Nos. 13-354 & 13-356

In the Supreme Court of the United States

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, ET AL., Petitioners,v.

HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., ET AL., Respondents.

CONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORP., ET AL.,Petitioners,

v.KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, ET AL., Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Courts ofAppeals for the Tenth and Third Circuits

BRIEF OF 67 CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS ANDETHICISTS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., ANDCONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORP.

D. JOHN SAUERCounsel of Record

SARAH E. PITLYKMARY CATHERINE HODESCLARK & SAUER, LLC7733 Forsyth BoulevardSuite 625St. Louis, Missouri 63105(314) 332-2980jsauer@clarksauer.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 2

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 6

I. Principles of Catholic Moral Theology Supportthe Claims of Religiously Objecting EmployersThat Compliance With the Mandate Would MakeThem Complicit in Religiously Forbidden Actions. 6

A. The Mandate Forces Employers ToCooperate In At Least Two Distinct ActivitiesThat Are Gravely Objectionable Under CatholicDoctrine. ............................................................... 9

1. The Mandate requires employers tofinance the use of abortifacients,contraceptives, and sterilizations, which aregravely objectionable to Catholics. ................ 10

2. The Mandate requires employers tofinance “education and counseling” that willinstruct and encourage persons to useabortifacients and contraceptives. ................. 12

B. The Mandate Requires Employers To MakeSubstantial and Direct Contributions to MorallyObjectionable Actions. ....................................... 15

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C. The Mandate May Require Employers ToBecome “Necessary” or “Essential” Causes ofObjectionable Actions. ....................................... 19

D. The Mandate Requires Employers ToProvide Funding Earmarked In Advance To BeUsed For Objectionable Purposes. .................... 21

E. Providing the Objectionable InsuranceCoverage Would Require Catholic Employers ToDisregard Guidance of the Catholic Bishops. ... 24

F. One May Reasonably Conclude That NoProportionate Reason Justifies the Substantial,Direct, and Necessary Cooperation in GraveMoral Wrongs Required by the Mandate. ........ 25

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 28

APPENDIX:

Full list of amici curiae, including their institutionalaffiliations……………………………………………….1a

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 2008). 20

Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) .......... 18

O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,No. 4:12-CV-476, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140097, at*19 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012) ............................... 17

Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana EmploymentSecurity Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) ............ 6, 16

Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) .............. 18

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) ................................. 13, 17

Other Authorities

Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. & Kevin D. O’Rourke, O.P.,Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis 195(4th ed. 1997) .................................................. 15, 19

Bishop Anthony Fisher, O.P., Cooperation in evil:understanding the issues, in Cooperation,Complicity & Conscience: Problems in healthcare,science, law, and public policy 27, 54 (Helen Watted., 2005) ....................................................10, 19, 22

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Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 2270 (1994) ... 10,12, 14, 24

Gary Atkinson et al., A Moral Evaluation ofContraception and Sterilization 79-80 (1979)(“Atkinson”) ..............................................8, 9, 15, 19

Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. 3:Difficult Moral Questions 872-73 (1997) .... 8, 19, 25

Health Res. & Serv. Admin., Women’s PreventiveServices: Required Health Plan CoverageGuidelines,http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/.............. 13

Inst. of Med., Clinical Preventive Services forWomen: Closing the Gaps 107 (2011); see also GinaM. Secura et al., The Contraceptive CHOICEProject: reducing barriers to long-acting reversiblecontraception, Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology,Aug. 2010, at 115e.1, 115e.4 ................................. 13

Letter of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to theBishops of the German Episcopal Conference ¶ 4(Jan. 11, 1998), athttp://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/1998/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_19980111_bishop-germany_en.html ............................................ 23, 26

Melissa Moschella, The HHS Mandate and JudicialTheocracy (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.thepublic-discourse.com/2013/01/7403/ .....................21, 22, 23

Orville N. Griese, Catholic Identity in Health Care:Principles and Practice 387-88 (1987)........ 8, 25, 26

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Russell E. Smith, The Principles of Cooperation inCatholic Thought, in The Fetal Tissue Issue:Medical and Ethical Aspects 81, 84 (Peter J.Cataldo & Albert S. Moraczewski eds., 1994)........ 7

Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,Responses to Questions Concerning Sterilization inCatholic Hospitals (Quaecumque Sterilizatio) ¶ 1(March 13, 1975), available athttp://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19750313_quaecumque-sterilizatio_en.html. ............................................................................... 12

The Ethicists, The National Catholic BioethicsCenter, Cooperating with Non-Catholic Partners,in Catholic Health Care Ethics: A Manual forEthics Committees 27/1, 27/3 (Peter J. Cataldo &Albert S. Moraczewski eds., 2009) ....................... 15

The Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer HealthBenefits 2012 Annual Survey: Summary ofFindings 1 (2012), http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/employer-health-benefits-2012-annual-survey/ ...................................................... 17

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, AdHoc Committee for Religious Liberty, Our First,Most Cherished Liberty: A Statement on ReligiousLiberty, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Our-First-Most-Cherished-Liberty-Apr12-6-12-12.pdf .................. 24

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,Ethical and Religious Directives for CatholicHealth Care Services ¶ 45 (5th ed. 2009), available

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at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf ..................11, 25, 26

Regulations

45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2013) ......................... 13

75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,733 (July 10, 2010) ............ 20

77 Fed. Reg. 8724, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) .................. 12

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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae are 67 Catholic theologians andethicists. A complete list of amici, with theirqualifications and institutional affiliations foridentification purposes, is included in the Addendumto this Brief. Amici believe that the regulatoryinterpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) thatrequires employers to provide insurance coverage forabortifacient drugs and devices, electivesterilization, and contraceptive services (“theMandate”) violates religious freedom. The religiousobjections to the Mandate of the employers in thesecases are well-founded and shared by many Catholicemployers, who will be affected by the disposition ofthis case. Catholic moral and theological principles,which are shared by many other Christiantraditions, indicate that providing health insurancecoverage for these objectionable services could causeobjecting employers to become unacceptablycomplicit in actions forbidden by their religious faith.

