The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 19 | Issue 3 | Number 3 | Article ID 5533 | Feb 01, 2021

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Belt and Road Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges forMongolia

Yelif Ulagpan

Abstract: In 2013, Chinese President XiJinping put forward the One Belt and One RoadInitiative, commonly known as the Belt andRoad Initiative. The initiative proposed‘peaceful development’ and ‘economiccooperation’ connecting Asia, Europe andAfr i ca . Wi th in th i s f ramework , theestablishment of the ‘China-Mongolia-RussiaEconomic Corridor (CMREC)’ is envisaged as apromising step toward regional connectivityand economic development in Eurasia throughthe territory of Mongolia. This article analyzesthe BRI projects to identify opportunities andchallenges to creating the Corridor inMongolia. The data draw on both primary andsecondary sources.

Key words: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),CMREC, Mongolia, Eurasia.

Introduction

The past decade has seen the emergence ofnew concepts such as China’s “Silk RoadEconomic Belt” and the United States’ “Freeand Open Indo-Pacific” in the internationalrelations arena of the Asia-Pacific. Whileexperts, analysts, and scholars have questionedand tried to define the significance andconcepts of these clashing initiatives, there isno consensus on what exactly these conceptsmean in theory and practice. Off icialdocuments and announcements explain itsrationale as being based on shared values suchas ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’. China’s Belt and

Road Initiative (BRI), which was launched byChinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, proclaims‘peaceful development’ and ‘economiccooperation’ through regional connectivityacross Asia, Europe, and Africa. (Office of theLeading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative,2017) The Initiative is based on the fiveconceptual pillars of policy coordination,facilitating connectivity, unimpeded trade,financial integration, and people-to-peopleexchanges. These pillars are linked to theSustainable Development Goals that wereadopted by the United Nations. (UnitedNations, 2019) Since its initiation, the BRI hasbeen the object of analysis and debate.Interpretations range from seeing the BRI as aChinese version of the “Marshall Plan”designed to expand economic development aswell as China’s sphere of influence and as away to transfer Chinese excess productioncapacity abroad (Simon Shen, 2016), todescribing it as “the new phase of globalizationintegrating the inland and marine economies.”(Zheng Bijian, 2017)

Regardless of differing views, developingeconomic corridors is a priority for the BRI inpromoting the regional cooperation andeconomic development agenda. Therefore, it isimportant to conceptualize the term ‘economiccorridor’ first to better understand the BRI.Although ‘economic corridors’ have become anintegral part of development projects acrossvarious countries and regions, there is no cleardefinition. However, the concept of ‘corridor’comes from issues related to trade andaccessibility problems affecting countries thatlack access to the sea. (Siegfried O.Wolf, 2020)Economic corridors play a crucial role in

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integrating local economies into internationalvalue and supply chains in global and regionaleconomic development strategies. (ADB, 2014)Experts view “economic corridors” not just astransport connections that facilitate themovement of people and goods, but anintegrated network of infrastructure that canspur economic development in the definedgeographical area. (Hans-Peter Brunner, 2013)

Indeed, the Corridor envisaged under the BRIis a broad concept that goes beyond roadbuilding. The BRI encompasses the followingsix economic corridors: “the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor”, “The New EurasiaLand Bridge Economic Corridor”, “China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor”,“China-Indochina Peninsula EconomicCorridor”, “China-Pakistan EconomicCorridor”, and “Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor” (Belt and RoadPortal, 2019). In fact, if fully realized, the BRI isprojected to create economic corridors thatbenefit 4.4 billion people, more than half (63%)of the global population with a collectiveannual Gross Domestic Product of 2.1 trillionUnited States dollars, which account for 29% ofthe world’s wealth (Christopher K. Johnson,2016). However, questions arise about theimplementation of these projects in the localcontexts, including the opportunities andchallenges, and the beneficiaries.

Within the framework of the BRI, Mongolia hasbecome a key transport corridor betweenChina-Russia and Europe. It is in one of the sixmain economic corridors – “the China-Mongol ia-Russia Economic Corridor(hereinafter, CMREC).” Given this, Mongolia isprofoundly affected by this grand strategy,though the details of this potential impact areas yet unclear. This article analyzes the BRI inthe Mongolian context. It first explores theorigins of the idea of a ‘China-Mongolia-RussiaEconomic Corridor’ and how it is envisagedwithin the context of Mongolia’s ‘Steppe Road’project. This will then be analyzed to identify

potential challenges and opportunities.

