britain, america, and the far east, 1937-1940 a failure in cooperation

8/7/2019 Britain, America, And the Far East, 1937-1940 a Failure in Cooperation

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Britain, America, and the Far East, 1937-1940: A Failure in Cooperation

Author(s): Nicholas R. CliffordSource: The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Nov., 1963), pp. 137-154Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The North American Conference on BritishStudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/175052 .

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Britain, America, and the Far East,1937-1940: a Failure in CooperationMost of the scholarly works on British policy in the years pre-

ceding World War II have neglected events in the Far East infavor of those in Europe. Any study of recent British diplomacyis, of course, seriously hampered by the lack of Foreign Officedocuments and by the generally uninformative nature of Britishmemoirs. Nevertheless, the sources which do exist give a picturewhich, while still incomplete, is interesting for its own sake inshowing how the Chamberlain Government met the problems ofthe Pacific, and also for the light which it sheds on Anglo-Americanrelations in this period. Perhaps nowhere else was there as muchconsistent misunderstanding and disappointment between Londonand Washington as over the questions raised by the Sino-JapaneseWar. The Manchurian episode had left a legacy of distrust be-tween the two countries; just enough was known about theapproaches made by the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, tothe Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, so that many on both sidesof the Atlantic believed that Britain had rejected American offersfor joint action against Japan in 1932, and that as a result nothinghad prevented the Japanese advance. When Stimson's The FarEastern Crisis appeared in 1936, it was read by many with moreenthusiasm than accuracy, and seemed to confirm these views.'In Britain it provided ammunition for the critics of the Govern-ment, while in the United States it increased the suspicions ofthose unwilling to trust Britain, and strengthened the trend toisolation.

Thus when fighting broke out at Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937,Britain was anxious not to become involved in a situation like thatof 1931-32, and Washington had somewhat less than completeconfidence in the policy of Chamberlain's Government. In thenext few years a number of issues arose from the war, issues whichprovided the opportunity for a firm Anglo-American stand; butthe unity was lacking, and the two powers for the most part actedseparately, making it clear that Japan had nothing to fear from aLondon-Washington entente.1. See Sir Norman Angell, The Defence of the Empire (New York, 1937),pp. 93-123, for one of the clearest statements of this view.


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THE JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIESOn July 13, when it had become clear that the fighting wassomething more than another local incident, a British memorandumto the State Department urged a western approach to Toyko, toexpress concern at the reports of large Japanese troop movementsinto China, and to reassure Japan that Nanking was being per-suaded not to aggravate the situation. At the same time Chinawould be told that the western mediation which she sought couldnot usefully be attempted unless both sides desired it2 - and Japandid not. This not very daring proposal was rejected by Washing-ton, which answered that Cordell Hull had already covered these

points in his talks with the Chinese and Japanese ambassadors,and that such action by the British would parallel his own. Thiswas simply a polite refusal; as Washington knew, the Foreign Sec-retary, Sir Anthony Eden, had acted along the same general linesas Hull, and what London was now proposing was something morein the nature of a concerted move. The American position waspresented to the British ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay:". . .cooperation on parallel but independent lines would be moreeffective and less likely to have an effect the opposite of thatdesired than would joint or identical representations."3 Thus whilethe British Embassies in Tokyo and Nanking were instructed tomake the approach outlined by Eden - independently of anyFrench move, presumably in order not to advertise the Americanabsence-on July 16 Hull issued a public statement to set forthAmerica's views on the maintenance of treaty obligations and onworld peace.4Here began a significant divergence between the two democ-racies in their policies toward Toyko. In a note to Britain onJune 1 the State Department had already defined its position,stressing the American desire to avoid alliances, and continuingthat

We feel the governments principally interested in the FarEast should endeavor constantly to exercise a wholesomeand restraining influence toward conserving and safeguard-ing the rights and interests of all concerned and towardpreventing friction and the development of tensions. Webelieve that consultation between and among the powers

2. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1937 (Wash-ington, 1954), III, 158-59. (Cited hereafter as FRUS.)3. Ibid., (1937), III, 159-60.4. Ibid., (1937), III, 160-61, 164; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of CordellHull (New York, 1948), I, 535-38; Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan,1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), I, 325-26. (Cited hereafter as FRUS, Japan.)

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BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE FAR EASTmost interested, followed by procedure on parallel linesand concurrently, tends to promote the effectiveness of suchefforts.5

