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Business Ethics:Restrictive or Empowering? BJ0rn KjonstadHugh Willmott

A B S T R A C T . T h e r e is a tendency in the businessethics literature to think of ethics in restrictive terms:wha t one should not do, and how to control this.Drawing on Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moraldevelopment, the paper focuses on, and draws atten-tion to, another more positive aspect of ethics: thecapacity of ethics to inspire and empower individ-uals, as well as groups. To understand and facilitatesuch empowerment , it is argued that it is necessaryto move beyond Kohlberg's justice reasoning so as toappreciate the value and impor tance of feeling andcare. Accordingly, we draw upon case study materialto review the meaning of Kohlberg's higher stages 5 , 6 and 7 to question the meaning of ethical 'rea^soning' . With such deeper understanding of par t ic-ular ethical codes or practices, it is thought thatmembers of organisations may come closer to thespirit, as opposed to the letter, of ethical conduct inorganisations. This, we argue, is consistent with thedegree of trust and integrity demanded by leaner.

Bjern Kjonstad has recently completed his Masters disser-tation. He has subsequently been ordained in theWestern Buddhist Order and is currently devotinghimself full-time to the work of the Friends of theWestern Buddhist Order.

Hugh Willmott is Reader in the Manchester School ofManagement having previously held appointments at theAston Business School and Copenhagen BusinessSchool. He has taken refuge in the Kagyu Order ofTibetan Buddhism. His most recent books have beenLa b o u r P ro c e s s Th e o ry (Macmillan, 1990 co-editedwith David Knights), Critical Management Studies(Sage, 1992, co-edited with Mats Alvesson) and Skilla n d C o n s e n t (Routledge, i992, co-edited with A ndrewSturdy and David Knights) and M a k i n g Q u a l i t yC r i t i c a l (Routledge, 1994 co-edited with AdrianWilkinson). Their common theme has been a criticalexamination of the changing organization and manage-ment of work in modern society.

post-bureaucratic ways of organizing and conductingbusiness as well as being personally beneficial to thepeople involved.

Introduction

There is a growing understanding that corporateactivity in general, and managerial work inparticular, involves ethical issues and dilemmas(Donaldson, 1982; De George, 1986). With thisgrowing understanding of the ethical significanceof corporate activity there has developed a'business ethics' industry, an industry that islargely devoted to codifying what is 'e thical ' . 'Within this industry, considerable emphasis iscurrent ly being placed upon the adopt ion ofethical codes of conduct. Typically, the intent ofsuch codes is to reassure existing or prospectivesuppliers, customers, employees and regulatorsthat they are dealing with (the representation of)an 'ethical ' company that can be 'trusted' (Waterset al, 1986, Rob ertson and Schlegelmilch, 1993).Although these codes may raise awareness of th enormative dimension and ethical significance ofcorporate activity, the fact that they are usuallycommended, installed and refined as an elementof a broader strategy for differentiating com-panies from their competitors (e.g. Barker, 1993),and thereby achieving a competitive advantage,means that the development of moral awarenessamongst employees (and others) is often a sec-ondary considerat ion, and at best an auxiliaryconsequence, of such ethics initiatives.A primary aim of the paper is to present andillustrate a conceptual framework that at onceacknowledges the attention currently being givento ethical codes of conduct and, more impor-


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446 B. Kjonstad and H. Willmotttantly, moves beyond this focus to incorporate anunderstanding of processes of moral learning anddevelopment. The paper is organised as follows.In the first section, we argue that it is not justthe complexity or even the r isk but , morefundamental ly, the indeterminacy and unpre-dictability inherent in business (and other)activity that promotes attentiveness to the moraland ethical qual i ty of corporate conduct anddecision-making. We then elaborate the viewthat the provision of codes of conduct is aninsufficient, and possibly a perverse, means ofrecognising the significance, and promoting thedevelopment, of ethical corporate behaviour. Weconcur with others who, in seeking to remedythis tendency, have contended that Kohlberg's(1 9 7 1 , 1973, 1981) work provides a valuableorientation to the field of business and manage-rial ethics (e.g. Rowan, 1976; Lavoie andCu lbert, 197 8, Trevino, 19 92). For it provides anextensive framework for advancing the study ofethics beyond rule-fol lowing behaviour(Kohlberg's second, conventional level) to theexercise of moral jud ge me nt in the application ofethical principles (Kohlberg's third, postconven-tional level). Our interest is in the developmentof moral learning and jud gem ent. B ut we areparticularly interested in the significance of theseventh stage of moral development, as stage thatis briefiy sketched , but com paratively u nd er-developed, in Kohlberg's work.

To illustrate and discuss the relevance of thedifferent levels in Kohlberg's theory, we employa case study that describes a manager and his wifestruggling to decide v^^hether to take a promo-tion abroad that has major implications for familyas well as career. As Maclagan (1992) has argued,the value of using case study material resides inits capacity to facilitate a depth exploration of'typical issues/dilemmas faced by managers' (andothers). However, whereas Maclagan and others(e.g. Bird and Waters, 1987) have used cases ofextreme moral dilemmas identified by managers,we beheve that it is equally legitimate, andperhaps more reveal ing, to consider mundanecases of decision-making that are not immedi-ately associated with the structures and values ofbusiness and work (Weber, 1990, 1991).Otherwise, there is the danger of restricting the

meaning and examination of ethics to thopractices and instances where the moral issues a'transparent' to managers rather than issues thare of greatest concern to other people withstake in the ethics of corporate activity (ewives, children, the local community, as well suppliers and customers). We draw upon our castudy to illustrate the six/seven stages Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

One reason for focusing upon the 'highstages of moral development is to place perspective the virtues of Kohlberg's third, poconventional level of moral behaviour, which aincreasingly attracting attention within the fieof business ethics. A second, and more copelhng reason for this focus is its relevance addressing difficulties, identified by Kohlbe(1973; Kohlberg et al, 1990) in a revision of hwork, that individuals encounter between thability to think about moral issues, the develoment of commitment to particular ethical principand their capacity to translate these principlespractice. In our view, it is at the 'higher' levelmoral development that these difficulties amost fully appreciated and directly addresseHowever, Kohlberg's theory is not without detractors who question inter alia its idealism its relevance to contemporary business practiIt is to a consideration of these views that turn in a discussion section, wh ere w e defend osuggestion that the recognition of a 'fourth' levof moral development could be helpful in futhering a processual approach to analysing aadvancing the ethics of corporate behaviour.

Response to normative order: Restrictivand empowering ethicsIf human affairs were programmed or instinctuethical issues and moral dilemmas would narise. As Bauman (1976, p. 6) has observed,

in human affairs a dangerous and portentous chastends to appear, unknown to non-human natubetween human conduct and nature's commanments. In the case of non-human phenomennature itself, without human intervention, takcare of the harmony between the necessary and t


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Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? 447actual, the identity of the real and the good; inthe hum an case, however, the gap between the twomust be bridged artificially, and requires sustainedand conscious efFort

Normative order, and with it the politico-ethicalexercise of choice, arises iti an efFort to fill thevacuum created by the lack of natural order. Thedifficulty, as Bauman (ibid., p. 17) subsequentlyobserves, is that the process of becoming human- in the sense of ma king sustained and consciousefforts to construct and comply with a norma-tive order 'is not necessarily an inherent desireof men' (sic). It is something that requires effort,effort that is not invariably forthcoming.Moreover, because normative order is based uponhistorically and culturally contingent values, thereis always the possibility of questioning andresisting prevailing forms of normative control.It may be partly for this reason that trainingcourses in business ethics stress compliance withcodes, as contrasted with more reflective formsof learning that invite questions about the legit-imacy of established, conventional norms andvalues (see e.g. Hoffman and Moore, 1990).Ethics that depend upon rules and regulations welabel restrictive a usage that is supported by oneof the meanings of the Greek 'ethos': custom. T healternative meaning of ethics, we label empowering- a usage that is supported by another meaningof ethos: sublime virtue, or character. Its concernis to facilitate a process of individual and collec-tive moral development.To signal the limitations of approaches thatconcentrate upon compliance with codes, wedraw a distinction between 'restrictive ethics',which are concerned with formulat ing andoperat ing codes of conduct , and 'empoweringethics' which are supportive of moral learningand development. Although we commend whatwe term 'empowering ethics', it is worth stressingthat we do not advocate its replacement of'restr ict ive ethics ' . Rather, we concur withGilligan (1982) when she argues that an atten-tiveness to the rational virtues of fairness andjust ice can complement, and be integratedwithin, an attentiveness to the affective virtues ofcare and loving-kindness. Or, as Gilligan (ibid.,

p. 174) makes this point.

