American Academy of Religion

Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method by Charles HartshorneReview by: Donald W. SherburneJournal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 43, No. 2, Book Review Supplement (Jun.,1975), pp. 388-390Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1461249 .

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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION

historical meaning" (p. 52). Collins admits there is no privileged method of historical questioning, yet says a method is to be tested by its contribution to the growth of historical understanding (p. 101), as though there were a consensus on this matter. The divergences among philosophers as to what constitutes understanding are too glaring to require comment. In fact Collins says there is no test for including or excluding any way of treating the sourcs (p. 208). But he goes on to say that treatment of a source in terms of a current question is to be deprecated if it results "in inhibiting our appreciation of many aspects of the source" (p. 208), and that theorizings about a matter without historical references are impoverished. The study of a philosophy "in the historical sprit and not as a collage of abstract theses" (p. 355) can be pursued according to Collins by four methods: 1) editing and translating texts, 2) using biographical materials for their contribution to an understanding of a philosopher's problems, 3) making a developmental investigation for its transformation of our understanding of the work as a whole, 4) synthesis of resultant materials with the systemic aspects of a philosophy.

This book can be viewed as a polemic in support of using historical sources to grasp a philosopher's "whole authorship" (p. 149). There can be no quarrel with a preference to use them in this fashion. But if one cites as a deficiency the "isolation of a particular text so that it receives no modifications from its context" (p. 324), some specification of the deficiency is called for. And some justification is required for the claim that a problem-oriented study cannot do full justice to a source unless one "shifts the perspective and treats some other problem as pivotal" (p. 180, italics mine). Suppose one prefers to consider a position p rather than some other position q resulting from the modifications imposed by p's context. Suppose one's concern is with the truth- value of p. Collins needs to meet in a detailed way the position Russell expressed in The Philosophy of Leibniz that "a purely philosophical attitude towards previous philosophers . . . without regard to dates or influences" (pp. v-vi) views a thinker as "the advocate of what he holds to be a body of philosophic truth. By what process of development he came to this opinion, though in itself an important and interesting question, is logically irrelevant to the inquiry how far he opinion itself is correct" (p. vi). Not only is there in Collins' book no consideration of Russell's claim to the value of isolating a specific opinion for investigation (as against casting light on "the problem of man" or "the meaning of humanity"); there is no single reference to G. E. Moore's extensive and acute analytic work of pursuing such a program. One of the analysts chosen for discussion is Wittgenstein. Thanks to the concern for placing him historically in relation to Schopenhauer and Kant, the thesis which sets him off from these philosophers and from Moore and Russell is completely ignored: this is that the aim of philosophy is not truth but a clarity in which a problem "completely disappears."

Smith College ALICE AMBROSE LAZEROWITZ

Creative Sinthesis and Philosophic Method. By CHARLES HARTSHORNE. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1970. xxi+337 pages. $10.00; $3.95.

The back fly-leaf of this book describes Charles Hartshorne as "the boldest and most vigorous spokesman for natural theology in America today" and America's most distinguished philosopher of religion"; the front fly-leaf describes him as "one of the greatest living philosophers" and "the foremost living advocate of 'process philosoph.i.' " It is not my purpose to quibble with these evaluations, undoubtedly the

historical meaning" (p. 52). Collins admits there is no privileged method of historical questioning, yet says a method is to be tested by its contribution to the growth of historical understanding (p. 101), as though there were a consensus on this matter. The divergences among philosophers as to what constitutes understanding are too glaring to require comment. In fact Collins says there is no test for including or excluding any way of treating the sourcs (p. 208). But he goes on to say that treatment of a source in terms of a current question is to be deprecated if it results "in inhibiting our appreciation of many aspects of the source" (p. 208), and that theorizings about a matter without historical references are impoverished. The study of a philosophy "in the historical sprit and not as a collage of abstract theses" (p. 355) can be pursued according to Collins by four methods: 1) editing and translating texts, 2) using biographical materials for their contribution to an understanding of a philosopher's problems, 3) making a developmental investigation for its transformation of our understanding of the work as a whole, 4) synthesis of resultant materials with the systemic aspects of a philosophy.

