'PATAPHYSICS: THE POETICS OF AN IMAGINARY SCIENCE

CHRISTIAN BOK

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Graduate Programme in English York University

North Y o r k , Ontario

December 1 9 9 7

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PATAPHYS ICS : THE FOETICS OF AN I M A G I N A R Y SCIENCE

by C H R I S T I A N BOK

a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fulfillrnent of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

O 1998 Permission has been granted to the LlBRARY OF YORK C;NIVERSITY to lend or seIl copies of this dissertation, to the NATIONAL L18RARY OF CANADA to microfilm this dissertation and to lend or sel1 copies of the film. and to UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this dissertation. The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the dissertation nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or othenivise reproduced without the author's written permission.

ABSTRACT

'Pata~hssics: The Poetics of an Imaainarv Science is a

survey that attempts to describe a hypothetic philosophp-

the avant-garde pseudo-science imagined by Alfred Jarry.

'Pataphysics is a supplement to metaphysics, accenting it,

then replacing it, in order to create a philosophic

alternative, whose discipline can study cases, not of

conception, but of exception: variance (anomalos), alliance

(syzuaia), and deviance (clinamen). 'Pataphysics

synthesizes the romantic schism between a literal,

scientized discourse and a figural, poeticized discourse,

and my thesis suggests that this revision of the signifier

"science" by 'pataphysics is symptomatic of a postrnodern

transition in science from a paradigm of absolutism to a

paralogy of relativism. Structured as a descriptive

explication, which emphasizes a theoretical perspective,

this survey is divided into five chapters: the first

chapter recounts the history of the conflict between science

and poetry (in order to contextualize 'pataphysics within

the metaphysical philosophies of the past); the second

chapter examines the avant-garde pseudo-science of

'pataphysics itself (in order to contextualize 'pataphysics

within the anti-metaphysical meta-philosophies of the

present); and finally, the last three chapters discuss the

influence of 'pataphysics upon the poetics of its subsequent

successors (first, the Italian Futurists; second, the French

Oulipians; and third, the Canadian "Pataphysicians). While

mg thesis focuses upon theories of textual poetics rather

than poetry itself (relyLng upon the kind o f Nietzschean

sophistries that have come to characterize postmodern

p h i l o s o p h y ) , my thesis does nevertheless trive to be as conceptually encyclopedic as 'pataphysics itself: instead

of normalizing 'pataphysics within one theoretical

perspective, this survey alludes intermittently to

'pataphysical enterprises that constitute exceptions to such

a genealogy of Jarryites. What is at stake is the status of

poetry in a world of science. How might poetry reclaim its

own viable truth? How might science benefit from its own

poetic irony? For the postmodern condition, such questions

have already opened up a novel space f o r speculative

imagination; hence, this survey presents itself as a kind of

primer for a future of possible reseerch.

PREFACE

T h e Museum of J u r a s s i c T e c h n o l o ~ s i n Los A n g e l e s is a

s t r a n g e g a l l e r y , where i n c r e d i b l e v e r i t i e s i n t e g r a t e s o

p e r f e c t l y w i t h b e l i e v a b l e u n t r u t h s t h a t a v i s i t o r m a s n o t

d e t e c t t h e p e c u l i a r s l i p p a g e f rom f a c t t o hoax. W i l s o n , t h e

c u r a t o r , h a s r e b u i l t t h e Wunderkammern of m e d i e v a l a r c h i v e s ,

p r e s e n t i n g c a b i n e t s and v i t r i n e s , f u l l of b i z a r r e c u r i o s a - -

s p e c i m e n s : n o t o n l y of M s o t i s l u c i f u a u s (a b a t whose s o n a r -

s y s t e m c a n be modulated t o create a p e r t u r e s t h r o u g h

s u b s t a n t i v e b a r r i e r s ) , but o f Meaaloponera f o e t e n s (an a n t

whose ne rve - sys tem c a n be c o n t r o l l e d by f u n g a l parasites f o r

r e p l i c a t i v e p u r p o s e s ) . W i l s o n does n o t s i m p l y r e p e a t t h e

grotesque s p e c t a c l e of R i p l e y , s i n c e t h e museum d o e s n o t

p r e s e n t t h e t r u t h of the a b s u r d w i t h t h e command: b e l i e v e

it o r n o t ! - - i n s t e a d , t h e museum p r e s e n t s t h e t r u t h as i t s e l f

a b s u r d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n : w h a t is it t o b e l i e v e o r not?

Wesch le r o b s e r v e s t h a t "Wi l son h a s [ . . . ] p i t c h e d h i s

museum a t t h e very i n t e r s e c t i o n o f t h e premodern and t h e

pos tmodern" ( g o ) , i n s e r t i n g t h e v i s i t o r i n t o t h e i n t e r s t i c e be tween wondering-at a n d wondering-whetherl--a gap into

which t h i s s u r v e y w i s h e s t o i n s e r t i ts own r e a d e r . What

W i l s o n c a l l s " J u r a s s i c t echno logy ," w e might cal1 " J a r r y i t e

' p a t a p h y s i c s W - - a science of imaginary s o l u t i o n s , i n which

the c r i t i c wishes not o n l y t o study, but also t o e v o k e ,

cases of exceptional singularity. Like Jarry (who wilfully

occupies an ambiguous interzone between ratiocination and

hallucination), Wilson hopes to imbricate the technical

truth of modern science with the medieval magic of poetic

wisdom. This survey, likewise, strives to indulge in s u c h a

figura1 project, since it too proposes the potential existence of a, heretofore chimerical, science.

'Pataphysics represents a supplement to metaphysics,

accenting it, then replacing it, in order to create a

philosophic alternative to rationalism. What Wilson has

performed, Jarry has predicted: the disappearance of

scientificity itself when reason is pushed to its own

logical extreme. Such a 'pataphysical qualification of

rational validity is symptomatic of a postmodern transition

in science frorn absolutism to relativism, When even time

itself fades away into spectacular uncertainty, the very

idea that an historical technology might be called

"jurassic" no longer seems wholly absurd (since w e can now

imagine a futuristic apocalypse, in which cloning might

allow a human tu coexist with a resurrected tyrannosaur--

j u s t as cinema has cloned the image of an actual thespian

and spliced it with the image of an unreal sauropod). 2

'Pataphysics is speculative, waiting for its chance to

happen, as if by accident, in a themepark of scientific

viii

conception. Like the museum of Wilson, this thesis on Jarry

attempts to scramble the jurassic sequence of history so that what is extinct in the past can be called forth again

out of its context into the present where the idea of the

past itself can in t u r n be made e ~ t i n c t . ~ For 'pataphysics,

any science sufficiently retarded in progress must seem

magical (but only after the fact), just as any science sufficiently advanced in progress must seem magical (but

only before the fact)--and if 'pataphysics is itself

thaumaturgic, it is so, not because of any ironic nostalgia

for a prehistoric past, but only because of its oneiric

prognosis for an ahistoric future. We see science itself

vanish before the zero-degree of its own anti-science.

Structured as a descriptive explication, which

emphasizes a theoretical perspective, this survey argues

that Jarry has provided an often neglected, but still

important, influence upon the poetic legacy of this century

(particularly the Italian Futurists, the French Oulipians,

and the Canadian "Pataphysicians ) . Wbile my thes is focuses

upon theories of textual poetics rather than poetry itself

(relying upon the kind of Nietzschean sophistries that have

corne to characterize the work of such French rebels as

Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Serres, et al.), my thesis

does nevertheless strive to be as conceptually encyclopedic

as 'pataphysics itself: instead of normalizing 'pataphysics

within one thecretical perspective, this survey alludes

intermittently to 'pataphysical enterprises that constitute

exceptions to such a genealogy of Jarryites.

Recounting the transition from 'pataphysics to

"pataphysics (from the single apostrophe of France to the

double apostrophe of Canada), this survey reflects the

influence of Jarry upon my own poetic career (in particular:

my 'pataphysical encyclopedia, ~r~stalloara~hu). Inspired

by the etymology of the word "crystallography," such a work

represents an act of lucid writinq, which uses the language

of geological science to misread the poetics of rhetorical

language. Such lucid writing is not concerned with the

transparent transmission of a message (so that, ironically,

the poetry is often "opaque");' instead, lucid writing is

simply concerned with the exploratory reflexivity of its o w n

pattern (in a manner reminiscent of lucid dreaminq). The

capricious philosophg of 'pataphysics is itself an oneiric

science aware of its own status as a dream.

'Pataphysics reveals that science is not as "lucid" as

once thought, since science must often ignore the arbitrary,

if not whimsical, status of its own axioms. Like the work

of some 'pataphysicians (particularly the Oulipians), who

make a spectacle of such epistemic formality by writing

texts according to an absurd, but strict, rule of machinic

artifice, this survey also expresses its own extreme of

nomic rigor ( in this case, grammatical parallelism ) : each

sentence develops a chiastic symmetry as balanced as the

contrast in physics between meta and pata. The a r b i t r a r y

character of such a constraint does not simply constitute a

stylistic frivolity, but strives 'pataphysically (if not

allegorically) to dramatize a scientific perversion: that

the universe is itself an a r b i t r a r y formality, whose rules

have created a science that can in turn discuss such rules.