the two disparate modes of experience are in theend connected . . . This dialogue between fairnessand care not only provides a better understandingof relations between the sexes but also gives riseto a more comprehensive portrayal of adult workand family relationshipsTh ose w ho understand that normative order is anecessary condition of social existence are some-times also inclined to believe that this conditioninvests in them an ethical right to require othersto accept their particular moral standards. But,equally, because no natural law governs theadoption of a particular standard, there is alwaysthe possibility (and even likelihood) that otherswill advocate or invoke alternative standards. Inwhich case, normative order must be establishedby pursuing some variant or combination of twopossible lines of action. Either, normative ordermust be coercively imposed and/or hegemoni-cally disseminated so that alternative possibilitiesare suppressed or marginalised. This is the likelyeffect, if not the conscious interest, of businessethics where the emphasis is upon codes ofconduct. Alternatively, an ethos must be devel-oped in which coercion and hegemony are sys-tematically exposed and eliminated through anempowering process of social and existentialstruggle.^ Only by constructing a business ethicsthat acknowledges, but also extends beyond, theusefulness of codes of conduct, we argue, is itpossible to complement the construct ion andappreciation of moral rules with the developmen tof moral learning and the exercise of moralj udgement .An 'empowering ethics', we beheve, is not justan appealing idea but has increasing practicalrelevance in 'postbureaucratic', networked orga-nizations where there is less reliance uponexternally imposed rules as greater emphasis isplaced upon forms of self-disciphne or 'respon-sible autonomy' (Freedman, 1977; Heydebrand,1989) . Relat ing the development of moraljudgement to the development of new forms oforganizations in which structures are more fluid,and a heavier reliance is placed upon post-bureaucrat ic means of communicat ion andcontrol. Reed and Anthony (ibid., p. 609) haveargued that


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448 B. Kjonstad and H. WillmottThe real need for a reformed management educa-tion rests on the requirement for managers to behelped to an awareness of their own significanceand responsibility by encouraging in them a con-sciousness of the difficulties with which they areengaged. They must be encouraged to think aboutthe unprogrammed complexities which face themwithout the distracting and specious existence ofcodes, competencies, catch phrases and missionstatements

In our view, the ' encouragement to think aboutunprogrammed complexit ies ' is consistent with,and necessitates the development of, less rou-tinised, dualistic forms of moral ' reasoning' 'reasoning' that involves intuition and feeling.'Reasoning ' is placed in scare quotes because wedo not restrict sense-making to cognitiveprocesses. Rather, and especially at 'higher' levelsof moral development, the exercise of moraljudgement involves a transpersonal integration of'cognit ive' / intel lectual and 'affective'/deeplyintuitive sense-making. These processes, wesuggest, lie beyond the comparat ively mecha-nistic, slow and dualistic operation of ' au to -nom ous ' cogni tive judge men t (Rowan, 1993).Rather, they involve an immediate, embodied,compassionate awareness of the interdependenceof social and organizational relations. Currently,the field of business ethics is dominated bynarrow, rationalistic formulations of human act ionand ethical behaviour that assume and reproducea Cartesian dualism of mind and body, individualand organization (see e.g. Capra, 1982).^ Onlyby situating business ethics within a moreencompassing framework is it possible to incor-porate, yet also move beyond, a rationalisticconception of ethics in which it is assumed thatreason and emot ion are opposing rather thancomplementary forces of moral development.

Beyond codes of conductEthics based upon codes of conduct - what wehave termed 'restrictive ethics' - have dominatedand shaped the literature on business ethics. Thisethics is preoccupied with identifying andprotecting the rights and duties of corporat ions,managers and employees. For example, Hoffman

and Moore's (1990) general textbook on busineethics is concerned inter alia with employeerights and duties; whistle blowing; quality oworking life; hiring practices. In a similar veiWebley (1988), writing on behalf of the Instituof Business Ethics, presents a series of guidelineon how to manage or restrict bribery; use oprivileged information; conflicts of interestother issues.

In common with other standardized normand values, codes of conduct purpor t to provida routinised means of managing or rationalizinwha t is, or has become, problematical . Foexample, in response to commercial pressures timprove the level of 'customer service' , mancompanies and retailers have trained their stato treat customers in ways that comply withcode that is deemed to be ethically correcThese codes offer instructions about, rather thpractical understandings of, the normative chacter of corporate conduct . This l imitat ioharbours a contradict ion. For in the absence oreflexive, practical understanding of t he normative organisation of human interact ion, it doubtful whether the principles contained withithe codes can be effectively interpreted, let alonbe translated into corporate practice. As R e eand Anthony (1992, p. 606) have observed, whecomment ing upon the dependence upon codeof conduct as means of regulating corporate anmanagerial behaviour, this approach

is questionable in so far as it abandons the verdifficulties attending the "ethical routine practiceof management" by proffering a routine bureaucratic response . . . Codes of practice have theuses: they set out the requirements of law; theprescribe the limits of discretionary decision; theoutline general good intentions. They are attrabu t not necessarily useful in helping managers to avomoral dilemmas because their purpose is to substitute fthe essential difficulties of moral issues, simple, undestandable, definitional rules

Where concern wi th the ethics of corporatactivity is equated with the refinement of codeof conduct, discussion of ethics is focused uponand often limited to, the quest ion of their legiimate scope and the specificity of their contenIn general, ethical codes are conceived by senio


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Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? 449management and their advisors who transmitthem to all corporate members. Employees thenhave the option of complying, at least behav-iourally, with the code's instructions or riskingtheir livelihood. In terms of the two lines ofaction sketched in the introduction, the estab-lished theory and practice of business ethics tendsto approximate more closely to the first line ofaction: normative order embodied in a code ofconduct is imposed, or, more often, is hege-monical ly disseminated (Robertson andSchlegelmilch, 1993). In most cases, resistance isslight, or weak, because the standards enshrinedin codes of conduct and mission statements aredeemed to be so abstract , anodyne, 'common-sensical' and/or broadly neutral, and perhaps alsopositive for employee welfare, as to provoke littleadverse reaction beyond a cynical dismissal oftheir frequently grandiose language and claims.

Similar doubts and misgivings about theequation of ethical discourse with the contentsof codes of conduct have been voiced by thosewho argue that their use may do as much toinhibit or circumvent moral reasoning as they doto promote conformity with ethical standards(Hosmer, 1987; Water and Bird, 1987). Whyshould this be? Because, instead of acting toencourage and facilitate the development ofmoral learning and the exercise of moral judge-ment, the codes operate to promote routinisedcompliance. Their effect can be to draw restric-tive boundaries around what is (rationally) ethicalso that alternative, less mechanistic conceptionsof the realm of the ethical appear 'extreme','i l legitimate' or 'irrational '. In the absence ofmoral understanding, lip service may be paid, andcompliance may well be achieved, especially incases where behaviour is explicitly monitored.However, in the absense of reflection upon thepractical meaning of codes' principles and ideals- for exam ple, ideas abo ut jus tice , fairness,honesty and social responsibility it is ques-tionable whether, when called upon to exercisediscretion, employees will be empowered tomobilise their moral reasoning to exemplify thespirit, as contrasted with the letter, of the codes(Barker, 1993).