Amici Curiae file this Brief with the consent of allparties.

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amicicuriae represent that, in consultation with amici, they authoredthis brief in its entirety and that none of the parties or theircounsel, nor any person or entity other than amici or theircounsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund thepreparation or submission of this brief. Counsel for amici alsorepresent that all parties have consented to the filing of thisbrief. Counsel for Respondents Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., et al.,in No. 13-354, have provided a written letter of consent tocounsel for amici curiae, and counsel for all other parties havefiled blanket notices of consent with the Court.

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Mandate imposes a substantial burden onthe religious freedom of Catholic employers andother religious believers who object on religiousgrounds to providing insurance coverage forabortifacients, elective sterilization, and/orcontraceptives, and for education and counselingdesigned to encourage the use of such services. ThisCourt must defer to religious employers’interpretation of their own religion, and must accepttheir conclusion that providing the objectionableinsurance coverage would violate their religiousprinciples, unless that conclusion is so bizarre or soclearly nonreligious in motivation as to warrantextreme judicial skepticism.

No such showing is possible in this case, becausethe employers’ unwillingness to comply with theMandate reflects an eminently reasonableapplication of Christian religious principles. TheCatholic theological tradition, in common withrelated Christian traditions, has well-developedconcepts used to assess whether a believer may“cooperate in”—i.e., facilitate or assist—thereligiously objectionable action of another person.Several objective criteria, commonly invoked by theCatholic theological tradition, determine whethersuch cooperation would cause the believer to share inmoral responsibility for that action.

Under these criteria, the Mandate thrustsCatholic and other religious employers into a“perfect storm” of moral complicity in the forbiddenactions. It requires employers to cooperate in (1)

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gravely objectionable actions, (2) by making asubstantial and direct causal contribution to thoseactions, (3) when such actions are less likely tohappen without the employers’ contribution, (4)through the provision of funds that are specificallydesignated in advance for the sole purpose of payingfor the forbidden actions, (5) in violation ofauthoritative guidance from the Catholic bishops toavoid close cooperation in such actions, and all (6)without a proportionate reason to justify materialcooperation.

First, in cases of material cooperation, theCatholic tradition considers the gravity of thewrongdoing in which the believer may cooperate.Graver wrongdoing requires a more serious reason tojustify material cooperation. By mandating coveragefor abortifacients, the Mandate requires employersto cooperate in the destruction of human life, whichis very gravely objectionable to Catholics and manyother Christians. Catholic teaching, in particular,also treats elective sterilization and contraception asseriously wrongful actions. In addition, instructingor encouraging someone else to commit a wrongfulact is itself a grave moral wrong—i.e., “scandal”—under Catholic doctrine. By mandating coverage forcontraceptive “education and counseling,” theMandate requires employers to finance counselingprograms designed to instruct and encourage othersto use abortifacients and contraceptives. ForcingCatholic and other religiously objecting employers tocooperate in such counseling programs presents adistinct and equally serious violation of theirreligious conscience.

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Second, in cases of material cooperation, manytheologians in the Catholic tradition consider howsubstantially and directly the believer contributes tothe performance of the forbidden action. The moresubstantial and direct one’s involvement, the greaterone’s share in the moral responsibility for thataction. The Mandate requires very substantial anddirect participation by employers in actionsforbidden by their religious principles. It requiresthem to finance a large proportion of the cost—bothof the services themselves, and of the education andcounseling designed to promote such services. Theemployers’ involvement in these objectionableactions is triggered by only one intervening cause,namely the decision of the employee who seeks theobjectionable services. By contrast, the causalcontribution of an individual taxpayer to anyparticular objectionable government program is farless substantial and direct than the participation inforbidden actions required by the Mandate.

Third, many Catholic theologians considerwhether the objectionable action would havehappened anyway without the believer’sparticipation, i.e., whether the believer is a“necessary” or “essential” cause of the objectionableaction. It is particularly problematic for a believerknowingly to assist in the destruction of innocenthuman life when such destruction would not occurwithout the believer’s contribution. The Mandatecreates the possibility that religious employers maybecome necessary or essential causes of such actions.Though contraceptives, including abortifacients, arewidely available at relatively low cost from othersources, the Mandate forces the employer to provide

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insurance that covers the entire cost of such services,which the Government intends to increase usage ofthem. Moreover, the Mandate is very likely to makeemployers necessary causes for education programsdesigned to encourage use of abortifacients andcontraceptives.

Fourth, some Catholic theologians considerwhether the cooperator is providing the third partywith a means that is specifically designed for use inthe forbidden action. Providing another person withcertificates or coupons to authorize the performanceof a morally objectionable action typically makes onemorally complicit in that action. The Mandaterequires religious employers to provide healthinsurance coverage for the morally objectionableservices, and for contraceptive education andcounseling. This is analogous to providingcertificates or coupons for abortifacients andcontraceptives.

Fifth, the many specifically Catholic employerswho are affected by the Mandate have an additionalreason for concern. On such matters of faith andmorals, Catholic employers are called to obey theteaching authority of the Catholic bishops, who haveuniformly condemned the Mandate, and who hadalready forbidden close cooperation in abortion andsterilization procedures prior to the Mandate.

Because providing the objectionable healthcoverage would involve substantial, direct, andpotentially necessary cooperation in very gravelywrongful actions, including the foreseeabledestruction of human life, Catholic and other

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religiously objecting employers can reasonablyconclude that no proportionate reason justifiesmaterial cooperation.

Because all these criteria are satisfied, it iseminently reasonable for a Catholic or otherreligiously objecting employer to conclude that thecompliance with the Mandate would gravely burdentheir religious conscience by forcing them to becomecomplicit in religiously forbidden actions.

ARGUMENT

I. Principles of Catholic Moral TheologySupport the Claims of ReligiouslyObjecting Employers That ComplianceWith the Mandate Would Make ThemComplicit in Religiously Forbidden Actions.

