Japan Railway & Transport Review / October 1994 45Copyright © 1994 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

Birth of The Shinkansen— A Memoir

Nearly 70 years have passed since Ientered the railway industry afterstudying mechanical engineering atuniversity. In those days, the steam lo-comotive dominated rail, and I startedmy career as a rolling-stock engineerdesigning steam locomotives.

Japan's first 3-cylinder locomotive,the C53 Class, was just being designed,based on the C52 imported fromAmerica. I was totally absorbed inwrestling with the locomotive designwith senior rolling-stock engineers.The C53 was soon completed using newtechniques to balance the drivingwheels and new valve-gear designs.The results were excellent, and I expe-rienced the thrill of reward for hardwork for the first time in my life.

At that time, Japan was developingher own technology, thanks to the hardwork of our senior engineers. To under-stand the actual circumstances of Japa-nese industry, I made it a rule to readas many domestic and foreign papers aspossible. To build high-quality rollingstock, we needed good components. Wewere eager to encourage the growingJapanese industries and to promote na-tional development by using domesticmanufacturers to make these parts.The national railway at that time had ahuge group of engineers, unrivalled ex-cept by the military. We were enthusi-astic about our jobs, taking pride thatwe had a direct influence on nationaldevelopment. In response to a requestfrom the Ministry of Commerce and In-dustry, we also participated in the de-sign and fabrication of a standard auto-mobile to promote the domestic auto-mobile industry. These automobileswere mass-produced when World WarII broke out. This experience helpedthe rapid growth of the Japanese auto-mobile industry after the war.

During the war, the Japanese rail-way industry was in great difficulty,suffering severe damage from air raidsand naval bombardment. There were

serious shortages of materials but wetried to manufacture as much rollingstock of limited design and simple con-struction as possible, while giving alow priority to quality. Major acci-dents resulted from using ancient roll-ing stock. Many passengers werekilled—they were hard days for engi-neers. The Hachiko Line Accidentwhich occured soon after the war wasespecially terrible. Over-speeding on adown grade caused the train to derailon a curve and it went over a cliff. Thewooden passenger cars, which were al-ready worn out by overuse during thewar, took a heavy toll of lives. We usedthe accident as the opportunity to ob-tain special permission and materialsfrom the occupation forces to modifyall wooden passenger cars (3000 werein use then) to a steel construction in afew years.

Soon, the time came when the Japa-nese National Railway (JNR) couldmake future plans. I started designingsteam locomotives, but I always felt thelimits of steam. On one hand, I wantedto build a steam locomotive with thegreatest traction capacity to gain areputation, but on the other hand, I re-peatedly thought about what directionto take to pass the limits of steam, tak-ing the features and condition of Japaninto consideration. The high-capacityC62 and D62 classes were developed forexpress passenger trains and heavy-duty freight trains, respectively, soonafter the war. They were suitable forending the age of steam.

To clear the limits of steam, it wasnecessary to either introduce internal-combustion locomotives or electric lo-comotives. Because Japanese rail-ways are narrow gauge with manygrades and curves, there are limits onlocomotive size. We concluded that in-creasing operating performance andachieving high-speed operation wouldmean using electric or diesel railcarswith power distributed along the cars,

namely use of distributed-power mul-tiple-unit control systems.

Until then, JNR had only used elec-tric railcars for urban short-distancetrains in Tokyo and Osaka. I organisedthe replacement of locomotive-hauledmiddle-distance trains on the TokaidoLine with electric railcar trains. Thisnew EMU was nicknamed "ShonanDensha" and was highly regarded.JNR at that time was supervised by theoccupation forces who did not alwaysagree with my ideas. JNR itself wasstill very passive, but I was confidentthat the success of the "ShonanDensha" demonstrated the possibilityof improving service quality by intro-ducing high-performance EMUs tolong-distance trains.

