse ' ) ' The difficulties are : ( i ) ' s absurdity doesn ' t require separate names , ( i i ) ' s does n ' t seem absurd . We preferred ( i ) : the absurdity lies in countenancing such a thing as the essence of. the essence horse ; naming draws attention to this consequence of non- identity , by reveal ing essence of horse as an existent , qua lifying. for

4 1

103lb 2 8 NOTES ON ZETA

its own essence . The fact that if.A.A.o = essence in 10 32a 2 also favours ( i ) excised from ( 2 ) b 31-2 .

4 2

CHAPTER 6 1032a. 4

10 32a 4-11 . We discussed two questions . ( 1) Is it implied that S t . t ..,, ... .Q. 1 c. ' "' ocra es is no a npwi:oi; xa.L xa.v p,ui;ov >..i;:yoj.o.e:voi;; ? Ross thought, yes taking the question of Socrates ' s identity with .. his essence as , ' different from , though all ied to ' the chapter' s question -seemingly on the ground that i f sophis tical objections agains t that identity were among the objections against the chapter' s ae:'aLi; there would be no reason to single out that particular identity for mention . But an adequate reason is to secure uptake : the Socrates puzzle and its solution were known to Aristotle ' s audience . We concluded that the passage affords no evidence either way on this question . ( 2 ) What is the sophistical tf>..e:yxoi; about . Socrates? We tried out various candidates , without reaching agreement . ( i ) Ross follows Alexander : if Socrates is his essence and Socrates is white , the essence of Socrates will be the essence of white Socrates . We did not see how to generate from this a puzzle which would cover universals , e. g . man; for ' man is white ' mus t refer to a particular man. . ( i i ) Cf . SE . 16 6b 3 3-4_: ' if ( Coriscus ) is different from Socrates , and. Socrates is a man , Coriscus is different from a man ' ; hence if man is the essenceof:Coriscu , Cori scus is different from his essence . But this only attacks

/ the conjunction of. the chapter' s ae:aLi; with ' man is the essence of each man ' . (iii) .I f Socrates is his essence , and Socrates is white , his essence is white ; or ( iv) if Socrates is . . his essence , and Socrates is the same as the man approaching , then his essence . is the same as the man approaching . These use failure of subs titutivity to discredit identity , and so will have analogues using general terms lik.e ' man ' in pl ace of proper names like ' Socrates ' . Furthermore ( iv) would be solved by the doctrine that accidental identity is not trans itive , SE . 168b 31-5

For Sth May 19.7 6 . Prolegomenon to Z 7-9

Interest was express.ad in raising some general issues about Metaphysics Z7-9 by way of approaching particular texts . So here , in shortened fqrm., are some proposals I once advanced for resolving a set o f paradoxes in .:those chapters together with present reasons for distrusting the proposals .

4 3

ll

NOTES ON ZETA

A . The puzzles are these .

l . Early in Z7 Aristotle says that a man or a plant is an ,1 ,.. ,, , , example of a 1J,Cl.ALOa AEyoEV OUOLac E LvaL ( 1 032a 19-20 , c f .

,._ ... c:. .,.. ,,. ' l0 3 4a 4 ) , and the phrase recall s the ouoLa n KUpwaa E KaL ,.. ,. aA Loa AEyoEvn of Cat . 2a 1 1- 1 2 . " A man or a plant" is soon

echoed in " a plant or an animal" (10 32a 2 3 ) , which trans lators (with the exception of Reale ) standardly construe as specimen references to individuals ( " an animal , e . g . MJW" ) . So it seems that Socrates is still an example of substance in the prime sense of the word . Yet shortly afterwards , without more argument , Aristotle cites not concrete individuals but their

,. " ,. form or essence as npw-n ouoLa ( 1 0 3 2b 1- 2 ) , and holds to this use of otoCa in what follows (l0 33b 1 7 , l034a 31- 3 2 , cf . l032b 3-6 with 1 6 ; so sti l l in Z l O , 10 35b 15 & 26 and esp . ... ' ., ,. 22 & 29 where the ouoa is contrasted with the concrete particular ) . 2 . In Z 8 , 1 0 3 3b 19- 2 4 ( c f . 10 34a 6 ) , A cis totle

. / ' " / argues that the form is not an individual . ( :tOOE l!.liH WPLOEvov) but a such , intrinsically predicative . Yet in the context he has regularly introduced the form as a this (not only 10 33b 13 & 19 but general ly 1033a 28-bl9 construed, contra Ross , as concerned with the possibility of generating form , not matter ; thus perhaps (but not necessarily) excise 060 with Jaeger at 1033a 32 . On this reading , the this that the bronze becomes is the form it acquires ; making this- from- that or this- formin-that is not to make this s impliciter, 1033a 31-b 5 ) . 3 . in Z 8 . l 0 3 3b 22-26 , Aristotle says that what a maker makes (or is making) out of a this (e ; g , this bronze) . is a such (e . g . a phere ) ; but when once i t i s made ( not is being made : c f .

