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CONTENTS

Vol. 16, No. 2: April–June 1984

Nakamura Masanori - The Emperor System of the 1900s

• Kawamura Nozomu - Fukutake Tadashi: Rural Sociologist of

Postwar Japan

• Roger W. Bowen - Political Protest in Prewar Japan: The Case of

Fukushima Prefecture

• John W. Dower - Art, Children, and the Bomb

• Brett de Bary - After the War: Translations from Miyamoto Yuriko

• Jayne Werner - Socialist Development: The Political Economy of

Agrarian Reform in Vietnam

• Laura E. Hein - The Dark Valley Illuminated: Recent Trends in

Studies of the Postwar Japanese Economy

• A. D. Haun - Three Works by Nakano Shigeharu: The House in the

Village, Five Cups of Sake, The Crest-Painter of Hagi, translated by

Brett de Bary / A Review

• Sandra Buckley - Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist

Consciousness in Japan, by Sharon L. Sievers; and The Hidden Sun:

Women of Modern Japan, by Dorothy Robins-Mowry / A Review

• Audrey Kobayashi - Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A

Study of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement by Roger W.

Bowen / A Review

• Kenyalang - The Sarawak Chinese by John M. Chin / A Review

• Brad Geisert - Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and

Political Collapse, 1937–45 by Hsi-sheng Ch’i / A Review

BCAS/Critical Asian Studies

www.bcasnet.org

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CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose

formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979,

but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose

should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of

the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of

our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of

Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their

research and the political posture of their profession. We are

concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak

out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to en-

suring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the le-

gitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We

recognize that the present structure of the profession has often

perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a

humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies

and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confrontsuch problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We real-

ize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand

our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in

scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial

cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansion-

ism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a

communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a commu-

nity for the development of anti-imperialist research.

Passed, 28–30 March 1969

Boston, Massachusetts

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Vol. 16, No. 2/Apr.-June, 1984

Contents

Nakamura Masanori 2 The Emperor Systemof the 1900s

Kawamura Nozomu 12 Fukutake Tadashi, Rural Sociologistof Postwar Japan

Roger W. Bowen 23 Political Protest in Prewar Japan: The Case

of Fukushima Prefecture

John W. Dower 33 Art, Children, and the Bomb

Brett de Bary 40 After the War: Translations from Miyamoto Yuriko

Jayne Werner 48 Socialist Development: The Political Economy

of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam

Laura E. Hein 56 The Dark Valley Illuminated: Recent Trendsin Studies of the Postwar Japanese Economy

A. D.Haun 59 Three Works by Nakano Shigeharu: The House inthe Village, Five Cups ofSake, The Crest-Painter

ofHagi, translated by Brett de Bary/review

Sandra Buckley 63 Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist

Consciousness in Japan, by Sharon L. Sievers,and The Hidden Sun: Women ofModern Japan,

by Dorothy Robins-Mowry/review

Audrey Kobayashi 66 Rebellion andDemocracy in MeijiJapan: A Study

of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement, byRogerW. Bowen/review

Kenyalang 69 The Sarawak Chinese, by JohnM. Chin/review

Brad Geisert 71 Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and

Political Collapse, 1937--45, by Hsi-shengCh'i72 List of Books to Review

Contributors

Roger Bowen: Department of Government, Colby College,

Waterville, Maine

Sandra Buckley: Asian Studies Centre, University of Adelaide,

Adelaide, South Australia

Brett de Bary: Department of Asian Studies, Cornell Univer

sity, Ithaca, New York

John W. Dower: Department of History, University of

Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

Brad Geisert: Departmentof History ,Northwest Missouri StateUniversity, Maryville, Missouri

A. D. Haun: Stanford University, Stanford, California

Laura E. Hein: Graduate student, Department of History,University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

Kawamura Nozomu: Department of Sociology, Tokyo Metro

politan University, Tokyo, Japan

Kenyalang: A student of Sarawak affairs

Audrey Kobayashi: Department of Geography, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec

Nakamura Masanori: Faculty of Economics, HitotsubashiUniversity, Tokyo, Japan

Jayne Werner: Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University,New York, New York

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The Emperor System of the 1900s

by Nakamura Masanori

Introduction

The prewar Japanese state with its emperor system had aset of characteristics not to be found at any time in any other

capitalist country. The absolutist emperor system emergedprogressively, but not full blown, out of the Meiji Restorationafter the suppression of the Movement for Democratic Rights.With the promulgation of the 1889 Meiji Constitution in 1889and the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, it wasconsolidated. Later, following the Sino-Japanese and RussoJapanese Wars, the emperor system transformed itself into animperialist state. Then, during the 1930s, it became, alongwith Germany and Italy, one of the mainstays of the

international fascist movement, thereby dragging the wholenation into the first total war in Japanese history.