I then left JNR to work for a privatecompany, but when Mr. Shinji Sogotook office as President of JNR in 1955,he asked me to assist him as a VicePresident of Engineering. I refused atfirst, but I discussed it with him severaltimes and was moved by his zeal, so Idecided to return to JNR.

At that time, JNR was suffering froma serious problem; the transport vol-ume of the Tokaido Line (556 km) con-necting Tokyo with Osaka, the centre ofcommerce and industry in West Japan,was increasing rapidly due to the rapidgrowth of the Japanese economy afterthe war. It was almost saturated. Fi-nally, in autumn 1956, the wholeTokaido Line was electrified. It wastransporting 24% of the total passen-

Hideo Shima

� C53 Class 3-cylinder Locomotive(Transportation Museum, Tokyo)

46 Japan Railway & Transport Review / October 1994

SPECIAL FEATURE – 30 YEARS OF HIGH-SPEED RAILWAYS

Copyright © 1994 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

gers of JNR and 23% of the total freight,and the transport volume was increas-ing at 7.6% annually, despite the factthat it only accounted for 3% of JNR'sservice kilometers (20,000 km). It wasclear to everyone that the transporta-tion capacity of the existing TokaidoLine connecting Tokyo with Osakamust be doubled to meet the demand,but opinion was divided into threegroups: one to construct a narrow-gauge line parallel to the existing line;another to construct a narrow-gaugeline along a completely different route;and another to construct a standard-gauge line like the major railways inEurope. When Mr. Sogo took office aspresident, the narrow-gauge opinionwas dominant. Its advocates insistedthat if a standard-gauge line was con-structed between Tokyo and Osaka, ifconstruction were delayed for any rea-son, a line with partially-completed sec-tions wouldn't work at all. In otherwords, to construct a standard-gaugeline, the whole line would have to becompleted at one time requiring vastconstruction cost, and it was not certainthat the necessary funds could beraised. On the other hand, the existingTokaido Line could be upgraded as nar-row-gauge partially one section afteranother according to budget, and thenew line would be able to use succes-sively-completed sections.

Mr. Sogo himself had the experienceof being guided by Mr. Shinpei Goto, abroad-gauge advocate, when there hadbeen a serious dispute about recon-struction of the Japanese railways tostandard-gauge at the end of the Meiji

era. He had also participated in man-agement of the South Manchurian Rail-ways, which had operated at highspeeds using standard-gauge tracks.The reconstruction of Japanese rail-ways to standard gauge in the Meiji erawas not achieved, but Mr. Sogo madeup his mind that standard-gauge wasindispensable to improving the capacityof the Tokaido Line and to creating anew railway that would not fall behindAmerican and European railways.

I was also thinking seriously how tomeet JNR's transport needs. At thattime, air and car traffic were showingremarkable growth. I thought thatbuilding a line that would soon fall be-hind the advancing transport worldwould be regrettable for the future ofJNR and in meeting social expecta-tions. I decided to build a railway thatwould be useful and rational for a longtime into the future.

Today, passenger cars and trucks runon roads at similar speeds. However, inearlier times, cars, coaches and cartsran on roads together, and the speed oftrucks dropped on hills due tounderpowering, resulting in traffic con-gestion. Traffic flow became smootheronly after truck performance had beenimproved so they could run as fast ascars.

Conventional railways, like roads,have different types of trains such asexpress trains, local trains and freighttrains, running at different speeds to-gether. Because trains run on rails, aslow train must enter a siding to vacatethe main line so a faster train can passit. It is quite hard, particularly on

trunk lines with large transport vol-umes, to shunt trains one after anotherso faster trains can get ahead while ob-serving the limits of signalling andsafety systems to avoid collision.

However, major private railwaycompanies in the Tokyo and Osaka re-gions considered the role allotment be-tween railways and cars in the post-war reconstruction period. They soonabandoned freight transport and de-voted themselves to high-frequencypassenger transport by EMUs. Theysucceeding in reinforcing their trans-port capacity by making the most ofthe track capacity. This fact is worthspecial mention in the history of Japa-nese railways.

