boehringer ingelheim pharmaceuticals, inc.: ftc brief ...€¦ · leslie rice melman assistant...

USCA Case #12-5393 Document #1444255 Filed: 06/28/2013 of 69

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

NO. 12-5393

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Respondent-Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (NO. 1:09-MC-00564-JMF)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Jonathan Nuechterlein General Counsel David C. Shonka Principal Deputy General Counsel John F. Daly Deputy General Counsel for Litigation Leslie Rice Melman Assistant General Counsel for Litigation Mark S. Hegedus, Attorney Office of the General Counsel FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20580 (202) 326-2115 [email protected]

Daniel W. Butrymowicz Rebecca Egeland Michael Perry Bureau of Competition FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20580

June 28, 2013

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

1. Parties

The Federal Trade Commission (“Commission” or “FTC”) was the

petitioner before the district court and appears as appellant before this Court.

Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Boehringer” or “BIPI”) was

the respondent before the district court and appears as appellee before this Court.

2. Ruling Under Review

The ruling under review consists of the memorandum opinion and the

associated order entered by the district court on September 27, 2012, which

addressed attorney work-product claims. Dkt. 69, 70. The district court entered a

companion ruling on search issues on October 16, 2012, Dkt. 71, 72.

3. Related Cases

This case has not previously been before this Court. No related cases are

pending before this Court or any other court.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii

GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................... viii

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ......................................................................................................... 3

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ..................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 4

A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below .... 4

B. Statement of Facts ................................................................................. 6

1. FTC investigation of Hatch-Waxman settlements and reverse-payment agreements .................................................................... 7

2. Mirapex and Aggrenox agreements ..........................................10

3. FTC investigation and Boehringer privilege claims .................11

4. District court proceedings .........................................................16

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................20

STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................22

ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................23

I. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD IN RULING ON BOEHRINGER’S WORK-PRODUCT CLAIMS ........................................................................................................23

A. The District Court Erroneously Deemed All Withheld Financial and Generic Entry Analyses as Opinion Work Product Because They Were Requested by Counsel ...............................................................23

1. An attorney’s request for a document does not necessarily make it opinion work product .............................................................24


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2. The record indicates that few of the withheld documents actually contain the mental impressions of counsel .................27

B. The District Court Committed Legal Error by Failing to Require Boehringer to Redact Any Opinion Work Product .............................31

II. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR BY FAILING TO EVALUATE WHETHER ANY OF THE WITHHELD DOCUMENTS WOULD HAVE BEEN CREATED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LITIGATION ................................................................................................33

III. THE FTC DEMONSTRATED A SUBSTANTIAL NEED FOR FACT WORK PRODUCT AND AN UNDUE BURDEN IN OTHERWISE OBTAINING IT ............................................................................................41

A. To the Extent That the District Court Applied a Heightened Standard for the Discovery of Ordinary Fact Work Product, This Was Legal Error .....................................................................................................43

B. The Information in the Withheld Documents is Highly Relevant to the FTC’s Investigation and Available Only from Boehringer ................46

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ACCEPTED AND RELIED ON IN CAMERA, EX PARTE AFFIDAVITS 53

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................58


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES*

CASES PAGE

Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ..............................................................................55

B.F.G. of Illinois, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18930 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2001) .....................................56

Boehringer Ingelheim Int'l GMBH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 562 F.Supp.2d 619 (D. Del. 2008), rev'd, 592 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......10

Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) ................................................................................................50

Chi. Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ............................................................................................50

*Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ................................................. 24, 25, 26, 42, 46

In Echostar Commcns. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ..........................................................................35

Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ....................................................................... 55, 56

FTC v. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 713 F.3d 54 (11th Cir. 2013) ..............................................................................49

*FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-416 (S. Ct. Jun. 17, 2013) ............................................ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 47, 49

FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No. 12-5393 (D.C. Cir. April 12, 2013) ............................................................... 3

FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ............................................................................45

FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ..................................................................... 22, 56

*FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ..................................................... 3, 22, 24, 44, 45

Gordon v. U.S.,, 722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983) ..............................................................................56

* Authorities principally relied upon.


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Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ......................................................................... 54, 56

Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ..........................................................................56

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) ............................................................................................24

In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) ........................................................................ 52, 53

Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ..............................................................................44

*Lykins v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ................................................................... 54, 55

Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ............................................................................57

Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) ....................................................................... 50, 51

Recycling Solutions, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 175 F.R.D. 407 (D.D.C. 1997) ...........................................................................35

In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Lit., 859 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1988) .............................................................................25

In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ..................................................................... 22, 34

In re Sealed Case, 129 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ..................................................................... 26, 27

*In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ..................................................................... 26, 31

Senate of the Com. of Puerto Rico on Behalf of Judiciary Committee v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 823 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ............................................................... 24, 31, 33

Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987) ..............................................................................25

In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1992) ...............................................................................29

Smith v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Amer., No. 2:07-cv-681, 2009 WL 2045197 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2009) ..........................27

In re Subpoena Served upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ..................................................................... 22, 31


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*U.S. v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998) ................................................................ 33, 34, 40

U.S. v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) ...................................................................................50

U.S. v. Clemens, 793 F.Supp.2d 236 (D.D.C. 2011) ......................................................................26

*U.S. v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ............................................................... 24, 32, 33

U.S. v. Legal Services for N.Y.C., 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ............................................................................ 3

U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) ..................................................................................... 24, 44

U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) ............................................................................................25

U.S. v. Sepenuk, 864 F.Supp. 1002 (D.Or. 1994), aff'd sub nom,

U.S. v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................57

U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) ............................................................................................51

U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................22

Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 (1981) ............................................................................................25

Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 145 F.R.D. 274 (D.D.C. 1992) .................................................................... 32, 33

Willingham v. Ashcroft, 228 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2005)......................................................................... 33, 34


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FEDERAL STATUTES

Federal Trade Commission Act

15 U.S.C. § 45 ....................................................................................................... 5

15 U.S.C. § 46 .....................................................................................................24

15 U.S.C. § 49 .................................................................................................3, 24

Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173 ................................................................ 8

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) .............................................................................. 8

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................................ 3

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................ 3

28 U.S.C. § 1337 ........................................................................................................ 3

28 U.S.C. § 1345 ........................................................................................................ 3

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) ................................................................................................. 8

RULES

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(ii) .................................................................................... 3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) ............................................................................................24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) .......................................................................... 26, 42

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B) ......................................................................................25

Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(5) ............................................................................................45

REGULATIONS

16 C.F.R. § 2.7(a)(4) ................................................................................................24 16 C.F.R. § 2.11 .......................................................................................................24

LEGISLATIVE

S. Rep. No. 107-167 (2002) ....................................................................................... 8


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MISCELLANEOUS

8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2024 (1970) ............................................................... 33, 34

11 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law,

¶ 1912g (3d ed. 2011) .........................................................................................50 12 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law,

¶ 2046c (3d ed. 2012) ........................................................................................... 7 Edna Selan Epstein,

The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine Vol. II (5th ed. 2007) ..........................................................................................56 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00955-TWT (N.D. Ga.), Second Amended

Complaint, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710060/090528androgelfinalcmpt.pdf ..... 47, 48

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00955-TWT (N.D. Ga.), Second Amended

Complaint, Exhibit A, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710060/130122watsonappendix2.pdf .............48

FTC Bureau of Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Summary of Agreements Filed in FY 2009 (2010), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/reports/mmact/MMAreport2009.pdf .................................... 9 C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and

Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (2009) ............................................................................ 9


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GLOSSARY

Barr ........................................ Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (including its wholly-owned subsidiary, Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc.)

BIPI ....................................... Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Boehringer ............................. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Commission .......................... Federal Trade Commission

Dkt. ....................................... Docket entry in district court case below (FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Case 1:09-mc-00564-JMF (D.D.C.))

FDA ....................................... Food & Drug Administration

FOIA………………………..Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524

FTC ....................................... Federal Trade Commission

FTC Act ................................. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58


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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court recently held that “reverse-payment” settlements of

pharmaceutical patent litigation are subject to antitrust scrutiny and that the central

question in assessing such an agreement is whether the branded drug firm’s

payment to the generic challenger is justified—that is, shown to be for something

other than avoiding the risk of competition. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-416, slip

op. at 19 (S. Ct. Jun. 17, 2013). This appeal concerns the ability of the Federal

Trade Commission (“Commission” or “FTC”) to obtain the most direct evidence

on that question: contemporaneous financial analyses, including analyses of

purportedly independent business arrangements. In Actavis, the Court noted that

the settling parties claimed the payments to the generic drug firms were

“compensation for other services the generics promised to perform,” while the

FTC complaint alleged that the payments were compensation for the generics’

agreement not to compete until 2015. Id. at 6. The complaint in that case relied on

an internal financial analysis by the branded drug manufacturer (at that time

Solvay) of various settlement scenarios, which was an exhibit to the complaint.

The current inquiry probes similar antitrust concerns and gives rise to a

similar need for the same types of financial records. As discussed below, branded-

drug manufacturer Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Boehringer” or

“BIPI”) simultaneously entered into two agreements with a generic-drug


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manufacturer, and it claims the two agreements were independent. The first was a

settlement of patent litigation between the two companies, in which the generic

manufacturer agreed to delay competitive generic entry for a period of years. The

second was a “co-promotion agreement,” in which Boerhinger agreed to pay the

generic manufacturer to promote Boerhinger’s own branded drugs. The FTC’s

investigation focuses on whether these two agreements are indeed independent.

Are the very large sums Boerhinger agreed to pay the generic manufacturer only

for these promotional services? Or are they side-payments for an anticompetitive

agreement to delay generic entry and share the ensuing monopoly profits?

Boerhinger’s internal financial and business analysis of these deals is directly

relevant to answering these questions.

The district court order challenged here frustrates that investigation. The

court made a sweeping, categorical ruling that Boehringer could withhold as

opinion work product hundreds of documents containing such financial or business

analyses, including every analysis of the co-promotion agreement. It reasoned that

“the co-promotion agreement was an integral part of the litigation,” Dkt. 69 at 10

[JA-___], even though Boehringer has repeatedly insisted that the co-promotion

agreement was a freestanding business transaction, distinct from the settlement.

