brandeis international journal

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL APRIL 2011

April 2011

Russia’s Resur-gence & How to Deal With It

Impact of China’s A2/AD Capabilities Asia Section PAGE 12North America Section PAGE 5

in theTurmoil

Arab WorldPAGE 17


North America

President: Karia SekumboSecretary: Bethlehem Solomon

Tianyi ZhangTreasurer: Truong PharmEditor: Sungtae ParkArt Director: Ying WuGraphic Assistant: Julie Yiu

Assistant Editors: Tanay Paranjape, Jesse Koklas

Interviewees:Wellington NyangoniShai Feldman

Supporting: International and Global Stud-ies DepartmentCrown Center for Mid-dle East Studies

E-mail: [email protected]

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Russia’s Resurgence & How to Deal With It

Letter From the President

China’s A2/AD Capabilities: Impacts on Regional Deter-rence Dynamics

Africa’s 54th State: The Fu-ture of Free Southern Sudan

Democratic Republic of Congo. Is There Any Hope?

Turmoil in the Arab World

Nicolas Sarkozy: The Reelected President

Rise of Turkey & Ameri-can Foreign Policy

Is Corruption Draining the Indian Economy?

Julian Assange How to be involved

Failures of International Pressure and Intervention Leave Ivory Coast in a State of Anarchy

An Age-Old Problem, Addressed by theTwenty-First Century

Timeline

Interview with Wellington Nyangoni

Regional Perspectives

Interview with Shai Feld-man

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Asia Theme

Europe

Africa

Feature End


! t is with the utmost pride and satisfaction that a"er three months of dedicated work from a group of motivated, passionate, and glob-ally conscious students that we #nally present our #rst issue of the Brandeis International Journal. As a campus that boasts so many di$erent cultures and perspectives from di$erent corners of the world, it was only a matter of time before a journal dedicated to discussing global a$airs was introduced to the community.

It is my personal belief that in order to foster amicable relations between diverse people around the world, there needs to be an under-standing of the di$erent problems that exist in the di$erent regions of the world. A sense of global awareness and consciousness has to be instilled within everyone before talks of peaceful co-existence may even take place. A"er all, we are all citizens of the world.Brandeis University is a community that has future leaders presently walking around campus as it is. %erefore, it is because of this reason that it is important that we engage each other in the various issues that persist around the world and always look to #nd solutions to these problems so that, we, as a human race are constantly rectifying on mistakes of the past and improving on the prospects for peace and prosperity for future generations.

Even when you are in disagreement with the views shared by your neighbor, bringing the views to the table in the #rst place is the most important step in arriving at any sort of compromise especially as we do not live in a world that consists of one opinion, but many. It is only through continuous discussion and engagement amongst one another that we are able to arrive at a point of agreement and conciliation.

%erefore, it is my request and hope that; as you, the members of the Brandeis community read our #rst issue of the Brandeis Inter-national Journal and future issues, you will use the magazine as an avenue through which you are able to read about various topics around the world and also as an opportunity where you are able to voice your own opinion and engage one another on issues that you may hold dear to you. As citizens of the world, we need to step out of our own comfort zone and begin to look at and acknowledge the rest of the world and work towards bringing about the change, peace, and prosperity that we all desire.

Karia Sekumbo ‘14President of the Brandeis International Journal

Note from the President:

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Resurgence of Russia and How to Deal With It

In early March, American Vice President Joe Biden made a visit to Russia during which Vladimir

Putin famously proposed abolishing visas between the United States and Russia. Although the media mainly focused on the cooperative talks and silly moments such as Putin’s tidbit about doing away with visas, the main reason Biden went to Russia was to talk about the strategic issues that the two countries will soon be facing after the American disengagement from Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States and Russia have constantly been at odds with each other ever since the internationaliza-tion of American foreign policy after World War II. As early as the 19th century, astute minds such as Alexis de Tocqueville predicted the rise and clash of the two countries as the two dominant world powers and for rightful reasons. One only needs to carefully examine the national security history and imperatives of the United States and Russia to see why their clash was inevitable and why they are bound to clash yet again in the near future. By the end of the 19th century,

the United States emerged as the larg-est economic power of the world. Its security was guaranteed by two great

on its coasts and two weak countries, Canada and Mexico, on its northern and southern borders. After expe-riencing two world wars, however, the United States added two more national security concepts: dominant control of all the world’s oceans and nuclear weapons. Controlling the sea meant that the United States could not be attacked conventionally on its homeland, while it could deploy its powerful navy anywhere in the world to threaten or attack any other con-tinent. Moreover, control of the sea gave the United States control of the global trade, economy, and wealth. Countries hostile to the United States faced possibilities not just of attack by the powerful American military but of economic blockades from the global trade as well. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, prevented the United States from total defeat. The only way the United States could lose was through mutually-assured-destruction vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Therefore, the United States, since WWII, has

stuck to two key national security im-peratives: Preventing the dominance of any region by one single power by keeping the balance of power in each region, stable preferably for the sake of global economy, in different parts of the world and preventing nuclear proliferation, all the while keeping strategic nuclear parity with the Soviet Union. Keeping the balance of power in a region meant that no major power could invest enough resources to build a navy that could challenge the Ameri-can navy because resources needed to

nearby major powers. Preventing nu-clear proliferation reduced the risk of any nuclear power that could eventual-ly challenge American nuclear forces, its last-resort measure. Through those means, the United States protected its political, economic, and physical security. Russia’s national security im-peratives, on the other hand, have his-torically depended on carving out its

as large as it may seem, is actually not so large if you cross off Siberia, which is very much a lot of nothing, and regions with hostile ethnic minorities.

By Sungtae Park

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One can see that most of Russia’s population is con-centrated in Moscow and its surrounding regions. Historically, the main security issue for the Russians was that the Moscow region, the heartland of Rus-sia, is located on a very open, vulnerable plain that could easily be invaded from the West, South, and

-sia’s history is a tragic one of destructive invasion after another by powerful foreign entities, whether they be the Mongols, the Prussians, Napoleon, or the Germans - twice. Hence, the Russian security depended on extending its strategic depth through

as well as nuclear weapons. Here, one can see why American and Rus-sian national security imperatives are ultimately incompatible. Americans want to prevent a domi-nant regional power from rising;; Russians want to become one. Although the United States did not win the Cold War through military attack, it engaged in

Putin believes that the West is determined to strangle Russia and reduce it to a minor player in the region.

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a costly arms-race and blocked the economically weak Soviet Union from participating in the global trade, there-by bringing its downfall from within. American obsession with preventing Russia from becoming the dominant regional power continued even after the fall of the Soviet Union, as NATO expanded to include the three Baltic states and Poland, the states which Russia saw as parts of their sphere

attempted to include Ukraine and Georgia, which would have brought NATO’s border closer to Moscow than it would have liked to see. For many Russians and leaders like Vladimir Pu-tin, NATO expansion into the Russian

promises and back-stabbing by the West, which promised cooperation and aid. Putin believes that the West is de-termined to strangle Russia and reduce it to a minor player in the region.

Ever since he became the leader of Russia, Putin has been deter-mined to reverse Boris Yeltsin’s

open policy and recreate the Russian

being the potential interference by the United States. The perfect chance came, however, when the United States became bogged down in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and now is occupied with Iran. In fact Russia’s refusal to cooperate fully on sanc-tions on Iran and willingness to give technological assistance to the rogue state’s nuclear program are both meant to keep American attention on Iran as long as possible. Meanwhile, Putin has been utilizing Russia’s abundance in natural resources, especially natural gas, to boost its economy as well to apply pressure Eastern and Central Europe that are dependent on Russian natural gas pipelines. Russian military

-ery, if not as powerful as the military of the Soviet Union. The Russian inva-sion of Georgia in 2008 was a clear statement made by Putin and Medve-dev, who made clear that they are pre-pared to use military force to protect

their interest in their sphere, as long as the United States is still occupied with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and that the Russian military is not as weak as it is believed to be. People continue to underestimate the strength of the Rus-sian military, however, as they tend to link Russia’s economy with Russian military power. By studying Russian

its political and military power never depended on its economy because the Russian economy has always been weak. Russia has always been able

authoritarian system at the expense of the general welfare of its people. Putin does not intend to create the

conquest. One lesson he learned from the fall of the Soviet Union was that direct control is often too costly and unsustainable. He does, however, plan to use military, political, and economic power of Russia to render the states on its periphery submissive towards Russia.

