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G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010.*

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THEPHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,respondent.

G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010.*

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO,JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVESECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. andDEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENTSECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondents.

Public Officers; Philippine Truth Commission (PTC); Wordsand Phrases; Truth commissions have been described as bodies thatshare the following characteristics: (1) they examine only pastevents; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a periodof time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporarybodies that finish their work with the submission of a reportcontaining conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they areofficially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State; ThePhilippine Truth Commission (PTC) is different from the truthcommissions in other countries which have been created as official,transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish thefacts and context of serious violations of human rights or ofinternational humanitarian law in a countrys past.The PTC isdifferent from the truth commissions in other countries which havebeen created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-findingbodies to establish the facts and context of serious violations ofhuman rights or of international humanitarian law in a countryspast. They are usually established by states emerging from periodsof internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve asmechanisms for transitional justice. Truth commissions have beendescribed as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they

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examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abusecommitted over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3)they are temporary bodies that finish their work with thesubmission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations;and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered bythe State. Commissions members are usually empowered toconduct research, support victims, and propose policy

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* EN BANC.

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Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through theirinvestigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn moreabout past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim toprepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutionalreforms.

Judicial Review; Requisites.Like almost all powers conferredby the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject tolimitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversycalling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challengingthe act must have the standing to question the validity of thesubject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personaland substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, orwill sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) thequestion of constitutionality must be raised at the earliestopportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the verylis mota of the case.

Same; Locus Standi; An act of the Executive which injures theinstitution of Congress causes a derivative but nonethelesssubstantial injury, which can be questioned by a member ofCongress.The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning thelegal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive OrderNo. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of thepower of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members.This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congressas an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of



their power and rights as members of the legislature before theCourt. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,235 SCRA 506 (1994)To the extent the powers of Congress areimpaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his officeconfers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of thatinstitution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution ofCongress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court leans on the doctrine that therule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed fornontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, andlegislators when the public interest so requires, such as when thematter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significanceto society, or of paramount public interest.The Court leans on thedoctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, suchas when the matter is of transcendental importance, ofoverreaching significance to society, or of paramount publicinterest. Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Asso-

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ciation, Inc. v. Torres, 465 SCRA 47 (2005), the Court held that incases of paramount importance where serious constitutionalquestions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxedand a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no directinjury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the firstEmergency Powers Cases, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), ordinary citizens andtaxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of severalexecutive orders although they had only an indirect and generalinterest shared in common with the public.

Presidency; Philippine Truth Commission (PTC);Reorganizations; Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292); Wordsand Phrases; To say that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) isborne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President underSection 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaningattributable to the term restructurean alteration of an existing



structurethe PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of thePresident prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.Thequestion, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of thePTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed inSection 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functionaland structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization ofthe Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating ormerging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit toanother; (2) transferring any function under the Office of thePresident to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)transferring any agency under the Office of the President to anyother Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refersto reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolitionthereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Thesepoints to situations where a body or an office is already existent buta modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creationof an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in saidprovision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in thenegative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of theOffice of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition,even in the plainest meaning attributable to the termrestructurean alteration of an existing structure. Evidently,the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the Presidentprior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The power ofcontrol is entirely different from the power to create public officesthe former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basisfrom either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent dutyto faithfully execute the laws.In the

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same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidentspower of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modifyor nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in theperformance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of theformer with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control isentirely different from the power to create public offices. The formeris inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from eithera valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully

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execute the laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Court declinesto recognize Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 as a justification forthe President to create a public officeP.D. No. 1416, as amendedby P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of theFirst Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII ofthe 1987 Constitution.The Court, however, declines to recognizeP.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a publicoffice. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable.P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of theauthority to reorganize the administrative structure of the nationalgovernment including the power to create offices and transferappropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree,embodied in its last Whereas clause: WHEREAS, the transitiontowards the parliamentary form of government will necessitateflexibility in the organization of the national government. Clearly,as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability andresiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D.No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the FirstCongress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; Faithful Execution Clause; The creation of thePhilippine Truth Commission (PTC) finds justification underSection 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon thePresident the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster onthe basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, thecreation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VIIof the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensurethat the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17.The President shall have control of all the executive departments,bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws befaithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). As correctly pointed outby the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principalbranches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him inensuring the faithful execution of lawsin this case, fundamentallaws on public account-

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ability and transparencyis inherent in the Presidents powers asthe Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conductinvestigations and to create bodies to execute this power is notexplicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not meanthat he is bereft of such authority.

Same; Same; Same; Residual Powers; The powers of thePresident are not limited to those specific powers under theConstitutionone of the recognized powers of the President grantedpursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power tocreate ad hoc committees, a power which flows from the obviousneed to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfullyexecuted.The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring thatour laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of thePresident are not limited to those specific powers under theConstitution. One of the recognized powers of the President grantedpursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power tocreate ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need toascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, 457 SCRA 438(2005), the authority of the President to issue Administrative OrderNo. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into theadministrative charges filed against the employees of theDepartment of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines wasupheld.

Same; Same; Same; The purpose of allowing ad hocinvestigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matterswhich the President is entitled to know so that he can be properlyadvised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to theexecution and enforcement of the laws of the land.It should bestressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies toexist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President isentitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided inthe performance of his duties relative to the execution andenforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited,this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in thepast like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, theMelo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being nochanges in the government structure, the Court is not inclined todeclare such executive power as non-existent just because thedirection of the political winds have changed.

Same; Same; Appropriations; There is no usurpation on thepart of the Executive of the power to appropriate funds where thereis only allotment or allocations of existing funds alreadyappropriated.On the charge that Executive Order No. 1

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transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for theoperation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no ap-

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propriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing fundsalready appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on thepart of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked forthe operation of the commission because, in the words of theSolicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided forthe Office of the President will be the very source of the funds forthe commission. Moreover, since the amount that would beallocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules andregulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; No quasi-judicial powershave been vested in the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) as itcannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it; Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questionsof fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide inaccordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcingand administering the same law.Invoking this authority, thePresident constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports ofgraft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. Aspreviously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in thesaid body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come beforeit. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power tohear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policyis to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid downby law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. Insimpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of thesequasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in thejudiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in thecase of administrative agencies.

