breeder reactor: no need for hurry

2

Click here to load reader

Upload: trankien

Post on 22-Feb-2017

216 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Breeder reactor: no need for hurry

Industry rebuts foes of plastic bottles An environmental group held a press conference in front of the Food & Drug Administration's Bureau of Foods in Washington, D.C., last week to question the safety of plastic bev­erage containers and was immediately upstaged by industry.

Called by the New York City-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the intended purpose of the press conference was to announce a suit on a procedural point in the Federal Appeals Court for the Dis­trict of Columbia to force FDA to withdraw its interim approval of the use of disposable polyacrylonitrile beverage containers. Although it doesn't supply data, NRDC claims

Monsantofs nitrite Coke bottle

that the plastic and its break-down products can migrate into beverages, and since, it claims, little is known about the toxicity and carcinogenicity of the material, it poses a potential threat to consumers. NRDC lawyer Marcia J. Cleveland cites studies being conducted by Dr. Cesare Mal-toni at the University of Bologna in Italy and by the Manufacturing Chemists Association in the U.S. as evidence for concern over the safety of acrylonitrile. Cleveland also cites a chemical similarity between acry­lonitrile and vinyl chloride.

Currently two plastic beverage containers for soft drinks are in test markets in the U.S.: a nitrile bottle made by Monsanto for Coca-Cola, and a polyester bottle made by Du Pont for Pepsi-Cola. About the polyester bottle, Cleveland says that it is "not one bit better" from a safety standpoint than the nitrile bottle.

Then industry went on the offen­

sive and turned the NRDC news conference into an industry news conference when representatives stepped up to waiting television and radio microphones—to the apparent dismay of Cleveland and NRDC staffers. Society of the Plastics In­dustry general counsel and Wash­ington lawyer Jerome H. Heckman blasted NRDC for "piling lawsuits on top of lawsuits" to confuse the issue to a point where "no one can submit enough safety data" to satisfy critics. Heckman stresses that both long- and short-term animal studies have been submitted to FDA demonstrating nitrile bottle safety, and that the FDA food additive petition contains "reams of data that FDA has had for four years." He called the NRDC ac­tion "utter nonsense."

Following Heckman, Monsanto was heard from through nutritionist F. D. Wharton, the company's man­ager of environmental affairs. Says Wharton: NRDC "is taking advan­tage of an emotional situation" by trying to link chemically and toxi-cologically acrylonitrile with vinyl chloride, a known carcinogen. Whar­ton denies the link between acrylo­nitrile and vinyl chloride and says that Monsanto has conducted ex­tensive safety studies with its nitrile bottle, and that NRDC has not come up with any data to refute the safety studies. An SPI staffer calls the NRDC move an "attempt to prove guilt by association." D

Breeder reactor: no need for hurry The latest in the long, long line of studies on the liquid-metal fast breeder reactor has concluded that previous breeder cost-benefit analy­ses need to be revised extensively before they can be used as the basis for a go/no-go decision on commer­cializing the reactor.

In a report prepared for the use of Congress' Joint Economic Commit­tee, Dr. Mark Sharefkin, a physicist-economist at Resources for the Fu­ture Inc., says that most cost-benefit analyses have been inherently biased toward commercialization because they compare only two futures—one with and one without commercial breeder technology. Thus, if breeder commercialization has benefits, the studies find that the earliest breeder commercialization date will yield greatest benefits. Most breeder studies do not address the major question that needs answering—not simply whether a breeder should be developed, but the schedule under which it should be developed.

After examining three key premises underlying the breeder cost-benefit analyses, Sharefkin concludes that the U.S. doesn't need to be in much of a hurry to commercialize the breeder reactor. First, he says, previous ap­praisals grossly underestimate po­tential U.S. uranium resources. He contends that proven uranium re­sources are low because they are ex­pensive to prove. And until recently, a soft uranium market marked by declining prices provided only weak incentives for exploration and devel­opment.

Secondly Sharefkin points out that the era of declining electricity prices, which spurred increased demand for electricity in the past, seems to be over. As a result, he says, electricity growth rates beyond 1980 may be closer to 2% per year rather than the 5 or 6% growth rates used in most analyses. Finally, according to Shar­efkin, there is no reason to believe the optimistic assumption that LMFBR capital costs will decline with expe­rience, since light-water reactor con­struction, on the contrary, has expe­rienced persistently increasing costs.

Taken together, Sharefkin says, these facts indicate that a decision on the breeder could well be delayed. And he suggests that future studies "instead of casting the LMFBR problem as one of 'to have or not to have an LMFBR,' net benefit esti­mates should be used to evaluate al­ternative LMFBR development strategies, with the overall social evaluation of the program left to other broader devices, including leg­islative decision."

The ink on the report was barely dry before four committee members, all Republicans, were objecting to it. They charge that the study's negative conclusions "clearly indicate a shal­low understanding of the promising future of the LMFBR program and the history of nuclear power devel­opment in general." The four mem­bers have commissioned yet another LMFBR study, which also will be published by the committee. D

ERDA plan big on energy conservation Energy conservation has been singled out for priority action by the Energy Research & Development Adminis­tration in its first annual revision of its national energy research, devel­opment, and demonstration (RD&D) plan. Indeed, the status accorded energy conservation is the only major change to the initial plan unveiled by ERDA on June 30 of last year, and, ERDA says, reflects observations of,

April 26, 1976 C&EN 5

Page 2: Breeder reactor: no need for hurry

of increase in the output of the do­mestic economy." Putting the em­phasis on energy conservation tech­nologies—particularly in the next five years or so—bears few of the price-related impediments.