'Pataphysics valorizes the exception to each r u l e in

order to subvert the procrustean constraints of science.

While this survey may do little to change the mind of a

customary scientist (who must ignore the 'pataphysical

peculiarity of science itself in order to avoid the c h a r g e

of crackpot delusion), my survey may nevertheless convince

poets to qualify their own ludditic attitude toward science.

Such poets might recognize that, if poetry cannot oppose

science by becoming its antonyrnic extreme, perhaps poetry

can oppose science by becoming its hyperbolic extrerne, using

reason aqainst itself 'pataphysically in order to subvert

not only pedantic theories of noetic truth, but also

romantic theories of poetic genius. Such poets might learn

to embrace the absurd nature of sophistic reasoning in order

to dispute the power of both the real and the true.

Vaneigem, however, warns us that, because of this

sophistry, "Joe Soap intellectuals, [']pataphysicians[ . . . f i -

bandwagon after bandwagon works out its own version of the

credo quia absurdum est: you [do notJ believe in it, but

you do it anyway" (178) so that, as a result, " [ 'plata-

physics[ . . . ] leads us with many a twist and turn to the last graveyards" (126). While such charges of nihilistic

conformism do apply to the work of some 'pataphysicians

(particularly Sandomir and Shattuck), such misgivings do not

take into account that, like Nietzsche, Jarry does

radicalize philosophy, lampooning pedagogic authority, in

order to foment a spirit o f permanent rebellion, be it anti-

bourgeois or anti-philistine.' My thesis argues that this

apparent strategy of "indifference" in 'pataphysics merely

serves to satirize t h e impartiality of sciexe i t s e l f .

'Pataphysics refuses to conform to any academic

standard: hence, this survey cannot demonstrate that it has

learned the lessons of its t o p i c without also negotiating a

virtually untenable ambiguity between the noetic mandate of

scholarship and the poetic license of 'pataphysics itself.

Since no literary history has ever traced in detail the

unorthodox genealogy of this avant-garde pseudo-science, 1

hope that my survey might in effect o f f e r a Wunderkammern of

literary teratism, cataloguing the scientific exceptions to

the given n o m s of poetry in order to create an absurd

museum of " jurassic" machines. J u s t as the anachronism of an iron tool from before the Ice Age might d i s r u p t our sense

of temporal security, so a l s o might such an archive of

anomaly r e c o n t e x t u a l i z e the g iven canon of modern poetry.

Let u s imagine a fu ture for such an impossible philosophy.

x i i i

Notes to Preface

l~eschler observes that , because the M ~ o t i s

lucifuaus is a hoax, while the Meaaloponera foetens is a

fact, "[tlhe Jurassic infects its visitor with doubts--

little curlicues of misgiving--that proceed to infest

all[ . . . ] other dealings with the Culturally Sacrosanct" (40).

2 ~ h e Jurassic Park of Crichton, for example,

dramatizes a 'pataphysical domain, in which a science of

operative risks (chaotic mathematics) indicts a science of

irnperative tasks (genetic engineering) for practising

"thintelligence' ( 2 8 4 ) - - a clever truth with wanton power.

'~urassic technology demolishes the rnernory of the

museum so that the museum can no longer function properly as

a mausoleum for what has otherwise been forgotten: there,

we do n o t remember what e x i s t s in the past so much as

remember that the past itself does not exist.

- ' ~ r ~ s t a l l o ~ r a ~ h y strives to achieve a state of

"birefrigence," offering two perspectives at the same time

from the focal point of a single lens, if not from the acute

angle of a poetic word: in other words, lucid writing does

not transmit so much as diffract a given meaning.

x i v

'vaneigeln must admit that , when active rather than

passive, such nihilism does evoke revolutionary sensi-

bilities: "Nietzsche's[ ...] i r o n y L . 1 , Jarry's Umour[ ...]-- these are some of the impulses[ ...] investing human con- sciousness with[ . . . ]a true reversa1 of perspective" ( 177 ) .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract

Preface

Science and Poetry: The Poetics of the Ur in 'Pataphysics

Millenial 'Pataphysics: The Poetics of an Imaginary Science

Italian Futurism: A 'Pataphysics of Machinic Exception

French Oulipianism: A 'Pataphysics of Mathetic Exception

Canadian " Pataphysics : A 'Pataphysics of Mnemonic Exception

Texts Cited

iv - v

vi - xiv

1

Science and Poetrs: The Differend of the Ur in 'Pata~hvsics

nNon cum vacaveris, ~atavhssicandum est."

(Jarry 1965:39 )

"[TJhe encyclopaedia said: For one of these

pnostics, the visible universe was aQ

i l l u s i o n or (more ~recisels) a sophism." (Borges 1983: 8 )

"The debt that ['Ipataphysics owes to sophism

cannot be overstated." (Bernstein 1994:105)

Quasi-Healities

Borges in T l h , Uqbar , Orbis Tertius imagines an

allegory about the seductions of s imulation. A secret cabal

of rebel artists has conspired to replace the a c t u a l w o r l d ,

piece by piece, with a virtual world, so that the inertia of

a true history vanishes, phase by phase, into the amnesia of

a false memory. The irony is that this conspiracy meets

with no resistance: lq[a]lmost immediately, reality yielded

on more than one account" for "[tlhe t r u t h is that it longed

to yield" (1983:22)--to disappear into its own phantasms.

Al1 things embrace the weirdness of this astonishing event

and ignore the piousness of al1 admonishing truth. The

event foments a revolution in philosophy--a shift away from

the nomic study of what is veritable t o a ludic study of

what is possible, as if "every philosophy is by definition a

dialectical game, a Philosophie des Als Ob" ( 1 4 ) .

Borges imagines a reality where to imagine a reality

can cause a reality t o e x i s t ex nihilo. Each memory of an

object conjures the miracle of an h d n , the replica of a replica; and yet, " [s] tranger and more pure than any h r h

is, at times, the u" (an ectype without prototype), "the

object produced through suggest ion, educed by hope" (1983: 18) .' Like the t ih i s ta s who believe that

"metaphysics is a branch of fantastic literature" ( 1 4 ) , the narrator of this fantasy pretends to believe in such an

imaginary philosophy, quoting fictitious references to it i n

gazettes and treatises. His alternative to metaphysics is

itself an ur because his dream of i t has indeed corne true,

not only in his story but also in our world. We too fulfill

this apocalyptic conspiracy by creating, for ourselves, a

world where fantasy has more reality than reality itself.

Postmodernism in fact defines itself in terms of such a

catastrophe. Philosophy has everywhere begun to threaten

the constraints of both the real and the true in order t o

practice an anti-philosophp-what Jarry might call by the

name of '~ataahssics, the science of imaginary solutions and

arbitrary exceptions ( 1 9 6 5 : 1 9 2 ) . Jarry suggests through 'pataphysics that reality does not exist, except as the

interpretive projection of a phenomenal perspective-which

is to say that reality is never as it is, but is always es

if it is. Reality is quasi, pseudo: it is more virtual

than actual; it is real only to the degree to which i t can

seem to be real and only for so long as it can be made to

stay real. Science for such a reality has increasingly

become what Vaihinger might call a "philosophy of as if"

(xvii), w i l f u l l y mistaking possibilities for veritabilities.

Baudrillard observes that, for the "[']Pataphysics of

the year 2000," history has accelerated past the escape

velocity for reality, moving from the centrifuga1 gravity of

the real into the centripetal celerity of the void

(1994a:l). Events occur in the nullspace of simulation,

where "[al11 metaphysical tension has been disaipated,

yielding- a 'pataphysical ambiancet' (1990: 71 ) . Things succumb to relativity, complexity, and uncertainty, shifting

from an absolute state of determinism to a dissolute field

of indeterminism. The science of 'pataphysics responds to

these sbsurdities with a genre of science fiction that shows

science itself to be a fiction. It nsrrates not what is,

but what miaht have become. It i n h a b i t s t he t e n s e of t he

f u t u r e p e r f e c t , o f the post modo--a paradoxical t e m p o r a l i t y ,

i n which what h a s yet to happen has already t a k e n place.

The U r of S c i e n c e

Jarry claims t h a t ' pa t aphys i c s studies "the universe

supplementary to this one," b u t n o t s i m p l y an adjunct

reality s o much as an e r s a t z r e a l i t y , "a universe which can

bel . . . ] envisaged i n the place o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l one" 1 9 6 5 : 1 3 1 ) S u c h a supplement i s always more s u b s t i t u t i v e t h a n augmentative, r e p l a c i n g r e a l i t y i n s t e a d o f accent i n g

r e a l i t y , and ironically t h e science t h a t studies auch a

supplement i s i t s e l f a supplement. I t is " t h e science of

t h a t which is superinduced upon metaphysicsl' as both an

excess and a r e d r e s s , "extending as far beyond metaphysics

as the latter e x t e n d s beyond physics" ( 131 ) . A n a u x i l i a r y

substitute that compensates for a lack i n philosophy even as

it impregnates the form of philosophy, such a science

simulates knowledge , p e r p e t r a t i n g a hoax, really and truly ,

b u t only t o r e v e a l t h e hoax of bo th t h e real and the t r u e .