As the United States eventually withdraws and lays its eyes off Iran, Iraq, and Afghani-

stan, it will return to pursuing its geopolitical imperative, which is to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon,

arise between the United States and Russia. A key issue that was raised during Biden’s visit was the issue of the missile defense system and de-ployment of American air force units in Poland. The United States claims that the system is aimed at preventing rogue states such as Iran from attack-ing Europe with short to intermedi-ate range missiles, not Russia. Yet it refuses to let Russia control it jointly. One must remember, however, that the current missile defense system is nowhere close to being able to defend against Russia’s large arsenal of short and intermediate range missiles. Then, why is Russia fussing so much about it, and why is the United States not let-ting Russia control it jointly, if it is not aimed at Russia? The real reason for

establishing the missile defense sys-tem with American military personnel in Poland is that it is a symbolic ges-ture of American security commitment of Eastern Europe against Russia. Thus, the world is already beginning to witness the clash between resurgent Russia and the United States that is trying to contain it yet again.

Cand the United States seems inevitable, although it prob-

ably will not be one of direct military confrontation, as the two countries still both possess very large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. As with the Cold War, the United States must pursue a policy of containment vis-à-vis Russia. During the Cold War, it was NATO, composed of Western Europe, which acted as a wall against the So-viet Union’s eastern sphere. This time around, however, Western Europe does not feel the immediate danger that the Soviet encroachment presented before. Instead, it is Eastern Europe, consisting of former-Soviet states not wishing to come under the Rus-

States must form a defense block with, along with other concerned states such as Turkey and Georgia. Because of the economic constraints coupled with ethnic troubles and the demographic problem of declining population it is facing, Russia should be easy to contain, much easier than containing the Soviet Union. An al-ternative solution would be to get the Russians to accept a status-quo with American missile defense and mili-tary commitments in Poland and with Ukraine, Georgia, and the three Baltic states remaining neutral or under the

compromise that neither side would accept. Geopolitics, to a great extent is determined. The role of a statesman is to let the destiny be the guide and

-nately, the United States is destined

Russia, and American statesmen must ease that hand of destiny by going along with it.

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Rise of Turkey & American Foreign Policy

By Sungtae Park

The world’s attention is currently focused on the internal political unrest in the Middle East, even

more than Iran’s nuclear program. Tur-key, on the other hand, never seems to make it to the headlines of today’s media. Many people do not even con-sider Turkey to be part of the Middle East. Yet, by examining the country, it is hard not to recognize its regional dominance as well as its potential sig-ni#cance with regard to the American policy in the region. %ere are many ways to measure power. One could measure power in terms of military and economic in&u-ence, as well as so" power appeals. Looking at Turkey, it is easily the largest economy in the Middle East, the 17th largest in the world, and still growing at a rapid pace. Militarily, it has a much larger military expenditure than Israel, has a massive, well-trained army, armed with modern equipment,

has extensive combat experience #ght-ing Kurdish militias, and is the only major naval power of the Middle East. %e Turkish army constitutes the most powerful ground forces in the Middle East and probably even among the European armies as well, not counting Russia. Politically, it is a democracy, although imperfect, and has a fairly stable government backed by powerful and secular military. In terms of so" power, it is perhaps the only power in the region that has wide-appeal among other regional states, even with Iran and Israel, although the &otilla incident did mean a downturn. At the same time, Turkey is also culturally tied to Europe and is seen by the West as a Middle Eastern model of secular-ism and modernization. Turkey has historically been a major power. One could just point to the example of the Ottoman Empire, which at its height controlled the

entire Middle East (with the excep-tion of Iran), parts of Central Asia, the Balkans, and Northern Africa. A"er World War I, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk self-contained the once-great-power in its homeland in the Anatolian penin-sula in order to thoroughly modernize and to democratize. %roughout the Cold War, until the end of the Cold War, and even until the Iraq War in 2003, Turkey pursued its foreign policy largely in line with the United States and NATO. Iraq War of 2003, however, was a bit of a wake-up call for Turkey to pursue its own and more forceful foreign policy again. Turkey was vigorously op-posed to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 because it feared that the Iraqi Kurdish elements, which the Americans supported against Saddam Hussein, would be let loose and would destabilize Turkey with its own rebel-lious Kurdish population. Moreover,

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Turkey was not interested in seeing the balance of power between Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia destroyed, as a single power dominating the Gulf region would not be in Turkish interest. Nonetheless, the United States dur-ing the Bush administration ignored dissent from Turkey and many other

countries and went through with the invasion. At that point, Turkey realized that it could not count on the United States to look out for its interests and that it needs to look out for its own interest. At the current stage, Turkey is already the most powerful Middle

Eastern power, whether it is ready to accept it or not. With eventual disen-gagement of the United States from the Middle East and with readiness to pursue its own independent foreign policy, Turkey will de#nitely be playing the dominant role in the region as the most powerful economic, military, and

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political player. %is is a fact that is being realized among the Turkish people as well, as one can hear talks of neo-Ottomanism going around in the country, although the country is not exactly sure how and where to direct its new and growing power. As of now, Turkey has adopted a make-

no-enemy foreign policy. Neverthe-less, as with any great power, being friendly with everyone is impossible, as countries with con&icting interest will want to forge relations, a great example being the United States and Iran both wanting stronger relations with Turkey. At some point in the near future, Turkey will have to make some important decisions about which pow-ers it will align with and which powers it will align against. %e other major power contender, Iran, although it may claim in&uence in the Gulf region a"er the American withdrawal, will have fairly limited in&uence across the rest of the Middle East due to its limita-tions on available resources, and any attempt to extend its in&uence will surely be checked by Turkey. More-over, the Iranians, recognizing their relative weakness vis-à-vis Turkey, are very careful to not antagonize Ankara, which could potentially be forced to be involved actively in the region much sooner than it would like to be. In this respect, Turkey and the United States could attempt to align their interests in the region again.

W ith respect to Iran, nei-ther the United States nor Turkey is interested in

seeing the Iranian domination of the Gulf. Yet, the United States is set to withdraw from the region. Instead of the United States, Turkey could exert

political pressure against potential Iranian domination of Iraq and the GCC states. %e fact that Turkey does not have hostile relations Iran would greatly help. Although not a member of the P5+1, Turkey could also play a more active part in negotiating to rid Iran of its nuclear developments. Regarding the Arab-Israeli relations, Turkey, as a country that can appeal to both the Arabs and the West, could be seen as a fairer mediator between the two sides, unlike the United States, which does not have mass appeal in the region. %e most crucial area in which the United States and Turkey could cooperate on is perhaps on put-ting a lid on the Russian dream of rec-reating its sphere of in&uence, which Vladimir Putin has been working on for the past ten years and will continue to do so even more aggressively in the future. Turkey is perfectly aware that, since the a"ermath of World War II, its strategic position vis-à-vis Russia has depended on its relationship with NATO and another powerful outside power, the United States. With resur-gent Russia on the horizon, American and Turkish interests should perfectly align in this area. %e Middle East is shaking because of internal unrest but Turkey is still thriving. For the United States, Turkey may be the ideal country to work with in stabilizing the region as well as countering the Russian in&u-ence.

Turkey is already the most powerful Middle Eastern power, wheth-er it is ready to accept it or not. “

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A recent poll released by the French daily newspaper Le Parisien showed that if the

presidential elections were held today, the current French president, Nicolas Sarkozy would receive 21% of the votes while his potentially main opponent Dominique Strauss Kahn- a socialist candidate and current president of the IMF- would have 23% and Marine Le Pen, the leader of the extreme right party called the Front National- a political party considered fascist by many journalists and politi-cians- would have 24% of the votes. In other words, if France could vote today, according to the poll, Sarkozy might not even qualify himself for the second round. Moreover, many people among his own political party, UMP, argue that he is not the best candidate anymore to represent right wing ideas. However, beside the current political atmosphere being against Sarkozy, he still has a high probability to win the presidential elections. Sarkozy appears as the most cred-ible candidate of the election on the right wing. For instance, beside the fact that he knows how to govern a country, he has defended many

unpopular reforms that he considered necessary for France. He postponed the retirement age from 60 years old to 62 and afterward his popularity decreased. However, even though the reform substantially decreased Sarkozy’s popularity, it showed his determination to deal with important issues whatever political costs he may pay;; this image will certainly help him during the campaign. For instance, due to some punctual reasons, such

coupled with structural reasons, as the

candidates will have nothing to offer but “blood toil tears and sweat” and an important part of the French popu-lation will see in Sarkozy the only person who would have the courage to implement this program on a national scale since he had already fought for unpopular reforms. Therefore, his credibility to cope with delicate issues will have a positive impact for him when people will have to choose a candidate. Furthermore, his recent

