brazilian navy...at 06:35 the boat "cavalo marinho i" passed by the lighthouse of mar...

BRAZILIAN NAVY Directorate of Ports and Coasts

WATERWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY SUPERINTENDENCY

Sinking of the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I" Department of Inquiries and Investigations of Navigation Accidents

Maritime Safety Investigation Report

BRAZILIAN NAVY

DIRECTORATE OF PORTS AND COASTS

WATERWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY SUPERINTENDENCY

DEPARTMENT OF INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS OF NAVIGATION ACCIDENTS

SINKING OF THE VESSEL "CAVALO MARINHO I"

AUGUST 24, 2017

MARITIME SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT

Photo 1: Obtained by Safety Investigators at the start of the investigation. The vessel was stranded on corals after the accident.

Reference: Casualty Investigation Code, of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) –

MSC-MEPC.3 / Circ.2 13 June 2008 / Resolution MSC.255 (84)

BRAZILIAN NAVY Directorate of Ports and Coasts Marine Safety Superintendence


Maritime Safety Investigation Rep

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INDEX

I- LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. 3

II- INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 4

III- SYNOPSIS ....................................................................................................................... 4

IV- GENERAL INFORMATION .............................................................................................. 5

A) Characteristics of the vessel....................................................................................... 5

B) Documents of the vessel “CAVALO MARINHO I”" ................................................... 5

V- ACCIDENT LOCAL DATA ……….......................................................................................7

VI- HUMAN FACTORS AND CREW .................................................................................. 12

VII- CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS .............................................................12

VIII- PROCEDURES AFTER THE ACCIDENT .................................................................. 13

IX- CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT ........................................................................14

X- EXPERT EXAMINATIONS................................................................................... .......... 14

XI- ANALYSIS AND CAUSAL FACTORS ................................. …..................................... 19

XII - PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSION ....................................... 28

XIII - SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................ 29

XIV- ANNEX ………………….………………………………………………………………........31




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I - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS - BTS - Bay of Todos os Santos - (Bahia) - Postal Code - Postal Address - CIR - Registration Booklet - CNA - National Certificate of Tonnage - CPBA - Captaincy of the Ports of Bahia - (Salvador-Bahia) - CPF - Register of Individuals - CREA-BA - Regional Council of Engineering and Architecture - Bahia - CSN - Navigation Safety Certificate - CTS – Minimum Safe Manning - IAFN - Administrative Inquiry on Accidents and Facts of Navigation - IML - Institute of Legal Medicine - ISAIM - Safety Investigation of Marine Accidents and Incidents - LAEP - Support Boat for Teaching and Research - MB - Brazilian Navy - MCP - Main Combustion Engine - MWM - Motoren Werke Mannheim - NORMAM - Standards of the Maritime Authority - IMO - International Maritime Organization - TIE - Vessel Registration Title




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II – INTRODUCTION

For the purpose of accomplishing the collection and the analysis of evidences, the identification

of the causal factors and the elaboration of the recommendations of safety that are necessary, in

order to avoid that in the future occur similar maritime accidents and/or incidents, the Ports Captaincy

of Bahia (CPBA) carried out the present Safety Investigation of Marine Accidents and Incidents

(ISAIM) in compliance with that laid down in the Casualty Investigation Code of the International

Maritime Organization (IMO), adopted by Resolution MSC.255(84).

This Final Report is a technical document that reflects the result obtained by the DPC in relation

to the circumstances that contributed or may have contributed to unleash the occurrence and does

not resort to any procedures of proof for verification of civil or criminal responsibility.

Furthermore, it should be emphasized the importance of protecting the persons responsible for

the supplying of information related to the occurrence of the accident, for the use of information

included in this report for ends other than the prevention of future similar accidents may lead to

erroneous interpretations and conclusions.

III - SYNOPSIS

On August 24, 2017, the boat "CAVALO MARINHO I", year of construction 1973, Gross

Tonnage 76, breath 5 m, draft 1.06 m, "sloop" type boat, built exclusively in wood and

authorized to navigate Navigation Interior Area 1, with capacity to carry 160 passengers and

4 crew members and certified by CPBA, had departed at 06:30 am from the Mar Grande

Maritime Terminal, in the municipality of Vera Cruz - BA, located on the Island of Itaparica, to

cross from the Mar Grande Terminal to Salvador, Bahia. The accident occurred around

06h44, about 200 meters from the Maritime Terminal of the municipality of Vera Cruz, in the

Bay of Todos Santos (BTS), demarcated by the point of coordinates LAT 12º57'33.0 "S and

LONG 038º35'36.7" W photo 3). According to the interviews of witnesses, at 06:30 the

vessel suspended from the Mar Grande Terminal with 116 passengers on board and 4 crew.

At 06:35 the boat "Cavalo Marinho I" passed by the lighthouse of Mar Grande. The

commander of the boat accelerated the machines and traced the route 060º in order to

compensate the ebb tide. At that time the weather was rainy and gusts of South wind.

Passengers accumulate to Port on the main deck. Between 0640 and 0645 the first wave

impact occurs on the fin of Starboard. The boat was aderned for Port, and before it could get

up, it was hit by another strong wave by Starboard, causing the boat to capsize, leading to

death 19 passengers aboard the vessel "Cavalo Marinho I"




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It is worth noting two factors: the absence of a history of fatal accidents in the last 60 years

of the crossing, and the atypical winter and the harsh climatic conditions of the winter of

2017, in the Bay of All Saints.

IV - GENERAL INFORMATION

A) Characteristics of the vessel:

Name: "CAVALO MARINHO I"

Registration number: 281-018236-1

Type: Boat

Activity / Service: Passenger Transport

Country and port of registration Brazil / Salvador-BA

Hull Material: Wood

Call sign: PP7782

Total length: 18,64m

Gross Tonnage: 17.03 tons

Breath: 5 m

Depth: 1,45 m

Gross tonnage: 76

Net tonnage: 39

Draft: 1,06 m

Total propulsion: 216,3 Kw

- MCP: MWM (propulsion)

- Fuel: Diesel

- Brazilian flag,

- Crew: driver and commander of the "CAVALO MARINHO I", Deck Sailor, Deck Deck Sailor;

Machine Oiler and Auxiliary Machine Oiler.

- Owner / Owner and Operator Data:

- Operator - CL Maritime Transportation - Rua Joaquim de Brito, 61, VeraCruz - BA, CEP:

44470-000.

B)Documents of the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I":

- Classification and Classification Society - Unclassified Vessel




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- Insurance - The vessel was not insured.

- Certification of the vessel involved in the accident - within validity.

- Title of Boat Registration (TIE) issued by the CPBA on 04/20/2016 and valid until

04/20/2021;

- Descriptive memorial;

Plan of General Arrangement / Security / Capacity;

Definitive Stability Study issued by naval engineer;

Photo 2: Vessel before the accident. Photo provided by the owner.




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Inclination Proof Report of 12/28/2011;

Navigation Safety Certificate - 281CSN00013 / 2016 of April 18, 2016, valid until

January 13, 2020, issued by the Port Authority of Bahia.

- National Certificate of Tonnage - 281CNA00001 / 2016 of April 18,

- Minimum Safe Manning (CTS) issued by the CPBA on 03/21/2016 and indefinite validity.

Details of the Trip:

The vessel was left at 06:30 am from the Mar Grande Maritime Terminal, in the municipality

of Vera Cruz - Bahia State, located on the Island of Itaparica, to cross the Mar Grande -

Salvador, on 08/24/2017. Then the boat passed the Mar Grande Lighthouse, which marks the

exit of waters sheltered by the crown formed by a barrier of corals. According to the report of

the commander of the vessel, the course taken was 060 degrees to compensate for the current

of the ebb tide. The accident occurred around 06h44, about 200 meters from the Maritime

Terminal of the municipality of Vera Cruz, in the Bay of Todos os Santos (BTS), demarcated by

the point of coordinates LAT 12º57'33.0 "S and LONG 038º35'36.7" W, culminating with the

death of nineteen passengers who were aboard the vessel.

V - ACCIDENT LOCAL DATA:

The accident occurred at the point of coordinates LAT 12º57'33.0 "S and LONG 038º35'36.7" W,

inside the Bay of Todos os Santos (BTS), in place of depth 5.3 meters, inland navigation Area 1 and

780 meters of the Lighthouse of Mar Grande, on the coast of the municipality of Vera Cruz, Island of

Itaparica, Bahia. In the course of the boat there is a low depth area marked in Photo 4.




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Photo 3: Location of the accident reported

Photo 4: Depths near the Island of Itaparica. One can observe the sand and stone

bank that will be quoted ahead.

The environmental conditions at the time of occurrence were as follows: between

05:00 and 07:30 hours on August 24, 2017, according to Environmental Information




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Bulletin No. 134/2017, of the Center of Hydrography of the Navy, the region of interest

was under the influence of atmospheric instabilities associated with a quasi-stationary

frontal system over the ocean.

Meteorological records at Salvador airport indicated a predominance of overcast,

almost overcast, and southeast direction winds with intensity between 9 and 11 knots.

However, Salvador's automatic station, closer to the crash site, recorded bursts of

16.9 knots and light rain. A more local analysis of the rainfall can be performed by the

images of the meteorological radar of Salvador, which indicated that before the

departure of the vessel (around 0630P) there was no rain, but during the crossing,

one can perceive the occurrence of rain weak, occasionally moderate, in the area of

interest. On-the-spot waves, the data available are on-board satellite altimeters, which

indicate the occurrence of waves from 2.0 to 2.2 meters high, at a distance of

approximately 100 nautical miles from the region of interest. Were collected by the

satellite in the early morning of the 24th, at 0544 hours. The Brazilian Marine

Meteorological Service, operated by the Directorate of Hydrography and Navigation

through the Center for Hydrography of the Navy, did not issue a valid weather warning

to the vicinity of the region of interest, in this case, the ECHO area.

