beyond realpolitik "the israel lobby and us support for israel

8/6/2019 BEYOND Realpolitik "the Israel Lobby and US Support for Israel

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BEYOND REALPOLITIK"The srael Lobby and US Support for Israel

DovWaxman

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S.Foreign Policy" (Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP06-01 1,John F.Kennedy School ofGovernment, Harvard University, 2006).Elizabeth Stephens, US Policy Towards Israel: The Role ofPoliticalCulturein Defining the SpecialRelationship (Portland, OR: Sussex AcademicPress, 2006).Irvine H. Anderson, BiblicalInterpretationandMiddleEastPolicy: The

PromisedLand,America, and Israel,1917-2002 (Gainesville: UniversityPress ofFlorida, 2005).

The close partnership between the United States an d Israel is unusual, evenexceptional, in the annals of inter-state relations. The range and depth ofthe diplomatic, military, and economic ties between the two states hasfew parallels, granting the US-Israeli relationship its "special" character.What makes the US-Israeli relationship truly "special," however, is not justthe extent of the ties that bind the two states together, but the degree ofcooperation, support, and understanding both states exhibit toward eachother.Although not formally allies,' over the years the US-Israeli embracehas grown tighter (especially after the 1967 War), involving a deepeninglevel of cooperation and coordination. Of course, the United States andIsrael do not always se e ey e to eye, and their relationship is seldom entirelyharmonious. But both states work closely together, trying to coordinatetheir foreign policies as much as possible, and trying to help each other asbest they can. The cooperation and coordination between the United Statesand Israel over many years an d in many different domains transcends thatIsraelStudies Forum,Volume 22, Issue2, Winter2007:97-114 Associationforlsraeltudiesdoi:10.3167/isf.2007.220205


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between allies, and makes it a "special relationship:2 Yet even this commondescription of he US-Israeli relationship does not fully capture it. Underly-ing the intimate relationship between the United States and Israel is theirunswerving mutual commitment to each other. This commitment has anintensity to it that distinguishes it from other "special relationships," eventhat between the United States and Great Britain.

The US-Israeli relationship is more a love affair than simply a marriageof convenience. It is marked by a passion and devotion that cannot beexplained solely in terms of calculations of interests. For the United States,in particular, realpolitik alone cannot account for its unprecedented dip-lomatic and financial largesse toward IsraelP For the past 30 years, theUnited States has given more money to Israel in foreign aid than it has toany other country.4 Each year, Israel receives approximately $3billion indirect military and economic aid (over time, the share of military aid hasincreased while the share of economic aid has declined); and unlike USforeign aid to other countries, Israel receives this money in a lump sum atthe beginning of the fiscal year with few strings attached. Diplomatically,the United States has been Israel's staunchest supporter, vetoing numerousUN Security Council resolutions criticizing Israel, defending and justifyingunpopular Israeli actions to the international community, and encourag-ing other states to establish diplomatic relations with IsraeL The UnitedStates has also provided Israel with some of its most advanced militarytechnology and hardware, and frequently shared with it highly dassifiedintelligence. No other American ally has consistently enjoyed such benefitsfrom the United States.By itself, the level of US support for Israel is quite astonishing, but whatmakes it even more remarkable is the fact that Israel is hardly a majorpower able to offer the United States similar benefits in return. Whilecooperation with Israel does bring the United States some benefits (espe-cially in intelligence and counterterrorism efforts, the development ofmilitary technology, and military training) (Inbar 2006:12), these benefitsdo no t match those that Israel gets from the United States. Undoubtedly,the United States is a far more useful ally to Israel, than Israel is to theUnited States. After all, for all its military prowess, technological sophis-tication, and dependability, Israel is still a small country, with a smallpopulation, and many enemies. Thus, although no t completely one-sided,the US-Israeli relationship is certainly imbalanced; which makes Ameri-can support for Israel more a matter of generosity than quid pro quo. Ye tdespite this obvious imbalance, the United States rarely treats Israel as aclient state. Instead, it often goes to great lengths to accommodate Israeliconcerns and interests, generally treating its junior partner as an equal,rather than a dependent.


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Slaughtering a Sacred CowFo r many years, American generosity toward Israel has been widelyaccepted in the United States. While observers in other countries haveoften been perplexed and sometimes infuriated by US support for Israel, inthe United States itself there has been little dissent except at the fringes ofthe political spectrum. In mainstream American politics, and among mostAmericans, US support for Israel was unquestioned and largely taken forgranted. Increasingly, however, a domestic debate has begun to developover this sacred tenet of US Middle East policy. The first stirrings of dis-content could be heard in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when shockedAmericans asked themselves "why do they hate the United States?" andsome suggested or quietly wondered whether it was because of America'ssupport for Israel. But at the time, this subversive thought received littleattention in the media and did not generate a public discussion over Amer-ican support for Israel. It was only with the coming of he Iraq war an d thedomestic divisions an d dispute over it, that the America's relationship withIsrael ha s come under greater public scrutiny an d become a topic of debate.Although this debate has not entered the corridors ofpower in WashingtonDC, it has burst into the mainstream media, shattering the general silencethat prevailed for so long on the subject of US support for Israel."The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," a working paper by JohnMearsheimer an d Stephen Walt (2006b),' has played a significant part inprovoking this debate.