Of course, we are assuming that codes ofethics are intended to make a difference to how

people (inter)act. Where codes are entirelycynical and dramaturgical (ie. intended to presentonly the appearance of change), then referenceto their 'spirit ' is, to say the least, redundant.Indeed, in the absence of critical, postconven-tional moral reasoning, the introduction of codesis likely to diminish rather than enhance thecapacity for moral reasoning as codes deflectattention from, rather than attract attention to,the problematical ethics of business and manage-ment. Where little attention is paid to the prac-tical business of realizing the spirit of the codesin everyday practice, it is also more likely thattheir contents will be interpreted cynically aslofty rhetoric produced for 'external consump-tion', or as yet another externally imposed setof rules to which the semblance of complianceis grudgingly provided.

From this it might be concluded that the fieldof business ethics, with its narrow focus upon thedevelopment and elaborat ion of codes ofconduct, could be safely disregarded if notcompletely ignored. This would indeed be adefensible position if the theory and practice ofbusiness ethics were not as important for what itmarginalises or excludes from consideration asfor what it includes within its field. By defaultif not intent, this 'restrictive' orientation tobusiness ethics fosters a discourse, and associatedset of practices, that are preoccupied with thesetting and monitoring of standards and theacquisition of technical competencies (Burgoyne,1989). By identifying corporate ethics with thecontent and application of codes of conduct, theestablished approach excludes from its perspec-tive an appreciation of the limitations of itsinstrumental, bureaucratic response to complexand problematical issues. As Maclagan (1990,p. 17) has observed, highlighting the imperson-ality of the codes and their minimal contributionto moral learning,

the currently fashionable interest in corporatecodes of ethics . . . cannot replace individuals' owncapacity for moral judgement and integrity. Theseare personal qualities which contribute to managers'performance, and are acquired through processesof moral learning and development . . .We endorse the general drift of Maclagan's


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450 B. Kjonstad and H. Willmottcom men ts. But we also emphasise the social char-acter of moral judge me nt. W e acknowledge thatmoral jud gem ent is a 'personal quality': i t cann otplausibly be abstracted from the individual actoror decision-maker. But, equally, moral learningand development occurs through processes ofsocial interaction and within institutional rela-tions of power (see e.g. Hosmer, 1987; Flanagan,1991; Robertson and Schlegelmilch, 1993). Theascription of moral jud ge m en t and integrity toindividuals and corporations, we argue, is avocabulary of motive. What counts as 'integrity'for example, is socially constructed, not a givenquality of particular actions or personalities.[Which is not to say that the meaning ofintegrity is 'purely relative' but, rather, that thecapacity to question and transform conventional,accepted meanings is conditional upon relationsof power through which the theory and practiceof' inte gri ty' is defined and developed].. It cannotbe assumed that conformity with a code ethicsindicates any commitment to, or active legiti-mation of, its contents: it may be obeyed to avoidsanctions rather than as a consequence of anybelief in the virtue of its requirements. AsGiddens (1984, p. 30) has argued,

normative elements of social systems are contin-gent claims which have to be sustained and "madeto count" through the effective mobilization ofsanctions in the context of actual encounters.Normative sanctions express structural asymmetriesof domination, and the relations of those nomi-nally subject to them may be of various sorts otherthan expressions of the commitments those normssupposedly engenderBecause decision making is always shaped andcondit ioned by the posi t ioning of individualswithin particular social structures, the dynamicsof moral development are less a matter ofpersonal choice than they are an issue of collec-tive political will. With the emergence of post-bureaucratic organizations, there is a moderationif not a replacement of an ethos of 'command-and-co ntrol ' by one of 'emp ow er-and-faci l i tate ' .In this context, it is more consistent to developa post-restrictive ethics. However, the translationof what is logically more consistent into corpo-rate practice requires managers, in particular, to

dilute their prerogative by encouraging subordnates to develop a postconventional level ethical conduct that may well conflict with coventional wisdom. Although postconventionmoral conduct may be more consistent wipostbureaucrat ic organizat ion, i t cannot presumed that it is consistent with the maintnance of existing hierarchies or the reproductiof a capitalist mode of production. And it perhafor this reason that the theory and practice business ethics has favoured a concentration upcodes of ethics, to the exclusion of approachto ethical behaviour that are informed by a moextensive theory of moral development.

In the next substantive section, we presentframework of moral development that builupon Kohlberg's work to elucidate the distint ion between ' res t r ic t ive ' and 'empower inethics. First, though, as a basis for illustrating othe rwise abstract discussion of different levels moral reasoning, we present a brief case studTh e case is based u po n Psalidas-Perlmutter (puhshed in Adler, 1986 and reproduced in Wilsoand Rosenfeld, 1990). It describes a situatioexperienced by Tom, an ambit ious engineerinexecutive, who is offered a major promotioThis requires him to move, with his younfamily, from a well paid jo b in N or th Am erito a high profile position in Latin America whehis work would take him away from his wife anchildren for lengthy periods of time. Tom wanto go but his wife, Jane, has misgivings. Shsenses that she is being excluded from tdecision, and feels resentful about this.

The career move: An i l lustrat ive caseTom and Jane C arp ente r, live with their threchildren Ma ry (aged 11), Jerry (aged 6) and A n(aged 3) in a New England town. Tom and Janare both well established within their commnity. Tom works as an engineering executive the headquarters of an internat ional manufaturing company. He is well liked and regardeas an optimistic, flexible, family man: a goocandidate for senior management. Contrastewith the 'pr actica l' Tom , Jan e, his wife, is ofteviewed as mo re of a 'dream er'. She finds the tim


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Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? 451and energy for good causes, and is activelyinvolved on several committees and in voluntarywork. Jane is strongly attached both to her familyand parents, who live in a nearby town.

Since their early marriag e, Tom and Jane havestruggled hard to realize their dreams: a family,financial security, many friends. Their strugglehas enabled them to build a rewarding relation-ship. Yet, despite the realization of their dreams,they have each recently begun to feel that some-thing is missing, though they do not admit thisto the other. Tom experiences life as a comfort-able but unchallenging routine. With his successas an engineering executive, and his standing asa family man, earlier anxieties and uncertaintiesabout his capability have melted away. But so toohas a sense of purpose and adventure. Likewise,despite her involvements in the local community,Jane has grown increasingly restless about theirsituation, a situation that has somehow becomea little too comfortable. But, when she feels thisway, she reminds herself that, after all, this is whatthe good life really is.At this time, when Tom and Jane were b othfeeling an unnerving but unspoken sense ofemptiness, Tom was selected, with three otherexecutives, to visit Latin America for fourmonths. I t was understood that one of themwould be chosen to head up a new operation inLatin America. Tom was very excited about thisprospect, but did not co mm unicate this to Jane.For her part, Jane was pleased that Tom had beenchosen for the trip. She was also attracted to thepossibility of broadening her horizons, shouldTom be selected for the position in LatinAmerica.It was when Tom came home with the newsof his selection, which carried with it a highersalary, cost ofliving expenses and an opportunityto travel throughout Latin America, that Jane firstbegan to have some serious misgivings. Onhearing Tom's news, she anticipated that shewould be isolated, that new friendships would bedifficult to make, that there would be some hos-tility to North Americans, that sanitary condi-tions and other basic needs, like education,would not be satisfactory, and so on. Jane felt thatTom w ould be the main beneficiary of the move,

and that she and the children would be burdened

with most of the difficulties. Her greatest fear wasthat Tom would be away a good deal, and thatshe would have to tackle problems alone. Sherecognised that most of her worries wereprobably based upon prejudice but she could notstop herself worrying. She also felt, and resented,being under pressure to make a quick decisionabout the move, especially because she sensedthat Tom had already decided that they weregoing to go.Jane did not communicate these fears to Tom.But he sensed their existence and he attemptedto comfort her with rational reassurances. Forexample, he said that the children would adapt

