building a political settlement: the international approach to kenya’s 2008 post-election crisis

7/28/2019 Building a Political Settlement: The International Approach to Kenyas 2008 Post-Election Crisis

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Kanyinga and Walker: Building a Political SettlementArt. 34, page 2 of 21

2007 Presidential election results, the crisisbroke out in the immediate post-electionperiod. Its impact rapidly spread across East Africa as parts of Kenya, the nucleus for com-munication and economic activity in theregion, were overcome with disorder andinstability, taking both Kenyans and the out-side world by surprise. The local and regionalimpact made it immediately evident thatthis was a crisis that the international com-munity could not afford to disregard. Conse-quently, the African Union (AU), with strong international support, mandated a Panel of Eminent African Personalitieschaired by the former United Nations Secretary Gen-

eral Kofi Annanto lead a mediation pro-cess between Kenyas lead protagonists, theParty of National Unity (PNU) of incumbentPresident Kibaki, and the Orange DemocraticMovement (ODM), the main opposition party of Raila Odinga.

Following 41 days of fraught mediation,the violence finally ceased on 28 February 2008 when Kibaki and Odinga signed an Agreement on the Principles of Partnership

of the Coalition Government. The two par-ties then enacted the 2008 National Accordand Reconciliation Act, which allowed for a power sharing agreement in which MwaiKibaki would remain President and RailaOdinga would assume the new position of Prime Minister; the Government of NationalUnity was formed in mid-April. Shortly after,in May, the mediators secured agreement ona comprehensive approach to address theunderlying structural issues that caused theelectoral violence and which also contrib-uted to the prevailing social tension, insta-bility and cycles of violence in Kenya (KenyaNational Dialogue and Reconciliation 2008:1).1 This instigated a number of fundamentalinstitutional reforms including the promul-gation of a long overdue new constitutionin 2010. 2 Overall, most studies now consider the international communitys handling of the Kenya crisis to have been relatively suc-

cessful (Brown 2009). Although a number of studies have exam-ined how the violence was halted and how

the mediation process unfolded, at presentthere is limited analysis of how internationalactors responded to the evolving politicalconflict and engaged with Kenyas politicalsettlement. More broadly, conceptual under-standing of political settlements has beenrefined substantially over the last five years with contributions from academia (Cole andParks 2010; Jones et al 2012; Khan 2010;Laws 2012) as well as development organisa-tions (DFID 2010a), but the debate remainslargely theoretical with limited empiricalstudies. Consensus has grown around thedefinition of political settlements, whereby they are often defined as rolling bargains

between powerful actors and the dynamicrenegotiation and compromise that charac-terises these bargains. But, discussion of thepractical, operational application of emerg-ing ideas and theory remains limited (Joneset al 2012; Lindemann 2010; Rocha-Menocal2009). International literature on fragileand conflict-affected states and situations(FCAS) particularly emphasises the impor-tance of an inclusive and legitimate politi-

cal settlement (OECD DAC 2011b; WorldBank 2011a), and many OECD governmentsand multilateral agencies have committedto work on this agenda (DFID 2010a; UNDP2012; Ausaid 2011).

Internationally endorsed frameworks andprinciples do also exist that encapsulatemore general good practice for engagementin these fragile situations, such as the OECDDACs (2007) Principles for Good Interna-tional Engagement in Fragile States andSituations. However, studies on how suchprinciples can be applied in practice whenengaging specifically with fragile politicalsettlements are, again, scarce.

The 2008 Kenyan crisis has thus been pur-posely selected to demonstrate how interna-tional actors can work on political conflictsand settlements. This paper is significant asit contributes to current academic and policy literature on how to build political settle-

ments and the role of the international com-munity in this respect. It specifically discusseshow the international community in Kenya


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embraced emerging development think-ing and influenced the Kenyan political set-tlement. This discussion moves the debatebeyond the theoretical, providing insightsinto the practical challenges and possibilitiesthat arise when translating political settle-ments theory into practice. The paper focuseson a number of influential internationalactors (hereforth referred to as the interna-tional community) consisting of the OECDgovernments represented in Kenya by diplo-matic missions and bilateral aid agencies, as well as international multilateral develop-ment agencies. The paper outlines how thiscommunity approached the Kenya crisis and

draws a set of conclusions to guide futureengagement in fragile situations. Particular attention is paid to the structures and meth-ods adopted by the international community to enhance its impact and overcome some of the challenges experienced whilst engaging with Kenyas evolving political settlement.

The paper is based on a wide range of datacollected in the first half of 2011. Intensiveinterviews were conducted with: representa-

tives from the OECD international develop-ment agencies that played a key role during the 2008 crisis; members of the diplomaticcommunities present in Kenya during theperiod of the crisis and mediation; mem-bers of the AU Panel of Eminent Personali-ties; local Kenyan civil society members; andKenyan journalists and academics. This array of interviewees meant that an in-depth andfirst-hand understanding both of Kenyasunique context and of the crisis itself wasattained. In addition, the study has reviewedrelevant reports to improve understanding of how international communities can engageeffectively in fragile situations.

Approaches to Fragile States andSituations: An OverviewDevelopment, diplomatic and defence policy analysts have made significant efforts to bet-ter understand how they can improve their

engagement in situations of conflict andfragility. These efforts respond to the real-ity that 1.5 billion people live in conflict-

affected and fragile states and not one of these countries has yet achieved a singleMillennium Development Goal (World Bank2011b: 12). In fragile states, despite the sig-nificant investment, and the commitments of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effective-ness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action,results and value for money have been mod-est (OECD DAC 2011b: 12).3 Fragile statesand situations require different responses tothose applied in more stable countries.

As understanding has grown amongstdevelopment actors that international engage-ment in fragile situations needs improve-ment, a number of practical guidelines have

been developed. The ten OECD DAC Princi-ples for Good International Engagement inFragile States and Situations (here termedFragile states principles) were endorsedand adopted by OECD ministers in 2007. These are probably the most recognised andrespected amongst the development com-munity. These include: the Basicstake con-text as the starting point, and do no harm;Statebuilding and Peacebuildingfocus on

state-building as the central objective, buildstate-society relations and support the legiti-macy, accountability and capability of statesto provide core functions; prioritising con-flict prevention; recognising links betweenpolitical, security and development objec-tives; promoting non-discrimination; andaligning with local priorities, agreeing coor-dination mechanisms, and acting fast butstaying engaged (OECD DAC 2007: 13).