Jarry performs humorously on behalf of l i t e r a t u r e what

Nietzsche performs seriously on behalf of philosophy. Both

t h i n k e r s in effect attempt to dream up a gay s c i e n c e , whose

5

joie d e v ivre thrives wherever the tyranny of truth has

increased our esteem for the lie and wherever the tyranny of

reason has increased our esteem for the mad. Both thinkers

lay the groundwork f o r an anti-philosophy, whose spirit of

ref orm bas corne to characterize such alternatives to

metaphysics as the grammatology of Derrida, the

schizanalysis of Deleuze, or the homeorrhetics of Serres.

Al1 such anti-metaphysical meta-philosophies argue that

anomalies extrinsic to a system remain secretly i n t r i n s i c to

such a system. The most credible of truths always e v o l v e s

rom the most incredible of errors. The praxis o f science

always involves the parspraxis of p o e t r y .

'Pataphysics, " t h e science of the particular" (131),

does not, therefore, study the rules governing the general

recurrence o f a periodic incident ( t h e ex~ected case) so much as study the garnes governing the special occurrence of

a sporadic accident (the excepted case). 'Pataphysics not

only studies exception, but has itself become an exception--

dismissed and neglected despite its influence and relevance .

Jarry has not only inspired t h e a b s u r d i t y o f nearly every

modern avant-garde, but has also p r e d i c t e d the absurdity of

nearly al1 modern techno-science. No history, however, has

ever traced in detail this unorthodox genealogy, even though

contemporary philosophy has begun to shift its emphasis from

6

the metaphysical to the anti-metaphysical-a trend that only

a few critics (Dufresne, McCaffery, etc.) have dared to

descr ibe as 'pataphysical in nature.

'Pataphysics b a s ultimately determined the horizon of

thought f o r any encounter between philosophy and literature,

but criticism has lasgely ignored this important principle

of the postmodern condition. What irony: 'pataphysics has

replaced metaphysics so slowly and subtly that, once

noticed, the transition seems at once sudden and abrupt.

This survey therefore intends to redress the surprise of

such smnesia by revising the history o f both science and

poetry i n o r d e r t o br ing 'pataphysics to bear upon

'pataphysics itself. Such revision, of course, faces

obstacles, not the least of which is the fact that

'pataphysics is imaginary. No such discipline exists. What

then is there to study? What museums can house its rel ies?

What codexes can record its axioms? Such a science may be

no more than an =--a l a s t hope that has yet to corne true.

'Pataphysics does not pretend to unify its parts into a

system or to ratify its ploys into an agenda. Such a cesual

science has no theory, no method ( even though Jarry has since i n s p i r e d writers t o c r e a t e t h e College o f

'Pataphysics, aspects of which allude to a fictional

-

i

archive, the Grand Academy of Lagado). Such a casual

science also has no manual, no primer (even though Jarry has

since inspired critics to study the Elements of

'Pataphysics, excerpts of which appear in a fictional

almanac, the Exploits of Doctor Faustroll). Like the

abridged treatise on T l b , the incomplete handbook of Jarry

compels its readers to finish the job of converting the fake image of a virtual science into a real thing in the actual

universe. Even t h i s survey may not explain t h e existence of

'pataphysics so much as conjure 'pataphysics i n t o existence.

Jarry implies that such a s c i e n c e can be written only

with an invisible ink, "sulphate of quinine," whose words

remain unseen u n t i l read in the dark under the "infrared

rays of a spectrum whose other colors [are] locked in an

opaque box" ( 1 9 1 - 1 9 2 ) . Such a science cannot be seen except under a l i g h t t h a t cannot be seen in a place that cannot be

s e e n . Such a science exists paradoxically in an eigenstate

o f indeterminate potentiality (like the cat of Schrodinger--

both there and n o t there at the same time). Not philosophy,

but philosophastry, such a science at first appears

scandalous and superfluous because it delights in the

eclectic and the esoteric. It encourages a promiscuous

economy of indiscriminate exchanges, playfully conjugating paradoxes in order to make possible an absolute expenditure

of thought without any absolute investiture in thought .

'Pataphysics thus heralds apocalyptically what

Baudrillard cal l s a "casual form of writing to match the

casual &&ementialitg of our ageW--a spiralling commentary

upon "the Grande Gidouille of History" (1994e:17). This

survey attempts to practice such a writing of h i s t o r y in t h e

belief that theory must explore as much as it must explain.

To do o therwise is t o reduce t h e science of ' p a t a p h y s i c s to

another species of hermeneutics: just a way to resd, not a

way to live. To write against metaphysics, with its good

sense and its good taste, is not to s h i r k the duties of the

c r i t i c , but to wager their values against the demand for

change. If we are to take 'pataphysics seriously, are we

not obliged to be exceptional? If this survey t h r e a t e n s to

meander, is this not because it imitates the vortices of a

pidouille in order to maintain an element of s u r p r i s e ?

Surprise b r e a k s the promise o f the expected: it is the

exception t h a t disturbs the suspense of what we know must

happen next. Hence, this survey offers the following

itinerary about things to corne in the hope that we might

later be surprised by the unexpected. This survey begins by

tracing the h i s t o r y of the conflict between science and

poetry in order t o contextualize 'pataphysics within the

four phases of such dispute (the animatismic, the

mechanismic, the oraanismic, and the cvborganismicl. The

survey then discusses 'pataphysics itself, defining three

declensions of exception (the anomalos, the s y z s a i a , and the

clinamen), in order to show the diverse parallels not only

between the work of Jarry and Nietzsche, but also to relate

such work to the diverse projects of such contemporary philosophers as Baudrillard, Derrida, Deleuze, and Serres.

Subsequently, the survey traces the influence of Jarry

on three cases of avant-garde pseudo-science (the Italian

Futurists, the French Oulipians, and the Canadian

"Pataphysicians). Each movement revises a prior schema

about the structure of exception in order to disrupt the

norrnalization of the 'pataphysical: for the Futurists,

exception results from the collision of machines; for the

Oulipians, exception results from the constraint of

programs; and for the "Pataphysicians, exception results

from the corruption of mernories. Like these movements, this

survey also tries to avoid the normalization of the

'pataphysical, doing so by alluding intermittently to

'pataphysical enterprises that do not refer to the tradition

of Jarry, but nevertheless represent some of the exceptions

to the genealogy that this survey posits.

10

Exceptions, after all, can resort to an assortment of

modalities: variance (anomalos), alliance (sszvgia), or

deviance (clinamen). The anomalos finds a way to d i f f e r

from e v e r y other thing in a system that values the norm of

equivalence; t h e s v z s a i a finds a way to e q u a t e t h i n g s to

each other in a system that values the norm of d i f f e r e n c e ;

and the clinamen finds a way to to detour around things in a

system that values t h e fate of contrivance. Al1 three modes

of exception do inform t h i s s u r v e y on 'pataphysics so that,

if its style r i s k s everything to d i s r u p t , to confuse, and to

digress, it does so not for any lack of forma1 rigour, but

for the sake of a crucial thesis. Can a ludic theory of

'pataphysics be fairly judged by the nomic values of

metaphysics if 'pataphysics criticizes metaphysics itself?

Are we not obliged to consider the problem of this question?

' Pataphysics , strangely enough, has two parallel

histories that act out opposite strategies for criticizing

such a scientific metaphysics: first, the irrationalism of

the Symbolists, the Dadaists, and the Surrealists (al1 of

whom argue for a poetic emancipation from science); second,

the surrationalism of the Futurists, the Oulipians, and the

"Pataphysicians (al1 of whom argue for a poetic

appropriation of science). Jarry has influenced both

strategies despite their opposition. The Futurists attack

the Symbolists, for example, just as the Oulipians attack

the Surrealists. Both cases of conflict pit the pragmatic

formalism of postrnodernity against the aesthetic mysticism

of rnodernity. What is at stake is the status of poetry in a

world of science. How rnight poetry reclaim its own viable

truth? Hou might science benefit from its own poetic irony?

Surrationalism, for example, responds to such questions

not only by using the forms of poetry to criticize the myths

of science (its pedantic theories of expressive truth), but

also by using the forms of science to criticize the myths of

poetry (its romantic theories of expressive genius).

Surrationalism has accented this conflict between science

and poetry in three different ways. The Futurists inflect

the machinic intensities of technological forms; the

Oulipians inflect the mathetic intensities of numerological

forms; and the "Pataphysicians inflect the mnemonic

intensities of palaeological forms. This survey focuses

largely upon these three surrational movements not only

because -they have better expressed the original intentions

of 'pataphysics, but also because they have received less

critical attention from theoreticians.

Surrationalism is t h u s j u s t as exceptional as it is 'pataphysical, defining a regime for the avant-garde, not

only in poetry, but also in s c i e n c e . Bachelard suggests

that al1 scientific radicalisrn begins with "an e ~ o c h e , a

placing of reality between parentheses" (28) so that science

might systematically explore an otherwise impossible

hypothesis: "it is in this area of dialectical

surrationalism that the scientific mind dreams" (32). Every

question about what if leads to a science of as if. No

longer limited by one case of nature, science can propose

many modes of reason: for example, the non-Euclidean

geometry of Riemann or the non-Boolean algebra of Korzybski.