quickly and that the experience would bringthem closer together. Inwardly, though, Tom wasdisappointed with Jane. To him, it seemed thather adventurous spir i t was dependent uponremaining in a familiar environment. He hadexpected that she would support him in makingsuch an important career move. Despite this dis-app ointm ent, h e confidently believed that Janewould eventually 'come around', and see what awonderful opportuni ty the promotion presentedfor them all. Convinced of this, he went aheadand booked language lessons for them both.A few days later, Tom's boss, Mr Abbottinvited Tom and Jane to dinner. M r Abbott toldthem that he always attached great importance tohow the wives of his executives felt about a majorjo b move abroad. Jane felt som e res entm entabout the lack of previous contact with MrAbbott. As Mr Abbott had a reputation for beingjudgmental and authoritarian, she w^as reluctantto reveal her doubts. Despite these somewhatnegative feelings, the dinner was pleasant. MrsAbbott regaled them with stories from their yearsabroad in Europe, though she admit ted knowinglittle about cities in Latin America.Towards the end of the evening, Mr Abbottturn ed to Jane to tell her h ow glad they all werethat she was being so positive about the newassignment, and how good it was that she recog-nised how important an opportunity it was forTom - far greater than he could hope for byremaining at the company's headquarters in NewEngland. Before Jane had a chance to reply, andto Mr Abbott 's clear delight, Tom intervened tosay that Jane was a born traveller. He immedi-


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452 B. Kjonstad and H. Willmottately added that she was looking forward to thenew exper ience and indeed was already takingSpanish lessons. To which Mr Abbott respondedby saying that the company was commit ted tocreating a senior management team comprisingexecutives with actual experience abroad, andthat Tom was indeed a lucky man to have a wifewilling to 'go off into the jungle ' .

At the dinner, Jane went along with thepositive drift of this conversation, even thoughinwardly she was angry. But later that night sherowed with Tom, and this continued over thenext few days. She strongly resented the way themeeting with Mr Abbot t had been conducted.It was, she thought , as if Tom had alreadyaccepted the j ob . She also resented the way thatTom had effectively prevented her fromexpressing any misgivings to Mr Abbot t . Inresponse to Jane's hurt and anger, Tom remindedher that Mr Abbott would not entertain, or evenlisten to, doubts about company decisions. Janewas now fmding it difficult to sleep. Tom said aformal decision was required by the followingMonday.

Kohlberg's theory of moral developmentIn this section, we use the descriptive materialpresented in the previous section to generate apossible account of the complex, problematicaland dynamic moral positioning of both Tom andJane. We recognise that our account is riecessarilyselective and partial. However, our intent ion is

not to provide a definitive interpretation of tmoral 'per formance ' , or standing, of tCarpenters . Rather , the case study materialdeployed to illustrate (our unders tanding oKohlberg's work on moral development in a wthat demo nstrates its relevance for developing ttheory and practice of ' empower ing e thicW h e t h e r or not we can reach agreement on t'moral facts' of the Carpenter case is of leimportance, for us, than whether the case provto be of some use in raising awareness of, adiscussion about, the existence of different mospaces in which human perceptions and decisioare made.

Kohlberg's model: Three stages, six leveIn broad outhne, Kohlberg (1971 , 1973, 19argues that human behaviour articulates a hiearchy of moral realms or positions. In the ledeveloped 'preconventional ' posi t ion, ethicawareness is virtually non-existent: there is simpan impulse to satisfy immediate desires whimay or may not be consistent with the desirof others. In the in termediate , 'convent ionpositions, there is a responsiveness to notionsfairness and just ice as enshr ined in establishrules and codes of conduct. Finally, in whKohlberg terms the 'postconventional ' levelmoral conduct , there is a developed capacityexercise principled judgement to evaluate atransgress conventional norms (see Table I).At the preconventional level (Kohlberg's St

TABLE ILevels and stages of moral development (based on Kohlberg 1986, 1990)

Stages & levels What is right/wrong? Examples from the Carpenter caseStage 0: Pre-moralityLevel I: Pre-conventionalStage 1: Hetero-nomous morality

No distnction between self and other, orright and wrong. O ne just 'is'.

To seek pleasure from an egocentricpoint of view; to avoid breaking rulesfrom fear of punishment.Mr Abbott, Tom's boss, is imposing hiwill at the dinner party, to the benefit fhimself and (possibily) the corporationhe is heading.


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Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? 453TABLE I (Continued)

Stages & levels What i s r ight /wrong? Examples from the Carpenter caseStage 2: Individualinstrumental purposeand exchange.Level II: ConventionalStage 3: Mutualinterpersonal expecta-t ions, relationships andconformityStage 4: Social systemand conscience

Level III: Post-conventionalStage 5: Socialcontract or utilityand individual rights

Stage 6: Universalethical principles

Level IV: Post-dualisticStage 7: Beyondmorality and justice

To follow rules when they are calculatedto be in one's immediate interest.

To live up to what is expected by peopleclose to one: family, colleagues, friends.

To fulfil duties to which one has agreed.To uphold rules except in extreme cases,because they conform one's sense ofidentity and obligation to society.

To be aware that people hold a varietyand opinions, and that rules oftenlegitimately conflict. To recognise that,despite this relativity, some values andrights must be privileged and upheld inthe interests of everyone or 'overalluti l i ty ' . There remain tensions betweenthis awareness and continuingattachments to convention.To determine and follow self-chosenprinciples. When rules contradict theprinciples, the principles are acted uponbecause there is a strong personalcommitment to these principles. Thebasis of this commitment is theunderstanding that people are ends inthemselves. There remain some tensionsbetween the strength of commitment tothis ideal and its practical fulfilment.

To realise the 'oneness' of oneself, th eaction and the guides for actions.Dissolving the separation of the 'doer'(ego) from the 'done' (principle) allowsprinciples to be fulfilled with minimalconflict.

Tom prevents Jane from v oicing herconcerns at the dinner party from fearof retaliations from Mr Ahhott.

Tom and Jane live up to conven tional(middle class) values and to theexpectations of Mr Abbott when at thedinner partyTom and Jane's shared attitude to life:Tom in terms of career opportunitieswithin the f irm; Jane by checkingdoubts about conventional virtues of life.

Jane struggles to overcome attachmentto convention, both in relation to Tom'sjob and boss, and her worries aboutliving in Latin America.

The Carpenter case is most significantfor its lack of considerations of thisstage: i.e. a lack of firm ethical principlesto guide Jane thro ugh her m isgivingsabout the situation and communicationdifficulties.

Although represented as a stage,embracing and going beyond stage 6,this is also the metaethical hasis thatanimates the dynamic of the framework,and underpins the other stages, reflectedin Tom and Jane's shared exp erience ofemptiness in life.


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454 B. Kjonstad and H. Willmott1 and 2), individuals are understood to have littleawareness of the other except as a distributer ofrecognition and rewards. What is right iswhatever is sensed or calculated to secure self-interest. We see this level at work during thedinner with Mr Abbott . In effect , Mr Abbottimposes his will, aided and abetted by Tom, ina way that neutralizes the will of Jane, W he nimplicitly threatened with corporate sanctionsfrom turning down the career-move, Tomprevents Jane from vo icing con cern s that heknows she has. An absorbtion in his ownambition overrides Tom's conventional sense ofresponsibility towards Jane.