The 2011 OECD report which monitoredthe application of these principles is aptly entitled Cant we do better? and concludesthat they have not sufficiently influencedchanges in develop ment partners practicesor helped improve results on the ground(OECD 2011c).4 In addition, the WorldBanks World Development Report on Con-flict, Security and Development (2011) alsoemphasises that without legitimate politics,inclusive political settlements and a positive

state-society compact, public confidence ina given political settlement is likely to below (World Bank 2011a). The New Deal for


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Fragile States (OECD DAC 2011b)which wasendorsed in 2011 by many fragile states as well as major bilateral and multilateral devel-opment agencies and civil society repre-sentativesmarks a further commitment by the international community to foster(ing)inclusive political settlements and conflictresolution in order to achieve legitimatepolitics in fragile states and situations(OECD DAC 2011b).

These new approaches towards more effec-tive engagement in fragile states are rootedin a set of new explanations of how develop-ment occurs. Whereas, in the past, develop-ment actors focused narrowly on improving

formal institutions, new approaches focuson informal sources of political power, localinstitutions and power arrangements (Grin-dle 2011). The potent influence of power-ful elites over the developmental trajectory of fragile countries is increasingly seen asimportant (Centre for Future State 2005;Fritz and Rocha-Menocal 2007; OECD DAC2007). Best fit approaches that build on thelocal social, economic, political and cultural

contexts are favoured (Levy 2011). Transi-tioning out of conflict or fragility is recog-nised as long, political work that requirescountry leadership and ownership (OECDDAC 2011b: 1).

These developments recognise that suc-cessful engagement in fragile situations isdependent on an understanding of the localpolitical context. If development actors areto improve their current ways of working infragile states, they must be far more attunedto the political situations on the ground, andto the structural factors, actors, institutionsand incentive structures that shape theseinternal political dynamics. Simply put, they must understand the socio-political and eco-nomic context, and the structural and imme-diate conditions for conflicts (Centre for Future State 2005; Centre for Future State2010; DFID 2010a; Grindle 2004; Grindle2011; North et al 2007; Rodrik et al 2002).

Political Economy Analysis has gained signifi-cant traction as a tool to help practitionersdeepen their understanding of these dynam-

ics and contexts. International developmentagencies are increasingly employing thisframework, recognising that internationalengagement in situations of conflict or fra-gility is a deeply political process.5 The framework enables practitioners to analyse andunderstand how political authority is estab-lished; how economic rents and resourcesare distributed; how power is negotiated; andhow formal and informal rules and patron-client relationships shape political decisionsand environments (OECD DAC 2010). Theseaspects of the framework are importantbecause they have the potential to affect andshape the nature of the political settlement.

For the international community to influ-ence and positively engage with evolving political settlements in fragile situations,it is crucial that they understand the con-text of politics and conflicts. As this paper has already noted, the political settlementsdebate remains beleaguered by questions andgaps. This research takes a much closer lookat howand to what extentinternationalactors can work on and influence political set-

tlements to address conflicts, moving the cur-rent debate beyond theorising and towardsa practical application and understanding of what works, and why.

We now turn to a short analysis of thepolitical economy of Kenya around the timeof the crisis.

Political Economy of Kenya: Fragilityand the Post-2007 Election The crisis that unfolded in Kenya in early 2008 was not solely a reaction to the dis-pute over the election result, but was rootedin long-term, foundational issues that hadremained unaddressed since Kenya gainedindependence in 1963. Kenyas deeply neo-patrimonial politics is one of the most sig-nificant issues. Powerful political elites haveestablished support using state resourcessince independence, causing widespreadgrievances over inequalities and long-stand-

ing perceptions of exclusion in the distribu-tion of resources (Branch and Cheeseman2008; HRW 1995; MacArthur 2008; Mueller


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2008). This patronage had weakened stateinstitutions over many years and, by the timeof the crisis, the Judiciary and Parliament hadlost their autonomy and were largely under the control and influence of the executive. A highly centralised presidency was also a dom-inant feature (Mueller 2008). Trust and confi-dence in key institutions declined further inlate 2005 after the executive weakened themuch anticipated draft constitution. Kenyansrejected this draft by referendum, leaving thecountry with its flawed and much amendedconstitution dating from the colonial era. These long-term political trends created theconditions for political instability.

The prevalence of weak and personalisedinstitutions sparked many contestations(Ndegwa 2008). In 2007, those institutionsthat were crucial for carrying out and over-seeing the political transition were perceivedas partisan and tied to the executiverep-resenting the presidents ethnic commu-nityrather than separate from it (Mueller 2008: 195). Ethnic and regional inequalitiesinfiltrated not only Kenyan politics but also

the society more broadly. Between 20022007, inter-ethnic rivalry and bitterness grew (Barkan 2008a) as the presidency rewardedfellow Kikuyus and the culturally relatedMeru and Embu communities with power and authority at the expense of other com-munities. Kikuyus held a disproportionatenumber of positions in the civil service, anda small group of Kikuyu and Meru ministers,known as the Mount Kenya Mafia, held anoverwhelming proportion of power control-ling the key government departments of finance, defence, internal security, justice,and information.

Although the economy grew consider-ably, with the growth rate rising from about1.0 per cent in 2003 to about 7.0 per centin 2007, inequalities blinded many to thisrecovery. Resentment grew amongst thoseoutside of Kibakis favour amidst deepening perceptions that the Kikuyu ran the country

to serve themselves (Barkan 2008a). Thisethnicisation of politics increased the condi-tions for instability, feeding perceptions that

the outcome of the elections would impactstrongly on issues of inclusion or exclusionfrom the centre of state power and resources(Jonyo 2003; MacArthur 2008; Wrong 2010).

The states gradual but unquestionable lossof control and monopoly over violence in thelead up to the 2007 election also fed into thegrowing conditions for instability. Kagwanja(2001) and Katumanga (2005) point out thatextra-state violence was institutionalisedthrough many parts of Kenya during thereign of President Moi and, later, PresidentKibaki (Kagwanja 2001; Katumanga 2005). Youth gangsoften used by politicians tocontrol and kill supporters of the opposi-

tionslowly took on a life and form of their own and the state lost control over many of them. They began to link up into a networkthat reached out not only across the citiesbut across many parts of Kenyas countryside,acting as what Duffield identifies as a shadow state (Duffield 2001). Politicians and busi-ness elites increasingly employed their ownsecurity squads or private security (Kagwanja2001; Katumanga 2005). As the 2007 elec-

tions approached, evidence of extra-judicialkillings increased and a dangerous culture of violence gripped Kenya.

