italy and the treatment of the ethiopian aristocracy, 1937-1940

Italy and the Treatment of the Ethiopian Aristocracy, 1937-1940Author(s): Alberto SbacchiSource: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1977), pp. 209-241Published by: Boston University African Studies CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/217347Accessed: 26/02/2010 23:47

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ITALY AND T THE TREATMENT OF THE ETHIOPIAN ARISTOCRACY, 1937-19401

Alberto Sbacchi

Prior to the conquest of Ethiopia in May 1936, Italian authorities anticipated placing the country under a form of government that would allow the Ethiopian aristocracy to maintain its status. The plan was designed to keep intact a social structure of considerable potential use to the conquerors; both politically and economically, Italy could derive great benefits from the cooperation of the elite in the administration of the country.2 However, during the first year of occupation, 1936-1937, unsettled political and military conditions in the newly acquired territories prevented the emergence of a clear colonial policy on the question. Moreover, Italian antagonism toward the nobles began to grow.

Exactly why Mussolini reversed his earlier thinking on ruling through the aristocracy is not clear, but several factors may have influenced his change in attitude. First, the territory outside Addis Abeba was proving

tResearch for this article was conducted in Italy using the resources of the Central State Archives and the archives of the former Ministry of Italian Africa in Rome. Permission to consult the latter was granted on the condition that the archival position not be cited. Therefore, the documents cited below that contain only a title, description, or sender and receiver, plus date, but omit any more specific numerical categorization or locational designation, are housed in the archives of the former Ministry of Italian Africa in Rome [hereafter AMIA]. Material from other repositories has been cited more fully. I would like to acknowledge the support given me by the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle and Atlantic Union College, as well as the assistance of my Ph.D. supervisor, Robert L. Hess, and the late Professor Carlo Giglio of the University of Pavia.

2Ministry of Colonies [hereafter MC], "Directions for a Possible Protectorate in Ethiopia" (July 1935), AMIA; MC, "Ethiopian Protectorate" (18 July 1935), AMIA; MC, "Ethiopian Protectorate" (19 July 1935), AMIA.

The International Journal olf Afican Historical Studies, x, 2 (1977) 209

210 ALBERTO SBACCHI

difficult to subdue. In addition, the Ethiopian people were expressing growing hostility toward the colonialists, and the nobles were said to be behind this feeling. Moreover, Mussolini's military campaign was in

part motivated by his desire to avenge Italy's shameful defeat at Adowa in 1896; Ethiopia's royal families had combined with Menelik II to resist the invaders, and as a result were partially responsible for Italy's humiliating loss. Finally, the victory over Ethiopia produced a state of euphoria in Italy. Its army had conquered an empire, and the defeat of forty years earlier had been revenged. The economic sanctions imposed by the Western democracies had been challenged and successfully resisted. The acquisition of Ethiopian territory made Italy a colonial power. Militarily, politically, diplomatically dominant, Eternal Rome ruled again on three seas. To share this power with the Ethiopian elite was no longer a tolerable idea, nor did such a civilized and powerful nation feel the need for intermediaries to govern its new subjects. There was also the fear that the nobles, allowed to stand between the government and the Ethiopian people, would delay penetration and threaten sovereignty. For all these reasons, once in power in Addis Abeba the Italians came to consider the rases (ras is an Ethiopian title equivalent to duke or other high-ranking aristocrat, a governor, or a marshal) and dejazmatches (a lesser noble or provincial marshal) not collaborators but enemies whose power at least, and perhaps lives, was to be eliminated.

The occasion for action was the assassination attempt on Rodolfo Graziani, viceroy of Ethiopia, on 19 February 1937. Graziani believed that the nobles had fomented the rebellion and threatened his life, and in retaliation he called for their exile. It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of Ethiopians deported to Italy beginning in March 1937. An early record gives a total of 155 persons, but a later listing of 197 seems to be a more accurate figure (see chart 1).3 By the end of 1937, however, the number sent to Italian confinement had grown to 377. Another document, which divides the exiles by sex, lists 321. The

largest group ended up in Asinara in Sardinia; their recorded number varies from 173 to 284.4 Rases were quartered at Tivoli and at the Villa Camilluccia near Rome.

3Graziani to MC (8 March 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 14, Central State Archives, Rome [hereafter CSA]; Princivalle to Governor General of Italian East Africa [hereafter GG of AOI] (21 March 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 39, fol. 59, CSA.

4Ministry of Italian Africa [hereafter MAI], Political Office, to Cabinet of the Minister of Africa (26 Aug. 1937), AMIA.

ITALY AND ETHIOPIAN ARISTOCRACY, 1937-1940

EXILES IN ITALY: NUMERICAL DIFFERENCES ACCORDING TO SOURCE

1937: 1555 1937: 3778

1937: 1976 1939: 1529

1937: 3247 1939: 8810

CHART 1

EXILES IN ITALY, 1937-1939

March March August December January July 1937 1937 1937 1937 1939 1939

5Princivalle to Vice-GG of AOI (21 March 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 59, CSA.

6Graziani to MC (8 March 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 59, CSA.

7"'Prospectus of the Ethiopian Nobles Sent to Italy" ([Dec.] 1937), AMIA.

8MAI, Political Office, to Cabinet of the Minister of Africa (26 Aug. 1937), AMIA. 9Moreno to Cabinet of the Minister of Africa (31 Jan. 1939), AMIA. l"' Prosp(,ctius of the Ethiopian Nobles Sent to Italy' ([Dec.] 1937), AMIA.

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212 ALBERTO SBACCHI

Allegedly dangerous individuals were sent to isolated places like Longobuco, near Cosenza, Asinara, and the island of Ponza, where Ras Imru, leader of Ethiopia's western army and cousin of Haile Selassie, was confined. Students were sent to Palermo. Older people, women, and children, who were considered harmless, were accommodated at Mercogliano (Avellino). The emperor's daughter Romanework and her children went to Turin under the care of the Missione della Consolata. 11 According to the available documentation, one-fourth of the 350 Ethiopians in Italy were women and children. Six were rases and fifty- four dejazmatches; there were thirty-eight ato (mister), fifteen Iji (noble), fifteen fitaurari (general or knight), three cadi (judge), one sheikh, and one abuna (bishop), among others (see chart 2).12

CHART 2

EXILES IN ITALY DIVIDED BY SEX, 1937-193913

May Aug. Jan. Locality 1937 1937 1937 1938 1939

Asinara Men 214 173 143 141 94 (Sardinia) Women 43 - - -

Children 27 - -

Mercogliano Men - - 32 - 18 (Avellino) Women - 32 37 12

Children - 21 22 - 6

Longobuco Men - 28 34 - 35 (Cosenza) Women - - -

Children --

'lMoreno to Cabinet of the Minister of Africa (31 Jan. 1939), AMIA; MAI, Political Office, to Cabinet of the Minister of Africa (26 Aug. 1937), AMIA; "List of Ethiopians at Asinara" (1938), AMIA; "Ethiopians to be Confined at Mercogliano [Avellino]" (1937), AMIA; "List of Ethiopian Nobles for Whom No Special Police Supervision is Necessary" ([1937]), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 82, CSA.

12This statistic is incomplete. The ranks of many persons are not given, and many nobles purposely did not declare their titles. The term dejazmatch also includes dejazmaz, kegnazmaz, and grazmaz.

13Moreno to Cabinet of the Minister of Africa (31 Jan. 1939), AMIA; MAI, Political Office, to Cabinet of the Minister of Africa (26 Aug. 1937), AMIA; "List of Ethiopians at Asinara" (1938), AMIA; "Prospectus of Ethiopian Subjects Sent to Italy" (1937), AMIA; Dr. Massimo Grisoglia to Ministry of Interior, Political Office, "Report... on the Services Rendered to the Ethiopians at Asinara" (1 May 1937), AMIA.

ITALY AND ETHIOPIAN ARISTOCRACY, 1937-1940 213

CHART 2 (continued)

EXILES IN ITALY DIVIDED BY SEX, 1937-193913

May Aug. Jan. Locality 1937 1937 1937 1938 1939

Palermo Men - 4 4 (Sicily) Women - -

Children -

Ponza: Men- 3 3 - 3 Women - - - -

Children- - - -

Tivoli Men - 11 11 - 18 (Rome) Women - - - 6

Children - - - 4

Tropical Men - 4 -

Hospital Women - 9 -

(Rome) Children - -

Missione della Men - - - -

Consolata Women 1 3 (Turin) Children - 3

Camilluccia Men - - 20 -

(Rome) Women - 10 Children - - 4

Torre Del Men- 15 -

Greco Women - -

(Naples) Children -- -

Naples Men - - -

Women - - 12

Children

Totals Men 214 231 247 141 168 Women 43 41 52 - 21 Children 27 10 32 - 13

Grand Total 284 282 331 141 202

214 ALBERTO SBACCHI

The conditions under which these people lived were precarious.14 Martino Mario Moreno, director of the political office at the Ministry of Africa, complained that the exiles were being sent out of the country precipitately. They had no chance to provide caretakers for their property, and Italians in Ethiopia were encouraged as a result to take possession of their estates, sometimes without even paying rent.15 Several nobles asked that the Ministry of Africa in Italy receive the income from their properties.16 They needed money for clothes in the concentration camps and to supplement food rations, which were limited by the Italian government's lack of funds. In one instance the prefect of Sassari, responsible for the Ethiopian prisoners at Asinara, reported that he had no money to pay food contractors, who had refused to extend any more credit.17 He needed at least five lire per person a day, or over half a million lire a year for about three hundred charges.18 To these expenses were added those for water, heat, clothing, and medical services; in the first six months the expenditure for Asinara alone amounted to half a million lire.19 The prefect of Avellino, who oversaw the exiles at Mercogliano, stated that his food budget was insufficient, and that he needed more money for heat, another expensive commodity.20

Italian documentation also records the difficulties the Ethiopians were having adjusting to their new environment, including the food and the climate. Many were demoralized by their mistreatment at Italian hands, in particular because the Italians differentiated between title- holding families and persons of royal blood. Most of the former were concentrated at Asinara and Mercogliano, while the latter, nearly all

14Nino Villa Santa, A. Scaglione, and others, Amedeo Duca D'Aosta (Rome, 1954), 175.