That the very same power kept playing so many differenthistorical roles is a rare phenomenon, perhaps without equalin the history of the world. But what exactly did the emperor

system mean for the modernization of Japan? That questionremains a matter of deep concern for the Japanese people, asevidenced by the growing number of historians who areattempting to reassess the entire course of Japan's modernization and have been conducting new investigations into themodem emperor system since the 1960s. For fifty yearsstudents of modem Japanese history have debated the questionof whether the Meiji Restoration should be interpreted as abourgeois revolution or as an emergence of absolutism.Although the controversy is still to be decided academically,it seems safe to say that the scholarly mainstream regards theRestoration as the emergence of absolutist rule.

When it comes to the question of how to interpret theemperor system in the age of imperialism that began in the1900s, this conventional view divides into two schools of

1. Shimoyama Saburo, "Kindai tennosei kenkyu no igi to hoho" [TheSignificance of the Methodology for Studying the Modem Japanese EmperorSystem] in Rekishigaku Kenkyu (July 1966).

thought. One school maintains that as capitalism developedJapan the absolutist emperor system changed itself accordinby acquiring certain bourgeois appearances. Yet the absolunature of the system remained essentially unchanged until Japlost the war in 1945. 2 The other school insists on stressing tthe absolutist emperor system actually transformed itself ia bourgeois, imperialistic power. 3 Further controversy th

arises among historians over the specific timing of that changeUnfortunately, neither view succeeds in grasping the r

historical significance of the modem emperor system. Tformer view, which emphasizes the absolutist aspects of

emperor system, fails to recognize in its theory of the state full significance of a crucial fact: Japan's economic struct

changed over time and acquired bourgeois characteristics.other words, Japanese capitalism completed its industrevolution between 1890 and 1910, and attained the monopcapitalist stage in the 1920s. The latter view on the other ha

pays attention to the transformation of absolutist into bourgepower, but slights the absolutist aspects of the politistructure. Specifically, it fails to offer a convincing explanatfor the fact that the emperor system continued to keep Japanese people under its absolute, un-democratic control uits defeat in 1945. The question I should like to address h

is: how can we overcome the drawbacks inherent in these tviews and formulate an alternative theory of the modemperor system?

2. Hoshino Jun. Shakai Koseitai ikljron josetsu [Introduction to the Thof Transition of Social Formation] (Miraisha. 1969) and Kokka ikoron

tenkai [On the Development of the Theory of State Transition] (Mirai1980).

3. Goto Yasushi, "Kindai tennoseiron" [On the Modem Emperor SystemKoza Nihonshi, Volume 9 (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971) and "KoKenryoku no Kozo ni kansuru shosetsu" [Concerning Theories of the Strucof State Power], in Nihon shihonshugi hattatsushi (Yiihikaku, 1979).

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Establishment of the Basic Organizationof the Emperor System, 1900-1910

Japanese historians have been long accustomed todiscussing the emperor system mainly in relation to the Meiji

Restoration. But when the emperor system first became thesubject of scientific inquiry, during the twenties and early

thirties, it was discussed in close conjunction with the debate

on the strategy for the Japanese revolution then taking placewithin the Marxist camp. At that time the main focus of analysiswas not the power of the emperor system forged during the

Meiji Restoration but rather the imperial power then in theprocess of suppressing the people inside Japan and stepping

up colonial aggression abroad. The 1927 and 1932 Theses of

the Japanese Communist Party called the emperor system into

question not as a power existing in the past era of the MeijiRestoration but precisely as a power existing in the present age

of imperialism characterized by highly advanced monopoly

capitalism.

Discussing the modern emperor system primarily inrelation to the Meiji Restoration abstracts it from its essentialcharacter, however, and is tantamount to defining the emperor

system as the final form of a feudal, absolutist state existingat the last stage of the dissolution of feudal society. Such adefinition implies also that the modern emperor system was

incapable of shedding its basic nature as a feudalistic-absolutiststate, irrespective of the development and the structural changeswhich Japanese capitalism experienced subsequently. Anargument on revolutionary strategy derived from this view

maintained that it would be impossible to advance a thesis of

a two-stage revolution unless the emperor system was defined

as a quasi-feudal, absolutist state. This formulation betrays anattempt to one-sidedly magnify and fix a historical event by

going back to its genesis.Clearly, we need to view the matter from a different

standpoint. Rather than focusing on the emperor system during

the stage when its fundamental structure was in the process offormation, or viewing the interwar period exclusively from theperspective of the Meiji Restoration as has been done

previously, we must approach the question from the reverse

direction and ask: when and how was the emperor system, theobject of analysis of the 1932 Theses, both "formed" and