The features of Kenyas political economy show that the states legitimacy was in jeop-ardy. By the end of 2007, state-society rela-tions were very fragile, while the failings of security and justice institutions left largesegments of the population vulnerable. Thecombination of historically poor governanceand weak institutions, entrenched politicsof exclusion and patronage, ethnicisation of Kenyan society established in the fragile con-text and, then, the highly disputed election,proved to be the spark that lit the tinderbox.

The International CommunitysApproach to the Kenya Crisis: TheFragile States Principles in PracticeMuch of the literature on the internationaldimensions of Kenyas post-2007 election cri-

sis analyses the mediation process, and recog-nises the important role that the internationalcommunity played to avert the intensification


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of civil war and possible state collapse (Kofi Annan Foundation 2009). Several analystshave concluded that the mediation suc-ceeded because the international community spoke with one coordinated voice, pointing to strong collaboration between the AU, the wider international community and Kenyanstakeholders (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009).OECD governments quickly committed them-selves to the AU-led mediation as soon as it was initiated and consequently placed their political influence at the service of its efforts.Our study is an effort to break down the vari-ous strategies and approaches that the inter-national community employed.

We will examine these, drawing on theFragile States Principles to analyse if and how these principles were applied in practice. Weacknowledge that the principles were notexplicitly discussed or referenced in Kenya.However, this discussion contributes to theunderstanding on how the internationalcommunity can engage in fragile situationsand influence political settlements.

Take context as the starting point Understanding the local context when working on political settlements and tran-sitions is a basic principle for good engage-ment in fragile and conflict affected states,as outlined earlier. Looking at the situationbefore Kenyas crisis, some critics point tothe donors lack of analysis and full under-standing of Kenyas historical, political andeconomic dynamics. They say that the inter-national community did not understand theprevalence of informality and neo-patrimo-nialism within Kenyan politics; 6 did not fully comprehend the significance of informalsources of political power. Mueller (2008),for instance, argues that the internationalcommunity focused on formal institutionsrather than on the incentive systems guiding the behaviour of political actors themselvesand the enormous informal power they hadacquired (Mueller 2008: 186). Consequently,

a false optimism developed amongst theinternational community that Kenya was an

island of stability within East Africa (Mueller 2008: 186).

Critics also argue that the internationalcommunity failed to recognise and addressthe growing signs of violence in the pre-election period (Barkan 2008a; Brown 2009).Brown (2009) argues that the potential for political violence during the 2007 elec-tions was very high, yet donors missed thesigns of rising violence in the lead up to theelections, having prematurely consignedpolitical violence to the dustbins of Kenyanhistory (Brown 2009: 2). Drawing on oneparticularly violent outbreak that took placein the months leading up to the election,

Cheeseman describes how the police car-ried out the extrajudicial killings of nearly 500 suspected Mungiki members (Cheese-man 2008: 170). Although the killings werea major signal of violence and tension, theresponse of the international community tothe killings was remarkably apathetic in his view (Cheeseman 2008). The internationalcommunity neither officially recognised therole of the parties to the violence, nor was

there any strong, explicit attempt to preventrecurrence (Brown 2003: 1). The international community did not

have a collective view of the Kenyan con-text. There were several formal governanceand conflict analyses carried out prior tothe crisis by various donors, but these werenot systematically shared, mainly because of their sensitivity. 7 The most prominent formalanalyses were the African Unions AfricanPeer Review Mechanism (APRM) report of 2006 and the Kenya Joint Assistance Strat-egy (KJAS). The APRM report was compiledthrough a participatory approach after the very divisive constitutional referendum inNovember 2005. It correctly forecast there would be trouble if Kenya did not urgently undertake institutional reforms and addressKenyas ethnic divisions, corruption and poor governance. The report specifically notedthat the country remained polarised along

ethnic lines after the referendum, that theprocess of national healing and reconcilia-


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tion is unlikely to proceed as long as society is still polarized and that without addressing past crimes, corruption, marginalization andpoverty, it is unlikely that reconciliation canbe achieved.8 The Government of Kenya had volunteered for this comprehensive assess-ment and did not publicly dissent from itsconclusions. Indeed, the President had toreport back to the AU Council of ministers onprogress against recommendations. However,the report was very lengthy, covering a broadrange of issues, and its impact faded quickly.

The KJAS was produced by donors and theGovernment of Kenya in 2007 in accordance with good donor practice. The strategy was

written specifically to provide donors witha planning mechanism. 9 To some, the KJASprovided a useful starting point for donorsin planning how to respond to the crisisbecause it included a low case scenario in which there could be no business as usual. 10 However, there are those who criticised thestrategy for its simplicity, lack of sophistica-tion and its failure to recognise and addressthe underlying political dynamics and causes

of Kenyas electoral violence.11

Furthermore,in order to get all partners, including the gov-ernment, to agree to publish the document,the political and governance analysis was watered down and made overly optimistic. This compromise resulted in the conclusionthat Kenyas political space was opening upand democratic institutions were becoming stronger. Nonetheless, KJAS had foreseen alow case scenario in which the internationalcommunity would assume a no business asusual approach in engagement with Kenya.

Even where critical analysis did exist, there were two particular problems. Firstly, there was a strong disconnect between analysisand programming, whereby analysis wasrarely used to inform donor programming. 12 Secondly, the analysis notwithstanding, theinternational community lacked institu-tional memory and understanding of the rootcauses of Kenyas electoral violence because

of staff turnover, a common problem whenmost international posts are staffed for three

years on average.13 In particular there wasinsufficient knowledge of the long-standing issues that contributed to the crisis. Issuessuch as lack of institutional reforms, lackof land reforms, lack of transparency andaccountability in the conduct of public affairs,alongside growing youth unemployment andimbalances in regional development, com-bined to contribute to the violence.

However, the international response to thecrisis itself did demonstrate some contextualunderstanding of the causes of the violence. The mediators included Graa Machel, whohad a thorough understanding of these long-term causes of the conflict. Machel had led

the APRM in 2006 and had been prescient inher own analysis that violence would breakout. FCNL argue that as the crisis playedout there was an overt re-focus amongst theinternational community towards under-standing and addressing the root causes of electoral conflict.14 Brown observes that dur-ing the crisis diplomatic and developmentactors were no longer prepared to supportthe political status quo (Brown 2009:1). This

shift was illustrated by the greatly height-ened levels of pressure imposed by interna-tional actors upon President Kibaki to recog-nise the tainted nature of the official results(Brown 2009:1).