We decided to apply the same or moreadvanced principles to the TokaidoLine. If only express trains ran on thenew line (shinkansen) while local andfreight trains ran on the conventionalline, unnecessary siding and waiting

would be eliminated, increasing run-ning speed and train frequency. Be-cause the new line (shinkansen) wouldonly run through great cities where ex-press trains stop, and would avoid otherbuilt up areas, and because the linewould exclude sharp curves, steepslopes and grade crossings, remarkablyhigh-speed operation would be possible.On the other hand, the speed and num-ber of services of local and freight trainson the existing line, which had longbeen sacrificed for the sake of expresstrains, could be increased. Transfer be-tween the new lines and conventionallines would be possible at major sta-tions producing a new "Pan-Tokaido"railway system, or an integrated rail-way of conventional and high-speedlines.

� C62 Class Tsubame Express Passenger Train (Transportation Museum, Tokyo)

� Mr Shinji Sogo, President of JNR from 1955 to1963 (Kotsu Shimbun)

Japan Railway & Transport Review / October 1994 47Copyright © 1994 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

The middle- to long-distance EMUswith distributed power systems that Ihad advocated showed remarkableprogress, with greatly improved run-ning speed and excellent riding com-fort, thanks to introduction of air sus-pension and air conditioning, thus sur-passing the passenger cars hauled bylocomotive. The speed increase madea day trip between Tokyo and Osakapossible. From the operational pointof view, the super-express trains be-came able to make return trips and theeconomic advantages of the distrib-uted-power system was clear. Soon,JNR had changed into one of the mostprominent "EMU-oriented railways"in the world.

Based on this experience, a distrib-uted traction system was applied toshinkansen trains. With all axlesdriven, it is possible to obtain the out-put required for high-speed operationwithout exceeding the limits on axleloads. In addition, stopping a train run-ning at high speed using friction brakessuch as shoe brakes or disc brakes,risks heat-damage to wheels and axles.Motorised axles solve this problem be-cause electric braking becomes pos-sible. Improving this to regenerativebraking can achieve energy-saving eco-nomic transportation.

Thanks to the experience obtainedfrom conventional lines, AC electrifica-tion was used for the shinkansen atwhat is called the West Japan commer-cial frequency of 25 kV/60 Hz. Theproblem of using the 50 Hz commercialsupply in East Japan was solved by fre-quency conversion substations.

Thus, the shinkansen was born frompursuit of the best method to improvethe capacity of the Tokaido Line. It hadremarkably high performance, com-pared with conventional lines, butthrough services between conventionaland shinkansen lines seemed to be notso useful because of the great differencein performance. Therefore, we aban-doned through operation and decided touse standard-gauge to make the most ofthe advantages of the new line.

Our decision to construct shinkansenon standard-gauge resulted from theproblems of through operation withconventional lines, and released JNRfrom old habits, making it possible touse new techniques that were impos-sible with conventional lines andachieving quite a new railway system.

Even if a narrow-gauge four-trackline had been built from higher-prior-ity sections, it would inevitably haveto have been expanded sooner or later,and repeated partial improvements

would have cost more. In addition,narrow-gauge lines would have notproduced high-speed and automaticoperation like the shinkansen.

After deliberating such points, in De-cember 1958, the Cabinet decided toconstruct a separate new trunk stan-dard-gauge line along the Tokaido Linewith a construction period of 5 yearsand construction costs of ¥ 194.8 billionconnecting Tokyo with Osaka in about3 hours.

We were most anxious about finan-cial difficulties in raising sufficientconstruction funds which would sus-pend construction. We had many expe-riences. Once the decision was madeto construct a standard-gauge trunkline separate from the conventionalline, it was necessary to have govern-ment backing from influential politi-cians. President Sogo took great painsabout this.