BRI: China-Mongolia-Russia EconomicCorridor

The proposal of the tripartite ‘economiccorridor’ emerged during the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO) Summit ofheads of state of China, Mongolia and Russia inDushanbe, Tajikistan in 2014. During thesummit, Mongolian president’s proposal to useits territory as a passage of international trafficbetween China and Russia coincided withChinese president Xi Jinping’s proposal ofconstructing an economic corridor among thethree nations. (Uradyn E. Bulag, 2014) Thiswas further discussed in 2015 during themeeting of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yiand the Minister of Foreign Affairs of MongoliaLundeg Purevsuren (People’s Daily, 2015).During the meeting, Lundeg Purevsurenexpressed Mongolia’s interest in joining theinitiative and developing the economy byintegrating it with Mongolia’s ‘Steppe Road’ or‘Prairie Road’ initiative. (The JamestownFoundation, 2015) Meanwhile, Russia’s interestwas in news sources covering the meeting.Russia Today quoted Chinese Foreign MinisterWang Yi’s speech "There is a huge area forcooperation existing between China, Russia,and Mongolia. The China Mongolia-Russiaeconomic corridor would connect China’s SilkR o a d E c o n o m i c B e l t t o R u s s i a ' stranscontinental rail plan and Mongolia'sPrairie Road program” (RT, 2015) Russianmedia noted that this concept coincided withRussia’s Eurasian transport corridor initiative,which involves high-speed rail and road linksbetween Moscow and Beijing. Following this,the three countries signed a Memorandum-of-Understanding (MoU) to build an “EconomicCorridor” on the basis of their respectivedevelopment strategies during the trilateralmeeting in Ufa, Russia in 2015.

In 2016, China, Mongolia, and Russia signed a

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trilateral agreement to build an economiccorridor on the sidelines of the 16th summit ofthe Council of Heads of the ShanghaiCooperation Organization Member States heldin Tashkent, Uzbekistan. As ‘The Diplomat’remarked at the time, instead of focusing onthe Shanghai Cooperation Organizationagenda, the members and guests used thisopportunity to settle trilateral issues. Theorigin of this Mongolia-Russia-China‘trilateralism’ can be traced back to the post-Ukrainian crisis and the rapprochementbetween China and Russia in 2014. WhileRussia has had to shift its economy towardsChina due to the sanctions imposed from theWest after the annexation of Crimea, Mongoliasought a ‘trilateralism’ strategy to preventbeing bypassed by a new version of theEurasian Silk Road. It is in Mongolia’s interestnot only to promote Mongolia as ‘a reliable andcheaper ‘Economic Corridor’ for Sino-Russiantransit traffic across Eurasia’ but also toincrease Russia’s investment in Mongolia,building a transport infrastructure that wouldconnect with the Trans-Siberian rail system andfurther with China and the Asia-Pacific. (AliciaCampi, 2020)

Prospects of Mongolia’s ‘Steppe Road’project under the CMREC

Within the scope of the BRI, among theproposed 190 projects from the Chinese side,Mongolia selected 32 projects for advancing itsdevelopment priorities. The projects are invarious fields such as transportation andinfrastructure (railway, logistics, road, andtelecommunication), industrial sector,development of border-crossing points, energysector, facilitation of trade and inspectionprocedures, environment and energy,educat ion, sc ience, and technologycooperation, humanitarian, agriculture andmedical science. Among these projects, morethan one third (13) involve transportationinfrastructure as regional connectivity is themain target of the initiative. (UB Post, 2019) On

that basis, in 2014, the Government ofMongolia came up with a plan called a “SteppeRoad” (in Mongolian, ‘Талын Зам’) project touse their geographical location to connect Asiaand Europe. The goal is to create a favorablepolitical and economic environment with theirtwo neighbors and for the landlocked nation toexport its products to third markets throughtheir territories. The project involves buildingroads, railways, oil and gas pipelines, andpower lines, and connecting the southern andnorthern neighbors with infrastructure. Inother words, the idea is to build trade andeconomic cooperation between the twoneighbors using Mongolia as a ‘bridge’ overland and an important transit corridor betweenAsia and Europe. In the same year, Russiasigned a 30-year gas deal with China (effectivefrom 2018) worth 400 billion US dollars amidits worsened relations with the westerncountries. Although the two countries initiallyplanned to build a 4000 kilometer gas pipeline,the Russian side also expressed interest inexporting its natural gas through Mongolia.This was welcomed by Mongolian authorities asit would allow it to export its natural gasthrough this channel. Later, the Ministry ofEconomic Development (dissolved in 2014)which calculated that through Mongolia itwould only require a 1500 kilometer gaspipeline. In September 2014, the thenMongolian Prime Minister Norov Altankhuyagconveyed Mongolia’s interest in serving as a‘bridge’ between China and Russia during hismeeting with President Vladimir Putin in Saint-Petersburg. Shortly afterward, the Governmentof Mongolia established a working group on the‘Steppe Road’ project (B.Shadavdolgor, 2016).