,. . Phys . 20lb 11- 12 = Met .K 1066a 4- 5 ; so o YEYOVO(; ,

l 0 33b 15 ) , i t is a this such , e . g . a particular brazen sphere . But: (a) in this context the form is the " such " , yet Aristotle denies that in making a such one makes a form (1033a 28-b 19 ,

.) recalled in Z l 5 , 1 0 3 9b 2 6- 2 7 , and as something proved Ev AAOLG in H J , 1043b 16-18 ) ; (b) what can be meant by saying

/ "' that a statue once made is a particular thing (ooE TO LovoE ) but that what the s culptor is engaged in making from his material is a sort of thing? Isn ' t the statue he is making

4 4

PROLEGOMENON TO Z79

the same particular statue that finally stands in the studio? The proposal for resolving the puzzles start by answering No to the last question.

B. The thesis .

Roughly and provisionally : a sculptor engaged in making a statue is not making e;ome particular statue , even if ' the end-product is a particular statue ; a seed in the process of becoming a tree is not becomng a particular tree , even if a particular tree is the end-product . (Aristotle seems to call

/ such concrete end-products Y LYVOUEva, 1032a 12-15 , 2 0 , 25-26 , 30-b 1 , b;.11-12 , 1033a 5-6 , b 12-13 , 16-19 , 1034a 9-1 0 ; so yevvtuevov , 1033b 19 , OE L ouv LOTUEva, 1034a 3 3 ; but note

q , u / the proviso oTav yevn

NOTES ON ZETA

report', (As though the problem were met. by saying "'Thftt seed is turning into a tree , namely . . " after mapy yea:&'s " this tree " . ) The point must hold good equally for "was becoming/making" in cases where the e nd-products already exist. If " Bill is/was demold.shing a statue " carries as part of its analys is the timeless ( Ex) (s tatue x & demolishing (Bil l , x)} , ." BilL is/was making a statue " carries no such analysis . This would be wrong if one accepted Vendler s claim (Philosophical Review lxvi ( 1 9 5 7 ) p . 1 4 5 ) : " If I say of a person that he is running a mile or of someone else that he is drawing a circle , then I do claim that the first one will keep running until he has covered the mile , and that the second will keep drawng until he has drawn the circle If they do not complete the ir activitd.es , my s tatement will turn out to be false . " For this would make the importing o f a particular c ircle just as integral to the logic of " I am drawing a circle" as it is to that o f " I am rubbing out a circle " . Elsewhere c A:t.is.totelian p leasures I I Proceedings 0 f the . Aristotel.ian Society . . lxxii (19 71- 2 ) p . 150) I argued :

" Suppose you i nterrupt me when I am drawing a circle ;md the circle is never finishedi i t cannot follow that I was not drawing a circle . For if but the circle- fragment

what I was drawing was not a circle left on my pape r , you did not

interrupt my drawing " . If Veridler were. fond o f centaurpictures he might propose " ci rcle-drawing" instead of " drawing a circle" to cover such cases , and e ven appeal to one of Aris totle ' s favourite examples of xCvna!:: , olx6oona (; . But, all Goodman difficulties apart, Aristotle ' s analysis does not take this short way : 1 0 3 3b 22-24 e t passim . One difference ( there are others ) may be conceded betwe.en drawing a circle

and making a s tatue or becoming a tree . In the latte r cases .process and product can overlap : an unfinished s tatue can be a s tatue , an unfinished circle is not a circle . Aristotle disregards the difference , even in o't.x65ona(; (Phys . . 2 0 lb 11-12) , and there are artificial ways of avoiding it ( "He ' s still

working on the s ta tue he made " , " It ' s become a tree but s till growing" ) . I t .does not affect the point that statements o f the fonn "A is becoming/making a Y" do not carry in thei r truthconditions or entailments any requirement that there must