According to the study of the oceanographic parameters of the accident area on

August 24, 2017, of the coastal management company PREAMAR, during the

morning the marine currents presented values ranging from 0.05 knots to 6:00 hours

and 1, 2 knot at 7:30 p.m. Also according to the same study, in the vicinity of the

passenger terminal of Mar Grande, the height of the waves reached values greater

than 1.6 meters. In addition, 1.8-meter-high waves were noted in the region south of

the accident.

The region where the accident occurred is considered homeless for the south

(180 °) and southeast (135 °) quadrant waves, since all the wave intervals (0 - 0.63

m, 0.63 - 0.78 m, 0, 78 - 0.94 m, 0.94 - 1.9 m) occur in the region. It is possible to

observe that in 75% of the time, the significant wave height in the place where the

accident occurred varied between 0.2 and 0.94 m, the wave period between 4 and 6

seconds and the wave direction between 140º and 148° , 4th. Waves with significant

height between 0.94 and 1.9 m occur in 25% of the analyzed period. Significant wave

height (Hs) is defined as the average of one-third of the highest waves recorded

during the time considered.




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The study then concludes that the wave conditions on August 24, 2017, at the

time of the accident with the vessel “CAVALO MARINHO I”, are considered atypical in

the region, since the significant wave height above 0.97 m wave period between 8.6

and 9 seconds correspond to an accumulated probability of occurrence of less than

25%. The region of the Mar Grande passenger terminal, in extreme sea conditions, is

exposed to south and southeast quadrant waves and can reach up to 1.8 meters in

height.

According to a report by the National Institute of Meteorology, data from the

Ondina meteorological station in the city of Salvador, on August 24, 2017, showed

time with low rainfall with rainfall indexes of 8.2 millimeters, minimum temperature of

19.6ºC and winds with 31 km / h (16.7 knots) of maximum gust. Still according to the

report, the months corresponding to the winter in the region presented number of

days with rains superior to the climatological average. The meteorological

phenomenon that contributed to this condition was the action of high pressure on the

Atlantic Ocean, with greater intensity and proximity of the Brazilian coast, which

favored the increase of the winds in the coast and, consequently, the increase of low

and average nebulosity in the coast of Bahia, mainly in the winter.

The tide table published by the Brazilian Navy's Hydrography and Navigation Board

confirmed for the morning of the accident (08/24/2017): high tide at 05:21 (2.5 meters)

and low tide at 11:26 a.m. (0.2 meter) in the port of Salvador, located in the interior of

Bay of Todos os Santos.




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Photo 5: Position of the accident drawn in the nautical chart of the region. Note the passage of the vessel on a sandbar and a high bottom to the south of the vessel, allowing waves from SSE

to be raised to the point of becoming potentially dangerous.




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VI - HUMAN FACTORS AND CREW:

Minimum Safe Manning - meeting the requirements of Chapter 1 of NORMAM-02 / DPC

and NORMAM-13 / DPC in both quantity and qualification of seafarers.

Nationalities: all four crew members involved in the accident were of Brazilian

nationality.

Boarding time / Previous experience - The crew member who commanded the vessel is

working at the company "CL TRANSPORTES" and commands the boat Nossa Senhora da

Penha; eventually, (approximately 20 trips) commanded the motorboat “CAVALO MARINHO

I”, in the condition of reserve boat. The Deck Auxiliary crew member since February 2014

has held this position in the six vessels of the company "CL TRANSPORTES MARÍTIMOS".

The crew member Able Seaman has been working for the company since 2008. He added

that, on the day of the accident, he was on the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I". The Oiler

works on all vessels belonging to the company and has been in the position for almost five

years. All had previous experience, resulting from previous shipments.

Periods of Work X Rest and Fatigue: No irregularities were found.

Accommodations for the crew - no accommodation for the crew in general. Crossing

navigation with a duration of less than one hour.

Use of alcohol, drugs and medicines, used by the crew involved in the accident - Nothing

at all.

Safety Management - There is no specific Safety Management established for the vessel

"CAVALO MARINHO I". Such a requirement is not mandatory for passenger vessels used in

inland navigation.

VII – CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

At 06:20 hours on August 24, 2017, as reported in the interviews with the crew of the

vessel CAVALO MARINHO I, the vessel was docked at the pier of the Mar Grande

passenger terminal.

At 06:30 hours the boat departed from the terminal of Mar Grande towards Salvador,

with 116 passengers and 4 crew. The climate was moderate rain, good visibility and

moderate wind. According to the tidal forecast report of the Navy Hydrography Center, the

tide had reached its peak at 5:21 a.m. of the same day, with 2.5 meter of high tide .




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According to the same bulletin, at 06:30 hours the tide was in an ebb tide, until it reached the

low tide of 0.2 meter at 11:26 in the morning of the same day.

At 06:35 hours the vessel passed the Lighthouse of Mar Grande, which marks the exit of

waters sheltered by the crown formed by barrier of corals. At that point, it began to rain hard

and visibility was affected. South-southeast winds with speeds of 15 to 16 knots were on the

starboard of the vessel. Wind and rain hit the passengers located on the upper deck of the

boat, so the crew lowered the starboard valances. According to the report of the commander

of the vessel, the course taken was 060 degrees to compensate for the current of the ebb

tide.

At 6:44 am, when sailing on a sandbar and rock, the vessel CAVALO MARINHO I was hit by

a strong wave in the starboard cross, causing the vessel to be diverted from the original

course. At the moment when the Commander of the vessel tried to correct the course, the

boat was hit by a second wave, which made it tack approximately 070 degrees to port.

Before it could return to normal condition, the vessel was hit by a third starboard wave, which

caused the total tack to 090 degrees and the fall of most of the passengers and crew in the

water. At this point, as reported in the interviews with the survivors on the lower deck of the

vessel, there was a heavy intake of water through the port windows and the access ladder to

the lower deck, making it impossible for passengers to leave the interior of the compartment.

The survivors who were in this compartment and who managed to escape passed through

the starboard windows and reached the outside of the hull.

The roof of the upper deck of the vessel was released, allowing the floats to be available to the

victims trying to remain on the surface of the water, still quite flogged by the waves and the wind in

the place. The vessel, even heavily hinged to port, continued to float and was driven by the current of

the ebb tide to the coral barrier located further south of the Mar Grande terminal. The survivors

waited for help in the water, trying to be together to facilitate the rescue, which was carried out with

the support of other passing passenger ships.

VIII - PROCEDURES AFTER THE ACCIDENT:

Immediately after learning of the accident, the first CPBA boat arrived on the scene in about 32

minutes after being fired. In total, in the Search and Rescue actions, five CPBA vessels and four

Brazilian Navy ships (MB) were sent with doctors and divers to the rescue of the victims. It was also

activated by MB, the Military Fire Brigade, the Mobile Emergency Service and the Air Force Branch of

the Military Police of Bahia, which sent a helicopter to the region of the event, besides requesting via

radio that vessels close to the site assist in the dodge the victims.




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The site called Barra da Penha was difficult to access and the victims were found dead, being

rescued by the Brazilian Navy five bodies, two in the sea and three inside the Barra da Penha.

The accident of the boat "CAVALO MARINHO I" caused the death of nineteen peoples, 59 injured

and one missing.

IX - CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT:

- Personal Injury - Yes, with nineteen passengers dead and fifty-nine people injured.

- Environmental damage - there was no significant pollution.

- Material damage - partial shipwreck, followed by stranding and total loss of the vessel, due

to the climatic conditions prevailing in the region from August 24 to September 04, 2017.

X – EXPERT EXAMINATIONS:

The vessel was stranded on the coral barrier south of the Mar Grande passenger terminal

(Photo 1). The investigation was then initiated in the hull wrecked on August 26, by the

Security Investigators of the Port Authority of Bahia. On August 28, the two Investigators

returned to the place where the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I" was located. The vessel had

a side crash on the starboard side at half a dock, where the team of experts gained access

to the interior of the hull. This malfunction was probably caused by the impact of the vessel

on the barrier of corals where it was stranded, since there were no reports of open water or

any other embarkation of water on board before the vessel was listed. On the lower

passenger deck were transverse mounted seats that were not provided for in the approved

plans of the vessel (Photo 6).




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Photo 6: View of the lower deck of the vessel CAVALO MARINHO I after the accident.




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Also noted were ballasts not provided for in the plans and stability study presented by

the naval engineer Technical Responsible for the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I".

Cement rollers were noted at the bottom of the lower passenger compartment (Photo 7),

cut loose and accumulated stones on the port side to the rear of the Engine Room

(Photo 8) and stones in the side of the port side below the command house of the vessel.

Photo 7: Cement rolls found between the structural reinforcements of the bottom of the hull, below the lower deck. The ballast was found submerged by the tide entering the rough vessel.

Photo 8: Stones used as ballast, found aft of the Engine Room, accumulated to starboard due to the trimming of the vessel.




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Several lifejackets were still in the boat, indicating that the passengers did not have time

to dress them after the overlap. On the main deck, some valances were still mounted and

it was possible to access the Engine Room and the Command Room. At the control of the

boat, you can see the throttle lever engaged (Photo 11).

Photo 9: Engine Room with two main propulsion engines.

The structure that served as the roof of the house on the main deck was separated

from the vessel during the accident (Photo 10). In the Engine Room it was verified the

assembly of two propulsion engines (Photo 9).

Photo 10: Main deck of the vessel, without the roof that fell after the trim.




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Photo 11: Cabin of command of the boat. The engine throttle levers were found to be engaged.

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BRAZILIAN NAVY

Directorate of Ports and Coasts Marine Safety Superintendence


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XI - ANALYSIS AND CAUSAL FACTORS:

(a) Summary of the vessel:

On January 17, 2012, the new Plans of the vessel were approved by the

Inspection and Inspection Group (GVI) of the Ports Capitaincy of Bahia (CPBA),

presented by the Technical Engineer Naval Engineer, changing the capacity of

132 passengers and 4 crew members to 160 passengers and 4 crew.

On January 13, 2016, the CPG GVI carried out the dry inspection of the

vessel for the renewal of the Navigation Safety Certificate (CSN) and, in the end,

issued a dry inspection report without any deficiencies. After that, a floating

survey was carried out, where the naval inspector of the CPG GVI verified

changes in the vessel and requested new technical documents compatible with

the actual condition of the vessel at the time of the survey. These changes were

already foreseen in new documentation issued on 12/28/2015 by the Technical

Engineer Naval Engineer, but until that moment, had not been presented to the

GVI of the CPBA for the proper approval in the light of NORMAM.