6The paper has become something of a sensation,generating a firestorm of controversy an d a great deal of media attention.Hundreds of newspaper articles an d op-eds have been written about it,7 it

ha s been critiqued at length in numerous magazines and periodicals, and ithas become a favorite subject of discussion in the "blogosphere.' The paperhas received warm praise and fierce criticism, an d Mearsheimer an d Walthave won acclaim and notoriety in equal measure. Fo r some, they are coura-geous speakers of "truth to power" willing to break a long-standing taboo;8for others they are at best ignorant and deluded, at worst, anti-Semitic..

So what is all the fuss about? Judging by the vitriolic and sometimeshysterical responses to it, one might think that "The Israel Lobby and U.S.Foreign Policy" is akin to the infamous anti-Semitic tract, The Protocolsof the Elders of Zion, alleging a Jewish conspiracy to control the world.In fact, although Mearsheimer and Walt have been accused of peddlingan inflammatory anti-Semitic conspiracy theory,9 all they really do isdenounce the excessive influence of the "Israel Lobby" (which, they takecare to note, is not exclusively Jewish and does not represent the viewsof American Jews) on US foreign policy toward the Middle East. This ishardly groundbreaking stuff. Mearsheimer and Walt are by no means the


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first authors to accuse the pro-Israel lobby in the United States of exer-cising a malign influence over US Middle East policy (see, e.g., Chom-sky 1983; Curtiss 1990; Findley 1985; Tivan 1987). What makes "TheIsrael Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" significant is not its novelty, but itsauthors. As prominent and well regarded scholars of International Rela-tions at highly prestigious universities-Mearsheimer at the Universityof Chicago and Walt at Harvard University-Mearsheimer and Walt havea credibility and legitimacy that previous critics of the pro-Israel lobbyand the pro-Israel "bias? in US foreign policy have lacked. As respectabletenured professors, they cannot easily be dismissed as "leftist loonies"or "right-wing bigots' and their thoroughly foot-noted paper-only 42pages of text with 40 pages of footnotes-appearing on the Web site ofthe Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University has all thetrappings of a serious scholarly paper. In short, Mearsheimer and Walthad to be taken seriously."The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" forcefully challenges US sup-port for Israel and the power of the Israel lobby.,It launches this challengehead-on by pointedly questioning why the United States provides so muchsupport to Israel-a level of support that is unique, according to the authors(Mearsheimer and Walt 2006b: 4). Mearsheimer and Walt argue that thereis neither a strategic nor a moral case for such support. They dismiss thecommon argument made by proponents of the de facto US-Israeli alli-ance that Israel is a strategic asset for the United States. While they acceptthat Israel may have been a strategic asset to the United States. during theCold War (when it helped in the containment of Soviet expansionism inthe Middle East), they contend that this is no longer true in the post-ColdWar era (ibid.). Rather, Mearsheimer and Walt contend that "Israel is infact a liability in the war on terror and the broader effort to deal with roguestates" (ibid.: 5). Israel is a strategic liability, they believe, not only becauseit cannot really help the United States deal with these strategic challenges,but also because US support for Israel actually contributes to creating thesechallenges. They claim that "unconditional" US support for Israel is an"important source" of anti-American terrorism, motivating Osama binLaden and other al-Qaeda leaders and boosting the appeal ofjihadism andradical Islamism in the Arab and Muslim world (ibid.).10 It also weakensthe US position outside the Middle East (ibid.: 6). Mearsheimer and Waltalso claim that US tacit acceptance of the Israeli nuclear arsenal under-mines its efforts to limit nuclear proliferation (and that Israel's nuclearweapons are one reason why states like Iran want them) (ibid.). Finally, asif all this were not bad enough, Mearsheimer and Walt also chastise Israelfor not behaving "like a loyal ally"-Israel has often broken its promises toUS leaders and ignored American requests, it has provided potential US


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rivals like China with sensitive US military technology, and it has engagedin espionage against the US (ibid.).Mearsheimer an d Walt are equally unsparing in their criticisms of Isra-el's treatment of the Palestinians and its own Arab citizens. Although theyaccept the moral case fo r supporting Israel's existence, because they donot think that Israel's existence is actually threatened, they see no moralgrounds fo r supporting Israel (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006b: 8). Draw-ing upon the work of Israel's "new historians" (such as Benny Morris andAvi Shlaim) and of human rights organizations (both international andIsraeli), Mearsheimer an d Walt depict Israel's conduct in its conflict withthe Palestinians and the Arab states in a highly negative light; accusing it ofexpansionism, expulsions, brutality (involving murder, torture, indiscrimi-nate use of force), an d systematically humiliating and inconveniencingPalestinian civilians (ibid.: 10-13). They even challenge Israel's democraticstatus by emphasizing its discrimination against its "second-class" Arabcitizens (ibid.: 9). Summarizing their rejection of the moral argument forsupporting Israel, Mearsheimer and Walt assert: "In terms of actual behav-ior, Israel's conduct is not morally distinguishable from the actions of itsopponents" (ibid.: 11).Having dispensed with the strategic and moral rationales for US sup-port for Israel, Mearsheimer an d Walt conclude that the only explanationfor this support "lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were itnot for the Lobby's ability to manipulate the American political system, therelationship between Israel and the United States would be far less intimatethan it is today" (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006b: 14). The rest of their paperis devoted to elucidating the "Lobby's" strategies, power, an d vast influ-ence. The paper explains the lobby's "extraordinary effectiveness" in termsof tw o factors. First, its influence in Washington, where it exerts "significantleverage over the Executive branch" an d has a "stranglehold on the U.S.Congress" primarily due to the work of AIPAC (the American Israel PublicAffairs Committee) which is able "to reward legislators and congressionalcandidates who support its agenda, and to punish those who challengeit" (ibid.: 17-20). Second, its influence over American public opinion andperceptions of Israel and the Middle East, which it achieves by shaping thepublic discourse about Israel through its "manipulation" of the mainstreammedia, its "commanding presence" in think tanks, its "policing of academia,"and its frequent use of "the charge of anti-Semitism" against anyone whocriticizes IsraeFs policies or the lobby's own influence (ibid.: 20-26).