Moreover, the district court based its decision to a significant extent on two ex

parte affidavits from Boehringer’s counsel, even though sworn testimony of


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Boehringer executives contradicts the conclusion the court drew from these

affidavits. In the course of these rulings, the district court misapplied this Circuit’s

precedent and reached an erroneous and overbroad conclusion as to the scope of

work-product protection. This Court should reverse.

JURISDICTION

The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 49

(authorizing district courts to enforce FTC subpoenas) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1337, and 1345. On September 27 and October 16, 2012, the district court entered

orders that, collectively, resolved all claims in this case, granting in part and

denying in part the FTC’s subpoena enforcement petition. Dkts. 69-72 [JA-___].

As a panel of this Court has already ruled, the Court has jurisdiction over

this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court’s September 27 and

October 16, 2012, orders were final and appealable. See FTC v. Boehringer

Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., No. 12-5393, Order (D.C. Cir., April 12, 2013) (per

curiam) (denying Boehringer’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction); see also

FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 873 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc); U.S. v.

Legal Services for N.Y.C., 249 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Commission

filed a timely notice of appeal on December 11, 2012. Dkt. 77 [JA-___]. See Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(ii).


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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the district court committed legal error when it treated all business

and financial analyses requested by in-house counsel as opinion work

product.

2. Whether the district court committed legal error when it failed to examine

whether any of the documents, including documents analyzing a

“freestanding,” “fair arms-length business arrangement,” would have been

prepared in essentially similar form irrespective of litigation and thus were

not work product.

3. Whether the FTC has shown substantial need for Boehringer’s factual work

product and whether the district court erroneously applied a heightened

standard of need.

4. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it accepted ex parte, in

camera affidavits, to which the FTC has still been denied access, without

determining that they were “absolutely necessary” to assess Boehringer’s

work product claims and that the need for secrecy “outweighed other crucial

interests.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below

On February 5, 2009, the FTC issued a subpoena duces tecum to Boehringer

seeking documents relevant to an investigation into whether Boehringer, Barr


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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Barr”), and their affiliates engaged in unfair methods of

competition in or affecting commerce, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15

U.S.C. § 45, with respect to the sale of two Boehringer drug products, Aggrenox

and Mirapex. Specifically, the FTC is investigating whether Boehringer unlawfully

paid Barr not to launch competing generic versions of Aggrenox and Mirapex as

part of a patent litigation settlement. See Actavis, No. 12-416, slip op. at 19-20.

After Boehringer failed to comply with several of the subpoena’s terms, the FTC

filed a petition for enforcement in the U.S. District Court for the District of

Columbia on October 23, 2009. Dkt. 1 [JA-___].

In proceedings before the district court, the FTC challenged, inter alia,

Boehringer’s refusal to produce hundreds of financial analyses and other similar

documents based on claims of attorney-client privilege and the work-product

doctrine. On September 27, 2012, the district court issued an order addressing

these claims. It held that all of the withheld financial analyses prepared in

connection with the settlement of the Aggrenox and Mirapex patent litigation—

including all analyses related to the business agreement that Boehringer entered

into with Barr at the time of settlement—constituted opinion work product subject

to the “virtually undiscoverable” standard, rather than the substantial-need standard

generally applied to work-product claims. It did so on the grounds that the analyses

(1) had been prepared at the request of Boehringer’s general counsel,


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(notwithstanding sworn testimony that at least some were created by non-attorneys

without input from legal personnel); and (2) were intended to “aid in the settlement

process” even though some of the documents were prepared well before settlement

negotiations began, or up to eight months after the settlement was executed.1 The

court resolved the remaining claims raised in the subpoena enforcement action in a

companion decision issued October 16, 2012.

This appeal followed.

B. Statement of Facts

Commission staff sought access to the documents withheld by Boehringer in

order to further the FTC’s investigation of Hatch-Waxman patent settlements

involving “reverse-payment” agreements. Typically, when a patentee sues an

alleged infringer, a settlement may involve the alleged infringer’s paying the

patentee. In a reverse-payment settlement, the alleged infringer agrees not to enter

the market for a period of time, and “the settlement requires the patentee to pay the

alleged infringer, rather than the other way around.” Actavis, No. 12-416, slip op.

at 1. This form of settlement “tend[s] to have significant adverse effects on

competition,” id. at 21, because it can amount to a sharing of monopoly profits in

1 Boehringer stated that “the patent litigation settlements with Barr [] were negotiated and executed between March and August 2008.” Dkt. 37 at 36. Almost 200 withheld documents pre-date March 2008, and over 30 documents are dated up to eight months after August 2008. Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Exs. 11-16.


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order to prevent the risk of competition. Id. at 18-19; see also 12 Phillip E. Areeda

& Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2046c, at 338 (3d ed. 2012) (“In such

cases a settlement agreement effectively ‘preserves’ the patent, thus giving the two

firms the joint-maximizing, or monopoly, output.”)

According to the Supreme Court, the antitrust analysis of reverse-payment

settlements focuses on the size of, and potential justifications for, the payment.

Actavis, No. 12-416, slip op. at 18-19 (“Although the parties may have reasons to

prefer settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is:

What are those reasons?”). In this investigation, Boehringer agreed to pay Barr

more than $100 million, purportedly as part of a co-promotion agreement executed

at the same time as the settlement. The Commission seeks to determine whether

this payment was “compensation for other services that the generic has promised to

perform,” or if it was for Barr’s agreement to forgo entry. Id. at 17. The withheld

financial analyses are the only direct evidence of how Boehringer

contemporaneously valued the co-promotion agreement.

1. FTC investigation of Hatch-Waxman settlements and reverse-payment agreements

Reverse-payment settlements typically arise in the context of the Hatch-

Waxman Act, a streamlined regulatory framework established by Congress to

encourage generic-drug entry and under which a generic-drug manufacturer may

obtain approval of its product from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).


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When a company seeks FDA approval to market a generic version of a brand-name

drug before expiration of a patent covering that drug, the generic applicant must

certify that the patent in question is invalid or not infringed by the generic product

(a “Paragraph IV” certification). 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). This system

encourages challenges to patents that may be invalid. See Actavis, No. 12-416, slip

op. at 13. Once a generic files a Paragraph IV certification, the patent holder may

bring suit immediately, even before the generic applicant markets its product. 35

U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). Paragraph IV patent challenges sometimes result in reverse-

payment settlements, as described above.

In 2003 Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman regime, seeking, in part, to

eliminate the “abuse of the Hatch-Waxman law” resulting from “pacts between big

pharmaceutical firms and makers of generic versions of brand name drugs, that are

intended to keep lower-cost drugs off the market.” S. Rep. No. 107-167, at 4

(2002). Among these changes, Congress created a mechanism for agency review

and investigation of potentially anticompetitive agreements. See 2003 Medicare

Amendments to Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-1118; Actavis,

No. 12-416, slip op. at 13. As part of its antitrust enforcement mandate, the FTC

investigates Hatch-Waxman settlement agreements to determine whether they

unlawfully restrain trade.


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In these investigations, the FTC often relies on companies’ internal financial

analyses and business forecasts to determine whether the branded firm has

compensated the generic firm for delayed entry. Compensation rarely takes the

form of explicit cash payments; instead, the settling firms typically include the

payment in a separate business deal executed simultaneously with the settlement.2

In these cases, the FTC assesses whether the side deal is an independent business

transaction or instead an inducement offered to persuade the generic firm to delay

entry. Financial forecasts and analyses of the deals are often the only direct

evidence of whether the branded firm believed the deal to be economically

freestanding or whether it instead viewed the deal as worth entering only because

of the additional profits gained through delayed generic entry. This evidence would

2 Before the FTC began investigating reverse-payment settlements, payments were often made part of the settlement. Since then, parties to these agreements have often conveyed payments via side deals. See, e.g., FTC Bureau of Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Summary of Agreements Filed in FY 2009 (2010) (cataloguing potential pay-for-delay agreements, including nine that included a “side deal”) (available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/mmact/MMAreport2009.pdf); see also C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 663 (2009) (“Today, side deals take two complementary forms: overpayment by the brand-name firm for value contributed by the generic firm, and underpayment by the generic firm for value provided by the brand-name firm.”).


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indicate the purpose and likely effect of the deal and thus help the Commission

determine whether it was an anticompetitive reverse payment.

2. Mirapex and Aggrenox agreements

In this investigation, the FTC is examining whether a patent litigation

settlement and a simultaneously executed co-promotion agreement between

Boehringer and Barr together constitute an unlawful reverse-payment agreement.

The investigation involves two Boehringer branded products: Mirapex

(pramipexole), which is used to treat the symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease, and

Aggrenox (aspirin and extended-release dipyridamole), which is used to prevent

excessive blood clotting and reduce the risk of stroke. Dkt. 1-1 at 3 [JA-___].

When Barr filed Paragraph IV certifications for both of these drugs, Boehringer

promptly filed infringement suits. Id.

In August 2008, Boehringer and Barr entered simultaneous agreements

settling the patent litigations. Id. at 4 [JA-___]. At that time, the Aggrenox

litigation was still in its early stages, id., but the district court in the Mirapex

litigation had declared Boehringer’s patent invalid. Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l

GMBH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 619 (D. Del. 2008). (This decision was

subsequently reversed on appeal, in litigation with a different generic firm.

Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GMBH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.

2010).)


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Under the settlement agreements, Barr agreed not to market generic Mirapex

until January 2010 and generic Aggrenox until July 2015. Dkt. 1-1 at 4 [JA-___].

At the same time, the companies entered into a co-promotion agreement in which

Boehringer agreed to provide substantial compensation to Barr purportedly in

exchange for its efforts promoting branded Aggrenox to women’s health doctors.