In Thomas v. Review Board of the IndianaEmployment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981),this Court stated that it would defer to a religiousbeliever’s interpretation of the dictates of his or herown religion unless the claim was “so bizarre, soclearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to beentitled to protection under the Free ExerciseClause.” Id. at 715. The judgment of many Catholicand other religious employers that compliance withthe Mandate would violate their religious conscienceis neither “bizarre” nor “clearly nonreligious inmotivation.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. Rather, itreflects an eminently reasonable application ofChristian religious principles, which have enjoyedparticularly explicit examination and developmentin the Catholic theological tradition.

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Theologians and ethicists in the Catholictradition employ a well-developed set of concepts toanalyze issues of complicity in the immoral actions ofothers. These concepts explain why so manyCatholic employers have taken the same position asthe employers in these cases. Such employersreasonably and sincerely draw a line againstproviding insurance coverage for abortifacients andcontraceptives, while not objecting to other forms ofless direct financial support for objectionableactions—such as paying federal taxes that supportobjectionable government programs, or paying cashto employees who may go on to use the money forobjectionable purposes.

First, in ascertaining whether knowinglyfacilitating or contributing to someone else’sforbidden actions is morally permissible, Catholicmoral theology speaks of “cooperation” with theforbidden actions. “Cooperation,” in this context, isunderstood broadly as “the participation of one agentin the activity of another agent to produce aparticular effect or joint activity.” Russell E. Smith,The Principles of Cooperation in Catholic Thought,in The Fetal Tissue Issue: Medical and EthicalAspects 81, 84 (Peter J. Cataldo & Albert S.Moraczewski eds., 1994).

Next, the Catholic tradition draws a distinctionbetween “formal” and “material” cooperation.“Formal” cooperation occurs when the believer, incooperating, shares in the intention that theforbidden action be committed by the other party.See Orville N. Griese, Catholic Identity in Health

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Care: Principles and Practice 387-88 (1987)(“Griese”); Germain Grisez, The Way of the LordJesus, Vol. 3: Difficult Moral Questions 872-73 (1997)(“Grisez”). “Formal cooperation always is morallyunacceptable, because, by definition, it involves badintending.” Grisez, at 873. “Material” cooperationoccurs when the believer foresees that his action willfacilitate or assist the performance of theobjectionable action by the third party, but does notshare in the principal agent’s intention to committhe action. Grisez, at 873; Griese, at 388. Materialcooperation is sometimes permissible, andsometimes impermissible. To determine whether itis permissible, one must balance the good one hopesto achieve by cooperating against the nature of thebad action and the closeness of one’s contribution toit. Grisez, at 876. A “proportionate reason”—i.e.,some good to be achieved that is significant enoughto counterbalance the bad action and the closeness ofone’s complicity in it—is required to justify materialcooperation in a forbidden action. Grisez, at 876;accord Gary Atkinson et al., A Moral Evaluation ofContraception and Sterilization 79-80 (1979)(“Atkinson”).

Several objective criteria are frequently invokedin the Catholic theological tradition to determinewhether cooperation in another’s bad action ispermissible. These criteria are supported bycommonsense moral intuitions, and many have closeparallels in the manner that our laws allocate legalresponsibility. In this case, all of these criteria pointin the same direction. Each one indicates thatcompliance with the Mandate could violate thereligious conscience of Catholics and other objecting

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employers by forcing them to assume an intolerabledegree of complicity in forbidden actions.

These criteria include: (1) the gravity of thewrongdoing that the believer facilitates; (2) themagnitude and directness of the believer’s causalcontribution to that wrongdoing; (3) whether thewrongdoing would have occurred without thebeliever’s cooperation, i.e., whether the believer is a“necessary” or “essential” cause of the objectionableaction; (4) whether there is a close fit between themeans provided by the believer and the objectionableaction; and (5) whether there is a specific directivefrom Church authorities forbidding the cooperation.

A. The Mandate Forces Employers ToCooperate In At Least Two DistinctActivities That Are GravelyObjectionable Under Catholic Doctrine.

The first criterion for assessing thepermissibility of material cooperation is how graveor serious is the wrongdoing that the believer isassisting. The graver the wrongdoing, the moreproblematic is cooperation in that wrongdoing. Ingeneral, “the more serious the harm from the sin, themore significant must be the good sought to justifycooperation.” Atkinson, at 80. A proportionatelystronger justification is required “the graver … theevil of the principal agent’s act in itself,” and “thegraver … is the harm which may be caused to thirdparties, especially the innocent,” by the objectionableaction. Bishop Anthony Fisher, O.P., Cooperation inevil: understanding the issues, in Cooperation,Complicity & Conscience: Problems in healthcare,

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science, law, and public policy 27, 54 (Helen Watted., 2005) (“Fisher”).

1. The Mandate requires employers tofinance the use of abortifacients,contraceptives, and sterilizations,which are gravely objectionable toCatholics.

The Mandate requires employers to cooperate inactions that are gravely wrongful according toCatholic teachings. First, the Mandate requiresemployers to finance the use of abortifacients,contraceptives, and sterilizations, by paying for alarge share of the premiums for insurance policiescovering those services. Each of these actions isseriously wrongful under Catholic teachings.

First, under Catholic doctrine, the use ofabortifacient drugs and devices is a moral wrong ofthe first order. The Catholic Church teaches that“[h]uman life must be respected and protectedabsolutely from the moment of conception.”Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 2270 (1994)(“Catechism”). “From the first moment of hisexistence, a human being must be recognized ashaving the rights of a person—among which is theinviolable right of every innocent being to life.” Id.Under Catholic doctrine, the destruction of innocenthuman life—including embryonic human life—is aviolation of the Fifth Commandment, “Thou shaltnot kill,” and thus a serious moral wrong. Id. ¶1858. “Since it must be treated from conception as aperson, the [human] embryo must be defended in its

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integrity, cared for, and healed, as far as possible,like any other human being.” Id. ¶ 2274.