In February 2016, the legal representative of the owner of the passenger vessel

"CAVALO MARINHO I" received a request from the CPBA for the issuance of

vessel alteration. Such alteration was intended to adapt the vessel according to

the habitability criteria recommended in Annex 3-M of NORMAM for Ships Used

in Inland Navigation. The change was also aimed at correcting the vessel's

billing notes, including the area covered, and adding one more propulsion

engine, leaving the vessel with two MWM engines of 145 HP each. These

alterations were consolidated by the Naval Engineer Technical Responsible of

the vessel through the technical documents issued on Dicember 28,2015.

On April 5, 2016, the new plans and technical documents regarding

the alterations of the vessel were verified, issuing later the License of

Amendment number 281LA00002 / 2016.

On April 12, 2016, the floating survey and the survey of tonnage

were carried out, with the objective of establishing real compatibility of the vessel

with the updated plans and signed by the Technical Naval Engineer. No

discrepancies were found in this survey.

On April 18, 2016, CPBA issued the Navigation Safety Certificate

(CSN) number 281CSN00013 / 2016, valid until January 13, 2020 and the

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National Archiving Certificate number 281CNA00001 / 2016.

On April 20, 2017, the CPBA carried out the survey for the CSN's annual

endorsement of the vessel.

Therefore, on the day of the accident, the vessel had all valid statutory

certificates.

(b) Modifications made on the vessel:

According to an interview with the owner of the company CL Transporte

Marítimo, responsible for the operation of the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I", it

was confirmed the change of the motorization of the vessel, exchanging a GM

engine for two MWM engines model TD 229/6, and the installation of stones in

the back region of the Machine Square, totaling 300 kilograms of ballast,

between May and June 2017.

During the inspection carried out on the vessel, the following alterations were

made without adequation of the plans and without the consent of the Maritime

Authority:

1 - Installation of transverse seats mounted lower deck of passengers that were

not foreseen in the approved plans of the vessel;

2 - About 300 kilograms of cut stones loose and accumulated on the side of port

aft of the Place of Machines; and

3 - About 100 kilograms stones in the region of the side to port below the house

of the command of the vessel.

About 600 kilograms of weights in the form of cement rollers were found

mounted on the bottom of the lower passenger compartment. This weight was

not confirmed as added weight in the vessel after the Test of Inclination carried

out in the year 2012 by the Naval Engineer Technical Responsible nor by the

owner. Therefore, this weight was considered as being part of the vessel,

declared in the Incline Test, and was not increased in the calculations of balance and

stability.

c) Results of the expertise:

During the two visits aboard the vessel stranded in the corona after the

accident, it was possible to verify the modifications declared in interviews, either the

installation of ballast in the form of stones cut to the rear of the Engine Room, or the

new arrangement with two propulsion engines in the same compartment. In addition,

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an estimated 100 kilograms of ballast-cut stones were found in a port bay next to the

side of the vessel below the forward command. The steering system, mechanically

driven by the rudder, was intact. It can be seen that the throttle lever was engaged

forwards (Photo 11).

On September 5, a simulation was carried out of part of the sinistrade vessel,

aiming to establish the exact location of the accident and, therefore, to analyze the

local environmental conditions, as well as the physical characteristics of the place,

mainly regarding the type background. The climatic conditions on that day presented

winds of the south quadrant and ebb tide, conditions close to the day of the

accident. The Driver and Commander of the SEA CAVALO I on the day of the

accident accompanied the team of investigators and indicated with precision the

point in the Nautical Chart where the accident occurred. The LAT coordinates. 12 °

57 '33''S and LONG. 038º 35 '36.7 "W represent, in the Nautical Chart, the point

where the accident occurred, on a sand and stone bank near the Mar Grande

terminal. It was found that the vessel was navigating on a sand and stone bank with

depth of 5.3 meters, with the Boreste being the presence of a region of high depth

with 3 meters of depth (Photo 4). On November 30th, with the presence of the driver

and commander of the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I" on the day of the accident, a

new simulation of the boat was carried out, to analyze the course carried out by the

vessel, from the Mar Grande Terminal the location of the accident.

Simulations and stability tests:

In possession of the Definitive Stability Study, the Plan of Lines, the Plan of

General Arrangement of the results of the Slope Test and Hydrostatic Curves,

prepared by the Technical Engineer who conducted the technical survey of the

vessel and presented to the Port Authority of Bahia on 01/17/2012; several

simulations and stability calculations were carried out in order to verify if the vessel

complied with the criteria of intact stability recommended in NORMAM-02 / DPC for

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inland navigation Area 1.

The hull of the vessel was modeled and introduced in MAXSURF naval

architecture calculations program, and weights were introduced according to the

distributions obtained for the day of the accident, considering the results shown in

the tilt test approved in 2012 and some recent modifications verified by the

Investigators and confirmed in interviews.

First, the static equilibrium conditions were plotted and the stability curve of the

vessel was plotted, considering only the data presented by the Technical Naval

Engineer. The cocking arms were then simulated due to the accumulation of

passengers, wind action and yaw maneuver, simulating strictly the parameters

presented by the Technical Engineer Naval Engineer for the condition of maximum

capacity of the vessel, which was 160 passengers and 4 crew , in a total of 164

people. It was verified that the vessel, based strictly on the data presented by the

Technical Naval Engineer, met the stability criteria for the inland navigation area 1,

as recommended in chapter 6 of NORMAM-02 / DPC. The Stability Study Report of

the Cavalo Marinho I Vessel was presented, attached to this safety investigation.

Stability Criteria for Inland Navigation Area 1:

The stability criterion established in NORMAM for vessels used in Inland

Navigation has five items, all of them mandatory, to be for the approval of the safe

conditions of the vessel, considering the expected loading in the project.

Level I corrections:

However, the value declared by the Technical Naval Engineer of the longitudinal

position of the center of gravity of the weight corresponding to the distribution of

110 passengers on the upper deck and 50 passengers on the lower deck does not

correspond to the calculation of the combined values on the two decks and can not

even be considered a mathematical approximation. It was then necessary to adjust

to a new value representing the precise calculation of the passenger distribution.

Another necessary adjustment was made in the value of the vertical position of the

center of gravity of the weights corresponding to the passengers' luggage. As

recommended in NORMAM-02 / DPC, a weight of 25 kg of luggage must be

stipulated for each person on board, stowed with the passenger, including also the

crew. The value presented by the Technical Engineer Naval Engineer for the vertical

position was then adjusted from VCG = 1.0 meter from the baseline of the vessel to

VCG = 1.775 meters from the same reference. The diesel oil tank (TOD) had its

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weight calculated by the Technical Engineer Naval Engineer, but the transverse

moment due to the removal of the center of gravity of the tank in relation to the

center line of the vessel ended up being despised by the Naval Engineer Technical

Responsible.

When verifying compliance with the stability criteria for area 1 of the inland

navigation, it is concluded that these corrections are already sufficient for the vessel

not to meet the criteria of areas under the static stability curve, as recorded in the

Stability Study of the vessel “CAVALO MARINHO I”, in the Annex.

For the same group of corrections of the data presented by the Technical

Engineer of the vessel, the static stability curve of the vessel was established, this

time considering the ballast stones found below the cockpit and inside the Machine

Square, in the position final, accumulated to port. The result is similar to the

simulation with the vessel without these ballasts, but the difference between the

minimum area negative results under the stability curve in the two cases indicates

the negative influence of these weights in the stability of the vessel.

Level II corrections:

At this level of adjustment, the centers of gravity of the accumulation of

passengers on the two decks were considered, grouped together using the

Solidworks program, as demonstrated in the Report. As envisaged in Item 0635,

sub-line 6 of NORMAM-02 / DPC: "Passengers without their baggage shall be

considered distributed in order to produce the most unfavorable combination that

can be verified in practice for the moment of the shipment due to the grouping of

passengers in an edge and or vertical position of the center of gravity in the

condition. " The Naval Engineer Responsible Technical considered as the most

unfavorable combination recommended by NORMAM-02 / DPC when transporting

the maximum capacity of 164 people, as requested by the shipowner and sanctioned

by the Naval Engineer Technical Responsible.

Stability simulations for conditions on the day of the accident:

According to the information collected during the investigation, a total of 120

people were on board the vessel at the time of the accident. In order to evaluate the

safety levels of the vessel, the stability tests required to certify the vessel were

simulated, considering the weight arrangement of the total number of people on

board, with the last modifications made by the shipowner.

According to interviews with the passengers and crew of the vessel, a minimum of

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20 people were on the lower deck on the day of the accident. Therefore, the

distributions were simulated considering 20 people in the lower deck and 100 people

in the upper deck, always considering a total of 120 people.

Regarding the modifications of the vessel after 2012, an increase of 500

kilograms in the Engine Room was considered, regarding the difference in weight

between the arrangement of two propulsion engines, as well as the stones

embedded in the bottom of the Machine's aft square, both verified on board by the

Investigators and confirmed in an interview. It is added that the stones mounted in

the region of the Machine's Square were considered accumulated in the side of port,

situation in which they were verified by the team of Experts after the accident. The

ballast stones found in a port side compartment below the cockpit, in front of the

vessel, estimated to have a minimum weight of 100 kilograms were also considered.

The same adjustments considered in the corrections levels I and II were applied

for this simulation, taking into account the reduction of the number of people on

board of 164 (100% of passengers) to 120 (arrangement of the day of the accident).

It was proved that the vessel carrying 120 people also did not meet the area

requirement under the static stability curve, even considering the minimum stability

criteria for area 1 of inland navigation, as recommended in chapter 6 of NORMAM-

02 / DPC.

Due to the winds of approximately 16.9 knots that reached the vessel on the

starboard side, which, together with the side awnings (valances) lowered, could

negatively influence the lateral restoration capacity of the vessel in the event of an

overhang, the arms were also simulated due to the wind considering the lowered

screens. It was found that the embedding arm due to the lateral wind was not

enough to compromise the restoring force of the vessel.