The Mongolian-proposed ‘Steppe Road’ projectinvolves railway, railroad, power line, oil andgas pipeline projects. Under the railwayproject, the aim is to upgrade the Trans-Mongolian railway corridor in conjunction withthe railway capacity of its two neighbors. Withregard to the railroad plan, the goal is to buildthree vertical and three horizontal tunnels.

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Mongolian planners estimate that reachingEastern Europe through Mongolia takes tenfewer days while it takes more than a month toreach Europe from China by sea. (S. Batbaatar,2015) Also, as the Asian Highway (AH) passesthrough Mongolia, it would create favorableconditions for the implementation of relatedroad projects. In turn, this would not onlycontribute to infrastructure development suchas trade and logistics centers in Mongolia butalso serve as a ‘bridge’ connecting twocontinents. Another important Steppe Roadproject is a power line. With the increasingenergy consumption of the three countries,energy cooperation and building an energysystem is a priority. China is by far the largestconsumer of energy not just in the region butglobally. Although most of China’s energy iscoal based, it has recently been exploring solarand wind renewable alternatives. Russia andMongolia are major energy suppliers to theirsouthern neighbor. This is also true for the oilpipeline project. Both Mongolia and Russiahave oil reserves and Russia supplies oil toChina via Manchuria. Building a pipeline inMongolia would allow both countries to exportoil and natural gas to China.

In 2017, the Chinese and Mongol iangovernments signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding on BRI cooperation during thefirst Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing. Thiswas followed by a cooperation plan forpromoting the BRI with Mongolia’s ‘SteppeRoad’ program in April 2019 during a state visitof Mongolian President Khaltmaa Battulga toBeijing (China Global Television Network,2019). In the same year, the President ofMongolia urged its two partners to accelerateconstruction of a network of cross-borderhighways, facilitate customs clearance,strengthen energy cooperation, and discuss theconstruction of regional power grids during thefifth trilateral meeting of presidents of Russia,Mongolia, and China. According to (Gal Luft,2017) trade between China and Mongoliacurrently follows two routes: (1) 1,200-mile

from Ulaanbaatar to the Port of Tianjin(passing through Erenhot in Inner Mongolia)and (2) a 1,400-mile route from Choibalsan(eastern Mongolia) to the Port of Dalianthrough Manzhouli in Inner Mongolia. The planunder the CMREC is to build high-speed railand road, the first to connect the Bohai BayEconomic Circle (the economic regionsurrounding Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region) toRussia via Hohhot (Inner Mongolia) and thesecond from Dalian to Chita in Russia viaShenyang, Changchun, Harbin and Manzhouli.According to some sources, this would allowthe cargo to reach Western Europe three timesfaster than by sea) (Ж.Гөлгөө, Б.Индра 2017)with the Mongolian cargo routed throughQinhuangdao, the world’s largest coal exportport in China. (Gal Luft, 2017) Other proposedrail projects under the CMREC such asconnecting Tavan Tolgoi (one of the world'slargest untapped coking and thermal coaldeposits, located in the Omnogovi Province insouthern Mongolia) to the Chinese border haveslowed for now due to lack of funding and otherexternal factors.

Source: Geopolitical Monitor

Opportunities and Challenges

Judging from the projects launched in Mongoliaunder the BRI, the majority of proposed

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projects are related to transportationinfrastructure and the railway projects arerelated to mining. This is also the case inRussia (the Far East and East Siberianregions). In the Mongolian case, while miningand enrichment will take place on Mongolianterritory, the products will be transported toChina. Coming to transit points, the capital,Ulaanbaatar, is identified as the main transitpoint in Mongolia, but the Altai (Gobi-Altai) cityin Western Mongolia is also listed as aconditional junction point of the ChuyaHighway (also known as Russian route R256 inNovosibirsk Oblast, Altai Krai and AltaiRepublic of Russia) with a potential road fromKyzyl in Russia. On Russian territory,Yekaterinburg is identified as the endpointconnecting all routes from China to the Westalong with Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Abakan,Taishet, Ulan-Ude, Kyzyl, and Chita. (See map)These Russian cities are listed as potentialfuture hubs of transshipment logistics centersand cargo-forming areas from and to China.