The negative effects of the lobby's influence, according to Mearsheimerand Walt, are widespread, extending well beyond the provision of massiveamounts ofUS foreign aid to an undeserving Israel. Not only is Israel virtu-ally immune from American criticism and the recipient of unconditional


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US support, but also US Middle East policy in general has a pervasive pro-Israel slant. They claim (2006b: 26) that the lobby "has worked successfullyto convince American leaders to back Israel's continued repression of thePalestinians and to take aim at Israel's primary regional adversaries: Iran,Iraq, and Syria' In what is perhaps their most explosive and controversialcharge against the lobby, Mearsheimer and Walt write: "Without the Lob-by's efforts, the United States would have been far less likely to have gone towar in March 2003" (ibid.: 35). The war in Iraq, they assert, "was motivatedin good part by a desire to make Israel more secure" (ibid.: 30). They alsosuggest that the Bush administration's uncompromising and confronta-tional approach to Iran's nuclear program is a result of the lobby's pressure(ibid.: 38-40). The implication is clear: if US military action against Irandoes take place, the lobbywill be to blame.

"The Israel Lobby: Myth and RealityMearsheimer an d Wal's blistering attack on America's support for Israeland the nefarious influence of the Israel lobby has been met with a barrageof criticism-some of it fair, some of t unwarranted (such as the denuncia-tions of it as a classic anti-Semitic conspiracy theory,11 which only lend cre-dence to the paper's contention that charges of anti-Semitism are used tosilence criticism ofIsrael an d dissent over US support fo r it). Of the former,critics have rightly noted the paper's lack of primary sources, its relianceon highly selective quotations and quotations taken out of context,12 itsone-sided presentation of the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts(which overlooks Arab aggression an d Palestinian violence),13 its omissionof important facts an d events,14 and its factual errors (such as the claimthat Israeli citizenship is based on the principle of"blood kinship`).'5 Theseweaknesses seriously compromise the paper's scholarly value, but they donot ultimately detract from the force of its central arguments.

The paper makes a compelling case for questioning American military,financial, and diplomatic support fo r Israel and the highly preferential treat-ment Israel receives from the US. Does the United States itself really benefitfrom this support, especially ifa consequence of it is the perception aroun dthe world (and especially in the Arab and M uslim world) of he United Statesas the unconditional backer (and banker) of Israel's occupation of Palestin-ian territories? This question is important, even urgent, and Mearsheimerand Walt are certainly right to raise it. Whether or not one agrees with theirargument that Israel is a strategic liability, rather than an asset, fo r the US,it is an argument worthy of serious engagement. Mearsheimer an d Walt arealso right to challenge the conventional w isdom in Washington that all too


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Beyond Realpolitik I 103often regards American and Israeli interests as synonymous. While theseinterests may well overlap at times, it is wrong to conflate the two (andpotentially harmful for both the United States and Israel).

The other central argument made by M earsheimer and Walt, concern-ing the power of the Israel lobby to shape public discourse about Israelin the United States and to push US Middle East policy in a pro-Israeldirection, is equally important. Here too, Mearsheimer and Walt are rightto challenge the influence wielded by the pro-Israel lobby in Washing-ton, especially in Congress, and its attempts to stifle critical discussion ofIsrael in the United States. As Mearsheimer and Walt note, the pro-Israellobby itself proudly touts its political influence; thus it is entirely legiti-mate to criticize it. Fo r good or ill, the pro-Israel lobby, especially AIPAC,is a force to be reckoned with in Washington. It is undoubtedly powerfuland it does influence US Middle East policy (that, after all, is its goal). Inbringing greater public attention to the activities of the pro-Israel lobby,Mearsheimer and Walt have succeeded in provoking a debate over its rolein the United States that is necessary and long overdue. Unfortunately, theirow n contribution to this debate is marred by their inaccurate and cursorydescription of the pro-Israel lobby, and by their grossly overstated depic-tion of its influence on US policy. For these reasons, "The Israel Lobby andU.S. Foreign Policy," although a welcome critique of the influence of thepro-Israel lobby, does little to further a serious understanding of it, andreally only adds to the myths about it.