The answer to the first British proposal in July thus establishedthis doctrine as the basis for action in the Far Eastern crisis, andit was to be consistently followed by Washington for the next fewyears. Over and over again there would be repeated this insistenceon "parallel" rather than "joint"action, anc[ not until 1941 was asignificant change made.As yet, however, the depth of the American commitment tothis policy was not clear. As the situation grew worse, Eden sug-gested to Ambassador Bingham on July 19 that a "united front"might prove more effective than parallel action, and the next dayBritain proposed a joint approach to both sides to halt troop move-ments, while the two democracies sought a solution. Again theUnited States demurred. Lindsay now said that although his coun-try did not insist on joint action, the British felt that they had donemore to make their views known in Tokyo and Nanking, and afurther clarification of the American position would be helpful.He was given a fuller answer the next day, but it re-emphasizedthe American belief in parallel and separate action. The patternwas set, and another attempt by Eden on July 28 met with no moresuccess than had the earlier ones.6This is not to say that there was no cooperation. In Tokyo,Nanking, Washington, and London, there appears to have been afairly broad exchange of information, and on August 10 and 11there were prearranged, though private, soundings of ForeignMinister Hirota by Ambassador Joseph Grew and James Dodds,the British charge, on the question of western mediation.7 Theywere of a highly cautious nature, however, and it was apparentthat Washington preferred to work alone without encouraging theimpression that it was making common cause with London.This became even clearer after the outbreak of fighting inShanghai on the night of August 13. An attempt by the American,British, French, German, and Italian ambassadors to keep the peacehad failed, but Britain continued to press for a neutralization of

5. Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, I, 533. For a view that Washington wasmoving closer to a policy of cooperation with Britain in the Far East in the yearsprior to the Lukouchiao incident, see Gerald B. Wheeler, "Isolated Japan: Anglo-American Diplomatic Co-operation, 1927-1936," Pacific Historical Review, XXX(1961), 163-78.6. FRUS (1937), III, 224-28, 235-36, 286-90.7. Ibid., (1937), III, 368-69, 372-73.

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THE JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIESthe city. Again she received little support from America. OnAugust 18 Dodds told Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Horinouchithat if both sides withdrew their forces from the city, and if otherpowers would join her, Britain would undertake the protection ofJapanese nationals in the International Settlement. Horinouchiheld out little hope of Japanese agreement, and because of thisthe United States refused to take part, despite a French promise ofsupport.8 When Lindsay persisted, the State Department's StanleyHornbeck, under Hull's orders, made the rather acid comment tothe Ambassador that the United States "could not but view withthe opposite of gratification the pressing upon us by the BritishGovernment of a project which we regard as already having beendisposed of adversely by the Japanese Government." He addedthat Washington deplored the publicity already given to the plan,and hoped that the charge would not be made that it had failedbecause of the American refusal to cooperate.9The front of Anglo-American solidarity was maintained, how-ever, and on August 25 Chamberlain, Eden, and Halifax issued acommunique noting the "close collaboration" of London, Wash-ington, and Paris. Ironically, the issue of the Times in which thisappeared also carried an editorial criticizing the obvious lack ofcooperation in Shanghai; when the American Embassay com-plained to the Foreign Office, an official blandly agreed that it wasan example of "irresponsible journalism."10Wherever the fault layfor the failure of the British demarche-it was, incidentally,accepted by China on August 25 - it was the last chance of savingthe peace in Shanghai.

There is little point in speculating whether the British pro-posals would have worked with American backing. What is argu-able is that now, when the war was still comparatively localized,and Japanese forces not as heavily committed as they would be bythe end of the year, the appearance of concerted action wouldhave operated in some measure as a brake on Japanese plans. Itmay be that nothing short of some form of sanctions would haveinfluenced Japan, and it is doubtful whether at this point theBritish would seriously have considered such a move."1 Nor would8. Ibid., (1937), III, 356-57, 360-61, 376, 390, 397-98, 399-400, 409-10,413-14, 440-41, 448-50.9. Ibid., (1937), III, 455-56, 464-65.10. Times, 26 Aug. 1937; FRUS (1937), III, 480.11. On 20 July 1937 Bingham, on his own initiative, had suggested to Edena British approach to Washington for sanctions; Chamberlain, however, opposedthe idea. Anthony Eden [Earl of Avon], The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl ofAvon: Facing the Dictators, 1923-1938 (Boston, 1962), pp. 603-04.

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BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE FAR EASTit have been accepted by Washington. Despite strong sympathyfor China, in the United States the dominant note of public opinionwas one urging the Administration to avoid trouble in the Far East.Lindsay, in assuring Hornbeck that Britain had no intention ofembarrassing the United States, explained that while in his countrythe Government was being urged to "do something," in the UnitedStates it was being told to stay out.12 Here the difference betweenAmerican and British opinion emerges at its clearest. In Americaefforts were being made to have the Government apply the Neu-trality Act and even to withdraw all American civilians and troopsfrom China, rather than risk a war.13 In Britain, on the other hand,the Government was being urged to take stronger action, and thepressure came not only from Labour and the Left, but increasinglyalso from the Right, from the business circles which saw theirChinese interests menaced by the Japanese drive.