From a Mongol ian perspect ive , theconstruction of railways and roads wouldimprove its infrastructure and open newopportunities to export its products to Europethrough Russia. Mongolia’s main exports arecopper, coal, gold as well as cashmere andanimal products such as meat and wool. Itsmain imports are refined petroleum, mineralfuels, petroleum oils along with machinery andequipment, cars, and consumer goods. Russiais the main supplier of Mongolia’s power andenergy and about 80 percent of Mongolia’s oil.However, almost half of its total external tradeis with China, which receives more than 90percent of Mongolia’s exports (mainly, naturalresources such as iron ore, copper and gold).Also, revenue from transit fees could contributeto economic growth. In short, the establishmentof the Corridor will further strengthen andintensify economic cooperation among thethree countries.

From a Russian perspective, this would not

only contribute to its domestic socio-economicdevelopment using the natural resources of theFar East region but integrate trade withMongolia, China, South Korea and Japan.Additionally, the natural resources of the FarEast and Siberia would attract foreigninvestment (B.Otgonsuren, 2015). However,some research suggests that the prospects fortransit through Mongolia are relatively low andrestricted mainly to the transportation oftimber from Russia. This is because Russianexperts calculate that the majority of freighttraffic including coal, grain and containerseither passes through the Trans-SiberianRailway to Chita and further to Harbin, or goesthrough Kazakhstan to Urumqi and farther tosouthern China (Beijing). They also note thatfor the successful operation of the alreadyestablished routes through Mongolia, suchmeasures as reduction of tariffs, advertisingcampaigns, ensuring lower risk indicators ofthe safety of cargo and smooth cross-borderoperations would facilitate trade between thecountries. (V.Yu. Malov, 2018)

Source: V.Yu. Malov, “Assessment of theProspects for Mongolian Transit as an

Integral Part of the Belt and RoadInitiative,” Regional Research of Russia,

2019.

There are further benefits and challengesregarding implementation of the BRI projects.Apart from financial issues and railway gauge

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differences of the three countries and otherrelated technical difficulties, there are socio-economic, political, and environmental risksassociated with the BRI projects. WhileMongolia is keen to develop its infrastructureand rail transportation, it lacks financial andtechnical resources. This means that thefinancing of the projects will largely depend onChinese enterprises and the Chinese state. Inturn, this could place Mongolia at risk ofexcessive borrowing, thus increasing itsdependency on China. In fact, some researchsuggests that Mongolia is among the high-riskcountries under debt distress through the BRI.(John Hurley et al, 2018)

There are, however, opportunities. Mongolia’seconomy is heavily dependent on its miningsector and the recent Chinese ban onAustralian coal opens the way for Mongolia tobecome China’s top coking coal supplier. It isworth noting that Northern and northeasternparts of China (Manchuria and Inner Mongolia)are the key regions for the coking coal market.BRI projects such as railways and gas pipelineswould smooth these processes and createeconomic opportunities. This would allow Chinato meet its demand for coal and other naturalgas from its two close neighbors at low cost.Mongolia and Russia could become the maincoal suppliers not just for China, but potentiallyto other Northeast Asian markets such asJapan.

On the other hand, the BRI transportationprojects pose environmental risks, as noted bythe World Bank. Direct effects of theconstruction and operations of roads and railsinclude air and water pollution, soil erosion,habitat destruction and fragmentation, andtimber depletion. Indirect effects are generatedthrough road or railway operations. Thechanges in transport availability and costs shiftmarkets and human populations with far-reaching economic and environmental effects,such as habitat loss for numerous species,deforestation, wildlife and timber trafficking. A

spatial assessment carried out by The WorldWildlife Fund in 2017 found significant overlapbetween the BRI corridors and some of themost ecologically fragile places on earth. (WWF2017) In the case of the BRI, areas within theChina-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor areidentified at ‘greatest risk’ facing activedeforestation. For instance, regions withinHeilongjiang in the Chinese territory, Republicof Buryatia, Irkutsk Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai inthe Russian territory and Lake Baikal close toMongolian border are all identified asecologically high-risk areas. (Elizabeth Lososet.al., 2019). Moreover, the proposed gas andoil pipeline project traversing Mongolia coulddisrupt the surrounding environment andthreaten the livelihood of local communities inthe areas. As Julian Dierkes, Professor at theUniversity of British Columbia’s Institute ofAsian Research, observes, significantenvironmental risks would be born entirely byMongolia. He adds that the pipeline wouldresult in a major disruption of herders’act ivit ies unless there is communityinvolvement in the planning. He also warns ofthe long-term risk of spills around a pipeline.(Communication to author, 2021) Indeed, thecountry’s economic relations with its twoneighbors is a major factor in its ability toprotect the environment. This can be seen fromthe nature of economic dependence andresource extraction at the national level. This isespecially true for mining and hydroelectricenergy sectors.