In summary, we point out that the interna-tional community lacked a full understand-ing of the context before the crisis. Althoughsome donors carried out critical political andgovernance analyses, they neither sharedthese nor incorporated their findings intotheir programmes. The major collectiveinternational analysis (the KJAS) was watereddown to enable agreement with the govern-ment and so did not foresee signs of trouble. The APRM report of 2006 had flagged deep-ening ethnic divisions and warned of dan-ger if the country did not undertake funda-mental reforms, but was then forgotten andignored. However, when the crisis broke, theresponse demonstrated clear understanding

of the root causes by the mediation team, which included the NEPAD reports lead


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author, and the international community quickly updated and shared their analysis, which was by then much less sensitive.

Do No Harm A Unifed and Legitimate International Response The Fragile States Principles do not explicitly point to a unified international approachand legitimacy is implied. However, therecent New Deal for Engagement in FragileStates underscores the need for an approachthat emphasises a unified response andimplementation by following one visionand plan. The Fragile States Principles dorecognise that international interventions

can inadvertently do harm and that interven-tions should be harmonised and graduatedin order to mitigate this. During the Kenyacrisis, the international community didcome together and act in a unified manner. They spoke with one voice and collaborated jointly with the AU panel of mediators. Thecrisis brought together actors and stakehold-ers from across the world, united in their purpose and determination to ensure Ken-

yas blazing fires were put out. The literaturepoints out that the role played by the AUPanel under Kofi Annan and the wider inter-national community was invaluable. Cohen,for example, states that the political settle-ment was reached as a direct result of thissupport (Cohen 2008). To some, the media-tion succeeded primarily because the inter-national community spoke with one united,coordinated voice and adopted a politi-cally oriented approach (Lindenmayer andKaye 2009). This unity of purpose and thestrong collaboration between the AU, the wider international community and Kenyanstakeholders was mentioned by a number of interviewees15 as well as in the literature(Barkan 2008b).

OECD governments and donors agreed tocommit themselves to the AU-led mediationas soon as it was initiated and consequently placed their trust, confidence and political

commitment at the service of the AU.16

Thisstrategy undoubtedly maximised the lever-age of the international community over the

dialogue process. Annan and his team rep-resented the strong lead the internationalcommunity had been waiting for, behind which they could consolidate and apply their support, clout and pressure. 17 Thisunity of purpose allowed for the mobilisa-tion of resources and support to the variousphases of the mediation, a point corrobo-rated in the literature (Brown 2009; Cohen2008; Kofi Annan Foundation 2009; Linden-mayer and Kaye 2009) and by interviewees.18 The leadership of the African Union and theappointment of the highly respected Mr. Kofi Annan through the Panel of Eminent AfricanPersonalities also greatly deepened the legiti-

macy of the entire mediation process. 19 Fromthe outset, Annan underscored the needfor unity of purpose and he insisted thata condition for him taking part and leading the mediation was that his team would bethe only team mandated to coordinate theeffort.20 Our research confirmed that therobust, uncompromising stance put forwardby Annan was critical and became the foun-dation upon which the international com-

munity could consolidate. It also preventedpolitical elites on either side of the bargain-ing table from window-shopping for a medi-ation process that may appear more favour-able to them. 21

It is clear that the international commu-nity collectively recognised the need for themediation to be an African-led effort and they put their efforts behind it. 22 It also quickly adopted the strong stance of no businessas usual towards the Kenyan government. 23 Fortunately, this low case scenario had beenagreed by the Government of Kenya anddonors in the KJAS just one year before, andit played out primarily through the suspen-sion of on-going development programmes whilst bringing in new humanitarian andmediation support. Crucially, although theamounts of money suspended were relatively insignificant, this move received high public-ity and was an important signal of serious-

ness and concern amongst the internationalcommunity to the Kenyan public, the media,foreign and domestic investors and wider


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international audiences. 24 It thus acted as apowerful signal to Kenyas political actorsthat important international players were nolonger prepared to accept the status quo. 25

By adopting each of these approaches theinternational community was able to work with great legitimacy on the political set-tlement in Kenya. Embracing this united,politically-oriented approach meant it wasable to enhance its leverage and confrontsome of the operational constraints posedby working within such a politically-troubledenvironment.

Coordination and Collaboration:

Mechanisms and Linkages The Fragile State Principles highlight theneed for agreement on practical coordina-tion mechanisms between internationalactors and the need to recognise the linksbetween political, security and developmentobjectives (OECD DAC 2007). The existing international coordination mechanisms wereemployed during and after the crisis, ramp-ing up their efforts significantly as the crisis

played out.26

These mechanisms, which willbe outlined below, were used to coordinateboth strategy and resources, including fund-ing and expertise. Interestingly, the linksbetween political and development objec-tives were explicitly recognised in a formalcollaboration mechanism, but security links were less explicit.

The Donor Coordination Group (DCG) con- vened the major OECD international donors(many of whom were also in diplomatic rolesand headed in-country by ambassadors).Set up in 2004, one of the DCGs aims wasto streamline donor coordination (Zeeuw 2010: 16). The DCG had spearheaded the2007 Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy and,during the crisis, it was the most significantdonor mechanism. The DCG represented themain forum for the discussion of appropri-ate donor responses. For example, the nobusiness as usual approach was agreed by

this group and it became the mechanismthrough which Kofi Annan, and later hisrepresentative Ambassador Nana, were able

to convey mediation progress and mobiliseinternational support. 27

To coordinate donor activity, the DCGhad already set up seventeen sector work-ing groups, the membership of each com-prising specialists from the various donors. The Democratic Governance Donor Group(DGDG)28 is one that had been meeting regu-larly before the crisis. Several donor agen-cies commented that during the crisis theDGDG became particularly critical for flex-ibly coordinating efforts. 29 The group rap-idly responded to the crisis meeting muchmore frequently, even on a weekly basis, atthe height of the crisis. The group shared its

own and external information and analysis widely and it took on technical liaison withmediation staff and funders, and it encour-aged joint decision making and coordina-tion with Kenyan domestic groups. 30