T h e conventional level (Stages 3 and 4) is dis-tinguished by a heightened awareness of others,and an appreciation of the rules that regulateinteraction between self and others. Morality isseen as justic e in the ap plication of these ru les(e.g. Kant, 1948; Rawls, 1971). We can inferfrom his rapid promotions through the companythat Tom is well schooled in corporate rules andregulations - he is a loyal, dep end able em ployee.Such conventional schooling may also bedetec ted in Jane's suppression o f her anger d urin gthe dinner with the boss: one does not challenge,or argue w ith, th e boss - especially in this situ-ation, where Tom and Jane are his guests, Astronger indication of the operation of this, con-ventional level of moral development is presentin the couple's shared attitude to life. Tom definesand plans his life in terms of career opportuni-ties offered by the firm. L ikewise, Jan e ch ecksany doubts she may have about the virtue of c on -ventional values, and the associated life-style, bytelling herself that the 'good life' is like that, andthat she has 'arrived' as a well-heeled, wellrespected wife, mother and citizen. When Janeexpresses misgivings abou t the prospective career-move, Tom parries them with standard reassur-ances that invoke his expectations that she willdo her duty as a loyal, supportive wife. In Bowie'sterms (1990, p, 402), this may stem from anunwillingness or inability to deal with what isunconscious:

When an individual represses information in theunconscious, these contents will be manifested,according to Jung, in the projections the individual

makes towards an external object or person. Thuit is always the other who is to blame.T h e postconventional level (Stages 5 and 6)associated with individuals' growing awareness others as individuals who are also making mordecisions. Since the re is also a heighten ed awarness of the social utihty of estabhshed regulationand values, the rules and struc tures from, thconventional level are not necessarily rejecteHowever, at a postconven tional level, convictionmay lead individuals to question and, ooccasion, to override these rules. KohlbergStage 5 is preoccupied with improvising arounthe them e of conventional i ty or just ice. H erdiscretion is used to interpret and make creativaccommodations to the rigid structure assumein Stages 3 and 4. For example, when contemplating the career mov e, Jane struggles un successfully to override her attachment to thcomforts and presumptions of convention btelling herself that her worries about living iLatin America are largely based upon prejudicAt Stage 6, individuals consciously formulatand strongly identify with, moral principles

principles that may or may not comply witconvention. These principles tend to be "positivprescriptions rather than negative proscription(don't kill, don't steal or cheat)" (Kohlberg, 198p. 497). Th e ' individual is com mitted to thesprinciples, which directly inform his or hedecisions and actions, because they have beehammered out and 'validated' through a procesof existential struggle. Although there is no cleaexample of this stage of moral development ithe case study, it is plausible to suggest that paof the difficulty and pain en cou nte red by Janin wrestling with the career move decision arisefrom discovering the lack of established ethicprinciples to guide her interactions with TomHowever, because she has a well developed sensof social utility (Stage 5), she is equally unablto fall back upon preconventional 'self-interesor conventional 'duty' to resolve the dilemma fowhich, unexpectedly, she finds herself morallunprepared. From this perspective, her outrage abeing treated like a chattel by Mr Abbott anespecially, by Tom, would seem to express a deepbut un-art iculated/un-rat ional ised, co mm itmen


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Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? 455to moral principles of open communication thatshe sensed has been seriously violated.

In addition to the oft-quoted six stages ofmoral development, Kohlberg hints at the exis-tence of two other stages. First a Stage '0', pre-ceding Stage 1, where a distinction between theself and the world has not yet emerged. We willdiscuss this briefly below. There is also a sugges-tion of a Stage 7. Kohlberg (1973) illustrates thisstage with references to experiences of nature,such as seeing a sunset, when one 'looses' thesense of there being a 'seeer' (observer) and a'seen' (e.g. sunset), as one becomes a direct expe-rience of the unfolding sunset. Interpersonally,in Stage 7 the possibility of an integration of self-lessness, compassion and awareness is moreexplicitly recognized and anticipated. Onlywith in this Stage, as Carter (1987, p. 91 , emphasisadded) argues, can we begin to answer thequest ion, "Why be moral?" This is because, whenthe duality of self and other is dissolved, "we arenot value-neutral toward the whole of things, butrather we love it as ourselves." (ibid.). It is alsoat Stage 7 that Kohlberg's model is at one withGilligan's emphasis on feelings, caring and com-passion. Approaching ethics from a differentdirection, Gilligan recognizes the need not onlyfor a "dialogue between fairness and care" (1982,p. 174), but to experience them as differentaspects of the love for 'ourselves'.

The significance of Kohlberg's Stage 7Koh lberg regards Stage 7 as a saintly deve lopm entof Stage 6 (Kohlberg, 1973, 1981, 1986). Weunderstand Stage 7 to be the metaethical basisthat animates the dynamic of his framework. Forus , the 'emptiness' of selfless, or 'saintly' com-passion, is the ground of experience. It is not somuch a stage as a foundation of human experi-ence that compels a process of moral develop-ment. The tension and suffering associated withthe dissonance between the selfless ground ofhuman experience and the l ived experience ofsubject-object separat ion motivates movement('down' as well as 'up') between the levels andstages of moral development. But it is at the'higher stages', and especially at Stages 6 and 7

that the drive, or 'pull', to act according to moralprinciples is strongest. It is also where the sense,intellectual and/or affective/intuitive, of uneaseabout the relative morality of other levels is mostintense. Postconventional moral reasoninginvolves an emotional aspect (Gibran, 1980;Sangharakshita, 1990; Wilber, 1991), which to avery limited extent is now being recognized inbusiness literature (Harrison, 1987; Bowles,1990). In the Carpenter case, Tom and Janesensed that 'something is missing'. But neither ofthem appear to have had any means of appreci-ating the substantial spiritual or self-actualisingvalue of this painful experience (Sangharakshita,1990; Wilber, 1983, 1991). To translate thisobservation into the language of this paper, theylacked an 'empowering ethics ' with which toaddress and work through the conflicts thatthreatened to tear them, and their family, apart.Instead of communicat ing and exploring themeaning of this experience, Jane suppressed itspotency by reassuring herself about the normalityof their life; and Tom displaced this, feeling byseeking to throw himself into a new challengeand adventure.

Although Kohlberg (1973) has consistentlyacknow ledged the presence of Stage 7, it was notuntil his last published work (Kohlberg andRyncarz, 1990) that he focussed upon this stagedirectly and began to appreciate its relevance foraddressing a key question for his theory withwhich he struggled, but failed, to resolve: 'whybe moral?'. At the conventional level of moraldevelopment, we have seen how this question isanswered through an unquestioning adherence toconvention. At this level, the question does notarise because the rightness of the prevailingnorms is self-evident to all members of thegroup. At the postconventional level, thequestion is flrst answered, in Stage 5, by calcu-lating that norms have social utility for thepursuit of self-interest. Stage 5 is dominated bythe calculation that the successful pursuit ofself-interest demands a degree of social stabilityand predictability whose attainment may requirea challenge to acc epted con ven tion (cf Jane'sagonising about the move to Latin America).At Stage 6, in contrast, there is an under-standing that the value of persons transcends any


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456 B. Kjonstad and H. Willmottinescapably limiting view that human life shouldbe treated as a means of culturally specific, nec-essarily partial, normative rules or principles.Stage 6 moves beyond the question of how the(socially constructed) self-interest of the indi-vidual may be pursued to explore whether somealternative basis for the definition and pursuit of'self-interest' may be more defensible ethically. Inturn, this involves a shift from a conception ofprin ciples th at can facilitate a give n, cu lturallyrelative conception of self-interest to a search for,and commitment to, principles that are moreuniversalistic in conception - such as the human-istic behef in the equahty of human rights for thedignity of human beings.