Opportunities for energy savings through enhanced conservation vary from sector to sector of the economy. For example, ERDA says, industry consumes 40% of the nation's energy. "By implementing the successful re­sults of RD&D projected industrial energy consumption can be decreased up to 17% per unit of output," or an energy savings equivalent to 1.8 mil­lion to 2.7 million aggregate bbl of petroleum equivalent per day by 1985. •

New spur needed for U.S. innovation Has the U.S. lost the initiative in technological innovation? Not yet, says Massachusetts Institute of Technology president Jerome B. Wiesner, but there are good reasons to worry that it might. Indeed there are, agrees Commerce Secretary El­liot L. Richardson. Both men were speakers at the MIT Club of Wash­ington's two-day conference last week on technological innovation and eco­nomic development.

Among the danger signs Richard­son cites are the declining portion of U.S. gross national product going to support research and development during the 1964-74 decade. In con­stant dollars, total expenditures for R&D remained level from 1968 through 1974. Expenditures for in­dustrial R&D and innovation actually fell 11% in constant dollars over this period, he says. And, although pro-

Wiesner: little Incentive now

ductivity in the U.S. continues to lead that of other industrialized nations, productivity increases are coming faster in all of the other major R&D-performing countries than in the U.S., Richardson says.

The real problem, as Dr. Wiesner sees it, is that the environment that fostered spectacular scientific and technological advancement in the U.S. from World War II until quite recently has changed. Economic fac­tors no longer favor innovation, he says. In steelmaking, shipbuilding, and railroads, for example, available technology has not been fully ex­ploited because of lack of capital. So there is little incentive to invest in more new technology.

Government is no longer as sup­portive of technology as it was earlier, Wiesner continues. Particularly missed is the support of basic and applied research that used to come from the Defense Department. And even when government still sponsors R&D, its patent policy tends to in­hibit private investment in technol­ogy development. Further, in areas such as energy, drugs, and agricul­tural chemicals, Wiesner says, gov­ernmental agencies concerned with potential health hazards "dominate the market decisions so completely that it is not possible for a business­man to judge the outcome of an in­vestment and sometimes he could not succeed if he tried, no matter how outstanding his performance."

President Ford has taken a number of major steps to encourage R&D, Richardson says, among them his re­quest for $24.7 billion for R&D in his fiscal 1977 budget. Particularly in the face of federal efforts to hold down spending in other areas, he says this 11% increase indicates the Adminis­tration's dedication to science and technology. Other steps include es­tablishing the White House Office of Science & Technology Policy and moves to stimulate private industry's spending on R&D.

What is needed most of all, both Wiesner and Richardson agree, is substantially more effective long-range analysis, particularly in the areas of technology where govern­ment has assumed significant re­sponsibility. Such analysis need not mean more government control or intervention, Richardson says. In fact, it may sometimes mean the opposite. "It ought to be self-evident," he says, "that the less you understand the ef­fect of [government] intervention, the more you have to intervene to correct its side effects.. . . To the extent that we want to limit government inter­vention . . . it ought to follow that we need a higher level of sophisticated analysis." Π

6 C&EN April 26, 1976

among other things, "only moderate progress" to date on supply tech­nologies. Overall, the basic goals and strategy of the initial plan, which pul priority emphasis on several energy supply technologies, are refined bu1 remain essentially intact.

hjRDA estimates that the potential savings from increased use of con­servation technologies are equivalent to almost 1 million bbl of oil per day within the next five years. Further, "by the year 2000, such technologies could permit local energy consump­tion to be 25% less than it would be without their adoption." Virtues cited by ERDA for the increased attention accorded energy conservation tech­nologies include "a barrel of oil saved can result in reduced imports," it typically costs less to save a barrel of oil than to produce it, and "conser­vation technologies can generally be implemented at a faster rate· and with less government involvement in near term than can new supply technolo­gies."

The new ERDA plan retains the initial plan's priority rating for six energy supply initiatives: establishing a complete light-water nuclear reac­tor fuel cycle in the private sector; expediting direct use of coal; ex­panding application of enhanced oil and gas recovery techniques; devel­oping the basis for a synthetic liquid and gas fuels industry; stimulating the use of solar heating and cooling;· and expanding use of geothermal re­sources.

Dr. Robert C. Seamans Jr., ERDA administrator, notes that over the next few decades before the success of one or more of the long-term tech­nologies—fusion, solar electric, and the breeder—can be proved, "we must rely on coal and conventional nuclear power, along with solar heating and cooling, geothermal and oil shale, to supplement oil and gas." Closer in the near-term, major em­phasis should be directed toward accelerating the use of the six key technologies that are either com­mercial or nearly so and that have potential for major contributions.

In contrast with Ford Administra­tion energy price hiking policies, ERDA indicates that raising prices for energy isn't the best means for conserving energy. ERDA adds that increased prices have fueled inflation, hold the promise of being even more inflationary, and boost unemploy­ment rates. "Higher prices (30% above those otherwise expected in 2000) could be required to achieve specified energy demand reductions, and this appears to be an undesirable cost to the nation." Further, "the ef­fects of higher prices and new tech­nology result in a slowing of the rate