Id. The FTC’s investigation focuses in large part on whether Boehringer used this

co-promotion agreement to pay Barr not to compete with Mirapex or Aggrenox.

3. FTC investigation and Boehringer privilege claims

On January 15, 2009, the Commission issued a Resolution Authorizing Use

of Compulsory Process in Nonpublic Investigation. The Resolution authorized

compulsory process to be used in connection with the investigation, to determine

“whether Boehringer . . . and Barr . . . [have] engaged or [are] engaging in unfair

methods of competition in or affecting commerce, in violation of Section 5 of the

[FTC Act,] with respect to the sale of Aggrenox or its generic equivalents and

Mirapex or its generic equivalents.” Dkt. 1-2 at 2 [JA-___]. On February 5, 2009,

the Commission issued the subpoena at issue in this appeal. Dkt. 1-3 [JA-___]. The

subpoena specified 37 categories of documents, including documents related to the

Aggrenox and Mirapex patent litigation, documents related to the sales, profits,

and marketing plans for Aggrenox and Mirapex (including forecasts of generic

entry), and documents related to the Aggrenox co-promotion agreement. Dkt. 1-1


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at 4-5 [JA-___]. Eight months later, Boehringer still had not certified compliance

with the subpoena. Id. at 9 [JA-___]. Accordingly, on October 23, 2009, the FTC

filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for

an order enforcing the subpoena. Dkt. 1 [JA-___]. The petition alleged that

Boehringer had failed to completely produce responsive documents and used

inadequate search procedures. Id. at 8-9 [JA-___].

After the FTC filed its petition for enforcement of the subpoena, the parties

exchanged correspondence in an effort to settle the outstanding issues, including

their disagreements about whether Boehringer had legitimately withheld or

redacted a large number of documents based on disputed attorney-client privilege

and work-product assertions. See Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 17 at 1 [JA-___]. This

appeal challenges the district court’s ruling only as it applies to Boehringer’s work-

product claims.3

Boehringer claimed attorney-client privilege or work product with regard to

3,420 documents. See Dkt. 32, Ex. B at 5 [JA-___]; Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 17 at

3 Boehringer asserted both work-product protection and attorney-client privilege for many of the challenged documents. Because the district court found that the challenged analyses and forecasts were opinion work product, it did not resolve whether any such documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The FTC is appealing only the court’s determination that these analyses were opinion work product. The FTC is not appealing the district court’s determination with regard to documents for which only attorney-client privilege was claimed. See Dkt. 69 at 15 [JA-___].


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1 [JA-___]. Based on Boehringer’s descriptions in its log and the sworn testimony

of Boehringer personnel, the FTC challenged 631 of those claims, including claims

of protected status for business documents “regarding” or “prepared as a result of”

patent litigation or analyzing settlement options and business documents analyzing

the Aggrenox co-promotion agreement. Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 17 [JA-___]. A

number of these documents even post-dated the settlement. Id. at 1-2, App. A [JA-

___].4 For purposes of this appeal, the challenged documents fall into two major

categories:

(1) Non-legal business documents “regarding” or “prepared as a result

of” patent litigation or analyzing settlement options. The FTC identified over

300 documents that the privilege log describes as “regarding” or “prepared as a

result of” the patent litigation, which were circulated to business executives and

prepared primarily by non-lawyers. Similarly, it identified 55 documents analyzing

settlement options that appear to be non-legal business documents. Id. at 2, App. A

[JA-___]. These documents are primarily financial forecasts of generic entry or the

financial impact of settlement options. See Dkt. 32, Ex. B at 6-7 [JA-___]. For

example, document no. 833 is a spreadsheet sent from Tom Buckley, a non-lawyer,

to Paul Fonteyne, a senior business executive, copying numerous other business

4 See supra note 1.


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executives. The privilege log, however, describes the document as “Analyses of

‘577 and ‘086/‘812 Patent Litigations prepared as a result of litigation.” Dkt. 32,

Ex. B Decl. Ex. 11 at 60 [JA-___]. Document no. 992 is a PowerPoint found in the

files of non-lawyer Steve Marlin (as to which Boehringer did not supply author

information and which was not circulated) described in the privilege log as

“Analysis of ‘577 Patent Litigations and settlement strategy prepared as a result of

litigation.” Id. at 75 [JA-___]. The FTC objected to Boehringer’s withholding these

and similar documents, arguing that documents created by non-lawyers for

business purposes (such as informing business decisions) are not work product.

The sworn investigational hearing testimony of Boehringer personnel

confirms that many of these documents consist of non-legal, financial analyses. For

example, Paul Fonteyne, who is listed in the privilege log as the creator or

recipient of many of the disputed documents, testified that his role was to provide

“commercial input” consisting of “mostly financial analyses.” Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl.

Ex. 20 at 41, 48 [JA-___]. Fonteyne’s testimony reinforces what the privilege log

suggests: many of these documents are simply business documents created to

inform business decisions.

(2) Non-legal business documents analyzing the Aggrenox co-promotion

agreement. The FTC also identified a number of documents, including seven

submitted in camera, related solely to the Aggrenox co-promotion agreement,


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which Boehringer maintains was an “arms-length business arrangement” separate

from the patent-litigation settlement. See Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 18 at 7 [JA-___].

For example, document no. 1090, sent from non-lawyer Hanbo Hu to non-lawyer

Fonteyne, is a PowerPoint “Analysis regarding possible Aggrenox co-promotion

agreement relating to ’577 Patent Litigation settlement prepared as a result of

litigation.” Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 17 at 4, App. A [JA-___].5 Despite its position

that the co-promotion was a separate economic transaction, Boehringer contended

that these documents were work product because the co-promotion agreement

“relates to” the patent-litigation settlement. Id. [JA-___].

Boehringer testimony again indicates that these documents were focused on

the financial, not legal, implications of the co-promotion agreement. Elizabeth

Cochrane, a financial executive who created many of the analyses, testified that her

role was to “quantify the Duramed [a Barr subsidiary] copromotion,” which

entailed evaluating “the financial impact to [Boehringer]’s P&L, profit and loss

statement.” Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 3 at 21:6-22:16 [JA-___]. Paul Fonteyne, who

was also closely involved in creating the analyses, testified that his role was to

provide “commercial input” on the deal. Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 20 at 48:7-9 [JA-

5 This document was included on the list of documents that the parties agreed would be submitted to the district court in camera, but the district court did not rule on this document. See infra note 6.


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___]. Some or all of these analyses appear to have been conducted in order to

evaluate the financial (rather than legal) implications of the Aggrenox co-

promotion agreement, which, again, Boehringer insists was a separate economic

transaction. Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 18 at 7 [JA-___].

4. District court proceedings

Ultimately, the parties failed to reach agreement as to the privilege claims or

other issues in dispute. See Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 9 [JA-___]; Id. Decl. Ex. 10

[JA-___]. Boehringer nonetheless certified its compliance with the subpoena on

April 19, 2010. See Dkt. 15 at 2 [JA-___]; Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 2 [JA-___].

The parties briefed the two disputed issues in 2010. After district court-supervised

mediation failed to result in settlement, the district court held a status hearing on

December 9, 2011. Dkt. 59 [JA-___]. As part of the proceeding, the parties

mutually agreed on 87 sample documents to submit to the district court for in

camera review. See Dkt. 69 at 3-4 [JA-___].

More than a year after the parties had briefed the disputed work-product

issues and on the eve of the hearing, Boehringer submitted ex parte affidavits from

Marla Persky, Boehringer’s general counsel, and Pamela Taylor, who is outside

counsel representing Boehringer in the FTC investigation and who had no

contemporaneous involvement in the settlements or co-promotion agreement. See

Dkt. 69 at 10-11 [JA-___]. Apparently relying on these affidavits, Boehringer


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argued that the withheld analyses of the settlement and the co-promotion were

“specifically asked for by [Persky], either directly or indirectly.” Dkt. 59 at 19 [JA-

___]. Because Boehringer did not disclose the affidavits or their content to the

FTC, the FTC had no opportunity to review or respond to them and objected to

their submission. Id. at 4-5 [JA-___].6

On September 27, 2012, almost a year after the status hearing and more than

three years after the FTC filed its enforcement petition, the district court issued its

opinion and order on Boehringer’s work-product claims. Dkt. 69 and 70 [JA-___].

It held all of the withheld financial analyses were requested by counsel to assist in

settlement negotiations and so were “opinion” work product, the disclosure of

which would “necessarily” reveal the attorneys’ thought processes. Dkt. 69 at 12

[JA-___]. The district court specifically addressed the disputed documents

containing analyses of the Aggrenox co-promotion agreement, stating that the

6 The affidavits appear to have placed additional documents before the district court for in camera review that were not part of the parties’ agreement on the in camera submission. The district court’s September 27, 2012, decision ruled on 101 documents, not the 87 agreed upon. Of the 101, 27 (nos. 1365, 1367, 1368, 902, 2918, 2919, 2920, 1580, 1984, 2250, 233, 790, 791, 2495, 2578, 2983, 780, 1008, 1016, 1001, 3327, 1364, 2917, 3057, 616, 1308, and 2945) were not covered by the agreement, and of those 27, 14 (nos. 1580, 2250, 233, 790, 2495, 2578, 2983, 780, 1001, 3327, 2917, 3057, 1308, and 2945) were not even contested by the FTC. The district court also failed to rule on 13 documents (nos. 3171, 3296, 2331, 1384, 1380, 1363, 1339, 1294, 1095, 1154, 1084, 1090, and 1029) that were jointly submitted.


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agreement “was an integral part of the settlement.” Dkt. 69 at 10 [JA-___]. It

acknowledged, but did not accord significance to, the tension between this

conclusion and Boehringer’s continuing claim that the co-promotion agreement

was “freestanding” and independent from the settlement agreement as a business

matter. Id.