Chiang Kai-shek, in appealing for American support of theBritish peace efforts, at one point even compared Hull's policy tothat of Simon in 1932. Nor was he the only one to see the parallel;Ambassador Grew noted in his Diary:Humorists might find humor in the complete turning of thetables between 1931 and 1937. Then it was we who steppedout in front and the British who would not follow. Now it isthe British who are taking the lead while we are movingslowly and very, very carefully.14

The British themselves did not seem to be of one mind on theproper policy to follow. On at least one occasion Dodds hadmoderated a statement which he was to present in Tokyo. Andthe new ambassador-designate, Sir Robert Craigie, on his way totake up his post, spoke freely to American officials in Ottawa ofhis disagreement with the forward course which British policy hadtried to follow.15

Nevertheless, Britain remained determined to do what shecould to secure a greater degree of American involvement. TheChinese had appealed to the League of Nations late in the sum-mer, but the United States representative to the League's Far12. FRUS (1937), III, 465-66.13. The best treatmentof Americanopinion in this period is in DorothyBorg, "The United States and the Far EasternCrisis, 1933-1938,"[MS. in prepa-ration for publication]ch. xiii. I am indebted to Dr. Borg for permissionto useher MS.14. FRUS (1937), III, 460-61; Joseph C. Grew, Papers,Diary MS. 1937,III, 3259. Houghton Library,HarvardUniversity. I am indebted to Mr. Grewfor permissionto use his papers.15. FRUS (1937), III, 401-04, 409-10.

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THE JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIESEast Advisory Committee sat simply as an observer. If Washingtonwere to play a greater part, the scene would have to be shiftedfrom Geneva. Accordingly on September 21 the Australian del-egate broached to the Assembly the idea of a conference of Pacificpowers, thus allowing the League to "transcend the limitations ofits present membership,"16as he tactfully put it. On October 1 theBritish delegate, Lord Cranborne, proposed to the Advisory Com-mittee a variant of the Australian scheme, calling for a meeting ofthe signatories of the Nine Power Treaty, joined by Germany andthe U.S.S.R. Later he privately told the American representativethat while he regretted that there had been no time to consultWashington beforehand, he had been faced with a Chinesedemand for action, and this seemed to be the best way out.17 Thismay have been quite true; at any rate, it was undoubtedly thequickest way to involve the United States. Perhaps London hopedthat despite Hull's commitment to an independent policy, he mightfind it easier to take what amounted to joint action in concert withthe other Treaty Powers than with Britain and France alone. Cer-tainly the United States welcomed the plan; the reports calling forthe meeting were adopted by the League on October 6, and Hullissued a statement supporting them, and in fact had the news ofRoosevelt's "quarantine speech" telephoned to Geneva, perhaps inan effort to encourage swift Assembly action.18If all this increased expectations for stronger action, there wasa disappointment in store in the ensuing Brussels Conference.While the Government did its best in Parliament to quiet thosewho called for sanctions, in private the possibility of such moveswas canvassed. A cautious sounding of Washington in earlyOctober brought an even more cautious reply: the United Stateswould take no lead, but might consider sanctions. Roosevelt's"quarantine speech" of October 5 encouraged Whitehall, and onOctober 19 it suggested that both countries should go to Brusselsfully aware of the implications of such a course. This time Wash-ington replied rather coldly that such questions "did not arise ina conference which had for its objective the finding of a solution... by agreement."19 Ambassador Bingham drove home the point

16. League of Nations, Official Journal (Geneva), 1937, Special SupplementNo. 169, p. 176; Special Supplement No. 177, pp. 17-18.17. FRUS (1937), IV, 54-58, 63-64.18. Ibid., (1937), IV, 62-63; Borg, "United States and the Far EasternCrisis," ch. xiv.19. 5 Hansard, CCCXXVII, 65, 174; 5 Hansard, CVI, 1077; W. N. Med-licott, The Economic Blockade (London, 1952, 1959), I, 12-14; FRUS (1937),III, 560, 582-83; IV, 89-90, 92.

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BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE FAR EASTto Eden: at Brussels no one nation should take the lead, nor shouldBritain try to force the United States into the lead. And, he said, theattempts to pin America down as to how far she would go and tojust what the "quarantine speech" meant were "objectionable anddamaging." Norman Davis, the American representative at Brussels,reinforced this point when he met Eden on November 2, and theForeign Secretary appeared to agree but said that London would bewilling to keep in step with Washington. If constructive efforts toreach peace failed, Britain would be quite willing to join in pressureon Japan, but would not embarrass Washington by advocating sucha course if it were unwelcome. He would second any Americaninitiative and would base his policy throughout the crisis on that ofthe United States. Eden, in fact, expected little of the Conferenceand saw it primarily as an opportunity to demonstrate Anglo-American solidarity, but to Hull it sounded as if Britain wereangling for an American lead.20It soon became obvious that there was to be no peace by con-ciliation, as Japan twice refused invitations to take her seat. OnNovember 10 French Foreign Minister Delbos joined Eden inassuring Davis that France would go as far as the United States,although she would insist on territorial guarantees in the Orient.If this was another opening for an American initiative, Davisrefused to take the hint. His instructions were unclear, and heappears to have given the impression that he might later discusssanctions. A few days afterwards Eden and Delbos, joined nowby Potemkin of the Soviet Union, again indicated that they favoredstrong action, but would not lead. Nothing could have been lesslikely to appeal to Washington. When Lindsay told Sumner Wellesthat Eden and Davis had discussed such subjects as non-recogni-tion, sanctions, and a naval show of force, Welles made it quiteclear that Davis was in no position to commit his government onmatters of this kind.21As could have been predicted, the Conference failed. Implicitly,both Britain and America had agreed to do nothing, and Britainmade no secret of her doubts as to the efficacy of sanctions.22 She,France, and Russia all waited for an American lead, and thispolicy was quite safe since Washington's refusal to take the initia-