We see science interrogate itself in order to relativize

itself. It can no longer t a k e its reality for g r a n t e d , but

must account for its history: the reason of its reason.

Baudrillard suggests that, while metaphysics is the

anti of simulation (opposing fantasy with ever more

r e a l i t y ) , 'pataphysics is the ante of simulation (opposing fantasy with ever more fantasy) : "only a 1 ' l~ata~hvsics of simulacra c a n remove us rom the[. ..lstrategy of simulation

and the impasse of death i n which it imprisons us," and

"[t]his supreme ruse of the system[. . . ] , only a superior ruse can stop" (1994b:153-154). Metaphysics is a supreme

ruse because it makes us believe in the true; 'pataphysics

is a superior ruse because it lets us pretend to be untrue.

Truth implodes upon itself and reveals an aporia at its

13

centre - - the "[dlead point[ ...] where every system crosses this subtle limit of[ .,.] contradiction [....]and enters live into non-contradictionw--the ecstasy of thought: "[hlere

begins a ['lpataphysics of systems" (1990:14).

The Ur of Historv

Beginnings: let us digress for a moment; let us begin

with a swerve. Ubu, the "Professor of ['lpataphysics,"

steps on stage at the turn of t h e century in order to

announce "a branch of science which we have invented and for

which a crying need is generally experienced" ( 1 9 6 5 : 2 6 - 2 7 ) . An imaginary science thus makes its debut in a millenary

instant, appearing at the transition from a romantic era to

a modernist era, when metaphysics has totalized, but not yet

optimized, its power to speak the truth. If poetry has

failed to oppose science by being its antonymic extreme,

then perhaps poetry c m attempt to oppose science by being

i ts hyperbolic extreme. A n absurd science t h a t might

dissect contradictions, has itself enacted contradictions.

It has simultaneously affirmed and negated, not only its

belief in, but also its doubts about, the values of reason.

Science has historically legitimated itself by

practicing a contemvtus historia. Theories in the past that

d i f f e r from theories in the present must forfeit t h e i r

validity. History becomes nothing more than what Canguilhem

might cal1 le ~ a s s d d k ~ s s s d ( 27 ) , a museum of error, where

time can cause any concept to becorne as quaint as a

metaphor . 2 Whenever science d e i g n s to think its h i s t o r y , it

narrates a transition from the falsity of poetry to the

verity of science, even though history s e e s science, not as

the progress to truth, but as the congress of truth--a

quorum of dispute, where the right to speak the truth is

itself a t s t a k e . The surrationalism of 'pataphysics might

pursue this line of reasoning in order to suggest that in

fact science replaces its errors not w i t h other errata, but

with other errors, each one more subtle than t h e last one.

Science errs when it s e e s its history as a consecutive

process of both accumulation and amelioration. When t r a c i n g

the history o f the term " p h y s i c a l , " from the d iscourse of

A r i s t o t l e (phsikos), through the discourse of Bacon

(phvsica), to the discourse of Heisenberg (phusics), science

often presumes not only that each discourse is the nascent

form o f t h e next discourse, but also that each discourse is

a variant form of the same discourse: scientie. The word 11 science," however, does not designate the coherent progress

of one rational practice, but instead signifies an unstable

array of logical tactics, whose local, synergistic conflict

can invoke, provoke, and revoke a global, syllogistic

program: deduction through dialectics (for Aristotle);

jnduction through empiricism (for Bacon); and abduction

through statistics (for Heisenberg).

'Pataphysics reveals that, like poetry, science has an

avant-garde with its own history of dissent. What Deleuze

and Guattari might cal1 the roval sciences of efficient

productivity have historically repressed and exploited the

nomad sciences of expedient adaptability ( 1987: 3 6 2 ) A royal science is a standardized rnetaphysics: it is deployed

by the state throughout a clathrate, Cartesian space,

putting truth to work on behalf of solid, instrumental

imperatives (law and order). A nomad science is a

bastardized metaphysics: it is deployed against the state

throughout an aggregate, Riemannian space, putting truth &

risk on behalf of fluid, experimental operatives (trial and

error). Such scientific economies are contrastive, but not

exclusive. They transect at many points acrose many scales,

each one immanent in the other, like a postponed potential.

Royal sciences value the renovation of what Kuhn calls

a paradiam (1970:10), a nomic language-game that must

systematically (im)prove its own consistency and efficiency

by solving problems, yevokinfi anomsly for the sake of what

1 6

is normal and known.' Nomad sciences, however, value the

innovation of what tyotard calls a p a r a l o ~ ~ ( 1 9 8 4 : 6 0 ) , a ludic language-game that must systematically (ap)prove its

own inconsistency and inefficiency by convolving problems,

invokinq anomaly for the sake of what is abnormal and

unknown. These two economies do not oppose each other so

much as enfold each other. They inflect opposite values of

intent within a composite system of truth. A failure in one

language-game played according to one set of rules always

determines the rules of success for a new language-game

played according to a new set of rules.

'Pataphysics no doubt d e f i n e s t h e rubric for this kind

of nomadic paralogy. Itinerant and sophistic, a l1 such

surrationalism reveals that science, like poetry, changes

only when it deploys what Shklovsky might cal1 a tactic of

ostranenie, of estrangement (12). Scientific revolutions

may be nothing more than metaphoric revolutions, in which

autotelic novelties foreground the dramatization of a system

in order to undermine the autornatization of its reason.

Paradigm shifts reveal t h a t every axiology secretly involves

a reductio ad absurdum--the anomaly of an irresistible, but

inadmissible, theorem. The aporia of such a system arises

paradoxically from the rigour of its logic--as if its

success also means its failure. The sudden triumph of

' p a t a p h y s i c s t h u s does not imply t h e utter defeat of

m e t a p h y s i c s so much as the pyrrhic v i c t o r y of m e t a p h y s i c s .

Lyotard o b s e r v e s that , because science creates a method

by which t o c o r r e c t t h e errors that it detec ts i n its

method, science is "a process of delegitimation f u e l e d by

the demand for legitimation itself" ( 1 9 8 4 : 3 9 ) . I n t e r d i c t i o n by a paradigm agains t c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n the parad igm causes

the paradigm t o e x c l u d e , as e x t r i n s i c from i t , a paralogy

i n t r i n s i c t o i t : " science--by c o n c e r n i n g itself w i t h such

t h i n g s as u n d e c i d a b 1 e s l . J - - i s theorizing i t s own evolution

as[ . . . ] p a r a d o x i c a l " ( 6 0 ) . Ironically, t h e system that yearns t o v a l i d a t e i t s e l f , o n l y l e a r n s t o invalidate i t s e l f .

No l o n g e r d o e s science r a t i o n a l i z e i t s t r u t h so much as

relativize i ts t r u t h . W e adopt "a model of l e g i t i m a t i o n

t h a t has nothing t o d o w i t h maximized p e r f o r m a n c e " ( 6 0 ) , but r a t h e r implies "a model of an 'open s y s t e m , ' i n which a

statement becomes relevant if it ' g e n e r a t e s ideas'" ( 6 4 ) .

Science g r a p h s a r h i z o m a t i c f l o w c h a r t of stratif ied

t r a j e c t o r i e s , an agonis t i c forcef i e l d of d i v e r s i f i e d c a t a s t r o p h e s , some o f which c o l l i d e w i t h each other, some of

which c o l l u d e w i t h each other, al1 of which o p e r a t e together

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n fits and s tarts at asynchronous rates of

incornmensurate change. Science is a complex tissue of

hybrid tensions, its metaphors not only reflectinq each

other, but also refracting each other. They facilitate

changes to aa economy of exchanges by accentuating al1 the

unforeseen instabilities in scientific signification. Like

poetry, science is a bricolage of figures, an assemblage of

devices, none of which fit together perfectly--but unlike

poetry, science must nevertheless subject its tropes to a system, whose imperatives of both verity and reality

normally forbid any willing suspension o f disbelief.

Science and p o e t r y have shared a common history,

undergoing four phases of distinct change (the anirnatismic,

the mechanismic, the organismic, and the cyborganismic);

nevertheless, the two disciplines h a v e not evolved in tandem

or in s y n c h . Foucault observes, for example, that science

and poetry have evolved opposite relations to the authorial

function (1977:125-126): science moves toward anonymity;

poetry moves toward eponymity. The absence of the author in

science serves a n allotelic interest (justifying itself for the sake-of a finality outside of its own language), while

the presence of the author in poetry serves an autotelic

interest (justifying itself for the sake of a finality inside of its own language). Whenever science gains the

anonymous power to speak the t r u t h about things, poetry

seeks an eponymous refuge in the space of its own words.

Allotelic interests have always regarded autotelic

interests as a waste of time, particularly in a capitalist

economy where only the most effective arsenal of productive

tactics can prevail. 1s it any wonder then that, for such

imperial cynicism, science and poetry function within a

relation, not of genre , but of power? The waxing influence

of science has always implied the waning re levance of

poetry--as if science must capitalize upon the competition

for truth in order to monopolize the legitimation of truth.