Same; Same; Same; Power to Investigate, and Power toAdjudicate, Distinguished.The distinction between the power toinvestigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Courtin Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991).Thus: Investigate, commonly understood, means to examine,explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The



dictionary definition of investigate is to observe or study closely:inquire into systematically: to search or inquire into: x x to subjectto an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry. The purposeof investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtaininformation. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquiredinto by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.The legal meaning of investigate is essentially the same: (t)ofollow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace ortrack; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and

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accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the takingof evidence; a legal inquiry; to inquire; to make an investigation,investigation being in turn described as (a)n administrativefunction, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require ahearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial orotherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning acertain matter or matters. Adjudicate, commonly or popularlyunderstood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as to settlefinally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on themerits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x xact as judge. And adjudge means to decide or rule upon as ajudge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grantjudicially in a case of controversy x x. In the legal sense,adjudicate means: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictestsense; and adjudge means: To pass on judicially, to decide, settleor decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicialdetermination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; The Philippine TruthCommission (PTC) will not supplant the Ombudsman or theDepartment of Justice (DOJ) or erode their respective powersif atall, the investigative function of the commission will complementthose of the two offices; The Ombudsmans power to investigateunder Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 is not exclusive but is sharedwith other similarly authorized government agencies.Contrary topetitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant theOmbudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,



the investigative function of the commission will complement thoseof the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, therecommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overalltask of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. Theactual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication onthe merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a functiongiven to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of itsinvestigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and givescredence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners.The function of determining probable cause for the filing of theappropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with theDOJ and the Ombudsman. At any rate, the Ombudsmans power toinvestigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared withother similarly authorized government agencies.

Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The equal protection ofthe laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfairdiscrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play.One of the basic principles

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on which this government was founded is that of the equality ofright which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in theconcept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends therequirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in aseparate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guarantyagainst any form of undue favoritism or hostility from thegovernment. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on thebasis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailedpartakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharperweapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

Same; Same; Same; The concept of equal justice under the lawrequires the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that areirrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective; The equalprotection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just thoseof the legislature.According to a long line of decisions, equalprotection simply requires that all persons or things similarlysituated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and



responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutionsto treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. Thepurpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every personwithin a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrarydiscrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statueor by its improper execution through the states duly constitutedauthorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under thelaw requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that areirrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. The equalprotection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just thoseof the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of thegovernment including the political and executive departments, andextend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

Same; Same; Same; Requisites; Superficial differences do notmake for a valid classification.It, however, does not require theuniversal application of the laws to all persons or things withoutdistinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals asdetermined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equalprotection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has fourrequisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited toexisting conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members ofthe same class. Superficial differences do not make for a validclassification.

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Same; Same; Same; For a classification to meet therequirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace allpersons who naturally belong to the class.For a classification tomeet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include orembrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. Theclassification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of theclass are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred andobligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification bemade with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of theclass should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all



those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. Themere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from theother members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishablefrom all others, does not justify the non-application of the law tohim.

Same; Same; Same; The classification must not be based onexisting circumstances only, or so constituted as to precludeaddition to the number included in the classit must be of such anature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similarcircumstances and conditions.The classification must not be basedon existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to precludeaddition to the number included in the class. It must be of such anature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similarcircumstances and conditions. It must not leave out orunderinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certainclassification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope WorkersUnion, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), and reiterated in a long line of cases,The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty ofequality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state.It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid theconstitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality ofoperation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation onpersons merely as such, but on persons according to thecircumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, notidentity of rights. The Constitution does not require that thingswhich are different in fact be treated in law as though they werethe same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discriminationas to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation whichis limited either in the object to which it is directed or by theterritory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of thelaws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification inlaw, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is thegrouping of things in speculation or practice because they agreewith one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid becauseof simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that ofinequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere

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fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of



constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is thatit be reasonable, which means that the classification should bebased on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must notbe limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equallyto each member of the class. This Court has held that the standardis satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonablefoundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Same; Same; Same; Not to include past administrationssimilarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equalprotection clause cannot sanctionthe Arroyo administration is butjust a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations, nota class of its own.Applying these precepts to this case, ExecutiveOrder No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equalprotection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truthcommission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning thereported cases of graft and corruption during the previousadministration only. The intent to single out the previousadministration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has beenmade in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.Specifically, these are: * * * In this regard, it must be borne in mindthat the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, thatis, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not toinclude past administrations similarly situated constitutesarbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label thecommission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Same; Same; Same; The reports of widespread corruption in theArroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishingsaid administration from earlier administrations which were alsoblemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety.Thoughthe OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyoadministration and other past administrations, these distinctions arenot substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigationto the previous administration only. The reports of widespreadcorruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis fordistinguishing said administration from earlier administrationswhich were also blemished by similar widespread reports ofimpropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to,the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

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Same; Same; Same; The fact remains that Executive Order No.1 suffers from arbitrary classificationthe Philippine TruthCommission (PTC), to be true to its mandate of searching for thetruth, must not exclude the other past administrations.Given theforegoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logicallyrecognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurysworth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that ExecutiveOrder No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be trueto its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the otherpast administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority toinvestigate all past administrations. While reasonableprioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it bestruck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quotedlanguage of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Though the law itself be fair on itsface and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administeredby public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so aspractically to make unjust and illegal discriminations betweenpersons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, thedenial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of theconstitution.

Same; Same; Same; While with regard to equal protectionclaims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entireremedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence orotherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have beenattacked, in Executive Order No. 1, however, there is noinadvertence.The Court is not unaware that mereunderinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under theequal protection clause. Legislation is not unconstitutional merelybecause it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evilswithin its reach. It has been written that a regulation challengedunder the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rationalpredicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. In severalinstances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reasonto strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can beattained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer tothe step by step pro cess. With regard to equal protection claims, alegislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial schemesimply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to coverevery evil that might conceivably have been attacked. In ExecutiveOrder No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previousadministration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as canbe gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times



in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that ExecutiveOrder No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event orreport to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions createdin the past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposefuland intentional discrimination.