The DGDG also created a new conflictsub-group which, among other remits, ledon coordination and liaison with the Com-mission into the Post Election Violence,established under the mediation to inves-

tigate and make recommendations on thepost-election violence. 31 Other existing sub-groups included: an Elections Group whichliaised with the Independent Review of theElections and influenced and funded sub-sequent reforms; Governance, Justice, Law and Order and Public Sector Reform Group, which suspended joint government-donor programmes during the crisis; and a CivilSociety Group that mobilised funding for civil society organisations. The groups sharedresponsibilities among members so as toensure efficient operation and fast responseto arising issues. Each sub-group was chairedby different donors, sharing the workload. In2009, when the Constitutional Commission was underway but needed unexpected andrapid funding, the DGDG spotted the gapand organised a joint process with UNDP tothe appreciation of the Vice Chair. 32

Another important body was the Like

Minded Partners Political Group (Limid-P).33

Made up of political counsellors from like-minded countries including US, Canada,


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many EC countries, Japan, Mexico and Swit-zerland. This group met frequently during the crisis.34 Quickly registering the need for increased efficiency and coordination giventhe complexity of the crisis and emerging solutions, Limid-P and DGDG co-chairs estab-lished a formal collaboration and division of labour to pool resources, choose which exist-ing technical groups would be best to leadon which initiatives, and share informationacross the political, development and gov-ernance spheres (Limid-P and DGDG 2008:1). This ensured a very close relationshipbetween political and development actors.In the past, the international community

had often handled politics and developmentas different portfolios, sometimes withoutreference to one another. This was arguably a problem with the pre-crisis support to elec-tions. International actors now recognisedthe importance of not only understanding the technical governance issues at hand,but also of being attuned to the politicaleconomy dynamics that were shaping andunderpinning Kenyas political context at

the time.35

The rapid strategic collaboration outlinedabove was replicated with funding efforts,particularly for the mediation. On behalf of the donors, the United Nations Develop-ment Programme (UNDP) set up a multidonor trust fund (MDTF) for the mediationprocess, into which all donors were able topay and pool resources. The Funds managersadopted a flexible approach and delivered arapid response to the crisis. 36 UNDP regardedit as a priority and assigned significant num-bers of staff to manage and administer it. 37 It was also very easy for donors to pay intothe fund as most already had accounts setup with the UN and many donors quickly committed their contributions. 38 Facilitating common reporting and joint monitoring of finances amongst the donors, the MDTF rep-resented a positive example of coordination which responded efficiently to the crisis. 39

The existing donor and diplomatic coordi-nation mechanisms were critical to a coordi-nated rapid and effective crisis response. The

international community used its structuresand staff efficiently and divided labour, ensur-ing that the hugely increased workload wasshared across the political and developmentcommunities. Importantly, it quickly adjustedto coordinate work on conflict preventionand the critical new constitution process.

Prioritising Prevention and Staying Engaged The Fragile States Principles indicate thatconflict prevention requires acting fastbut staying engaged to focus on long-termissues, looking beyond quick-fix solutionsto address the root causes of state fragility

and strengthening indigenous capacities toprevent and resolve conflicts (OECD DAC2007:13). While it is important to act rap-idly and flexibly in fragile situations, inter-national engagement must also focus on thelong-term. The fastest institutional trans-formations have taken a generation (WorldBank 2011a).

In Kenya, the mediation panel acted fastand prioritised prevention of further vio-

lence. The Kenya National Dialogue andReconciliation team was established with abroad mandate to negotiate how to end the violence and move the country forward (Kofi Annan Foundation 2009). However, themediation team also looked beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of the violence, producing an agenda or Road Mapfor the dialogue. This ensured the mediation was tackled in a sequence of manageablesteps.40 The road map was set out soon after the mediation talks started on 1 February and was divided into four Agendas: AgendaOne focused on immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental humanrights and liberties; Agenda Two focused onimmediate action to address the humanitar-ian crisis; Agenda Three aimed to overcomethe short-term political crisis; and AgendaFour dealt with the long-term, underlying issues that had caused the violence (Kofi

Annan Foundation 2009: 10). By breaking down the huge list of tasks at hand into four areas with the most contested and difficult


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issues to be addressed coming last in the list the mediation panel cleverly ensured thatthe negotiations started on a positive, con-structive note. 41 All agreements and time-lines were swiftly publicised throughout thedeveloping process, providing everyonetheKenyan public, the international commu-nity and Kenyas political playerswith aclear framework and indicators of successto work with. 42

When the National Accord and Reconcili-ation Act was signed on 28 February, there was not clarity on the flawed election andthe ensuing violence, let alone what reformsshould follow. Yet, on 4 March, an agreement

was reached on the most critical processes:a new constitutional process; an independ-ent review of the elections; a Commissionof Post-election Violence; and a Truth, Jus-tice and Reconciliation Commission. Other Agenda 4 items were not finalised until astatement of principles on 23 May and animplementation matrix on 30 July. Througha systematic approach to the crisis, violenceended, but there would still be a further pro-

cess of agreement, enquiry and follow upalllaid out publicly in the media.In the view of many people interviewed in

this study, the mediators achieved an insur-mountable amount in bringing the violenceto an end after forty-one days of fraughtmediation, something that would never have been achieved without the presenceof Annan and the wider international com-munity.43 The United Nations involvementenhanced the leverage of the mediationprocess especially because of the clear andunconditional statements of support by theUN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon for the work of Annan.44 However, the internationalcommunitys unified backing, both throughpublic support and funding and throughbehind-the-scenes pressure, ensured thatthe process stayed on track through the six months of agreements, longer enquiries andsubsequent reforms. 45 The mediation pro-

cess did not lose sight of the bigger picture,retaining a focus on the long-standing issuesunderlying the crisis.