The United States Conference of CatholicBishops has authoritatively applied this teachingagainst destroying human life to Catholic healthcare providers:

Abortion … is never permitted. Everyprocedure whose sole immediate effectis the termination of pregnancy beforeviability is an abortion, which, in itsmoral context, includes the intervalbetween conception and implantationof the embryo. Catholic health careinstitutions are not to provide abortionservices, even based upon theprinciple of material cooperation.

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic HealthCare Services ¶ 45 (5th ed. 2009), available athttp://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf (“Directives”).2 Regardless of theGovernment’s definition of “abortion,” the Catholicfaith views the destruction of a human embryo atany time after conception—including during “theinterval between conception and implantation of theembryo,” id.—as an abortion, and gravely wrongful.These views, moreover, are shared by many other

2 All internet citations were last visited January 24, 2014.

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non-Catholic Christians, including the religiousemployers in these cases.

The Catholic Church also deems electivesterilization and contraception to be seriouslywrongful. “[E]very action which, whether inanticipation of the conjugal act, or in itsaccomplishment, or in the development of its naturalconsequences, proposes, whether as an end or as ameans, to render procreation impossible” isimpermissible. Catechism ¶ 2370. “Anysterilization which … has the sole immediate effectof rendering the generative faculty incapable ofprocreation … remains absolutely forbiddenaccording to the doctrine of the Church.” SacredCongregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,Responses to Questions Concerning Sterilization inCatholic Hospitals (Quaecumque Sterilizatio) ¶ 1(March 13, 1975), available athttp://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19750313_quaecumque-sterilizatio_en.html.

2. The Mandate requires employers tofinance “education and counseling”that will instruct and encouragepersons to use abortifacients andcontraceptives.

The Mandate also requires religiously objectingemployers, through their contribution to theemployee health care plan, to finance “patienteducation and counseling” for their employees in theuse of abortifacients and contraceptives. 77 Fed.Reg. 8724, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012); see also 42 U.S.C. §

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300gg-13(a)(4); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2013);Health Res. & Serv. Admin., Women’s PreventiveServices: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines,http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/. In thereport upon which the Mandate’s contraceptiverequirements are based, the Institute of Medicinemade clear that the intended purpose of thecontraceptive education and counseling requirementis to increase the use of contraceptives, includingthose that function as abortifacients:

[S]tudies show that postpartumcontraceptive counseling increasescontraceptive use …, that counselingincreases method use amongadolescents in family planning clinics,that counseling decreases nonuse ofcontraception in older women ofreproductive age who do not want afuture baby, and that counseling ofadult women in primary care settingsis associated with greatercontraceptive use….

Inst. of Med., Clinical Preventive Services forWomen: Closing the Gaps 107 (2011); see also GinaM. Secura et al., The Contraceptive CHOICE Project:reducing barriers to long-acting reversiblecontraception, Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology, Aug.2010, at 115e.1, 115e.4 (attributing increased use ofabortifacient contraceptive methods to increasedpatient education, among other factors). There canbe no doubt that the Government-mandated“education and counseling” programs, which arefinanced by employer-provided health insurance

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plans, will be designed to instruct and encouragewomen to use abortifacients and contraceptives.Whether or not such programs will actually beeffective in promoting such usage, religiouslyobjecting employers will be required to support suchprograms, contrary to their religious beliefs.

The Catholic tradition forbids “scandal,” whichin the theological context is defined as encouragingor exhorting other persons to engage in wrongdoing:“Scandal is an attitude or behavior which leadsanother to do evil. The person who gives scandalbecomes his neighbor’s tempter.” Catechism ¶ 2284.“Anyone who uses the power at his disposal in such away that it leads others to do wrong becomes guiltyof scandal and responsible for the evil that he hasdirectly or indirectly encouraged.” Id. ¶ 2287.Teaching and educating others about how to performwrongful actions is a particularly serious form ofscandal. Id. ¶ 2285 (“Scandal is grave when given bythose who by nature or office are obliged to teachand educate others.”).

By compelling employers to finance a schemethat necessarily includes counseling and educationin the use of abortifacients and contraceptives, theMandate requires religiously objecting employers tocooperate in the grave moral wrong of scandal—i.e.,encouraging others to engage in wrongdoing—inaddition to their cooperation in the grave moralwrong of their employees’ actual use of abortifacientsor contraceptives.

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B. The Mandate Requires Employers ToMake Substantial and DirectContributions to Morally ObjectionableActions.

Second, in cases of material cooperation, manyCatholic theologians consider the magnitude anddirectness of the believer’s causal contribution to theforbidden action. This concept is often expressed bydistinguishing between “proximate” and “remote”forms of cooperation. “‘Proximate versus remote’refers to how closely … cooperation is connected withthe evil in some way but not as an instrument of itsperformance.” Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. & Kevin D.O’Rourke, O.P., Health Care Ethics: A TheologicalAnalysis 195 (4th ed. 1997). Because a moresubstantial and direct contribution to anobjectionable action tends to increase one’s share inthe moral responsibility for that action, proximatematerial cooperation requires a greater justificationthan remote material cooperation. Thepermissibility of cooperation thus depends in part on“how closely connected with the sinful action are thecircumstances in which there is cooperation.”Atkinson, at 80. Conversely, “the more aninstitution is causally removed from the immoralprocedure or activity, the more acceptable is itsmaterial cooperation” in that objectionable action.The Ethicists, The National Catholic BioethicsCenter, Cooperating with Non-Catholic Partners, inCatholic Health Care Ethics: A Manual for EthicsCommittees 27/1, 27/3 (Peter J. Cataldo & Albert S.Moraczewski eds., 2009) (“Manual”).