This book can be viewed as a polemic in support of using historical sources to grasp a philosopher's "whole authorship" (p. 149). There can be no quarrel with a preference to use them in this fashion. But if one cites as a deficiency the "isolation of a particular text so that it receives no modifications from its context" (p. 324), some specification of the deficiency is called for. And some justification is required for the claim that a problem-oriented study cannot do full justice to a source unless one "shifts the perspective and treats some other problem as pivotal" (p. 180, italics mine). Suppose one prefers to consider a position p rather than some other position q resulting from the modifications imposed by p's context. Suppose one's concern is with the truth- value of p. Collins needs to meet in a detailed way the position Russell expressed in The Philosophy of Leibniz that "a purely philosophical attitude towards previous philosophers . . . without regard to dates or influences" (pp. v-vi) views a thinker as "the advocate of what he holds to be a body of philosophic truth. By what process of development he came to this opinion, though in itself an important and interesting question, is logically irrelevant to the inquiry how far he opinion itself is correct" (p. vi). Not only is there in Collins' book no consideration of Russell's claim to the value of isolating a specific opinion for investigation (as against casting light on "the problem of man" or "the meaning of humanity"); there is no single reference to G. E. Moore's extensive and acute analytic work of pursuing such a program. One of the analysts chosen for discussion is Wittgenstein. Thanks to the concern for placing him historically in relation to Schopenhauer and Kant, the thesis which sets him off from these philosophers and from Moore and Russell is completely ignored: this is that the aim of philosophy is not truth but a clarity in which a problem "completely disappears."

Smith College ALICE AMBROSE LAZEROWITZ

Creative Sinthesis and Philosophic Method. By CHARLES HARTSHORNE. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1970. xxi+337 pages. $10.00; $3.95.

The back fly-leaf of this book describes Charles Hartshorne as "the boldest and most vigorous spokesman for natural theology in America today" and America's most distinguished philosopher of religion"; the front fly-leaf describes him as "one of the greatest living philosophers" and "the foremost living advocate of 'process philosoph.i.' " It is not my purpose to quibble with these evaluations, undoubtedly the

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REVIEWS

work of Open Court's ebullient editor, Eugene Freeman, co-editor of the Hartshorne Festschrift Process and Divinity and one of the most dedicated of Hartshorne's admirers. Rather, I wish to point out to the readers of this journal that though their interest in Hartshorne may be primarily in Hartshorne the theologian, in this volume, perhaps more clearly than in any other of Hartshorne's major writings, it becomes clear just how completely Hartshorne the theologian is dependent upon, nay, even identical with, Hartshorne the philosopher. To truly know and understand Hartshorne the theologian as praised on the back fly-leaf, one must know and understand Hartshorne the philosopher as praised on the front fly-leaf. Since the front fly-leaf is promoting the book we are here discussing, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, I strongly recommend this book to all readers of this journal who have any interest whatsoever in Hartshorne's theological writings.

Since Hartshorne holds that '"neo-classical metaphysics', when its ideas are adequately explicated, is neo-classical natural theology, and vice versa" (p. 40) and makes other statements such as "the idea of God contains implicitly the entire context of metaphysics," one might ask how this book could possibly add anything to what Hartshorne has already said qua theologian in such other books as The Divine Relativity (1948) or Anselm's Discovery (1965). As Aristotle would have said, in a sense the book does make such an addition and in a sense it does not - the key philosophical concepts and commitments of Charles Hartshorne are certainly present in the earlier books, but the present work draws out the philosophical argumentation that is Hartshorne's forte in much greater detail as he recurs again and again to such philosophical themes as indeterminacy, psychicalism, the a priori, eternal objects, perishing and the status of the past, causation, abstract/concrete, internal/external relations, etc., and inevitably brings his conclusions back to bear on his dipolar theism.