-self as a solid candidate. Sarkozy’s designation of two undeniably competent ministers, Alain

Juppé and Claude Guéant, in a strate-gic ministries- the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of domestic af-fairs respectively- will boost Sarkozy’s popularity in the polls few months before the elections. Alain Juppé and Claude Guéant, will certainly give him an advantage during the campaign. Both ministers are widely accepted as

-lysts and are both going to lead a very strategic ministry. In fact, because of Sarkozy’s decision to check the rise of the Front National by organizing a de-bate about the theme of public safety as well as about the place of Islam in France, drop in the numbers of crimes and aggressions proved to be crucial if Sarkozy wants to win. Hopefully for the French president, Gueant’s nomi-nation will certainly sensibly affect the diminution of crimes and aggres-sions. Moreover, due to the “spring revolutions” in many Arab countries and because of the close historic ties between France and North African countries, France attitude toward its North African neighbors will still be on the French foreign policy’s agenda and will still captured the attention of the public opinion. Sarkozy will be

Europe

Nicolas Sarkozy: The Reelected President

By Dan Lahmi

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Europe

able to rely on Juppe for good diplomatic results. Subsequently Sarkozy’s diplomatic successes and solid improvement of the people’s security in France will place him as a serious contender for the elections. In addi-tion Sarkozy can still believe in his reelection because he will certainly be the only candi-date of the right as well as for the following reasons.

The candidate de Villepin will not run and his voters will vote for Sarkozy. The poll published by Le Parisien

indicated that if Dominique Strauss Kahn

the second round, just behind Marine Le Pen, and if Strauss Kahn runs Sarkozy would not

-though this poll reinforces the idea that Sar-kozy will not be reelected, it paradoxically consolidate his chance to win the elections. For instance the poll included the candidature of Dominique de Villepin- a former member of the UMP who became a dissident of the party and created his own party- and assessed that 7% of the voters would vote for him if the elections were held today. However, be-cause of the great chance that Marine Le Pen accedes to the second round while Sarkozy might not even accede to it, de Villepin will not run. In fact, the latter knows that he does not have any chances to win the elections and would rather prefer as President of France someone who supports right wing idea rather than a proponent of left-wing ideas or extreme right wing ideas. Consequently, de Villepin’s voters would switch to Sarkozy and he would gain approximatively 7% of more votes, which would position him as a potential winner of the election. To conclue, Sarkozy can and should still believe in his reelection because of his unique image of a courageous reformer because of the expected good result in ministries that will count during the election and because of his probable monopoly as the only candidate representing the right wing. Furthermore, in politics time tends to run slowly, the Presidential elections will happen in 14 months or in other world in an eternity for a politician. In few days everything can change and usually in French politics it does;; all French presidents who have been elected

-ner by any poll a year before the election. Why would it change today?

In a few days every-thing can change and usually in French poli-tics it does.

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Nicolas Sarkozy.


On December 26th, 2010, in an interview with China Signpost, Admiral Willard of

China’s DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) had reached its Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Achieving the IOC for the ASBM is

in China’s development of “anti-access area denial” (A2/AD) systems. China’s determination in acquiring these capabilities necessitates care-ful analysis of China’s underlying motivations as well as the intended or unintended geopolitical impacts of these capabilities. The major motivation for the development of these systems is China’s grave concern over Taiwan’s potential de jure independence. Taiwan has huge social and geopoliti-

and is one of the “core interests” of China. Taiwan currently is a prosper-ing democracy in East Asia and an important component of the First Island Chain. People in China, as time passes, often look up to Taiwan’s economic prosperity and the degrees of individual freedom Taiwanese enjoy. The deep contrast between a democratic Taiwan and an oppressive China raises a serious and dangerous legitimacy crisis to the ruling Chinese Communist Party. A prospering Han-democracy at China’s door-step is thus a de-stabilizing factor to China’s domestic politics. Beijing is also concerned about Taiwan’s unique identity as a key component of the First Island Chain. Historically, during the Cold War, the First Island Chain became the frontline for the United States and its allies to contain Soviet imperialism

Cold War world, Beijing put itself in the vacant position left by the former Soviet Union as the key competitor of the U.S. in the 21st century. China, therefore, is deeply concerned with the U.S. military presence in East Asia and suspects itself to be the tar-get of a new containment. Although the control of the island of Taiwan

military projection capabilities given the quality and quantity of America’s military projection platforms, it certainly will boost such capabili-ties of any other regional power who controls Taiwan. China’s growing economy has become increasingly de-pendent on the import of oil and other strategic materials through maritime trade routes. The security of China’s trade routes is thus directly linked to the ability of China to maintain

China’s A2/AD Capabilities: Impact on Regional Deterrence Dynamics

By Jieming Chu

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Asia


an 8% annual GDP growth. The >8% GDP growth, together with national-ism, are the major current sources of legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, China’s acquisition of Taiwan would allow China to break through the First Island Chain and ensure that China does not become the next victim of economic strangulation under a new American containment. In 1996, prior to Taiwan’s presiden-tial election, China launched mis-siles and held massive military drills near Taiwan to warn the Taiwanese electorate not to vote for the pro-inde-pendence candidate Lee Teng-hui. At that time, tensions directed across the Strait reached an all-time high and the U.S. president Bill Clinton sent in two aircraft carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait and neutralized China’s threat. During this crisis, both China and the U.S. sent each other a strong

message. The Chinese leadership reaf-

by force should Taiwan seek de jure independence. The United States, on the other hand, demonstrated its credibility to its Asian allies and its determination to come to Taiwan’s aid under the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

I n fact, China backed down in this crisis facing the strong coercive force posed by the two American

aircraft carriers. Beijing’s show of force even eventually brought it with counter-productive outcomes as Lee Teng-hui enjoyed a 5% boost in public support and won the election with a majority. This crisis led Beijing to speed up its military modernization process and construct strategies that could guarantee victory vis-à-vis a U.S.-backed Taiwan in a conventional

war. This winning strategy that Beijing proposed is A2/AD. China’s A2/AD strategy employs a wide range of conventional military systems including high-tech sub-marines, state-of-the-art air defense systems, advanced aircrafts, over-the-horizon radars, spy satellites as well as the ASBMs. The combination of these systems is expected to effectively de-ter, delay, or destroy incoming Ameri-can military interventions in a possible Sino-Taiwanese war. In essence, the A2/AD capabilities will allow China to exploit its asymmetrical advantages to win a limited conventional war against the much more superior U.S. air and naval forces in the Taiwan Theater. China understands that America’s defense commitments to Taiwan are not bound by any treaties but are only vaguely described in the Taiwan

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PLAN vessel ranges illustrate maximum time on station (unreplenished) at state range


Relations Act. The ambiguity of the wording of the Taiwan Relations Act allows the U.S. to come to Taiwan’s aid under circumstances and in ways

-ibility of American military response but it also has its weaknesses. China, with proper means, can manipulate and exploit this particular ambigu-ity. Whether a bluff or not, China’s A2/AD capabilities would play into America’s consideration of interven-tion. The ever growing economic tie between China and the United States eliminates incentives for direct military confrontation of these two states. Now, realizing China’s possible

traditional American military projec-tion platforms, America’s administra-tion would be more reluctant to risk suffering heavy economic and military losses in asymmetrical warfare at the time and place of China’s choosing. If the deterrence fails and the Ameri-can leadership decides to stand up to China’s threat and come to Taiwan’s aid, Beijing’s hope would be that the A2/AD systems would cause enough damage and disruption to America’s deployment of military assets into the theater of war so that de facto Chinese control over Taiwan could be

-tion irreversible. In this situation, the international community would most possibly be coerced to accept the Chi-

nese occupation of Taiwan.

One fact that is often over-looked is the third possible situation in which the United

States decides to intervene regard-

has too high a stake in the de facto independence of Taiwan and too much credibility to lose if it fails to uphold its commitments to its ally. In this case, the Chinese leadership, under strong domestic pressures of national-ism, would be unlikely to back down from a military offensive against Taiwan. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that China also has a plan to use the A2/AD systems to destroy U.S military assets in the Taiwan Theater

return. Hence, China would continue to develop its A2/AD capabilities to prepare for this worst situation and to serve as a credible deterrence.