20. FRUS (1937), IV, 114-15, 145-47; Jay Pierrepont Moffat, The MoffatPapers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, ed.Nancy H. Hooker (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 162-65; Hull, Memoirs ofCordell Hull, I, 551; Eden, Memoirs of Anthony Eden, p. 608.21. Moffat, Moffat Papers, pp. 174-78; FRUS (1937), IV, 152-55, 183-85,198-99.22. FRUS (1937), IV, 153.

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THE JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIEStive was quite clear and had been before the Conference met. Onthe other hand, by actively discouraging an American lead, Wash-ington prevented any firm stand, for no country would have daredin 1937 to oppose Japan unless assured of American military,economic, and diplomatic backing. A month later Chamberlaintold the House of Commons "There was only one way in whichthe conflict would have been brought to an end, as it proved, andthat was not by peace but by force . . . [but] coercion would nothave obtained the support of any member of the Brussels Con-ference."23

In December, Britain and America were presented with theclearest opportunity yet for joint action, and this time their failureto act in concert could not have been made much more obvious.On December 5 a Japanese air raid on Wuhu had damaged Britishshipping on the Yangtse, and on December 12, again at Wuhu,HMS Ladybird was struck by artillery fire and suffered severalcasualties. A few hours later Japanese aircraft sank the USS Panay.Eden and Chamberlain immediately urged Washington to consideracting, if not jointly, at least with a closer degree of parallelismthan before. Once again, however, Washington refused to join inany d6marche which would imply concerted action with London,and Grew was instructed to make his protest without waiting forthat of Sir Robert Craigie, London's new ambassador to Tokyo.To the disappointed Lindsay, Welles sought to justify the Americanmove, adding firmly that he was carrying out Roosevelt's wishes.24For a while it seemed as if a stronger stand might develop. Asthe evidence of Japanese guilt mounted, Roosevelt did begin toconsider economic retaliation, and had Treasury Secretary Mor-genthau telephone Sir John Simon, then the Chancellor of theExchequer, to sound out the British. Simon rather unwillinglypromised to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister, and afew days later when he called back he gave the impression thatBritain was not eager to have anything to do with sanctions.25Roosevelt, however, was already losing interest in the plan, and bythe end of the year both countries had settled their cases. Thecrisis thus ended with no show of firmness and, as Dorothy Borghas pointed out, showed Tokyo that Japan had little to fear in the

23. 5 Hansard, CCCXXX, 1809.24. FRUS (1937), IV, 490-91, 494-95, 499-500, 503-04; FRUS, Japan, I,523-24.25. John M. Blum, From the Morganthau Diaries: Years of Crisis, 1928-1938(Boston, 1959), pp. 483-92.

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BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE FAR EAST

way of an Anglo-American united front.26 The Japanese Govern-ment was encouraged, and the wave of national humiliation thathad swept over the country after the Panay sinking quickly dieddown. The tone of the Japanese reply to the American protestwas appreciably milder than was that to Britain, and to Craigie itseemed that Japan might be trying to drive a wedge between thetwo countries.27 Tokyo did not fail to note, however, that at theopening of the new British base at Singapore, on February 14,1938, the only foreign men-of-war present were three Americancruisers. Meanwhile, in secret, an American naval officer was sentto London to initiate discussions with the Admiralty on navalstrategy in the event of a future war.28The next serious difference between Britain and the UnitedStates arose in early 1938. That winter Japan and Britain hadentered on a long diplomatic wrangle over the vexed subject ofthe Chinese Maritime Customs. With all the important ports northof Hangchow Bay in Japanese hands, most of the Customs revenueswere no longer being paid to the Central Government. Yet Chinaremained bound to continue to service loans secured on the Cus-toms revenues, and it was therefore of some importance to hercreditors, and to Britain in particular, with her historic interests inthe Customs service, to try to prevent a Chinese default. Craigieworked hard to find a solution, but met with no success in tryingto associate the United States in his efforts.2 In late April hereached an agreement with Foreign Minister Ugaki, the terms ofwhich were given to Paris and Washington. The French acceptedit, but the Americans made no comment. Craigie warned Grewthat unless both countries expressed "no objection" to the agree-ment, the situation would collapse and the Japanese would seizethe Customs. The United States refused, but before the final deci-sion, Craigie and Ugaki had issued a joint communique on May 3implying that Washington would not object. Craigie apologized,and Hull tried to correct the impression thus given to the world,but the damage was done. Due to China's refusal to take part, theagreement remained a dead letter, and its importance therefore laylargely in the light which it threw on Anglo-American relations.Craigie's view was that his country had done the work, partly for

26. Borg, "United States and the Far Eastern Crisis," ch. xviii.27. Grew Papers, Conversations, 1937-1938, p. 184.28. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-war Plans and Preparations(Washington, 1950), 92-93.29. FRUS (1937), III, 904-05, 913-14; FRUS (1938), III, 626-27; GrewPapers, Diary, 1938, V, 3719.