15Moreno to Teruzzi, Memorandum (Dec. 1938), AMIA. 16Some of the nobles requesting their rent payments were Woiziero Turuerk Aligaz,

Ato Jasu Maru, Woiziero Tzahaity Askale, Woide-Emanuel, Woiziero Debritu Aberet, Woiziero Azede Babicheff, and the widow of Ras Nasibu. All these people wrote directly to the Ministry of Italian Africa. Their correspondence is found among the papers of the Ministry of Italian Africa's Political Office housed at the Central State Archives. See MAI, Political Office [hereafter MAI/PO], busta 21, fol. 14-11, CSA; Petretti to all governors of AOI (23 April 1927), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 60, CSA.

17Vella (prefect of Sassari) to MAI (12 March 1938), AMIA. 18Cerulli to MAI (17 March 1938), AMIA; Cerulli to MAI (2 Sept. 1938), AMIA;

Lessona to GG of AOI (15 May 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 64, CSA; Grisoglia, "Report... on the Services Rendered to Ethiopians at Asinara" (1 May 1937), AMIA.

19Teruzzi to GG-of AOL (29 Nov. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 15, CSA. 20Tamburini (prefect of Avellino) to MAI (4 Oct. 1938), AMIA; Moreno to

Tamburini (20 Dec. 1938), AMIA.


rases and their families, were kept near Rome. The Italian government paid 750,000 lire a year to house the rases in private dwellings at the Camilluccia and at the Villa Leonardi in Tivoli.21 The rases were also given generous salaries, although not enough to compensate for their loss of power and freedom. Enrico Cerulli, one of the directors at the Ministry of Italian Africa, visited Asinara to interview some of those detained there. Dejaz Ayalu Burru, former leader of Amhara, told him that Italy needed the nobles to govern the country. The pacification of the territories outside the capital, especially Shoa, could be effected only through a continuous military campaign; without the cooperation of the nobility such a campaign would be impossible, but he, for one, had been asked to perform only cerefnonial functions. In its own interests, therefore, as well as the nobles', the Italian government should restore their possessions, guarantee their positions, and assure their futures.

Ras Gabre Haywot, son of Ras Mikael of Wallo, said that he had helped Graziani establish his administration in Addis Abeba. Liberated by the Italians after nine years in exile at Haile Selassie's instigation, he hardly expected to be imprisoned by his rescuers.22 Another high- ranking official who complained about Italian treatment was Brehane Markos,23 educated in Catholic missions, former minister of post and telecommunications, and later Ethiopian minister in Istanbul. He told Cerulli that his countrymen could benefit greatly as subjects of an Italian empire, but only if the imperial leaders followed the advice of the aristocracy on a number of issues of local government, tradition, and interethnic relations. Dejaz Makkonen Wosenie, former minister of the interior and mayor of Addis Abeba, had contributed to the submission of Wallamo and the disarmament of its people. He described Ethiopians as tired of war and desirous of peace and security; they would find the return of the aristocracy reassuring. Cerulli also

21Lessona to GG of AOI (10 Aug. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 69, CSA; Lessona to GG of AOI (21 June 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 35, fol. 58, CSA.

22Cerulli, "Report on the Visit to Asinara" (25 April 1937), AMIA. 23Angelo Roncalli (Apostolic delegate of the Vatican in Istanbul, later Pope John

XXIII), "Memorandum on Brehane Markos" (23 Aug. 1936), Graziani Papers, busta 27, CSA. The Ethiopian foreign minister from 1920 to 1930, Brehane Markos helped the Italian government obtain the concession to build the road from Assab to Dessie. He helped Baron Franchetti secure mineral rights in Aussa. As minister of post and telecommunication, he arranged to have the Italian Ansaldo Company build a powerful radio transmitter near Addis Abeba, and he was a close friend of engineer Mario Zambon.

215

216 ALBERTO SBACCHI

spoke to Dejaz Ayale Gebre, former president of the mixed court of justice which had tried Europeans in the pre-invasion period. When Pietro Badoglio entered the capital in May 1936 Ayale Gebre had cooperated in setting up the new judicial organization; after the assassination attempt he had helped search for the guilty persons.24 In these and others Cerulli discovered individuals who had been rewarded for their cooperation with imprisonment, who were condemned and punished without evidence of wrongdoing. Cerulli was convinced that their treatment was both demoralizing and unjust. Moreno agreed; he recommended reparation and an early determination of their status. In his opinion, the rights of the aristocracy had been abused to the point that their trust in the government was shaken beyond repair.25

Unfavorable as the living conditions were for the Ethiopians interned in Italian concentration camps, those at Nocra in Eritrea and at Danane in Somalia were even worse. In these two penal centers were the lower- ranking Ethiopian officials rounded up after the attempt on Graziani's life in 1937. The number at Danane varied from fifteen hundred to sixty-five hundred.26 Many of these were Amhara soldiers, members of the defeated army of Ras Desta Damtu, Haile Selassie's son-in-law, but prisoners taken during the conquest whom Graziani wanted out of the way were also housed there.27 Graziani planned to eliminate all the Ethiopian authorities who would not cooperate with his administration, but especially Amharas and Shoans,28 by sending them to Somalia for life. He transported them into exile in covered trucks by night so they would not be seen by the people. 29 Once in Danane they were organized into units of 150 persons, again on Graziani's order to the governor of Somalia, and allowed to work to earn their food and lodging.

According to Ethiopian eyewitnesses, conditions at Danane were unbearable. Prisoners ate mostly galletta, dry biscuits, rotten with worms. Reportedly the diet reached eighteen hundred calories a day; despite this, body resistance was lowered, and internees became the

24Moreno to GG of AOI (9 July 1938), AMIA; Cerulli, "Report on the Visit to Asinara" (25 April 1937), AMIA.

25Moreno to Teruzzi, Memorandum (Dec. 1938), AMIA; Moreno to the prefect of Avellino (20 Dec. 1938), AMIA.

26Hazon toGG of AOI (24 July 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 62, CSA. 27Graziani to Chief of the Italian Government (21 March 1937), AMIA. 28Graziani to Santini (28 Feb. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 14, CSA; Graziani to

Santini (18 April 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 14, CSA. 29Graziani to Governors of Harar and Somalia (21 March 1937), Graziani Papers,

busta 14, CSA.


victims of various diseases. Hygiene was a problem, and polluted water caused many deaths.30 Without potable water many were forced to drink sea water; they caught dysentery and died at a rate of between fifteen and thirty a day. The climate claimed many lives as well. Ethiopians were used to the cool dry weather of the highlands. Danane, at sea level, was hot, humid, and beaten by monsoonal winds. Italian records show pneumonia as a cause of death at Danane. According to Ethiopian sources, out of sixty-five hundred detained at Danane, 3175 died. Others lived only because they received enough money from their relatives to purchase mineral water and milk.31

But Colonel Azolino Hazon, chief of the Italian police in Ethiopia, reported that mortality at Danane was not very high. Canero Medici of the political office at the Governorate of Somalia affirmed his claim; according to Medici, in August 1937 126 of the approximately eighteen hundred prisoners were ill and thirty-six died, only seven percent and two percent of the total.32 In July 1938 there were six deaths.33 In April 1939 183 persons, or about ten percent of the inmates at Danane, were given medical attention, again according to Italian statistics.34 Because of these conflicting reports, the occurrence of illness and death is difficult to determine, but we can assume that many suffered and died. Graziani's order to supply them with only enough food to live strongly suggests it,35 as do the conditions under which the Ethiopians were confined. Poor facilities, including latrines, the humid climate, malaria, stomach infections, and venereal disease took many lives, especially among those compelled to work on the irrigation canal or on the banana and sugar-cane plantations.36

3?Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice, Documents on Italian War Crimes (2 vols., Addis Abeba, 1950), II, affidavit of Blatta Bekele Hapta Michael (judge of the High Court of Justice of Ethiopia), doc. 18; Italian War Crimes, I, doc. 56; Hazon to GG of AOI (20 Sept. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 66, CSA.

31Italian War Crimes, II, affidavit of Michael Tessemma (official at the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice), doc. 15; Italian War Crimes, I, doc. 56.

32Hazon to GG of AOI (20 Sept. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 66, CSA; Canero Medici to GG of AOI, Mogadisho (21 Sept. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 66, CSA.

33Governor of Somalia to MAI (18 Aug. 1938), AMIA. 34Governor of Somalia, "Economic-Administrative Report of Somalia" (April 1939),

AMIA. 35Grimaldi to Quartermaster General's Branch in Addis Abeba, Makki (9 March

1937), Graziani Papers, busta 14, CSA. 36Governor of Somalia, "Economic-Administrative Report of Somalia" (April 1939),

AMIA. The Italians made sure the Ethiopian aristocracy was not subject to degrading tasks. Petretti to Governor of Somalia (16 May 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 36, fol. 40, CSA; Santini to GG of AOI (24 April 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 36, fol. 40, CSA.

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Italian documents describing the treatment of Ethiopians at Danane are few. Those that exist claim that the largest number of prisoners interned was 2847.37 Ethiopian sources give this figure as 6500. The latter is the more accurate according to Michael Tassemma of the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, medical assistant at Danane for three and a half years and in charge of recording illness and death.38 And indirect Italian evidence indicates the kind of crowded living conditions that lead to health problems. Alessandro Lessona, minister of Italian Africa, urged Graziani to send Ethiopians to other localities to relieve the overcrowding at Danane. He stressed that these alternative camps should be somewhere in Italian East Africa, however, because the penal colonies in Italy were already bulging with prisoners.39 Colonel Hazon noted that the number of latrines at Danane was insufficient to accommodate the increased population.40 These reports suggest that many of those who died at Danane were the victims of confinement and poor living conditions as much as of disease.