However, at Stage 6, when the social forcesof convention are diminished and the establishedsense of self-interest is problemadsed, it becomesmore questionable why one should act morallyor, indeed, why one should carry on living at all.As Kohlberg notesAlthough Stage 6 ethical principles offer a morecomplete solution to the problem of relativity ofvalues than those of Stage 5, they have an evenless complete solution for the problem, "Why bemoral"? (Kohlberg and Ryncarz, 1990, p. 192)

Kohlberg then goes on to observe that thestruggle to answer the question of moral com-mitment entails another question " "Why live?" a question that is as much, and more, an onto-logical question than a moral one. He alsosuggests that, unlike moral questions, suchontological quest ions cannot be answered on'purely logical or rational grounds' (ibid.). WithKohlberg, we find it plausible to say that reasoncontributes to decisions that are made about howto live our lives. For example, when positionedwithin the conventional level, individuals aretaught to engage their reason to recognise thegood sense of fulfilling what are construed astheir duties to others. Or to give another illus-tration, Jane deployed her reason in an efFort todispel her fears as she struggled to overcome herprejudices a bout Hfe in Latin America. How ever,we regard Kohlberg's claim that the morality ofaction can ever be logically or rationally justi-fied as highly dubious. Indeed, in our view, it is

precisely an awareness of the problematical chaacter of such claims that atrends and bedeviStage 6 where it becomes much clearer that caculations about what is moral - whether basupon particularistic (e.g. cultural) or allegeduniversaUstic'* (e.g. hu m an istic) e thica l crite ria are tied to, and compromised by, a concern pre-serve and regulate the self in relation other. In Foucauldian terms, such calculations ainvolve 'games of truth' (Foucault, 1988, p. or modes of 'governm ental i ty ' (1979). Of coursthis does not mean that such criteria should rejected or avoided (as if such an option weavailable to us). But it does suggest the impotance of recognising the difference between (striving to make individual action exemplirat ional ly computed principles, which remaithe preoccupation of Stage 6; and (ii) movinbeyond the closed loop of the rational ambitioof the individual - ambit ions which, howevaltruistic or humanistic, retain caught up in aegoistical concern to identify, defend and appthe most rationally defensible principleInterestingly, Habermias, whose discussion moral development is strongly influenced bKohlberg's model, also recognises the importanof an appeal to some sense of un ity, to which hrefers rather vaguely as the 'intuitive'.

Moral Intuitions are intuitions that instruct us ohow best to behave in situations where it is in opower to counteract the extreme vulnerability others by being thoughtful and considerat(Habermas 1990, p. 199)The importance of Stage 7, as Kohlbeacknow ledges, is that it dissolves the dep end encupon calculative reason to guide and justifethical conduct. A distinctive feature of Stage 'solutions', Kohlberg suggests, is that 'theinvolve experience of an nonegoist ic or noduahstic variety' (Kohlberg and Ryncarz, 199p. 192). The movement from Stage 6 to Stage involves a shift from a humanistic to a cosmperspecdve, a shift that 'means o ne experiencean int imate bond between oneself and thcosmos' (ibid., p. 206), an experience that is nowilled by reasoned compliance with a set universal principles but is inspired and sustaine


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Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? 457by 'experience of a level at which self and theuniverse seem unified' (ibid.). To repeat, this doesnot demand the dismissal of other stages sincethese are recognised to be steps in the process ofcoming to terms with, and ultimately dispelling,the sense of subject-object separation that beginswith Stage 1.

To grasp fully the significance of Stage 7, it isrelevant to appreciate that a sense of 'oneness'(Stage 0) precedes the perception of being asubject (individual) that is differentiated from th eobject (world). The experience of subject-objectseparation that is, the emergence of Stage 1 is learned, not given. Once this perception ofseparation arises, and becomes solidified througha process of social interaction, the associatedimpulse is to pre-serve self by avoiding punish-ment and seeking social approval. This orienta-tion is strongest in what Kohlberg terms thepreconventional level of moral development .What he omits to consider is how the undiffer-entiated experience of being, which, we argue,precedes the preconventional level, continues tounderpin, and interact with, this and other levelsof moral development. It is the tension betweenStage 0 and the other stages, we have suggested,that fuels the process of moril development.For example, it is the experience of contra-diction between an earlier sense of harmony(Stage 0) and the conflict and mutual suspicionassociated with preconventional levels that moti-vates individuals (and corporations) to committhemselves to the conventional level where thesocial relations are regulated by a moral code (seee.g. Robin et al., 1989; Hil tebei tel and Jones,1992). Similarly, tension between the restrictionsof convention and the openness of human exis-tence promotes the search for a post-conventionalmode of moral reasoning (see e.g. Brady, 1987;de Woot, 1990). Finally, in the transition fromStage 6 to Stage 7, the sense of separation, andthe desire of individuals to secure and retain asense of auton om y and con trol, is experienced asa limitation that can only be transcended througha re-affirmation of the primordiality of Stage 0(see e.g. Carter, 1984; Loy, 1988).

To summarise, in the course of moraldevelopment we sense a pull towards something'universal', which may facilitate an empathy for

others, and which may be 'contacted' or madeuse of. This intuition of a 'universal empathy',which Gilligan (1982) terms 'a path', is uncon-ditionally and unequivocally enacted only inKohlberg's Stage 7. Nonetheless, i t underpins theprevious stages and motivates the dynamics ofmovement to 'higher' (and lower) levels. Prior toStage 7, there are glimpses of nonduality butthese are not fully realised or explicitly recog-nized . Th ey are felt as a lack: as a frustration w iththe limited satisfaction gained by becom ing pos i-t ioned in conventional and postconventionallevels of moral development. One response tosuch feelings is to give up the struggle byreverting (or regressing) to a seemingly lessdemanding, more secure, level; another is tonaturalise the feelings, thereby becoming 'stuck'at a given level; and a third response is to struggletowards a 'higher' stage of development.

Discussion: The prospect of 'empoweringethics'We have drawn upon Kohlberg's theory of moraldevelopment to indicate the limitations of'restrictive ethics'. More specifically, we haveargued that there are experiences, which arefrequently labelled 'intuitions', that are nonethe-less critical for understanding ethical behaviour.In this section, we draw attention to a developingbody of literature that is broadly supportive ofsuch a thesis before addressing a number ofpossible objections to it.

Integrat i ng reason and emot i on:Nonduality, compassion and aw^arenessMacMahone (1985, p. 347) has argued that "theunique religious contribution [to business ethics]might be the spiritual motive which broadens andstrengthens the deeper aspirations of executiveand managers." If Tom, for example, had beenenabled to break free from his investment inpreconventional and conventional moral rea-soning, he would almost certainly have beenmore receptive to Jane's misgivings and anxieties.

Paradoxically, a more open acknowledgement


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458 B. Kjonstad and H. Willmottof the threat to h im po sed by Jane's wo rriesmight have done much to open up communica-tion betwe en the c ouple. Jane migh t then haveencouraged Tom to work through the value hewas placing upon career as a 'solution' to hisgrow ing sense of emptiness. Even at a mo re co n-ventional and instrumental level, Tom might havecome to recognise his family as an importantsupport for his career; and that, in addition toundermining his espoused family values, placinghis marriage in jeopard y migh t also damage hiscareer. This reckoning might then have allowedhim to concede that there were indeed othercandidates for the jo b in Latin Am erica, perhapswith fewer family commitments. In any event,by better understanding how other parties werelikely to be affected by the career move, and howdifferent aspects of himself are fulfilled by dif-ferent, and sometimes contradictory involve-ments, Tom may have become more at ease withhimself and the world (Barnett, 1985). In turn,his work might have come an integrated praxis,rather than as a means of acquiring temporarym onu m ents (e.g. jo b titles) to distinguish selffrom other (Willmott, 1990). Alternatively,opening up communicat ion between the couplemight have enabled Jane to work thro ugh heranxieties, and for them to move to Latin Americawith a mo re com m on and coh erent sense ofpurpose and direction.