The paper's most fundamental flaw in this respect is its casual definitionof the "Israel Lobby" as a "loose coalition of individuals and organizationswho actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction"(Mearsheimer and Walt 2006b: 14). According to Mearsheimer and Walt,this "coalition" is composed of formal lobbying organizations (most nota-bly, AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American JewishOrganizations), think tanks (such as the Washington Institute fo r NearEast Policy and the Jewish Institute fo r National Security Affairs), andcountless individuals, including those American Jews "who make a sig-nificant effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that itadvances Israels interests" (ibid.), well-known Christian evangelicals, andneo-conservative policy-makers, pundits, an d thinkers. This descriptionof the pro-Israel lobby is too broad and elastic. Especially problematic isthe inclusion within it of the neo-conservatives. Neo-conservatives, bothJewish an d Gentile, are not simply lobbyists for Israel. Although they areindeed staunchly pro-Israel, their foremost concern is with the UnitedStates, including its interests, values, and global role. Their support forIsrael is largely derivative of the emphasis neo-conservatism places on thevalue of democracies, and the need for the United States to defend them


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from attack by non-democratic forces and regimes."6 Moreover, neo-con-servatives do no t hold a common view with regard to Israel: some areresolutely hawkish and close to Israel's Likud Party (like Douglas Feith,former undersecretary of defense for policy in the Bush administration),others are more dovish and much less involved in Israel-related activities(like the Bush administration's former deputy secretary of defense, PaulWolfowitz). And none of them advocated a war with Iraq for Israel's sake,as Mearsheimer and Walt claim. TIhey did so because they believed, for avariety of reasons, that regime change in Iraq was in America's interests;not because the Israel lobby told them to (in fact, for the most part, thepro-Israel lobby was lukewarm about a US invasion of Iraq, as Iran wasregarded as a far greater threat than Iraq).In reality, the pro-Israel lobby in the United States is made up of JewishZionist organizationsl and, increasingly, evangelical Christian Zionist orga-nizations.18 Of these myriad organizations, AIPAC is the most dominantand influential19 If Mearsheimer and Walt had just focused their attentionon AIPAC, they could have avoided many of the criticisms that have beenleveled against them. In particular, they would not have fallen into the trapof depicting the Israel lobby as monolithic. Although they themselves notethat the "Lobby" is "not a unified movement with a central leadership,' andthat individuals within it disagree on certain issues (Mearsheimer and Walt2006b: 14), their subsequent discussion of the "Lobby" (and even their use ofthe capital L) belies this qualification. They treat the lobby as a single-minded,cohesive, "unitary actor"; when in fact pro-Israel groups seldom agree amongthemselves, let alone act in unison. While they try to promote Israel's inter-ests, pro-Israel groups differ in their views on what Israel's interests actuallyare (just as Israelis do). Mearsheimer and Walt ignore this diversity of viewsamong Israel's supporters in the US. They do not mention "dovish" pro-Israel groups like Americans for Peace Now and the Israel Policy Forum thatoppose Israel's occupation of the territories and unconditional Americansupport for Israeli policies. Nor do they acknowledge more generally thatpro-Israel groups-whether "dovish" or "hawkish"-do not always supportthe policies of Israeli governments, and sometimes even act against them?DThe designation "pro-Israel.' therefore, tells the United States verylittle aboutthe specific policies that different organizations actually lobby for.

As well as mischaracterizing and oversimplifying the Israel lobby, theother big problem with Mearsheimer and Walt's discussion of the "Lobby"is their exaggeration of its power. The pro-Israel lobby is hardly as omnipo-tent as they depict it to be. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006b: 1)go as far as toclaim that the "overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region [the Middle East]is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activi-ties of the 'Israel Lobby:" This attributes far too much importance to the


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pro-Israel lobby and completely overlooks all the other forces-strategic,economic, political, and cultural-that shape US Middle East policy. Evenwhen it comes to US domestic politics, the pro-Israel lobby is just one lobbyamong many others such as those that represent the oil industry, weaponsmanufacturers, and Middle East governments (especially Saudi Arabia),to name only the most prominent. It is highly questionable whether thepro-Israel lobby is more influential than these other lobbies in shapingUS Middle East policy. It is worth recalling that in what was perhaps themost famous battle of the lobbies over US Middle East policy-the Rea-gan Administration's proposed sale ofAWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia in198 1-the pro-Israel lobby lost.

To be sure, when it comes to US policy toward Israel and the Palestin-ians, the pro-Israel lobby is very influential. AIPAC, in particular, has a lotof influence in Congress and, to a lesser extent, in the executive branch ofthe American government. It is often able to prevent or stall US actionsagainst Israel, which is why successive administrations have not used theirleverage to stop Israeli settlement construction in the occupied territories.But while AIPAC can limit the room for maneuver of any US administra-tion on issues related to Israel, it cannot always get its way. It was unableto prevent President Ronald Reagan from officially recognizing the Pal-estine Liberation Organization, to prevent President George H. W Bushfrom threatening to block billions in loan guarantees to Israel, or to pre-vent President Clinton from offering the Palestinians sovereignty over theTemple Mount in Jerusalem (the holiest of Jewish sites). It has also failedto prevent several major US arms sales to Arab states, and to get the USembassy in Israel moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In short, fo r all itsfearsome reputation, AIPAC (and the pro-Israel lobby in general) is just apressure group-it pressures policy-makers, it does not control them.

