brave new nuclear world - princeton universityaglaser/talk2006_chicago.pdf · 2006-11-17 ·...

Brave New Nuclear World

Alexander GlaserProgram on Science and Global Security

Princeton University

The Future of Nuclear Energy Conference, The Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsNovember 1-2, 2006, Chicago, Illinois, USA

November 2, 2006

The Expansion of Nuclear Power and itsRelevance for the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Revision 7, web

1

“

J. Robert Oppenheimer(on the prospects of a nuclear weapons convention)

in the Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsVol. 1, No. 12, June 1946

We would not make atomic weapons, at least not to start with, but we would start out and build enormous plants, and we would call them power plants—maybe they would produce power; and these plants we would design in such a way that they could be converted with the maximum ease and the minimum time delay to the production of atomic weapons, and we would say, this is just in case somebody two-times us; and we would stock-pile uranium, we would keep as many of our developments [as] secret as possible, we would locate our plants, not where they would do the most good for the production of power, but where they would do the most good for protection against enemy attack.”

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Scale of a HypotheticalGlobal Expansion of Nuclear Power

3

Capacity Buildup

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100

2010-2050-2100

“Expansion begins”

Target 1

Target 2

Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006

Year

Inst

alle

d nu

clea

r cap

acity

[GW

e]

Slower growth scenario

4

Capacity Buildup

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100

2010-2050-2100


Target 1

Target 2


Year

Inst

alle

d nu

clea

r cap

acity

[GW

e]

Faster growth scenario

5

Capacity Buildup

0

20

40

60

80

100

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100

2010-2050-2100

Annu

al n

ucle

ar c

apac

ity a

dded

[GW

e/yr

]Alexander Glaser, Brave New Nuclear World, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Chicago, November 2006

Year

(incl

udes

new

con

stru

ctio

n an

d re

plac

emen

t)


• A nuclear expansion would have to be extremely aggressive (both in scale and speed) in order to make a significant contribution to climate-change-mitigation efforts by 2050

• Hypothetically, 4500 GWe by 2100 would be “easier” to achieve than 1500 GWe by 2050 because the infrastructure (to build reactors) would already be in place

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Global Nuclear Expansion Scenario(1500 GWe in 58 countries, based on 2003 MIT study)

More than 10 GWe installed

At least 1 GWe installed


7

Enrichment Demand and Distribution(for 1500 GWe Global Nuclear Expansion Scenario)

Global enrichment capacity: 1,500 x 150 tSWU/yr (225,000 tSWU/yr)

12,750

4,800

2,250

5,100

27,750

24,450

5,400

2,8503,150

2,850

36,600

20,850

37,200

11,050

10,300

17,650

tSWU/yr Total SWU-production in country

Combined SWU-demand of countries importing alltheir enrichment services: 11,850 tSWU/yr


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The Example of the Gas Centrifugefor Uranium Enrichment

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Centrifuges for Uranium Enrichment

Depleted uranium

Enriched uranium

rotor

bottom bearing

bottom scoop

baffle

top scoop

electromagnetic motor

casing

tails

feed

product

center post

Source: IPFM 2006 Report

Source: Presentation by Mohammad Saeidi (AEOI)


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Source: Urenco

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Centrifuges in the Past

Centrifuge technology for uranium enrichmenthas been around for more than 50 years

Until recently, export controls were considered “sufficient”by those who held the technology

Proliferation occurred when export controls were violated

Technology considered “too complex” to be a proliferation threat

Focus was on the back-end of the fuel cycle(discouraging reprocessing / separation of plutonium)

R&D classified since 1960 in those countries that were already exploring the technology


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Why Are Centrifuges Different?

13

Crude Breakout Scenario(using an early-generation machine)

Stage number

Num

ber o

f mac

hine

s in

sta

ge

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2160

40

20

0

20

40

60

21 40 56 71 84 96 106 91 79 67 57 48 40 34 27 22 17 13 9 6 3

Total number of machines in cascade: 987

Assumed characteristics of P-2-type machine

peripheral velocity =rotor diameter =

rotor height =separative power =

48515

1005

m/scmcmSWU/yr

Source: Urenco

of UF6 w/ natural uraniumof UF6 w/ 4.4%-enriched uranium

Feed =Product =

32.4 kg/d3.3 kg/d

Performance of reference LEU-cascade


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(compare to equilibrium time for gaseous diffusion process, which is on the order of months)

Time [hours]

Enric

hmen

t [w

t%]

-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 120

20

40

60

80

100

Simple batch operation:1 cascade usingpre-enriched feed-stock

Serial batch operation:10 cascades feedinto 1 additional cascade

26%

86%


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Production of 25 kg HEU in less than 12 days(contained in 37 kg of UF6 and requiring 3900 kg of UF6 LEU feed-stock)

Batch operation in series11 cascades (10 cascades feeding into 1 additional cascade)

about 11 000 machines or 55 000 SWU/yr

Collection of LEU feed-stock over a period of less than 4 months (110 days)

PREPARATION FOR BREAKOUT

Note: up to 2500 kg of enriched UF6 can bestored in one standard product cylinder (Type 30B)


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Clandestine Options

Reactor

Reprocessing

Yes Yes No

No No (Yes)

Detectability (Selected Criteria)

IdentifiableStructure

ThermalSignature Effluents

Calutron/EMIS

Gaseous diffusion

No Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

PlutoniumProduction

Centrifuge No No No

UraniumEnrichment


(Undeclared centrifuge facilities are virtually impossible to detect)

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What Are Our Options?