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THE JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIESthe benefit of the Americans, who now threatened to sabotage theagreement.30Nevertheless, there was toward the end of the year evidenceof a greater degree of cooperation. On November 7, 1938, Britain,France, and America delivered simultaneous protests against thecontinued closure of the Yangtse to the navigation of foreignmerchantmen. The initiative came from Washington, but this timethe other two governments were invited to take part. And thatwinter the three countries delivered notes which attacked theconcept of the New Order and the tripartite bloc of Japan, Man-chukuo, and China, as it had been outlined by the Konoye govern-ment in the autumn.31 Furthermore, in December, both Britainand America took their first steps to aid China directly, in advanc-ing credits for Chinese purchases. Except for the Yangtse notes,however, little planning took place beforehand to coordinate acommon policy, and the apparent unity was largely a matter ofcoincidence.

Although it had seemed for a while as if a new approach wasin the making, these moves stopped short of any drastic measuresagainst Japan. The deterioration of the European situation, onlybriefly alleviated by the hope of Munich, tended to discourageany strong policy in the Far East. At the same time the westernhope that Japan might be restrained from joining a threatenedTriple Alliance of the Axis powers meant the postponement of anydecision for firmness. Thus the parallel measures of the democ-racies not only had little effect in Tokyo, but it soon became evi-dent that Japan was launching her strongest drive yet against thewestern position in China, in a campaign which concentrated onthe foreign settlements. The International Settlements in Shanghaiand Amoy came under attack, as did the British Concession inTientsin, and it was here that during the summer of 1939 Britainand Japan reached the verge of war.There were many reasons for the Japanese concentration onTientsin. Most important was the fact that both the British andFrench Concessions represented a stumbling block to the con-solidation of Japanese economic and military control over NorthChina. The arrest of a number of suspected terrorists in theBritish Concession, together with what appeared to be the breach

30. FRUS (1938), III, 684-89, 692-95; Grew Papers, Diary, 1938, V, 3742.31. FRUS (1938), IV, 194-96; FRUS, Japan, I, 820-26; Documents on BritishForeign Policy, 1919-1939, ed. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, third series(London, 1949-55), VIII, Nos. 422, 431.

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BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE FAR EASTof a British promise to surrender them to the Japanese, gave Tokyoa chance to seek negotiations on not only the issues immediate toTientsin, but also on the much larger problems of Britain's rela-tions to Japan in occupied China.32Despite Craigie's insistence that the talks cover only localissues, both Foreign Minister Arita and Prime Minister Hiranumawere under pressure from the Army and public opinion to broadenthe base of discussions. Thus when Craigie met Arita on July 15,the latter proposed the acceptance of a general formula as thebasis for the talks. By the terms of his draft, Britain would donothing to impede the Japanese in taking such steps as theydeemed necessary to maintain order in occupied China. This wasunacceptable, but Britain realized that something of the sort hadto be arrived at, and what finally emerged seemed little better.The "Craigie-Arita"Formula"- announced on July 24- stated thatBritain would countenance no acts or measures which wouldprejudice the Japanese in maintaining their own security andpublic order in areas under their control.33 Not surprisingly, thiswas looked on as a sort of Far Eastern Munich, and both Rightand Left in Britain shared this point of view. Craigie claimedlater that the formula was harmless, but at the time it was clearlya propaganda victory for Tokyo.34Most unexpected was the American reaction. When Britainappealed for American help in mid-June, Washington had agreedonly to deliver a strong note to Japan. Even this was never sent,however, because of the opposition of Ambassador Grew andEugene Dooman, the American charge. Consequently Doomansimply voiced American concern at the spread of the anti-Britishoutbreaks in occupied China, while Hull told the press that Wash-ington was concerned with the "broader aspects" of the Tientsincrisis.35 On July 12 London asked whether the United States wouldjoin the Tokyo talks if the issue of currency was raised, since thiswould concern all the powers with interests in China. Again the

32. The dispatches on the Tientsin crisis are found in Documents on BritishForeign Policy, IX, passim, and in FRUS (1939), IV, 163ff. See also the accountby F. C. Jones in the Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946; The Eve of theWar, 1939, ed. Arnold J. Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee (London, 1958),pp. 640-41.33. Documents on British Foreign Policy, IX, Nos. 325, 326, 328; 5 Hansard,CCCL, 944.34. Sir Robert L. Craigie, Behind the Japanese Mask (London, 1946), p. 75.35. Documents on British Foreign Policy, IX, Nos. 210, 218, 221-23, 235,258, 272; FRUS (1939), IV, 185, 213-17, 220-21; William L. Langer and S.Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York, 1952), pp.151-52.