"established"? Quite unlike the ordinary, commonsense

understanding of the word, "establishment" in this sense doesnot mean that something solid and fixed is brought to

completion. Rather, inherent in the logic of establishment is

the logic of dissolution, for the very manner in which somethingis established has inherent in it the moment of contradiction

which later determines the way in which it is dissolved. Thatis, the manner of the emperor system's establishment

determined the manner of its dissolution and, conversely, thevery manner in which the old regime ended its historical life

and dissolved revealed the basic nature of the emperor systemat the time of its establishment. In other words, the process of

establishment of the emperor system and of its dissolution areclosely related to each other, each illuminating and being

illuminated by the other. Adopting this standpoint shouldenable us to correct the distorted image of the emperor system

which derived from viewing it only from the perspective of

the Meiji Restoration and develop a balanced overview of thehistorical evolution of the emperor system all the way from itsgenesis in the Meiji Restoration to its collapse on August 15,

Japan's military victory in the Sino-Japaneseand Russo-Japanese Wars and the colonizationof Taiwan and Korea represented a significantbreakthrough for the ideology of the emperor

system, which thereafter began spreading andstriking roots deep among the Japanese people.In a sense the emperor system took advantage of

the two wars not only in solidifying the militarymachine-the core of the state machinery-but

also in bringing to completion its dominion withregard to ideology.

I f we take this standpoint and look at the dissolution of

the emperor system as an ancien regime, we must begin byasking the destruction of which component elements of the old

order enables us to say that the system as such came to astandstill. Briefly, the characteristic features of the fall of the

old order can be summarized in terms of the following six areas:

the dissolution of the emperor-led military; the loss of the

colonial territories; the dissolution of the zaibatsu; the landreform; the establishment of the new Constitution; and the

collapse of the ideology of the emperor system. On the level

of the theory of the state there were three decisively importantmainstays of the old order among the above features of theemperor system: the Meiji Constitution, the military and the

bureaucratic apparatuses, and the ideology of the emperorsystem (the ideology of domination typically manifested in the

Imperial Rescript on Education). On the level of the economicsubstructure there were three other mainstays: the old colonial

territories (Taiwan, Korea and "Manchuria"), the zaibatsuinterests, and the parasitic landlord system. This logically leads

us to another set of questions. When and how were these sixcomponent elements of the emperor system formed? And,

given that these six elements did not exist independently of

each other but in certain structural relations to one another,what were these binding relations?

Finding answers to these questions will be of decisiveimportance in identifying the structure which the emperorsystem had in its formative stage. There is not enough spaceto make a detailed examination of this matter, but it seems

clear that the above six component elements of the emperor

system, each structurally joined to the other, formed and tookroot in the period following the Sino-Japanese War throughthe aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, in other words, inthe period from 1900 through 1910. These six componentelements did not stand in parallel with each other at the samelevel: the military machine and soldiers carried the heaviest

weight, playing the role of a link binding the other fiveelements. Moreover, the possession of the colonies pushed themilitary in the direction of becoming a force with a large degree

of independence. More precisely, the colonization of Taiwanin 1895 and Korea in 1910, though having taken place within

an institutional framework in which the prerogatives of supreme1945.

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command was supposed to be inviolable, actually served as acrucial stimulus to the military to grow larger and become acentral political force in its own right. Japan's military victoryin the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars and thecolonization of Taiwan and Korea represented a significantbreakthrough for the ideology of the emperor system, whichthereafter began spreading and striking roots deep among theJapanese people. In a sense the emperor system took advantage

of the two wars not only in solidifying the militarymachine-the core of the state machinery-but also in bringingto completion its dominion with regard to ideology as well.

As for the Meiji Constitution, the fundamental law of thestate which legally epitomized the emperor system, the yearof its promulgation, 1899, marked an epoch in Japan's modemhistory. From that time forward the fundamental shape of thestate was determined, though the Constitution did not actuallybegin to function with political effectiveness until after theSino-Japanese War. In the Diet prior to the Sino-Japanese War,the Government with its fukoku kyohei (enrich the nation,strengthen the military) policy was always fighting fiercely withthe political parties which insisted upon policies of minryoku

kyuyo (store up national power through alleviation of tax

burdens) and keihi setsugen (curtail state expenditures). Theextent of political control at the disposal of the MeijiGovernment was thus very unstable.

What about the parasitic landlords and the zaibatsuinterests which were the class and economic foundations forthe emperor system? The landlord system established itself firstas an integral part of the dominant system of rule, followedby the zaibatsu interests which succeeded in forming Konzerns

in the period between the end of the Sino-Japanese War andthe aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. In this period thezaibatsu interests and the landlords formed a bourgeois-landlordbloc. The fundamental structure of the emperor systemcharacterized by the six component elements mentioned abovecan, therefore, be regarded as having been established duringthe course of the first decade of this century. 4

I f the above analysis of the structure of the emperor systemin its formative stage is correct, then the following questionarises: how to define the historical and class nature of thisemperor-system-dominated state.