The science of 'pataphysics, however, expresses on behalf of

poetry what the metaphysics of science represses in itself:

its own basis in signs, their errors and biases--the

ideology of metaphor. The autotelic aspect of science (its

ludic surrationalism) always threatens to radicalize the

allotelic agenda of science ( i t s nomic rationalism).

Althusser argues that, although ideology always

involves a denegation of itself so thst subjects produced by

it cannot recognize themselves within it, the allotelic

anonymity of science means that the clarity of its language

can nevertheless negate ideology, yet successfully remain

impartial: "ideology has no outside (for itself), but at

the same tirne[ ...] it is nothina but outside (for science [ . . . ] ) " (175). Barthes disagrees, however, arguing that

science is never neutral. Instead, science interpellates

its subject as an absence--a vanishing point, projected

within ideology as though beyond ideology: "the scho lar

excludes himself i n a concern for objectivity; yet what is

excluded i s never anything but the 'person'[...], not the

subject; moreover, this subject is filled[..,]with the very

exclusion it[ ...] imposes upon its person" (8).

Barthes suggests that science d i f f e r s from poetry, not

because of any disparity between them in format, content,

method, or intent, but becase of a d i s p a r i t y between them

in status-a prestige of pedagogy ( 3 ) . Whereas poetry h a s

always offered an egalitarian regime, destabilizing the

s i g n i f i e r within a generalized economy of polysemic

enunciation, science has only offered a totalitarian regime,

stabilizing the si~nified within a r e s t r i c t e d economy of

monosemic enunciation. For Barthes, s c i e n c e must begin to

acknowledge i t s ideological investments, radicalizing i t s e l f

by poeticizing i t s e l f . If ideology is the unreal

conciliation of a real contradiction, is it not fair to Say

that ideology is i t s e l f an imaginary solution--and therefore

'pataphysical? If metaphysics must study the ontology of

t ruth , must not 'pataphysics study the ideology of power?

Ultimately, the conflict between science and poetry

concerns this power to speak the truth, and this power has

undergone four phases of epistemic transition: the

animatismic phase, whose truth involves interpreting signs

through an a c t of exegesis; the mechanismic phase, whose

truth involves disquisiting signs through an ect of

mathesis; the oraanismic phase, whose truth involves

implementing signs through an act of anamnesis; and the

cvbornanismic phase, whose truth involves deregulating signs

through an act of catamnesis. The life sciences, for

example, have progressed from the biomaav of animatism,

through the biotaxu of mechanism, through the biolo~v of

organism, to the bionics of cyborganism. Each phase

involves not only a different definition of science and

poetry, but also a different opposition between t h e m .

During the animatismic phase, when papal academies

divide discourse scholastically into modes of textualization

and numeralization (trivium and suadrivium), knowledge is

rarefied largely because of its insufficient supply. During

the mechanismic phase, when royal academies divide discourse

aristocratically into modes of investigation and

dissemination, knowledge is rarefied largely because of its

unspecialized market. During the organismic phase, when

state academies divide discourse democratically into modes

of ratiocination and acculturation (scientia and humanitas),

knowledge is rarefied because of its specialized labour.

2 2

And during the cyborganismic phase, when state academies

divide discourse plutocratically into modes of totalization

and optimization, knowledge is r a r e f i e d largely because of

its overabundant supply*

The Animatismic Phase

Foucault observes that , bef ore empiricism, "divinatio

and eruditio are both part of the same hermeneutics"

(1973:34). Medieval trestises on natural history establish

no criterion for the condition of relevance, s i n c e such

treatises merely compile leaenda, collecting together

haphazardly al1 the randorn lore about a sample topic in

order to document the complex heraldry of its textual

spectrum: "none of these forms of discourse is required to

justify its d a i m to be e x p r e s s i n g a truth before it is

interpreted; a l 1 that is required of it is the possibility

of talking about it" (40). Science in its snimstismic phase

s e e s that signs e x i s t long b e f o r e being known: they are

written-into things by nature, and they extinguish the

distance between things in order to reveal the synchronie

continuum of their secret order.

Reality for the animatismic phase is a stable orrery

t h a t r e v o l v e s around a central fulcrum. Knowing such a

reality involves an exegetic function, reading signs,

interpreting them, rearranging them within an anagram that

permutes al1 their modes of sympathy and antipathy. Such an

anatomy o f forms distributes signs aesthetically throughout

a nomad regime in which al1 things must conform to an order

of both resemblance and concordance. Even the difference

between the reasoning of science and t h e imagining o f poetry

does not yet exist because no paradigm provides a consensus

for such verities. Each text has equal truthfulness. Each

myth can convey what Vico might cal1 a "poetic wisdom"

(110), whose truth owes its power t o an error that demands

belief in a "credible impossibilityt' (120)--an as if that

can provide the premise in the future for a nuovo scienza. 4

Poetic wisdom simply monopolizes the totality of both

the subject and the o b j e c t , leaving no space f o r modern science to speak the truth for itself except as an act of

deviance within such a norm. Poetic wisdom cannot recognize

any disparity between the subjective affect of imagining and

the objective effect of reasoning. Alchemy, for example

r e s o r t s t o such poetic wisdom in order to imagine a lapis

philoso~horum that can produce a coniuntia o ~ ~ o s i t o r u m ,

harmonizing the disputes among al1 such elements. Truth

becomes a r i t u a l of scenes in which al1 things can change

their images into each other. The transitive category for

2 4

l e a d becoming gold transmutes i n t o a redemptive allegory

about body becoming soul. The lapis ~ h i l o s o ~ h o r u m is a

t h i n g unlike any o t h e r , but i t makes t h i n g s so that they are

l i k e everything else. Tt is the metaphor for al1 metaphor.

Donne practices the poetic wisdom of such a s c e n i c

ritual when he d e l i b e r a t e l y misunderstands t h e difference

between the s c i e n c e of alchemy and his p o e t r y of c o n c e i t s ,

i n v i t i n g h i s reader, " A s f i r e these drossie Rymes to

p u r i f i e , / O r as E l i x i r , t o change them t o g o l d " since such a

reader is "that A l c h i m i s t which alwaies had/ W i t , whose one

spark could make good th ings of bad" ( 2 9 4 ) . Alchemy becomes a metaphor that can undergo a process o f alchemy itself.

The device of t h e conceit r e f l e c t s an alchernical rnarriage o f

antongrnical extremes so t h a t , f o r example, the idea of love

can be equated w i t h any m o t i f , no matter how absurd, b e i t a

drafting compass or a drinking i n s e c t . The lapis of

alchemy, like the lexis of poe try , reveals t h a t the figura1

is merely the alembic for t h e l i t era l . The noble metal of

truth arlses from t h e ignoble filth of e r r o r . 5

Vico claims that just as modern science shows t h a t "man becomes al1 things by understanding (homo intelliaendo fit

ornnia)," so a l s o does p o e t i c wisdom show tbat "man becomes al1 t h i n g s by not understanding[...)(bomo non intelliaendo

25

fit omnia)" (130). To understand on behalf of truth is to

be reactive, accepting the world of the as is, but to

misunderstand on behalf of error is to be creative,

inventing the world of the as if. To be an alchemist is to

practice an aesthetic that acts as a lapis ~hiloso~horum,

transmuting the errors of alchemy (a nomad science) into the

truths of chemistry (a royal science), but ironically, this

change requires that science and poetry shift from an order

where they are unified to an order where they are divided.

A literal stone that philosophers must diligently seek

embodies a figura1 power that they must eventually deny.

Foucault argues that, during such a transition, the

"tautological world of resemblance n o w finds itself

dissociated and, as it were, split down the middle"

(1973:58). For Donne, such a dissociation of sensibility

implies the failure of alchemy to reconcile the imminent

conflict between the subjective affect of imagining and the

objective effect of reasoning: "new philosophy cals al1 in

doubt" so that "The Sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's

wit/ Can well direct him, where to looke for it" (335).

The old, geocentric order of elemental synthesis regards the

conceit as the integrel epitome of al1 similes, but the new,

heliocentric order of empirical analysis regards the conceit

as the marginal extreme of al1 follies.' N o t until the

advent of 'pataphysics does the conceit, the s y n t h e s i s of

opposites, regain its status as a device of poetic wisdom.

The Mechanismic Phase

Bacon observes that , before empiricism, "systems are

but so many stage plays, representing worlds of their own

creation after an unreal and scenic fashion" ( 1 9 6 0 : 4 9 ) . Natural history must revoke these "Idols of the ~heater"

( 4 9 ) , replacing the theatrical world of scenes (the as if) with the empirical world of senses (the as is), but this

change risks an aporia since this new mode of investigation

only ratifies a new mode of dramatization--the petit r&i t

of an experiment in which an event must restage itself again

and again under the auspice of control. Epistemic errors

are now simply traced to linguistic abuses. Science in its

mechanismic phase sees t h a t signs e x i s t only by being known:

they are written ont0 things by culture, and they

distinguish the distance between t h i n g s i n order to invent

the synchronie continuum of their proper order.