At Nocra (Dahlak Islands) near Massawa the situation was even worse. In 1937 the island prison contained five hundred serving life sentences for serious political crimes. By 1939 most Ethiopian political prisoners had been returned from Italy, and some found their way to Nocra. Combined with other political prisoners, the new arrivals swelled the number of detainees to fifteen hundred. Inmates at Nocra were subjected to forced labor in quarries; they manufactured cement or were assigned to AGIP, the Italian petroleum company exploring for oil.41 Temperatures at Nocra averaged 122?F (50?C), taking a heavy toll of inmates, who suffered sunstroke, marsh fever, from lack of fresh water, and dysentery.42 And bad as conditions were, there seemed little chance that they would improve, since those who endured them were considered politically dangerous. The arrival of the Duke of Aosta as viceroy in late 1937 signaled a shift in attitude, however, and the status of the Ethiopian aristocracy changed again.

The Duke of Aosta wanted to ameliorate the situation for human-

37MAI, "Ethiopian Prisoners" ([1937]), AMIA. 38Italian War Crimes, passim. 39Lessona to Graziani (15 May 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 59, CSA. 40Hazon to GG of AOI (20 Sept. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 34, fol. 66, CSA. 41Daodiace, "Report on My Second Year of Government in Eritrea" (1939), AMIA;

Daodiace, "Political:Administrative Report on Eritrea" (Dec. 1937), AMIA; Corriere Eritreo (19 Jan. 1939).

42Italian War Crimes, II, affidavit of Jacob Gabre Leul (lieutenant colonel in the Ethiopian army), doc. 16.


itarian reasons, but he also felt that the Ethiopian elite would be useful in helping administer the country. His visit to Asinara had convinced Cerulli that only a handful of the approximately three hundred prisoners were even indirectly involved in the assassination attempt, a fact which added to their demoralization.43 Other colonial officials, for example Renzo Meregazzi, chief pf the cabinet at the Ministry of Africa, Attilio Teruzzi, minister of Italian Africa, and Moreno agreed with Cerulli that, following the assassination attempt, many of the aristocracy had been detained on minimal evidence and without trial. A large number of persons with no political significance had been sent to Italy at great expense when they could have been held at Ambas, a natural mountain fortress, at no cost to the government.44 Many of those incarcerated in Italy had rendered favors to the colonial regime; as a result, it was widely believed in Ethiopia that to submit to the Italians was to endanger one's life and liberty.45 Not unnaturally, the prisoners themselves resented their confinement and distrusted Italians and Italian justice. This further lowered Italy's prestige.46 For all these reasons, the new viceroy was anxious to return the rases, dejazmatches, and other exiles home to restore trust in the Italian government and prevent dissension among the people.

In early 1938 Moreno suggested that the detainees reenter Ethiopia gradually, beginning with women, children, and demonstrably innocent men.47 In June Mussolini decided that those whose presence in Ethiopia posed no political problem should be released at once; others could be relocated under police supervision in Obbia and Rocca Littorio in Somalia. The Asinara inmates could go to Danane, while those at Tivoli, Mercogliano, and Longobuco would remain there. As welcome as the release of the innocent would be, Mussolini's relocation scheme would hardly restore confidence in the colonial government. Rather it would increase antagonism, because going to Somalia was considered a harsher punishment than staying in Sardinia.48

43Cerulli, "Report on the Visit to Asinara" (25 April 1937), AMIA. Ironically, those responsible for the plan, Abraha Debac Mogos Asghedon, Brehane Hopte Mikael, and Blatta Ayele Gabru, had escaped and were free in Ethiopia.

44Teruzzi to Duke of Aosta (14 Feb. 1938), AMIA. 45Moreno to Teruzzi (26 April 1938), AMIA. 46Moreno to Teruzzi, Memorandum (Dec. 1938), AMIA; Meregazzi to Teruzzi (21

June 1938), AMIA. 47Moreno, "Memorandum on the Return to Ethiopia of the Ethiopians Exiled in

Italy" (27 June 1938), AMIA; Moreno to Teruzzi (26 April 1938), AMIA. 48Moreno, "Memorandum on the Return to Ethiopia of the Ethiopians Exiled in

Italy" (27 June 1938), AMIA; Moreno to Teruzzi (26 April 1938), AMIA.

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Determining which Ethiopians would be returned, and in what order, was not an easy task. The General Governorate of Italian East Africa was given orders to review the political merits of each case and issue acts of clemency,49 which in reality were nothing less than acknowledg- ments of the political, psychological, and material damage Italy had caused. In 1938, another proposal for the repatriation of the exiles was put forward: those who were harmless should be returned home but kept under surveillance, while those considered politically dangerous should be sent to Somalia. Teruzzi agreed that all the women and children at Mercogliano, with the exception of the family of Workeneh Martin, the Ethiopian minister exiled in London, should be repatriated immediately. Abuna Isak and Afework Gebre Jesus, the former

Ethiopian minister in Rome, returned. The inmates at Asinara were sent to Somalia,50 and Ras Imru remained on the island of Ponza, but Ras Seyum of Tigre, Ras Getachew, former governor of Kaffa, Ras Kebbede of Ghedem-Enfrata, and Dejaz Asserat, son of former minister of war Ras Mulugeta, were home by the end of 1938.51

The reentry procedure was accelerated by an incident provoked by Zerai Derres, an Eritrean who had served as interpreter to the confined rases. On 13 June 1938 Derres stood in front of the monument to the fallen heroes of Dogali in Rome and began shouting anti-Italian and pro-Haile Selassie slogans to the public. Several persons were injured in an attempt to silence him.52 In anger, Mussolini ordered the

repatriation of all Ethiopian interpreters and nobles, and in the meantime he forbade them to go out of their houses, saying he didn't want to see any more "niggers" on the streets of Italy.53 But in spite of his order, the rases were still in Italy in October,54 delayed by the paperwork involved in examining each case. In November 1938 the Ministry of Africa expressed reservations about repatriating Ras

Seyum, Ras Kebbede, Ras Getachew, and Dejaz Asserat, perhaps because of their part in the Zerai Derres incident. Teruzzi recommended that they be sent to Libya or the Italian Aegean islands rather than to Italian East Africa. The women and children could return,

49Moreno to Teruzzi, Memorandum (Dec. 1938), AMIA. 50Meregazzi to MAI (23 June 1938), AMIA. 51Meregazzi to Teruzzi, on board the Victoria (24 May 1938), AMIA. 52Meregazzi to Teruzzi (15 June 1938), AMIA. 53Moreno to prefects of Avellino, Cosenza, Sassari, and Rome (15 May 1938),

AMIA; Meregazzi to MAI, Political Office (15 June 1938), AMIA; Meregazzi to Teruzzi (15 June 1938), AMIA.

54Teruzzi, handwritten notes (18 June 1938), AMIA.


however, as could a group of fifty at Asinara, as soon as accommodation could be found for them in Addis Abeba. In addition, Muslim and Orthodox Christian leaders such as Cadi Ahmed Abdalla and Giaha Ahmed were allowed to return; in their cases the Italians hoped to accrue some political advantage from their release. Those remaining in Italy would be able to go back when the political situation permitted.55 Thus, at the end of 1938 and the beginning of 1939, after more than eighteen months' confinement, the first Ethiopians came home.

In response to pressure from the Ministry of Africa for a speedy implementation of its decision, and perhaps to leave a favorable impression in the people's minds, Graziani marked his departure from Addis Abeba in 1938 by releasing nine hundred prisoners at Danane. Generous and humanitarian, his act of clemency was impractical since it was done indiscriminately. Among the nine hundred were many students from the School of Holetta, who had sworn to oppose the colonial government and had supported the attempt on Graziani's life. The pardon put the incoming viceroy, the Duke of Aosta, in an embarrassing position: to punish the transgressors he would now have to either reopen court proceedings against them, or reimprison them at Nocra and bring new charges against them later.56 In a similar manner, repatriation caused problems that offset any heightening of Italian prestige the original act might have promised. The return of so many caused a serious housing shortage. Moreover, as most of the nobles left the concentration camps destitute, the colonial government had to support them financially. Added to the various other difficulties the Italian government was experiencing, the influx of repatriated exiles made the administration of the empire even more ineffective. Even the political benefit to Italy of their release was limited by the overwhelm- ing number of pardons granted. Used with moderation and at advantageous moments, restoring the nobles' freedom might have had the meaningful political effect the Italians hoped. 57

The Duke of Aosta recommended that the nobles be pardoned gradually; he also pointed out that much more significant use could be made of their administrative and political potential. On the other hand, he realized that the Ethiopian feudal system could not be changed

55Teruzzi, "Notes for the Duce" (10 Nov. 1938), AMIA; Teruzzi to GG of AOI (18 Nov. 1938), AMIA.

56Duke of Aosta to MAI (21 Feb. 1938), Graziani Papers, busta 27, fol. 10, CSA. 57Duke of Aosta to MAI (19 March 1938), AMIA; Corriere Eritreo (19 Jan. 1939);

Gazzetta Del Popolo (14 Nov. 1938).