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THE JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIESDepartment refused, and Welles admitted that it was largely fromfear of Congress.36Undoubtedly the lack of American support was in part respon-sible for the acceptance of the Craigie-Arita formula. Its an-nouncement on July 24 provoked the expected criticisms of Britishpolicy but nevertheless helped drive the United States to the firstsignificant step of economic retaliation. On July 26 Rooseveltgave the required six months' notice of abrogation of the Jap-anese-American commercial treaty of 1911; this meant that as ofJanuary 26, 1940, American trade with Japan would be on a day today basis, regulated by no written agreements.The Tokyo formula was, of course, only one of a number offactors influencing the decision.37 The step was taken hastily,without consulting either Grew, who was then on home leave, orDooman, to say nothing of London. On July 27 Lindsay saw Hulland asked him about the denunication. "I never before in my lifedrew such a complete blank. He spoke as if it were a purely com-mercial step, with no political implications, and all in the tone ofa very anodyne note in which [the] decision was conveyed to theJapanese Government."38The British press applauded the decision, but the fact remainedthat London was left in an embarassing position. The UnitedStates was acting in keeping with her past practice of movingwithout consulting Britain, and the juxtaposition of the Craigie-Arita formula on the one hand, with its suggestions of defeat, andthe American denunciation on the other, made a striking contrast inthe diplomatic postures of the two countries.

A similar situation occurred a year later. Shortly after theFrench surrender, in June 1940, the Japanese brought pressure onBritain to close the Burma Road, the last route open for the supplyof western arms to Chungking. Powerless, the Government decidedto give in unless a clear assurance of American support could beobtained.39 An appeal to Washington brought no help. The StateDepartment warned that appeasement would solve nothing, butheld out no hope of American action if Britain had to fight. Afrank British aide-memoire of June 27 admitted that Britain couldnot refuse if it would mean war. Consequently there were onlytwo courses open. One would be for a vast increase of American

36. Documents on British Foreign Policy, IX, Nos. 297, 306, 329-30.37. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 157-58.38. Documents on British Foreign Policy, IX, No. 405.39. S. Woodburn Kirby et al., The War against Japan, The Loss of Singapore(London, 1957), I, 45.

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BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE FAR EASTpressure on Japan, either by a "full embargo," or by sending war-ships to Singapore, with the realization that this might meaninvolvement in war. The alternative was to "wean" Japan fromaggression by offering to negotiate a Far Eastern settlement.Put bluntly, this was an ultimatum to Washington either tosupport a strong stand or to help reach a settlement which wouldat least temporarily appease Japan and forestall trouble in the FarEast. Hull refused to go along with either course, and added thatthe United States could countenance no peace made at the ex-pense of China or of the principles of his statement of July 16,1937.40 Despite this, Britain did not surrender completely toJapan, but negotiated a compromise by which the Burma Roadwould be closed to shipments of war materials for three months,while Japan would seek a peace with China. Informed of this inadvance, Hull expressed his disappointment, but said nothing ofbacking a stronger stand, despite Chinese pressure to do so. OnJuly 16, two days before the announcement of the agreement, Hull,disregarding an appeal from Lord Lothian (then British ambas-sador in Washington) told the press that America had a "legitimateinterest in the keeping open of arteries of commerce in every partof the world" and added that the closure would constitute anunwarranted interposition of obstacles to world trade. He toldLothian that this was aimed at Tokyo rather than London.41 Iftrue, this was unconvincing, and in Britain his statement was takento mean that the Government had failed to consult the UnitedStates. Once again there was a sharp difference in the apparent,if not in the real, positions of the two countries.

From the foregoing episodes the most surprising conclusion,perhaps, is the record of fairly consistent British attempts atstrong common action with the United States against the Japaneseadvance. Despite the doubts and hesitations which Londonshowed, particularly in the matter of sanctions, the British posturein the Far East seemed considerably different from that which wasthen being assumed by the Chamberlain government in Europe.The contrast is startling enough so that one must ask whether itwas real or apparent. It is possible simply to dismiss these episodesas unimportant, as so out of keeping with the appeasement policyof the period, that they must be meaningless; but can they bedisposed of so easily?There were certainly good reasons why Britain may have been

40. FRUS (1940), IV, 362-67, 369-72.41. Ibid., (1940), IV, 45-49, 53; FRUS, Japan, II, 101; Times, 17 July 1940,

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THE JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIESwilling to try a stronger policy in East Asia than she was in Europe.In pursuing collective security in China she would be dealing witha relatively known quantity - the United States - rather than withthe unstable Third Republic and the uncertain and fearsomeSoviet Union. Added to this was the fact that British economicinterests were more clearly and directly menaced by Japan's actionin China than they were by the actions of either Germany or Italyin pre-war Europe. Nor is there any evidence to suggest thatJapan's portrayal of herself as a bulwark against Bolshevism, oiher argument that she was extirpating Chinese communism, hadany appreciable effect on responsible British circles. On thecontrary it was only too evident that Japan was forcing Chiangand the Communists into a Popular Front alliance, and was ap-parently directing her expansion not towards Siberia, but towardsthe rich colonial lands of southeast Asia. There may have beenthose in England who had hoped that Hitler's appetite could besatisfied in the East, without having him turn west, but there waslittle to suggest that in Japan's frankly expansionist drive she wouldforsake the fertile south for the barren north.