Agreement amongst Kenyas political eliteson Agendas One and Two had been fairly unanimous, but negotiations around Agenda Three became tense and bitter, as there wasso much to lose by agreeing to share power by including the other party. 46 Althoughpower-sharing was increasingly seen asthe most probable solution, the mediationslowed down. Annan and the internationalcommunity used a number of techniquesto encourage the principals to move forward quickly and to agree to share power.External politicians and technical expertsprovided clarification on intricate, techni-cal issuessuch as grand coalitionsto the

negotiators, helping inspire confidence fromneutral experts. 47 Indeed, Annan invited the Tanzanian President, Jakaya Kikwete, intothe mediation process so that he could sharehis direct experiences of power-sharing gov-ernment and show the negotiators that whatfelt like unchartered territory had actually been tried and tested successfully, elsewhereby a neighbour (Kofi Annan Foundation2009: 12). This enhanced the legitimacy and

influence of the mediation team (Kofi AnnanFoundation 2009).Some countries were able to use further

pressure to ensure that the negotiationsmoved productively. They put pressure onthe negotiating teams through threats of travel bans to elites who were thwarting themediation or were seen to have incited vio-lence. This threat had been used previously in Kenya to handle those suspected of cor-ruption. Given that many elites have educa-tional, financial and property links overseas,it was an effective influencing tool.

The national dialogue and the mediationin particular made substantial progress. There were clear gains brought about by thesupport of the international community.However, as everyone began to implementthe agreement, it became evident that sig-nificant gaps remained. There was, for exam-ple, no coherent strategy in place to outline

exactly how the coalition government wasgoing to function and how power was to beshared between the two principals. 48 Indeed,


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even the most basic modalities such as how decisions are taken, how the two principalsshould work together, how often they shouldmeet, what level of power would be com-manded by both, and at what point are their decisions binding were not defined during the mediation process. 49 This meant that thepresidency remained highly centralised andthe Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, was left with an incredibly small amount of power.

Although the international commu-nity does not always act fast, when Kenyabroke down into violence, rapid action wasrequired with no clear game plan. Interna-tional actors had to be flexible, take risks and

seek rapid funding mechanisms to supportemerging opportunities. There were contro- versies among development actors. Somechose less risky strategies, earmarking their funds to the MDTF or avoiding controversialissues.50 Some adopted politically risky strat-egies, separately funding the Kenya NationalCommission on Human Rights (KNCHR) toconduct early investigations of the violence. This has paid off: the investigations pro-

vided some evidence on the nature of the violence and subsequent investigations tendto use these findings for further investiga-tions. Some argued that donors should notsupport the constitutional review process,given that Kenya had already had the worldsmost participatory and thorough process.But, when credible experts were appointedand government funding had stalled, severaldonors chose to support it collectively againthrough the MDTF. 51 This fund had the addi-tional benefit of ensuring that donors couldstay jointly focused on core issues and influ-encing rather than wasting their and part-ners time establishing new individual andparallel funding mechanisms. 52

The international community acted fast,looking for mediation options at the startof the process, and then mobilising supportand funding behind the best solution andits processes whilst maintaining pressure for

rapid conclusions to the commissions. Themediation team was able to ensure long termengagement by agreeing the Agenda 4 pro-

cess and the international community wasable to use Agenda 4 reforms to maintainpressure to deal with the long term causes of the conflict. In effect, the international com-munity influenced the political settlement,backing the mediation strategy of prioritis-ing prevention of conflict by looking beyondquick fix solutions and by acting fast butstaying engaged.

Focus on Statebuilding Statebuilding is sometimes a misunderstoodterm. The OECD DAC guidance on statebuild-ing defines it as an endogenous process toenhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy

of the state driven by state-society relations(OECD DAC 2011a: 2). There are thus limitsto what the international community can do. The Fragile States Principles place it as a cen-tral objective because states are fragile whenthey lack the political will or capacity to provide the basic functions of poverty reduction,security and human rights. The principlesalso include promotion of non-discrimina-tion as a basis for inclusive and stable soci-

eties and stress the importance of aligning with local prioritiesideally government-ledbut also with a range of national stakehold-ers. The question we address here is: how didthis play out in Kenyas post-election crisis?

The mediation team recognised that thepost-election violence was not the first occa-sion of electoral violence in Kenya and thatit would not be the last unless some of thelong-term structural statebuilding issues were addressed. The violence in particular laid bare important characteristics of theKenyan state. Kenya is a multi-ethnic society,comprising about 42 groups but no group isnumerically large enough to dominate oth-ers. The country uses a majoritarian electoralsystem, which has meant increased mobilisa-tion of political support along ethnic appealsespecially by elites from the principal eth-nic groups. Parties and alliances form andbreak along ethnic lines. This sometimes

leads to violence because the principal faultlines in politics follow ethnic divisions. Alsoshifting alliances among the principal five


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Recognising these limitations, from early 2009 onwards the DGDG worked to extractand agree upon the most important priori-ties and used these to facilitate dialogue onreforms with the government. 59 In July 2009the revised matrix was presented to the DCG,and consequently used by the DCG to dis-cuss progress during the Kenya ConsultativeGroup (KCG) meetings with the government. The KCG was the key forum for Kenyas devel-opment partners and the Government. Com-menting on these meetings, a leading donor and ambassador outlined that the donorsdrew on the matrix many times to informtheir discussions with the government. 60

Our research found that, by early 2010,donors had agreed that the Coalition govern-ment was facing too many challenges andthat they should reduce political pressureand return to a more overtly developmentalagenda.61

The international community thus col-lectively chose to adopt an explicitly less political approach at this moment in time.Indeed, this was a fragile and sensitive politi-

cal period for a weak coalition government,and the international community began tofocus more on bilateral relations again. Allthe same, developing an agenda for solutionsfor long standing issues was an importantachievement. The international community was in a relatively strong influencing posi-tion, and this was an opportunity to ensurethat Kenyas political players adopted astrong reform agenda that touched on many aspects of state building. In particular, theseincluded constitutional and institutionalreforms and attention to national cohesionand unity. 62

During the mediation process, both theEminent Panel and the broader interna-tional community paid great attention toand spent time listening to and working with Kenyas domestic stakeholders. The civilsociety activists and business community spoke out loudly and at times jointly calling

for an end to violence and a peaceful, justagreement. Donors were able to quickly backKenyan organisations to work on humani-

tarian issues, peacebuilding, investigationand analysis of violence and lobbying. They supported new groups, such as Kenyans for Peace Truth and Justice (KPTJ)63 and its obser- vations that peace without justice wouldprove transitory and would not address thelong-term issues. This group underlined thatsecuring peace while not holding perpetra-tors of violence to account would mean thatfuture violence was inevitable. The views of this group effectively supported the princi-ple of focusing on statebuilding as a centralobjective and pushed the international com-munity to pay more attention to the long term-causes of violence.64

Notwithstanding, findings reveal thatinternational funding was not easily avail-able to all domestic groups who were coor-dinating efforts to press the two parties tothe negotiating table. This was particularly true for less recognised, smaller civil society groups. 65 Donors did attempt to use an exist-ing multi-donor fund, but there were many complaints that this was slow and cumber-some. This may have marginalised some

local mediation efforts and even reducedinternational leverage. In the future, donorsmust look much harder for flexible andrapid support mechanisms in such crisissituations. However, in general, the inter-national community was very supportive of the strong, outspoken and respected Kenyanactivists who also carried considerable pub-lic support.