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overnight. This difficulty had been circumvented in Eritrea by an Italian campaign to progressively transform the traditional customs and ways of thinking. The viceroy thought this could be done in Ethiopia by introducing and applying Italian institutions, especially the Italian judicial system. The nobles could be encouraged to support such changes with financial compensation,58 the amount determined by how well they served Italy's interests. Returning the rases' political and military power was of course out of the question, the duke said, but they should nevertheless be treated with the respect their titles and their former positions in Haile Selassie's government deserved.59

The duke's plan to use loyal nobles as high-ranking state function- aries and executives in the colonial government was strongly criticized by the Fascist party.60 Nevertheless, it was evident that restoring at least some of the exiles' former power was necessary. In Amhara and Shoa, government control had little impact outside the resident's territorial seat, and, with few well-qualified colonial officials to represent it, Italy elicited only limited cooperation from the people. Moreover, Ethiopians traditionally obeyed only their own governors, another reason to put them in leadership positions. The viceroy won his point, and a move was made to restore authority on conditional terms, with the first two to assume their old positions being Dejaz Gugsa of Tigre and Ras Hailu of Gojam.61

The wider political situation made some kind of accommodation crucial. Italy anticipated an international war, in which case a hostile population and an unfriendly elite would prove an impediment. In an attempt to inspire trust and eliminate uncertainty, the duke contacted a number of dissident notables in Amhara and asked for their submission in return for a guarantee of justice.62 Preliminary discussions were opened in 1939 with nationalist leaders like Asfaw-Bogale of Debre Tabor and Dagnau Tessema of Belesa63 to determine the concessions the Italians would make in return for acceptance by these notables and their followers. The same method was followed in Shoa, where

58Duke of Aosta to MAI (25 Oct. 1938), AMIA. 59Duke of Aosta to MAI (Feb. 1938), in Villa Santa, Scaglione, and others, Amedeo

Duca D'Aosta, 177. 60National Fascist Party to Mussolini (30 Oct. 1938), Segreteria Particolare del Duce,

Carteggio Ordinario, busta 260, fol. 1, CSA. 61Moreno to Teruzzi, Memorandum (26 April 1938), AMIA. 62Duke of Aosta to MAI (Feb. 1938), in Villa Santa, Scaglione, and others, Amedeo

Duca D'Aosta, 177. 63Frusci, "Political Report of the Governorate of Amhara" (April 1939), AMIA.


innumerable military campaigns had made the people particularly hostile to the government. Here General Guglielmo Nasi, vice- governor general of Italian East Africa, began talks with Abebe Aregai, the leader of the Shoan opposition, to secure his submission. At the moment of success, a resident massacred a number of Abebe's followers, and the agreement failed. The results of these meetings bore some fruit, however. All of 1939, as negotiations continued, peace reigned throughout Shoa and part of Amhara. The number of aggressive incidents diminished, as did their resultant threat to Italian rule. Despite this advantage, the attempts at appeasement by the viceroy and the vice-governor general were too late to be really beneficial.

Another policy error the duke attempted to correct concerned Ethiopian participation in a Council of the Empire. The constitution of Italian East Africa, as spelled out in the Legge Organica and the Ordinamento Politico Ammistrativo, provided that a council be called at least once a year. Six members of the assembly were to be Ethiopian leaders, one representing each of the six governorates into which Italian East Africa was divided. Although the council was to be an advisory body, it could have functioned as a forum for discussing colonial matters with those familiar with the problems of their people,64 and served as a contact point between the Italian government and its subjects. In July 1936, however, Graziani had been unable to make the appointments because he was not familiar enough with the rases to know which ones would be loyal. The one individual he felt was trustworthy, Ras Hailu, he nominated as adviser for internal affairs.65 But Lessona observed that singling out Ras Hailu would make the other nobles jealous, and he proposed five more for places on the council, among them the Muslim rulers Sufian Abdullahi, son of the former emir of Harar, and Abba Dula and his son Abba Jiobir of Jimma, both of whom had submitted to Italy in writing even before the Italo- Ethiopian war. Lessona foresaw no difficulty in finding suitable candidates in Eritrea and Somalia, and as for the newly acquired Christian territories of Amhara and Shoa, whose notables were little known to the Italians, let them be brought to Addis Abeba as

64Law of 1 June 1936, No. 1019, Art. 24; Law of 11 Nov. 1937, No. 2708, Arts. 15-17. See Gennaro Mondaini, Legislazione Coloniale Italiana (2 vols., Milan, 1941), II, 423-425; Renzo Meregazzi, Lineamenti della Legislazione per l'Impero (Milan, 1939), 47-48.

65Graziani to MC (8 July 1936), AMIA.

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councillors without actually being nominated as such. They could serve as advisers, and as hostages as well.66

Graziani responded with a more definitive list of nominees. He thought that Ras Hailu could represent Gojam; Ras Kebbede, Shoa; Ras Gabre Haywot, Amhara and Gondar; Dejaz Gugsa, Eritrea; Sufian

Abdullahi, Harar and Somalia; and Abba Jiobir of Jimma, the territory of Galla-Sidama. Graziani also suggested to the Ministry of Africa that, considering the great ethnic and linguistic diversity among the Ethiopian people, their representation in the council was very small. Moreover, limiting membership denied the viceroy the use of other important personalities in the empire, such as Ras Seyum of Tigre and Dejaz Ayalu Burru of Amhara. As a result, instead of encouraging cooperation by allowing the aristocracy a voice in the administration, the establishment of the Council of the Empire was a source of resentment among those traditional leaders not chosen to sit on it. To avoid this, Graziani proposed that the number of Ethiopian councillors be increased.67

Both Mussolini and Lessona rejected this suggestion, although Lessona counterproposed calling the most important nobles to Addis Abeba and giving them salaries scaled according to their rank.68 As politically advantageous as their presence in the capital might be, however, it also would give rise to the more immediate danger of gathering all the potential troublemakers in the empire in one place. Graziani foresaw in Lessona's suggestion the possibility of creating a class of people paid to do nothing but breed dissatisfaction. On the other hand, he was certain that, given constructive employment in which they could take pride, many of the rases could prove as useful to the colonial government as was Ras Hailu. The Gojami chief had been officially nominated adviser to the viceroy, and had disarmed the people of Addis Abeba and Shoa in a short time when all Italy's attempts to do so had failed.69 Another person who could have been very helpful to the Italians was Ras Seyum of Tigre, but Mussolini suspected his loyalty, and denied him council membership on those grounds.70

Stymied in his attempts to exploit the rases in administering their people by ministry objections and Mussolini's opposition, Graziani

66Lessona to Graziani (11 July 1936), AMIA. 67Graziani to Lessona (28 July 1936), AMIA. 68Lessona to Graziani (1 Aug. 1936), AMIA. 69Graziani to MC (27 July 1936), AMIA. 70Lessona to Graziani (4 Aug. 1936), Graziani Papers, busta 23, CSA.


found it expedient to postpone calling the council indefinitely.71 Other causes contributed to the delay as well, such as the conquest of western Ethiopia, the mass exile of the nobles to concentration camps, and revolt in Amhara and Shoa. By the time Graziani left, no one paid attention to the absence of council meetings, despite the fact that the colonial constitution required a yearly convocation. The Duke of Aosta inherited this situation but he had little chance to rectify it, since by that time most of the Ethiopian aristocracy was interned away from Addis Abeba.

In a general review of how best to exploit the rases after their return in 1939, however, Moreno revived Graziani's suggestion to raise the number of council members. Moreover, Moreno proposed that each of the local governorates be provided with a consultative body on internal affairs. In this way all Ethiopians above a certain rank would become involved in the colonial government. Participation in these bodies could be made attractive by generous salaries, which Moreno felt was a cheaper proposition than maintaining the large army required to keep order without the rases' cooperation.72 Despite these arguments, by the end of 1939 the colonial governors were convinced that calling a council would be useless: the Ethiopian representatives, divided by race, religion, language, and understanding of Western culture, shared neither the same interests73 nor the same opinions on how internal problems should be solved. As a result, the Council of the Empire was never called, and in 1940 the Committee for the Reform of the Fundamental Laws of Ethiopia recommended its abolition in light of the new racial law which prohibited the participation of colonial subjects in the administration of the empire.74

The death of the council, the only approved structure for Ethiopian participation in the colonial administration, had been assured by the policy of niente potere ai ras, which prohibited sharing power with the rases. Mussolini had reminded the Duke of Aosta on a visit to Rome in June 1938 that Ethiopian traditional leaders were to be confined to Addis Abeba and were forbidden to occupy positions of military or political importance. They were to be kept happy and paid generous

71Lessona to Graziani (12 Sept. 1936), Graziani Papers, busta 13, CSA; Lessona to Graziani (3 Oct. 1936), Graziani Papers, busta 13, CSA.

72Moreno to Teruzzi, Memorandum (26 April 1938), AMIA. 73Duke of Aosta to MAI, "Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Governors of AOI"

(11-12 Dec. 1939), AMIA. 74Committee for the Reform of the Fundamental Laws of AOI to Teruzzi (14 Nov.

1940), AMIA.

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salaries and could be consulted individually on questions concerning the Ethiopian people, but the number of rases Italy would recognize formally was six, and even one of these would not be replaced if the titleholder died.75

Despite Mussolini's strict proscriptions, under the Duke of Aosta the condition of the Ethiopian nobility improved, since the duke sometimes followed his own judgment rather than the duce's orders in dealing with his aristocratic subjects. He could hardly do otherwise than promote Dejaz Gugsa to ras, since Badoglio had promised to make the appointment in 1936. In addition, he rewarded other nobles for supporting his administration. At Maskal, the Festival of the Cross, Haile Selassie customarily had distributed gifts and titles; in September 1938 the viceroy continued the tradition, bestowing the title of dejazmatch on Sebhautu Johannes, an interpreter; Takle Markos, former minister of post and communications; and Fullas Wonneta, chief of the Christian Guraje.76 At the 1939 Maskal five nobles were awarded the title of ras: Ayalu Burru of Amhara; Kidane Miriam, chief of Arresa (Eritrea); Barachi Beshit, military leader of the colonial troops in Eritrea; Amedie Ali, traditional ruler of the Borana region; and Abba-Ukum Burru of Shoa, political adviser to the colonial government.77

The new viceroy was anxious to impress the aristocracy with the greatness of Italy's culture and the benefits their country could derive from association with it. For this reason he sent delegates from all over Italian East Africa to the second anniversary celebration of the founding of the Italian empire in Rome on 9 May 1939.78 About forty nobles,

75The rases to which Mussolini was referring were Ras Seyum of Tigre, Ras Kebbede of Wollo, Ras Getachew of Shoa, Ras Gugsa of Tigre-Eritrea, Ras Hailu of Gojam, and Ras Gabre Haywot of Wollo-Gondar. Meregazzi to Teruzzi, Addis Abeba (24 June 1938), AMIA; MAI to MAI, Political Office (June 1938), AMIA; Meregazzi to Teruzzi (22 June 1938), AMIA. To keep the rases under surveillance in Addis Abeba, a number of houses with gardens were built for them. See Nasi, "Bi-Yearly Report of the General Governorate of AOI" (July 1939), AMIA.