4 6

PROLEGOMENON TO Z7-9

( timelessly) be some particular Y for A to become/make . Rej ecting the extensional analysis for such statements does not require us to read them as reporting purposes or purposelike ends , e . g . to read "making" as " trying/meaning to make" . Such a reading would indeed j ustify our unwillingness to replace "a statue" or " a tree " in . such_cootexts .);iy .a description true of the actual statue or tree that happened to: emerge ; and perh_aps such cases are at the forefront of Aristotle ' s mind . But the analys is should also provide for unintentional developments or such deviations as Aristotle tries to accommodate at 1033b 33-1034a 2 . .3 . It is natural to say that , whereas " I am/was demolishing a statue " invites the question "Which .statue ? " , with " I am/was making a statue " the question does not arise or i f it arisea. may have ,l'lo answ.ez . But .this needs care . 11 . .Geach" ( i b13lj_eve) pointed o1lt '.that if someone says " Callias is a man" the question "Which man?" would be pointless ; yet patently this could not show that Callias is not a particular man . Suppose then I am at a dogshow and anxious to1 sort out the name s in my cata logue ( I can ' t tell which you tell me that

are of dogs and which of owners ) ; then if Callias

question, Which man is he? is a man I shall still press the

( In fact it is hard to think of circumstances in which " Callias is a man" would be informative but the further question would not col lect more information . ) By contrast , if I say that I have been making a statue this does not enitle you to-. expect that there is any answer to the question "Which statue ? " . I can disallow the question by saying " But, as usual , it came to nothing" . But in default of any answer to "Which ma,n is Cal l ias?" the claim that allias is a man . WO\l.ld fail . (b-) :Gareth Mat--thew points out that even if the. statue-making came to nothing I might have an answer to "Which s tatue?" Statues were commissioned from several sculptors ; my assignment was the statue of .Yehoshua Bar-Hille! for the Philosophy Library . But , first , :the tfUest

NOTES ON ZETA

answering to his description , both que stions could still be raise d . Secondly , i t remains i n any case true that given the truth of " I was making a s tatue " it is a contingent matter that the ques tion "Which statue? " should have or lack an answer, and given the truth of " I was demolishing a s tatue"

. t:h..iS.. , is not so . 4 . Some further points may be cleared by developing an imaginary conversation o f the sort that Aristotle seems to envisage at 10 3 3b 8-26 , l0 34a 5- 8 . ( The reasons for not presenting this as direct exegesis will be obvious . ) Objecto r : Surely the s tatue the sculptor was making is the particular s tatue to be finished yeste rday . Aristotle : Let us be explicit: the particular bronze s tatue that he finished yesterday ':' Then he was making that particular bronze into a statue . Will not this formula satis fy your hankering for the particular re ference? At the same time i t puts the reference where it bel6ngs , outside the purview of

" a statue" . Making this bronze into a statue is like making it into a sphere , which is s imply making it spherical ( l 0 3 3a 32-34) O : But surely if I make ( of or from) this bronze a statue , what I make (of or from) the bronze. is a particular statue ; the expression " a s tatue ": makes . . reference to j us t that statue . A : You will make me repeat my pattern of analys is , and that will give you. a regress . I f to make this bronze a statue is to make it a particular statue , it is to make it a particular Y which is a statue ; and this is j ust to make the particular Y a s tatue ( 10 33b 11-19 ) . O : Then what becomes of your . l ater warni9g that the material components are not to be vested with full parti cularity ( 10 40b 5-16 ) ? Here ( 1 0 3 3b 2 2- 2 6 , 1 0 3 4a . 5-8) you seem to have no qualms on this , and you impl!'z' as much e lsewhere ( 10 35b 30-31 , 104la 2 6-2 7 ) . Let me concede that a lump of bronze o r a pile of bricks is .usually identifiable enough : lumps and collections can be dis tinguished and counte d , though with some familiar hazards that do not bese.t the counting of houses and s tatues . But this last diittinction::.s essential . When : I make. the. lump

into a s tatue I make a higher-order individual , falling under a concept which imposes s tronger conditions of identity and numbering; and this new individual does not bre ak down into

4 8

PROLEGOMENON TO Z7-9

the old individual plus the attribute of s tatuenes s , as the blue article I produce by paints o r dyes breaks down into the original article plus this colour . It is not , as you have put it e lsewhere , jus t an l/J...Ao xa ' 11.AAOU AEybEvov . So to make this bronze into a statue is to make it into a different, because di ffe rently individuated, individua l ; and to this new individual " a s tatue" mus t be supposed to re fe r . A : Certainly , to know what makes something a man is to know how to count and differentiate men : in that sense a man is one man is one exis ting man ( 1 0 0 3b 26-30 , 1 0 5 4 a 16-19 ) . By contras t , to know what makes something blue is not to be able to count bare blue somethings . But to unde rstand the claim that something is/was/will be becoming a man one need not accept that that man could be differentiated and counted among others . One only need know how to count and di ffe rentiate men . " This is becoming a man" is i