We argue that the international commu-nity focused on statebuilding for at least two years post-crisis, building on agreementsunder the National Accord. The statebuild-ing reforms proposed in Agenda item 4 weremore problematic given their exhaustive andunprioritised nature, but the internationalcommunity usefully identified priority areasto focus on with the Kenya government. The views of Kenyan domestic actors wereheeded and they were often funded to gather information and to take action, although

funding could have been more flexible andrapid. However, the international commu-nity became uncomfortable with such a


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strong political approach and chose to revertto technical development programmes and agreater focus on bilateral relationships after two years. Given that many of the causes of the conflict were long-standing, both in their existence and in finding lasting solutions,this may not have been advisable.

Conclusion The scale of Kenyas post election crisis sur-prised the world. Few, if any, expected thatKenya would implode into such a violentand widespread conflict over elections. How-ever, as we and many others have observed,Kenyas political settlement was very fragile.

The international communitys responsehelped turn the crisis into an opportunity for long term reforms and to shift the exist-ing political settlementan essential ingre-dient if conflict-affected countries are toescape cycles of violence. Even though it wasnot recognised at the time, the internationalcommunity followed good practice and our research shows that it inadvertently appliedthe OECD-DACs Principles for Engagement

in Fragile States. Our research points to twoother important principles emerging fromthis case study: a unified and legitimateresponse. These principles should be usefulto others working on a political settlementin a fragile state.

Firstly, the international community quickly revised its understanding of the Kenyan con-text, shocked into this by the crisis. Althoughthe research found that the internationalcommunity lacked a full understanding of the context before the crisis and had a weakand inaccurate joint analysis, the responsedemonstrated a clear understanding of theroot causes by the mediation team and by the international community. Most organi-sations quickly updated and, in some cases,shared their analyses.

Secondly, the international community approached the crisis with a unity of purposeand a highly legitimate response. It adopted

a strong stance of support for the AU-ledmediation and deferred to Kofi Annans lead-ership. Collectively, it developed an unwaver-

ing position of no business as usual and wasprepared to embrace a more politically- risky strategy than in the past, publicly halting some joint donor development programmes.

Thirdly, the international community usedits existing donor and diplomatic coordina-tion mechanisms very effectively to respondto the crisis, enabling it to collectively pres-sure for agreed reforms and to support thenew constitution. Collaboration betweenpolitical and development agencies provedcritical. The UNDP MDTF represented an effi-cient and practical coordination mechanismof support to the mediation process andassociated commissions: all donors were able

to pay into the fund rapidly and with ease.Fourthly, the international community

acted quickly to prioritise conflict prevention,mobilising support and funding behind thebest mediation solution whilst keeping pres-sure on for rapid conclusions to the enquiry commissions. The mediation team was ableto ensure long-term engagement through the Agenda 4 process, keeping a representativein place and providing regular monitoring.

The international community was also ableto build on that process, at least until early 2010, by maintaining pressure on negotiat-ing parties to deal with the long-term causesof the conflict.

Lastly, the research found that the inter-national community did focus strongly onstatebuilding for at least two years post-cri-sis, listening to Kenyan voices and its owncontextual analysis. However, the decision topursue technical development programmesand reduce the focus on political reformsmay not have been correct, given the deeply-rooted issues in Kenyas political economy that caused the last crisis. This suggests theneed for persistent engagement by the inter-national community in long-term structuralstatebuilding issues if we are to begin toaddress the deep-rooted causes of conflictsthat make political settlements fragile. Con-tinued engagement in statebuilding issues

after every election would establish a strong foundation for sustainable peace and demo-cratic governance.


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Notes 1 The mediation agreement recognised that

poverty, inequitable distribution of re-sources and perceptions of historical in- justices and exclusion on the part of seg-ments of the Kenyan society constitutedthe underlying causes of the crisis.

2 Before the violence, there had been sev-eral unsuccessful attempts to make a new constitution and this was therefore animportant success.

3 The Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness(2005) lays out the practical strategies for improving the quality and impact of aid while the Accra Agenda for Action (2008)

seeks to deepen and accelerate the imple-mentation of the Declaration.

4 In the thirteen countries under review, in-ternational engagement was partially or fully off-track for eight out of ten of theFragile State Principles.

5 Early examples include: the Swedish In-ternational Development Agencys (SIDA) work on Power Analysis, developed tobetter understand the informal politicallandscapes, including rules and struc-tures of the countries within which SIDA works (ODI Website); DFIDs Drivers of Change programme; the Dutch ForeignMinistrys Strategic Governance and Cor-ruption Assessment (SGCA). Other exam-ples of political economy based frameworks include the World Banks (2007)Tools for Institutional, Political and So-cial Analysis of Policy Reform; DFIDs(2009) Political Economy Analysis How To Note; Fritz, Kaiser and Levys (2009)Problem Driven Governance and PoliticalEconomy Analysis. Pooles (2011) Politi-cal Economy Assessments at Sector andProject Levels. DFID has also producednumerous policy and practice papers which place the issues of informality,power and politics at the very forefrontof their thinking including DFID (2010)Building Peaceful States and Societies;

DFID (2010) What Really Works? Lessonsfrom 10 Years of Research on Governance

and Fragile States; DFID (2010) The Poli-tics of Poverty.

6 Interview with Director of Kenya HumanRights Commission, Nairobi, 23 May 2011.

7 Interview with Senior Peace and Develop-ment Officer, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 12May 2011.

8 African Peer Review Mechanism (2006)Country Review Report of the Republicof Kenya.

9 Interview with Governance Adviser, Do-nor Agency, Nairobi, 10 May 2011.

10 Interview with Deputy Head, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 25 May 2011.

11 Interview with Ambassador of Diplomat-

ic Mission, Nairobi, 23 June 2011. 12 Interview with Former Permanent Secre-

tary and Prominent Kenyan Civil Society Leader and Political Activist, Nairobi, 23May 2011.