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Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Supreme Court, inexercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own willupon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act ofgovernment is done in consonance with the authorities and rightsallocated to it by the Constitution.To answer this accusation, thewords of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, towit: And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutionalboundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the otherdepartments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of thelegislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligationassigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims ofauthority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties inan actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures andguarantees to them. Thus, the Court, in exercising its power ofjudicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal bodybut rather simply making sure that any act of government is donein consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by theConstitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds noconstitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authorityof proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court willnot be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.

Same; Same; Same; Perhaps a revision of the executive issuanceso as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it topass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to theConstitution; Of all the branches of the government, it is thejudiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and soit will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to itsattainment.Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell fora truth commission as nobly envisioned by the presentadministration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance soas to include the earlier past administrations would allow itto pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront tothe Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the



judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so itwill not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. Itmust, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must bewithin constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of lawsand not of men.

CORONA,C.J., Separate Opinion:

Philippine Truth Commission; While the right to the truth isyet to be established as a right under customary law or as a generalprinciple of international law, it has nevertheless emerged as alegal concept at the national, regional and international levels,and relates to the obligation of the state to provide information tovictims or to their families or even society as a whole

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about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of humanrights.The fundamental base upon which a truth commission iscreated is the right to the truth. While the right to the truth is yet tobe established as a right under customary law or as a generalprinciple of international law, it has nevertheless emerged as alegal concept at the national, regional and international levels, andrelates to the obligation of the state to provide information to victimsor to their families or even society as a whole about thecircumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights. Atruth commission has been generally defined as a body set up toinvestigate a past history of violations of human rights in aparticular country ..., and includes four elements: ... First, a truthcommission focuses on the past. Second, a truth commission is notfocused on a specific event, but attempts to paint the overall pictureof certain human rights abuses, or violations of internationalhumanitarian law, over a period of time. Third, a truth commissionusually exists temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time,ceasing to exist with the submission of a report of its findings.Finally, a truth commission is always vested with some sort ofauthority, by way of its sponsor, that allows it greater access toinformation, greater security or protection to dig into sensitiveissues, and a greater impact with its report.

Presidency; Separation of Powers; Public Office; It is settledthat, except for the offices created by the Constitution, the creation ofa public office is primarily a legislative function.The separation



of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.This principle is one of the cornerstones of our constitutionaldemocracy and it cannot be eroded without endangering ourgovernment. The 1987 Constitution divides governmental powerinto three co-equal branches: the executive, the legislative and thejudicial. It delineates the powers of the three branches: thelegislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, theexecutive department to the enforcement of laws and the judiciaryto their interpretation and application to cases and controversies.Each branch is independent and supreme within its own sphere andthe encroachment by one branch on another is to be avoided at allcosts. The power under scrutiny in this case is the creation of apublic office. It is settled that, except for the offices created by theConstitution, the creation of a public office is primarily a legislativefunction. The legislature decides what offices are suitable, necessaryor convenient for the administration of government.

Same; Philippine Truth Commission; Equal Protection Clause;The identification of the Arroyo administration as the subject of theTruth Commissions investigation does not pass the jurisprudentialtest of reasonableness.Given the indubitably clear mandate ofE.O. No. 1, does the identifica-

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tion of the Arroyo administration as the subject of the TruthCommissions investigation pass the jurisprudential test ofreasonableness? Stated differently, does the mandate of E.O. No. 1violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution? Yes.

Same; Same; What the President granted the TruthCommission is the authority to conduct preliminary investigation ofcomplaints of graft and corruption against his immediatepredecessor and her associates.The scope of the investigatorypowers and functions assigned by the President to the TruthCommission encompasses all public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, ifany, during the previous administration. There is no doubt in mymind that what the President granted the Truth Commission is theauthority to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints ofgraft and corruption against his immediate predecessor and herassociates.



Same; Same; Ombudsman; Separation of Powers; TheConstitution has vested in Congress alone the power to grant to anyoffice concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conductpreliminary investigation of cases of graft and corruption.Thepower of control and supervision of the President includes the powerto discipline which in turn implies the power to investigate. NoCongress or Court can derogate from that power but theConstitution itself may set certain limits. And the Constitution hasin fact carved out the preliminary investigatory aspect of the controlpower and allocated the same to the following: (a) to Congress overpresidential appointees who are impeachable officers (Article XI,Sections 2 and 3); (b) to the Supreme Court over members of thecourts and the personnel thereof (Article VIII, Section 6); and (c) tothe Ombudsman over any other public official, employee, office oragency (Article XI, Section 13 (1)). However, even as theConstitution has granted to the Ombudsman the power toinvestigate other public officials and employees, such power is notabsolute and exclusive. Congress has the power to further definethe powers of the Ombudsman and, impliedly, to authorize otheroffices to conduct such investigation over their respective officialsand personnel. The Constitution has vested in Congressalone the power to grant to any office concurrentjurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conduct preliminaryinvestigation of cases of graft and corruption.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Without any law authorizing him,the President cannot legally create a committee to extend hisinvestigatory reach across the boundaries of the executivedepartment to public officers and employees, their co-principals,accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,

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during the previous administration without setting apart thosewho are still in the executive department from those who are notonly the Ombudsman has the investigatory jurisdiction over themunder Article XI, Section 13.Although pursuant to his power ofcontrol the President may supplant and directly exercise theinvestigatory functions of departments and agencies within theexecutive department, his power of control under the Constitutionand the Administrative Code is confined only to the executive



department. Without any law authorizing him, the Presidentcannot legally create a committee to extend his investigatory reachacross the boundaries of the executive department to public officersand employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories fromthe private sector, if any, during the previous administrationwithout setting apart those who are still in the executivedepartment from those who are not. Only the Ombudsman has theinvestigatory jurisdiction over them under Article XI, Section 13.There is no law granting to the President the authority to create acommittee with concurrent investigatory jurisdiction of this nature.