What this means, of course, is that while Chamberlain washardly the man to take any firm stand on his own (and in viewof Britain's military weakness, could hardly have done so), herein the Far East, if anywhere, resistance to an aggressor would havebeen popular with both Right and Left. Firmness with Italy overAbyssinia was hampered by the continuing belief of men likeHoare and Chamberlain that Italy must be kept friendly; firmnessin Spain may have been almost impossible due to the deep ideo-logical cleavage caused by the Civil War. But in the Far East thesituation was different, and while there certainly remained thetraditionalists who had a lingering sympathy with Japan, feelingwas overwhelmingly on China's side, and it was a feeling for whichthere were solid strategic and economic reasons, as well as moraland ideological ones.Furthermore, Britain apparently felt justified in believing thatwhile little could be expected from America in Europe, Washingtonmight be more active in East Asia. American isolation had tradi-tionally been less evident here, and America had a stake, bothstrategic and sentimental, in seeing China develop into a viablemodem state dominated neither by Russia nor Japan. If, duringthe Manchurian crisis, a Republican administration had been ap-parently ready to form an Anglo-American front, a Democraticadministration should be at least willing to consider a similar

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BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE FAR EASTpolicy. But it was not, and it took some time for this seemingchangein policyto be madeclear.One reasonfor this has alreadybeen suggested: the very con-trastbetween her Europeanand Asianpolicies left Britain'ssincer-ity and motives open to serious doubt. As Eden, Lindsay, andCraigie were arguing with Washington for joint action againstJapan,in the fall of 1937, Halifax was visiting Berchtesgaden,andChamberlainwas trying to associate Washingtonin his negotia-tions with Mussolini,negotiationswhich led to acceptanceof theItalianconquestof Abyssinia,and violated the fundamentalAmer-ican belief in the principleof non-recognition.Chamberlainneverput inuch faith in America'swillingness to take concrete action,and his rebuff of Roosevelt'sEuropeaninitiative in January1938undoubtedly helped to confirm Washington's fears of Britishreadinessto deal with the dictators. It is difficult to see, however,that Chamberlain'sattitude in this particularepisode had mucheffect on Anglo-Americanpolicies in the East; and the replace-ment of Eden by Halifax,which followed in February,seems tohave made no appreciabledifference on the conduct or aims ofBritishpolicytowardsJapan.There were other reasonsmilitating against the success of theBritish approaches. Chief of these was the traditionalAmericanfear of having to fight for Britishinterests,a fear sharedby boththe isolationistsand by those liberals who saw Britainas a colonialpower. There was also the suspicion - undoubtedly justified - thatthe proposedAnglo-Americanpartnershipwas to be led by Wash-ington. Thus, when after the Brussels Conference, the Britishproposed an "overwhelmingdemonstrationof naval force" in thePacific,Wellespointedout that it wouldreallymeanan overwhelm-ing demonstrationof Americannaval force, since the Britishcouldspare so few ships for the East.42 American suspicions werematched by the Britishfeeling that they were bearing the bruntof the diplomatic action, and thus earning Japan'senmity; thatBritainwas workingfor America'sbenefit as well as her own; andthat the United States was not pulling its own weight.American isolation and mutual suspicion were not the onlyreasonsfor the failure of these approaches. It is noteworthythatthe American insistence on "parallel"action during these yearswent furtherthan Hull's first definitionwould seem to imply. Thenote of June 1, 1937 had said that such action should be taken"concurrently,"following "consultationbetween and among the

42. FRUS (1937), III, 724-25.

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powers most interested."43 Since then, however, the United Stateshad frequently avoided discussions with Britain before proceedingon its own, and the British were unprepared for this. More im-portant still was the basic disagreement over the policy to befollowed, both to end the war in the East and to protect Westerninterests there. Here Britain favored a stronger stand than theUnited States, but in concert with the United States rather thanwith the League or the Washington Treaty nations. Both coun-tries were from the first conscious of the rivalry between the civilgovernment and the military in Japan. But how best to exploitthis? In December 1937 Craigie suggested that an Anglo-Americanshow of force would bolster the "moderates" against the military,while Grew felt that it would simply weaken them. Furthermore,he added privately to Hull, the United States should not have toshare the "consequences of British ineptitudes, both of action andof statement" which had exacerbated feelings between Britain andJapan.44 In Grew's mind the United States had managed to makeits views known just as effectively as had Britain, but withoutstirring up Japanese passions as much, "by taking independentaction and simultaneously refraining from encouraging otherPowers to take a stronger position vis-a-vis Japan than that whichthey would be disposed independently to take . .."45 A yearlater both sides held to the same views. In September 1938 Craigietold Halifax that, bad as was the British situation in China, itcould be worse, and British pressure had been necessary to mitigateit, especially in view of the "supineness of the United States."46A month later Grew told Washington that while America had notbeen able to secure her rights in all respects, American approacheshad at least commended themselves to the Japanese Government,and that there was consequently less feeling against Washingtonthan against London47- an estimate which was undeniably true.Both men were convinced of the rightness of their positions. Thedifference in approach was summed up in a penetrating commentwhich Dooman, the American charge, made to Craigie during theTientsin crisis: the main reason, he said, why Britain was havingmore trouble with Japan was that from the beginning theUnited States had declared its intentions of defending Americanrights by its own exertions, while the British, both in China and

43. Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, I, 533.44. FRUS (1937), III, 792-94.45. FRUS (1937), III, 575-76.46. Documents on British Foreign Policy, VIII, No. 99.47. FRUS (1938), IV, 71-72.

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BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND THE FAR EASTin London, had shown that they relied on a Chinese victory forthe defense of their interests. Consequently many Japanese hadbeen led to believe that British and Chinese interests were thesame.48 He might also have added that in Japanese eyes it hadbeen Britain, and not the United States, which from the beginningseemed intent on building up an anti-Japanese coalition.49What made the situation even worse, from the British point ofview, was the ironical fact that by her very inaction the UnitedStates appeared to be doing more than Britain to meet the Japanesethreat. Thus the world heard Hull's statement of principles inJuly 1937; it heard the "quarantine speech" and misunderstood it asa call for economic sanctions;50it hailed the American abstentionfrom the Customs agreement of May 1938; it saw the Americantreaty denunciation of July 1939 as a contrast to the Craigie-Aritaformula; and it welcomed Hull's defense of free trade routes whenthe Burma Road was closed in 1940. At the same time Britainappeared to be temporizing with aggression in the Far East as shewas in Europe. On this account the Government came underattack from its critics: the Labour benches in the House of Com-mons, the writers of the New Statesman and Nation, and the pub-licists of the League of Nations Union. Thus a Labour M.P. couldeven say that it was clear that at the Brussels Conference, theAmericans had pressed for decisive action while Britain heldback.51Yet Britain never quite understood why the United States wasunwilling to join her. Conscious of the American desire to keep anindependence of action, she never really grasped its depth. Hencethe American rebuffs to British overtures, and the fact that theovertures themselves occasionally embittered relations betweenthe two countries. So Chamberlain could write in his diary that"It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Amer-icans but words."52 And in late 1938 Craigie commented that "Ithas . . . long been clear that, barring some serious incident involv-ing the loss of American lives, the United States Governmentwould not proceed beyond protests and remonstrances, and would

48. Documents on British Foreign Policy, IX, No. 460; FRUS (1939), III,564-68.49. For an official expression of this view, see the Tokyo Gazette, No. 15,Sep. 19, 1938, pp. 10-11.50. As Sir Norman Angell and Lord Cecil (among others) did. Times, 8Oct. 1937, 13 Oct. 1937.51. Times, 31 Dec. 1937.52. Quoted in Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London,1947), p. 325.

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THE JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIESeven prefer, to the risk of war, a progressive withdrawal of theirinterests in China and the Far East."53

This view was matched by Washington's monolithic outlookon British policies, her insistence on seeing Britain simply as apower bent on upholding a privileged economic position in China.This may have been the classical American view of Britain, andone which was strengthened by the appeasement policy pursuedin Europe; nevertheless, a deeper insight might have discerned theclear differences between Europe and the Far East which havebeen suggested above. These, however, were differences whichconcerned domestic politics as well as foreign policies, and per-haps for that reason they were missed. Diplomats as well asdiplomatic historians sometimes consider nations too much as unitsof power without looking at their internal mechanisms. It is,however, a paradox that at a time when there was in the Americandiplomatic establishment much in the way of penetrating politicalreporting (such as that of Ambassador Grew) this was not trueof the London Embassy, and the dispatches of Ambassadors Bing-ham and Kennedy are generally considerably less informative inthis respect.There were thus basic differences in outlook which weremasked by the disagreement on whether to use "joint"or "parallel"action in these years. Parallel action allowed Washington topreserve the illusion of neutrality; joint action for Britain wouldhave meant the sort of collective action which Liberals and theLabour opposition were demanding, but a collective action notoverly dependent upon the League, and perhaps more in keepingwith Conservative preferences. It was not until a year after the fallof France, when America had moved to the fore as the chiefrepresentative of the western nations in dealing with Japan, thatconcerted action came on a vital issue: the freezing of Japaneseassets after the occupation of southern Indochina. It is impossibleto know whether or not such action, taken several years earlier,might have stopped Japan; taken in July 1941, it did not.

NICHOLASR. CLIFFORD

53. Documents on British Foreign Policy, VIII, No. 308.

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