China’s wishful thinking, its ag-gressive postures in the year of 2010 and its growing military

superiority in East Asia, however, have brought immediate unintended geopolitical consequences in East Asia. Regional powers have sensed China’s growing A2/AD capabili-ties and viewed China as a threat to traditional balance of power in East Asia. Japan, in particular, felt the need to address China’s threat to Japan’s

vital national interests in the resource-abundant East China Sea. Japan’s new defense strategy in 2010, therefore, calls for a shift in Japan’s defense posture and a greater integration of Japanese military with the United States military. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also moved closer to the United States to curb Chinese threats. Apparently, China’s growing military capabilities, especially its potential ability to keep

-ence in the future, has triggered wide-spread regional security concerns and only invited a more prominent U.S.

Maintaining the geopolitical bal-ance of power in East Asia is therefore fundamental to regional stability and the United States has to take lead in accomplishing this task. Good news is that, amid concerns, Admiral Willard

America’s ability to stand up to the challenges posed by China’s growing A2/AD capabilities, saying: “Cer-tainly, this kind of capability should be a concern to the region, and it poses a challenge to any naval or air operations that would be conducted in that area were it to be employed. Is it affecting my operations today? Not at all. Were it to pose a challenge to

have the capability to operate in that air space and water space.”

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China’s determination in acquiring these capabilities necessitates care-ful analysis of China’s underlying motivations as well as the intended or unintended geopolitical impacts of these capabilities.

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By Tanay Paranjape

The Indian government announced this week that GDP grew by 8.9% year-on-year in the most recent quarter. %is makes it the second

fastest growing economy a"er ChinaHowever everything does not seem to be going well, as the country has seen many corruption scandals in-volving major corporates. Some of the major scandals include alleged bribes-for-loans involving state-con-trolled banks and lenders. %ere is alleged corruption in telecom market which cost the government exche-quer a whopping $ 40 billion. Recently published IMF reports suggest a capital &ight of $462 billion since independence.%e telecom scandal has received the most atten-tion due its magnanimity. %e scandal has lead to the resignation of the Telecom Minister Andimuthu Raja subsequently charges were framed against him leading to his imprisonment. %e Telecom Department under Minister Raja sold second-generation (2G) mobile-telephone licenses and bandwidth in 2008 at throwaway prices. Instead of auctioning them, he sold them at prices that had been set in 2001, when the market was far smaller causing the government a major revenue loss. To make matters worse, many of the #rms that won licenses appear not to have been quali#ed. An audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India published last month said the sale was conducted on a murky “#rst come, #rst served basis”, in many cases to companies that lacked the necessary capital or had fogged essential documents. Two #rms won licenses and then sold them to foreign #rms: Unitech, primar-ily a property company, was part-bought by Norway’s Telenor; and nearly half of Swan Telecom was bought by Abu Dhabi’s Etisalet ETEL at much higher prices. India has grown rapidly since it underwent liber-alization and major economic reforms in 1991. %e country’s economy has grown over $ 1.43 trillion and has the potential for much more. But is this sort of crony capitalism hindering economic development? Is the money remaining the hands of a few where as a large section of the population does not bene#t for the fruits of growth? %e $ 40 billion dollars earned could be well spent in welfare schemes where the money is much needed. Healthcare, education and infrastructure which are among the major sectors needing massive government spending remain neglected which could provide for a more inclusive growth. %e nexus between business and politicians is preventing the common man to ben-e#t from the growth the nation has undergone. %e government needs to take #rm action against cases of corruption at all levels of government and bu-reaucracy. %e imprisonment of a high ranking union cabinet minister will hopefully pose as a deterrent to others in government.

Is corruption draining the Indian economy?

15

Former Telecom Minister A Raja.

Asia


Turmoil in the Arab World

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Theme

Thousands camp out in Tahir Square, not willing to give up until they have won their rights.

17


Theme

The stirrings of discontent in the Arab world that evolved into (in many cases) passion-

ate protest and much violence, did not stem from issues unheard of until now. The protests occurred be-cause these people were unhappy,

This unhappiness originated most directly from miserable unemploy-ment rates. Naturally, the people blame their leaders. Oppressive leaders have existed for as long as leaders have existed, and yet now, the people have more weapons with which to combat them. The twenty-

science of communication. Social

sending and receiving of messag-es- perfect for mass protests, and perfect for the countries in question, who have very young populations. The spread of these uprisings is

a few short months, millions have fought in the streets for the right to be heard, decades-long rules have been disrupted, and an entire region is in turmoil. In the following few pages, we attempt to examine all aspects of the protests, using statis-tics and professional opinions. We begin with a background of events, which starts with Tunisia, the spark

Note: We concede that as events are changing day to day, especially in the case of Libya, some of the views ex-pressed in this section may not consider the most current developments.

An Age-Old Problem, Addressed by the Twenty-First Century

18

Tunisia

Libya

%eme Section by Jesse Koklas


Theme

Statistics from CIA World Fact Book

Pop.(m) Median age jobless% Below poverty line% Internet Users(m) %pop on internet

Tunisia 2.50 20.90 16.50 46.00 1.30 52.00

80.50 24.00 9.60 20.00 20.00 24.846.40 24.20 30.00 33.00 0.35 5.4725.70 24.90 10.80 N/A 9.6 37.3523.40 17.89 35.00 45.20 2.20 9.401.21 30.90 15.00 N/A 0.42 30.00

EgyptLibyaSaudi ArabiaYemenBahrain

Youth and Poverty

Unemployment is a chief concern of the young, and a reason to rebel.

EgyptSaudi Arabia

Yemen

Jordan

Bahrain

19

Longtime Arab LeadersLeader, took power From U.S. State Dept.reportsPresident AbdelazizAlgeria

Libya

Morocco

Egypt

Sudan

Jordan

Syria

Yemen

Saudi

Arabia

Thousands of enforced disappearances:freedom of association is very restricted

Authoritarian regime;; torture, arbitraryarrest are continuing problemsEmergency law in place for 30 yeaarseffectively outlaws political parties

Bashir indicted for genocide for hiscounterinsurgency campaign in Darfur

Law does not provide citizens the right to change government

Has failed to comply with minimuminternational human rights standardsSevere violationsof religious freedom

Mounting poverty among a growing young population;; frustration witha lack of political freedoms

King MohammedVI,1999Col. Moammar

President HosniMubarak, 1981

President OmarAI-Bashir, 1993

King Abdullah1999

President BasharAsad, 2000King Abdullah,2005

President AliAbdullah Saleh,1990


Tunisia (the Spark) December 17, 2010: Mohammed Bouazizi, a young fruit and vegetable vendor, sets himself on #re in the street a"er local o'cials con#scate his stand because he did not have a permit. Many, who want better job options and a higher quality of life, share his discon-tent. Protests begin in Sidi Bouzid that same day. December 28, 2010: A"er several pro-tests, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali says that the protests are unacceptable. Tunisia Federation of Labor Unions and 300 lawyers also rally to show their support for the protesters. %e Tunisian ministers of communication, trade and handicra"s, and religious a$airs are dismissed. Januray 2, 2011: %e cyberactivist group “Anonymous” starts Operation Tunisia in solidarity with the protests by striking down a number of Tunisian government websites.Januray 7: A group of bloggers, jour-nalists, activists and a rap singer are arrested. Snipers carry out a series of charges in Kasserine and %ala.Januray 13: Approximately 66 dead since the protests began. President Ali

announces he will not run for reelec-tion.Januray 14: Ben Ali orders a state of emergency, and bans meetings of more than three people. %e army seizes the country’s main airport. Ali’s family members are arrested. He escapes the country by plane. According to the UN, approximately 219 were killed in the uprisings, and another 510 injured.

Egypt (the Big Deal)Januray 25, 2011: Protesters take to the streets in Cairo’s Tahir Square. Calls of “Down with Mubrak” resound. Januray 28: Internet and mobile phone text messages are disruped. President Hosni Mubarak announces he dismissed his government. Januray 29: Mubarak appoints a vice-President for the #rst time in three decades.Januray 31: 250,000 people gather in Tahir Square to protest an oppressive regime. %e EU calls for free and fair elections in Egypt. %e White House says the government must address the people and resolve unrest. Worldwide investors continue withdrawing signi#-

cant capital from Egypt in the midst of mounting unrest.February 1: Mubarak declares he will not run for reelection, but refuses to step down. President Obama says only the Egyptian people can determine their leaders. Protests continue and clashes break out between pro-Mubarak and anti-government forces.February 2: Internet is partially re-stored. Google improves its speak2tweet technology for the protesters. February 7: %ousands are camped out in Tahrir Square. %e government ap-proves a 15 per cent raise in salaries and pensions in a bid to appease the angry masses. Estimated number of people dead is 302. February 11: A"er tens of thousands people take to the streets across Egypt in angry protests, Mubarak resigns and hands over power to the army- techni-cally a military coup. Scattered protests are still occurring, but the main objec-tive, to remove Mubarak, was achieved.