Same; Same; Same; It is patent from the provisions of ExecutiveOrder (E.O.) No. 1 itself that quasi-judicial powers are indeedvested in the Truth Commission, particularly in Section 2,paragraphs (b) and (g).Despite respondents denial that the TruthCommission is infused with quasi-judicial powers, it is patent fromthe provisions of E.O. No. 1 itself that such powers are indeedvested in the Truth Commission, particularly in Section 2,paragraphs (b) and (g): b)Collect, receive, review, and evaluateevidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruptionwhich it has chosen to investigate, x x x g) Turn over from timeto time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorialauthorities, by means of a special or interim report andrecommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers andemployees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices oraccessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation theCommission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe theyare liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;x x x.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The powers toevaluate evidence and find reasonable ground to believe thatsomeone is liable for graft and corruption are not merely fact-finding or investigatorythese are quasi-judicial in nature.Thepowers to evaluate evidence and find reasonable ground tobelieve that someone is liable for graft and corruption are notmerely fact-finding or investigatory. These are quasi-judicial innature because they actually go into the weighing of evidence,drawing up of legal conclusions from them as basis for their officialaction and the exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicialnature.

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Same; Same; Same; The power to establish if there is reasonableground to believe that certain persons are liable for graft andcorruption under pertinent applicable laws is quasi-judicial innature because it is akin to the discretion exercised by a prosecutorin the determination of probable cause during a preliminaryinvestigation.The power to establish if there is reasonable groundto believe that certain persons are liable for graft and corruptionunder pertinent applicable laws is quasi-judicial in nature becauseit is akin to the discretion exercised by a prosecutor in thedetermination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation.It involves a judicial (or quasi-judicial) appraisal of the facts for thepurpose of determining if a violation has in fact been committed.

Same; Same; Same; As a mere creation of the executive andwithout a law granting it the power to investigate person andagencies outside the executive department, the Truth Commissioncan only perform administrative functions, not quasi-judicialfunctions.As a mere creation of the executive and without a lawgranting it the power to investigate person and agencies outside theexecutive department, the Truth Commission can only performadministrative functions, not quasi-judicial functions.Administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neitherpart of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.

CARPIO,J., Dissenting Opinion:

Presidency; Faithful Execution Clause; To execute faithfully thelaw, the President must first know the facts that justify or requirethe execution of the law, and to know the facts, the President mayhave to conduct fact-finding investigations.Executive power isvested exclusively in the President. Neither the Judiciary nor theLegislature can execute the law. As the Executive, the President ismandated not only to execute the law, but also to execute faithfullythe law. To execute faithfully the law, the President must firstknow the facts that justify or require the execution of the law. Toknow the facts, the President may have to conduct fact-findinginvestigations. Otherwise, without knowing the facts, thePresident may be blindly or negligently, and not faithfullyand intelligently, executing the law. Due to time and physicalconstraints, the President cannot obviously conduct by himself thefact-finding investigations. The President will have to delegate thefact-finding function to one or more subordinates. Thus, thePresident may appoint a single fact-finding investigator, or acollegial body or committee.

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Same; Same; The power to find facts, or to conduct fact-findinginvestigations, is necessary and proper, and thus inherent in thePresidents power to execute faithfully the law.The power to findfacts, or to conduct fact-finding investigations, is necessary andproper, and thus inherent in the Presidents power to executefaithfully the law. Indeed, the power to find facts is inherent notonly in Executive power, but also in Legislative as well as Judicialpower. The Legislature cannot sensibly enact a law withoutknowing the factual milieu upon which the law is to operate.Likewise, the courts cannot render justice without knowing the factsof the case if the issue is not purely legal.

Same; Same; Philippine Truth Commission; The President cancreate the Truth Commission as a public office in his Officepursuant to his power to reorganize the Office of the PresidentProper.The creation of a public office must be distinguished fromthe creation of an ad hoc fact-finding public body. The power tocreate a public office is undeniably a legislative power. There aretwo ways by which a public office is created: (1) by law, or (2) bydelegation of law, as found in the Presidents authority toreorganize his Office. The President as the Executive does notinherently possess the power to reorganize the Executive branch.However, the Legislature has delegated to the President the powerto create public offices within the Office of the President Proper, asprovided in Section 31(1), Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of EO 292.Thus, the President can create the Truth Commission as a publicoffice in his Office pursuant to his power to reorganize the Office ofthe President Proper. In such a case, the President is exercising hisdelegated power to create a public office within the Office of thePresident Proper. There is no dispute that the President possessesthis delegated power.

Same; Same; Same; In the alternative, the President can alsocreate the Truth Commission as an ad hoc body to conduct a fact-finding investigation pursuant to the Presidents inherent power tofind facts as basis to execute faithfully the law.In the alternative,the President can also create the Truth Commission as an ad hocbody to conduct a fact-finding investigation pursuant to thePresidents inherent power to find facts as basis to execute faithfullythe law. The creation of such ad hoc fact-finding body isindisputably necessary and proper for the President to executefaithfully the law. In such a case, members of the Truth



Commission may be appointed as Special Assistants or Advisers ofthe President, and then assigned to conduct a fact-findinginvestigation. The President can appoint as many Special Assistantsor Advisers as he may need. There is no public office created andmembers of the Truth Commission are incumbents already holdingpublic office in gov-

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ernment. These incumbents are given an assignment by thePresident to be members of the Truth Commission. Thus, the TruthCommission is merely an ad hoc body assigned to conduct a fact-finding investigation.

Same; Same; Same; The creation of ad hoc investigating bodies,as well as the appointment of ad hoc investigators, does not resultin the creation of a public office.The creation of such ad hocinvestigating bodies, as well as the appointment of ad hocinvestigators, does not result in the creation of a public office. Increating ad hoc investigatory bodies or appointing ad hocinvestigators, executive and judicial officials do not create publicoffices but merely exercise a power inherent in their primaryconstitutional or statutory functions, which may be to execute thelaw, to exercise disciplinary authority, or both. These fact-findingbodies and investigators are not permanent bodies or functionaries,unlike public offices or their occupants. There is no separatecompensation, other than per diems or allowances, for thosedesignated as members of ad hoc investigating bodies or as ad hocinvestigators.

Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The power of control doesnot involve the power to create a public office, neither does thePresidents power to find facts or his broader power to execute thelaws give the President the power to create a public office.ThePresidents power to create ad hoc fact-finding bodies does notemanate from the Presidents power of control over the Executivebranch. The Presidents power of control is the power to reverse,revise or modify the decisions of subordinate executive officials, orsubstitute his own decision for that of his subordinate, or even makethe decision himself without waiting for the action of hissubordinate. This power of control does not involve the power tocreate a public office. Neither does the Presidents power to find



facts or his broader power to execute the laws give the President thepower to create a public office. The President can exercise the powerto find facts or to execute the laws without creating a public office.

Same; Philippine Truth Commission; Words and Phrases;There is no language in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 granting theTruth Commission quasi-judicial power, whether expressly orimpliedly, because the Truth Commission is not, and was neverintended to be, a quasi-judicial body; Quasi-judicial power is thepower of an administrative body to adjudicate the rights andobligations of parties under its jurisdiction in a manner that isfinal and binding, unless there is a proper appeal.There is nolanguage in EO 1 granting the Truth Commission quasi-judicialpower, whether expressly or impliedly, because the TruthCommission is not, and was never intended to be, a quasi-judicialbody. The power of the President to create offices within the Officeof the President Proper is a power to create only executive or ad-

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ministrative offices, not quasi-judicial offices or bodies. Undeniably,a quasi-judicial office or body can only be created by theLegislature. The Truth Commission, as created under EO 1, is not aquasi-judicial body and is not vested with any quasi-judicial poweror function. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves thedetermination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of whatthe law is, what the legal rights and obligations of the contendingparties are, and based thereon and the facts obtaining, theadjudication of the respective rights and obligations of theparties. The tribunal, board or officer exercising quasi-judicialfunctions must be clothed with the power to pass judgment on thecontroversy. In short, quasi-judicial power is the power of anadministrative body to adjudicate the rights and obligationsof parties under its jurisdiction in a manner that is final andbinding, unless there is a proper appeal.

Same; Same; Same; That Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 declaresthat the Truth Commission will act as an independent collegialbody cannot invalidate EO 1this provision merely means that thePresident will not dictate on the members of the Truth Commissionon what their findings and recommendations should be.That EO1 declares that the Truth Commission will act as an independent



collegial body cannot invalidate EO 1. This provision merely meansthat the President will not dictate on the members of the TruthCommission on what their findings and recommendations should be.The Truth Commission is free to come out with its own findings andrecommendations, free from any interference or pressure from thePresident. Of course, as EO 1 expressly provides, the President,Congress and the Ombudsman are not bound by such findings andrecommendations.

Same; Same; Three Types of Fact-Finding Investigations in theExecutive Department.There are three types of fact-findinginvestigations in the Executive branch. First, there is the purelyfact-finding investigation the purpose of which is to establish thefacts as basis for future executive action, excluding thedetermination of administrative culpability or the determination ofprobable cause. Second, there is the administrative investigation todetermine administrative culpabilities of public officials andemployees. Third, there is the preliminary investigation whose solepurpose is to determine probable cause as to the existence andperpetrator of a crime. These three types of fact-findinginvestigations are separate and distinct investigations.

Same; Same; Ombudsman; Purely fact-finding investigationsto improve administrative procedures and efficiency, to instituteadministrative measures to prevent corruption, to provide thePresident with policy options, to recom-

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mend to Congress remedial legislation, and even to determinewhether there is basis to file a formal administrative charge againsta government official or employee, do not fall under the primaryjurisdiction of the Ombudsman.The Ombudsman has primaryjurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.The cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are criminal cases aswell as quasi-criminal cases like the forfeiture of unexplainedwealth. [I]n the exercise of this primary jurisdiction over casescognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman may take overx x x the investigation of such cases from any investigatory agencyof the Government. The cases covered by the primaryjurisdiction of the Ombudsman are criminal or quasi-criminal cases but not administrative cases. Administrative



cases, such as administrative disciplinary cases, are not cognizableby the Sandiganbayan. With more reason, purely fact-findinginvestigations conducted by the Executive branch are notcognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Purely fact-findinginvestigations to improve administrative procedures and efficiency,to institute administrative measures to prevent corruption, toprovide the President with policy options, to recommend to Congressremedial legislation, and even to determine whether there is basis tofile a formal administrative charge against a government official oremployee, do not fall under the primary jurisdiction of theOmbudsman. These fact-finding investigations do notinvolve criminal or quasi-criminal cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan.

Same; Same; Same; If the Ombudsman has the exclusive powerto conduct fact-finding investigations, then even the Judiciary andthe Legislature cannot perform their fundamental functionswithout the action or approval of the Ombudsman.If theOmbudsman has the exclusive power to conduct fact-findinginvestigations, then even the Judiciary and the Legislature cannotperform their fundamental functions without the action or approvalof the Ombudsman. While the Constitution grants the Office of theOmbudsman the power to [i]nvestigate on its own x x x any act oromission of any public official, employee, office or agency, suchpower is not exclusive. To hold that such investigatory power isexclusive to the Ombudsman is to make the Executive, Legislativeand Judiciary wholly dependent on the Ombudsman for theperformance of their Executive, Legislative and Judicial functions.

Same; Same; The Truth Commission, a body authorized to taketestimony, can administer oaths and issue subpoena and subpoenaduces tecum pursuant to Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of ExecutiveOrder (E.O.) No. 292.Section 2(e) of EO 1 confers on the TruthCommission the power to [i]nvite or subpoena witnesses and taketheir testimonies and for that purpose, ad-

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minister oaths or affirmation as the case may be. Thus, the TruthCommission, a body authorized to take testimony, can administeroaths and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum pursuant toSection 37, Chapter 9, Book I of EO 292. In fact, this power to



administer oaths and to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecumis a power of every administrative fact-finding investigative bodycreated in the Executive, Legislative or Judicial branch. Section37, Chapter 9, Book I of EO 292 grants such power to everyfact-finding body so created.