Contributing factors to the accident:

The vessel CAVALO MARINHO I had its stability calculated and presented by the

Naval Engineer Technical Responsible for Area 1 of the inland navigation, allowing

the vessel to operate on the route between Mar Grande and the tourist terminal of

Salvador, since it is located within the limits of this type of navigation. The criteria

that must be met to meet the stability requirements are relatively milder if we

compare with the stability requirements for Inland Navigation Area 2 or for open sea

navigation where waves of significant height and adverse combinations of

environmental agents such as such as wind, currents or tides can hinder the traffic

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of vessels.

However, the hull modeling and the calculation of static stability curves

performed by the Expert team showed that the vessel did not comply with the

minimum stability criteria for the navigation area where it operated, for both the

maximum passenger loading condition (160 passengers + 4 crew) and for the

passenger loading condition on the day of the accident (116 passengers + 4 crew).

The minimum area criterion under the static stability curve of the vessel is directly

related to the dynamic stability of the vessel, as it represents the work of the

restoring arm as opposed to the work performed by a dump arm caused by some

force external to the vessel. In the case of criteria for inland navigation area 1, this

arm may be caused by accumulations of people on one side of the vessel, by the

lateral wind action or by a yaw maneuver already established in NORMAM. In the

case of the passenger vessel CAVALO MARINHO I, the most significant cocking

arm is due to the accumulation of passengers on one of the edges. According to the

criteria, the area under the curve of static stability shall be equal to or greater than the

area under the curve of the inflatable moment until the vessel inclines to the angle of flood

or 40 °, whichever is less.

However, area A2 under the static stability curve of the vessel on the day of the

accident from the equilibrium angle after passenger accumulation of 11.7 ° to the

second equilibrium angle of just over 32 °, where the static stability curve touches

again the curve of the brewing moment, is lower than the area A1 under the curve of

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the brewing arm to the first equilibrium angle. This means that when we apply the

overhanging arm due to the accumulation of passengers in the vessel, it tilts

transversely beyond the first equilibrium angle until the area under the static stability

curve equals the area of the seeding moment. However, when we apply this

moment of embedding, the boat ends up sloping beyond the second equilibrium

angle, which is unstable, that is, it does not guarantee the return of the vessel to the

first equilibrium angle, causing the boat's definitive adernement when it passes of

32 °. It is true that people did not accumulate on one side of the vessel at the time

of the accident, as was simulated to verify compliance with the criterion, but we must

take into account that this criterion juxtaposes a safety margin, which is adequate

and sufficient to ensure that the vessel has sufficient stability, even in temporarily

unfavorable wind and sea conditions, which may well occur in sudden environmental

changes, even in warm waters.

It was also demonstrated that ballast weights improperly installed loose in the

Machine Square and in the region below the command contributed to the reduction

of the vessel's ability to resist the dump arms due to external forces. When the boat

was tilted, the weights were displaced precisely to the trimming edge due to the

action of gravity, definitely influencing the final balance of the vessel.

According to the Environmental Information Bulletin of the Navy's Hydrography

Center, the region where the accident occurred was under the influence of

atmospheric instabilities associated with a quasi-stationary frontal system over the

ocean. According to the report of the National Institute of Meteorology, the months

corresponding to the winter in the region presented number of days with rainfall

above the climatological average. The meteorological phenomenon that contributed

to this condition was the action of high pressure on the Atlantic Ocean, with greater

intensity and proximity of the Brazilian coast, which favored the increase of the

winds in the coast and, consequently, the increase of low and average cloudiness in

the coast of Bahia, especially in winter. The study of oceanographic parameters

concluded that the wave conditions on August 24, 2017, at the time of the accident

with the vessel CAVALO MARINHO I, are considered atypical in the region, since

the significant wave height above 0.97 m wave period between 8.6 and 9 seconds

correspond to an accumulated probability of occurrence of less than 25%. The

region of the Mar Grande passenger terminal, in extreme sea conditions, was

exposed to south and southeast quadrant waves and can reach up to 1.8 meters in

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height.

As was demonstrated during the simulation of the vessel's position to the site of

the accident, which is located in a low sand depth region (Photo 4), it is important to

discuss the behavior of the wave propagation in shallow waters, in practice for with

depths of less than 5 meters. The wave propagation speed decreases when it

encounters areas of low depth. The movement of the particles of the fluid is delayed

by the influence of the bottom closest to the surface, occurring a compression of the

crests of the waves, reducing the length and increasing the height of the waves.

With this, the crests of the waves become narrow and pointed, and the cavas

become wide curves, just as in the high-energy waves of the open sea. Increasing

height accompanied by decreased wavelength, increases the wavelength (H / L).

When it reaches L / 7, the wave breaks.

Therefore, in low-lying regions, the waves originating from the open sea that

enter the south quadrant in Todos os Santos Bay may have their height increased

and, depending on the relationship between height and length, become waves of

bursting. On the day of the accident, the vessel “CAVALO MARINHO I” was sailing

in the low depth region and was subject to vacancies that, coming from the South,

passed over a region of high depth with only 3 meters of depth according to Nautical

Chart of the region (Photo 4).

Added to this scenario is the marine current caused by the ebb tide, in a north-south

direction, contrary to the propagation of the waves, which probably contributed to the

surge of waves that struck the boat on the starboard wing, ship that was exposed to

these environmental factors.

As recommended in NORMAM-02 / DPC, in "Precautions against bottlenecks",

compliance with the stability criteria does not guarantee immunity against

bottlenecks or absolve commanders of their responsibilities. The commanders

should therefore act with caution and observe seafaring rules, taking into account

the weather reports and the navigation zone for the season, and should adopt the

speed and course appropriate to the circumstances. Special attention should be

paid before the commencement of a voyage so that all cargo and larger pieces of

equipment are properly stored and handled to minimize the possibility of longitudinal

or transverse displacement when at sea under the effect of accelerations caused by

rocking movements and pitching.

Commanders should be alert to regions of wave breaking and certain

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combinations of wind and current occurring in river estuaries or in a shallow area

due to the fact that these waves are dangerous, especially for small vessels.

It is important to note that, according to the standards in force, the Commander of

the vessel shall be the supreme authority on board and shall, where necessary, take

over the maneuver in situations of dangerous crossings, entering and leaving ports,

mooring, unattended, adverse or severe sea conditions, seizure or any other

maneuver in cases of emergency. The same, when faced with the conditions of wind

and adverse / moderate sea, could have aborted the trip and returned to the terminal

of Mar Grande, because the conditions of wind and sea were not satisfactory for the

navigation at that moment, according to information of the witnesses and the Bulletin

of the Navy Hydrography Center.

In navigation with strong winds and adverse / moderate sea, it is recommended

that the Commander make safe navigation, navigating under cover, thus avoiding

strong balances and risk of heeling or band of the vessel. According to the

information collected and the reconstruction of the accident, the commander, at the

time of the accident, sailed with the true 060º course, with the wind and sea in the

direction of SSE, crossing through Starboard side, thus favoring the instability of the

vessel at that moment. The commander would recommend avoiding the incidence of

severe wind and sea through the Starboard but rather navigate the cover, adopting a

more comfortable course, leading to Port, heading approximately NNE, 023 degrees

true and continue the boat. It could also have avoided this area of risk, the sandbank

and stones, where the contribution of the fund to the increase of the waves is

relevant.

XII - PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS:

The exposure of the vessel to navigation in atypical adverse conditions of current,

sea and wind not common to the region, aggravated by abrupt meteorological

alteration added to the decision of the Commander of the vessel not to take

preventive security measures that were necessary at that moment to avoid the

accident, such as:

- should not be suspended from the Mar Grande passenger terminal;

- even after the exit could have avoided the sandbank and stones, thus reducing the

impacts of waves and winds through starboard or

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- could have returned to the Mar Grande terminal, awaiting better conditions of sea

and wind for safe navigation and possibly would have avoided the accident.

- existence, at the operating company, of operating limits for the Mar Grande -

Nautical Terminal of Salvador could possibly have prevented the accident.

The shipping company responsible for the operation of the vessel "Cavalo

Marinho I" does not have specific procedures to establish the operational limits for

the transportation of passengers in cases of meteorological changes for the crossing

of Mar Grande - Salvador's Nautical Terminal and the occurrence of atypical waves

for the locality. According to information gathered from the Commander of the

vessel, there is a basic procedure to alert the conditions of wind and severe sea and

is conducted by the Operations Manager of the company CL. However, on the day

of the accident no warning of weather degradation was triggered and neither was

the ship's commander informed of such condition, which would prevent the vessel

from leaving the Mar Grande terminal, Vera Cruz.

It was found that the owner of the vessel installed ballast stones in the Engine

Room but only fitted between the back caves of the compartment. The inadequate

fixing of these weights caused the displacement of the stones to the edge of the

sheeting, contributing to the imbalance of the vessel and, consequently, the

degradation of its stability. In addition, the ballast weights installed in the Engine

Room, in addition to the new arrangement with two propellers, introduced a weight

amount that extrapolated a minimum of 2% of the light weight of the vessel, which

requires, as recommended in the Norms of Maritime Authority for Inland Navigation

Vessels, that the Technical Officer of the vessel perform a new Slope Test and

prepare a new Stability Study, taking into account the modifications of the total

weight and position of the center of gravity of the vessel.

XIII - SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Rigorous inspection of the vessels employed in the transportation of passengers

in the bay of Todos os Santos, through actions of Naval Inspection, with a more

conservative attitude;

2) Use of quick release devices for valances;

3) Study the need to change the navigation areas 1 and 2 in the Bay of Todos os

Santos (BTS), considering that the Mar Grande - Salvador crossing area, at some

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times of the year, presents characteristics of a homeless area;

4) During the Naval Inspection activities, request from the operating companies the

presentation and execution of the Crew Training Plans of the passenger vessels, as

stated in chapter 10 of NORMAM-02 / DPC;

5) Present operating limits for passenger vessels in case of meteorological changes

to the Mar Grande - Nautical Terminal of Salvador and other passenger terminals

located in the bay of Todos os Santos, aiming at the integrity of passengers, crew

and security of the avoiding similar accidents in the future.