The Minister of Finance was Mr.Eisaku Sato, who later became PrimeMinister and won the Nobel Prize forpeace. Mr. Sato had been a manager inthe Ministry of Railways in his youth.He realised that such a huge projectcould not be completed during the termof one Cabinet, so it must not be af-fected by changes in government policydue to changing political conditions. Hesuggested that JNR use funds from theWorld Bank. To use such funds, thegovernment must guarantee comple-tion of a project so the government can-not break its promise even if the Cabi-net changes. It was decided to ask theWorld Bank for a loan of $80 million,and I was dispatched to the USA to ex-plain the technical feasibility of theshinkansen early in 1960. Questionswere serious and various including thefinancial condition of JNR, the profit-ability of the shinkansen, the reason for

� Series 80 EMU Shonan Densha near Ginza, Tokyo (Transportaion Museum, Tokyo)

� Narrow Gauge Super Express Kodama(Transportation Museum, Tokyo)

48 Japan Railway & Transport Review / October 1994

SPECIAL FEATURE – 30 YEARS OF HIGH-SPEED RAILWAYS

Copyright © 1994 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

using standard-gauge, the necessity forforeign funding, etc. One World Bankcriterion excluded experimental tech-niques from loans. I persuaded theWorld Bank that shinkansen tech-niques included no experimental factorbut was an integration of proven ad-vanced technologies achieved under theslogan "Safety First".

It was a supreme priority to open theshinkansen before October 1964, whenthe Tokyo Olympic Games were to beheld. Because part of the land had al-ready been secured before the war, con-struction progressed quickly. However,the budget approved by the governmentwas cut due to political considerations,and the shortage became clear as con-struction progressed. It was a seriouspolitical problem. In the end, the bud-get was increased twice to 380 billionyen. Assuming responsibility for thismatter, President Sogo resigned justbe fore the comple t i on o f theshinkansen. I also left with him.Therefore, Mr. Sogo, who conceived theshinkansen and myself, who helped de-sign it, did not attend the opening cer-emony.

I clearly remember explaining myidea to Mr. Louis Armand, President ofthe French National Railways when hevisited Japan. At that time I was pon-dering over the shinkansen plan. De-spite a long technical career, Mr.Armand was a human leader. Al-though he managed the French Na-tional Railways under German occupa-tion during the war, he also guided theFrench Resistance. After the war, hewas appointed President of the FrenchNational Railways, as well as Chair-man of Euratom (the European AtomicEnergy Commission) and SecretaryGeneral of UIC (The InternationalUnion of Railways). He was also amember of the Academie Francaise. Itwas wonderful to hear such a greatman understand and agree with myidea to develop a high-standard, high-speed, passenger railway. I believethat Mr. Fernand Nouvion who devel-oped high-speed electric cars under Mr.Armand as well as Mr. Bernand DeFongalland, who promoted the Paris-Lyons TGV, understood our idea too.Although Mr. Armand died in 1971, theengineers of the French National Rail-ways who had studied under him built

the wonderful TGV. At the news of theTGV completion, I could not helpblessing their success and sent a letterof hearty congratulations to my oldfriends in France. �

Hideo ShimaMr Shima was born in 1901 and studied at the University of Tokyo before he joined the railways in1926. He became Director General of Rolling Stock Department in 1948. He left JNR once in 1951,but in 1955, he was appointed Vice President/Engineering by Mr Shinji Sogo, then President of JNR.He left JNR again in 1963 with Mr Sogo, without seeing the birth of their brainchild, the shinkansen.He became President of the National Space Development Agency in 1969, where he led Japan'sspace development programme until 1977. As one of the most prominent engineers in post-warJapan, he has been awarded various prizes and honours, including the Elmar A Sperry Prize by theAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers, and the James Watt Gold Medal by the British Instituteof Mechanical Engineers.

� Series 0 Shinkansen Train near Ginza (cf. previous page)