76Duke of Aosta to MAI (27 Oct. 1938), AMIA. 77Corriere dell'Impero (29 Sept. 1939); Azione Coloniale (5 Oct. 1939). None of the

Galla nobles were awarded the title of ras, a fact which caused resentment among the Galla people. Especially bitter were the brothers Johannes and Hosanna Jottie, who had helped the Italians defeat Ras Imru and conquer western Ethiopia. Marraffa to MAI, Political Office, "Information from SIM [Italian intelligence agency]" (15 Sept. 1939), MAI/PO, busta 1, fol. 5, CSA; Teruzzi to GG of AOI (10 Nov. 1939), AMIA.

78Located in the Archives of the Ministry of Italian Africa are three different major lists of the nobles invited to Italy for the ceremonies, each list reporting a different set of figures. One, "List of Participants to the Second Anniversary of the Foundation of the


with their wives, children, and interpreters, represented the Christians, the Muslims, and peoples of indigenous religions in the empire. An especially large delegation came from Amhara, where the duke was particularly interested in spreading word of Italy's military power. Many of the exiles were also invited to attend the ceremonies,79 although they were not allowed to sit with their countrymen for fear they would stir up anti-Italian feeling among the visitors from home.

For the latter, the schedule of activities included an audience with the king of Italy on 13 May and with Mussolini on 2 June 1938. The duce and his visitors, Ras Hailu, Dejaz Gugsa, Sherifa El Morgani of Eritrea, Sultan Olol Dindle of Ogaden, Sultan Abba Jiobir, the Echege, and the head of the monks of the Ethiopian Orthodox church, Abuna Yohannes, exchanged presents to commemorate the occasion. Yohannes received a heavy gold Coptic cross,80 a gift that symbolized Italy's support of the Ethiopian church, now independent with Italian help from the patriarch of Alexandria. Abuna Yohannes was also taken to the Church of Saint Mark in Venice,81 while others of the delegates visited the industrial centers in Genoa, Milan, Turin, and Venice, and

Italian Empire," gives the following from the governorate general of Addis Abeba: Abuna Johannes Tamrat, Fitaurari Dilnessau, Dejaz Johannes Hailu, Dejaz Tessemma Johannes, Ras Hailu, Dejaz Abba Akau Burru, and nine servants. From the governorate of Somalia came: Sultan Olol Dindle, Hugas Mumim Warfaia, Hugas Mohammed Ashi, Sheik Mohammed, Chief Hussen Haile, Chief Ezzi Gurei (Abdullai Dirie Dinle), and seven servants; from the Governorate of Harar: Dejaz Mellion Tedla Fitaurari Igzau Chetema, Sultan Nur Dadi, Sheik Ussein Sude, Imam Mohammed (Sufian Emir Abdullai), accompanied by four servants; from the Governorate of Galla-Sidamo: Sultan Abba Jiobir Abba Dula, Sultan Abba Jiobir Gumai, Fitaurari Gebremedhin Abbaboghib, Noble Desta (Dejaz Hosanna Jiottie, Dejaz Israel Jiottie), and five servants; from the Governorate of Amhara: Dejaz Woldesellassie Gebre, Dejaz Joseph Burru, Dejaz Wubinesh Sheccol, Dejaz Matabie Derso, Dejaz Mesfin Ajalu Ghemer, Fitaurari Ghetahun Meccia, Dejaz Nugguru Hailu (Dejaz Issa Shiaraf), and eight servants; from the Governorate of Eritrea: Dejaz Haile Selassie Gugsa, Dejaz Chidane Mariam Chebremeshel, Dejaz Beine Barashi, Dejaz Abraha Tessemma, Dejaz Hassen Ali, Diglel Gelani El Husein, Sherifa Aluia El Morgani, Dejaz Hagos Ghebre, with a following of fourteen servants, four women, and three children.

79The rases already in Italy at the time were: Ras Seyum, Woiziero Atzede Asgaw, Ras Kebbede, Ras Getachew, Woiziero Luladei Zamanuel, Dejaz Asserat, Dejaz Ajalu, Dejaz Mekkonen Wosenie. Ras Hailu was very ill, the result of complications from diabetes, syphilis, and pneumonia. Teruzzi nevertheless insisted on his being present in Rome because Mussolini wanted to recognize him publicly for his services to Italy. Teruzzi to Viceroy (18 April 1938), AMIA; Duke of Aosta to MAI (21 April 1939), AMIA.

80Meregazzi to Teruzzi, Addis Abeba (2 June 1938), AMIA; "Notes for Teruzzi" (6 July 1938), AMIA.

8lTeruzzi to prefect of Turin (13 May 1938), AMIA.

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witnessed naval maneuvers in Naples. For propaganda reasons, the tour emphasized Italy's production capacity. The government hoped the Ethiopians would return home impressed with its booming industry, and in reporting to their countrymen would convince them of the futility of continuing hostilities against colonial control.

In Turin they visited an airplane factory, and Alessandro Federici della Costa, chancellor at the ministry, reported that the Amhara agreed among themselves that Haile Selassie was wrong in claiming during the Italo-Ethiopian war that Britain supplied all of Italy's aircraft. They could see that the Italians were capable of fulfilling their own needs. At the Fiat factory, according to Federici della Costa, these same nobles called Haile Selassie a fool for thinking he could resist so powerful an enemy, and cursed him for involving them in a war which had caused so many Ethiopian deaths. 82

Back at home, the delegates lived up to the government's expecta- tions. General Ottorino Mezzetti, governor of Amhara, wrote that the traditional leaders in his province had been highly impressed with Italy's organization, industry, and military strength. Roman monu- ments had amazed them. Their audiences with Mussolini and the king had made them proud to serve in the Italian government, and other Amhara notables, intrigued by their reports, wanted to see Italy, too.83 General Guglielmo Nasi, governor of Harar, said the Harari delegates had been bewildered by Italian culture, material progress, and industrial

capacity. They described what they had witnessed as miraculous. Nor did the stories lose in the telling. In recounting their trip the delegates magnified Italy's power and achievements, but their listeners received it as accurate, in particular because they respected the source. Nasi reiterated the advantage to the colonial government of their accepting such propaganda. If the Ethiopians could be convinced that their material culture would prosper from belonging to the Italian empire, they might forget about their lost independence. To further this aim, Nasi suggested that nobles visit Italy regularly,84 and Mussolini agreed to receive small groups of five each in the following months.85

82Federici della Costa Alessandro (chancellor at the MAI) to Meregazzi, chief of the Cabinet of the Minister of Africa (14 July 1938), AMIA.

83Mezzetti to GG of AOI, Gondar (7 July 1938), AMIA. 84Nasi, "Political Report of the Governorate of Harar" (July 1939), AMIA. 85Moreno, handwritten notes (July 1938), AMIA; Moreno to Teruzzi (25 April

1938), AMIA.


If these visits were politically useful, however, the presence of Ethiopians in Italy caused delight in the populace and problems for the authorities. The Italian people were little affected by racial prejudice or the problems of accommodation it posed. When they saw Ethiopians in the streets they gathered around to greet them. In Genoa they gave them a sincere welcome. They solicited their autographs, their photographs, and handshakes.86 The officials in charge of the visitors had a different reaction, however. In 1924 Ras Hailu and Haile Selassie had stayed at the Grand Hotel, and later Dejaz Gugsa had stayed at the Excelsior. These were the two best hotels in Rome. Although minor nobles were assigned second-class establishments like the Metropolitan and the Milan, it was thought politically unwise to put the more prominent visitors in anything less prestigious than the Excelsior or the Grand. Not only did this practice put the Ethiopians under the same roof as whites, sometimes Italians were moved out or turned away to make room for them. A number of Englishmen left hotels in the fashionable Via Veneto in protest against their accommodation of the blacks, and to add to the confusion, Muslims refused to share quarters with Christians, and Libyans with Ethiopians.

Moreover, the Ethiopians did not behave according to accepted Italian standards of etiquette and mores. They lounged in the hotel armchairs and failed to give them up to ladies. They patronized houses of prostitution and were served by Italian waiters, whom they tipped generously, both offenses against the notion of racial superiority. They ran up enormous bills, which the government took its time paying.87 At the Hotel Milan in 1938 they left an outstanding debt of 64,156 lire, and a year later the account was not paid. The owner of the Societ'a Esercizi Alberghi, Brazzi Fortunato, was compelled to take the Ministry of Africa to court to collect his money.88 While the Ethiopians could not be blamed for the government's tardiness, it hardly endeared them to their hosts.

In September 1938 a memorandum went out on ways to counteract these problems. To eliminate contact between Ethiopians and whites, a special village was to be built in Rome, with an Orthodox church and a Muslim mosque.89 In the meantime, one whole floor of the Hotel

86Federici della Costa Alessandro to Meregazzi (14 July 1938), AMIA.

87Meregazzi to MAI, Political Office (20 June 1938), AMIA. 88Prefect of Rome to MAI, "Notice to Appear in Court as Requested by Hotel

Milano," Rome (19 April 1939), AMIA. 89Moreno to Teruzzi (23 June 1938), AMIA.