In answering this question, it is necessary first to clarifythe characteristics of the Japanese bourgeoisie and landedproprietors who together constituted the class basis of theemperor-system-dominated state, and then go on to discuss thecentral features of the organizational structure of this state asepitomized by the Meiji Constitution.

Economic and Political Composition

of the Capitalist ClassJapanese capitalism simultaneously established itself and

completed its transformation into imperialism in the periodbetween 1890 and 1910. Keeping abreast of this change, thecapitalist class secured the position of an economically

dominant class. Although the bourgeoisie became an econoically dominant class, the specific types of capitalists varifrom one industrial sector to another depending on tdifferences in the modes of capital accumulation. Consequenthere were differences in the relations they had with temperor-system-dominated state power. In order to clar

these differences it is necessary to classify capital into sevetypes and identify the corresponding types of Japane

capitalists as well. Anticipating my conclusion, the kindscapital that existed in the formative period of Japanecapitalism fell into five types: 1) state capital, 2) zaibacapital, 3) spinning interests (bOseki capital), 4) silk-reeliinterests (seishi capital), and 5) weaving interests. s

Japanese capitalism simultaneously established itself and completed its transformationinto imperialism in the period between 1890 and

1910. Keeping abreast of this change, thecapitalist class secured the position of an

economicaUy dominant class.

State capitai consisted not only of "state capital in form of industrial capital" operating in such government-cotrolled enterprises as the Army and Navy Arsenals, steel worrailways and telephone and telegram, but also of special banincluding the Bank of Japan and other kinds of "state capiin the form of loan capital." Throughout the period of

industrial revolution, these various types of state capcontinued to gain in importance. For instance, in mininmanufacturing, and transportation, the share of governmeowned enterprises in the total amount of owned capital areserve fund of both government and private enterpricombined was 29.3 percent in 1897 and 27.2 percent in 19In 1907 the government's share leaped to over 50 percenta result of the extensive nationalization of railways. In bankin

too, state capital loomed large. The special banks' share in total paid-up capital and deposits of special and commercbanks combined increased from 31.4 percent in 1897 to 3percent in 1907. Behind this significant weight held by stcapital lay the fact that private industrialists had been ableaccumulate only insignificant amounts of funds. Second, view of the large risk involved in investment in heaindustries, zaibatsu interests chose not to go into these areInitially the Meiji Government, driven by the necessity compete militarily and politically with the advanced imperiacountries and with the countries of Southeast Asia, pou

4. Nakamura Masanori, "Kindai tennosei Kokkaron" [The State Under the 5. Nakamura Masanori, "Nihon burujoajii no kosei" [The composition of

Modem Emperor System] in Nakamura Masanori, ed. , Taikei Nihon Kokkashi Japanese Bourgeoisie] in Oishi Kaichiro, ed., Nihon sangyo kakumei no ken

[Outline of the History of the Japanese State, Modem Period I] (Tokyo [Studies in the Japanese Industrial Revolution], Vol. 2 (Tokyo DaigDaigaku Shuppankai, 1975). Shuppankai, 1975).

4

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enonnous amounts of government funds into governmentowned enterprises in complete disregard of cost-profit considerations. Thus not only did state capital serve as an importanteconomic base, facilitating the transfonnation of Japanesecapitalism into imperialism, it also provided the essentialmaterial conditions for the bureaucrats of the emperor systemto attain relative autonomy.

The second variety of capital, zaibatsu capital, was

represented by the three largest all-around zaibatsu-Mitsui,Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. These zaibatsu capitalists operatedbasically as family-based and closed consolidations of severalundertakings. Their pattern of accumulation was throughdiversified operations rather than accumulation by way of

specialization in one specific industry. For instance, Mitsui hadthree major undertakings under its direct control: MitsuiBussan, Mitsui Bank and Mitsui Mining, while Mitsubishi hadas its mainstays Mitsubishi Mining, Mitsubishi Shipbuildingand Mitsubishi Marine Transportation.

Zaibatsu capital chose this pattern of accumulation basedon diversified operations because during the time of primitiveaccumulation state capitalism had already inaugurated the keysectors of heavy industry. This pattern of accumulation through

diversification became all the more solid as the sectors ofpolitical and military significance grew larger during the periodof industrial revolution. As a result, with the notable exceptionof mining and shipbuilding industries, the zaibatsu interestswere barely able to hold a grip on the heavy industrial sectors.They had to content themselves with controlling the lightindustrial sectors or the sectors of circulation including banksand trading companies.