The Cultural and Religious Roots of US Support for IsraelUltimately, American support for Israel is not based on "the unmatchedpower of the Israel Lobby," as Mearsheimer and Walt contend. While thehuge and unprecedented financial support that Israel continues to receivefrom the United States is largely due to the work of the pro-Israel lobby inCongress,2' America's "special relationship" with Israel in general is due toa variety of factors. To cite just a few: the belief that Israel can help serve USstrategic interests in the Middle East an d beyond; the perception of Israelas the only democratic state in the region; the identification of Israel an d theUnited States as similar nations; Christian religious devotion to the Jewishstate an d homeland; an d a widespread public sympathy for Jewish suffering


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in the Holocaust and, more recently, Israeli suffering from Palestinian ter-rorist attacks. Whether or not one agrees with these beliefs, perceptions,and attitudes, one must take them into account in explaining America'sspecial, even unique, relationship with Israel.Elizabeth Stephens (2006) does just that in her book US Policy TowardsIsrael: The Role of PoliticalCulture in Defining the Special Relationship.Instyle and substance, Stephens's book is entirely different from Mearsheimerand Walt's paper. Whereas "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" isa brief polemic, full of hyperbole and angry assertions, and lacking anyprimary sources; U.S. Policy Towards Israel is a much longer (311 pages,including 53 pages of notes) academic text with in-depth, careful analysis,largely free of controversial statements, and drawing on numerous pri-mary documents and first-hand interviews conducted by the author. Inother words, unlike "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,' US. PolicyTowards Israel is a thoroughly scholarly examination of the reasons forAmerican support for Israel. While the former was obviously written toattract as wide a readership as possible and provoke a national debate, thelatter appears to have been written for the members of a doctoral disserta-tion committee (there is even a reference to the book's earlier incarnationas a thesis) (Stephens 2006: 70). Needless to say, US. Policy Towards Israelwill not be the subject of newspaper op-eds or Internet chat rooms, as "TheIsrael Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" has been.For those seeking to understand US support for Israel, however, US.Policy TowardsIsraelis far more informative and insightful than "The IsraelLobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.' Both regard this support as exceptionaland, significantly, both argue that strategic considerations alone cannotaccount for the level of support Israel receives. While Stephens does dis-cuss the strategic interests that US policy-makers believed Israel could haveserved during the Cold War (the book concentrates on US policy towardIsrael during the Cold War, and only briefly deals with the post-Cold Warperiod), she argues that the "Israel as a strategic asset" explanation for USsupport is insufficient. "[W]hile the notion of Israel as a strategic asset con-tributes to an explanation of U.S. policy towards Israel" she writes (2006:30), "the underlying rationale for the policy must be found elsewhere' But,contrary to Mearsheimer and Walt, Stephens rejects the "domestic politicsperspective" that emphasizes the role of the pro-Israel lobby in securing USsupport for Israel. Though she acknowledges the important role of AIPACand the political influence of American Jews and evangelical Christians,Stephens believes that there is more than just money and votes behindAmerica's support for Israel.In addition to strategic interests and domestic political pressures, Ste-phens claims that US support for Israel is due to American political culture.


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This ultimately explains US unflagging commitment to Israel through theCold War to the post-Cold War era. She discusses the concept of politicalculture and the various strands of American political culture (which sheterms "exceptionalism," "redemptionism' "exemplarism" and American-ism"), and she argues that domestic political culture influences foreignpolicy by shaping ho w the general public an d policy-makers perceive theworld and other states. In the case of Israel, Americans (including theirdecision-makers) perceive a country with whom they can identify andsympathize with. Not only do Americans feel a sense of moral obligation tothe Jewish state because ofJewish suffering in the Holocaust (and America'spassivity) and because of America's role in Israel's establishment, but alsothey regard Israel's history, struggles, an d aspirations as similar to that ofthe United States. Americans also believe that Israel and the United Statesshare the same liberal, democratic values, and a common Judeo-Christianreligious heritage. Americans, therefore, empathize with Israel and careabout it (by contrast, there is little or no empathy fo r Israel's adversar-ies). This attitude, according to Stephens; gives Israel a special place in theAmerican consciousness and underlies official US support for Israel.

To support this thesis, Stephens analyzes the policies of the Johnson,Nixon, Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations toward Israel. She provides agood summary of these policies and the various regional crises to whichthese administrations had to respond (notably, the 1967 War, the 1973War, the first Lebanon war, the first Palestinian Intifada, and the Gulf War).Stephens chronicles the up s and downs in the US-Israeli relationship, thefrequent tensions in the relationship, an d the frustrations ofAmerican pres-idents and officials in dealing with their often recalcitrant Israeli ally.Whatemerges from this account ofUS-Israeli relations is a picture that is starklyat odds with that presented by Mearsheimer and Walt. Instead of uncondi-tional and uncritical American support for IsraeFs policies and actions, asMearsheimer and Walt claim, US foreign policy toward Israel has frequentlyinvolved American pressure (including threats) being exerted on Israeligovernments who have generally had to comply with America's wishes.22Furthermore, far from being formulated in accordance with Israel's inter-ests, US Middle East policy has sometimes been at odds with Israers desiresmost clearly when it comes to the US-Saudi relationship. Although the UScommitment to IsraeFs security an d well-being has been unshakeable, it hasnot been translated into support for everything Israel wants or does.

U.S. Policy Towards Israel, herefore, offers a nuanced and multifacetedexplanation for American support fo r Israel, avoiding the reductionismof "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy." As such, it is a useful cor-rective to the simplistic notion that the pro-Israel lobby is solely, or evenmostly, responsible fo r America's backing of Israel. Although the book is


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not without its flaws (for instance, there are numerous factual errors, espe-cially concerning key dates), it makes a convincing case fo r the importanceof American political culture in influencing US policy toward Israel.