As the mining sector is the engine of theMongolian economy, addressing relatedenvironmental risks is a long-term challenge tosustainable development goals with local andglobal implications. For example, in 2015,Mongolia was planning to build a massive dam(with partial Chinese investment) on its largestriver, Orkhon, both to meet increasingdomestic power needs and provide water forthe country’s mining industry. This has ledenvironmental groups to raise concerns ofdangers of the hydroelectric power plant and a

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related pipeline project to Lake Baikal which isjust over the border in Russia. (Anson Mackay2015) Similarly, other proposed hydropowerplant projects on the largest Selenge river andits tributaries in northern Mongolia involvedanger to the water system of Lake Baikal.While alternative approaches such as supplyingMongolia with electricity from various Russianhydroelectric and thermal power plants wereproposed, they have yet to be realized.(V.Yu.Malov 2019) On top of that, although theGovernment of Mongolia is committed tohydroelectric development as a potentialsolution to its electricity shortages andreduction of its energy dependency on its twoneighbors, the hydroelectric energy sector hasnot been productive. This is largely because therivers remain frozen for most of the year andrivers are relatively small in size and capacity.This has been further worsened by climatechange impacts in recent years.

With regard to BRI projects, China has pledgedto adhere to the laws and norms of the host-country. Technically, then, host countries areresponsible to bear the risks associated.However, this is not just an issue of anindividual country but also involves fundingorganizations and other related stakeholders.Therefore, for successful implementation of theCMREC projects under the BRI, a strategicenvironmental and social assessment isessential to ensure better outcomes. As asignatory of international agreements such asthe Paris Agreement and SustainableDevelopment Goals Agenda of the UnitedNations, BRI projects are likely to challengeMongo l ia to meet i t s in ternat iona lcommitments and sustainable developmentefforts. According to a recent publication“Greening the China-Mongolia-RussiaEconomic Corridor: A Visual Synthesis” by ZoiEnvironment Network, while Mongoliagenerates 93 percent of its power from coal, ithas the potential to become a regional cleanenergy (wind and solar) exporter from thecountry’s vast steppes and deserts. Under the

CMREC, a possible project is to create aregional integrated power supply andtransmission network for exporting cleanenergy out of the Gobi Desert to China, Japan,and other northeast Asian countries.Considering that China and Russia aso have thehighest energy potential from hydropower(Statista, 2020), there is an opportunity toswitch to clean energy alternatives which couldreduce greenhouse gas emissions in the region.However, so far, Chinese involvement in theMongolia energy sector is still dependent oncoal-related technologies as can be seen fromthe map below. (Zoi Environment Network,2020) In this context, environmentally-friendly‘green’ technologies will be key to greening theeconomic corridor.

Source: Zoi Environmental Network 2020

Finally, as some scholars state, while an‘economic corr idor ’ i s cons idered ageographically-targeted development initiativethat helps to develop infrastructure andincrease people-to-people and economicconnectivity, it is also a geopolitical tool.(Stephanie Petrella,2018) Against the backdropof Beijing’s increasing attention to itsneighboring countries there is growingsignificance given to regional economicintegration and connectivity. (Peter Cai, 2017)

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Therefore, the article further analyzesgeopolitical factors within the context ofMongol ia ’s ‘Third Neighbor’ pol icy.Geographically, Mongolia is sandwichedbetween Russia and China with no access tosea. Therefore, the Corridor under the BRI is agolden opportunity for landlocked Mongolia toreach a wider international market and todiversify its economy.