In spite of this, the zaibatsu interests succeeded in makingenonnous profits as they managed to coax the emperordominated state into offering them all sorts of protection on apreferential basis. To cite some examples of the privileges theyenjoyed, the business activities of Mitsui Bank in the periodof industrial revolution were sustained by large sums of

borrowings from the Bank of Japan. Mitsui Bussan was ableto carry out business thanks to large sums of government andsocial funds mobilized on its behalf by Yokohama Specie Bank,Mitsui Bank, Daiichi Bank, and Shanghai Bank of Hong Kong.Mitsubishi enjoyed privileges of no less significance. NipponYiisen Kaisha and Mitsubishi Shipyard in Nagasaki were ableto gain huge profits, thanks to preferential measures with regardto fund procurement that were prescribed under the NavigationPromotion Law and the Shipbuilding Promotion Law. In short,the zaibatsu interests were more dependent upon and muchcloser to the state power than other private interests. 6

Third, the cotton spinning industry, along with therailways, was one of the industries that led Japan's industrialrevolution. With exports of cotton yarn surpassing imports in1897, the industry became competitive internationally. As earlyas 1903-04, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, the sixlargest spinning companies had solidly established themselves,prematurely gaining monopoly control over the spinningindustry. The pattern of accumulation in the cotton spinningindustry was characterized by a heavy reliance on externalfunds. Capitalists in this industry met their requirements for

6. Matsumoto Hiroshi, Mitsui zaibatsu no Kenkyu [A Study of MitsuiZaibatsu] (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1979).

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fixed capital (that is, equipment funds) by mobilizing thesavings of merchants and landlords through the medium of

joint stock companies. In the procurement of the liquid capital

(funds for purchasing of raw cotton) they at first relied heavilyon borrowings from banks, but eventually the supply of creditsby trading companies in the fonn of cotton bills became muchmore popular. The excessively heavy reliance on external fundsby the capitalists in the spinning industry meant that they hadto meet heavy interest payments. But they managed to raiseprofits far in excess of that burden through forcing femalespinning workers to do exhausting midnight labor at wages no

better than those paid in colonial India. On behalf of thespinning industry, too, the state devised various sorts of

politically motivated protection, even though these were notso generous as those enjoyed by the zaibatsu interests. Themeasures of protection included exemption from both the rawcotton import duty and the cotton yarn export duty, provisionof subsidies to cargo ships running on the Bombay line undercontract to carry cotton from India, and granting by the Bankof Japan and the Specie Bank of foreign exchange credits forimport of raw cotton and export of cotton yarn and cotton cloth.It is therefore impossible to discuss the rapid growth of theJapanese spinning industry without referring to these measuresof protection offered by the state. 7

7. Takamura Naosuke, Nihon bOsekigyoshi josetsu [Introduction to the Historyofthe Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry, vols. I, 2](Hanawa Shobo, 1971).

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In brief, the electoral system consisted ofdifferent levels of representatives, with town andvillage assemblies situated at the bottom, pro-ceeding up to the prefectural assemblies, thenational Diet and the House of Peers. Theinterests of local men of influence (meibOka) wasits axis and on that basis stood the power of theemperor system with the emperor at the peak ofthe pyramid.

Fourth, the silk reeling industry solidly laid its foundationin 1894, the year in which the production of mill-reeled silksurpassed that of hand-reeled silk. Outstripping Italy in terms

of export in 1905 and China in 1909, the Japanese silk industrybecame the world's largest silk exporter. Unlike the spinningfactories which were run in the form of joint stock companies,the silk mills were either private managements or familypartnerships. The mills were able to meet their equipment

expenses by themselves since the amounts involved were notso large, but they relied on raw silk wholesalers in Yokohama

and local banks for the supply of funds for purchasing cocoons.Such borrowings took up a dominant portion of their liquidcapital requirements. Furthermore, the silk reeling industry wassubject to the control of the American silk fabric industry acrossthe Pacific Ocean. This placed it in the unfavorable situationof being frequently troubled by violent changes in silk threadprice which were out of their own control. Placed in such a

situation, the silk-reeling industry was virtually without anyassurance of making profits on a constant basis. The capitalistsin the silk reeling industry made up for this particular weakness

by forcing the cocoon raising peasants to supply their cocoonsat an extremely low price, and forcing the silk-reeling femaleworkers to do long hours of hard work for little pay. 8

In contrast to the generous measures of protection thegovernment took on behalf of the zaibatsu and the cottonspinning interests, the silk reeling industry had far more limitedand indirect governmental protection. In the period from thel890s through the 1900s, the government policy toward thesericulture industry was centered on the provision of politicallymotivated financing (i.e., financial aid) to the raw silkwholesale merchants in Yokohama. In other words, thecapitalists in the silk-reeling industry were "protected" onlyindirectly in the sense that the wholesalers, supported bygovernment financing, made advance payments to them.