Irvine Anderson (2005) makes a similar case fo r the importance of cul-tural factors in shaping American policy regarding Israel in his bookBibli-ca l Interpretationand MiddleEastPolicy: The PromisedLand, America,and Israel,1917-2002.The book is concerned with examining the impactof Christian Zionism on British and then American Middle East policy.According to Anderson, there has long been a cultural "predisposition"among many people in Britain an d the United States to support the returnof Jews to Palestine and the Jewish claim to the land. This widespreadChristian Zionism, Anderson persuasively argues, has profoundly influ-enced British and American government policy toward the Zionist move-ment and Israel (for instance, Britain's Balfour Declaration, and PresidentHarry Truman's recognition of the newly proclaimed State of Israel).

BiblicalInterpretationandMiddle East Policyprovides a thorough anddispassionate analysis of Christian Zionism, locating its religious sourcesin literalist interpretations ofcertain biblical passages, and tracing its emer-gence and spread from the middle of the nineteenth century on, as it wasinculcated in children through the teaching of biblical stories (about Godgiving the "Promised Land" to the Jews, his "Chosen People") at SundaySchools, and disseminated in popular culture through novels and, later,television. The book pays particular attention to "End Times" or "Arma-geddon theology," which believes that the return of the Jews to the HolyLand is a necessary precondition for the Second Coming of Christ. Thistheological belief is popular in the Protestant evangelical movement inthe United States, whose members constitute at least 25 percent of the USpopulation (and were essential to the victory of George W. Bush in the2000 and 2004 presidential elections). Anderson (2005: 104) notes that 66percent of Americans believe that Jesus Christ will on e day return, and 36percent believe that the "Second Coming" will occur in their lifetime.

The importance of these Christian beliefs in shaping American policytoward Israel extends beyond the existence of a large American public thatis "predisposed" to support Zionism. The rise of the evangelical movementand Fundamentalist Christianity in the United States has led to the emer-gence of a new stridently pro-Israel force in American politics. Andersondescribes in detail the alliance that has developed between the Christianright and the Jewish pro-Israel lobby, and he emphasizes the impact thisalliance has upon Congressional support for Israel. In Anderson's words(2005: 118), the political power of this alliance, augmented by the absenceof a powerful pro-Arab or pro-Palestinian lobby, basically means that"[f]or many congressmen an d senators, there is something to be gained


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through support [of Israel] and nothing to be gained from opposition"In highlighting the influence of fundamentalist Christian groups on USsupport for Israel, Anderson's book adds to our understanding of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States. This lobby is not simply a Jewish lobby,as some imply or depict it to be . Rather, the power of the pro-Israel lobbyrests on Christian as well as Jewish devotion to Israel. In fact, in the yearsto come, it may even rely more on Christian than Jewish support fo r Israel,as American Jews become increasingly less politically engaged with Israelwhile their Christian counterparts become more engaged.

Conclusion: Back to Honest Broker?The influence of the pro-Israel lobby, an d especially the evangelical Chris-tian component within it, has reached new heights during the administra-tion of George W Bush-himself an evangelical Christian. No other USadministration has been as resolutely pro-Israel as the Bush administra-tion, much to the delight of IsraeFs supporters and the consternation of itscritics and adversaries. The Bush administration's prolonged disengage-ment from peacemaking between Israel and the Palestinians, its largelyuncritical acceptance of Israel's aggressive military tactics against Palestin-ian militants, its endorsement of Israeli plans to annex some settlementblocs in the West Bank,23 its unflagging support fo r Israel's war againstHezbollah in the summer of 2006, and its willingness to maintain the boy-cott of the Palestinian Authority even after the establishment of a Palestin-ian National Unity government (that includes Hamas), have all created thepopular impression that the Bush administration is completely beholdento the pro-Israel lobby. Under Bush's presidency, the United States appearsto have abandoned its traditional role of trying to act as an "honest broker"between Israel and the Palestinians, an d has thrown its support solidlybehind Israel. This has fueled the recent criticism of American support forIsrael, ofwhich M earsheimer and Walt's paper is just one much-publicizedexample (another equally well-publicized example is former PresidentJimmy Carter's (2006) highly controversial best-selling book, Palestine:PeaceNot Apartheid). Ironically, then, President Bush-hailed by pro-Israel partisans in the United States as the best friend Israel has ever hadin the White House-may have inadvertently undermined the continuedstability of the US-Israeli relationship.

The vociferous debate over America's support for Israel that has recentlyerupted in the United States (largely as a result of Mearsheimer and Walt'spaper an d Carter's book) has ended a long period in which this supportwas largely unquestioned in the mainstream media, in American politics,


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and in the minds of most Americans. Although American politicians andthe general American public remain decidedly pro-Israel, 24 their continuedsupport fo r Israel can no longer be taken for granted now that serious ques-tions have arisen over the strategic wisdom and morality of this support.Although such questions may not undermine US commitment to Israel'ssecurity, they could well encourage a more even-handed approach by thenext US administration (whether Republican or Democratic) to the fes-tering Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such an approach would not only be inAmerica's best interests, but also, arguably, in Israel's best interests as well

Dov Waxman is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department atBaruch College of the City University of New York. He is the author of ThePursuitofPeaceand the Crisis of sraeliIdentity: Defending/Defining he Nation(2006). His articles and reviews have appeared in The WashingtonQuarterly,TheMiddleEastQuarterly,CurrentHistory,World PolicyJournal,Commentary,andIsraelAffairs, among others. He serves on the Board of Directors of the Associa-tion for Israel Studies and is an Associate Editor ofIsraelStudies Forum.