Libya (the Oil)February 15-16,2011: Protests erupt in Benghazi.

A Timeline of Discontent

20

The beginnings of unrest. Protesters experience violence in Tunisia.


February 17: Calls for a “Day of Rage” is made in response to an oppressive government under Muamar Qadda#. February 22: Qadda# orders his force to crush the uprisings. February 25: %e EU agrees to impose an arms embargo, freeze assets, and impose a travel ban.February 28: Western powers discuss a no-&ight zone, but need the Security Council’s decision. Pro-Qadda# forces continue to clash with protesters, and the police and security continue to use weapons and violence against the protests. March 10: African Union summit held to #nd a solution. AU says external countries should not meddle in the a$airs of Africa, and a no-&ight zone would be violating previous agree-ments.March 17: %e UN has backed a no-&ight zone. Enforcement is set to begin the 20-21st.

BahrainFebruary 14: Clashes are reported from parts of Bahrain. At least 14 people were injured in clashes over-

night where police used tear gas and rubber bullets. February 15: On February 15, thou-sands of protesters manage to gain con-trol of the Manama Pearl Roundabout, and tent there overnight, mimicking the protests in Tahir Square.February 18: Government uses live ammunition against the protesters. Protests and #ghting continues, with no leniency on the part of the government.March 15: %e king declares a three-month state of emergency, authorizing armed forces chief to take all measures to “protect the safety of the country and its citizens.”

Saudi ArabiaJanuray 15: Announces it is hosting Ben Ali and his family. In response to Bahrain unrest, the government bans all protests.March 16-17: Hundreds protest in the east in solidarity with the Bahraini protests. YemenFebruary 2, 2011: %ousands take to the streets in this “First Day of Rage.”March 1: : Hundreds of thousands rally

in most main cities to express solidar-ity with the families of protesters killed in the past month, particularly for a “Tuesday of Rage.”March 10: President Ali Abdullah Saleh goes on TV to announce plans to change the constitution to transition to a parliamentary system. He refuses to step down until 2013 (he has ruled for 32 years).

Jordan Januray 28, 2011: Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, trade unions, and le"ist organizations, numbering 500, demand that Samir Rifai step down as prime minister and that the govern-ment control rising prices, in&ation and unemployment. Protests reported in the capital and six other cities. February 10: %e old government o'cials let go a week earlier, a new government is sworn in. February 18: Protesters clash with police forces.February 25: 6,000-10,000 take to the streets in the capital, in a protest called for by 20 political parties. Protests continue.

Theme

21


Theme

The Arab

League

A quick resolution to the unrest is the wish of the Arab League. In the case of Libya, a

be employed, but there should be no invasion of Libya.

Asian Perspective

The rising crude oil prices have been a great concern for most Asian countries. Asia heavily depends on the Middle East to meet its crude oil requirements. The uncertainty associated with the production of oil has af-fected stock markets across Asia. Stability in

in the markets. Asian countries desire quick restoration of peace and tranquility in the Middle East.

European Perspective

Western Europe has always been a supporter of giving the common man a voice. The European Union has called the governments in the Middle East to enable a transition to a functional democracy. Particularly in

Members aspiring to form an alternate government are in the process of meeting European heads of state and other political leaders. Europe hopes a transition to democracy will occur, where people get the legiti-mate rights they are being denied.

African Perspective

The African Union initially did not want to get involved in

being considered, however, the African Union has spoken out against it, saying it goes di-rectly against the Declaration of Economic Development signed at the 1973 conference in Algiers, which condemned foreign intervention in the affairs of Africa. Rwanda, as head of the Peace and Security Council, advocates an end to the violence and loss of life in Libya.

North American Perspective

Overall, it is not in the interest of the United States for an anti-American regime to come into power for any of the countries in the region, although nothing is certain at the mo-ment. If Egypt, the center of the Arab nation, becomes anti-American and anti-Israeli, the United States will have to overturn its compre-hensive Middle East strategy formulated with the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. If Bahrain becomes anti-American, or even worse, an

-tion degenerates into complete breakdown of law and order, it could potentially turn into a terrorist haven. The United States advocates

invasion would not be in American interest.

Regional Perspectives

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Theme

Educated Opinions

For the educated opinions, we turn to our professors. Who better to go to than the people who educate us, and shape how we think of the world?

-proach the same issue a bit differently.

Undergraduate Advising Head, Professor of African and Afro-American Studies by Jesse Koklas

Interview With Professor Wellington Nyangoni

Jesse Koklas: Do you think the same force is behind the unrest in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya?Professor Wellington Nyangoni:

Yes or no. Many people were taken by surprise by the events in Tunisia, which was considered quite stable compared to Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. But one could say that the government of Ben Ali had become very repressive, and it was a military regime that did not grant people the liberty that they wanted to have. So there was a simmering against the government, because when Ben Ali overthrew Bourguiba he claimed that there would be an open election, a democratic one. %is openness [that had been promised] never came, and instead the military entrenched itself in power more and more and more.

In terms of Egypt, one could argue that the state of emergency, which was proclaimed a"er Anwar Sadat was assassinated, was never removed, and also the democratic changes that were promised never came. %e government became more oppressive, and di$er-ent types of views were not accepted. When the rebellion would take place was a question of time, and eventually, it did. But I think where the problem lies is that we are not sure of how this was organized, we just hear it was all of a sudden- I don’t think it was all of a sudden, I think it was organized.

JK: So do you think democracy was a main force behind the protests, or an actual force? WN: We are not sure, because we do not know the powers behind the

revolt- are these people democratic or not? We do not know. Particularly if you look in Tunisia, they rebelled. %e army was in power. We re-ally don’t know who were the real brains behind the revolt, what is their ideology? If they are indeed talking about democracy, we do not know what kind of democracy they have in mind. You know, no one’s really come out and said, “%is is what we want; we want democracy.” What kind of democracy are people talking about? We don’t know. In Egypt, some of the people who were behind this, the young people, have also not told us a clear vision of the Egypt they want. “Mubarak go Mubarak go,” the army is now in power. %ey wanted changes, they wanted a new constitution, but we really do not know what kind of de-

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Theme

“

“

We just had many more people killed in the Sudan, in Darfur- we did not enforce a

there.”

mocracy they have in mind, and what kind of ideas they want this country to stand for. %eir issues about Egypt’s relationship [with] Israel, not much has been said. %eir ideas about the Arab League? Not much has been said. What about the ideas in the African Union, not much is said. I don’t want to say that it is democracy- one needs to know the characters behind this. In the case of Egypt, there is the Islamic

Brotherhood. What are its views about all these things? We know what they stood for in the past, and their enmity, their hatred for the West, we know. It is still unclear to me.

JK: Is the situation in Libya jeop-

to go?WN: I know the common view ex-

pressed by many people is that Qadda# should go. But who is going to replace him, what do these people believe in? I wish I knew the people who were trying to replace him and what their philosophy is of this revolution, if it indeed can be called a revolution. Where do they want to take Libya to? %e other thing too, it’s all an issue of international law. %e United Nations says that countries should not inter-

fere in the internal a$airs of member states, and I am not sure I am the right person to say “Qadda# should go.”

JK: Well it’s your opinion.WN: Yes but I think it is the opinion of the majority of Libyans who should say if he should go. It’s their country, and I think they have a right to determine how they should be governed and who should govern them. But I know some people have &own to Europe, saying Europe should impose a no-&ight zone, but a no-&ight imposition, that’s almost like a declaration of war. Do we

really want to intervene in Libya? If we do so, are we continually going to in-tervene everywhere where there is in-ternal revolt? If there are revolts in any country, should we impose a no-&ight zone in those areas? What about if it is a minority that is revolting- should we take the side of the minority? I mean I know the Marxist people have revolted in Bengazi, but that doesn’t re&ect the overall opinion of what the Libyans think. I know for some reasons other people don’t like Qadda#, he has been a thorn in the &esh of many countries, so many people want him to go. But

I’m not sure whether our like or dislike of Qadda# should be the basis to say the government should be changed.