Not the least of Hartshorne's attractions as a philosopher is his charming, almost child-like, openness, sincerity, and frankness. These characteristics appear in the present book in many passages evaluating the character and quality of the work of other contemporary philosophers. What in the hands of another could degenerate into mere gossip or petty back-biting emerges in Hartshorne as revealing and helpful orientation in the confused jungle of modern methodologies. I will reproduce one schematism offered by Hartshorne in this context of evaluating other philosophers because it will permit me very succinctly to point out the character of Hartshorne's most valuable contribution to philosophy, as well as to make what I consider a very serious criticism of his work.

On p. 41 Hartshorne states that "A metaphysician can be evaluated: 1. for his originality; 2. his clarity; 3. his coherence and integration; 4. his comprehensiveness and balance; 5. his ability to grasp diverse possible or historical perspectives on problems; 6. his ability to defend his view against others without making the task easy by presenting competing doctrines in less than their strongest form and without committing fallacies; 7. his readability." Hartshorne opines that Peirce and Whitehead rate well across the board, with the former being weakest perhaps in 3 and the latter in 6; Alexander is viewed as strong in 1-3 and 7; Paul Weiss (to whom the book is dedicated) is held to be very strong in 1, 4 and 7, but lacking somewhat in 2, 3 and 6; Brand Blanshard is ranked very high in 2 and 7 but judged weakest in 1 and 4; and so on. Hartshorne invites his readers to judge his book by "some such criteria" and in accepting this invitation I offer my final remarks.

As already noted, Hartshorne suggests that Whitehead may be weakest in 6. I agree. Hartshorne, on the other hand, is strongest right here in 6 where Whitehead is weakest. Hartshorne's genius is his argumentation, his dialectical skill. In this age when

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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION

"analysis" dominates philosophy we have spawned an even larger crop than usual of "hagglers," and the importance of Hartshorne is that he can "haggle" with the best. Hartshorne, much more aggressively and dramatically than Whitehead, puts process thought into dialogue with other traditions (and this is especially true in connection with theology, where Hartshorne's criticisms of classical theology and his presentation and defense of his neo-classical alternative are brilliant). Re 1, Hartshorne is quick to admit how much he owes to Whitehead, Peirce, Fechner, Buddhism, etc., but in spite of the truth of these admissions Hartshorne is still a creative, original man; his originality, again, lies in his genius for finding new, unexpected and arresting arguments for a vision that may often be shared with others but is rarely argued for with such consummate dialectical skill. Hartshorne is also strong in 2 and 3 - though he sometimes cries a bit and wrings his hands because he feels he does not know enough technical logic, his logical acumen is nevertheless intimidating and results in tight, coherent argumentation which, however, never jeopardizes readability (7). But to come back to 6, it would not be fair to Hartshorne's accomplishments to simply say he plays Boswell to Whitehead's Johnson, but it might be fair to say that in doing 6 superbly Hartshorne stands to Whitehead rather as T. H. Huxley stands to Darwin- a great defender and popularizer who also has added very real contributions of his own.

My one serious criticism of Hartshorne centers on 4, comprehensiveness and balance. I could quibble with him about his treatment of "perishing," or his criticism of eternal objects, etc., but far more fundamental is my unhappiness with his desire to equate metaphysics with "the study which evaluates a priori statements about existence" (p. 19; cf. pp. 132 and 162). Because he accepts that equation, Hartshorne distinguishes metaphysics from cosmology, which is "the application of metaphysical principles to what science reveals as the structure of our 'cosmic epoch'" (p. 54). Hartshorne opines that "Certainly someone ought to correlate metaphysics and physics" (p. 53), but to leave this job to the cosmologist as a specialist quite distinct from the metaphysician seems to me to create a hopeless bifurcation in the one discipline Whitehead referred to as "speculative philosophy," a discipline which has "its rational side and its empirical side" (cf. Process and Reality, Part I, Chapter I, Section I). As Whitehead there observes, "the two sides are bound together," and they are bound together because the categories constituting the philosophical scheme are not arrived at a priori, but rather are coaxed out of immediate experience by the method of imaginative rationalization, and are then tested by being "confronted with circumstances to which [they] should apply" (ibid., Section III). It is this double movement I miss in Hartshorne and this is no minor loss, for it in in this movement that mere technical philosophy, brilliant though it may be, passes over into wisdom. "The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought," claimed Whitehead (ibid., Section II) and since the road back home to experience can be long and tortuous, the truly great philosopher posseses not just the logical acumen and argumentative skill of a Hartshorne, but in addition the persistent homing instinct for experience of an Aristotle, a Hegel, a Heidegger, or a Whitehead.