Reality for the mechanismic phase is a stable clock

t h a t operates within a static regimen. Knowing such a

r e a l i t y involves a mathetic function, testing signs,

disquisiting them, regimenting them within a diagram that

27

d i s p l a y s a l 1 t h e i r modes o f i d e n t i t y and a l t e r i t y . Such a

taxonomy o f forms d i s t r i b u t e s signs i n c r e m e n t a l l y throughout

a royal regime in which al1 t h i n g s must depend upon an o r d e r

o f both equivalence and d i f f e r e n c e . The evidence of

s c i e n c e , not the eminence of p o e t r y , provides a consensus

for t h e v e r i t i e s of a paradigm. A l 1 t e x t s have their

t r u t h f u l n e s s at stake. Al1 t e x t s must legitimate their

s o u r c e s . The t r u t h of science fulfills such a r e q u i s i t e by

favourably gauging its power over the object a g a i n s t t h e d i v i n e power of n a t u r e . The t r u t h o f science t h u s aligns

i t s cause, i t s a r c h e , w i t h t h e power of a noumenal origin.

Modern science s i m p l y c o l o n i z e s the a l t e r i t y of t h e

o b j e c t , l e a v i n g no space f o r poetic wisdom t o speak t h e t r u t h about nature except through an act of alliance with

s u c h a norm. Poetic wisdom must adopt t h e v a l u e s of modern

s c i e n c e i n o r d e r t o s t a t e any objective v e r i t i e s . Sprat,

for example, argues t h a t , poet i c a l l y " T r u t h 1s n e v e r so

w d l e x p r e s ' d or a m p l i f y ' d , as by those Ornaments which are

Truie1 and Real i n t hemse lves " ( 4 1 4 ) . Truth is t h e b e s t ornament because it has the least ornament--which is t o say

t h a t s c i e n c e i s the best poetry because it has t h e least

poetry. The i r o n y here is t h a t verse must l e a r n i ts r u l e s

of metaphor from a genre t h a t r u l e s out metaphor. The sage

o f s c i e n c e a c t u a l l y becomes the muse of poetry (hence t h e

numerous elegies to scientists, particularly N e w t o n , despite

the fact that science follows a principle of antipoeisis). 7

Newton berates poetry for its "ingenius nonsense" (Bush

40) even though Glover portrays him as the paragon of

poetry: "O might'st thou, ORPHEUS, now again revive,/ And

NEWTON should inform thy list'ning ear" ([Pemberton 231).

Poetry indulges in scientific sycophancy, largely because

the gravity of force in the Princi~ia lends itself to the

idea of a poetic sublime just as the levity of light in the Opticks lends itself to the idea of a poetic beauty. 8

Glover writes that "Newton demands the muse" ( [ 1 4 ] ) , but soon Thomson w o n d e r s : "How shall the Muse, then, grasp the

mighty theme," particularly "when but a f e w / Of the deep-

studying race can stretch their minds/ To w h a t he knew"

(1853:337). Science has unveiled so many universal

mysteries that, ironically, it threatens to become a poetry

of truth more sublime than the t r u t h of poetry itself.

Poetry makes an effort to dispute this omniscience of

science (its will to power), as Swift does, for example, but

poetry cannot dispute the conscience of science (its will to

truth). While science ascends to a state of greater

complexity, becoming more abstract, theoretic, and

autocratic, poetry descends through science to a state of

29

greater simplicity, becoming more concrete, pragmatic, and

democratic. To keep Pace with science, poetry must shift

its focus from the sublime in the natural physics of Newton

to the poetic beauty in the natural history of Linnaeus.

As Aikin avers, the updated images of natural history must

replace the outdated tropes of poetry since "no th ing can be

really beautiful which has not truth for its basis" (25).

To fulfill a didactic mandate, poetry must learn its truth

directly from the mineral, the vegetal, and the bestial. 9

Darwin, the p o e t i c savant, follows such advice to t h e

letter when he explains the botanical taxonomy of Linnaeus

by equating modes of floral procreation with modes of s o c i a l

flirtation: " t h e general design[ ...] is to i n l i s t Imagination under t h e banner of Science; and to l e a d her

votaries from t h e l o o s e r analogies, which dress[ . . . ] p oetry,

to the stricter ones, which form[ . . . lphilosophy" ( 1791 :v) . Poetic pleasure submits to noetic pedagogy. The catalogue

of flowers, the antholonv, so to speak, is merely the

flowery ornament for the summary document of its scientific

marginalia. The poetry acts as a mere note for the notes

themselves--a pretense to plant the seeds of interest so

that the reader might in turn disseminate this information.

The poetry literally is a botanic garden, in which

germinates the romantic metaphor that poetry is organic.

The Oraanismic Phase

Coleridge observes that, after empiricism, the botanic

mode1 of science does inform a poetry of organic unity, but

contrary to Darwin, t h i s poetic pleasure does not submit to

noetic pedagogy: "[a] poem[ ...] is opposed tof. ..]science, by proposing for its immediate object pleasure, not truth"

(164). Wordsworth qualifies this statement by arguing that

"the knowledge of both the Poet and the Man of science is

pleasure" ( 4 5 6 ) , but while poetry i s an e c s t a t i c search for an intimate truth, science is a monastic search for an

ultimate truth--one whose discourse values an empiricism of

the senses at the expense of their sensualism. Science in

its organismic phase s e e s that signs evolve by being known:

they are written across events by culture, and they

distinguish the interval between events in order to direct

the diachronic continuum of their normal order.

Reality for the organismic phase is a simple engine

that generates a stable dynarnic. Knowing such a reality

involves an anemnestic function, working signs, implementing

them, redeploying them within a program that displays al1

their modes of function and relation. Such an economy of

forms distributes its signs pragmatically thoughout a royal

regime in which al1 things must depend upon an order of both

3 1

productivity and applicability. Not only the evidence of

science, but also the progress of science, provides a

consensus for the verities of a paradigm. Al1 texts have

their usefulness at stake. A l 1 texts must legitimate their

intents. The truth of science fuifills such a requisite by

favourably gauging i L s power over the subject against the

humane power of culture. The truth of science t h u s aligns

its effect, its telos, with the power of a noumenal motive.

Modern science simply colonizes the identity of the

subject, leaving no space for poetic wisdom to speak the

truth about culture except through an act of defiance

against such a norm. Poetic wisdom must evict the values of

modern science in order to state any subjective verities. Hence, Keats condemns Newton for the "cold philosophy" that

must "Conquer al1 mysteries by rule and line" (226) just as

Blake condemns Newton for the "Reasonings like vast

Serpents" that must hang their "iron scourges over Albion"

(16). Such reasoning that allegedly discredits imagining

only creates an undead truth, an Ur-Frankenstein that, for

Wordsworth, must await a poetic rebirth: "the Poet will

lend his divine spirit to aid in the transfiguration" when

"science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put

on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood" ( 4 5 6 ) .Io

32

Wordsworth claims t h a t "[ t lhe r e m o t e s t discoveries of the C h e m i s t , t h e B o t a n i s t , o r M i n e r a l o g i s t , will be as

p r o p e r o b j e c t s o f t h e ~ o e t ' s art[. . . ] i f the t i m e should ever corne when t h e s e things s h a l l be f ami l i a s to us" ( 4 5 6 ) , but in t h e meantime, this differend has no t e r m s f o r c o n s e n s u s .

Poetry i n d u l g e s i n s c i e n t i f i c c o n t r o v e r s y , largely because

the schisrn be tween r e a s o n i n g and i m a g i n i n g has begun t o

reflect t h e anomie of p o e t i c labour. For Huxley, such

l a b o u r c a n n o t compete w i t h t h e c a p i t a l v a l u e s o f u t i l i t y

( 1 9 4 8 : 4 9 ) - - t h u s p o e t r y must warrant a Benthamite r e j e c t i o n - - but for Arnold, such labour d o e s reflect upon t h e communal

values o f l i b e r t y (1889:llZ)--which is to s a y , the reasoning

of s c i e n c e can t e a c h w h a t is real and t r u e , but o n l y t h e

i m a g i n i n g o f poetry can t e a c h what is f i n e and j u s t .

Schlegel writes that p o e t r y must redeem science in the

b e l i e f that "al1 art should become science and al1 science

art" ( 1 5 7 ) . Poetry must become a genre of therapeutic knowledge , c r e a t i n g pseudo-statements t h a t can, according t o

Richards, d e t a c h the untruth of poetry from belief and yet

retain the b e a u t y of such untruth in order to r e f i n e belief

i t s e l f ( 6 1 ) . Newtonian cosmology has discredited the p o e t i c o b j e c t just as Darwinian e v o l u t i o n has discredited t h e p o e t i c sub ject ; t h e r e f o r e , poetry must henceforth resort to

the as if of an imaginary solution in order to speak i t s own

t ru th . Poetry must ascend through science to a state of

greater complexity, becoming more abstract, theoretic, and

autocratie. Poetry must transform its scientific

radicalism, shifting its critique from an opposition

(external to science) to a subversion (interna1 to science).