JK: To what extend should the United States intervene in the revo-lutions? WN: I personally don’t think that the United States alone should intervene; I think it should be a question for the UN to intervene. Or Europe. It should be the global community as agreed by the UN (particularly the Security Council). %at would give it a sem-blance of legality, but if we just go by

24

Education and the InternetThese countries have a very high percentage of young adults of university age in school. The majority of people protesting are young adults, frustrated by the lack of job options after graduat-ing university. The Internet is a viable way to spread informa-tion, especially by young, educated people.


Theme

ourselves to intervene, I don’t think that would be legal under international law. JK: So why are we pushing for a no-

-ests besides humanitarian interests in Libya?WN: Libya is a very rich country in terms of oil, and some people want ac-cess to that oil. Italy and the Europeans have that, but that does not mean we

will not become interested in that oil- [we as in] American companies.

JK: Was there any country that

Or is it too early to tell?WN: I think it’s too early to tell, and also when we say bene#ts what do we mean, are we talking about politi-cal bene#t, strategic bene#t, what are we talking about. It is very di'cult,

because these are unfolding events. Now, if Qadda# is overthrown, maybe that will be a bene#t in and of itself to some people. But suppose he clings onto power, and is not overthrown, what happens? What is our relation-ship going to be in the future with that country? I don’t think we should be guided by the principles that we don’t want him and therefore we should intervene- there should be much more

than that, in terms of what our strate-gic interests in the area are. JK: African Union if he goes, or does he have

WN: Well, I would be surprised if many African countries would support the overthrow of Qadda#, or even a no-&ight zone imposed, because Qadda# is a member of the African Union, an active member, and the African union is op-posed to foreign countries intervening and changing governments in Africa. If they go to Libya, where else will they go? Many of the African countries would rather have

immediate settlement in the area. As you and I are talking, there are e$orts in the African Union right now to try and medi-ate what is happening to try to bring peace to the area. We just had many more people killed in the Sudan, in Darfur- we did not enforce a no-&ight zone there. A lot of people have been killed in the Congo, and although the UN is there, not much is hap-pening, there has not been a major posture to intervene in Darfur.

JK: What effect will these revolutions have on the world’s oil supply?WN: Saudi Arabia has said that it will

increase the production of oil to o$set the loss of the oil from Libya. Nigeria and other countries have said they are willing to step up their supply- good for them economically. But one just won-ders if there was really no oil, if there was nothing, whether the international community would have been so moved to try and intervene and argue for the overthrow of Libya. It’s suspicious. But I have not talked to any of these people, to the people in the U.S. government, so there is no de#nitive answer. I can merely speculate as to why some coun-tries would want to intervene.

Crisis in Egpt, Tunisia & Yemen BuzzGraph of leading keywords

sourcce:sysomos.com

25

Tweets rose dramatically during the period of most intense protest in these countries, which shows how important and effective social media was when spreading and organizing the spirit of unrest.


Sungtae Park: What are the un-derlying causes, conditions of the unrest in the region? Are they all different?Professor Shai Feldman: %e deeper, structural causes are at least three. You have one very authoritarian regime. You have huge corruption. You have huge economic disparities even in countries that experienced recently rapid economic growth. %e fruits of the economic growth were not distrib-uted fairly. %e most went to a very thin stratum. %en, you have the com-plete ine'ciency and dis-functionality of the government. Finally, you have the demography, which is very young population that is getting into the workforce without su'cient employ-ment opportunities. So the huge dis-

content in the middle class. And that’s common to a number of di$erent Arab countries. None of this explains, by the way, why this happened now. No one predicted that this would happen now. Beyond these three or four main, basic reasons, there are huge di$erences between every country. In Bahrain, you have the whole issue of the Sunni-Shia divide. Even with respect to these days, when we see the beginning of some protest in Saudi Arabia. To some extent, it’s taking place in the Eastern provinces and is also connected to the Sunni-Shia divide. In Jordan, all these socio-economic issues intersect with the issue of the Palestinians. So, yes, there are some basic, common issues in the Arab world but there are also big di$erences. Again, no one actually

saw all this coming. So that leaves a di$erent question. Why did it happen now?

SP: What can the outsiders do about the unrest in the region?SF: One thing I’m going to stay away from is giving advice to the U.S. government. What we need to take account is that these are revolutions or protests that are run by the people themselves. Whether it’s the U.S. or anybody else. I don’t think there’s much that outsiders can do. Now, if you have situations like in Libya, which is di$erent from all the other situations because there, the situation has deteriorated to a civil war. %e outsiders can a$ect it because what you see is the use of airplanes, artillery,

by Sungtae Park

Judy and Sidney Swartz Director’s Chair of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies and Professor of Politics

Interview with Professor Shai Feldman

Theme

26


tank forces, and so on. To the extent to which the use of these weapons will be constrained by outsiders, they can in&uence the situation. %ey can in&u-ence the balance of power between the pro-Gadda# and anti-Gadda# forces. Whether they should do that or not is a value judgment. But we can at least say that in contrast to the situation in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and other places, where this was primarily a protest movement and a confrontation between a protest movement and the regime, where I don’t think outsiders could a$ect it much. %ey could a$ect

one aspect of it, which is the reaction of the military, to the extent to which other militaries have relationship with, for example, the Egyptian military. %ey could probably somewhat a$ect the reaction of the Egyptian military and the decision not to confront and not to suppress the protesters. But overall, the impact of outsiders in this situation was very limited. In Libya, now that it has degenerated into a civil war, outsiders, if they are willing to intervene militarily, they can a$ect the outcome of the civil war. But they have to be willing to do that.

SP:

from the unrest?SF: I think that’s a question that is much too early to answer because all of this is still work in progress in almost all these countries. So the issue of who bene#ts and who loses is a question that can only be answered once these developments will begin to stabilize and we know what’s happening. In Egypt, which is the most important, the largest, and the most populous of the Arab countries, one that has set the pace of the Arab world on more than one occasion, we are only in the

Theme

beginning of this process. %e consti-tutional amendments committee has just brought out the amendments that it wants to see. %is will be up for the referendum very soon. %ere will be new parliamentary elections. %ere eventually will be presidential elec-tions. We will have to see the outcomes of all these moves to be able to see what kind of new Egypt will emerge out of that. Even a"er all of that, we will not be able to say anything remotely de#nite as to who bene#ted and who lost in the region. Take Iran for example. If the net result of all of this would be the strengthening of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, does this bene#t Iran? On one side, it supports religiosity. %e religious forces become stronger. But on the other hand, it’s

the religiosity of the rival camp. It’s the Sunnis. In a way, a challenge to the religious leadership of the Shia in Iran. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Sunni religious leader that was in Qatar and now was permitted to come back to Cairo and give a sermon in Tahrir Square. %at’s a big boost for the Sunni camp. It’s just a small example of how di'cult it is at this point and time to say who’s bene#ting and who’s losing and so on. I guess one can say that the only party that you could say in this situation, that is very hard to see how they could lose as the result of all of these is, but not impossible, everything is possible in the Middle East, are the Muslim Brothers. %ey are the best organized to take advantage of the situation, and already it seems like many of

the constraints that they have suf-fered for a number of decades, at least temporarily, have been li"ed. It was inconceivable that al-Qaradawi would be allowed to give sermons in Tahrir Square three months ago. Clearly, they have proven to have organiza-tional capacities better than anyone else except the military in Egypt. One of their members is a member of the constitutional amendment committee. Sympathetic to them, close to them, is the chairman of the committee. At least in the near term, it’s quite clear that the Muslim Brothers have gained from these developments. But that’s in the short term, and nobody can say what’s going to happen in the long term.SP: How will the unrest affect the

In the end, we have to remember that whatever regime change there will be, in any one of these countries, they will have to sell their oil.

““

27


Arica

Africa’s 54th StateThe Future of a Free Southern Sudan

By Jesse!Koklas

Southerners wait to vote on the matter of secession. Photograph: Jenn Warren/USAID Africa Bureau

30


It is…the strength-ening of a distinct African identity- an identity as free as possible from

-ences.