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Russia was rented for ninety thousand lire a year, the Hotel Russia being constructed so that the Ethiopians could use a different entrance and elevator than the Italian guests.90 The memorandum also stipulated that the visitors would be served only by Ethiopian servants.91 Its proposals were not implemented, however. In Ethiopia Italian waiters served the rases at parties and feasts,92 and in 1939 the Ministry of Africa rented the Via Scarlatti, seven miles outside Rome, at fifty thousand lire a year to accommodate distinguished Ethiopian guests.93

Italian confusion over relations with the nobles extended even to language. On 22 July 1939 Teruzzi ordered the viceroy and his staff to address Ethiopians of every rank as tu (you), a form which implies disrespect. 94 The Duke of Aosta insisted on the more formal voi (or lei), however, at least for the most important individuals, and Teruzzi agreed.95 The duke's victory on the question of address was indicative of his success in determining a more reasonable attitude toward the aristocracy under his control. By 1939 his policy had done a great deal to restore the authority and prestige of the more powerful traditional rulers. Some he appointed his personal counsellors; others were given judicial posts. Increasingly Ethiopian opinion was heard on conflicts between ethnic groups. Particularly in Amhara and Shoa, where the presence of a great many notables created the potential for an influential and dissentient class of unemployed, the viceroy called on these people for help and advice.96

The duke's efforts to involve the rases in the colonial structure marked the beginnings of a radical transformation in the traditional system of governing. No longer would a ras rule his territory absolutely; instead, he became a representative of the central government.97 Elites, especially among the Amhara, served as advisers to the viceroy and to governors of regions or as regional governors themselves. Nasi records that an Ethiopian was given wide administrative and judicial powers in Addis Abeba and that a young noble assumed the residency of

90MAI, "Memorandum for Dell'Armi" (16 Sept. 1938), AMIA. 91Caroselli to MAI, Political Office (6 Sept. 1938), AMIA. 92Meregazzi to GG of AOI (16 March 1940), AMIA. 93MAI, Political Office, "Memorandum for Teruzzi" (19 Aug. 1941), AMIA. The

person responsible for the villa was Major Francesco Torresani. 94Teruzzi to GG of AOI (27 July 1939), AMIA. 95Duke of Aosta to Teruzzi (5 Sept. 1939), AMIA; Teruzzi to GG of AOI (6 Sept.

1939), AMIA; Teruzzi to GG of AOI (21 Oct. 1939), AMIA. 96Azione Coloniale (12 Feb. 1942). 97 A. Bertola, Storia ed Istituzioni dei Paesi Afro-Asiatici (Turin, 1964), 270.


Marabatie. He also indicates at least the intention to make Ato Abegaz commissioner of Selale.98 By 1939-1940, a conscious and innovative structure for governing the empire was emerging. The sultan of Aussa, Mohammed Jaja Amfari, was restored to a position of almost complete autonomy, although he was technically under the supervision of the district commissioner at Assab. In his case, however, the political motive was extremely practical, since the sultan was the only ruler able to control the unruly Danakil people, both in Ethiopia and in neighboring French Somalia.99 For this service to Italy he received fifteen thousand lire a month, of which he returned twenty thousand a year as a fixed tribute to Italian sovereignty.100 Another influential chief who was valuable to the colonial government was Abba Jifar, an important Muslim leader who broadcasted Italian propaganda throughout the Arabic-speaking world.101 He was also instrumental in fighting opposition in Galla-Sidama and in naming trustworthy rases who would side with Italy in the event of a European war. Abba Jifar was so valuable to the Italians that they allowed him a bodyguard of ten armed men, a privilege few Ethiopians enjoyed.102 In Ogaden, Sultan Olol Dindle was made paramount ruler, and many of the chiefs in Galla- Sidama were restored. The Jottie family regained their lands in western Ethiopia, as did Sultan Mustafa Gojali of Beni Shangul. And in another attempt to conciliate the nobles, the viceroy conferred the title of ras on Dejaz Ayalu Burru, even though he was not of royal blood. The new titleholder was sent to Amhara, where Governor Mezzetti assigned him the task of arranging a reconciliation between the government and anti- Italian Amhara leaders.103 Individuals like these, whom Italy had planned in 1936 and 1937 to eliminate, were by 1938 becoming valuable tools in the governing of the empire. Not only was the duke willing to allow indigenous leaders to rule in some areas, he also considered experimenting with local governing councils composed solely of elected Ethiopians. But implementing such plans took time and patience, and the advent of World War II made them impossible.

98G. Nasi, Noi Italiani in Etiopia (Rome, 1950). 99Daodiace, "Political-Administrative Report of the Governorate of Eritrea, Semester

July-Dec. 1938," AMIA. l??Daodiace, "Political Report of the District Commissioners of Eritrea" (Sept.

1938), AMIA. 10?Alfieri (minister of propaganda) to MAI (7 June 1938), AMIA. 102Gazzera, "Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Commissars of the Governorate

of Galla Sidama," Jimma (12 June 1939), AMIA; Geloso, "Political Report of the Governorate of Galla Sidama" (March 1937), AMIA.

103Duke of Aosta to MAI (22 Oct. 1938), AMIA; R. Di Lauro, Come Abbiamo Difeso l'Impero (Rome, 1949), 331; Nasi, Noi Italiani in Etiopia.

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The most influential of the rases was Ras Hailu, on whom the Italians conferred extensive honors and in whom they placed an inordinate amount of trust.104 Graziani ordered General G. Belly, commander of Italian forces at Ambo, to respect Ras Hailul05 and to take his advice on inter-Ethiopian affairs.106 The Italian government decorated him with the Star of Italy and the Order of San Maurizio and Lazzaro.107 Members of his family also received titles, decorations, and residencies in Burie. 108 Many of his former headmen replaced leaders installed by Ras Imru in 1935, and were rewarded with salaries and positions for their help to Italian troops in 1936.109 Seventy of Hailu's followers who had taken part in the conquest of western Ethiopia received titles and pensions. 110 In recognition of Hailu's contribution, Graziani stayed the execution of rebel members of his family,1ll although he also hoped that the ras would persuade his nephew, Dejaz Negash, his son-in-law, Dejaz Mangasha Jambore, and his daughter Seblewangel to submit to Italian forces. In addition, Graziani wanted Hailu to use his influence in Gojam to eliminate Ras Imru's men and the patriots who opposed the government. 112

Honored, promoted above other nobles, the anticolonial members of his family given special treatment, Ras Hailu was also rewarded materially. His wealth and avariciousness were famous; he was said to be, with the exception of Haile Selassie, the richest man in Ethiopia.113 Much of the property that Haile Selassie had confiscated before 1935 had been returned to him; only that held by others loyal to the Italians

104Valentino B. Vecchi, "Notes on the Events in Ethiopia" (3 Aug. 1942), AMIA. G15Graziani to Geloso (2 June 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 35, CSA.

106Graziani to Duke of Aosta (25 Dec. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 35, CSA. 107Graziani to MAI (15 Nov. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 35, CSA; Duke of Aosta

to MAI (28 April 1938), AMIA. N08Nasi, Noi Italiani in Etiopia.

109Pirzio Biroli, "Political Report of the Governorate of Amhara" (June 1937), AMIA.

ll?Graziani to Duke of Aosta (25 Dec. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 35, CSA. 1 lGraziani to Governorate of Amhara (24 Oct. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 35, fol.

80, CSA. 112Graziani to Biroli (27 Oct. 1937), AMIA. 1l3Riccardo Astuto, "Political Report of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Amhara" (30 Sept.

1933), Carte del Primo Aiutante del Re, Carteggio Segreto, filza 135, CSA. It was believed that Ras Hailu owned twenty-one thousand head of cattle and several thousand head of horses and mules. From his estates and other land in Addis Abeba alone he received thirty-five thousand Maria Theresa dollars a year as rent. Rinaldini to Morgagni, Brussels (3 March 1936), Stefani-Morgagni Papers, busta 7, fol. 18, CSA; Ministry of Foreign Affairs to MC, "Notes sur l'Ethiopie" (25 Nov. 1935), AMIA.


remained with its new owners, and the ras was compensated for what he could not repossess in the amount of 126,000 lire.114 He was allowed to build a house in the Italian district of Addis Abeba, a privilege forbidden any other Ethiopian.115 Permitted also to conduct business, he bought vast tracts of land in the area of the great markets and speculated in wheat and cereal, upsetting the prices for those commodities in the capital and its environs. The Italian government granted him a loan of four million lire, with his property as security.116 On the other hand, he was known to take a long time in repaying his debts, in particular twenty-five thousand lire he owed to the Bar Sabaudia.117 Finally, despite a general proscription against driving in the city because of a fuel shortage, Ras Hailu had the use of his car. 118

Unsatisfied with these successes, Ras Hailu's ultimate ambition was to become negus (king) of Ethiopia and to return to Gojam at the head of an army.119 He discussed his goal with his fellow chiefs and Italian authorities on many occasions. The Italian Intelligence Service reported in 1939 that Ethiopians believed that, were an international conflict to erupt, Ras Hailu would take command of the country. Then, after establishing and expanding his power, he would provoke an uprising, drive out the Italians, and assume control of Ethiopia permanently.120 The same source accused him of secretly supporting the revolt in Gojam to convince the Italians that he should be nominated to the throne, or at least be given the authority to suppress the revolution.121 In 1937 similar rumors were circulating. Ladislas Farago, a former employee of the Societe Nationale d'Ethiopie, wrote that, even though he had submitted to Graziani, Ras Hailu was planning a military attack

114MAI, Political Office, to Viceroy (18 May 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 35, CSA; Teruzzi to Graziani (30 April 1940), AMIA.

115GG of AOI, Political Office to Governorate of Addis Abeba (11 Dec. 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 35, CSA.

116MAI, "Notes for Mussolini" (10 Nov. 1939), AMIA; Marraffa to MAI "Information from SIM" (15 Sept. 1939), MAI/PO, busta 1, fol. 5, CSA.

117Teruzzi to Graziani (30 April 1940), Graziani Papers, busta 37, fol. 86, CSA. 118A. Bonaccorsi, "Impressions on the Empire for the Viceroy," Addis Abeba (30

April 1940), AMIA. 119Duke of Aosta to MAI (28 April 1938), AMIA. 120Marraffa to MAI, "Information from SIM" (15 Sept. 1939), MAI/PO, busta 1, fol.