6) Regarding the positioning of lifejackets, these should be in easily accessible and

well-marked locations. For passengers traveling seated, it is recommended to

position under the seat. For other passengers, lifejackets can be positioned on the

roof, provided that there is ease of removal, without the need for external

assistance.

7) make information on wind intensity and sea state available at boarding stations;

8) formalize the operational limits to interrupt the crossing in case of bad weather,

depending on the sea and wind conditions in each region;

9) provide duly equipped support vessels to operate in emergencies of their own

vessels;

10) Effectively control the embarkation of passengers, depending on the capacity of

each vessel;

11) to create a training program for masters of passenger vessels, covering the

following topics, among others:

- the responsibilities of masters,

- observation of the weather,

- precautions against capsizing;

- the importance of the dissemination of safety instructions to passengers (briefing),

training in emergency situations, abandonment and others;

12) formalize the obligation of the use of uniforms by the crew of the vessels, in

order to differentiate them from the passengers in emergency situations;

13) in vessels with Gross Tonnage greater than 20, present the records of the drill

exercises for crew training, for emergency situations; and

14) require the affixing of plaque on vessels containing the main responsibilities of

masters.

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XIV) ANNEX:

Report on the Stability Studies of the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I"

*****************************************************

- A-1 -

Report on the Stability Studies of the vessel "CAVALO MARINHO I"

MARINHA DO BRASIL

DIRETORIA DE PORTOS E COSTAS

Relatório do Estudo de Estabilidade da

Embarcação Cavalo Marinho I

2017

- A-2 -

Sumário

Introdução Objetivo

1. Modelo da Embarcação

1.1. Hidrostática da Embarcação Leve (Lightship)

2. Condição A – Norman 0635 - Seção V

2.1. Sem Correções

2.1.1. Características Hidrostáticas da condição de equilíbrio

2.1.2. Gráfico da Curva do Braço de Restauração

2.1.3. Resultado dos Critérios

2.2. Com Lastro



2.2.3. Resultados dos Critérios

2.3. Correções Nível I (sem lastro)




2.4. Correções Nível I (Com lastro)




2.5. Correções Nível II (Sem lastro)




2.6. Correções Nível II (Com lastro)




2.7. Resumo da Condição A

- A-3 -

3. Condição do Acidente (100-20)








- A-4 -

Introdução

No presente documento o engenheiro perito apresenta os procedimentos adotados e os

cálculos efetuados para a análise da estabilidade da embarcação Cavalo Marinho I.

Objetivo

O objetivo é documentar e avaliar objetivamente os resultados do teste de equilíbrio e

estabilidade e as exigências que se aplicam pela norma.

1. Modelo da Embarcação

A documentação e os dados utilizados para a criação do Modelo foram:

- Tabela de Cotas

- Plano de Linhas

- Características Hidrostáticas da Embarcação na condição Leve (Lightship)

Devido a impossibilidade de periciar as medições na embarcação no local do acidente

(forma do casco, posições e pesos) o modelo do casco foi criado com base nas

informações prestadas pelo engenheiro priorizando atingir, sem reduzir, os principais

atributos ligados à estabilidade.

O plano de linhas apresentado à Marinha é de documentação datada de 2012, anterior à

última reforma, porém foi considerado fidedigno à forma do casco, conforme estabelecido

pelo engenheiro, e utilizado para ajuste a fim de obter as características principais

indicadas no documento.

Segue imagem abaixo do resultado final da modelagem:

FIGURA 1 - IMAGEM DA MALHA DA EMBARCAÇÃO

- A-5 -

FIGURA 2 - PLANO DE LINHAS DO ALTO

FIGURA 3 - PLANO DE LINHAS D'ÁGUA

FIGURA 4 - PLANO DE BALIZAS

-A- 6 -

1.1. Hidrostática da Embarcação Leve (Lightship)

A embarcação após sua modelagem apresenta similitude com a condição leve informada pelo engenheiro.

A seguir indicamos a comparação da característica hidrostática dos resultados:

● A primeira criando uma condição de equilíbrio com base no calado e trim indicado

pelo engenheiro no documento “ Estudo de Estabilidade Definitivo ”.

● A segunda rodando uma análise de equilíbrio através do deslocamento, LCG e

VCG da embarcação informado pelo engenheiro no documento “ Estudo de Estabilidade Definitivo ”.

Portanto, segue o seguinte resultado hidrostático para a primeira comparação da embarcação:

Dados Hidrostáticos Valor Unidade Engenheiro

Displacement tons 37.6 m 37.47

Heel to Starboard 0 º 0

Draft at FP m 0.80 m 0.809

Draft at AP m 0.82 m 0.821

Draft at LCF m 0.81 m 0.815

Trim (+ve by stern) m 0.01 m 0.012

KG m 1.25 m 1.250

GMt m 2.13 m 1.956

O segundo resultado nos fornece:

Dados Hidrostáticos Valor Unidade Engenheiro

Displacement tonne 37.4 t 37.47

Heel to Starboard 0 º 0

Draft at FP m 0.81 m 0.809

Draft at AP m 0.80 m 0.821

Draft at LCF m 0.81 m 0.815

Trim (+ve by stern) m - m 0.012

KG fluid m 1.25 m 1.250

GMt m 2.01 m 1.956

-A- 7 -

De acordo com o documento “Estudo de Estabilidade Definitivo ” apresentado pelo

engenheiro, pode-se notar que foram respeitadas as principais características

hidrostáticas da embarcação principalmente o GMt:

Dados Hidrostáticos 1 2ª Engenheiro

Displacement tons 37. 37.4 37.47

Heel to Starboard 0 0 0

Draft at FP m 0.8 0.80 0.809

Draft at AP m 0.8 0.80 0.821

Draft at LCF m 0.8 0.81 0.815

Trim (+ve by stern) m 0.0 - 0.012

KG m 1.2 1.25 1.250

GMt m 2.1 2.01 1.956

Os resultados indicam que na primeira situação, onde estipulou-se o calado e o trim, a

embarcação apresentou um deslocamento superior ao do engenheiro em apenas 0,3% e

um GMt superior em 9%. Esses valores comprovam que a embarcação modelada possui

um volume submerso maior que o indicado pelo engenheiro e com uma condição de

estabilidade melhor.

Na segunda situação, onde o programa calcula a condição final de equilíbrio após

indicação de peso e centro de gravidade, o resultado nos oferece uma condição com

pequeno trim de 9 mm à vante enquanto o engenheiro apresenta 12 mm à ré,

praticamente aprumados, e um GMt superior em 3%.

Analisando o caso conjuntamente é possível comprovar que a embarcação foi modelada

de forma precisa e constitui-se em uma embarcação mais estável que a apresentada

pelo engenheiro na documentação, portanto os estudos de estabilidade efetuados e seus

resultados possuirão uma pequena margem conservadora.

-A- 8 -

2. Condição A – NORMAM 2/DPC , 0635 - Seção V

O estudo de estabilidade da embarcação na condição de carga total de partida, com

carga distribuída homogeneamente em todos os espaços de carga e com

abastecimento total de gêneros e combustível é apresentado a seguir na seguinte

sequência:

- Sem correções

- Com lastro

- Com correções

- Com correções e lastro

2.1. Sem Correções

Os dados utilizados foram os mesmos que o apresentado na documentação:

Item Peso Kg MV LCG ML TCG MT

Navio Leve 37,470 1,250 46,838 8,678 325,165 0,000 0,000

Combustível 0,33 1,300 0,432 15,020 4,987 0,000 0,000

Água 0,30 1,300 0,390 14,120 4,236 0,000 0,000

Passageiros 12,000 2,780 33,360 8,250 99,000 0,000 0,000

Tripulantes 0,40 2,700 1,080 15,100 6,040 0,000 0,000

Bagagem 4,00 1,000 4,000 8,250 33,000 0,000 0,000

Lastro 0,00 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000

Motorização 0,50 0,677 0,339 4,844 2,422 0,000 0,000

Total 55,002 1,572 86,438 8,633 474,849 0,000 0,000

-A- 9 -


Dados Hidrostáticos Valor

Draft Amidsh. M 1.05

Displacement tonne 55.0

Heel to Starboard degrees 0.0

Draft at FP m 1.07

Draft at AP m 1.04

Draft at LCF m 1.05

Trim (+ve by stern) m -

WL Length m 18.3

WL Beam m 4.95

Wetted Area m^2 85.7

Waterpl. Area m^2 71.6

Prismatic Coeff. 0.72

Block Coeff. 0.55

Midship Area Coeff. 0.76

Waterpl. Area Coeff. 0.78

LCB from Amidsh. (+ve fwd) m -

LCF from Amidsh. (+ve fwd) m -

KB m 0.64

KG fluid m 1.57

BMt m 2.09

BML m 27.8

GMt m 1.16

GML m 26.8

KMt m 2.74

KML m 28.4

Immersion (TPc) tonne/cm 0.73

MTc tonne.m 0.82

Max deck inclination deg 0.1

Trim angle (+ve by stern) deg -0.1

-A- 10 -

- 10 -


- A-11 -

2.1.3. Resultado dos Critérios

Critérios Valor Unidade Encontrado Situação

Ângulo de Equilíbrio Inicial Não deve ser superior a (<=) 15.0 graus 0.0 Aprovado

Altura Metacêntrica no Ângulo de Equilíbrio (GMt) Ângulo de equilíbrio 0.0 graus Não deve ser inferior a (>=) 0.350 m 1.168 Aprovado

Braço de Endireitamento Máximo ( GZ máximo) Não deve ser inferior a (>=) 0.100 m 0.275 Aprovado

Valores intermediários Angulo de ocorrência GZ máximo graus 19.1

Ângulo de Alagamento Progressivo Não deve ser inferior a (>=) 25.0 graus 66.7 Aprovado

Ângulo de Imersão do Convés Deve ser superior a (>) graus 9.2

Critério de Ângulo de Equilíbrio sob Momentos:

Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Não deve ser superior a (<=) 15.0 graus 10.1 Aprovado

Valores intermediários Braço de endireitamento máximo m 0.203

Momento de Guinada Não deve ser superior a (<=) 15.0 graus 0.9 Aprovado

Momento do Vento (1) + Momento do Vento (2) Não deve ser superior a (<=) 15.0 graus 0.7 Aprovado

Critério de Áreas sob Momentos :

Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % 122,918% Aprovado

Momento de Guinada Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % * Aprovado

Momento do Vento (1) + Momento do Vento (2) Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % * Aprovado

Obs: Os valores em “*” indicam que não foram calculados por não haver necessidade

uma vez que, pelo gráfico, notamos que o momento é irrisório se comparado com o

acúmulo de passageiros.