Same; Same; Contempt Power; There is no provision inExecutive Order (E.O.) No. 1 that gives the Truth Commission thepower to cite persons for contempt; To require every administrativefact-finding body to have coercive or contempt powers is toinvalidate all administrative fact-finding bodies created by theExecutive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government.Thereis no provision in EO 1 that gives the Truth Commission the powerto cite persons for contempt. As explained by Solicitor General JoseAnselmo I. Cadiz, if the person who refuses to obey the subpoena,take oath or give testimony is a public officer, he can be chargedwith defiance of a lawful order, which should meaninsubordination if his superior had ordered him to obey thesubpoena of the Truth Commission. If the person is not a publicofficer or employee, he can only be dealt with in accordance withlaw, which should mean that the Truth Commission could file apetition with the proper court to cite such private person incontempt pursuant to Sections 1 and 9 of Rule 21 of the Rules ofCourt. However, the mere fact that the Truth Commission, by itself,has no coercive power to compel any one, whether a governmentemployee or a private individual, to testify before the Commissiondoes not invalidate the creation by the President, or by theJudiciary or Legislature, of a purely administrative fact-findinginvestigative body. There are witnesses who may voluntarily testify,and bring relevant documents, before such fact-finding body. Thefact-finding body may even rely only on official records of thegovernment. To require every administrative fact-finding body tohave coercive or contempt powers is to invalidate all administrativefact-finding bodies created by the Executive, Legislative andJudicial branches of government.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; There is much ado about thewords Truth Commission as the name of the fact-finding bodycreated under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1there is no law or ruleprescribing how a fact-finding body should be named.There ismuch ado about the words Truth Commission as the name of thefact-finding body created under EO 1. There is no law or ruleprescribing how a fact-finding body should be named. Infact, there is no law or rule prescribing how permanent govern-

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ment commissions, offices, or entities should be named. There isalso no law or rule prohibiting the use of the words TruthCommission as the name of a fact-finding body. Most fact-finding bodies are named, either officially or unofficially, after thechairperson of such body, which by itself, will not give any clue asto the nature, powers or functions of the body. Thus, the nameFeliciano Commission or Melo Commission, by itself, does notindicate what the commission is all about. Naming the present fact-finding body as the Truth Commission is more descriptive thannaming it the Davide Commission after the name of its chairperson.

Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; To prioritize based onreasonable and even compelling grounds is not to discriminate, butto act sensibly and responsibly.These are not only reasonablebut also compelling grounds for the Truth Commission toprioritize the investigation of the Arroyo administration. Toprioritize based on reasonable and even compelling groundsis not to discriminate, but to act sensibly and responsibly. Inany event, there is no violation of the equal protection clause justbecause the authorities focus their investigation or prosecution onone particular alleged law-breaker, for surely a person accused ofrobbery cannot raise as a defense that other robbers like him allover the country are not being prosecuted. By the very nature of aninvestigation or prosecution, there must be a focus on particular actor acts of a person or a group of persons.

Same; Same; Same; To require that earlier pastadministrations must also be included in the investigation of theTruth Commission, with the Truth Commission expresslyempowered to investigate all past administrations, before there canbe a valid investigation of the Arroyo administration under theequal protection clause, is to prevent absolutely the investigation ofthe Arroyo administration under any circumstance.The majorityopinion goes on to suggest that EO 1 could be amended to includethe earlier past administrations to allow it to pass the test ofreasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution.The majority opinions reasoning is specious, illogical, impractical,impossible to comply, and contrary to the Constitution and well-settled jurisprudence. To require that earlier pastadministrations must also be included in the investigation of theTruth Commission, with the Truth Commission expresslyempowered to investigate all past administrations, beforethere can be a valid investigation of the Arroyo administration



under the equal protection clause, is to prevent absolutely theinvestigation of the Arroyo administration under anycircumstance.

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Same; Same; Same; Classifying the earlier pastadministrations in the last 111 years as just one class is notgermane to the purpose of investigating possible acts of graft andcorruption.The earlier past administrations prior to theArroyo administration cover the Presidencies of Emilio Aguinaldo,Manuel Quezon, Jose Laurel, Sergio Osmea, Manuel Roxas,Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos Garcia, DiosdadoMacapagal, Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, andJoseph Estrada, a period spanning 102 years or more than acentury. All these administrations, plus the 9-year Arroyoadministration, already constitute the universe of all pastadministrations, covering a total period of 111 years. All theseearlier past administrations cannot constitute just one class ofadministrations because if they were to constitute just one class,then there would be no other class of administrations. It is likesaying that since all citizens are human beings, then all citizensbelong to just one class and you cannot classify them as disabled,impoverished, marginalized, illiterate, peasants, farmers, minors,adults or seniors. Classifying the earlier past administrationsin the last 111 years as just one class is not germane to the purposeof investigating possible acts of graft and corruption. There areprescriptive periods to prosecute crimes. There are administrationsthat have already been investigated by their successoradministrations. There are also administrations that have beensubjected to several Congressional investigations for alleged large-scale anomalies. There are past Presidents, and the officials in theiradministrations, who are all dead. There are past Presidents whoare dead but some of the officials in their administrations are stillalive. Thus, all the earlier past administrations cannot beclassified as just one single classa class of pastadministrationsbecause they are not all similarly situated.

Same; Same; Same; To insist that earlier past administrationsmust also be investigated by the Truth Commission, together withthe Arroyo administration, is utterly bereft of any reasonable basisother than to prevent absolutely the investigation of the Arroyo



administration.A fact-finding investigation of earlier pastadministrations, spanning 111 years punctuated by two worldwars, a war for independence, and several rebellionswouldobviously be an impossible task to undertake for an ad hoc body likethe Truth Commission. To insist that earlier pastadministrations must also be investigated by the TruthCommission, together with the Arroyo administration, is utterlybereft of any reasonable basis other than to prevent absolutely theinvestigation of the Arroyo administration. No nation on this planethas even attempted to assign to one ad-hoc fact-finding body theinvestigation of all its senior public officials in the past 100 years.