Notes1. There is no mutual defense treaty between the US and Israel.2. As early as 1962, President John E Kennedy described the US-Israeli rela-tionship as "special," telling then Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir:

"The United States has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle Eastreally comparable only to what it has with Britain over a wide range ofworld affairs: Quoted in Gold (2006).3. Even during the Cold War, Israel's strategic value to the United States wasquestionable and not the reason for the US commitment to Israel, as thearch-realist Secretary of State Henry Kissinger remarked in 1975: "[T]hestrength of Israel is needed for its own survival bu t not to prevent thespread of Communism in the Arab world. So it doesn't necessarily helpthe U.S. global interests as far as the Middle East is concerned. The sur-vival of Israel has sentimental importance to the United States.' Quoted inJohn Judis, "Apocalypse Now: Bush's Failed Israel Strategy,' New RepublicOnline,2 August 2006.4. Congressional Research Service, "Israel: Background and Relations with theUnited States,' CRS Report for Congress, 14 June 2006 (http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33476020060614.pdf).


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Beyond Realpolitik I Ill

5. A shorter version of the paper (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006a) was pub-lished in the LondonReview ofBooks, after being turned down for publica-tion in the Atlantic Monthly.

6. This was their intention, as Mearsheimer and Walt (2006c) wrote in a sub-sequent article: "Our goal was to break the taboo and to generate a candiddiscussion of U.S. support for Israel'

7. See, for example, "Of Israel, Harvard and David Duke:' Washington Post,26 March 2006; Charles A. Radin, "'Israel Lobby' Critique Roils Academe:'Boston Globe, 29 March 2006; Nathan Guttman, "'AIPAC Study Is Igno-rant Propaganda:" JerusalemPost, 22 March 2006; Julian Borger, "U SProfessors Accused of Being Liars and Bigots over Essay on Pro-IsraeliLobby:' Guardian, 1 March 2006; Bret Stephens, "The Israel Conspiracy,'Wall Street Journal,25 March 2006; Nicholas Goldberg, "Who's Afraidof the 'Israel Lobby'?" Los Angeles Times, 26 March 2006; Philip Weiss,"Ferment Over 'the Israel Lobby," Nation, 15 May 2006; Daniel Levy, "SoPro-Israel That It Hurts," Haaretz,25 March 2006; Rupert Cornwell, 'AtLast, a Debate on America's Support for Israel," Independent,7 April 2006;Tony Judt, 'A Lobby, Not a Conspiracy," New York Times, 19 April 2006;Christopher Hitchens, "Overstating Jewish Power,' Slate, 27 March 2006;Eric Alterman, 'AIPAC's Complaint," Nation, 1May 2006; Joseph Massad,"Blaming the Lobby,' Al-Ahram Weekly, 23-29 March 2006; David Ger-gen, "Atkn Unfair Attack,' U.S. News & World Report, 3 April 2006; BennyMorris, 'And Now for Some Facts:' New Republic, 8 May 2006; Max Boot,"Policy.Analysis-Paranoid Style:' Lo s Angeles Times, 29 March 2006; "InDark Times, Blame the Jews;' Forward, 4 March 2006.8. See, fo r example, Juan Cole, "Breaking the Silence," Salon.com, 19 April 2006.

9. See, for example, Eliot Cohen, "Yes, It's Anti-Semitic," WashingtonPost, 5April 2006.

10. This claim, which has been assailed by some critics as falsely attributingIsrael to be the cause of anti-American terrorism, has in fact been madeearlier by the Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer (a long-time supporter of Israel and supposed neo-conservative). In a discussionon 24 September 1998, led by Robert Satloff, the executive director ofthe Washington Institute for Near East Policy (a think tank identified byMearsheimer and Walt as part of the Israel lobby), Krauthammer stated:"Israel's very existence is one of the reasons that the United States facesa low-end [terrorism] threat. Th e fact of Israel in part provokes Islamicextremist threats to the United States. So, while yes, Israel is an ally in thisstruggle [against terrorism], it is also part of the problem ... [I]t's odd tosee Israel only as an asset since it's in some ways a source of the problem'Quoted in "Still Special? The U.S.-Israel Relationship,' Middle East Quar-terly 5, no. 4 (December 1998).

11. For instance, the Anti-Defamation League denounced the paper as "aclassical conspiratorial anti-Semitic analysis invoking the canards of


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Jewish power and Jewish control:' Anti-Defamation League Analysis,"Mearsheimer and Walt's Anti-Israel Screed.-A Relentless Assault in Schol-arly Guise 24 March 2006.12. Alan Dershowitz, "Debunking the Newest-and Oldest-Jewish Con-spiracy: A Reply to the M earsheimer-Walt 'Working Paper," HarvardLaw School, April 2006 (http://www.ksg.harvard.edulresearch/working-papers/dershowitzreply.pdf).13. Michelle Goldberg, "Is the 'Israel Lobby' Distorting America's MideastPolicies?" Salon.corn, 18 April 2006.14. For instance, in their discussion of the Bush administration's eventual supportfor the Sharon government's "hard-line"approach to the Palestinians-whichthey attribute to domestic pressure from the Israel lobby-Mearsheimer andWalt do not mention the KarineA incident (the KarineA was a Palestinian

Authority-contracted ship loaded with Iranian arms that was intercepted byIsrael in January 2002). This incident was instrumental in turning PresidentBush decisively against then Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. Nor do theymention the wave ofPalestinian suicide bombings within Israel in the springof2002, culminating in the Passover bombing of the Park Hotel on 27 March2002, which also played a major role in gaining American support for theSharon government's military actions in the West Bank.15. Dershowitz, "Debunking the Newest-and Oldest-Jewish Conspiracy."16. As Irving Kristol, often described as the 'godfather' ofneo-conservatism,puts it: "Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feelobliged to defend, ifpossible, a democratic nation under attack from non-democratic forces, external or internal. Thai is why it was in our nationalinterest to come to the defense of France and Britain in World War If.That is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival isthreatened. No complicated geopolitical calculations of national interestare necessary." Irving Kristol, "The Neoconservative Persuasion," WeeklyStandard,25 August 2003.