Here we see the difference in the intensity of class unitybetween capitalists in the cotton spinning industry and thosein the silk-reeling industry. The bourgeoisie in the cottonspinning industry reorganized their Federation of Cotton

8. Ishii Kanji, Nihon sanshigyoshi bunseki [An Analysis of the History of the

Japanese Silk Industryl (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1972).

Spinners' Associations in 1888, discarding its former appea

ance as a government-dictated organization and makingappear a more independent and horizontally structur

organization. Thereafter, the Federation served on the one haas a vehicle for implementation of industry-wide labor policisuch as countermeasures against strikes and prevention of

excessive scramble for female workers by the spinning miland on the other hand it functioned as a lobbying organizati

vis-a-vis the government, successfully coaxing it into providithe set of protective policies mentioned above.

In contrast, the capitalists in the silk reeling industry, wh

were mostly small- and medium-sized capitalists located in tcountryside, were unable to organize themselves on

nation-wide scale in this period. Rather it was the Silk YaExporters' Association of Yokohama, an organization of t

raw silk wholesale merchants, that represented the interests the sericulture industry as a whole. In a way this reflects tweaker position vis-a-vis industrial capitalists of the silk reeliinterests, depending as they did upon merchant capital.

The fifth category of capital was the weaving industrwhich we shall touch on only in passing. Except for the limitcases in which cotton spinning companies were also active

weaving and looming operations, these operations were moscarried out on the basis of farming-out by the piece under tcontrol of weaver-merchants. Weaver-merchants direc

rented out weaving materials to loom-workers, paid them atpiece rate, and received the cloth in return. What w

characteristic of the weaving industry, furthermore, was ththese weaver-merchants in turn were more or less dependeupon yam dealers or local wholesale merchants. Because thmembership was composed of different types of traders wvarying interests, the trade associations of weavers lackunity. Accordingly, they did not have much ability to pressuthe state authority into taking important measures on thbehalf. Compared with the capitalists in the cotton spinniand the silk-reeling industries, the capitalists in the weavi

industry were more distant from state power and were ableacquire far less government protection. In that sense, capioperating in the weaving industry was the least privileg

among the five categories of capital mentioned above.We have examined several segments of the Japane

bourgeoisie with reference to the corresponding categoriescapital. Clearly, the capitalists in the various industrial secto

in Japan were far from uniform. Capitalists formed a hierarcin accordance with differences in the pattern of accumulatiin each sector and differences in the degree of governmenprotection each enjoyed. The zaibatsu capitalists stood at ttop, followed by the capitalists of the cotton spinning industnext the silk reeling industry and finally the weaving industrIn other words, the interests of the bourgeoisie were dividalong the borders of industrial sectorse, making it impossib

for the bourgeoisie in these sectors to join hands with eaother across the boundaries of industries and formautonomous class unity of the bourgeoisie as a whole.

Thus, the bureaucrats of the emperor system,implementing policies that reflected the interests of

bourgeoisie, did not have to do anything other than organfrom above the zaibatsu capitalists who stood at the top of

whole bourgeoisie and simply rely on them for full fledgcooperation. As a matter of fact, after the Sino-Japanese Wthe bureaucrats began to solicit the opinion of the zaibataffiliated capitalists by asking them to take part in vario

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governmental consultative bodies. On their part the capitalistsactively began to work upon politicians and bureaucrats throughvarious channels, and to succeed in realizing their interests tosome extent.9

Three such channels linked the bureaucrats and thezaibatsu interests. The first channel consisted of the variousconsultative bodies of the government such as the Supreme

Conference of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry (1896-98)and the Currency System Investigation Committee (1893-95),both of which operated in the post-Sino-Japanese War period,and the Production Investigation Committee (1910-12) whichappeared in the post-Russo-Japanese War period. Zaibatsuaffiliated capitalists were asked to sit in these consultativebodies as influential members. The second channel of

communication between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucratswas provided by such organizations of the bourgeoisie as theJapan Economic Society (1897), the Society of Commercialand Industrial Economy (1900-created jointly by the JapanEconomic Society and the Tokyo Society for Consultation onCommerce and Industry), and especially the Yiiraku Club(1900), an organization of Tokyo-based zaibatsu capitalists.

The third channel took the fonn of "private" and cozyrelationships which business maintained with bureaucrats andpoliticians. These ties became especially important fromaround the Russo-Japanese War as the zaibatsu interests beganto establish, on the private level, relationships by marriagewith prominent politicians-Mitsui with Inoue Kaoru,Sumitomo with Saionji Kinmochi, Furukawa with HaraTakashi, and Mitsubishi with Kato Takaaki-and, on thecollective level, a reliable channel with the bureaucrats in thefonn of the Anko-kai (Anglerfish Eating Club) during the firstKatsura administration and the Unagi-kai (Eel Eating Club)during the second Katsura administration.