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• Increase the effectiveness of (and the confidence in) safeguards

• Increase the ability to detect undeclared facilities

• Contain technology to existing or selected producers

• Focus on the demand side (i.e. “devalue” nuclear weapons)

Possible Strategies to Limit the Front-End Proliferation Risks of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Preclude covert misuse

Motivation

Deter clandestine activities

TARGET/OBJECTIVESTRATEGY

Know-how held by “trusted users”


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Containment Strategies

Black Box approaches with or without “Poison Pills” and combined with multinational operation of facilities

Have and have-not approachesBush Proposal (2004) or other “criteria-based” proposals


Export ControlsDeter, delay, detect procurement efforts

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Containment Strategies

To what extent are containment strategies durable anyway?Underlying assumption that indigenous R&D efforts are irrelevant/insufficient


(cont’d)

PROBLEMS

Strategies do not effectively address the unique proliferation concerns of centrifuge technology(breakout and clandestine option)

Since the idea of further restrictions on nuclear fuel cycle technologieshas been revitalized in 2004 (e.g. supplier-/client-state arrangements), several countries

have expressed renewed interest in domestic enrichment

In addition to Iran and Brazil, these are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan,South Africa and the Ukraine

Economic incentives to forego domestic enrichment (e.g. assurances of supply) are largely irrelevant

Even if a country is willing to pay five times the market-price for enrichment services in order to havea domestic uranium enrichment capability, this would only raise the overall cost of electricity by about 10%

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Genealogy of the Gas Centrifuge

Brazil

Japan

India

Australia

Original centrifuge R&D (pre-commercial, “Zippe-connection”)

Technology transfer (confirmed or planned)

Independent development or unconfirmed foreign assistance

Status or achievement unclearLast revision: 09/2006

USA

Russia

Germany

U.K.

The Netherlands

(Libya)

N. Korea

Pakistan

(Iraq)

Iran

Urenco

ChinaFrance


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Timeline of Centrifuge Programs

(arrows indicate uncertain dates of respective events or milestones)

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Japan

India

U.K.

Netherlands

Iran

Germany R&D as part of URENCO/ETC

Pakistan

Australia

Brazil

R&D as part of URENCO/ETC

R&D as part of URENCO/ETC

R&D

Machineat least 2-5 SWU/yr

Test cascadeat least 100 machines

Pilot plantand further developments

DRAFT version, August 2006 - by Alexander Glaser, Princeton University


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Timeline of Centrifuge Programs


How long does it take to develop centrifuge technology?

Length of required R&D-period has not significantly changed over the past decades(It takes about 15-20 years to go through all phases of the R&D-process)

Even important outside assistance does not shorten the R&D-period excessively(possibly up to 50%, e.g. the case of Pakistan)

Will more countries be able to successfully develop centrifuge technology?

Timeline suggests that countries may begin to pursue a centrifuge program sooner orlater, depending on when they feel sufficiently confident to be able to carry out such an R&D project

Key technologies that were previously used specificallyfor centrifuge-component manufacturing are expanding into additional sectors of modern

industry and/or require less experience or expertise to be operated

(Examples are rotor balancing and flowforming techniques)

(cont’d)

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• Increase the effectiveness of (and the confidence in) safeguards

• Increase the ability to detect undeclared facilities

• Contain technology to existing or selected producers

• Focus on the demand side (i.e. “devalue” nuclear weapons)

Possible Strategies to Limit the Front-End Proliferation Risks of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Preclude covert misuse

Motivation

Deter clandestine activities

TARGET/OBJECTIVESTRATEGY

Know-how held by “trusted users”


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Viability of a Nuclear ExpansionConclusion and Outlook

If the incentives to acquire national enrichment capabilities,for either peaceful or military purposes, continue to exist, we can indeed expect successful

independent development and deployment of centrifuge technology in more states


Despite current efforts to set-up a system of assurances of supply, incentives to acquirenational enrichment capabilities remain high

The only effective approach to reduce these incentives is to increase the countries sense of security

Progress in nuclear disarmament has to be a central element of such an agenda

To consider a global expansion of nuclear energy before one reestablishes confidence inthe future of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime is an imprudent proposition

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brave new nuclear world - princeton universityaglaser/talk2006_chicago.pdf · 2006-11-17 ·...

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