However, often-times, instead of seeingMongolia as a potential contributor to globalmarket chains, international specialists see itas a potential ‘geopolitical chessboard’ amidrising geopolitical tensions. This is becausehistorically, Mongolia’s relations wererestricted within the sphere of its twoneighbors. Mongolia was viewed as ‘a pawnwhose fate was determined by the nature of theSino-Russian relationship.’ (Alicia Campi, 2020)For example, Mongolia maintained goodrelations with both countries until the Sino-Soviet schism of the 1950s. With the intensifiedSino-Soviet clash in the mid-1960s, theMongolian People’s Republic became a front-line of Soviet defense against China for thenext two decades. (Jeff Goodson, JonathanAddleton 2020) However, with the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, Mongolia entered into a newera. Relations between China and Mongoliaimproved with the exchange of high-level statevisits of each country. This was followed by the‘Declaration on Friendship and Good-Neighborly Cooperation’ between Mongoliaand Russia. (Ts.Batbayar, 1998)

In 1990, Mongolia took important steps towardbecoming a multiparty, pluralistic anddemocratic society. With the New Constitutionof 1992, Mongolia declared its intention ofpursuing balanced relations with its twoneighbors and a new framework for acontinued open foreign policy and a newinternational orientation. While Mongoliaenjoys friendly relations with its two neighbors,it also follows a ‘Third Neighbor’ foreign policy.Given changing geopolitical realities of the 21st

century, Mongolia’s relations with othercountries including the United States, Japan,Germany and South Korea are expanding.Particularly, the vast mineral resources inMongolia have not only attracted foreigninvestments but also have allowed it to expandits relations with those countries. Among its‘third neighbors’, the role of the United Statesis an important factor in its relations with itstwo neighbors. Arguably, growing geopoliticaland geoeconomic competition between Chinaand the United States will affect Mongoliasignificantly as it is considered important inChina’s Belt and Road Initiative and in the U.S‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific.’ (MendeeJargalsaikhan, 2020) For example, expertshighlight the direct impact of the so-called U.S-China trade war on Mongolia. As China isMongolia’s dominant economic partner, thisleaves it highly vulnerable to Chinese economicfluctuations and Chinese pressures. (JeffGoodson, Jonathan Addleton 2020) Given that,it can be said that Mongolia’s fate will besubstantially affected by geopolitical rivalriesamong the big powers. This includes thecompetition for access to Mongolia’s mineraland energy sources. For Ulaanbaatar, thiswould mean that it has to ensure that thedevelopment of its mining industry does notresult in dependency on either of its neighbors.As a result, external investments from thirdcountries are significant. On one hand, as ayoung democratic country, Mongolia looks upto its ‘third neighbors’ like the United States,Japan, and others; on the other hand, itseconomic fate is closely connected with Russiaand China. The important question forMongolia is not who might win in the greatpower competition, but how Mongolia cannavigate through all these factors whilekeeping the right balance in the sphere ofgeopolitics in flux.

This is not to suggest that these geopoliticalfactors will be a major challenge for theimplementation of BRI projects. In fact, assome Mongolian scholars point out, rather than

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seeing geopolitical factors as a hindrance toMongolia’s infrastructure development, it isimportant to see it as an economic and politicalopportunity. (Uradyn E.Bulag, 2014) This canalso be supported by international experts whoargue that while the majority of analysts seeChinese motives under the BRI as combingeconomic and strategic drivers, focusing on thegeopolitical dimensions of the BRI underminesits principally geo-economic drivers. (Peter Cai,2017) In this context, it can be said thatMongolia can benefit from the BRI provided allthe parties can exert strong political will andcommitment to the projects under the Corridor.As far as China and Russia is concerned, therapprochement of the two countries followingthe Ukraine crisis, is likely to persist for thetime being as both Russia and China facesanctions from the West, above all from theUnited States. This could push the twocountries to strengthen their economiccooperation within the framework of the BRI.While Western analysts are sceptical about thecontinuation of the Sino-Russian alliance, someexperts highlight that even in the case of liftedor relaxed sanctions of western countries,Russia is likely to tilt toward China for itseconomic growth. (Alexander Gabuev, 2016)While it is too early to judge whether theenvisaged Corridor between China, Mongoliaand Russia would be successful or not in thelong term, it can become clear that potentialoutcomes from the BRI projects have far-reaching regional and global implications.

Overall, BRI projects hold both opportunitiesand challenges for Mongolia. However, ifaddressed correctly, it seems that thechallenges can be translated into futureopportunities. In other words, to fully benefitfrom the Corridor and to avoid potential risksinvolved, care should be taken to safeguard theenvironmental and social criteria in theimplementation processes of the projects. Thiswould in turn, contribute to realization ofSustainable Development Goals both at thenational and global levels.

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Yelif Ulagpan is a Master candidate at Shanghai University in Shanghai and is an affiliate ofCenter for the History of Global Development, Shanghai University. Her research interestsare in the fields of international and public affairs, (sustainable) development, public healthand the environment.

Contact: yelif.ulyqpan@gmail.com