better maps for illinois
TRANSCRIPT
Better Maps for Illinois
Peter S. Wattson
Redistricting Conference
Paul Simon Public Policy Institute
Springfield, Illinois
April 30, 2013
Introduction
▪ The Facts of Life
▪ The Need for Limits
▪ Protecting Minorities
▪ Partisan Gerrymandering
The Need for Limits
▪ People
▸Who draws the plans
▪ Process
▸Data that may be used
▸Review by others
▪ Principles
▸Districts that result
Who Draws the Plans
▪ No legislators
▪ No appointees of a legislator
▪ No public officials
▪ No politicians
▪ Minority party represented
▪ Equal number from majority & minority
▪ Neutral tie-breaker
Illinois
Who Draws the Plans - Legislative
▪ Primary Responsibility - Legislature
▸ Until June 30, 2021
▪ Secondary Responsibility - Commission
▸ If redistricting law not enacted
▸ 8 members appointed by caucus leaders
– 4 legislators
– 4 non-legislators
▸ If no plan filed by August 10
▸ 9th member chosen by lot
– Supreme Court submits two names
– Secretary of State draws one name to chair
Limits on Data
▪ No party registration
▸ Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska
▪ No election results
▸ Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska
▪ No socio-economic data
▸ Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska
▪ No incumbent residences
▸ Arizona, California, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Wyoming
Review by Others
▪ Public hearings
▸Commission states
▸ Iowa
▪ Preliminary plan
▸Commission states
▸ Iowa
▪ Judicial review
▸Colorado
▸Florida
▸Kansas
Limits on Districts that Result
Districting Principles for 2010s Plans
▪ Populations equal - 50 states
▪ Territory contiguous - 50 states
▪ Territory compact - 38 states
▪ Political subdivisions preserved - 46 states
▪ Communities of interest preserved - 22
▪ Minorities fairly represented - 27 states
Limits on Districts that Result
Districting Principles for 2010s Plans
▪ House districts nested in Senate - 17 states
▪ Cores of prior districts preserved - 12 states
▪ Not favor party or incumbent - 12 states
▪ Avoid contests between incumbents - 7
▪ Politically competitive - 2 states
Illinois
Const. Art. IV, § 3
▸ “Legislative districts shall be compact,
contiguous and substantially equal in
population.”
Voting Rights Act § 2
▪ Not deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of:
▸Race or color
▸Membership in a language minority group
– Spanish heritage
– American Indian or Alaskan Native
– Asian American
Voting Rights Act § 2
▪ No Discriminatory Effect
▪ Thornburg v. Gingles - Three Preconditions
▸ Minority Population Sufficiently Large and
Geographically Compact
▸ Minority is Politically Cohesive
▸ Bloc Voting by White Majority Usually Defeats
Minority’s Preferred Candidate
▪ Totality of the Circumstances
▪ Draw Districts the Minority has a Fair Chance
to Win
Drawing Minority Districts
An Effective Voting Majority
▪ A realistic opportunity to elect▸ More than a simple majority?
– 65%?
– Packing?
▸ Less than a simple majority?
– Crossover districts
– Coalition districts
▪ Ten years of election history▸ Endogenous elections (same office)
▸ Exogenous elections (other offices)
▸ Biracial contests
Voting Rights Act § 5
▪ “Covered Jurisdictions”
▪ Preclearance
▸ U.S. Department of Justice
▸ U.S. District Court for District of Columbia
▪ Do Not Retrogress
▸ Ability to Elect a Candidate of Choice
▪ Do Not Intend to Discriminate
▪ You Need Not Maximize the Number of
Majority-Minority Districts
14th Amendment
Equal Protection Clause
▪ You May Consider Race in Drawing Districts
▪ Avoid Drawing a Racial Gerrymander
Traditional Districting Principles
▪ Contiguous Territory
▪ Compact
▪ Preserve Political Subdivisions
▪ Preserve Communities of Interest
▪ Protect Incumbents
▸ Preserve Cores of Prior Districts
▸ Avoid Contests Between Incumbents
Strict Scrutiny
▪ A Compelling Governmental Interest
▪ Narrowly Tailored to Achieve that Interest
▸ Remedying Past Discrimination
▸ Avoiding Retrogression Under VRA § 5
▸ Avoiding a Violation of VRA § 2
Partisan Gerrymandering
Can It Be Proved?
▪ Davis v. Bandemer (1986)
▸ Intentional discrimination against an identifiable
group
▸ Discriminatory effect
– “electoral system . . . will consistently degrade . . . a group
of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole”
Partisan Gerrymandering
Can It Be Proved?
▪ Vieth v. Jubelier (2004)
▸ Stevens
– Partisan purposes predominated over traditional districting
principles
▸ Souter
– Paid no heed to traditional districting principles where
drawing boundaries around party’s voters
▸ Breyer
– Traditional districting principles not followed
– Party with minority of votes statewide wins a majority of
seats
Partisan Gerrymandering
Can It Be Proved?
▪ LULAC v. Perry (2006)
▸Plaintiffs
– Mid-decade redistricting was invalid because its sole
objective was partisan gain
Florida
Fair Districts Amendment (2010)
▪ Tier-One Principles
▸Not favor or disfavor political party or incumbent
▸Not discriminate against racial or language
minorities
▸Contiguous territory
▪ Tier-Two Principles
▸Equal population
▸Compact territory
▸Use existing political and geographic boundaries
Florida
In re: Senate Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176
(2012)
▪ Numbering scheme rejected
▸ Favored incumbents
▪ 8 Senate districts rejected
▸ Violation of tier-two principles
– Not compact
– Did not use existing political or geographic boundaries
▸ Was evidence of intent to violate tier-one principles
– 8 of 8 to favor incumbent
– 4 of 8 to favor a political party