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To illustrate this principle, consider the case of areligious objector who opposes the death penalty.Each year, she pays her federal taxes, knowing thata portion of her tax money may ultimately be usedby others to finance the federal death penalty.Because her own tax money makes, at most, aminuscule and indirect causal contribution to anyparticular execution, this would typically not troubleher conscience much. But suppose that one year, thegovernment were to direct her to personally financea large portion of the cost of the drugs for a lethalinjection, instead of paying her taxes. She wouldpresumably balk at doing this, even if she knew thatthe execution would proceed regardless of herparticipation. Her reluctance would arise from thecommonsense intuition that she would beparticipating far more substantially and directly inthe execution than she does by merely paying taxes,and that such close participation would cause her toshare in moral responsibility for the execution.

In fact, this example is similar to the facts ofThomas. In Thomas, the religious objector “testifiedthat he could, in good conscience, engage indirectlyin the production of materials that might be usedultimately to fabricate arms—for example, as anemployee of a raw material supplier or of a rollfoundry,” but that he could not in good consciencework directly in the manufacture of weapons.Thomas, 450 U.S. at 711. The Supreme Court heldthat this judgment was a valid exercise of religiousliberty. Id. at 716.

In this case, the Mandate would require Catholicand other objecting employers to make a very

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substantial and direct causal contribution to theiremployees’ receipt of contraceptive counseling anduse of abortifacients. First, under the Mandate, theemployer must pay a very significant portion of thecost of the services. Because the Mandate requiresthat there is no cost-sharing at the time of purchase,see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a), the proportion of thecost financed by the employer is the proportion of theinsurance premiums paid by the employer—onaverage, 82 percent of the premiums for employeeswith individual coverage, and 72 percent of thepremiums for employees with family coverage. TheKaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits2012 Annual Survey: Summary of Findings 1 (2012),http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/employer-health-benefits-2012-annual-survey/ (noting thatthese percentages have been “relatively unchangedover the past decade”). Thus, the monetarycontribution required by the Mandate, in proportionto the total cost of the objectionable action, is manyorders of magnitude greater than (for example) thecontribution of an objecting Catholic taxpayer to anyparticular federal execution.

The employer’s provision of health insurance isalso a direct manner of cooperating in theiremployees’ contraceptive counseling and use.Contrary to the suggestion of some district courtsthat the employer’s contribution “might, after aseries of independent decisions by health careproviders and patients covered by [the employer’s]plan, subsidize someone else’s participation” in anobjectionable activity, see, e.g., O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’tof Health and Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476, 2012U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140097, at *19 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28,

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2012), there is no lengthy chain of mediatingdecisions separating the employer from the morallyobjectionable activity in this case. All that isrequired is for one of the employees to decide to seekinformation about, or access to, contraceptive orabortifacient agents. With that single triggeringdecision, the Catholic employer would becomecomplicit in a grave moral wrong. This complicity isnot remote, like that of the objecting taxpayer whosecontribution to a federal execution is mediatedthrough decisions of Congress, prosecutors, judges,and criminal defendants. Rather, it is substantialand direct complicity, in that the employer directlysupports the action, by paying for it. To be sure, themorally objectionable action is ultimately committedby someone else, but so it is in any case of complicity.

The cooperation required by the Mandate,therefore, is quite different from that in thetaxpayer-funding cases on which the Governmentrelies in its brief in its Opening Brief in HobbyLobby. See Br. for the Pet’rs in No. 13-354, at 34-35(citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) andBoard of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)). Inthose cases, the financial contribution of eachindividual taxpayer to the allegedly objectionableprograms contributed a miniscule fraction of the costof the government’s programs, and the programswould almost certainly have still occurred withoutthat contribution. Under the Mandate, by contrast,the employer’s contribution to the objectionableaction is very substantial—the employer finances thelarge majority of the cost—and there is a realpossibility that the objectionable action might not

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take place at all without the employer’s contribution.See infra, Part I.C.

C. The Mandate May Require Employers ToBecome “Necessary” or “Essential”Causes of Objectionable Actions.

Third, in weighing the material cooperator’sdegree of moral responsibility for the forbiddenaction of a third party, Catholic moral theologiansconsider whether the forbidden action would havehappened anyway if the believer had not facilitatedit. In the parlance of Catholic theology, oneconsiders whether the believer is a “necessary” or“essential” contributor to the objectionable action.One important factor in assessing materialcooperation is “how indispensable is the cooperationfor the sinful action to occur.” Atkinson, at 80.Cooperation is particularly problematic when one“participate[s] in the evil act by doing somethingnecessary for the actual performance of the evil act,”such that “one’s action contributes to the activeperformance of the evil action so much so that theevil action could not be performed without the helpof the cooperator.” Benedict M. Ashley, O.P. et al.,Health Care Ethics: A Catholic Theological Analysis56 (5th ed. 2006); see also Manual, at 27/2 (statingthat a Catholic hospital would be morallyresponsible when “immoral procedures would not betaking place but for the collaboration” of thehospital). A much stronger justification is required“[i]f forgoing the [cooperation] certainly or probablywould prevent the wrongdoing or impede it andgreatly mitigate its bad effects.” Grisez, at 882-83.“[T]he more difficult it would be for the principal

20

agent to proceed without the cooperator’sinvolvement,” the more serious the justificationrequired to cooperate. Fisher, at 55.

For a religious employer of significant size, thereis a reasonable possibility that compliance with theMandate will cause an increase in the use ofabortifacients, contraceptives, and electivesterilizations, which would not occur without themandated coverage. And it is even more likely thatit will cause an increase in the incidence ofcontraceptive “education and counseling,” since suchcounseling can be provided to female patients ofchildbearing age even if (and perhaps especially if)they do not deliberately seek out contraceptiveservices. To be sure, abortifacients and othercontraceptives are already widely available fromother sources at relatively low cost, so it is notcertain that the Mandate will produce a significantincrease in contraceptive use. But it is a possibility,and increased usage is in fact the Government’s aimin reducing the employee’s out-of-pocket cost for theobjectionable services to zero. See 75 Fed. Reg.41,726, 41,733 (July 10, 2010); cf. Baude v. Heath,538 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Anything thatraises the cost of an activity will diminish thequantity”).