As we have seen, Kohlberg's theory of moraldevelopment is formulated in terms of anevolving rational response to the question of howto regulate one's relations with others. Implied,but insufficiently explored by Kohlberg, isanother dimension of the evolving response tothis question: the affective dimension of caringand compassion. At the preconventional level, thisis subordinated to calculations about how toavoid punishments and how to maximise imme-diate gratification. At the conventional level, asense of well-being is derived from deployingreason to comply, loyally, and honourably, withthe dominant set of conventions. For example,'care' is identified with whatever is convention-ally regarded as 'care' - such as conformity withthe code on 'customer care ' , adopted by com-panies similar to Tom's. Finally, at the postcon-

ventional level, there is an integration of decisions and actions with those principles to whicthe person has beco me rational ly com mitte(McCoy, 1983). So, for example, 'care' for customer would not be confined to complyingin letter or in spirit, with the code establisheby the company. In our case study, this wouldalmost certainly have meant Tom challenging thauthori ty of the company as embodied in thfigure of Mr Abbott. This might have resultein him being fired or at least being pressured tresign from his jo b. Being po stconv ention al is nowithout its material costs! (Alvesson anWillmott, 1992). However, i t is also possibl(though probably unlikely, in this case) that postconventional orientation would have enableTom to cooperate with, and support , Jane icommunicat ing their misgivings, as a familyabout the prospective move to Latin America.

For such misgivings to be communicated andreceived by Mr Abbott without him losing hitemper, or simply refusing to be drawn intodiscussion of such issues, would necessitatconsiderable awareness and resolve.^ It would necessary for Tom and Jane to be sensitive to thpossibility of an adverse reaction without beinovercome by fear. To achieve this, it would binsufficient merely to keep fear in check. Iwould, instead, be necessary to develop an awareness that the move to Latin America was worthmaking only if their anxieties could be addressedand allayed. Such an orientation does not implyeither an unrestrained expression of emotion oits suppression through rational control: it is nobein g suggested that Tom and Jane simply offload their anxieties and frustrations onto MAbbott, nor that they keep their emotions tightlyin check. Rather, the suggestion is that theoutcome of the meeting with Mr Abbott wasin part, a consequence of the moral space inwhich Tom and Jane were com mun icat ingM oving to an al ternat ive space - com prisinggreater integration, compassion and awareness could have facilitated (but not guaranteed, givenMr Abbott's reputation) a full(er) discussion otheir concerns.


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Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? 459Anticipated criticismsHaving outlines three aspects of empoweringethics - integration, compassion, and awareness which may be incorporated into managerialpractice, we now anticipate some criticismsstemming from the above discussion. We groupthese into three kinds objections to the proposedframework: it is too idealistic; it is incompatiblewith Western values; it involves or promotes atrivialization of what we have termed the ethicof empowerment.a) It is too idealistic. The most immediate reactionmay be that, although emotionally appealing, theframework is impractical. Ideals about compas-sion, etc. have been in circulation for thousandsof years, yet societies are riven by war, unrest,inequality and injustice, business fraud, egoism,materialism and so one (see Small, 1993). Inresponse to this, it may be countered that fewpeople have attempted to put these ideals intopractice, in part because they are dismissed asimpractical; and that those who have done so arerarely a focus of history-book or media atten-tion (Donaldson, 1989). Even ifit is allowed thatsuch ideas are either too demanding or too vagueto get a handle on - which seems to have beenKohlberg's view until a late conversion (Kohlbergand Ryncarz, 1990) - we may ask: what it is thatmakes the ideas demanding and vague? Can thedifficulty be ascribed directly to the ideas them-selves, or does the problem arise, in part at least,from our perception of, and receptivity to, theircontent? A major problem is perhaps that peoplein general, and managers in particular, believein and demand 'quick-fix', painless remediesfor their problems (Littler and Salaman, 1982).Perhaps it is they who are the (unrealistic)idealists?

b) It is incompatible with Western values. Rela ted ly ,Kohlberg's theory, and his formulation of Stage7 in particular, may be criticised for its vague-ness, and for being founded on non-rationalclaims, such as 'feeUng' and 'mercy'. Those whodefend the exclusion of these 'irrational aspects'from debates on morals argue that they provide

an unsound basis for ethical conduct. Forexample. Bailey (1986, p. 201) asserts that

The problem of considering further reasons whyfeelings and other affective phenomena cannotserve any justificatory role in the moral life, or actas any adequate indicator of a person's moral devel-opment, lies partly in the difficulty of classifyingthe great variety of conceptual differentiation inthe affective area.

As we noted in the introduction to this paper, apowerful response to this is made by Gilligan(1982, p. 167) who argues that we can indeeddefine our world and its morality in rationalterms, but that this is inadequate. This view isshared and developed by Carter (1986, pp.4041), who contends that

What Kohlberg provides is considerable assistancein our journey from moral blindness (and insensi-tivity), to a perspective from which one can seewith a bit more clarity whatever is not immedi-ately under one's own nose.Without denying that Western values privilege

the autonomy of Stages 35, its commitment tocritical reason, in the form of the critique ofdogma, also opens up the possibility of chal-lenging the devaluing of Stages 6 and 7. AsFinkelstein (in Barnett, 1985, p. 57) has tellinglyobserved

If American businessmen are right in the way mostof them now live, then all wise men of the ages,all prophets and saints were fools.We are not persuaded that sages can be easily

dismissed as fools. But neither do we believe thatall 'businessmen' can be dismissed as moral defec-tives. We would rather suggest that the partic-ular social structures (e.g. the elevation of marketdiscipline) in which business is currently trans-acted are hostile, or at least unreceptive, to suchteachings (Waters and Bird, 1987; Hosmer,1987). Resistance to 'higher' stages in Kohlberg'sframework is widespread in the workplace, as istestified in the following statement of a formervice president of a large firm:


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460 B. Kjonstad and H. WillmottWhat is right in the corporation is not what isright in a man's home or in his church. What isright in the corporation is what they guy aboveyou wants from you. That's what morality is in thecorporation. (Jackall, 1988, p. 6)In other words, it is widely understood andaccepted that one is free to pursue a postcon-ventional morality at h o m e or even 'in one'schurch ' , but not at work. As a corpora teemployee one may be induced to act at a distancefrom one's personal beliefs. However, thispressure is likely to create tension and frustra-tion (Fromm, 1956), as evident in rising levelsof stress and cynicism (Kunda, 1992). But asidefrom these 'dysfunctions', that might be 'wri t tenoff' as costs, in the form of high turnover orexecutive burnout , it is doubtful whether doing'what the guy above you wants from you' - thatis, complying with 'his ' demands - is necessarilyfunctional in a postbureaucratic climate where aneffective response to the intensification of c o m -petition often requires proactive innovation ratherthan 'mindless' conformity.

c) It trivialises the ethic if empowerment. If s o m epeople regard the ethics of empowerment as tooidealistic, others may see it as trivial. Weacknowledge that there is a danger of repre-sent ing complex and sometimes contradictorypractices of moral reasoning as a series of levelsand stages of moral development . In actuality, aswe have indicated in the Carpenter case, peopleshift within and between levels as they arepositioned within diverse social and organisa-tional relationships. If this complexity is notappreciated, then Kohlberg's theory of moraldevelopment may be vulnerable to appropriat ionas a tool for legitimizing 'progressive' forms ofmanagement cont rol which promote self-discipline rather than compliance with externalrules.Against this risk, we have argued thatKohlberg's theory of moral development isvaluable in enabling us to appreciate a continui tybetween apparently dissonant traditions in a waythat can extend and enrich our understanding ofthe theory and practice of business ethics. Aswith all forms of knowledge, this framework may

become commodified as a 'bible' that demand'brand loyalty' from its consumers. However, thiwould be to interpret Kohlberg's theory of moradevelopment from within level 2, where indviduals are preoccupied with (blindly) complyinwith others' expectations. It should be clear thaKohlberg 's commendat ion of postconventionaethics, as a higher level of moral developmenhighlights the l imitations of simply complyinwith a given authority. Kohlberg's successivat tempts to clarify and refine his theoryincluding his unders tanding of Stages 6 and 7exemplify his own preparedness to engage icritical self reflection upon the adequacy of hiformulations. We regard our at tent ion to Stag7, in particular, as a cont r ibut ion to an on-goinprocess o f dialogue and renewal that, in principlecounters the triviahsation of Kohlberg's ideas.