'Pataphysics thus arises j u s t before modernism begins to wring its hands about the enigma of what Snow calls "the

Two Cultures" ( 2 ) . Huxley argues that, despite their dispute, the two cultures resemble each other most when the

noetic clarity of reasoning and the poetic opacity of

imagining approach t h e sublimity of the ineffable (1963:14).

What is sublime in t h e pseudo of poetry can, according to

Richards, return reasoning and irnagining to an equilibrium

t h a t resembles the tension of forces in a cloud of magnets

(15-18) .ll Such an equation of antonyms revives the conceit

as a sublime device not of alchernical marriage, but of

scientific synthesis; hence, Eliot can equate poetry with a

platinum catalyst that f u s e s oxygen and sulphur w i t h o u t

changing-itself: " [ i l t is in this depersonalization that art may be said to approach the condition of science" (7). 12

The Csbor~anismic P h a s e

B a r t h e s observes that, after modernism, science can no

34

longer stabilize its object within an allotelic economy of

monosemic reference, but must, like poetry, criticize its

method within an autotelic economy of polysemic existence:

"science speeks itself; literature writes itself[...]: it

is not the same body, and hence the same desire, which is

behind the one and the other" (5); nevertheless, "science

will becorne literature, insofar as literature [ . . . ] is

alreadyr. ..]sciencew (IO), only when science can see that

its own truth exists not outside of language, but only

because of language. Science in its cyborganismic phase

sees that signs evolve beyond being known: they are written

as events by culture, and they extinguish the interval

between events in order to create the synchronic

discontinuum of their random order,

Reality for the cyborganismic phase is a complex matrix

that cornputes a mobile dynamic. Knowing such a reality

involves a catamnestic function, playing signs,

deregulating them, recombining them within a hologram that

displays-al1 their modes of seduction and simulation. Such

a synonymy of forms distributes its signs excrementally

throughout a nomad regime in which al1 things must depend

upon an order of virtuosity and virtuality. Al1 texts have

their artfulness at stake. Al1 texts must legitimate not

only their reasons (be they in the origin or in the result),

35

but the reason for these reasons. The truth of science can

no longer fulfill s u c h a r e q u i s i t e by favourably gauging its

power against t h e metaphysics of e i t h e r an arche or a telos,

but only against the 'pataphysics of an exceptional

phenornenon-be it an aporia, a c h i s s m , or a swerve*

Modern science simply mono.polizes the totality of both

the subject and the object, leaving no space for poetic

wisdom t o speak t h e t r u t h for i t s e l f except as an act of

deviance within such a norm. Modern s c i e n c e can no longer

stabilize the disparity between the subjective affect of

imagining and the objective effect of reasoning. The advent

of 'patsphysics signals the f i r s t attempts to subvert this

agenda from within its own limits. The science of

'pataphysics inspires a literary tradition that has i n t u r n

begun t o regard i tse l f as s response to science with an

outcome to be studied by a science, be it formalist,

structural, semiologic , or c y b e r n e t i c . l3 The ' pataphysical

fundamentsls of surrationalism have in turn provided the

aesthetic parallel for the dialectic sophistry of almost al1

anti-metaphysical meta-philosophies.

Baudrillard s u g g e s t s that, "a century after J a r r y , but

in a cool universe w i t h o u t irony, and without 'pataphysical

acid," science has so inflated the fund of information that

36

the excesses of such metastasis evoke the flidouille of Ubu:

"['p]ataphysics or metaphysics, this pregnancyr . . . ] is one of the strangest signs[ ...] of this spectral environment where each ce11 ( e a c h function, e a c h structure), is left with the possibility, as in cancer, [...]of multiplying indefinitely"

(1990:28). Science is a tautological extravagance, for

which Ubu, "a figure of genius, r e p l e t e with that which has

absorbed everything, transgressed everything, [... Iradiates in t h e void like an imaginary solution" (71). Science now

f u n c t i o n s i n what Jarry might cal1 an economy of phvnance

(1969:43), expending w i t h o u t investing, producing pschitt or

merdre--an ironic eponym f o r "excess" w i t h an e x c e s s l e t t er .

Baudrillard suggests that, for such an economy o f

science, the threat of the unrea l haunts every system o f

verity s i n c e t h e methods of physics can no longer confirm

whether or not reality itself is a fsntasy: "[sJuch would

be the [']pataphysics[ ...] that lies i n w a i t for al1 physics at its inadmissible limitstt (1990:85). Has not physics

already started to resemble a s c i e n c e of imaginary

solutions, what with its particle zoo of new paradoxes (the

amphibolies of psrticles, the metaleptics of causality)? Do

we not see a h i n t of 'pataphysics in the strsngeness gf

anti-matter, black-holes, and time-travel (the theories of

which have already fomented philosophical apprehensions

37

about the existence of existence itself)? In the face of

such scientific absurdities, poetry has responded by

portraying itsel f as a literalized experiment .

Prigogine and Stengers observe that, for such an

episteme, "science occupies a peculiar position, that of a

poetical interrogation of nature, in the etymological sense

that the poet is a 'makerY--active," inventing the world

post facto while observing the world a priori (301).

Science has finally achieved the hyperbole of its own

"death," so t o speak, disappearing into a condition of

tautologic metalepsis, paradoxically becoming both the cause

and effect of its own virtual reality. Science has begun to

fulfill the simulacral precession that, for Baudrillard,

defines the 'pataphysics of a postmodern philosophy. As

Genosko suggests, "[i]t is surely a ['Jpataphysical accident

that death is for Baudrillard the very[. . .]gesture which

pushes the tautologies of the system over the edge, with a

b e l l y laugh of symbolic proportions" ( 116).

Pseudo-Sciences

Feyerabend argues t h a t , f o r science t o progress, the

nomic t ru th of the as is must induce an escape to the ludic

space of an as i f : " w e need a dream-world in order to

discover t h e f eatures of the real world[ . . . Iwhich may

actually be just another dream-world" (32). Science in such

a Traumwelt adopts not the terrorism of unified theories,

but the anarchism of ramified theories--"[t]he only

principle t h a t does not inhibit progress is: ansthina noes"

(23). Such a principle does not encode a laissez-faire

economy (whose Darwinian cornpetition requires that a royal

science discard the truth of a defunct concept as either

extinct or deviant); instead, such a principle tries to

entice a savoir-faire economy (whose Lucretian arbitration

requires that a nomad science bracket the truth of a defunct

concept as either dormant or defiant), 15

'Pataphysics dramatizes this principle of Feyerabend by

arguing t h a t , however obsolete or indiscrete any theory

might at first appesr, every theory has the potential to

improve knowledge in s a m e way. Just as biodiversity can

make an ecology more adaptable, so also can dilettantism

make an episteme more versatile. The process of science

muet lea-rn to place its defunct concepts into a kind of

suspended animation that preserves them for the millenary

reverie of an imaginary science. The truth diverges

throughout many truths, inducing the sophisms of dissent,

novelty, and paradox: "given any rule(...]for science,

there are always circumstances when it is advisable not on ly

39

to ignore the rule, but to adopt its opposite" (23) in order

"to make the weaker case the stronnerl...land t h e r e b v to

sustain the motion of the whole" (30).

'Pataphysics thus behaves as if it is a Philosophie des

Als Ob. Vaihinger observes that the phrase "as if"

constitutes a "comparative apperception" (91), juxtaposing

two concepts somewhere in t h e interzone between the

virtuality of a figura1 relation and the a c t u a l i t y of a

literal equation. Neither rhetorical nor theoretical, the

as if constitutes a paradox of contingency, since reference

is made to an impossibility, but from t h i s impossibility an

inference is made: "reality[ . . . ] is com~ared with something whose[. ..]unreality is at the same time admitted" (98). The

as if posits the possible consequences of an impossible

inconsequence. The as if is simply the irnaginary solution

tu the question what i f . 1s not this question a deliberate

misreading that shows the real and the true to be quasi and

pseudo--free, that is, to be something else?

'Pataphysics s u g g e s t s that metaphysics forgets that

this operative conditional (as if) is not an imperative

conditional (if t h e n ) ; nevertheless, the latter relation always resides unheard between the two words of the former

relation. The if t h e n revokes t h e suspension of disbelief

4 0

in the as if so t h a t the event must be treated as it would

be treated i f it were as is. The slightness of t h i s

difference between the as i f and the if then thus marks t h e

slightness of the difference between t r u t h and power. The

science of 'pataphysics explores t h e s e conditionals i n order

to see what might happen if science is treated as poetry and

vice versa, the philosopher studying the exceptional ( b e i t t h e anomalos, t h e s u z ~ ~ i a , or t h e clinameq) i n order to make

t h e weaker case, t h e stronger--almost as i f to s a y t h a t

ultimately such a case might be as true as ang from Tlon.