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Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; If courts cannotexercise the Executives special province to decide whether or not toindict, which is the equivalent of determination of probable cause,with greater reason courts cannot exercise the Executives specialprovince to decide what or what not to investigate foradministrative fact-finding purposes.In the present case, no onehas been charged before the prosecutor or the courts. Whatpetitioners want this Court to do is invalidate a mere administrativefact-finding investigation by the Executive branch, an investigativephase prior to preliminary investigation. Clearly, if courts cannotexercise the Executives special province to decide whether or notto indict, which is the equivalent of determination of probable cause,with greater reason courts cannot exercise the Executives specialprovince to decide what or what not to investigate foradministrative fact-finding purposes. For this Court to exercise thisspecial province of the President is to encroach on the exclusivedomain of the Executive to execute the law in blatant violation ofthe finely crafted constitutional separation of power. Anyunwarranted intrusion by this Court into the exclusive domain ofthe Executive or Legislative branch disrupts the separation of poweramong the three co-equal branches and ultimately invites re-balancing measures from the Executive or Legislative branch.

Same; Same; Same; A claim of selective prosecution that violatesthe equal protection clause can be raised only by the party adverselyaffected by the discriminatory act.A claim of selectiveprosecution that violates the equal protection clause can beraised only by the party adversely affected by the



discriminatory act. In Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433(1982), this Court declared: x x x Those adversely affected mayunder the circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only ifthey can show that the governmental act assailed, far from beinginspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted bythe spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that findsno support in reason. x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Here, petitionersdo not claim to be adversely affected by the alleged selectiveprosecution under EO 1. Even in the absence of such a claim by theproper party, the majority opinion strikes down EO 1 asdiscriminatory and thus violative of the equal protection clause.This is a gratuitous act to those who are not before this Court, adiscriminatory exception to the rule that only those adverselyaffected by an alleged selective prosecution can invoke the equalprotection clause. Ironically, such discriminatory exception isa violation of the equal protection clause. In short, the rulingof the majority is in itself a violation of the equal protection clause,the very constitutional guarantee that it seeks to enforce.

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Same; Same; Same; The majority opinions requirement thatearlier past administrations in the last 111 years should beincluded in the investigation of the Truth Commission to complywith the equal protection clause is a recipe for all criminals toescape prosecution.The majority opinions requirement thatearlier past administrations in the last 111 years should beincluded in the investigation of the Truth Commission to complywith the equal protection clause is a recipe for all criminals to escapeprosecution. This requirement is like saying that before a personcan be charged with estafa, the prosecution must also charge allpersons who in the past may have committed estafa in the country.Since it is impossible for the prosecution to charge all those who inthe past may have committed estafa in the country, then it becomesimpossible to prosecute anyone for estafa.

Same; Same; Same; A fact-finding investigation in theExecutive or Judicial branch, even if limited to specific governmentofficialswhether incumbent, resigned or retireddoes not violatethe equal protection clause.A fact-finding investigation in theExecutive or Judicial branch, even if limited to specific governmentofficials whether incumbent, resigned or retired does not



violate the equal protection clause. If an anomaly is reported in agovernment transaction and a fact-finding investigation isconducted, the investigation by necessity must focus on the publicofficials involved in the transaction. It is ridiculous for anyone toask this Court to stop the investigation of such public officials on theground that past public officials of the same rank, who may havebeen involved in similar anomalous transactions in the past, are notbeing investigated by the same fact-finding body. To uphold such alaughable claim is to grant immunity to all criminals, throwing outof the window the constitutional principle that [p]ublic office is apublic trust and that [p]ublic officials and employees must at alltimes be accountable to the people.

Same; Same; Same; Accountability of Public Officers; Themajority opinion completely ignores the constitutional principle thatpublic office is a public trust and that public officials are at alltimes accountable to the people.The majority opinionsrequirements that EO 1 should also include earlier pastadministrations, with the Truth Commission empowered toinvestigate all past administrations, to comply with the equalprotection clause, is a requirement that is not only illogical andimpossible to comply, it also allows the impunity to commit graft andcorruption and other crimes under our penal laws. The majorityopinion completely ignores the constitutional principle that publicoffice is a public trust and that public officials are at all timesaccountable to the people.

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Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Court, in strikingdown Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 creating the Truth Commission,overrules the manifest will of the Filipino people to start thedifficult task of putting an end to graft and corruption ingovernment, denies the President his basic constitutional power todetermine the facts in his faithful execution of the law, andsuppresses whatever truth may come out in the purely fact-findinginvestigation of the Truth Commission.Neither theConstitution nor any existing law prevents the incumbentPresident from redeeming his campaign pledge to theFilipino people. In fact, the incumbent Presidents campaignpledge is merely a reiteration of the basic State policy, enshrined inSection 27, Article II of the Constitution, that: Section 27. The State



shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and takepositive and effective measures against graft andcorruption. (Emphasis supplied) The incumbent Presidentscampaign pledge also reiterates the constitutional principle that[p]ublic office is a public trust and that [p]ublic officers andemployees must at all times be accountable to the people. ThisCourt, in striking down EO 1 creating the Truth Commission,overrules the manifest will of the Filipino people to start the difficulttask of putting an end to graft and corruption in government,denies the President his basic constitutional power to determine thefacts in his faithful execution of the law, and suppresses whatevertruth may come out in the purely fact-finding investigation of theTruth Commission. This Court, in invoking the equal protectionclause to strike down a purely fact-finding investigation, grantsimmunity to those who violate anti-corruption laws and other penallaws, renders meaningless the constitutional principle that publicoffice is a public trust, and makes public officials unaccountable tothe people at any time.

CARPIO-MORALES,J., Dissenting Opinion:

Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Equal Protection Clause;Petitioners with legal standing as legislators cannot properly assertthe equal protection claim of the previous administrationthepeculiarity of the locus standi of legislators necessarily confines theadjudication of their petition only on matters that tend to impairthe exercise of their official functions.Petitioners in G.R. No.193036, with legal standing as legislators, cannot properlyassert the equal protection claim of the previousadministration. While legislators have locus standi in certaincases, their legal standing as such is recognized only insofar as theassailed issuance affects their functions as legislators. In theabsence of a claim that the issuance in question violated the rightsof petitioner-legislators or impermissibly intruded into the domain ofthe Legislature, they have no legal standing to institute the presentaction

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in their capacity as members of Congress. No doubt, legislators areallowed to sue to question the validity of any official action upon aclaim of usurpation of legislative power. That is why, not every time



that a Senator or a Representative invokes the power of judicialreview, the Court automatically clothes them with locus standi. TheCourt examines first, as the ponencia did, if the petitioner raises anissue pertaining to an injury to Congress as an institution or aderivative injury to members thereof, before proceeding to resolvethat particular issue. The peculiarity of the locus standi oflegislators necessarily confines the adjudication of their petition onlyon matters that tend to impair the exercise of their official functions.