To the extent the Mandate achieves its purpose,then, the Government threatens to force employersto become necessary and essential causes of acts ofthe destruction of innocent human life. And even ifthe Mandate fails to increase use of abortifacientsand contraceptives, it will still likely compel

21

employers to become essential causes of encouragingcontraceptive use through education and counseling.

D. The Mandate Requires Employers ToProvide Funding Earmarked In AdvanceTo Be Used For Objectionable Purposes.

Certain Catholic moral theologians also considerwhether the means provided by the cooperator isdirectly ordered to, or specifically tailored for, use inthe forbidden action, and they weigh the cooperator’sresponsibility more heavily when there is such adirect relationship. As one commentator puts it, thecooperator’s moral complicity greatly increaseswhere there is an “essential tie” or “intelligible link”between the cooperator’s action and the wrongdoing.Melissa Moschella, The HHS Mandate and JudicialTheocracy (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/01/7403/ (“Moschella”).

In cases where the manner of cooperationconsists of paying for the forbidden action—such asthis case—an “essential tie” or “intelligible link”exists when the cooperator provides the wrongdoerwith a “certificate” to pay for the wrongful action:

[P]aying a salary and providinginsurance coverage for certain servicesare far from equivalent. Thedifference is analogous to thedifference between giving cash tosomeone, and giving, say, a giftcertificate to a steakhouse. In theformer case, the money you give couldbe used to buy steak, but there is no

22

essential tie between your gift andthat particular use of it. In the lattercase, you are giving a voucher for theprocurement of a specific and limitedrange of goods or services; there is anintelligible link between your gift andthe use to which the recipient mightput it.

Id. (emphasis in original). In other words, onebecomes complicit in wrongdoing when one providesa “gift certificate” or “voucher” to perform thewrongful action, id.—even if the wrongdoer would beable to perform the wrongful action without thatassistance.

A related question about the permissibility ofproviding a certificate or voucher for theperformance of a wrongful action arose in Germanyin the late 1990s. In 1995, Germany legalizedabortion during the first trimester, “provided thatthe woman had a certificate that she had attended… an approved counseling center” before seeking theabortion. Fisher, at 46-47. The certificate of thecounselor was required by law for the woman toreceive an abortion. Certain German bishops, whilecondemning the abortion law, sought to haveCatholic counselors participate in the state-approvedcounseling program. Id. at 47. These bishopsanticipated that Catholic counselors would tend todissuade women from having abortions, and that theparticipation of Catholic counselors would thusreduce the overall number of abortions. Id.

23

In 1998, Pope John Paul II authored a letter tothe German bishops, calling on them to “take carethat … ecclesiastical institutions do not become co-responsible for the killing of innocent children” byissuing such counseling certificates that authorizedwomen to receive abortions. Letter of His HolinessPope John Paul II to the Bishops of the GermanEpiscopal Conference ¶ 4 (Jan. 11, 1998), athttp://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/1998/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_19980111_bishop-germany_en.html (“Papal Letter”). Though heapplauded the intentions and actions of the Catholicpregnancy counselors, id. ¶ 6, the Pope expressedgrave concern that, by providing women withcertificates that authorized the women to receiveabortions, Catholic counselors “are involved incarrying out a law that leads to the killing ofinnocent human beings.” Id. ¶ 7. Because suchinvolvement made Catholics morally complicit inabortion, the Pope “urgently” exhorted the Germanbishops to ensure that the practice would cease. Id.

Likewise, under the Mandate, employers wouldbecome complicit in abortion by providing theequivalent of “certificates” or “vouchers” foremployees to receive abortifacients. See Moschella.By providing insurance coverage for those services,religiously objecting employers would effectively beproviding vouchers or coupons to cover the cost ofsuch services. This action can quite reasonably beviewed as rendering them morally complicit in theact of abortion. Much like the Catholic counselorswho issued “abortion certificates” in Germany,Catholic employers in this country could become, inthe words of Pope John Paul II, “involved in carrying

24

out a law that leads to the killing of innocent humanbeings.” Papal Letter ¶ 8.

E. Providing the Objectionable InsuranceCoverage Would Require CatholicEmployers To Disregard Guidance of theCatholic Bishops.

Furthermore, the many specifically Catholicemployers affected by the Mandate have anadditional reason for concern. For Catholics, thejudgment of their bishops on religious matters offaith and morals is entitled to deference, respect,and obedience. The bishops are “authentic teachers,that is, teachers endowed with the authority ofChrist, who preach the faith to the people entrustedto them, the faith to be believed and put intopractice.” Cathechism ¶ 2034. The Catholic’sindividual conscience “should take account of … theauthoritative teaching of the Magisterium on moralquestions,” and “[p]ersonal conscience and reasonshould not be set in opposition to the moral law orthe Magisterium of the Church.” Id. ¶ 2039.Specific guidance from the bishops on moralquestions, therefore, is to be treated as highlypersuasive by Catholic believers.

In this case, the United States Conference ofCatholic Bishops has expressed “vigorous and unitedopposition” to the Mandate as infringing upon thereligious freedom of Catholic employers. UnitedStates Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ad HocCommittee for Religious Liberty, Our First, MostCherished Liberty: A Statement on Religious Liberty,http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-

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liberty/upload/Our-First-Most-Cherished-Liberty-Apr12-6-12-12.pdf. Moreover, prior to thepromulgation of the Mandate, the Catholic bishopshad already instructed that “Catholic health careorganizations are not permitted to engage inimmediate material cooperation in actions that areintrinsically immoral, such as abortion, euthanasia,assisted suicide, and direct sterilization.” Directives¶ 70. The teaching of the Catholic bishops on thisspecific issue provides an additional compellingtheological reason for Catholic employers to avoidthe conduct compelled by the Mandate. Based onthese statements, Catholic employers mayreasonably infer that the Catholic bishops havedetermined that providing the objectionable healthinsurance coverage would be morally problematicunder Catholic doctrine.