Vanderbilt University DONALD W. SHERBURNE

Neoplatonism (Classical Life and Letters Series). By R. T. WALLIS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972. xii+212 pages. $10.00. L.C. No. 70-39183.

Neoplatonism has been the victim, through the centuries, of the loss of too many of

"analysis" dominates philosophy we have spawned an even larger crop than usual of "hagglers," and the importance of Hartshorne is that he can "haggle" with the best. Hartshorne, much more aggressively and dramatically than Whitehead, puts process thought into dialogue with other traditions (and this is especially true in connection with theology, where Hartshorne's criticisms of classical theology and his presentation and defense of his neo-classical alternative are brilliant). Re 1, Hartshorne is quick to admit how much he owes to Whitehead, Peirce, Fechner, Buddhism, etc., but in spite of the truth of these admissions Hartshorne is still a creative, original man; his originality, again, lies in his genius for finding new, unexpected and arresting arguments for a vision that may often be shared with others but is rarely argued for with such consummate dialectical skill. Hartshorne is also strong in 2 and 3 - though he sometimes cries a bit and wrings his hands because he feels he does not know enough technical logic, his logical acumen is nevertheless intimidating and results in tight, coherent argumentation which, however, never jeopardizes readability (7). But to come back to 6, it would not be fair to Hartshorne's accomplishments to simply say he plays Boswell to Whitehead's Johnson, but it might be fair to say that in doing 6 superbly Hartshorne stands to Whitehead rather as T. H. Huxley stands to Darwin- a great defender and popularizer who also has added very real contributions of his own.

My one serious criticism of Hartshorne centers on 4, comprehensiveness and balance. I could quibble with him about his treatment of "perishing," or his criticism of eternal objects, etc., but far more fundamental is my unhappiness with his desire to equate metaphysics with "the study which evaluates a priori statements about existence" (p. 19; cf. pp. 132 and 162). Because he accepts that equation, Hartshorne distinguishes metaphysics from cosmology, which is "the application of metaphysical principles to what science reveals as the structure of our 'cosmic epoch'" (p. 54). Hartshorne opines that "Certainly someone ought to correlate metaphysics and physics" (p. 53), but to leave this job to the cosmologist as a specialist quite distinct from the metaphysician seems to me to create a hopeless bifurcation in the one discipline Whitehead referred to as "speculative philosophy," a discipline which has "its rational side and its empirical side" (cf. Process and Reality, Part I, Chapter I, Section I). As Whitehead there observes, "the two sides are bound together," and they are bound together because the categories constituting the philosophical scheme are not arrived at a priori, but rather are coaxed out of immediate experience by the method of imaginative rationalization, and are then tested by being "confronted with circumstances to which [they] should apply" (ibid., Section III). It is this double movement I miss in Hartshorne and this is no minor loss, for it in in this movement that mere technical philosophy, brilliant though it may be, passes over into wisdom. "The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought," claimed Whitehead (ibid., Section II) and since the road back home to experience can be long and tortuous, the truly great philosopher posseses not just the logical acumen and argumentative skill of a Hartshorne, but in addition the persistent homing instinct for experience of an Aristotle, a Hegel, a Heidegger, or a Whitehead.

Vanderbilt University DONALD W. SHERBURNE

Neoplatonism (Classical Life and Letters Series). By R. T. WALLIS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972. xii+212 pages. $10.00. L.C. No. 70-39183.

Neoplatonism has been the victim, through the centuries, of the loss of too many of

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