As support for its holding that these analyses reflected Persky’s mental

impressions, the district court cited primarily the pair of in camera affidavits from

Persky and Taylor. Id. at 11 [JA-___]. According to the court, BIPI attorneys

supplied “information and frameworks” to be used in these analyses. Dkt. 69 at 11

[JA-___] Further, it held that any factual work product in those documents could

not be segregated from the opinion work product because disclosing “any aspect”

of the analyses would shed light on the nature of the attorney’s request. Dkt. 69 at

12 [JA-___]. The court did not discuss the sworn investigational hearing testimony

(which the FTC had presented in its briefs) in which Persky and other Boehringer

witnesses stated that Persky did not provide input or assumptions to guide the

creation of these financial analyses.

Having deemed all of the financial analyses opinion work product, the

district court then ruled the FTC had not demonstrated the “overriding and

compelling need” required to discover this type of work product. The court stated

that it was “sympathetic to the FTC’s argument that these financial analyses are the


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only documents that could demonstrate whether or not [Boehringer] was using the

co-promotion agreement to pay Barr not to compete.” Id. at 13 [JA-___]. But in the

court’s view, the documents did not provide additional useful information beyond

what the Commission already knew about the settlement. Id. at 12-13 [JA-___].

(“No one is pretending that the FTC is not fully aware of the deal that was made or

the economic benefits the deal makers were trying to achieve.”). The court

declared “there are no smoking guns contained in these documents.” Id. Further, it

believed that “the arithmetical calculations of various potential scenarios … are not

in any way evidence of any conspiratorial intent to violate the law” and “do not

cast any light on the fundamental legal issue of whether the deal was or was not

anti-competitive in intendment or result.” Id. The district court announced this

conclusion without addressing issues such as how the Commission might analyze

or use the financial and quantitative data in the documents as part of its

investigation, what legal and economic theories the Commission and its staff might

consider, or what other documents and data the Commission might be able to

consider in conjunction with these calculations.7

7 The parties have also disputed whether Boehringer failed to conduct centralized electronic searches of its records and improperly maintained documents. See Dkt. 32, Ex. B. Decl. Ex. 7 at 1 [JA-___]. On October 16, 2012, the district court issued a second opinion resolving the parties’ dispute over the backup tape search, fully resolving all outstanding issues before it on that question. Dkt. 71, 72 [JA-___]. This appeal deals only with the district court’s work-product decision.


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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court applied an indiscriminate, categorical approach to the work

product doctrine that contradicts this Court’s precedent and established work-

product principles. First, the district court erroneously concluded that every

financial and generic entry analysis prepared by non-lawyers at the request of

Boehringer’s general counsel necessarily conveyed the mental impressions of

counsel and was thus subject to the heightened “opinion” work-product standard

rather than the normal standard for “factual” work product. That holding

contradicts settled precedent: documents prepared by non-lawyers in response to a

general request from a lawyer are not opinion work product simply because they

might indirectly shed some weak light on the lawyer’s thought processes. Because

it erroneously concluded otherwise, the district court categorically suppressed all

of the relevant documents in their entirety and failed to require Boehringer to

evaluate whether particular documents or portions of documents contained only

“factual” work product that could be produced. Testimony from Boehringer

witnesses, admissions from counsel, and the district court’s own characterization

of the documents prevent any reasonable inference that this entire category of

documents amounts to opinion work product.

Second, the district court erred by failing to consider whether any of the

withheld documents would have been created in essentially similar form


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irrespective of the litigation. Such documents were not created “because of”

litigation, and are therefore not work product at all. This error was particularly

significant with regard to the withheld analyses of the Aggrenox co-promotion, a

purportedly freestanding, “arms-length” business deal. Record evidence, including

testimony from Boehringer personnel, as well as common sense, indicates that

Boehringer would have conducted ordinary-course financial analyses before

entering the co-promotion agreement—a $120 million deal. Yet Boehringer has

withheld every contemporaneous financial analysis of the agreement as work

product.

Third, the FTC has shown substantial need for Boehringer’s factual work

product. To the extent that the district court required a higher showing than

substantial need, it misperceived the applicable legal standard and abused its

discretion by substituting the court’s assessment of the investigation’s merits for

the FTC’s own. The FTC amply demonstrated below that Boehringer’s

contemporaneous analyses of the settlement and co-promotion agreement are

highly relevant and otherwise unavailable.

Finally, the district court abused its discretion by relying on in camera, ex

parte affidavits from Boehringer’s general counsel and outside counsel to conclude

that virtually all of the over 600 documents withheld by Boehringer were created at

Persky’s request for the purpose of aiding the Aggrenox and Mirapex patent


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litigation. Boehringer made no attempt to show that the ex parte affidavits were

“absolutely necessary” to decide a dispute over work-product protection, and the

district court erroneously failed to require such a showing. Moreover, record

evidence casts doubt on the reliability of these affidavits. In these circumstances, it

was an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely on Boehringer’s ex parte

representations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In subpoena enforcement cases, this Court undertakes a de novo review of

whether a district court applied the correct legal standard. See U.S. Int’l Trade

Comm’n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2005); FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,

555 F.2d 862, 876 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc). Where the district court

misperceives the applicable legal standard, no deference is due. See In re Subpoena

Served upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

In other respects, a district court’s decision is reviewed “for arbitrariness or abuse

of discretion.” FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(quoting In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).


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ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD IN RULING ON BOEHRINGER’S WORK-PRODUCT CLAIMS

A. The District Court Erroneously Deemed All Withheld Financial and Generic Entry Analyses as Opinion Work Product Because They Were Requested by Counsel

The district court made a blanket determination that virtually all of the

categories of documents challenged by the FTC were opinion work product,

including Excel spreadsheets and other documents calculating the financial impact

of generic entry, documents analyzing the financial impact of proposed settlement

terms, and documents analyzing the profitability of the Aggrenox co-promotion

agreement. Rather than evaluating which of the withheld documents actually

contained mental impressions of counsel, the court categorically concluded that

any analysis requested by counsel “necessarily” conveyed the mental impressions

of counsel, Dkt. 69 at 11 [JA-___]:

[A] disclosure of any aspect of the financial analyses would necessarily reveal the attorneys’ thought processes regarding the BIPI-Barr settlement. The reports in question were prepared at the behest of BIPI attorneys, who requested that certain data be entered and manipulated to determine whether various settlement options were beneficial to BIPI. Revealing the data chosen for this analysis would necessarily reveal the attorneys’ mental impressions, including, at a bare minimum, that the attorneys believed such analyses of that data was necessary or important to determining an appropriate settlement.


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Id. at 12 (emphasis added). But such a request is not a sufficient legal basis for

presuming that these analyses reveal opinion work product, particularly where, as

here, counsel did not choose the inputs or assumptions that Boehringer business

people used in the analyses. See Part I.A.2, infra. In effect, the district court

applied a rule that extends work-product protection “to every written document

generated by an attorney.” Senate of the Com. of Puerto Rico on Behalf of the

Judiciary Comm. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(internal quotation and cite omitted). That was reversible error.

1. An attorney’s request for a document does not necessarily make it opinion work product

The work-product doctrine protects an attorney’s legal analyses and

preparations from intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Hickman v.

Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). U.S. v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 130

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that work-product doctrine protects documents created

“because of” litigation). A party may still discover work product, however, based

on a showing of substantial need for the materials and undue hardship in acquiring

the information in any other way. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3);8 Dir., Office of Thrift

8 While the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49, and case law, see, e.g., U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Texaco, 555 F.2d 862, govern enforcement of Commission subpoenas, the Commission recognizes work-product claims, 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.7(a)(4), 2.11, and applies federal common law concerning work product, as codified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).


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Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The

general rule for discoverability does not apply to the narrower set of work product

documents that disclose an attorney’s “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,

or legal theories.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B); U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238

(1975). This “opinion” work product is “virtually undiscoverable.” Dir., Office of

Thrift Supervision, 124 F.3d at 1307.

The category of opinion work product is reserved for documents that

“reveal[] the attorney’s mental processes.” Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 400

(1981). All documents prepared for litigation arguably contain some clues as to an

attorney’s thinking, and a request from counsel does not automatically transform

all resulting documents into opinion work product. Dir., Office of Thrift

Supervision, 124 F.3d at 1307-08. If “every item which may reveal some inkling of

a lawyer’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories” were to be

classified as opinion work product, “the exception would hungrily swallow up the

rule.” In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Lit., 859 F.2d 1007, 1015 (1st Cir.

1988); see also Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397. 402 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987)

(“The purpose of the work product doctrine—that of preventing discovery of a

lawyer’s mental impressions—is not violated by allowing discovery of documents

that incorporate a lawyer’s thoughts in . . . an indirect and diluted manner.”).


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“Where the context suggests that the lawyer had not sharply focused or

weeded the materials,” they are deemed fact work product and may be obtained on

a showing of substantial need and undue burden under Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(3)(A)(ii).” In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Although

this Court has not directly articulated the “degree of selection necessary to

transform facts into opinions,” Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 124 F.3d at 1308,

work-product cases in this and other circuits illustrate that the attorney must be

more than a catalyst for the document’s creation.

In the context of attorney notes memorializing witness interviews, for

example, courts in this circuit have rejected the view that all such attorney notes

necessarily convey the mental impressions of counsel. This Court has distinguished

between “interviews conducted as part of a litigation-related investigation,” in

which the facts elicited “necessarily reflected a focus chosen by the lawyer,” and

preliminary interviews initiated by a non-lawyer that cover a wide range of topics,

which may not contain opinion work product. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 236.

Lawyer notes memorializing the second category of witness interviews are not

necessarily opinion work product, even though the notes invariably involve some

degree of editing and selection by the lawyer. See U.S. v. Clemens, 793 F. Supp. 2d

236, 252-53 (D.D.C. 2011) (discussing the degree of editing involved in Sealed

Case, as described in Judge Tatel’s dissent from the denial of en banc hearing, 129


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F.3d 637, 638). See also Smith v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Amer., No. 2:07-cv-681,

2009 WL 2045197, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2009) (an actuarial calculation created

at the request of a lawyer was “at most, ‘fact work product’” because “documents

reflect only the financial calculations of [the actuary]” and “no impressions,

opinions or thoughts of an attorney are revealed”). The district court erred in

holding that an attorney’s request necessarily transforms a document into “virtually

undiscoverable” opinion work product.