F. One May Reasonably Conclude That NoProportionate Reason Justifies theSubstantial, Direct, and NecessaryCooperation in Grave Moral WrongsRequired by the Mandate.

As noted above, in certain cases of materialcooperation, the Catholic tradition calls for thecooperator to consider whether there is a“proportionate reason” that might justify one’sfacilitation of another’s wrongdoing. Grisez, at 876.As each of the factors discussed above is satisfied,however, an increasingly compelling proportionatereason is required to justify the cooperation. SeeGriese, at 400-01. Where, as here, all the factorsdiscussed above are implicated, it becomes veryreasonable to conclude that no proportionate reason

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would justify the cooperation. This is particularlytrue where the wrongdoing includes the destructionof innocent human life, viewed as a moral wrong ofthe highest gravity by the Catholic faith. Asdiscussed above, Pope John Paul II’s letter to theGerman Bishops in 1998 reflected a similarjudgment about the absence of proportionate reasonsthat might justify cooperation in abortion. InGermany, Catholics were participating in theabortion counseling program “in order to be able bygoal-directed counseling to save many unborn babiesfrom being killed.” Papal Letter ¶ 6. According tothe Pope, not even that vitally important purposewas sufficient to justify the grave evil of becoming“involved in carrying out a law that leads to thekilling of innocent human beings.” Id. ¶ 7. See alsoGriese, at 401-02 (noting that “it is difficult tosuggest a reason which might justify” proximate andnecessary “cooperation in an intrinsically evilprocedure” such as abortion). Relatedly, due to themoral gravity of abortion, the Directives of theUnited States Conference of Catholic Bishopscategorically forbid immediate material cooperationin abortion procedures. Directives ¶ 70. Thus,employers can very reasonably conclude that noproportionate reason would justify their provision ofhealth insurance coverage for abortifacients,contraceptives, and sterilizations.

* * * For these reasons, the Mandate places employersin the midst of a “perfect storm” of moral complicityin actions forbidden by the Catholic faith and othersimilarly grounded religions. It requires employersto cooperate in (1) actions that are very seriously

27

wrongful under Catholic teaching, (2) by making avery substantial and direct causal contribution tothose actions, (3) in circumstances where it ispossible that some of these wrongs would nototherwise occur, (4) by furnishing funding that isspecifically designated in advance for the solepurpose of paying for the objectionable actions, (5) inthe face of authoritative guidance from the Catholicbishops forbidding close cooperation in these wrongs,and all (6) without a proportionate reason to justifytheir cooperation. Thus, the judgment of manyCatholic and other religiously objecting employersthat the Mandate substantially burdens theirreligious freedom reflects an eminently reasonableapplication of theological principles.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Amici respectfullyrequest that this Court hold that the Mandateimposes a substantial burden on the free exercise ofreligion by objecting employers.

Respectfully submitted,

D. JOHN SAUERCounsel of Record

SARAH E. PITLYKMARY CATHERINE HODESCLARK & SAUER, LLC7733 Forsyth BoulevardSuite 625St. Louis, Missouri 63105(314) 332-2980jsauer@clarksauer.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

January 28, 2014

APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Full list of amici curiae, including their institutionalaffiliations……………………………………………….1a

1a

List of Amici Curiae

Ann W. AstellProfessor of TheologyUniversity of Notre DameNotre Dame, Indiana

Rev. Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, Ph.D., S.T.L.Associate Professor of Biology and Instructor ofTheologyProvidence CollegeProvidence, Rhode Island

Dr. Melanie BarrettAssistant Professor of Moral TheologyUniversity of St. Mary of the LakeMundelein SeminaryMundelein, Illinois

Gregory R. Beabout, Ph.D.Department of PhilosophySaint Louis UniversitySt. Louis, Missouri

Francis J. BeckwithProfessor of Philosophy and Church-State StudiesBaylor UniversityWaco, Texas

J. Brian Benestad, Ph.D.D’Amour Professor of Catholic ThoughtDepartment of TheologyAssumption CollegeWorcester, Massachusetts

2a

John BerkmanRegis CollegeUniversity of TorontoToronto, Ontario

Rev. Thomas V. Berg, MA, PhDProfessor of Moral TheologyDirector of AdmissionsSt. Joseph’s SeminaryDunwoodie, New York

Christopher O. Blum, Ph.D.Professor of History and PhilosophyAcademic DeanThe Augustine InstituteGreenwood Village, Colorado

Patrick J. Boyle, S.J.Associate ProfessorChristian Life DepartmentUniversity of Saint Mary of the LakeMundelein SeminaryMundelein, Illinois

Professor Gerard V. BradleyNotre Dame Law SchoolNotre Dame, Indiana

Joseph E. CapizziAssociate Professor of Moral TheologyThe Catholic University of AmericaWashington, District of Columbia

3a

John C. CavadiniProfessor, Department of TheologyUniversity of Notre DameNotre Dame, Indiana

Reverend Brian P. Chrzastek, O.P.Assistant Professor of PhilosophyPontifical Faculty of the Immaculate ConceptionDominican House of StudiesWashington, District of Columbia

Patrick M. ClarkAssistant ProfessorDepartment of Theology/Religious StudiesUniversity of ScrantonScranton, Pennsylvania

Father Basil Cole, OP, STDProfessor of Moral and Spiritual TheologyPontifical Faculty of the Immaculate ConceptionDominican House of StudiesWashington, District of Columbia

Randall G. Colton, Ph.D.Professor of PhilosophyKenrick-Glennon SeminarySt. Louis, Missouri

Holly Taylor CoolmanAssistant Professor of TheologyProvidence CollegeProvidence, Road Island

4a

Reverend John D. Corbett, O.P.Assistant Professor of Moral TheologyPontifical Faculty of the Immaculate ConceptionDominican House of StudiesWashington, District of Columbia