-A- 12 -

2.2. Com Lastro

Os dados utilizados foram retirados da documentação apresentada à Capitania,

porém com o acréscimo do lastro encontrado durante perícia:

Item Peso (t) Kg (m) MV LCG (m) ML TCG MT

Navio Leve 37,470 1,250 46,838 8,678 325,165 0,000 0,000

Combustível 0,332 1,300 0,432 15,020 4,987 0,000 0,000

Água 0,300 1,300 0,390 14,120 4,236 0,000 0,000

Passageiros 12,000 2,780 33,360 8,250 99,000 0,000 0,000

Tripulantes 0,400 2,700 1,080 15,100 6,040 0,000 0,000

Bagagem 4,000 1,000 4,000 8,250 33,000 0,000 0,000

Lastro Vante 0,100 2,150 0,215 14,000 1,400 1,300 0,130

Lastro PM 0,300 0,700 0,210 2,712 0,809 1,379 0,327

Motorização 0,500 0,677 0,339 4,844 2,422 0,000 0,000

Total 55,402 1,568 86,863 8,611 477,058 0,008 0,457

Como durante a perícia, lastros foram encontrados nas regiões de popa, a ré da Praça

de Máquinas, e proa, no costado à vante, e suas posições foram estimada no desenho

do arranjo geral, com base nos registros fotográficos e inspeção, e o seu peso foi

estimado por baixo na perícia e confirmado nos depoimentos.

Lastro da Praça de

Máquinas (Lastro PM): Peso

= 300 Kg (no mínimo)

CG = (2.712 ; 1.379 ; 0.700)

Lastro da Cabine de Comando

(Lastro Vante): Peso = 100 Kg

(no mínimo)

CG = (14.000 ; 1.300 ; 2.150)

-A- 13 -



Draft Amidsh. M 1.064



Draft at FP m 1.073

Draft at AP m 1.056

Draft at LCF m 1.064

Trim (+ve by stern) m -0.017

WL Length m 18.342

WL Beam m 4.956




Block Coeff. 0.556



LCB from Amidsh. (+ve fwd) m -0.363

LCF from Amidsh. (+ve fwd) m -0.635

KB m 0.646

KG fluid m 1.568

BMt m 2.086

BML m 27.741

GMt m 1.164

GML m 26.819

KMt m 2.732

KML m 28.387


MTc tonne.m 0.828

RM at 1deg = GMt.Disp.sin(1) 1.126



-A- 14 -

- 14 -


-A- 15 -


Critérios Valo Unidade Encontrad Situação



Braço de Endireitamento Máximo (GZ máximo) Não deve ser inferior a (>=) 0.10 m 0.264 Aprovado



Ângulo de Imersão de Convés

graus 9.1

Critério de Ângulo de Equilíbrio sob


Valores intermediários Amplitude do braço de emborcamento m 0.201




Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % 106.680% Aprovado



Obs: Os valores em “*” indicam que não foram calculados por representarem valores muito

irrisórios, principalmente se comparados com o momento causado pelo acúmulo de

passageiros.

-A- 16 -

2.3. Correções Nível I (sem lastro)

As correções Nível I feitas nos cálculos do engenheiro foram:

➢ LCG final (tabela – Pag. 6 do documento “Estudo de Estabilidade Definitivo”)

O LCG final da condição de lotação dos conveses não representa o cálculo dos

valores indicados e nem uma aproximação.

A tabela do engenheiro é:

Conveses Lotação Peso LCG VCG TCG

Convés Sup. 110,00 8,25 7,72 3,40 1,00

Convés Inf. 50,00 3,75 9,85 1,40 0,76

Totais: 160,00 12,00 8,25 2,78 0,93

Mesmo se alterássemos os valores para o menor valor possível de um arredondamento

numérico, teríamos a seguinte tabela com 3 casa decimais:

Conveses Lotação Peso LCG VCG TCG

Convés Sup. 110,00 8,250 7,715 3,40 1,00

Convés Inf. 50,00 3,750 9,845 1,40 0,76

Totais: 160,00 12,00 8,38 2,78 0,93

Portanto, não encontramos justificativas lógicas para o valor indicado pelo engenheiro.

A tabela final foi considera com o cálculo de acordo com os valores indicados, tornando o

LCG final igual ao expresso na tabela abaixo:

➢ VCG da Bagagem (pag 6 do documento “Estudo de Estabilidade Definitivo”)

O centro de gravidade vertical, ou seja, a distância do centro à linha de base da

embarcação foi considerado como sendo Z = 1,0 m (Pag. 6 do documento “Estudo de

Estabilidade Definitivo”).

Porém, se as bagagens forem calculadas como no convés em que se encontra o

passageiro, ou seja, numa relação de 1 para 1, indicando a bagagem estando junto ou

próxima ao dono, teremos o seguinte resultado:

110 passageiros no convés superior = 110 bagagens no convés superior 50 passageiros no

convés inferior = 50 bagagens no convés inferior

O valor de cada bagagem de acordo com a Norma é = 25 Kg = 0,025 t

O convés superior se encontra em altura Z = 2,40 m *(Não de acordo com o desenho,

apenas cálculo do engenheiro)

O convés inferior se encontra em altura Z = 0,40 m *(Não de acordo com o desenho,

apenas cálculo do engenheiro)

Conveses Lotaçã Peso LCG VCG TCG

Convés Sup. 110,00 8,250 7,720 3,40 1,00

Convés Inf. 50,00 3,750 9,850 1,40 0,76

Totais: 160,00 12,00 8,39 2,78 0,93

-A- 17 -

*Obs: A posição vertical do CG considerada (2,40 e 0,40) foi calculada pelo engenheiro,

porém na correção nível II, mais adiante, foi calculada e corrigida pela perícia.

Portanto, tem-se a seguinte expressão e valor final do VCG das bagagens:

100 X 0,025 X 2,40 + 50 X 0,025 X 0,40

VCG = 160 X 0,025

* VCG = 1,775 m

➢ TCG do T.O.D (tanque de óleo diesel) – (Não calculado no documento)

De acordo com a documentação apresentada ao órgão responsável há, no arranjo geral,

um tanque de óleo diesel (T.O.D.) deslocado da linha de centro. Seu peso é calculado

pelo engenheiro e o momento longitudinal, porém é desprezado o momento transversal

causador de banda e facilitador de adernamento para o bordo em questão.

Peso = 0,33 t LCG = 15,02 m

VCG = 1,30 m

TCG = 0,0675 m (Calculado pelo desenho em escala)

Portanto, a condição final corresponde a:

Item Peso (t) Kg MV LCG ML TCG MT

Navio Leve 37,470 1,250 46,838 8,678 325,165 0,000 0,000

Combustível 0,332 1,300 0,432 15,020 4,987 0,068 0,022

Água 0,300 1,300 0,390 14,120 4,236 0,000 0,000

Passageiros 12,000 2,780 33,360 8,250 99,000 0,000 0,000

Tripulantes 0,400 2,700 1,080 15,100 6,040 0,000 0,000

Bagagem 4,000 1,775 7,100 8,250 33,000 0,000 0,000

Lastro 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000

Motorização 0,500 0,677 0,339 4,844 2,422 0,000 0,000

Total 55,002 1,628 89,538 8,633 474,849 0,000 0,022

A distância transversal do centro de gravidade da concentração de passageiros no mesmo

bordo Yc foi utilizada a do engenheiro e não foi corrigida.

Yc = 0,930 m.

-A- 18 -

2.3.1. Características Hidrostáticas da condição de equilíbrio Dados Hidrostáticos

Valor

Draft Amidsh. m 1.059



Draft at FP m 1.075

Draft at AP m 1.044



WL Length m 18.33

WL Beam m 4.955




Block Coeff. 0.552





KB m 0.643

KG fluid m 1.628

BMt m 2.097

BML m 27.81

GMt m 1.112

GML m 26.83

KMt m 2.740

KML m 28.46


MTc tonne.m 0.822

RM at 1deg = GMt.Disp.sin(1) tonne.m

1.068



-A- 19 -


Ângulo de Equilíbrio com o Momento = 10,7 º

Ângulo de Perda de Estabilidade (Vanishing Stability) = 30,1 º

-A- 20 -





Braço de Endireitamento Máximo (GZ máximo) Não deve ser inferior a (>=) 0.100 m 0.257 Aprovado Valores intermediários Ângulo de ocorrência GZ máximo graus 18.2



graus 9.2


Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Não deve ser superior a (<=) 15.0 graus 10.7 Aprovado Valores intermediários Amplitude do braço de emborcamento m 0.203




Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % 77,085% Reprovado



Obs: Os valores em “*” indicam que não foram calculados por representarem valores

muito irrisórios, principalmente se comparados com o momento causado pelo


** - Reprovado no critério de momento devido ao acúmulo de passageiros. Significa

que a embarcação não tem energia suficiente para endireitar ao ser aplicada força

externa proporcional ao acúmulo de passageiros em um dos bordos.

-A- 21 -

2.4. Correções Nível I (Com lastro)

Adicionamos nesta análise o valor referente aos lastros encontrados Portanto, a

condição do Nível I com lastro corresponde a:

Item Peso (t) Kg (m) MV (t.m) LCG (m) ML (t.m) TCG (m) MT (t.m.)