In contrast, the cotton spinning interests, the second mostimportant section of the bourgeoisie after the zaibatsu

capitalists, rallied under the banner of the industry-wideassociation of their own, the Japan Federation of CottonSpinners, submitting proposals to and petitioning the government in search of various measures of governmental protectionon various issues. The channel between themselves and thegovernment was not so solid as the ones the zaibatsu interestsenjoyed. The silk-reeling and the weaving interests had hardlyany reliable connection with the government. In addition tothose we have mentioned above, other important associationsof capitalists came into existence after the Sino-Japanese Warsuch as prefectural Chambers of Commerce composed of localmerchants and industrialists and the National Federation of thelocal Chambers. The activities of these organizations, forinstance the submission of various proposals and petitions to

the government, reflected chiefly the interests of the largerbourgeoisie of major urban centers, like Tokyo, Osaka,Yokohama, Kyoto, Kobe and Nagoya. Only the anti-BusinessTax campaign of 1896-97 reflected the interests of the smallerbourgeoisie as well.

9. Nakamura Masanori, "Nihon shihonshugi kakuritsuki no kokka kenryoku"[State Power in the Period of the Establishment of Japanese Capitalism] inRekishigaku Kenkyii, bessatsu tokushu 1970. Yamashita Naoto, "Ni-ShinNichi-Ro senkanki ni okeru zaibatsu burujoajii no seisaku shiko" [The ZaibatsuBourgeoisie and their Policies between the Sino-Japanese and Russo-JapaneseWars] in Rekishigaku kenkyii (November, 1977).

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Strata of Land Owners

Total AmountofLand Numberof

Land Value Value in Thousand Yen Percentage ofTotal LandOwners Percentage ofTotal

More than 100,000 Yen 7,382 0.46 41 0.0006

50,000-100,000 Yen 10,063 0.63 154 0.0023

10,000-50,000 Yen 85,212 5.36 5,208 0.08

1,000-10,000 Yen 503,067 31.63 255,086 38.27

400-1,000 Yen 436,413 27.44 701,709 10.53

200-400 Yen 259,897 16.34 919,144 13.79

Less than 200 Yen 288,328 18.13 4,784,440 71.78

Total: 1,590,362 100.00 6,665,782 100.00

Source: Prefectural Affairs Department, Home Ministry, "Table ofPrivate Landed Property in Each Metropolitan Area and Prefecture," Home Ministry, 1886.

Various sections of the bourgeoisie had their own interestsreflected in. the will of the state in different ways and these

differences formed a multiple-layered hierarchical structure,corresponding to the hierarchical relations among these sections

themselve. The character of the Japanese bourgeoisie thus intum provided a basis for the relative autonomy of thebureaucrats in the service of the emperor system.

There was another economically dominant class with noless significance than the bourgeoisie, the landlords. In the lastdecade of the nineteenth century the landlord class establishedits dominant position in Japanese rural society. 10 Like the

bourgeoisie, the landlord class was internally stratified.According to the 1886 "Survey on Landowners by ClassStrata," made by the Prefectural Affairs' Department of theHome Ministry (see table), forty-one landlords, possessing landvalued at over 100,000 yen, occupied the top of the pyramid.Its base consisted of about 4,780,000 petty land owners withland valued at less than 200 yen. Thus, the farming class hada pyramidal structure.

This hierarchy of land ownership similarly shaped thepolitical order of the village. The various electoral systemsfrom the state level down to the village level show this quiteclearly. Prior to the opening of the Imperial Diet in April 1889,the Town and Village Ordinance was enacted together withelectoral systems for the selection of town and villageassemblymen and assemblymen for prefectural and metropolitan district assemblies. This system of local self governmentaccorded rights of participation in local government only to"citizens" (kOmin). To qualify as a kOmin one had to meet three

10. Nakamura Masanori, Kindai Nihon jinushiseishi kenkyu [A Study on

Landlord System in Modem Japan] (University of Tokyo Press, 1979).

8

conditions: 1) be a male house head over twenty-five years o

age; 2) live in the same town or village for over two yearsand 3) in order to qualify for the rights of suffrage anparticipation in town and village assemblies, pay a land tax odirect national taxes of over two yen. In short, the decisiv

qualification for becoming a kOmin was possession of

significant amount of property.

Moreover, the election of town and village assemblymerested on a system of ranking and dividing electors into twdifferent classes, an arrangement highly advantageous t

owners of large amounts of landed property. The list of electowas drawn up corresponding to the amount of money that eac

paid in taxes. The top group, who paid over one half of thtotal amount of vifllage taxes, were designated as first-claselectors. The remainder were made second class electors. Eacgroup elected one-half of the total number of villagassemblymen. Naturally, only first class landowners coulbecome village chiefs or village assemblymen. Often thesimply sent to the village assembly people directly under theinfluence, thereby further strengthening their own voicevillage affairs.