“

“31

Africa


“The independence of south Sudan will force governments to pay

greater attention to the concerns and grievances of marginalised areas. Regions which have had long-standing secessionist threats are likely to receive closer at-tention from African leaders,” Knox Chitiyo, head of the Africa programme at the Royal United Service Institute, has said. When the European powers drew borders in the “scramble for Af-rica” in the 1880’s, ethnic bound-aries of Africa’s inhabitants were disregarded. When independence was won from colonial control, keeping these borders avoided disputes that could easily escalate.

nation to secede post-independence

nation to disregard the African Union’s wish that its countries remain united. Joint British-Egyptian rule of the Sudan ended in 1956. Unrest quickly evolved into full-scale civil war, which resulted in an extremely unstable government and strained relations with its neighbor Chad. Extensive human rights abuses

in Darfur, which has caused 2.7 million people to leave their homes (according to the UN) and more than 200,000 to die in seven years. In January of 2005 a peace deal was signed, followed by the establishment of a power-sharing government in Khartoum, the capital. In October of the same year an autonomous government was formed in the south, run by former rebels. In 2009 the war in Darfur

the leaders of North and South reach the terms of a referendum agreement for secession. In January of 2011 the people of the South voted in favor of full inde-pendence from the North.

toll of over 1.5 million people, the South

own identity when it splits from the North in July. The most immediate issue of the suc-cession is the dispute over the (question-ably) oil-rich border town Abyei. Short-ly after the peace deal in January, from 10 to 36 people were killed in quarrels over grazing rights for cattle- an integral part of the economy there. The two main ethnic groups involved were the Dinka Ngok, who want their city to be south-ern, and the Arab Misseriya who want it to be northern. Abyei will vote in the near future. Doubts have surfaced as to whether it would dare join the South and anger the North. If it does, the North is

over Abyei, the South has much work and developing ahead if it is to be successful. The current transportation infrastructure and the amount of schools and hospitals cannot accommodate its roughly 8 million people. The African Union has called for unity and discouraged secession in the past. However, the secession of South Sudan could very well be considered an effort towards unity in a different sense.

that was always much too diverse to be united, and the strengthening of a distinct African identity- an identity as

-ences. It is foreseeable that North Sudan will identify more strongly with the Arab North, and the South will be a welcomed addition to the character of southern Africa. Although there is clear-ly much work ahead and more violence almost inevitable, the new nation should be seen as a positive step for Africa. It is a symbol of self-determinism, and a breaking free of the limitations of impe-rialist boundaries. Africa’s 54th addition may be its most African yet.

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Africa


As Ivory Coast nears 4 months since the presidential elec-tions, the country has not

moved closer in deciding who the next leader will be. Tensions in Abidjan run high as presidents elect Llaurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara cling on to the title of president. Outtara holds his ground on the basis of a United Nations backed electoral com-mittee recognizing him as the right-ful president. Conversely, Gbagbo, refuses to relinquish power on the claims that there was rigging in the north. As a consequence of the rig-ging, the Constitutional Council of Ivory Coast has over ruled the results coming from the north and has sworn

in Llaurent Gbagbo as the rightful president. The international communi-

isolating Gbagbo, including freezing of foreign assets and a recent ban on cocoa exports (Ivory Coast’s chief export and provider of foreign cur-rency) whilst it has also urged member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take action against him. However, as Gbagbo still maintains strong back-ing from the military and considerable local support, these steps taken by the international community have proven to be futile as he refuses to relinquish power and has in fact moved towards coercing Outtara to recede from his

claims of being president. This dan-gerous stalemate has left Ivory Coast in a situation edging closer towards civil unrest. As per the laws of international sovereignty, it has to be called into question why the UN backed electoral committee had such a heavy say in the domestic affairs of Ivory Coast. More so, as the country’s local authorities have sworn in Gbagbo as president, what right does the UN electoral com-mittee have in recognizing Outtara as the president and thus ignoring the local constituents? The sovereignty of any country lies in its ability to act autonomously without foreign involvement in domestic affairs, and

Failures of International Pressure and Interven-tion Leave Ivory Coast in a State of Anarchy

By Karia Sekumbo

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Africa


the United Nation’s decision to go beyond the boundaries of provid-ing humanitarian and technical assistance has proven to be contra-dictory of its own ideals in respect-ing and recognizing international sovereignty. With the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) showing no intent on following through on their word to use “legiti-mate force” in removing Gbagbo, it is apparent that whatever interna-tional intervention was promised in Ivory Coast has failed to material-ize and has instead left Ivory Coast in a state edging closer and closer

After having seen two attempts by former UN Secretary General;;

South Africa;; Thabo Mbeki fail at mediating the disputes between the two parties;; there are no positive signs for a peaceful resolution and agreement between the two. This

comes after Outtara’s party express-ing a positive attitude towards a power sharing agreement. In any case, allowing any sort of power sharing agreement would set an ominous precedent for future demo-cratic elections in any African state

may contest and pledge a case for power sharing in the event that they do not agree with the outcome of their elections. This, in effect would be counter intuitive for any demo-cratic state in the world. As things currently stand, Outtara is the more isolated party in this circumstance as he is administers his affairs from a hotel in Abidjan heavily guarded by UN troops. On the other hand Gbagbo, stands in a position of more power than Outtara as he still controls most of Ivory Coast’s resources despite a freezing of foreign assets and is most importantly, in control of the army.

Born: 1st January 1949

Political Party: Rally of the Republicans

Religion: Islam

Served as Prime Minister: 7th November 1990 -1993

Alassane Ouattara

Alassane Ouattara

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Therefore, the cleanest resolu-tion from this situation is to allow Gbagbo to serve another term in

option of recognizing Outtara as a subordinate. With interna-tional intervention, Ivory Coast’s sovereignty is put in severe ques-tion. Also, this option must be discarded as it sets an example for the international community which would not be kept in all countries where there are political disputes, particularly in the countries whose political presence on a global scale

Ivory Coast. In addition to this, as long as Gbagbo retains military support, the threat of violence escalat-ing to disproportionate heights always looms. Therefore, on the grounds of respecting international sovereignty and avoiding the risk of civil unrest, casualties, and displacement, it is of paramount

importance that the United Nations and all other interested interna-tional parties including France and Britain withdraw from any political interference in the Ivory Coast as they may provoke a humanitarian crisis amid confrontation with pro Gbagbo forces. With allowing for Outtara to serve under him, Gbagbo would

political factions within the coun-try and at the same time appease himself towards member states of the international community as he takes steps towards working with opposition for the welfare of the people of Ivory Coast. In Outtara’s situation, as he is current cornered into a position whereby he holds no credible authority, serving under Gbagbo would allow him to par-tially administer the policies that he had wanted to, and at the same time regroup his political party to consider their next strategy.

Born: 31st May 1945

Political Party: Ivorian Popular Front

Religion: Roman Catholic

26th October 2010

Llaurent Gbagbo

Llaurent Gbagbo

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The Democratic Republic of Congo is rich in valuable min-erals and natural resources, rare

animal species, and beautiful rainfor-ests. It is poor in every other way: it is one of the most economically stricken and war-torn countries in the world. In 1960, Belgium was no longer able to maintain control of such a vast territory, and the Republic of Congo became independent of imperial rule. The country greeted independence with instability and questionable lead-ership. In 1964 Joseph Mobutu seized power through a coup, and renamed the country Zaire. Due to a lack of foresight and poor decision-making on Mobutu’s part, the economy steadily deteriorated. In 1990, in response to voices of dissatisfaction, Mobutu agreed to lift the ban on multiparty politics and hand over a small portion of his power to a transitional govern-ment. In May of 1997, rebels captured the capital, and named the country the Democratic Republic of Congo once more. Laurent Kabila is made presi-dent. Turmoil continued. In August of 1998 rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rose up against Kabila, and Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia sent troops to help repel them. The rebels took control of much of the east, and

continued until 2003. In May of 2005 a new constitution was adopted by parliament, but did not signify hope or a new era for the DRC;; violence remains an active part of life today. In fact, that very year the ICC ac-cused warlord Thomas Lubanga of employing child soldiers. The rape, kidnapping, mutilation, and torture of thousands of women and girls by the Congolese army and foreign militias were almost completely ignored. There is more attention today on these issues today, but these atrocities still occur. This is partly due to the fact that the media is mainly state-run, and those who try to uncover corruption are faced with threats, arrest, and vio-lence. The violence is also extremely

simply too much of it. Each attempt to usurp an oppres-sive government has served only to institute a different oppressor. All use violence, and all seem to have no regard for their people. Again, clashes broke out in August 2008, this time in the east between army troops and reb-els led by Laurent Nkunda. Thousands were forced from their homes. This bout of battles seemed to be a mistake strategically on the part of Nkunda- in-ternational discontent soared because of it, and in 2009 he was arrested by

Rwandan forces (those who were once loyal to him). Solutions to the violence were not near. In May of 2009 Kabila approved a law that gives amnesty to armed

-ing in east, yet all it seemed to do

continue. From June to August of the same year, an operation was launched against Ugandan rebels that forced

Now, President Kabila is pressuring the UN to leave the country before elections in 2011. It seems unlikely that the UN will leave now, though, after a peacekeeping effort of eleven years. A New York Times article aptly described the situation: “nowhere else in the world has the United Nations invested so much and accomplished so little.” It appears clear to all except the UN that its peacekeeping there is futile. The devastation brought on by the turbulence of the past few decades is extensive. But is there truly no hope? It sure seems that way. The army is corrupt, promoting violence

poaching, according to the UN. The leadership has failed countless times to improve life for its people. Rebels roam the country. There has been much attention on

Democratic Republic of Congo: Is There Any Hope?