Navio Leve 37,470 1,250 46,838 8,678 325,165 0,000 0,000

Combustíve 0,332 1,300 0,432 15,020 4,987 0,068 0,022

Água 0,300 1,300 0,390 14,120 4,236 0,000 0,000

Passageiro 12,000 2,780 33,360 8,250 99,000 0,000 0,000

Tripulantes 0,400 2,700 1,080 15,100 6,040 0,000 0,000

Bagagem 4,000 1,775 7,100 8,250 33,000 0,000 0,000

Lastro 0,100 2,150 0,215 14,000 1,400 1,300 0,130

Lastro PM 0,300 0,700 0,210 2,695 0,809 1,090 0,327

Motorização 0,500 0,677 0,339 4,844 2,422 0,000 0,000

Total 55,402 1,624 89,963 8,611 477,058 0,009 0,479

A distância transversal do centro de gravidade da concentração de passageiros no

mesmo bordo Yc foi utilizada a do engenheiro e não foi corrigida.

Yc = 0,930 m.

- A-22 -






Draft at FP m 1.073

Draft at AP m 1.056



WL Length m 18.342

WL Beam m 4.955




Block Coeff. 0.556





KB m 0.646

KG fluid m 1.624

BMt m 2.086

BML m 27.742

GMt m 1.108

GML m 26.764

KMt m 2.732

KML m 28.388


MTc tonne.m 0.826





- A- 23-

Ângulo de Equilíbrio com o Momento = 11,2 º

Ângulo de Perda de Estabilidade (Vanishing Stability) = 29,2 º


-A- 24 -








graus 9.1







Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % 62,092% Reprovad



Obs: Os valores em “*” indicam que não foram calculados por representarem valores

muito irrisórios, principalmente se comparados com o momento causado pelo


** - Reprovado no critério de momento devido ao acúmulo de passageiros. Significa

que a embarcação não tem energia suficiente para endireitar ao ser aplicada força

externa proporcional ao acúmulo de passageiros em um dos bordos.

-A- 25 -

2.5. Correções Nível II (Sem lastro)

Na correção Nível I do tópico anterior, foi assumido que o engenheiro havia calculado

corretamente o CG pelo programa indicado na documentação, exceto pelo erro

verificado em um dos cálculos.

Neste tópico calculamos o CG resultante dos passageiros através do programa

Solidworks (pelo cálculo do centroide de área), do documento do arranjo geral

(medições em escala) e Microsoft Excel (pelo cálculo de média ponderada) e foram

encontrados valores totalmente diferentes dos apresentados pelo engenheiro.

Os passageiros foram distribuídos priorizando a ocupação mais afastada da linha de centro.

Onde havia lugar para o passageiro ficar sentado foi assumido que este ficaria sentado.

Onde havia área disponível para ficar em pé esse foi assumido como de pé, uniformemente distribuído como uma “nuvem de densidade uniforme de 4p/m²”.

Conforme as imagens e cálculos nas páginas que se seguem:

➢ 73 em pé no Convés Principal:

-A- 26 -

LCG = 7,003 m

TCG = 0,927 m

VCG = 3,45 m

-A- 27 -

➢ 37 Passageiros sentados no Convés Principal:

LCG = 6,602 m

TCG = 1,342 m

VCG = 3,25 m

-A- 28 -

➢ 34 passageiros em pé no Convés Inferior:

LCG = 9,588 m

TCG = 1,151 m

VCG = 1,50 m

-A- 29 -

➢ 16 Passageiros sentados no Convés Inferior:

LCG = 8,979 m

TCG = 1,838 m

VCG = 1,30 m

-A- 30 -

Resultado final do CG dos Passageiros

LC Qnt Pes Ponto Massa LCG Final

Convés Principal

(em pé) 73 5,4 7,003 12,0 7,657

(sentado) 37 2,7 6,602

Convés Inferior (em pé) 34 2,5 9,588

(sentado) 16 1,2 8,979

TCG

Qnt

Pes

Ponto

Massa

TCG Final

Convés Principal

(em pé) 73 5,4 0,927 12,0 1,162

(sentado 37 2,7 1,342


(sentado 16 1,2 1,838

VCG

Qnt

Pes

Ponto

Massa

VCG Final

Convés Principal

(em pé) 73 5,47 3,450 12,0 2,774

(sentado )

37 2,77 5

3,250


(sentado 16 1,2 1,300

Os tripulantes e suas bagagens:

= 3,50 m

Portanto a condição final da embarcação ficou conforme tabela abaixo:

Item Peso Kg MV (t.m) LCG ML (t.m) TCG MT (t.m.)

Navio 37,470 1,250 46,838 8,678 325,165 0,000 0,000

Combustív 0,33 1,300 0,432 15,020 4,987 0,068 0,022

Água 0,30 1,300 0,390 14,120 4,236 0,000 0,000

Passageir 12,000 2,774 32,208 7,657 92,100 0,000 0,000

Tripulante 0,40 3,500 1,080 15,100 6,040 0,000 0,000

Bagagem 4,00 1,841 7,100 8,250 33,000 0,000 0,000

Lastro 0,00 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000

Motorizaçã 0,50 0,677 0,339 4,844 2,422 0,000 0,000

Total 55,002 1,631 90,050 8,508 467,949 0,000 0,022

*Obs: O TCG dos passageiros é utilizado na fórmula do momento de emborcamento devido ao Acúmulo de passageiros.

4 X 0,075 X 3,75 + 4 X 0,025 X 2,75

VCG = 4 x 01

-A- 31 -




Displacement tonne 55

Heel to Starboard degrees 0

Draft at FP m 1.030

Draft at AP m 1.082


Trim (+ve by stern) m 0.052

WL Length m 18.34

WL Beam m 4.955




Block Coeff. 0.553





KB m 0.643

KG fluid m 1.637

BMt m 2.104

BML m 28.14

GMt m 1.110

GML m 27.15

KMt m 2.747

KML m 28.79


MTc tonne.m 0.832

RM at 1deg = GMt.Disp.sin(1) tonne.m 1.066


Trim angle (+ve by stern) deg 0.2


-A- 32 -

Ângulo de Equilíbrio com o Momento = 14,9º

Ângulo de Perda de Estabilidade (Vanishing Stability) = 23,9º

-A- 33 -


Critérios Valor Unidad Encontrad Situação




Valores intermediários Ângulo de ocorrência GZ máximo graus 18.2



graus 9.2







Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % 5,105% Reprovado*



Obs: Os valores em “*” indicam que não foram calculados por representarem valores muito irrisórios,

principalmente se comparados com o momento causado pelo acúmulo de passageiros.

** - Reprovado no critério de momento devido ao acúmulo de passageiros. Significa que a

embarcação não tem energia suficiente para endireitar ao ser aplicada força externa proporcional ao

acúmulo de passageiros em um dos bordos.

- A-34 -

2.6. Correções Nível II (Com lastro)

Realizando todas as correções do Nível II anterior e adicionando posições conforme o arranjo geral

do lastro solto encontrado em perícia.

Os dados utilizados foram:


Navio Leve 37,470 1,250 46,838 8,678 325,165 0,000 0,000

Combustíve 0,332 1,300 0,432 15,020 4,987 0,068 0,022

Água 0,300 1,300 0,390 14,120 4,236 0,000 0,000

Passageiro 12,000 2,780 33,360 8,250 99,000 0,000 0,000

Tripulantes 0,400 3,500 1,080 15,100 6,040 0,000 0,000

Bagagem 4,000 1,775 7,100 8,250 33,000 0,000 0,000

Lastro 0,100 2,150 0,323 14,000 2,100 1,300 0,195

Lastro PM 0,300 0,700 0,210 2,695 0,809 1,090 0,327

Motorização 0,500 0,677 0,339 4,844 2,422 0,000 0,000

Total 55,402 1,612 89,331 8,486 470,163 0,010 0,566

- A-35 -






Draft at FP m 1.028

Draft at AP m 1.094



WL Length m 18.34

WL Beam m 4.955




Block Coeff. 0.552





KB m 0.646

KG fluid m 1.612

BMt m 2.093

BML m 28.06

GMt m 1.127

GML m 27.09

KMt m 2.739

KML m 28.70


MTc tonne.m 0.836





- A-36 -




-A- 37 -


Ângulo de Equilíbrio Inicial Não deve ser inferior a (<=) 15.0 graus 0.5 Aprovado






graus 9.0







Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % 3,183% Reprovado*








-A- 38 -

2.7. Resumo da Condição A

Critério Requisito Sem

correções Com lastro

Correções N1 (sem lastro)

Correções N2 (sem lastro)

Correções N1 com lastro

Correções N2 com lastro

Ângulo de Equilíbrio

>15º 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,5

Altura Metacêncitrica

>0.35 1,168 1,163 1,112 1,110 1,107 1,125

Braço de Endireitamen to Máximo

>0.1

0,275

0,264

0,257

0,255

0,246

0,249

Ângulo de Alagamento

>25º 66,7º 65,9º 67,7º 64,6º 65,9º 63,7º

Ângulo de Imersão do

9,2º 9,1º 9,2º 9,2º 9,1º 9,0º

Ângulo de Equilíbrio com o

Momento de Acúmulo de

<15º

10,1º

10,5º

10,7º

14,9º

11,3º

15,6º


Momento de

<15º

≈1º

≈1º

≈1º

≈1º

≈1º

≈1º


Momento de

<15º

≈1º

≈1º

≈1º

≈1º

≈1º

≈1º

Área sob as curvas de

Momento de Acúmulo de

>100%

123%

106,7%

Reprovado

77,09%

Reprovado

5,10%

Reprovado

62,10%

Reprovad

o 3,18%


Momento de

>100%

455,50%

**Aprovado

**Aprovado

**Aprovado

**Aprovado

**Aprovad

o


Momento de

>100%

**Aprovado

**Aprovado

**Aprovado

**Aprovado

**Aprovado

**Aprovad

o

Os valores aprovados com “**” indicam que a análise foi feita graficamente e que eles não

apresentavam riscos de Reprovação. Pode-se notar nos gráficos da condição A (sem correção) que

a interseção dos gráficos ocorre em ângulos muito pequenos e a área consequentemente também e

essa situação se repete para as demais condições.