Patrick J. DeneenAssociate Professor of Political ScienceDavid A. Potenziani Memorial Chair inConstitutional StudiesUniversity of Notre DameNorte Dame, Indiana

Patrick G. Derr, Ph.D.Professor of PhilosophyClark UniversityWorcester, Massachusetts

Dana L. Dillon, Ph.D.Assistant Professor of TheologyProvidence CollegeProvidence, Rhode Island

Jason T. Eberl, Ph.D.Semler Endowed Chair for Medical EthicsMarian University College of Osteopathic MedicineIndianapolis, Indiana

Robert Fastiggi, Ph.D.Professor of Systematic TheologySacred Heart Major SeminaryDetroit, Michigan

5a

Doctor Gloria Falcao DoddInternational Marian Research InstituteDayton, Ohio

Michael P. Duricy, MA, STLInternational Marian Research InstituteDayton, Ohio

John FinleyAssistant Professor of PhilosophyKenrick-Glennon SeminarySt. Louis, Missouri

Michael P. FoleyAssociate Professor of PatristicsBaylor UniversityGreat Texts ProgramWaco, Texas

Alfred J. FreddosoJohn and Jean Oesterle Professor of ThomisticStudiesConcurrent Professor of LawPhilosophy DepartmentUniversity of Notre DameNotre Dame, Indiana

Right Rev. W. Thomas Frerking, OSB, D. Phil.Abbot, The Abbey of St. Mary and St. LouisSt. Louis, Missouri

Michael GormanSchool of PhilosophyCatholic University of AmericaWashington, District of Columbia

6a

John S. Grabowski, Ph.D.Associate Professor and Director of Moral TheologyEthics School of Theology and Religious StudiesCatholic University of AmericaWashington, District of Columbia

Marc D. Guerra, Ph.D.Associate Professor and Chair of TheologyAssumption CollegeWorcester, Massachusetts

Ann HartleEmory UniversityAtlanta, Georgia

Lawrence R. Hennessey, Ph.D.Professor of Dogmatic TheologyUniversity of St. Mary of the Lake/MundeleinSeminaryMundelein, Illinois

Joshua P. HochschildAssociate Professor of PhilosophyMount St. Mary’s UniversityEmmitsburg, Maryland

Dr. Leroy HuizengaUniversity of MaryBismarck, North Dakota

Dr. Christopher KaczorProfessor of PhilosophyLoyola Marymount UniversityLos Angeles, California

7a

James Keating, Ph.D.Creighton UniversityOmaha, Nebraska

Karl Keating, Th.M.President and FounderCatholic AnswersEl Cajon, California

Mary M. KeysUniversity of Notre DameNotre Dame, Indiana

Angela KnobelAssociate ProfessorSchool of PhilosophyCatholic University of AmericaWashington, District of Columbia

Reverend Dominic M. Langevin, O.P.Instructor of Systematic TheologyPontifical Faculty of the Immaculate ConceptionDominican House of StudiesWashington, District of Columbia

Patrick LeeJohn N. and Jamie D. McAleer Professor of BioethicsDirector, Institute of BioethicsFranciscan University of SteubenvilleSteubenville, Ohio

Father Dominic Legge, O.P.Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate ConceptionWashington, District of Columbia

8a

Matthew LeveringMundelein SeminaryMundelein, Illinois

V. Bradley LewisAssociate ProfessorSchool of PhilosophyCatholic University of AmericaWashington, District of Columbia

Charles S. LiMandri, Esq.President and Chief CounselFreedom of Conscience Defense FundRancho Santa Fe, California

Doctor Steve A. LongProfessor of TheologyDepartment of TheologyAve Maria UniversityAva Maria, Florida

Father Brendan LuptonAssistant ProfessorMundelein SeminaryMundelein, Illinois

Bruce D. MarshallLehman Professor of Christian DoctrineDirector, Graduate Program in Religious StudiesSouthern Methodist UniversityDallas, Texas

9a

William C. Mattison IIICatholic University of AmericaWashington, District of Columbia

Monsignor Kevin T. McMahon, S.T.D.Director of Spiritual FormationCollege of Liberal Arts Professor of Moral TheologyPontifical College JosephinumColumbus, Ohio

Father David Meconi, S.J.Saint Louis UniversitySt. Louis, Missouri

Melissa MoschellaAssistant Professor of PhilosophyCatholic University of AmericaWashington, District of Columbia

Mark C. MurphyMcDevitt Professor of Religious PhilosophyGeorgetown UniversityWashington, District of Columbia

Michael Pakaluk, Ph.D.Professor and ChairmanDepartment of PhilosophyAve Maria UniversityAve Maria, Florida

C. C. PecknoldAssociate Professor of TheologyCatholic University of AmericaWashington, District of Columba

10a

Rev. Thomas Petri, O.P., S.T.D.Moral TheologianVice President and Academic DeanPontifical Faculty of the Immaculate ConceptionDominican House of StudiesWashington, District of Columbia

Daniel PhilpottDirector of Civil and Human RightsUniversity of Notre DameNotre Dame, Indiana

Patricia E. Powers, M.Div., Ph.D.Bioethicist, Independent Consultant

Alexander R. PrussAssociate Professor and Director of GraduateStudiesDepartment of PhilosophyBaylor UniversityWaco, Texas

Lawrence J. Welch, Ph.D.Professor, Systematic TheologyKenrick-Glennon SeminarySt. Louis, Missouri

Shawn McCauley WelchAssociate Professor of Moral TheologyKenrick-Glennon SeminarySt. Louis, Missouri

11a

Father Thomas Joseph White, O.P.Associate Professor of Systematic TheologyThomistic InstituteDominican House of StudiesWashington, District of Columbia

Christopher WolfeEmeritus ProfessorMarquette UniversityMilwaukee, Wisconsin

Reverend Martin ZielinskiAssociate Professor of Church HistoryUniversity of St. Mary of the LakeMundelein, Illinois