13 Interview with Executive Director, Lead-ing Civil Society Organisation, Nairobi, 20May 2011.

14 Interview with Executive Director, Lead-ing Civil Society Organisation, Nairobi, 20May 2011.

15 Interview with Kenyan Journalist, Nairo-bi, 10 May 2011.

16 Interview with Officer, African UnionPanel of Eminent Personalities, Nairobi,24 May 2011.

17 Interview with Conflict Adviser, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 13 May 2011.

18 Interview with Kenyan Journalist, Nairo-bi, 10 May 2011.

19 Interview with Executive Director, Leading Anti-Corruption Civil Society Organisa-tion, Nairobi, 18 May 2011; Interview withSenior Peace and Development Officer,Donor Agency, Nairobi, 12 May 2011.

20 Interview with Kenyan Journalist, Nairobi,10 May 2011; Interview with Deputy Chair-person, Committee of Experts on Constitu-tional Review, Nairobi, 19 May 2011.

21 Interview with Ambassador of Diplomat-ic Mission, Nairobi, 17 May 2011.

22

Interview with Governance Adviser, Do-nor Agency, Nairobi, 18 May 2011.


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23 Interview with Ambassador of Diplomat-ic Mission, Nairobi, 23 June 2011.

24 Interview with Reporter, Journalist andFilmmaker, Nairobi, 26 May 2011.


26 Interview with Programme Analyst, Dem-ocratic Governance Unit, Donor Agency,Nairobi, 19 May 2011; Interview with Po-litical Adviser, Diplomatic Mission, Nai-robi, 13 May 2011.

27 Interview with Country Director for theEast Africa Region, Multilateral Organi-sation, Nairobi, 22 June 2011; Interview

with Deputy Head, Donor Agency, Nai-robi, 25 May 2011.

28 The DGDG is composed of the govern-ance technical leads in those bilateral,multilateral and international non-governmental organisations present inKenya and its principal remit is to ensureconstant policy dialogue on strategic sec-toral issues.

29 Interview with Programme Analyst, Dem-

ocratic Governance Unit, Donor Agency,Nairobi, 19 May 2011; Interview with Gov-ernance Adviser, Donor Agency, Nairobi,18 May 2011.

30 Interview with Team Leader, DemocraticGovernance Team, Donor Agency, Nai-robi, 21 May 2011. The DGDG met for in-stance with Concerned Citizens for Peace,a domestic group comprising Kenyans with experience in peace building.

31 Interview with Governance Adviser, Do-nor Agency, Nairobi, 18 May 2011.

32 Interview with Senior Lecturer in Africaand the Politics of Development, Univer-sity of Leeds, Nairobi, 20 April 2011.

33 Interview with Political Adviser, Diplo-matic Mission, Nairobi, 13 May 2011;Interview with Conflict Adviser, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 13 May 2011.

34 Interview with Political Adviser, Diplomat-ic Mission, Nairobi, 13 May 2011; Inter-

view with Conflict Adviser, Donor Agency,Nairobi, 13 May 2011.

35 Interview with Conflict Adviser, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 13 May 2011; Interview with Senior Peace and Development Of-ficer, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 12 May 2011.

36 Interview with Ambassador of DiplomaticMission, Nairobi, 17 May 2011; Interview with Conflict Adviser, Donor Agency, 13May 2011.

37 Interview with Senior Peace and Develop-ment Officer, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 12May 2011.

38 Interview with Ambassador of DiplomaticMission, Nairobi, 17 May 2011; Interview with Senior Peace and Development Of-ficer, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 12 May 2011.

39 Interview with Ambassador of DiplomaticMission, Nairobi, 17 May 2011; Interview with Senior Peace and Development Of-ficer, Donor Agency, Nairobi, 12 May 2011.

40 Interview with Country Director for theEast Africa Region, Multilateral Organisa-tion, Nairobi, 22 June 2011.

41 Interview with Senior Staff Member, Afri-can Union Panel of Eminent Personalities,Nairobi, 24 May 2011; Interview with For-

mer Permanent Secretary and ProminentKenyan Civil Society Leader and Political Activist, Nairobi, 23 May 2011.

42 Interview with Political Adviser, Diplo-matic Mission, Nairobi, 13 May 2011. In-terview with Ambassador of DiplomaticMission, Nairobi, 17 May 2011.

43 Interview with Executive Director, Lead-ing Civil Society Organisation, Nairobi, 20May 2011; Interview with Kenyan Jour-nalist, Nairobi, 2 May 2011.

44 Interview with Senior Staff Member, Af-rican Union Panel of Eminent Personali-ties, Nairobi, 24 May 2011.

45 Interview with Political Advisor, Diplo-matic Mission, Nairobi, 13 May 2011.



48

Interview with Former Permanent Secre-tary and Prominent Kenyan Civil Society


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Leader and Political Activist, Nairobi, 23May 2011.

49 Interview with Former Permanent Secre-tary and Prominent Kenyan Civil Society Leader and Political Activist, Nairobi, 23May 2011.



52 Interview with Senior Peace and Develop-ment Officer, Donor Agency, 12 May 2011.


54 Interview with Kenyan Academic, Nairo-bi, 20 May 2011.

55 Interview with Deputy Chairperson, Com-mittee of Experts on Constitutional Re- view, Nairobi, 19 May 2011.

56 Interview with Team Leader, DemocraticGovernance Team, Donor Agency, 21 May 2011.

57 Interview with Governance Adviser, Do-nor Agency, Nairobi, 10 May 2011. One

donor representative who was familiar with the matrix noted that it compriseda list of all challenges facing Kenya.


59 Interview with Senior Lecturer in Africaand the Politics of Development, Univer-sity of Leeds, Nairobi, 20 April 2011.




63 Interview with Managing Director, Lead-ing Civil Society Organisation, Nairobi, 12May 2012.

64

Interview with Managing Director, Lead-ing Civil Society Organisation, Nairobi, 12May 2012.

65 Interview with Adviser, Kenyan HumanRights Civil Society Organisation, Nairobi,23 May 2012.

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How to cite this article : Kanyinga, K and Walker, S 2013 Building a Political Settlement: TheInternational Approach to Kenyas 2008 Post-Election Crisis. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 34, pp. 1-21, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bu

Published: 17 July 2013

Copyright : 2013 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of theCreative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License (CC-BY 3.0), which permits unrestricted use,distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ .

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building a political settlement: the international approach to kenya’s 2008 post-election crisis

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