Notes to Chanter 1

is of course an i r o n i c signifier w i t h two

meanings that c o n t r a d i c t each other. Its real usage as an

a d j e c t i v e i n German refers t o a n o r i g i n a r y mode1 f o r imaginary c o p i e s , b u t its u n r e a l usage as a s u b s t a n t i v e i n

T l h e s e r e f e r s to imaginary copies wi t h o u t any originary

model. The ur thus embodies a paradox o f s i m u l a t i o n , whose

s t r u c t u r e impl ies t h a t , a t the origin, no o r i g i n e x i s t s , but

t h e dream of an o r i g i n . No longer does t h e causa l vector

from t h e r ea l t o i t s copy make sense s i n c e the fantasy of

t h e u_r d o e s not r e p l i c a t e , so much as o r i g i n a t e , r e a l i t y .

' ~ a n ~ u i l h e r n observes t h e t " t h e history of s c i e n c e

i s t h e h i s t o r y of a n abject[. ..]that is a h i s t o r y and [that] has a h i s t o r y , whereas sc ience is the s c i e n c e of an o b j e c t -

t h a t is n o t a history [and] t h a t has a h i s t o r y " ( 2 5 - 2 6 ) . Science ignores its history because s c i e n c e i n its history

is no longer s c i e n c e * F o r s c i e n c e , t r u t h is p r e s c i e n t ,

always t-here b e f o r e t h e fact of its revelation; for h i s t o r y ,

t r u t h is expedient, only there a f t e r the fact of i ts

production. The h i s t o r y of t r u t h shows t h a t a persistent

concept does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y imply its c o n s i s t e n t meaning.

42

'~uhn writes that "a paradigi is a criterion for

choosing problems that, while the paradigm is t a k e n for

granted, can be assumed to have solutions" (1970:37). It is

a Weltanschauung with three discursive functions: first, it

ratifies interdictions in order to define what it makes

perceivable and thereby improve its accuracy; second, it

verifies predictions in order to align the perceivable with

the conceivable and thereby improve its efficacy; and third,

it pacifies contradictions in order to define what it makes

conceivable and thereby improve its adequacy.

'~uovo scienza is a poetic wisdom that might

study poetic wisdom (and thus such a science almost appears

to preempt 'pataphysics itself). Vico, like Jarry, believes

that, because nature is an inhuman creation, we can never

know its truth; but unlike Jarry, Vico believes that,

because culture is a human creation, we can know its truth.

Jarry argues that al1 truth, be it natural or cultural, is

still an opaque mirage, never to be known. Every science,

for him; is a poetic wisdom if only because it rnust commit

at leest one error--the error of belief in truth itself,

onne ne suggests t h a t al1 "this worlds genrall sicknesse" ( 336) might paradoxicslly cleanse impurity itsel f

and thus "purifie/ A l l , by a true religious Alchimy" (334).

Metaphysics involves a christological transmutation that

purifies a supernal truth of al1 its errors; however,

'pataphysics involves an anti-christological transmutation

that purifies an infernal error of al1 its truth (as if

t r u t h itself is the filth)-ohence, Ubu in the heraldic

allegory of Caesar Antichrist performs a reverse alchemy, in

which to rise above sin i s to fa11 from grace.

'~allyn observes t h a t , for Copernicus and Kepler,

" t h e world is the work of a divine poietes," and "what they

aim to reveal through their own poetics is thus

t r u l y [ . . . ] t h e poetic structure of the world" (20). Donne feels snxiety about such a p o e t i c cosmos even though its

system is more aesthetic than empirical, not verified and

rectified so much as symmetrized and harmonized. The

problem is that such a view radically displaces humanity,

propelling us into a regressive infinitude, a sublime

extreme without limit, be it atomic or cosmic in scale.

44

'~homson eulogizes Newton: "The heavens are al1

hi6 own; from the w i l d rule/ O f whirling v o r t i c e s and

circling s ~ h e r e s , / To t h e i r first great simplicity

restored," and "Even Light i t s e l f [ . . . ] / Shone undiscover'd, till his brighter rnind/ Untwis ted al1 the shining robe of

day" (1853:336). Akenside, likewise, eulogizes Newton:

"The lamp of science through the jealous maze/ Of Nature

g u i d e s , when haply you reveal/ Her secret honours: [...)/ The beauteous l a w s of l i g h t , the central powers/ That wheel

the pensile p l a n e t s round t h e year" ( 1825: 51-52 ) .

orce ce and light a c q u i r e aesthetic currency i n an industry that must versify t h e theory by Newton i n order t o

d e i f y the memory of N e w t o n . F o r poets influenced by the

sublime of the P r i n c i ~ i a , see William Powell Jones: The

R h e t o r i c of Science: A Studs o f Scientific Ideas and

Irna~ery in Ei~hteenth-Centurv Enalish Poetrv (Berkeley:

U n i v e r s i t y o f California, 1 9 6 6 ) . For poets in f luenced by the beauty of the Opticks, see Marjorie Nicholson: Newton Pemands -the Muse: Newton's 'Opticks' and the Ei~hteenth

Centurs Poets (Hamden: Archon, 1 9 4 6 ) .

45

' ~ i k i n p o s i t s a didact ic hierarchy a s c e n d i n g f rom

t h e m i n e r a l t o the animal, so t h a t zoology l e n d s i t s e l f best

t o p o e t r y , l a r g e l y because beasts most closely resemble

humans and thus p r o v i d e a larges repertoire of p e d a g o g i c a l

similes ( 3 4 ) . A ik in thus contradicts himself: he argues that poetry must use s c i e n c e t o reject t h e past o f culture and d e p i c t n a t u r e d i r e c t l y , b u t then h e argues that p o e t r y

must use s c i e n c e t o reject a par t of nature and depict c u l t u r e i n d i r e c t l y . Poetry must imitate a facet of t h e

n a t u r a l t h a t most imitates t h e realm of the c u l t u r a l .

l0wordsworth posits a dualist paradox when he

deploys this animatismic t r o p o l o g y - f o r although science is

an i n a n i m a t e body of knowledge, it has no flesh, no corpus ,

and is thus a body w i t h o u t a body, yet this i n s e n s a t e ,

i ncorporea l form of knowledge is not a s o u l , because i t has

no breath, no animus, and is thus a s o u l w i t h o u t a s o u l .

Science, l i k e t h e Monster in Frankenstein, is a morbid

f i g u r e for the c o r r u p t i o n of s i m u l a t i o n . Shelley i m p l i e s

t h a t s c i e n c e , n o t poetry, i s t h e replica of an error t h a t

threatens t o r e p l a c e t h e t r u t h of t h e o r i g i n .

46

l lFtichards argues that poetic wisdom is s brownian

movement: "Suppose that[ ...] w e carry an a r rangement o f msny magnet ic n e e d l e s , l a r g e and small, swung so t h a t they

i n f l u e n c e one a n o t h e r , some a b l e o n l y t o swing h o r i z o n t a l l y ,

others v e r t i c a l l y , others hung freely[.. .. ] Each new

d i s e q u i l i b r i u m f ...] co r r e sponds to a need ; and the wagglings which ensue as t h e system rearranges i t s e l f are our

responses[ ....] Sometimes the poem is itseif t h e i n f l u e n c e which disturbs us, sometimes it is merely the means by which

an already existing disturbance can r i g h t i t ~ e l f . ' ~ (15-18)

12~liot argues that p o e t i c wisdom i s a chernical

r e a c t i o n : "When the two gases[ . ..]are mixed i n t h e p r e s e n c e

of a f i l a m e n t o f platinum, they form s u l p h u r o u s acid. T h i s

combinat ion t a k e s p l a c e only i f the p l a t i n u m is p r e s e n t ;

nevertheless t h e newly formed acid c o n t a i n s no trace of

platinum, and t h e p l a t i n u m itself is a p p a r e n t l y u n a f f e c t e d ;

has remained i n e r t , neutral, and unchanged. The mind o f t h e

poet i s the shred of p l a t i n u m [ . ...] [Tlhe more p e r f e c t the ar t i s t , - t h e more completely separate i n him w i l l be t h e man

who suf fers and t h e mind which creates" ( 7-8 ) .

" ~ a u l s o n has provided one of the most

theoretically comprehensive surveys of such sciences when he

plots the epistemic transition from the organismic paradigm

of literature to the cyborganisrnic paralogy of information:

"[ais science disqualifies the medium through which we have experienced and spoken the world, language and culture as we

have known them are swept away at an astonishing rate" so

that, " [ i l f we want to preserve something of our subjectivityl ... 1, then we must open Our texts to the

n e w [ , . . ]noises of science" ( 5 2 ) .

"~audrillard implies that , as a " [ ' plataphysician

at twenty" (l996a:83), he derives much of his irony from a

scientific vocabulary--particularly when he indulges in his

own hyperbole of molecular metaphors, be they quantum,

fractal, genetic, etc. Genosko remarks that, for

Baudrillard, such language does not evoke the rhetorical

equivalent of scientific legitimation; instead, the nomad

value of these modifiers rises in indirect relation to their

absence -of meaning: they constitute a "science fiction

practised in the service of the symbolic" (106).

48

15~eyerabend writes: "NO idea is ever examined in

a l1 its ramifications and no view is ever given al1 the

chances [thst] it deserves" ( 4 9 ) for "[tlheories are abandoned and superseded by more fashionable accounts long

before they have had an opportunity to show their virtues"

(40). Voodoo, for example, offers science an insight into

(heretofore unknown) aspects of pharmac