5, CSA. 121MAI, "Notes for Mussolini" (10 Nov. 1939), AMIA; U. Presti, "Political Report"

(8 Nov. 1939), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 12, CSA.

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against him to force him out of the country.122 The Ethiopian people were described as favorable to Ras Hailu as emperor; they felt he would represent them fairly and would protect the Orthodox church.123 Graziani, too, thought he deserved the office as a reward for his cooperation, which continued to be valuable in 1940 as the international situation intensified.124 Teruzzi, on the other hand, felt that his bid for the throne should be discouraged. To make Ras Hailu negus would create resentment among the other rases, who would complain of Italian partiality. The first to object would be Ras Seyum, who hoped to regain control of Tigre.125 In fact, although the colonial government returned his purchased property and his rest (hereditary) land and gave him a car, Ras Seyum never ruled his feudal holdings again. 126

With the entrance of Italy into the second world war on 10 June 1940, Nasi proposed that the great nobles of Shoa and Amhara be used to resist the British invasion. Moreno approved, and Ras Seyum was assigned three thousand men and sent to the northern front. Ras Gugsa was given responsibility for the defense of Enderta (Tigre), Ras Hailu was put in charge of western Ethiopia, and Ras Ayalu took command of Semien.127 Ras Seyum was nominated the leader of all of northern Ethiopia under the title Ye Ethiopia Semiani Mesfin (prince of northern Ethiopia, including Tigre, Tembien, Lasta, Wagh, Jejjiu, Wolcait, and Tzeghedi).128 Because the viceroy had granted the office only after parts of these territories were in the hands of advancing British troops, however, Ras Seyum never took actual political or military control.

122Buenos Aires Herald (7 May 1937). It was said that Ras Hailu maintained close relations with his anticolonial relatives in Gojam, to whom he allegedly sent truckloads of arms. Reports asserted that Hailu had expressed his resentment to a meeting of Ethiopian leaders for the way the Italians were limiting his ambitions to the throne. On other occasions he was accused of being the main supplier of money and arms to the anti-Italian leader Abebe Aregai. The latter was said to have saved Ras Hailu in 1942 when Haile Selassie wanted to execute him. Report of a PAI officer, "Clarification of the Report Brought to Italy by the Refugees in the Guilio Cesare Boat, on the Situation in Ethiopia during May-June 1942," AMIA; Membrini (PAI inspector) to MAI, Colonial Police Headquarters, Addis Abeba (18 Oct. 1939), MAI/PO, busta 1, fol. 5, CSA.

123Marraffa to MAI, Political Office, "Information from SIM" (15 Sept. 1939), MAI/PO, busta 1, fol. 5, CSA.

124Graziani to Teruzzi (26 Nov. 1940), Graziani Papers, busta 37, fol. 86, CSA. 125Teruzzi to Graziani (30 April 1940), Graziani Papers, busta 37, fol. 86, CSA; MAI,

"Notes for Mussolini" (10 Nov. 1939), AMIA; Presti, "Political Report" (8 Nov. 1939), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 12, CSA.

126Ras Seyum to Graziani (18 May 1937), Graziani Papers, busta 23, CSA. 127Duke of Aosta to MAI (15 Feb. 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA. 128Duke of Aosta to MAI (3 Feb. 1941), AMIA.


Nevertheless, the Italians hoped his titular command would move him to resist the British invasion. The Duke of Aosta explained the appointment by saying that the title had real significance for the land occupied by the enemy, and honorary significance for that still in Italian hands.129 His statement makes it obvious that Ras Seyum would have remained a mesfin (prince) in name only, and that had the Axis powers won the war his actual authority would have been limited. Thus the new cooperation between the rases and the colonial government was to be merely a transitional arrangement. Underscoring Italy's intentions on this issue is a proposal as late as 1940 to eliminate the rases because they could not be trusted. Critics countered that to do so would only create new problems, however, since lesser chiefs would prove disloyal on the assumption that the fate of their superiors would be theirs as well. Instead, the cooperation of the aristocracy must be bought with titles and honors, which would also serve to increase their prestige among the people. 130

The sudden appointment of Ras Seyum to the command of northern Ethiopia had the opposite effect, however. Ethiopians took Italy's change in policy toward the nobility to mean that it was incapable of defending the country without the nobles' help, and from then on Italy's prestige in Ethiopia began to fall.131 The return of Ras Seyum to Tigre provoked an internal crisis in the district. Other families of the house of Emperor Yohannes IV, who like Seyum had claims to the throne, resented his restoration and refused to accept his authority. Their fears intensified when Seyum removed local chiefs and replaced them with those loyal to him. As a result Tigreans, orderly until that time under Ras Gugsa, began fighting among themselves.132 In an attempt to correct the balance of power in northern Ethiopia, Ras Gugsa was made mesfin of eastern Tigre and given an army of a thousand men.133

The appointment came too late to cement Ras Gugsa to the Italian cause; by this time he was totally disillusioned with the colonial

129Teruzzi to Duke of Aosta (6 Feb. 1941), AMIA. Teruzzi approved the viceroy's proposal to make Ras Hailu mesfin of northern Ethiopia.

130MAI to GG of AOI, "Policy to Follow toward the Ethiopian Great Chiefs" (1941), T-586/412/005063-005064, Italian Captured Documents [hereafter ICD]/U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter USNA].

131Di Lauro, "Report on the Events in AOI from June 10, 1940 to Nov. 28, 1942," AMIA.

132Di Lauro, Come A bbiamo Difeso I'lmpero, 251. I33Duke of Aosta to MAI (14 March 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA.

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government. Emilio De Bono, commander-in-chief of the Italian troops in East Africa, had promised him the title of ras in 1935 and Badoglio had done the same in 1936. Not until 1938, however, did Ras Gugsa achieve this distinction.134 He also had been assured the status of an Italian citizen; he was to have his traditional family rights recognized, to be addressed as Highness, and to receive a generous salary in place of the tribute he was no longer able to collect on his lands. These promises had been incompletely kept.135 Ras Gugsa felt that not only his political services to the colonial government but his education, European travel, and culture had earned him the rights and privileges of an Italian, and he resented being treated as a racial inferior.136 The Italian government had a more pragmatic attitude toward encouraging his ambitions. Although they could not ignore his merits, colonial officials were reluctant to create him a mesfin, since such action would open them to charges of preferment, especially since Gugsa would become the superior of Ras Hailu and Ras Gabre Haywot, who were anxious to become mesfin of Gojam and mesfin of Wollo respectively. 137

Ras Hailu finally was awarded the title of negus of Gojam, but he held it for a very short time. To the Ethiopians negus was emperor, but the Italians gave it a lesser meaning, king or prince, one of many designations without political or military significance.138 Faced with a critical military situation in 1941, Teruzzi consented to make Ras Hailu delegate of the viceroy in Gojam (in Amharic, Taqlai Enderasie), with the same authority as that granted the sultan of Aussa, including the collection of tribute and the administration of justice. Teruzzi was even willing to call him prince of princes (ras of rases) if necessary, and allow him his traditional pomp. 139 In addition, Ras Hailu was given command of three thousand men, whose numbers increased as he marched into Gojam. To support his troops the government set aside six million lire;140 at a monthly expenditure of a million lire each, the armies of Seyum, Gugsa, and Hailu cost three million lire every month. 141

'34Meregazzi to Teruzzi (20 June 1938), AMIA. 135Duke of Aosta to MAI (25 Jan. 1940), AMIA; Mussolini to Badoglio (18 Jan.

1936), reproduced in /I Giorno (14 Nov. 1968). 136Duke of Aosta to MAI (30 April 1940), AMIA; Teruzzi to GG of AOI (10 March

1940), AMIA. 137Duke of Aosta to MAI (3 April 1940), AMIA. 138Duke of Aosta to MAI (28 Jan. 1941), AMIA. 139Teruzzi to GG of AOI (28 Jan. 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA. 140MAI to Ministry of Finance (6 Feb. 1941), T-586/412/005061, ICD/USNA. 141Duke of Aosta to MAI (15 Feb. 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA; Duke of

Aosta to MAI (25 Jan. 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, CSA.


Teruzzi's proposal to make Ras Hailu ras of rases was denied, again for fear of resentment among the other nobles.142 But the military situation was worsening every day. British troops were advancing from the Sudan, and Ras Hailu's forces were retreating in the face of them. Hoping to spur Hailu to an attack, the Duke of Aosta promised him the title of negus,143 but Mussolini and Teruzzi made the appointment conditional: only if Ras Hailu could establish effective control of Gojam in the name of the Italian government and disperse the troops of Haile Selassie could he assume the throne.144 They asked the impossible. Anticolonial Ethiopian troops, armed and financed by the British, were making fast progress toward the heart of the country. Soon they had occupied Woggerat, Tzeghede, Tzellmt, Wolkait, and all the lands of Amhara along the Sudanese border, the feudal territory of Ras Ayalu.

Ras Ayalu was an ambitious noble who had received little attention from the Italians, and as a result he felt he was not adequately compensated for his services to the colonial government. He was married to Woiziero Mannialishal, the daughter of Ras Kassa, one of the most important of the aristocracy in exile, and sister of Aberra and Wondewassen Kassa, whom the Italians had executed for fomenting revolution against them. Graziani was informed that Mannialishal was writing letters urging the people of Selale (Shoa), her feudal territory, to rise up against the colonists and avenge the death of her brothers. Even in exile in Rome, Dejaz Ayalu and his wife continued to correspond with Ras Kassa's partisans.145 Graziani, suspecting his loyalty, had been unwilling to make Ayalu ras, but with the relaxed policy toward the nobles and as a recompense for his time in exile the Duke of Aosta conferred on him the coveted title. At the outbreak of the war he was sent to Begemeder to attract dissidents to the Italian cause. 146 When the military situation became critical, the viceroy gave Ras Ayalu the title of delegate to the viceroy in Amhara, to become effective if he could actually win full military and political control of Amhara in the name of Italy. 147

The effort to form a cohesive force against the British invasion by restoring Ethiopia's traditional leadership came too late. Italy was

142Duke of Aosta to MAI (24 March 1941), MAI/PO, busta 16, fol. 3, CSA. 143Duke of Aosta to MAI (2 April 1941), MAI/PO, busta 16, fol. 3, CSA. 144Teruzzi to Duke of Aosta (29 April 1941), MAI/PO, busta 16, fol. 3, CSA. 145Graziani to Duke of Aosta, Addis Abeba (4 Jan. 1938), Graziani Papers, busta 40-

A, fol. 101-5, CSA. 146Duke of Aosta to MAI (27 Jan. 1941), AMIA. 147Duke of Aosta to MAI (14 March 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA.