2. The record indicates that few of the withheld documents actually contain the mental impressions of counsel

Despite the district court’s blanket holding that any financial analysis

requested by Boeheringer’s attorneys is opinion work product, the record illustrates

that many of the withheld documents do not reflect the mental impressions of an

attorney. Boehringer witnesses testified that financial analyses lacked any

substantive contribution from in-house counsel, and Persky herself testified that

she provided minimal, if any, substantive input. Dkt. 32, Ex. B Dec. Ex. 19 at 117:

2-7 [JA-___]; Dkt. 37, Ex. 4 at 118:3-23 [JA-___]. She explained that she asked a

senior business executive, Paul Fonteyne, to provide financial analyses that would

inform the terms that would be acceptable for Boehringer for the Mirapex

settlement, the Aggrenox settlement, and the Aggrenox co-promotion agreement.

Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 19 at 113:14-22 [JA-___]. According to Persky, Fonteyne

was the key “decision-maker” regarding the terms of the Aggrenox co-promotion


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agreement, and was responsible for evaluating whether the agreement with Barr

made sense from a “financial [and] business perspective.” Id. at 61:1-23, 68:19-24

[JA-___]. Fonteyne likewise testified his role was to provide “commercial input,”

which consisted of “mostly financial analyses.” Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 20 at

48:7-16 [JA-___]. With assistance from other non-lawyers, he conducted many of

the withheld financial analyses.

Both Fonteyne and Persky testified that the assumptions used to construct

these analyses were generated from non-legal sources. For example, Persky

testified that she had not supplied any legal assumptions about Boehringer’s odds

of success in the patent litigation. Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 19 at 117:2-7 [JA-___].

In fact, she testified that the information flowed in the opposite direction: “I did not

provide them with figures. I asked them to provide me with figures.” Dkt. 37, Ex. 4

at 118:3-7 [JA-___]. And those figures concerned business, not legal matters.

Fonteyne explained that he—not any legal source—was responsible for the

“business constructs” of the agreement, which he considered to include: date of

generic entry, royalties, Aggrenox supply (to Barr in 2015), and the Aggrenox co-

promotion agreement. Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex 20 at 64:11-21 [JA-___]. Critically,

Fonteyne testified that the market information supporting the assumptions built

into these financial forecasts were supplied by the marketing team. Dkt. 32, Ex. B

Decl. Ex. 20 at 109:10-16 [JA-___]. The marketing team, not the legal department,


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supplied information on the timing of competitor launches and generic entry,

including entry based on litigation. Id. at 109:17-110:13 [JA-___].

The district court’s factual characterization of the withheld documents is

entirely consistent with this evidence:

From my review, there are no smoking guns contained in these documents; rather, they are the sort of financial analyses one would expect a company exercising due diligence to prepare when contemplating settlement options. They yield nothing more than the arithmetical calculations of various potential scenarios and are not in any way evidence of any conspiratorial intent to violate the law.

Dkt. 69 at 12-13 (emphases added) [JA-___]. The withheld documents—a series of

spreadsheets, financial analyses, and forecasts—would thus appear to be “nothing

but straightforward calculations from raw data, making it difficult to imagine what

‘mental impressions’ were involved.” In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d

939, 945 (2d Cir. 1992).

Moreover, some withheld documents appear to have been requested by

Persky only indirectly, if at all. For example, document 3058, described in the

privilege log as a PowerPoint presentation authored by non-lawyer Elizabeth

Cochrane and containing “Analyses of settlements of ‘086/‘812 and ‘577 Patent

Litigations prepared at the direction of attorney,” Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 15 at 13


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[JA-___], was attached to a cover email sent by Persky (document 3057).9 That

cover email, sent to Dr. Alessandro Banchi, a non-lawyer member of Boehringer’s

Board of Directors, responded to his “request for information on the effect a co-

promotion agreement with Barr would have on our financial projections.” The

cover email makes clear that document 3058 was requested by the Board of

Directors, not Persky, and that it was created to provide financial information.

Boehringer’s counsel at the status hearing admitted that some of the analyses

were not directly requested by counsel. See Dkt. 59 at 19:22-24 [JA-___] (claiming

that Persky asked for the financial analyses “either directly or indirectly”), 20:11-

12 [JA-___] (asserting that financial analyses were “directed at some level by

counsel”), 20:13-19 [JA-___] (admitting that the financial analyses were

“delegated” to people who had no direct involvement with counsel) (emphasis

added). And even those documents that were in fact requested by Persky cannot be

presumed to reflect the mental impressions of counsel, given her role as the

company’s lead negotiator on “business terms” and “the broad economic

arrangement” for “all the agreements.” Dkt. 37, Ex. 4 at 70:2-12; see also id. at

71:10-12 (Persky negotiated “key business terms of co-promotion agreement”).

9 The cover email, which the district court ordered to be produced to the FTC, Dkt. 69 at 13 [JA-___], was included in the in camera submission to the district court.


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In sum, the district court’s holding that an attorney’s request—no matter

how attenuated—necessarily transforms a document into opinion work product

would extend protection “to every written document generated by an attorney,”

and even beyond. Senate of Com. of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 586. As this Court

and others have recognized, that approach would be “virtually omnivorous” in the

range of relevant evidence it would shield from discovery. In re Sealed Case, 124

F.3d at 237. This Court should thus reverse and remand for application of the

appropriate standard. See Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d at 633.

B. The District Court Committed Legal Error by Failing to Require Boehringer to Redact Any Opinion Work Product

The district court’s failure to order production of any work product materials

that do not include opinion, or with opinion work product redacted, underscores

that its conclusion was based on a categorical presumption rather than an

individualized review of the documents. It is simply implausible that the entire

contents of the hundreds of withheld documents are opinion work product, or that

any opinion work product is so intertwined with fact work product (or non-work

product) that all of the documents must be withheld in their entirety. The district

court should thus have required Boehringer to produce the documents with any

opinion work product redacted.

In fact, counsel for Boehringer admitted that there was a “segregable factual

portion” to the financial analyses that would be “similar to the ordinary course


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analysis that [Boehringer] already provided” for agreements other than those

entered into at the time of the patent settlements. Dkt. 59 at 31:19-25 [JA-___].10

And the district court itself found that the documents are “financial analyses” and

“arithmetical calculations.” Dkt. 69 at 13 [JA-___]. Indeed, the district court

ordered production with redaction for the transmittal emails and other

correspondence that accompanied the financial analyses, but inexplicably failed to

require the same level of scrutiny for the analyses themselves. Dkt. 69 at 17 [JA-

___].

Given this record, even protected documents “likely … include[] other

information that is not work product.” Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d at 139. The district

court’s failure to require individual review and redaction reinforces the conclusion

that the court committed legal error by assuming that any document resulting from

counsel’s request necessarily merited protection as opinion work product.

Accordingly, this Court should remand the case to the district court “for the

purpose of independently assessing whether the document[s were] entirely work

[opinion] product, or whether a partial or redacted version of the document[s]

could have been disclosed.” Id.; see also Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 145

10 He went on to state that the segregable portions would be meaningless out of context, but this is not Boehringer’s decision to make.


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F.R.D. 274, 278 n.7 (D.D.C. 1992) (notes and commentary constituting opinion

work product can be protected with redactions).

II. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR BY FAILING TO EVALUATE WHETHER ANY OF THE WITHHELD DOCUMENTS WOULD HAVE BEEN CREATED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LITIGATION

In addition to the district court’s erroneous conclusion that all withheld

financial analyses were opinion work product, the court erred by failing to consider

whether any of the documents would have been created in essentially similar form

irrespective of the litigation and are therefore not work product at all. See

Willingham v. Ashcroft, 228 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2005); see also U.S. v. Adlman,

134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998). Sworn testimony from Boehringer witnesses

establishes that many of the documents in question were straightforward financial

analyses—a key subset of which relate only to a business agreement that

Boehringer has repeatedly claimed was freestanding. Moreover, many of the

withheld documents were created well before or after settlement negotiations.

The work-product doctrine protects only those documents created “because

of” litigation. See Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 129. A document is prepared “because of”

litigation if, “in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the

particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained

because of the prospect of litigation.” Senate of the Com. of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d

at 586 n.42 (quoting 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §


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2024 at 198 (1970)). Thus, documents prepared in the ordinary course of business

are not work product. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Similarly, “if documents would have been created in essentially similar form

irrespective of the litigation, it cannot fairly be said that they were created ‘because

of’ actual or impending litigation.” Willingham, 228 F.R.D. at 4; Adlman, 134 F.3d

at 1202. “Even if such documents might also help in preparation for litigation, they

do not qualify for protection.” Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202. The district court recited

this standard, Dkt. 69 at 6-7 [JA-___], but then wholly failed to apply it.

The district court’s failure to consider whether any withheld documents

would have been created irrespective of the litigation arose with respect to all

categories of documents, including financial and generic entry analyses. This

failure, however, was particularly indefensible with regard to those documents

analyzing the financial impact of the Aggrenox co-promotion agreement, which

Boehringer insists was a business transaction economically independent of the

settlement. Given Boehringer’s position, it is implausible that it conducted

financial analyses of this purportedly freestanding transaction only because of the

litigation settlement. Any analyses that would have been conducted to evaluate the

deal regardless of a contemporaneous settlement are not work product and must be

produced.