17. Such as AIPAC, the Conference ofPresidents of Major American JewishOrganizations, the American Jewish Committee, the American JewishCongress, the Anti-Defamation League, and B'nai Brith.18. Such as the Christian Coalition of America founded by Pat Robertson,the Moral Majority founded by Jerry Falwell, the National Unity Coalitionfor Israel, the Religious Roundtable, the International Christian EmbassyJerusalem, and the newly formed Christians United for Israel.19. AIPAC has 100,000 members and more than one hundred staff membersin Washington DC, as well as nine regional offices and ten satellite offices.Its annual budget is $47 million. For a discussion ofAIPAC and its politi-cal influence, see Michael Massing, "The Storm over the Israel Lobby,"New York Review ofBooks 53, no. 10 (8 June 2006).20. During the early years of the Oslo peace process, for example, the Rabingovernment complained that some pro-Israel organizations in the United


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States were acting against its policies and attempting to undermine thepeace process. AIPAC, fo r instance, lobbied the US Congress to pass a billrequiring the United States to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,despite the behind-the-scenes objections from the Rabin government.

21. This is not to say that US foreign aid to Israel is due only to the influenceof the pro-Israel lobby. American strategic considerations have also playedan important role in motivating US aid to Israel, as Organski (1990) haspersuasively argued.

22. Perhaps the best known example of this compliance wa s Israel's agree-ment to the United States' request that it not respond to Iraqi scud missileattacks during the 1991 Gulf War, lest the international coalition that theUS had assembled against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm fall apart. Morerecently, under intense American pressure, Israel reluctantly agreed tocancel a planned $1 billion sale ofPhalcon airborne early warning systemsto China in 2000; and in 2005, Israel agreed not to upgrade VenezuelanF-16 fighter jets because the US objected to this.

23. In an April 2004 letter to Prime Minister Sharon, Bush stated that Israelwould not have to withdraw to the "Green Line." See "Statement by thePresident," 14 April 2004 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-2.html); Elisabeth Bumiller, "In Major Shift, Bush EndorsesSharon Plan and Backs Keeping Some Israeli Settlements," New YorkTimes, 15 April 2004.

24. In an August 2006 Harris poll, 75 percent ofAmericans identified Israel aseither a "close ally" or "friend." "Most in U.S. See Israel as Friendly And Iranas an Enemy, Poll Finds:"Wall Streetjournal,30 August 2006. There is, how-ever, a significant difference between Republicans and Democrats in theirattitudes toward Israel. According to a July 2006 poll, 84 percent of Republi-cans sympathized more with Israel than with the Arab states, whereas only43 percent of Democrats felt this way. Poll cited in Jennifer Siegel, "PowerfulChairmanships at Stake in November," Forward,13 October 2006.

ReferencesAnderson, Irvine H. 2005. BiblicalInterpretationandMiddle EastPolicy: ThePromisedLand,America, and Israel, 1917-2002. Gainesville: University

Press of Florida.Carter, Jimmy. 2006. Palestine:PeaceNot Apartheid.New York. Simon &Schuster.Chomsky, Noam. 1983. The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the

Palestinians.Boston: South End Press.Curtiss, Richard. 1990. Stealth Pacs:How Israel'sAmerican Lobby Took Controlof U.S. MiddleEastPolicy.Washington, DC: American Educational Trust.


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Findley, Paul. 1985. They Dare o Speak Out: Peopleand InstitutionsConfrontIsrael'sLobby.Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill.

Gold, Dore. 2006. "The Basis of the US.-Israel Alliance: An Israeli Responseto the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault." JerusalemIssue BriefS, no. 20 (March).

Inbar, Efraim. 2006. "Israek An Enduring Union.f The Journalof InternationalSecurityAffairs 11 (Fall): 7-13.

Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen Walt. 2006a. "The Israel Lobby,' LondonReview of Books 28, no. 6 (March).

___. 2006b. "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy." KSG WorkingPaper No. RWP06-01 1,John E Kennedy School of Government, HarvardUniversity,March.

. 2006c. "Unrestricted Access: What the Israel Lobby Wants, It TooOften Gets" ForeignPolicy (July/August).

Organski, Abramo F. K 1990. The $36BillionBargain:Strategyand PoliticsinUS. Assistance to Israel.New York: Columbia University Press.Stephens, Elizabeth. 2006. U.S.Policy Towards Israel:The Role of Political

Culture in Defining the SpecialRelationship.Portland, OR. Sussex Aca-demic Press.

Tivan, Edward. 1987. The Lobby: JewishPoliticalPowerandAmerican ForeignPolicy.New York: Simon and Schuster.


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