São considerados aprovados os ângulos de equilíbrio devido ao momento de acúmulo de

passageiros com valores abaixo de 15 graus de inclinação transversal, mesmo apresentando valores

maiores que os ângulos de imersão do convés, pois acima do valor do pontal de 1,45 metros ainda

há uma continuação do costado até as janelas laterais, cuja parte inferior a água atinge quando a

embarcação inclina 15 graus transversalmente, conforme a modelagem do casco.

- A-39 -


Com base em informações periciadas evidenciou-se que durante o acidente havia uma

quantidade de pessoas à bordo inferior à capacidade total projetada. Essa quantidade era

equivalente a 120 pessoas e a distribuição destes correspondia à 100 passageiros no

convés superior e 20 passageiros no convés inferior.

Os passageiros foram distribuídos priorizando a ocupação mais usual e afastada da linha

de centro. Onde havia lugar para o passageiro ficar sentado foi assumido que este ficaria

sentado.

Onde havia área disponível para ficar em pé esse foi assumido como de pé,

uniformemente distribuído como uma “ nuvem de densidade uniforme 4p/m² ”.

Os tripulantes foram assumidos na cabine de comando com sua posição determinada com

base no desenho em escala apresentado pelo engenheiro à Marinha.

Conforme seguem as imagens e cálculos nas páginas que se seguem:

- A-40 -

➢ 72 Passageiros em pé no Convés Principal

LCG = 7,009 m

TCG = 0,939 m

VCG = 3,45 m

24 Passageiros sentados no Convés Principal

- A-41 -

LCG = 6,911 m

TCG = 1,628 m

VCG = 3,25 m

➢ 06 Passageiros em pé no Convés Inferior

- A-42 -

LCG = 9,400 m

TCG = 1,723 m

VCG = 1,50 m

➢ 14 Passageiros sentados no Convés Inferior

- A-43 -

LCG = 9,318 m

TCG = 1,961 m

VCG = 1,30 m

Resultado final do CG dos passageiros

- A-44 -

LCG Qnt Peso Ponto Massa Total LCG Final

Convés Principal (pé) 72 5,4 7,009 8,7 7,377

(sentado) 24 1,8 6,843

Convés Inferior (pé) 6 0,45 9,400

(sentado) 14 1,05 9,318

TCG Qnt Peso Ponto Massa Total TCG Final


(sentado) 24 1,8 1,748


(sentado) 14 1,05 1,961

VCG Qnt Peso Ponto Massa Total VCG


(sentado) 24 1,8 3,250


(sentado) 14 1,05 1,300

O VGC das bagagens dos passageiros será diferente devido ao quantitativo de pessoas à bordo:

= 2,114 m

O VCG dos tripulantes e suas bagagens corresponde ao cálculo que segue:

= 3,500 m

Realizando todas as correções e adicionando o lastro encontrado em perícia podemos simular a

condição da embarcação no momento do acidente e avaliar sua estabilidade, tal como, a resistência

ao emborcamento.

96 X 0,025 X 2,45 + 20 X 0,025 X 0,50

VCG = 116 x 0,025

0,1 X 2,75 + 0,3 X 3,75

VCG = 0,4

- A-45 -


Navio Leve 37,470 1,250 46,838 8,678 325,165 0,000 0,000

Combustíve 0,332 1,300 0,432 15,020 4,987 0,068 0,022

Água 0,300 1,300 0,390 14,120 4,236 0,000 0,000

Passageiro 8,700 3,057 28,493 7,000 60,900 0,000 0,000

Tripulantes 0,400 3,500 0,275 15,100 1,510 0,000 0,000

Bagagem 2,900 2,114 6,130 8,250 23,925 0,000 0,000

Lastro 0,100 2,150 0,215 14,000 1,400 1,300 0,130

Lastro ré 0,300 0,700 0,210 2,712 0,814 1,379 0,414

Motorizaçã 0,500 0,677 0,339 4,844 2,422 0,000 0,000

Total 51,002 1,666 84,945 8,492 433,124 0,011 0,566

O TCG dos passageiros equivale à Yc = 1,270 m.


- A-46 -





Draft at FP m 0.966

Draft at AP m 1.036



WL Length m 18.31

WL Beam m 4.944




Block Coeff. 0.540



LCB from Amidsh. (+ve fwd) m -

LCF from Amidsh. (+ve fwd) m -

KB m 0.613

KG fluid m 1.617

BMt m 2.234

BML m 29.66

GMt m 1.230

GML m 28.66

KMt m 2.847

KML m 30.27


MTc tonne.m 0.814





- A-47 -

- 49 -




- A-48 -







Ângulo de Imersão de Convés Não deve ser superior a (<=) 15.0 graus 10.4 Aprovado







Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % 97.917 Reprovado*

Momento de Guinada Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % *** Aprovado

Momento do Vento (1) + Momento do Vento (2) Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % *** Aprovado






- A-49 -


Nesta análise do acidente iremos efetuar mais uma simulação do arranjo do acúmulo de

passageiros em um dos bordos da embarcação durante o acidente, assim como se

estivéssemos projetando a embarcação para 120 passageiros.

O engenheiro, em um projeto ou alteração, para determinar a lotação de uma embarcação

deve analisar mais de um caso de distribuição para respeitar o preconizado pela

NORMAM onde enuncia que o engenheiro deverá apresentar a condição mais agravante.

NORMAM-02/DPC – 0635 Condições de Carregamento – b) Embarcações de passageiros – 6)

“Os passageiros sem suas bagagens devem ser considerados distribuídos de forma

a produzir a mais desfavorável combinação que pode ser verificada na prática para o

momento emborcador devido ao agrupamento de passageiros em um bordo e ou

posição vertical do centro de gravidade na condição.”

Portanto, a distribuição dos passageiros a bordo corresponde a 100 pessoas no convés

superior e 20 pessoas no convés inferior.

Em que simulou a situação de 68 passageiros em pé e 28 sentadas no convés principal, e,

6 em pé e 14 sentados no convés inferior e com os 04 tripulantes na cabine de comando.

Conforme seguem as imagens e cálculos nas páginas que se seguem:

68 passageiros em pé no convés principal

- A-50 -

LCG = 7,038 m

TCG = 0,987 m

VCG = 3,450 m

28 pessoas sentadas no convés principal

- A-51 -

LCG = 6,830 m

TCG = 1,623 m

VCG = 3,250 m

➢ 06 Passageiros em pé no Convés Inferior

- A-52 -

LCG = 9,400 m

TCG = 1,723 m

VCG = 1,50 m

- A-53 -

➢ 14 Passageiros sentados no Convés Inferior

LCG = 9,318 m

TCG = 1,961 m

VCG = 1,30 m

- A-54 -

Resultado final do CG dos passageiros

LCG Qnt Peso Ponto Massa LCG

Convés Principal

(pé) 68 5,1 7,038 8,7 7,385

(sentado 28 2,1 6,830


(sentado 14 1,05 9,318

TCG Qnt Peso Ponto Massa TCG

Convés Principal

(pé) 68 5,1 0,987 8,7 1,293

(sentado 28 2,1 1,623


(sentado 14 1,05 1,931

VCG Qnt Peso Ponto Massa VCG

Convés Principal

(pé) 68 5,1 3,450 8,7 3,041

(sentado 28 2,1 3,250


(sentado 14 1,05 1,300

O VGC das bagagens dos passageiros será:

= 2,114 m

O VCG dos tripulantes e suas bagagens corresponde a:

= 3,500 m

96 X 0,025 X 2,45 + 20 X 0,025 X 0,50

VCG = 116 x 0,025

0,1 X 2,75 + 0,3 X 3,75

VCG = 0,4

- A-55 -

Realizando todas as correções e adicionando o lastro encontrado em perícia podemos simular a

condição da embarcação no momento do acidente e avaliar sua estabilidade, tal como, a resistência

ao emborcamento.

Item Peso Kg MV LCG ML TCG MT

Navio 37,470 1,250 46,838 8,678 325,16 0,000 0,000

Combustív 0,33 1,300 0,432 15,02 4,987 0,068 0,022

Água 0,30 1,300 0,390 14,12 4,236 0,000 0,000

Passageir 8,70 3,041 26,460 7,385 64,252 0,000 0,000

Tripulante 0,40 3,500 1,400 15,10 6,040 0,000 0,000

Bagagem 2,90 2,114 6,131 8,250 23,925 0,000 0,000

Lastro 0,10 2,150 0,215 14,00 1,400 1,300 0,130

Lastro ré 0,30 0,700 0,210 2,712 0,814 1,379 0,414

Motorizaçã 0,50 0,677 0,339 4,844 2,422 0,000 0,000

Total 51,002 1,616 82,413 8,495 433,24 0,011 0,566

O TCG dos passageiros equivale à Yc = 1,293 m.


- A-56 -





Draft at FP m 0.967

Draft at AP m 1.035



WL Length m 18.31

WL Beam m 4.944




Block Coeff. 0.540





KB m 0.613

KG fluid m 1.616

BMt m 2.234

BML m 29.66

GMt m 1.230

GML m 28.65

KMt m 2.846

KML m 30.27


MTc tonne.m 0.814





- A-57 -




- A-58 -







Ângulo de Imersão de Convés Não deve ser superior a (<=) 15.0 graus 10.4 Aprovado







Momento de Acúmulo de Passageiro Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % 88.711 Reprovad

Momento de Guinada Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % *** Aprovado

Momento do Vento (1) + Momento do Vento (2) Area1 / Area2 não deve ser inferior a (>=) 100 % *** Aprovado






- A-59 -

Obs: Nas análises os tripulantes não contribuíram com o braço de emborcamento

durante o acúmulo no bordo, situando-se na cabine de comando junto com suas

bagagens, assim como fora indicado pelo Engenheiro na documentação “Estudo de

Estabilidade Definitivo”. Entretanto, este perito ressalva que durante um acidente, e com

base nos depoimentos, todos a bordo assim como suas bagagens soltas contribuem

para o momento de emborcamento após um determinado ângulo de banda.

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