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Boehringer is taking inherently inconsistent positions on the subject of those

co-promotion documents, and that inconsistency renders Boehringer’s work-

product claims not only untenable, but also inequitable. While the FTC continues

to investigate whether the co-promotion agreement was an anticompetitive vehicle

to pay Barr for delayed entry, Boehringer has repeatedly asserted that it was not,

and that it instead represented an economically separate business transaction. See

Dkt. 37 Ex. 4, at 113:3-6 [JA-___] (Aggrenox co-promotion agreement not “a

vehicle to pay Barr not to compete on generic”); Dkt.32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 18 at 7

[JA-___] (stating that the co-promotion “stands by itself” and is a “fair arms-length

business arrangement”). These assertions undermine any plausible work-product

claim that documents related solely to the co-promotion agreement were created

“because of” the litigation settlement. Boerhinger cannot have it both ways:

because it maintains that these two deals are economically separate, it must face up

to the logical implication of that position in this work-product dispute.11

11 If, on the other hand, Boehringer’s ex parte affidavits represented to the district court—contrary to its court filings and sworn testimony—that the co-promotion was part of the consideration for the settlement, then it has advanced conflicting positions in order to gain an unfair litigation advantage, and this Court should take the appropriate remedial action. See Recycling Solutions, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 175 F.R.D. 407, 408 (D.D.C. 1997) (“As the adage states, privilege cannot be used both as a sword and as a shield.”); see also In re Echostar Commcns. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (district court should “balance the policies to prevent sword-and-shield litigation tactics with the policy to protect work product”). Moreover, the FTC’s inability to examine this


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In particular, if there is any truth to Boehringer’s repeated assertion that this

was a freestanding, arms-length business transaction, a sophisticated company like

Boehringer would have performed analyses to determine the financial value of the

co-promotion agreement, which required payment from Boehringer in excess of

$100 million.12 Indeed, we know that Boehringer performed such analyses, but it

has withheld every contemporaneous analysis of the co-promotion agreement as

work product.13 The premise of the district court’s holding is that Boehringer

conducted each and every one of these financial analyses only because the co-

promotion agreement was being considered simultaneously with the patent

litigation settlement. But that premise crashes headlong into the position

Boehringer has taken in this case. Any conclusion that these analyses would not

have been created in essentially similar form in the absence of litigation

possibility provides further reason to question the district court’s uncritical reliance on ex parte affidavits. See Part IV, infra. 12 The terms of the co-promotion agreement reveal that it was a significant financial transaction. Under the agreement, Boehringer agreed to pay Barr a one-time fee plus annual, increasing royalties on total U.S. Aggrenox sales for a period of years. Dkt. 37, Ex. 19 at 14-15 [JA-___]. In 2008, Aggrenox had total U.S. sales of about $366 million. Dkt. 32, Ex. B at 3 [JA-___]. At this level of sales, the FTC estimates that the deal would ultimately cost Boehringer over $120 million in royalties. 13 The district court noted that “BIPI insists any freestanding non-litigation-based financial analyses were already disclosed to the FTC,” Dkt. 69 at 11 [JA-___], but although it has produced some ordinary-course financial forecasts, Boehringer has not produced any such financial analyses for the co-promotion agreement.


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necessarily presupposes that the co-promotion was a vehicle to pay Barr for the

delayed entry codified in the settlement. Again, Boehringer cannot logically

maintain that the deal was economically freestanding while attributing all of the

analyses of the deal to the settlement.

In any event, whatever the relationship between the patent litigation

settlement and the co-promotion agreement, the district court should have

considered whether any of the analyses would have been created in essentially

similar form irrespective of the litigation. Any such documents are not work

product.

Testimony from Boehringer personnel confirms that their analyses were a

standard part of the evaluation of a transaction of this sort. Persky testified that

“[w]e negotiated with Barr the co-promote agreement … as a freestanding

agreement.” Dkt. 33, Ex. 2 at 112:15-23 [JA-___]. She testified that the decision to

enter the agreement was a business one, id. at 67:16-22, 68:6-16 [JA-___], and said

that whether the co-promotion agreement made sense from a “financial business

perspective” was a “business” decision, id. at 68:19-24 [JA-___]. Not surprisingly,

the business people who conducted the analyses testified that their role was to

perform routine financial projections of the transaction.

Elizabeth Cochrane, a Boehringer executive involved in creating the

withheld analyses, stated that her role was to “quantify the Duramed [Barr]


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copromotion,” which entailed evaluating “the financial impact to [Boehringer]’s

P&L, profit and loss statement.” Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 3 at 21:6-22:16 [JA-

___]. The P&L analyses amounted to “simply doing the math for, if this changes,

this is what it means to our P&L, a lot of adding and subtracting.” Id. at 26:5-9

[JA-___]. The analyses described by Cochrane are precisely the kind of financial

forecasts one would expect Boehringer to conduct before entering a $120 million

business transaction. Indeed, Cochrane testified that when Boehringer has entered

co-promotion agreements with other companies, it has conducted similar financial

analyses. Dkt. 33, Ex. 3 at 72:21-23 [JA-___].14

Paul Fonteyne, a Boehringer business executive, is listed as the author of

many of the withheld co-promotion analyses. Dkt. 32, Ex. B Decl. Ex. 11 at 58

[JA-___] (no. 815); 82 [JA-___] (nos. 1085-88); 103 [JA-___] (no. 1341); 10 [JA-

___] (no. 135); 53 [JA-___] (no. 758); 57 [JA-___] (no. 800); 59 [JA-___] (no.

819). He testified that his role was to provide “commercial input”—as opposed to

legal input—on the co-promotion agreement. Dkt. 32. Ex. B Decl. Ex. 20 at 48:7-9

[JA-___]. He elaborated that commercial input consisted primarily of providing

financial analysis, id. at 48:10-21 [JA-___] and stated that he worked with the data

14 Since those agreements were global, the analyses were conducted at Boehringer’s headquarters in Germany rather than in the U.S., and Cochrane had no specific knowledge of what they entailed. Id. at 72:6-20 [JA-___].


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he received from Cochrane, Dkt. 37, Ex. 6 at 49:18-23, 62:10-14. The testimony

thus shows that Fonteyne examined the profit and loss forecasts produced by

Cochrane in order to determine whether the co-promotion made commercial sense

for Boehringer. These documents were standard financial projections that likely

would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation.

Analyses of the co-promotion are the most obvious documents that would

likely have been prepared irrespective of litigation. However, the district court’s

error is not limited to these documents. Many of the other withheld documents are

standard financial analyses that may have been created even in the absence of

litigation. The district court acknowledged that “similar reports are prepared for

BIPI executives as a matter of regular business.” Dkt. 69 at 11 [JA-___].

Additionally, many of the withheld documents were created before settlement

negotiations began or after the negotiations concluded, strongly suggesting that

their creation was not due to the settlement negotiations.15 The district court should

15 See supra note 1 (over 200 of the over 600 documents at issue in this case fall into this category). The district court’s opinion contains no analysis articulating why these pre- and post-settlement documents are entitled to work product protection. Its finding that “[i]nformation used to assess settlement option [sic] clearly falls within the ambit of the work product doctrine,” Dkt. 69 at 11 [JA-___],—the sole basis for the court’s work product ruling—simply does not apply to roughly one-third of the documents at issue in this case.


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have ordered Boehringer to produce any documents that would have been created

in essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation.

United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, on which Boehringer relied

extensively in the proceedings below, does not support the applicability of work

product to the challenged documents. Adlman held that “[w]here a document is

created because of the prospect of litigation, analyzing the likely outcome of that

litigation, it does not lose protection under this formulation merely because it is

created in order to assist with a business decision.” Id. at 1202. As the Adlman

holding makes clear, a work-product document must first have been “created

because of the prospect of litigation” in order to qualify for protection. Id. Further,

Adlman’s holding refers to “documents analyzing anticipated litigation, but

prepared to assist in a business decision rather than to assist in the conduct of

litigation.” Id. at 1201-02 (emphasis added). Thus, if a company contemplating a

business deal asks its counsel to evaluate litigation that might arise from the deal,

that analysis may be protected as work product under Adlman. Id. at 1199.16 But if

a business deal is simply part of the consideration offered in settlement, documents

created to assess the commercial value of the deal are “financial analyses one

16 Similar examples include an analysis by in-house counsel of a potential merger partner’s prospects in its existing litigation or a prediction of litigation outcomes prepared to aid in a financial forecast. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199-1200.


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would expect a company exercising due diligence to prepare” (Dkt. 69 at 12-13

[JA-___]), and do not become work product simply because an attorney was

involved or due to the temporal connection to the settlement. Again, that

conclusion follows with particular force if, as Boehringer insists, the business deal

is economically independent of the settlement.

The record evidence supports the common-sense conclusion that many of

the withheld documents, particularly the analyses of the co-promotion agreement,

would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation.

The district court failed to consider this possibility, and Boehringer continues to

insist that all such documents were prepared “because of” the Barr settlement. This

Court should order Boehringer to produce any documents that would have been

created in essentially similar form in the absence of litigation, especially those

documents related solely to the co-promotion agreement. Alternately, this Court

should remand to the district court for an individualized assessment of the

documents.

III. THE FTC DEMONSTRATED A SUBSTANTIAL NEED FOR FACT WORK PRODUCT AND AN UNDUE BURDEN IN OTHERWISE OBTAINING IT

As seen in the foregoing sections, Boehringer has not shown that all of the

financial analyses and other documents at issue in this appeal reflect opinions of

counsel; those materials constitute—at most—fact work product. Under


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established work product standards, “[a] party can discover fact work product upon

showing a substantial need for the materials and an undue hardship in acquiring the

information any other way.” Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 124 F.3d at 1307;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). In the proceedings below, the FTC demonstrated

substantial need for any factual work product in the withheld documents and undue

hardship in acquiring the underlying financial projections elsewhere. While the

district court did not disagree, it held that the FTC had not shown an “overriding

and compelling need” to discover the withheld documents, which it thought

necessary on the basis of its erroneous conclusion that all of them were opinion

work product. Dkt. 69 at 12-13 [JA-___].