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willing to recognize the nobles' rights to their traditional lands only when it had lost control of those lands. In conferring titles, the Italians were giving away what they no longer had, for the rases could regain political authority only where they could conquer it militarily, and even then their claims theoretically had to be approved by the government. Colonel Luigi Talamonti, former colonial officer in Eritrea and political adviser to Graziani, understood that the appointments had been ill- timed. Five years earlier, immediately after the fall of Addis Abeba, a return to traditional authority would have permitted the normalization of the country. The aristocracy would have had time to realize that life under Italian rule could be more beneficial than under that of Haile Selassie. Instead, they had lost their positions, their prestige, and their fortunes. They could hardly trust Italian motives, or accept the relaxation in policy, without question.

Ras Seyum in particular had no reason to thank the government. He had not been treated generously, he had received no special titles, and in fact he had lost his office as chief of Tigre to his cousin, Ras Gugsa.148 Just before Italy entered the war, Afework Gebre Jesus informed the general governorate that Ras Seyum would not oppose a British invasion.149 The viceroy expressed the same opinion, saying that in the face of the invaders Seyum would turn and run to save himself. Their suspicions were well founded. Ras Seyum regained control of his capital, Adowa, and made sure of the loyalty of his

fighting force, which had grown from an original three thousand to twenty thousand. In April 1941, with these strengths behind him, he presented himself to the British commander, and sent word to Haile Selassie that he would help him regain the throne. In addition to his personal animosity for the Italians, Ras Seyum owed a debt to the British for the aid Lord Napier had given his grandfather, Yohannes IV, against Emperor Tewdros in 1889.150 The government had little idea how welcome the British invasion was to Ras Seyum. He was also anxious to demonstrate to Haile Selassie that he bore the emperor no ill feeling for abandoning his country in 1936, although he only now had the opportunity to express his loyalty.151 Finally, Ras Seyum was the

148Di Lauro, Come Abbiamo Difeso I'lmpero, 251. 149Di Lauro, "Report on the Events in AOI from June 10, 1940 to Nov. 28, 1942,"

AMIA. 150Di Lauro, Come Abbiamo Difeso l'Impero, 252. 151Di Lauro, "Report on the Events in AOI from June 10, 1940 to Nov. 28, 1942,"

AMIA; Marraffa to MAI (8 April 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA; Marraffa to MAI (25 April 1942), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA; AOI, "Territories Occupied By British Troops" (6 April 1941), MAI/PO, busta 4, fol. 13, CSA.


father-in-law of Prince Asfaw Wosen,152 the emperor's son; his own chances of success consequently lay in supporting Haile Selassie and exploiting these family ties.

Ras Seyum's defection to the British ruined the viceroy's defensive maneuvers at Amba Alagi; moreover, it had a significant demoralizing effect on the Italian forces. In an attempt to save the viceroy, beseiged at Amba Alagi, Ras Seyum wrote him a letter offering to mediate for him with the British in the hope of reaching some kind of compromise. He did so, he said, to prevent the bloodshed of Christians, and in recognition of all the duke had done for him and for his country during his tenure there.153 When the duke refused to negotiate, Ras Seyum accompanied the British in storming the Italian position. His men were responsible for killing General G.B. Volpini, the viceroy's aide-de- camp, during discussions with the British command for Amba Alagi's surrender.

Another blow to Italy's prestige was the loss of Ras Ayalu, who sold his cooperation to British Major B.I. Ringrose for three hundred thousand Maria Theresa dollars.154 The government had sent him in command of six thousand men to Dabat to build up reserves in Wolchefit and prevent the infiltration of anticolonial forces at the Ente Romagna, an agricultural center run by Italian immigrants which supplied food to Gondar.155 Instead Ras Ayalu proclaimed himself leader of the resistance, and gathered Ethiopian patriots around him. He attacked the Italian fort at Wolchefit, where he was wounded in the legs and captured by Italian troops. Had Nasi not intervened, he would have been shot.

Nasi's stay of execution was motivated by important political considerations. Killing a wounded ras would have given Haile Selassie and the British a powerful propaganda weapon, and might have provoked retaliatory executions among Italian prisoners held by the Ethiopians, who until that time had been treated well.156 General Pietro Gazzera, governor of Galla-Sidamo, advised that Ras Ayalu be condemned in a public court martial but not executed, in order to demonstrate that the Italian government would not tolerate treason.

152"Submission of Ras Seyum to Haile Selassie" (14 April 1941), MAI/PO, busta 4, fol. 1, CSA; Newsweek (14 April 1941).

153Ras Seyum to Duke of Aosta (April 1941), in Di Lauro, Come Abbiamo Difeso l'Impero, 274.

154Di Lauro, Come abbiamo Difeso l'Impero, 339. 55Vecchi, "Notes on the Events in Ethiopia" (3 Aug. 1942), AMIA.

156Nasi to MAI, Gondar (22 June 1941), AMIA.

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Teruzzi agreed with Nasi, however, and advocated no trial.157 A proposal to take Ayalu to Italy and hold him as hostage was considered, but he was too seriously wounded to move, and in any case Wolchefit was cut off from Gondar.158 Nasi's wisdom in sparing his life eventually was rewarded; when Gondar fell in November 1941 for lack of food, Nasi was able to use Ras Ayalu's presence inside the fort to persuade the townspeople to supply the garrison with provisions.159

Ras Hailu, created negus of Gojam to increase his authority over his feudal lands, was not as successful as the Italians hoped. At first he received the submission of many resisters to colonial rule, including his cousins Dejaz Balai Zelleche, Dejaz Hailu Belau, and most of those from eastern Gojam.160 He might have been able eventually to disarm Belai Zelleche, whose loyalty was suspect despite his formal surrender,161 but military pressure from a third cousin and most powerful patriot leader, Dejaz Mangasha Jambore, and from advancing British troops162 forced his retreat to his capital, Debra Markos. The Italian explorer Gustavo Bianchi had reported that Ras Hailu's father, Negus Teckla Haymanot, had ruled Gojam so despotically that every order was obeyed unquestioningly throughout the land. In 1941 the colonial government did not realize that times had changed. Impressed by the loyalty of some of Ras Hailu's Gojami followers, the Italians beguiled themselves into thinking that the relative few represented the attitude of all of Gojam. In fact, Ras Hailu no longer commanded much respect as prince of Gojam, and his people gave him little assistance in his attempt to keep the anticolonial fighters from joining Haile Selassie's troops. In the 1930s Ras Hailu, his son Admasu, and other members of his family had brutally plundered the Gojami people, and as a result they were unwilling to help him defend the area against the British now.

In promoting Ethiopia's traditional leaders to win their military support, Rome exhausted almost its last defense against the encroach- ment of its European adversaries. Nor was outright bribery any more successful. The paper currency the Italians tendered their supporters was being steadily devalued by inflation, while the Maria Theresa dollars and gold sterling of the British were appreciating rapidly. Fueled by British funds and British firearms, patriots in Wolcait, Ermaccio,

157Teruzzi to Gazzera (30 June 1941), AMIA. 158MAI to Italian Supreme Military Command (5 July 1941), AMIA. I59Vecchi, "Notes on the Events in Ethiopia" (3 Aug. 1942), AMIA. I60Duke of Aosta to MAI (28 Jan. 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA. 161Duke of Aosta to MAI (27 Jan. 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA. 162Duke of Aosta to MAI (13 Jan. 1941), MAI/PO, busta 13, fol. 6, CSA.


Wagh, and Tembien revolted. Enderta fell despite the presence of Ras Gugsa in the territory. In other regions brigands, a traditional source of opposition to central authority, created conflict that Ras Gugsa, Ras Kassa, and Ras Ayalu were incapable of eliminating.163 Brigand mercenaries and nationalist fighting units were very useful to the British, who were able to buy their services easily. From 1936 onward the Italians reported one failed campaign against the resistance after another. On 6 April 1941 Ras Hailu and Ras Gugsa surrendered to Haile Selassie, and one by one, the other rases did the same. The five-and-a- half-year-old Italian empire, proclaimed with great fanfare in May 1936, by November 1941 had been ingloriously defeated.

During its short-lived occupation of Ethiopia, Italy was hindered by the chaotic political and military situation from formulating a stable policy on how best to govern its new subjects. The available documentation suggests that Rome was beginning to appreciate the positive results of the Duke of Aosta's attempts to involve the aristocracy in the administration of the country. Despite his short tenure and its experimental nature, the viceroy's policy was having some effect on anticolonial feeling among Ethiopians. In general, however, the memory of past abuses was strong, particularly among the nobles, for whom the restoration of titles could never compensate for the loss of their revenue, prestige, and authority. Blindly Italy continued to antagonize its Ethiopian subjects, to underestimate their worth, and to overestimate its influence on them. Anticipating the outbreak of war in Europe and Africa, the government in Rome nevertheless refused to consider making the friendly overtures toward the aristocracy that would have secured its cooperation in Ethiopia's defense. Mussolini's ignorance of and lack of interest in colonial affairs partially explains this posture, as does his acceptance of second-rate administrators like Attilio Teruzzi, minister of Italian Africa. And after 1938 Italy embarked on a policy of racism second in its ferocity only to that of its ally, Nazi Germany, that was to bring about the total destruction of the Mussolini regime.

163Di Lauro, Come Abbiamo Difeso I'lmpero, 125, 253.

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