Same; Same; Same; Breach of the equal protection clause, aspresently raised by petitioner-legislators on behalf of the ExecutiveDepartment of the immediate past administration, has nothing todo with the impairment of the powers of Congress.Breach of theequal protection clause, as presently raised by petitioner-legislatorson behalf of the Executive Department of the immediate pastadministration, has nothing to do with the impairment of thepowers of Congress. Thus, with respect to the issue in Pimentel, Jr.v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, 469 SCRA 1 (2005), that did not involveany impairment of the prerogatives of Congress, some Senators whomerely invoked their status as legislators were not grantedstanding. Moreover, petitioner-legislators cannot take the cudgelsfor the previous administration/s, unless they admit that they aremaintaining a confidential relation with it/them or acting asadvocates of the rights of a non-party who seeks access to theirmarket or function.

Equal Protection Clause; Philippine Truth Commission; Thereis nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the Truth Commissionsdefined scope of investigation.The ponencia holds that theprevious administration has been denied equal protection of thelaws. To it, [t]o restrict the scope of the commissions investigationto said particular administration constitutes arbitrariness which theequal protection clause cannot sanction. I find nothing arbitrary orunreasonable in the Truth Commissions defined scope ofinvestigation. In issues involving the equal protection clause, thetest developed by jurisprudence is that of reasonableness, whichhas four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantialdistinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is notlimited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to allmembers of the same class.

Same; Same; Presidency; Separation of Powers; The Court couldnot, in any way, determine or dictate what information thePresident would be needing in fulfilling the duty to ensure thefaithful execution of laws on public

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accountability.This Court could not, in any way, determineor dictate what information the President would be needingin fulfilling the duty to ensure the faithful execution of lawson public accountability. This sweeping directive of theponencia to include all past administrations in the probe tramplesupon the prerogative of a co-equal branch of government. Thegroup or class, from which to elicit the needed information, rests onsubstantial distinction that sets the class apart.

Same; Same; Same; The exclusion of other past administrationsfrom the scope of investigation by the Truth Commission is justifiedby the substantial distinction that complete and definitive reportscovering their respective periods have already been rendered.TheExecutive Departments determination of the futility or redundancyof investigating other administrations should be accorded respect.Respondents having manifested that pertinent and credible dataare already in their hands or in the archives, petitioners idea of anall-encompassing de novo inquiry becomes tenuous as it goesbeyond what the Executive Department needs. The exclusion ofother past administrations from the scope of investigation by theTruth Commission is justified by the substantial distinction thatcomplete and definitive reports covering their respective periodshave already been rendered. The same is not true with theimmediate past administration. There is thus no undue favor orunwarranted partiality. To include everybody all over again is toinsist on a useless act.

Philippine Truth Commission; The purpose of Executive Order(E.O.) No. 1 is to produce a report which, insofar as the TruthCommission is concerned, is the end in itselfthe purpose of thereport is another matter which is already outside the control of E.O.No. 1.The purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to produce a report which,insofar as the Truth Commission is concerned, is the end in itself.The purpose of the report is another matter which is already outsidethe control of E.O. No. 1. Once the report containing the neededinformation is completed, the Truth Commission is dissolved functusofficio. At that point, the endeavor of data-gathering isaccomplished, and E.O No. 1 has served its purpose. It cannot besaid, however, that it already eradicated graft and corruption. Thereport would still be passed upon by government agencies. Insofaras the Executive Department is concerned, the report assimilatesinto a broader database that advises and guides the President inlaw enforcement. To state that the purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to stamp



out acts of graft and corruption leads to the fallacious and artificialconclusion that respondents are stamping out corrupt acts of theprevious administration only, as if E.O. No. 1 represents the entireanti-corruption efforts of the Executive Department.

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Same; Equal Protection Clause; Laws that are limited induration (e.g., general appropriations act) do not circumvent theguarantee of equal protection by not embracing all that may, in theyears to come, be in similar conditions even beyond the effectivity ofthe law.The Truth Commission is an ad hoc body formed underthe Office of the President. The nature of an ad hoc body is that it islimited in scope. Ad hoc means for the particular end or case athand without consideration of wider application. An ad hoc body isinherently temporary. E.O. No. 1 provides that the TruthCommission shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31,2012. That the classification should not be limited to existingconditions only, as applied in the present case, does not mean theinclusion of future administrations. Laws that are limited induration (e.g., general appropriations act) do not circumvent theguarantee of equal protection by not embracing all that may, in theyears to come, be in similar conditions even beyond the effectivity ofthe law. The requirement not to limit the classification to existingconditions goes into the operational details of the law. The lawcannot, in fine print, enumerate extant items that exclusivelycompose the classification, thereby excluding soon-to-exist ones thatmay also fall under the classification.

NACHURA,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Philippine Truth Commission; Public Office; Given the powersconferred upon it, as spelled out in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,there can be no doubt that the Truth Commission is a public office,and the Chairman and the Commissioners appointed thereto, publicofficers.A public office is defined as the right, authority, or duty,created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, eitherfixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, anindividual is invested with some sovereign power of government tobe exercised by him for the benefit of the public. Public offices arecreated either by the Constitution, by valid statutory enactments, orby authority of law. A person who holds a public office is a public



officer. Given the powers conferred upon it, as spelled out in E.O.No. 1, there can be no doubt that the Truth Commission is a publicoffice, and the Chairman and the Commissioners appointed thereto,public officers.

Presidency; Power of Control; Take Care Clause; ThePresidents power of control is derived directly from the Constitutionand not from any implementing legislation, while,

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