The court below erred to the extent that it applied this “overriding and

compelling” standard to ordinary factual work product, and compounded its

error—and usurped the Commission’s investigatory function—by purporting to

determine what kinds of evidence are needed to advance the investigation. The

district court’s discussion of substantial need reflects a fundamental misperception

of the context in which this case arose and the legal standards for enforcing agency

investigative subpoenas. Thus, this Court should ensure that the district court on

any remand properly applies the correct “substantial need” standard, under which

the Commission has a patent need for, and thus is entitled to obtain, the materials

withheld here.


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A. To the Extent That the District Court Applied a Heightened Standard for the Discovery of Ordinary Fact Work Product, This Was Legal Error

As discussed below, the district court apparently recognized that the FTC

had demonstrated substantial need for withheld factual work product. It went on,

however, to opine that the Commission had no “overriding and compelling need”

for the withheld documents because they contained “no smoking guns,” Dkt. 69 at

12 [JA-___], were “not in any way evidence of any conspiratorial intent to violate

the law,” id. at 13 [JA-___], “add[] nothing to what is already known about what

the involved companies intended in settling their suit,” id. [JA-___], and did “not

cast any light on the fundamental legal issue of whether the deal was or was not

anti-competitive in intendment or result,” id. [JA-___]. Despite being “sympathetic

to the FTC’s argument that these financial analyses are the only documents that

could demonstrate whether or not BIPI was using the co-promotion agreement to

pay Barr not to compete,” the district court concluded that the documents “cast no

light of [sic] whether that intendment existed.” Id. [JA-___].

In so doing, the court below compounded its basic error of categorically

deeming all of these financial analyses to be opinion work product by also failing

to take proper account of the context in which the Commission seeks this

information. The present proceeding is for the enforcement of an investigatory

subpoena, for which the Commission has broad authority under Section 9 of the


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FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 49. This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a district

court’s “role in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena is a strictly

limited one.” Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 871-72; Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn

& Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

“[T]he scope of issues which may be litigated in an enforcement proceeding must

be narrow, because of the important governmental interest in expeditious

investigation of possible unlawful activity.” Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 872. “[I]it is

sufficient if the [agency’s] inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the

demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant.” Id.

(quoting U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). “The district court is

not free to speculate about the possible charges that might be included in a future

complaint, and then to determine the relevance of the subpoena requests by

reference to those hypothetical charges.” Id. at 874; see also Linde Thomson, 5

F.3d at 1512 (court not to make “an ex ante determination of what claims, if any,

may eventually be pursued by an agency undertaking a broad investigation

pursuant to its clear statutory mandate”).

Thus, in assessing the Commission’s “substantial need” for the material in

question, the district court should have taken into account the investigatory

context, in which the Commission is entitled to materials of “reasonable relevance”

to an investigation that may itself properly be open-ended. The court erred in


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ignoring these principles, and instead relying upon its own assessment of whether

the documents “cast any light on the fundamental legal issue” (Dkt. 69 at 13 [JA-

___]) of the existence of a violation of the FTC Act.

Moreover, both factually and institutionally, the district court could not have

any basis for concluding that the “arithmetic of various potential scenarios adds

nothing to what is already known about what the involved companies intended in

settling their suit.” Id. [JA-___]. By definition, the proceeding was summary, with

no discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(5); FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 789 (D.C.

Cir. 1980). There was no complaint defining any potential FTC claims that

Boehringer’s conduct violated the FTC Act. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 874. The

district court did not have access to the full evidentiary file that the FTC would use

to determine the existence of a violation. The district court did not and could not

consider all the possible legal theories that the FTC had under consideration or the

possible conclusions to be drawn from the evidence gathered by the agency. In

light of the record before it, the district court could not have determined whether or

not the withheld documents added to what the FTC did or did not know. In light of

its limited role in enforcing the subpoena, the court’s determination that the

documents did not add to the FTC’s knowledge was both legally erroneous and an

abuse of the court’s discretion. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 874, 885.


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B. The Information in the Withheld Documents is Highly Relevant to the FTC’s Investigation and Available Only from Boehringer

Under a proper legal standard, there is no question that the Commission has

established a substantial need for any of the materials in question that constitute

fact work product. The district court itself indicated that the FTC had shown a

substantial need for fact work product that can be segregated from opinion work

product. Although the court’s treatment of the generic entry and financial analyses

was dominated by its erroneous categorical conclusion that fact work product

could not be excised from opinion work product (Dkt. 69 at 13 [JA-___]), it

elsewhere recognized the existence of genuine need. Addressing work product

contained in transmittal emails, for example, the district court concluded that the

FTC is entitled to fact work product “that can be reasonably excised from any

indication of opinion work product.” Dkt. 69 at 13; see also id. at 17 [JA-___]; see

also Dkt. 71 at 6 [JA-___] (holding that if a document found through search of

Boehringer’s back-up tapes “contains some factual work product and some opinion

work product, and the opinion work product can be excised from the rest of the

document, BIPI should redact the privileged material and disclose the rest”).

In any event, the FTC amply demonstrated “a substantial need for the

materials and an undue hardship in acquiring the information any other way.” Dir.,

Office of Thrift Supervision, 124 F.3d at 1307. The Commission’s investigation

seeks to determine whether Boehringer agreed to share its monopoly profits on two


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branded drugs with its potential rival, Barr, in exchange for Barr’s agreement to

delay entry with lower-priced generic products. Among other things, the

Commission seeks to assess whether Boehringer is using the Aggrenox co-

promotion deal, entered contemporaneously with the patent settlement, as a way to

pay Barr not to enter, and to understand any potential justifications for such a

payment.

Notably, in its recent Actavis decision, the Supreme Court considered an

FTC complaint containing allegations that rely on the same kinds of

contemporaneous internal financial analyses of settlement options and business

deals that are at issue in this appeal. As the Supreme Court noted, the settling

parties claimed the payments to the generic drug firms were “compensation for

other services the generics promised to perform,” while the FTC complaint alleges

that the payments were compensation for the generics’ agreement not to compete

until 2015. Actavis, No. 12-416, slip op. at 6. The FTC complaint in that case

prominently features an internal financial analysis by the branded drug

manufacturer (at the time Solvay) of various settlement scenarios. FTC v. Actavis,

Inc., Case No. 1:09-cv-00955-TWT (N.D. Ga.), Second Amended Complaint ¶¶


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57-5917 & Exhibit A.18 That is precisely the kind of document the Commission

seeks here.

The Actavis exhibit contains various mathematical calculations showing that,

if Solvay paid its potential competitors, the parties would have more profit to

divide the longer they delayed competition. Id. Ex. A at 3, 10-12; Joint Appendix

at 105, 112-14. Solvay thus calculated in concrete dollar amounts how paying its

potential generic competitors to agree to a later entry date increased the total pool

of profits available to all the manufacturers. The financial analysis also contains

Solvay’s calculation that possible side business arrangements with the generic

challengers would result in net costs rather than profits, which is evidence that

those agreements made economic sense only as a mechanism for Solvay to pay the

generic firms to delay competing. Id. at 12; Joint Appendix at 114, Actavis Compl.

¶ 82.

The relevance of a branded company’s financial analysis reflected in Actavis

is particularly striking here, given the district court’s characterization of the

withheld financial analysis documents as mere “arithmetical calculations of various

17 The Second Amended Complaint is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710060/090528androgelfinalcmpt.pdf. 18 Exhibit A to the Second Amended Complaint is reproduced in Volume 2 of the Joint Appendix filed in the Supreme Court and is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710060/130122watsonappendix2.pdf.


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potential scenarios” that “do not cast any light on the fundamental legal issue of

whether the deal was or was not anti-competitive in intendment or effect.” Dkt. 69

at 13 [JA-___]. In fact, as shown by the complaint in Actavis, such mathematical

calculations go directly to “the relevant antitrust question” in an antitrust

investigation of a reverse-payment settlement: the reasons the parties used such

payments. Actavis, No. 12-416, slip op. at 19. As the Eleventh Circuit recently

observed in ordering that Exhibit A be part of the public record in Actavis, the

financial analysis “had a direct bearing on the economic advantages that Solvay

reaped by entering into a reverse-payment settlement.” FTC v. AbbVie Prods. LLC,

713 F.3d 54, 64 (11th Cir. 2013).

Boehringer contended below that the FTC did not need the withheld

documents because the FTC could re-construct the company’s analyses based on

the agreements themselves and the FTC’s own financial calculations. Dkt. 37 at 24

[JA-___]. This is incorrect for a number of reasons.

First, the inputs, assumptions and formulas for those analyses came from

Boehringer’s business people. Dkt. 37, Ex. 4 at 118:3-23 [JA-___]. That

information is not available to the FTC. Without access to Boehringer’s

documents, the FTC cannot question the business people during investigational

hearings about the specific inputs and assumptions used in the withheld analyses.

Indeed, the district court declared itself “sympathetic to the FTC’s arguments that


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these financial analyses are the only documents that could demonstrate whether or

not BIPI was using the co-promotion agreement to pay Barr not to compete.” Dkt.

69 at 13 [JA-___].

Second, even if the FTC could run its own calculations using available data,

such calculations could not replace Boehringer’s own. Courts routinely consider

evidence of the parties’ purpose in order to “interpret facts and to predict

consequences.” Chi. Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also

Broad. Music Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (“[O]ur inquiry must focus

on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show effect, … the purpose of

the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market

economy”); U.S. v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[C]ourts often

look at a party’s intent to help it judge the likely effects of challenged conduct.”).

Moreover, “in cases of ambiguity we presume that the defendants, who are in the

best position to know their business, are also rational actors. As a result,

knowledge of their own expectations can aid a tribunal in determining whether the

likely effects of restraints are competitive or anticompetitive.” 11 Philip E. Areeda

& Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1912g, at 367 (3d ed. 2011).

Third, an objective assessment conducted years later is no substitute for

Boehringer’s contemporaneous assessment of its business justifications for the

settlement. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir.


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1985) (conduct under the antitrust laws to be evaluated at the time of contract).