By Jesse Koklas

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Africa


Approxi-mately 45,000 peo-ple have died each month since 2003, when the war ended.

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the “revolutions” in the north of Africa, while relatively little atten-tion is paid to a crisis where approximately 45,000 people have died each month since 2003, when the war ended. But will more interna-tional intervention help? The leaders of the DRC will work to evade international law, which they appear to have no regard for. By re-questing the UN to leave, they have made it clear they want no help. What the international community can do is streamline aid. There is currently around $3 billion in development aid from donor coun-tries- where is the money going? This brings us back to the issue of corruption- present in many African governments. Usually, the affairs of Africa should be for Africa to attend to, and its own people should solve its problems. When an outside country is giving aid, though, the path the aid takes should be monitored. The donor countries of the DRC should make efforts to ensure the money is not used for the personal uses of those with power, but that it actually makes it to the people. The way to help the people is by working to improve their quality of life. Hospitals and schools need to be built. Education empow-ers the people, and provides a way out of poverty. A transformation is necessary from the bottom up;; greater development of education,

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$24 trillion worth of untapped resources. The resources should be used to help the country and the people, not as a source of war. If greater value is placed on the people and on strengthening the unity of the nation, this very long process of improvement can begin.

-tered here at the Don Bosco school compound. Picture Reuters/Finbar o’Reilley

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Directed and represented by the now world-famous Julian As-sange, Wikileaks sprang into

the general American consciousness in the summer of 2010 upon releasing the leaked “Collateral Murder” video that depicts the slaughter of dozens of civilians, including two Reuters journalists, in Iraq. Although the orga-nization has been releasing private and

-ics from Arab assassination schemes, to Peruvian oil scandals, to the Iranian nuclear program, it took the combina-tion of “Collateral Murder” and the publishing of some 250,000 US dip-lomatic documents in November 2010 to spark the international debate about privacy, security, and transparency, that is occurring today. Wikileaks pursues its ends in an overzealous manner, striving to drive governmental transparency to lev-els neither attainable nor functional. Wikileaks’s stated goal is to promote transparent and fair government and business by providing a mechanism for whistleblowers to anonymously submit evidence of oppressive and

corrupt practices around the world. A small, and ironically nameless, team of employees then vets the information submitted by the whistleblowers and presents the revelations in the form of “leaks”, attempting to expose state and corporate secrets while maintaining the anonymity of whistleblowers. The reactions to the leaks have been passionate, both for and against Wikileaks. Human rights and jour-nalism organizations, like Amnesty International and The Economist, have bestowed upon Wikileaks and Mr. As-sange some of their most prestigious awards. On the other hand, Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, threatens to prosecute those who publish American state secrets. He even warns that the United States will work to “close the gaps” prevent-ing the prosecution of foreign nation-als like Mr. Assange. These “gaps” already appear to be closing, as mem-bers of both the Senate and the House of Representatives have proposed amendments to the Espionage Act that would make publishing the names of US informants a violation an act of

espionage. The current and future effects of Wikileaks on international affairs are both wide-ranging and uncertain. The organization has uncovered corruption in many parts of the world, catalyzing change and transparency. It sends a powerful message to potential wrong-doers: the world is changing, and with new forms of communication, legal and moral transgressions are more likely to be uncovered. More disturb-ingly, Wikileaks has also revealed the identities of many US informants in Afghanistan, putting the lives of inno-cent people at the mercy of a Taliban that is just as able to read the leaks as any Western citizen. While it is still unclear if any lives have been lost due to this, the possibility is real. Addition-ally, Wikileaks has made public hun-dreds of thousands of US diplomatic cables revealing a wide array of pri-vate correspondences. These include

-tions of foreign leaders, and sensitive diplomatic communications within the US government and with other entities that were not intended for

Julian AssangeBy Sam Datlof

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public scrutiny. At the very least, it is likely that these revelations will have a chilling effect on diplomatic relations across the globe;; if actors realize that

kept, they will be less likely to engage in any delicate or private activity, be it illicit or legitimate. But what motivates the actions of Mr. Assange? What are his goals and what is his end-game? Some insight can be gleaned from two essays published by Mr. Assange himself in 2006: State and Terrorist Conspira-cies, and Conspiracy as Governance.

corporations as “conspiracies”, or organizations that makes “secret plans jointly to commit a harmful act”. He then goes on to describe conspiracies as decentralized groups that rely on communication to achieve their devi-ous ends. The traditional means of destroying a conspiracy is to destroy the most central or active members who communicate with the most other members of the conspiracy or are the most fundamental parts of the plot, either through assassination, incarcera-tion, or any other means. According to Mr. Assange, this “traditional” attack on conspiracy may not be the most effective strategy in the age of modern communication. Wikileaks is based on the theory that instead of attacking individual members of a conspiracy, it is possible to attack the group as a whole, by inhibiting their ability and willingness to conspire. Releasing

-ments, corporations and individuals destroys the perception of secrecy that these actors once had. The logical ex-

tension of this involuntary increase in transparency is a disincentive against morally bankrupt acts.

There are many problems, both practical and theoretical, with Mr. Assange’s theory. First

and foremost, a perfectly transparent government cannot function. While increased transparency in government is a laudable goal, especially given recent revelations of human rights abuses on American soil as well as abroad, the standard of transparency Wikileaks forces upon governments is unattainable. A certain level of pri-vacy is essential in governance. Frank and honest assessments of foreign leaders need to be made so that dip-lomats can most effectively conduct business with them. Military and in-

will not be published on the Internet. Leaders willing to make concessions for the greater good but who cannot lose face need to keep facets of agree-ments hidden. The fact of the matter is, a perfectly transparent government would destroy any country’s ability to defend itself. Without the capac-ity to protect intelligence sources, negotiating instructions, the identities of under-cover operatives, military ca-pabilities, and unpopular but necessary diplomatic agreements, a country’s ability to conduct both diplomacy and war would be irreparably undermined. Assange’s model leaves no room for moral, law-respecting, legitimate governments. Instead of focusing his attack on solely the corrupt practices of governments, as was generally

practiced by Wikileaks until 2010, with the massive leak of US diplo-matic cables they elected to instead throw sand in the cogs of the entire US government, complicated both legiti-mate and illegitimate action. Instead of putting and end to “lying, corrupt and murderous leadership from Bahrain to Brazil”, as he claims is his goal, he vastly complicates the legitimate tasks of governments to form trade agree-ments, come to diplomatic solutions to international problems, protect their informants helping protect innocent lives in Afghanistan and Iraq, and any number of other governmental tasks that require even a grain of tact or secrecy. Somehow, in the crusade against conspiracy, Assange forgets the most

the enemy: harmful. Secrets shared among a group of actors do not inher-ently constitute conspiracies, and therefore do not merit destruction. Mr. Assange’s concern is a legitimate one: that governments have too much free reign, that they use wars as an excuse for secrecy, and that trust in the United States, the supposed beacon of de-mocracy, has been betrayed from Abu Ghraib to Guantanamo. Wikileaks and other similar technologies have the potential to be powerful forces for good, for more transparent govern-ment, and for accountability both in government and in the corporate world, but they need to learn to target their actions against those deserving of exposure. Eliminating corruption is a worthy goal;; to attempt to eliminate secrecy altogether, however, would be misguided.

Feature

The world is changing, and with new forms of communication, legal and moral transgressions are more likely to be uncovered.

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