Summary and conclusionThe emergence of business ethics as a practicaissue, and as a sub-field of management theoryhas brought moral and ethical issues firmly ontthe agenda of management and organizat iostudies. We have argued that in order to advanctheory and practice in this field it is relevant tappreciate how virtually all forms of h u m aactivity, including the sphere of business, argoverned by normative understandings. In almosall human conduct, values are mobilised, moror less consciously, to effect closure on thopenness and indeterminacy of human existenceUnless this is recognised, there is a danger thaonly certain issues are (commonsensicallyregarded as meriting 'ethical ' consideration; anthat these issues then become ghettoised withicorporate ethics departments and within thacademic sub-field of business ethics.Corpora te behaviour has ethical significancnot least because it is intimately involved i"the management of meaning:" (Pettigrew, 1985p. 44) . Once it is acknowledged that most formof business activity and management pract ice arcondi t ioned by normative understandings, thissue becomes: how is normative closure to baccomplished? Should explicit normative regulation be minimised by depending, whereve


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Ethics: Restrictive or Empowering? 461possible, upon the apparent impersonality andimpartiality of the market mechanism? Or shouldit be directed consciously by exercising moraljudgements about what kinds of behaviour areacceptable? If the latter course is favouredwhich seems to be the implicat ion when corpo-rate codes of ethics are introduced to overrideanarchic market principles then it is relevantto inquire into how the realm of the ethical isto be constituted and circumscribed. Is it to beaccomplished by fiat, through the formalizationof codes of conduct? Or is it to be realizedthrough processes of moral formation thatsupport and faci l i tate movement through thestages of moral development identified byKohlberg?

Our argument has been that both responses arerelevant, but that an appreciation of their relativecontribution can be gained from locat ing bothrestr ict ive and empowering ethics withinKohlberg's theory of moral development. Arestrictive ethics one that accepts and enforcesthe constraints of codes of conduct - is of valuein inhibi t ing what Kohlberg terms preconven-tional moral behaviour. It can also provide thebasis for deve loping a postc onv ention al m oralorder in which a mindless or cynical adherenceto ethical codes is replaced by a conscious choicebetween, and commitment to, a set of ethicalprinciples. An empowering ethics activelyencourages moral development as it incorporates,but also extends beyond, the confines of codesof conduct. Conformity to ethical codes is nolonger u nproblematical ly accepted as a 'goo dthing'. Adherence to convention is related to pastand present mobilizing of sanctions that are pro-ductive of expressions of loyalty and obedience.In other words, conformity is placed in doubt bythe suspicion that its appearance may amount tono more than an instrumental or cynical com-pliance with, rather than any deep seated com-mitment to, a particular normative order.In response to this criticism of the limitationsand potential perversity of 'restrictive ethics', ithas been argued by some, often in the name ofethical principles that question the morality ofinfiuencing individuals' personal attitudes butwhich fail to acknowledge its inevitability, thatbusiness ethics do and should seek behavioural

conformity, not moral consent. To those who usethis (seemingly ethical) argument to defend'restrictive ethics,' and to reject the prospect of'empowering ethics, ' we suggest that the onus isupon them to show how their position is ethi-cally tenable in cases where its effect is topromote and legitimise 'bad faith' as personalvalues are routinely subordinated to corporatedemands (e.g. Jackall, 1988). Fu rthe rm ore , andof greater importance for this paper, the onus isupon them to show how a preoccupation withthe contents of moral codes and behavioralcompliance with their demands is consistent withany broader social and organizational objective ofadvancing ethical practice through processes ofmoral development.

Without denying that codes of conduct maybe useful in inhibiting or proscribing behaviourthat is deemed to be morally defective, we haveargued that an unintended consequence may beto weaken an appreciation of the ethics of cor-porate or managerial behaviour. In the absenceof alternative discourse that encourages criticalreflection upon the meaning of ethics, theprospect is for codes to be reified so that com-pliance with their demands is dramaturgical(contrived) and/or is routinely equated withethical behaviour. In other words, a relianceupon codes can actually undermine the capacityof corporate employees, including managers, toengage in moral reasoning that transcends theethical space that is constituted by the code ofconduct . Through the device of the code, themundane is deemed to correspond to, andcomply with, the ethical.^ The risk of foundingthe theory and pract ice of corporate and/ormanagerial ethics exclusively, or even principally,upon codes of conduct is the inhibition of moraldevelopment. It is necessary to move beyond apreoccupation with the development and imple-mentation of codes of conduct if the theory andpractice of business ethics is not to be broughtinto disrepute.As the normative character of business activitybecomes more apparent , corporate employeesand most especially managers are faced with anethical choice. Should they limit the practice ofbusiness ethics to refinement of codes of conductor should this be extended to incorporate post-


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462 B. Kjonstad and H. Willmottconventional moral development? We have sug-gested that there are both ethical and pragmaticreasons for favouring such an extension . Ethically,an extension is defensible because to do other-wise contributes to the unnecessary stunting ofmoral development v^^ithin the workplace.Pragmatically, the development of empoweringethics is more consistent with postbureaucraticforms of organization in which responsivenessand innovation are preferred to predictability androutine.

Notes' T he establishment of the term 'business ethics ' isitself problematic. To cater for the State, voluntaryand non-profit organisations, 'organisational ethics'would be more appropriate (Maclagan, 1992). Inhmiting the scope of this paper, we will lookprimarily on managers and their relationship withethics in the organisation. For us, the term manage-rial ethics signifies the distinctive kinds of dilemmaencountered by managers. It does not signify a typeof ethics that is differentiated from other, non-man-agerial spheres of activity. In principle, we see noethical justification for asserting that ethics is, orshould be vested in the 'role ' rather than in theperson.^ The former course of action is more closelyassociated with the Weberian idea of 'an ethic of them ean ' (Weber, 1978, pp. 38 5-3 86 ). Here ethicalconduct is associated with conformity to whatevernormative order is given, culturally and historically,within a given society or sub-culture. The ethics ofhuman conduct are then evaluated in terms of theircompliance with this (arbitrary) standard. The alter-native 'heroic ethic' involves a process of continuouscritical reflection and 'overcoming' of attachments toestablished, routinised norms and values. Rather thanconformity, it demands 'endless striving'. It is thisprocess of striving which, for Weber, distinguishes thenature of huma n beings whose behaviour* lacksinstinctive programming from other creatures whoselives are events within nature. And it is by engagingthe 'heroic ethic' of str iving to question and gobeyond routine adherence to culturally arbitrarystandards that human nature is most fully realized. Wereturn to this theme in the discussion section of thepaper.* For examp le, De Ge orge (1986 b, p. 430, em phasis

added), amongst others, has argued that "if there to be such a dialogue {between philosophical and regious conceptions of ethics} . . . i t should be pursuon neutral territory. The neutral territory, I suggeis their common ability to reason." By assuming adequacy of his own sense of reason, De Georerects a self-contained rationalistic frame aroun d tstudy of ethics. Feeling may be experienced, but anot considered relevant, because they are placoutside the frame.** W e stress 'allege d' bec ause u niversalistic criteria ainevitably the product of particular cultural traditio' A metap hor sometimes used to convey the devopment of awareness is that of a dusty mirroThrough the dust you can only see a blurred imagbut if you w ipe the m irror, th e reflection w ill clearer, richer. This process of dusting parallels tmovement through the six/seven stages of Kohlbergframework.^ A suspicion that ethical codes act as smok e-screeis perhaps greatest where codes of conduct are leembedded within, and accompanied by, processes moral development that enable employees to undestand and realize the practical, ethical significance aimplications of their actions.

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be restrictive or empowering

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