Courts have made clear the importance of contemporaneous documents,

particularly where they contradict testimony. See U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333

U.S. 364, 396 (1948) (trial testimony contradicted by contemporaneous documents

entitled to little weight).

Fourth, as indicated by Persky’s testimony, Dkt. 33, Ex. 2 at 133:23-134:4

[JA-___], Boehringer has not produced any other documents that are equivalent to

those it has withheld. It has not produced any contemporaneous financial analyses

of the settlement agreements or side deal that lie at the heart of the FTC’s

investigation. Dkt. 59 at 41:8-14 [JA-___] (noting that none of the financial

analyses prepared by Fonteyne, the decision-maker for the co-promotion

agreement, had been produced). During the hearing before the district court,

counsel offered a carefully worded assertion that Boehringer had produced 270,000

pages of “ordinary course” documents, Dkt. 59 at 35:10 [JA-___], but failed to

mention that Boehringer has withheld on privilege and work-product grounds

every contemporaneous analysis of the relevant transaction. In particular,

Boehringer has not produced any “ordinary course” analysis for the Aggrenox co-

promotion agreement, nor has it produced in redacted form the “segregable factual

portion” of the analyses that it has admitted to have conducted. Dkt. 59 at 31:14

[JA-___].


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And fifth, Boehringer is withholding the very documents that it claims

justify its conduct. “BIPI is asserting that the terms of the Co-Promotion

Agreement executed between the parties, when evaluated using BIPI’s financial

information relating to Aggrenox that the FTC has in its possession, are not

anticompetitive.” Dkt. 37 at 23 [JA-___]. Yet Boehringer is claiming work-product

protection for the evaluations that purportedly demonstrate that the settlement is

not anticompetitive. Id. Persky testified similarly that the co-promotion agreement

was not “a vehicle to pay Barr not compete on generic Aggrenox,” Dkt. 33, Ex. 2

at 113:3-6 [JA-___], and that the financial analysis of that agreement supported her

testimony, Id. at 127:12-15 [JA-___]. When asked to identify the document that

would support the proposition that the co-promotion agreement was a fair business

deal, Persky identified the financial analysis that Boehringer refuses to produce. Id.

at 133:23-134:4 [JA-___].

The FTC thus made a highly persuasive showing of the need for and

unavailability of the analyses and information withheld by Boehringer. Moreover,

production of the withheld documents “will not trench upon any substantial interest

protected by the work-product immunity.” In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482,

493 (2d Cir. 1982). As shown above, Persky provided little substantive input into

the documents and appears to have used them not as an attorney but in her role as

lead business negotiator. Dkt. 37, Ex. 4 at 70:2-71:12 [JA-___]. “To the extent that


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the statements imply [Persky’s] questions from which inferences might be drawn

as to [her] thinking, those inferences merely disclose the concerns a layman would

have as well as a lawyer in these particular circumstances, and in no way reveal

anything worthy of the description ‘legal theory.’” Id.

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ACCEPTED AND RELIED ON IN CAMERA, EX PARTE AFFIDAVITS

On the eve of the hearing and long after the parties had filed their respective

status reports that served as briefs in the proceeding below, Boehringer submitted

the two ex parte affidavits of Persky and Taylor. Dkt. 69 at 10-11 [JA-___]. The

affidavits were presumably submitted to lay the factual foundation for the work-

product claims based on Persky’s request for analyses, even though Persky directly

requested very few of the withheld documents, Dkt. 59 at 5:19-6:7 [JA-___], and

Taylor was apparently not involved with the patent litigation or settlements, id. at

5:10-11 [JA-___]. Boehringer sent the affidavits directly to chambers, but did not

file them with the district court. The company told the FTC only that the two

affidavits had been submitted but provided no information other than the names of

the affiants. At the hearing, the FTC objected to the affidavits, id. at 4:21-5:18 [JA-

___], but the district court nevertheless heavily relied on them in ruling that

Boehringer could withhold the documents. In particular, these affidavits seem to be

the only evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion that the documents


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were prepared using “information and frameworks provided by BIPI attorneys,”

Dkt. 69 at 11 [JA-___], given the sworn testimony that Persky did not provide the

key inputs for many of the financial analyses. See Part I.A.2, supra.

The district court abused its discretion by allowing Boehringer to submit the

affidavits on an ex parte, in camera basis and then relying on them in its ruling.

Though a district court has the discretion to accept ex parte affidavits under some

circumstances, see Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1978), this Court has

long expressed reservations about the practice, especially in cases that do not

involve national security issues:

The legitimacy of accepting in camera affidavits (as opposed to in camera review of withheld documents) has troubled this court in the past. Although in camera review of withheld documents is permissible (and even encouraged), we have held that a trial court should not use in camera affidavits unless necessary and, if such affidavits are used, it should be certain to make the public record as complete as possible.

Lykins v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (addressing

the use of in camera affidavits in FOIA case involving national security

exemption).19 In camera affidavits are problematic because our judicial system

requires “providing as much information as possible to [an opposing party], so that

19 In the cited cases, as here, the in camera affidavits were submitted ex parte and withheld from the other party.


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the adversary system can function effectively in assisting the trial court to make a

determination and producing a record that is susceptible to appellate review.” Id.

The Court has stressed that “in camera proceedings should be preceded by

as full as possible a public debate over the basis and scope of a privilege claim.”

Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (non-FOIA case involving

documents withheld on state secret grounds during discovery).

The more specific the public explanation, the greater the ability of the opposing party to contest it. The ensuing arguments assist the judge in assessing the risk of harm posed by dissemination of the information in question. This kind of focused debate is of particular aid to the judge when fulfilling his duty to disentangle privileged from non-privileged materials—to ensure that no more is shielded than is necessary to avoid anticipated injuries.

Id.

In light of these concerns, a district court permitting in camera affidavits

“must both make its reasons for doing so clear and make as much as possible of the

in camera submission available to the opposing party.” Armstrong v. Executive

Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Such affidavits should

be used only where “absolutely necessary” and where “the interests of the

adversary process are outweighed by other crucial interests.” Lykins, 725 F.2d at

1465 (internal quotes and cites omitted).

That is not the case here. Boehringer submitted the affidavits without any

justification, and the district court met none of the requirements for acceptance of


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in camera affidavits. Additionally, it failed to examine whether the affidavits

contained any unprivileged information that should have been disclosed to the

FTC.

In fact, there could be no justification for the use of in camera affidavits

here. The facts necessary to lay the foundation for a work-product claim are not

themselves protected. Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the

Work-Product Doctrine, Vol. II at 1123-24 (5th ed. 2007); see also

GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d at 145-48 (relying on corporate affidavit that was filed

publicly); B.F.G. of Illinois, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

18930, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2001). In addition, this case does not involve the

kind of subject matter as to which courts have endorsed in camera affidavits,

principally national security, e.g., Ellsberg, 709 F.2d 51; Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d

1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979), state secrets, e.g., Halkin, 598 F.2d 1, or grand jury

testimony, e.g., Gordon v. U.S., 722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).

Boehringer’s conduct and the district court’s acquiescence harmed both the

adversarial process and the FTC’s ability to pursue this investigation effectively.

Despite the FTC’s objection, the district court relied on these affidavits for critical

aspects of its work-product analysis. Boehringer’s central argument was that the

withheld analyses “were prepared not in the ordinary course of business, but for

the specific purpose of informing counsel whether the proposed BIPI-Barr


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settlement offers should be accepted.” Dkt. 69 at 9 [JA-___]. The district court

“credit[ed] the declarations of Persky and [Taylor] … that the various financial

analyses were prepared for the client during settlement discussions and involved

discussions among the attorneys and their agents who were handling the settlement

negotiations.” Id. at 11 [JA-___]. It further explained that Persky’s in camera

affidavit claimed “that the documents were created by BIPI or Boehringer

Ingelheim employees in response to her personal requests for financial and other

information.” Id. The affidavits appear to be the primary factual basis on which the

district court concluded that “[t]his was information [Persky] needed in order to

provide her client, BIPI, with legal advice regarding the potential settlement

between BIPI and Barr.” Id..

The district court’s decision, thus, relies in substantial part on in camera

testimony “unaided by the benefits of adversarial proceedings which buttress the

validity of judicial decisions.” Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force,

566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also U.S. v. Sepenuk, 864 F.Supp. 1002,

1007 (D.Or.1994) (rejecting privilege claims after reviewing in camera affidavits

and stating that “[t]he government raises a valid objection to the in camera

affidavits which have made it impossible for them to respond in fairness to

respondent's claim of privilege”), aff’d sub nom U.S. v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418,

1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding without analysis review of in camera affidavits in


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these circumstances). It should be reversed as an abuse of discretion. If the Court

remands the case for any further proceedings, it should also instruct the district

court not to permit any further use of in camera affidavits.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the district court and hold that Boehringer has not

proven that the withheld documents should be shielded by the work-product

doctrine or, in the alternative, remand the case to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with the Court’s decision.

Respectfully submitted,

Daniel W. Butrymowicz Rebecca Egeland Michael Perry Bureau of Competition FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20580

Jonathan Nuechterlein General Counsel David C. Shonka Principal Deputy General Counsel John F. Daly Deputy General Counsel for Litigation Leslie Rice Melman Assistant General Counsel for Litigation /s/ Mark S. Hegedus Mark S. Hegedus, Attorney Office of the General Counsel FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20580 (202) 326-2115 [email protected]

Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant

Federal Trade Commission

Dated: June 28, 2013


Certificate of Compliance and Service

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because the brief contains 13,478 words, excluding the

parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Brief were served upon the

following counsel of record, via the Court’s CM/ECF system, this 28th day of

June, 2013.

Lawrence D. Rosenberg JONES DAY 51 Louisiana Ave., NW Washington, DC 20001 [email protected] Michael Sennett William F. Dolan Pamela L. Taylor JONES DAY 77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 3500 Chicago, IL 60601 [email protected] Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

/s/ Mark S. Hegedus Mark S. Hegedus