The qualifications for prefectural assemblymen annational Diet members were extremely favorable to the uppstrata of land owners. Suffrage rights for prefectural assemblymen and metropolitan district assemblymen were given onlto those who paid over 5 yen in direct national taxes, chiefthe land tax. Eligibility rights were given to those who paiover 10 yen in direct national taxes. Both the suffrage aneligibility requirements for the Diet were limited to payers o

over 15 yen in taxes. In 1890, payers of a land tax of 15 ye

were either landed farmers or small landowners owning fieldof about two hectares, so the overwhelming majority of mesent to the first Imperial Diets were landlords, people whosoccupation was agriculture.

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This particular mechanism of electoral representation laybehind the criticism that the early Diets were "landlord Diets."Although we speak of landlord Diets, the House of Representatives actually centered mainly on middle- and small-scalelandlords. The stage for the activities of large-scale land ownerswas the House of Peers, which was composed of members ofthe imperial family, the court nobility, imperial appointees andthose who paid large amounts of taxes. The Peers was the

stronghold of the emperor system.Large landlords entered the House of Peers on the basis

of the "Large Taxpayers Membership System," therebysecuring their voice in the control of national affairs. Thissystem elected one Peer from each prefecture and metropolitandistrict. They were elected by mutual vote from among the topfifteen payers of direct national taxes (both land and income

taxes).In brief, the electoral system consisted of different levels

of representatives, with town and village assemblies situatedat the bottom, proceeding up to the prefectural assemblies, thenational Diet and the House of Peers. The interests of localmen of influence (meibOka) was its axis and on that basis stoodthe power of the emperor system with the emperor at the peakof the pyramid. The power structure established by the ImperialConstitution of 1889 and the Local Self Government Law wasfurther stabilized after Japan's victory in the Sino-JapaneseWar of 1894-95. In particular, the establishment of the SeiyuParty in 1900 allowed the landlord forces to acquire their ownpolitical party and draw close to the bourgeoisie, becomingone wing of the bourgeois-landlord bloc.

Kiyoura Keigo, member of the House of Peers and primeminister in 1924, once remarked that "Although we made agood constitution, the fulfillment of its content is the mainthing. Only after the establishment of the system of local selfgovernment did constitutional politics for the first time comefully into operation."" The landlord class, just like thebourgeoisie, was ranked politically by the size of its landholdings. Mediated by the system of local self-government,they supported from below the rule of the emperor system stateover the localities.

Characteristic Features of the Form of theState under the Emperor System

A distinction between type of state and form of state mustbe made. Generally speaking, the state is above all a politicalorganization of those in possession of the fundamental meansof production, and as such, in any socio-economic formation,is "ordinarily a state of the most powerful and economicallydominant class. This class, using the state as its own means,becomes also a politically dominant class, thereby obtaining

new means for oppression and exploitation of the oppressedclasses." (Marx-Engels Werke, 21. Bd., SS 166-67) Theancient state was basically characterized as a slave state whichwas nothing but a means of exploitation and oppression of theslaves by the slave holders, the feudal state as one based onserfdom, and the modem bourgeois state as a capitalist state(or as one based on wage labor). That is to say, the historical

II . Koshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den [Biography of the Duke Yamagata

Aritomo, Vol. 2, p. 1042.] (Hara Shobo, 1969).9

and class nature of a state is decided by what particular classinterests it serves.

The concept "type of state" points to the class nature of

the state in the sense above, but this is insufficient for clarifyingthe historically specific characteristics of an individual state.For instance, a bourgeois state might take any of a variety of

forms from republican constitutional monarchy, or Bonapartist,to fascist. Just calling a certain state bourgeois without making

any distinction between these various forms makes very littlesense. In making a historical analysis of a state, therefore, itis imperative to pay special attention to the characteristics of

the specific form it takes. What, then, is a "form of state"?The form of state is a concept encompassing the

mechanism by which the will of the state is decided andenforced on the population, and includes the manner as wellas the mechanism by which the population is controlledideologically. In other words, the essential task of the theoryof the form of state is in clarifying which class is in possessionof state power, and what is the specific form by which it

organizes the various organs of the state so as to control thedominated classes. Studies of the emperor system undertakenin Japan have so far failed to realize the importance of this

point and have given rise to unnecessary confusion. Below Iwill present in summary form my interpretation of the historicalcharacteristics of the emperor system.

Japanese capitalism, as explained earlier, established itselfin the period between 1900 and 1910 and at the same timetransformed itself into imperialism. In keeping up with thischange. the capitalist class climbed to the position of theeconomically dominant class, and state policies began to bedevised and implemented faithfully reflecting the interests of

the zaibatsu capitalists who stood at the peak ofthe bourgeoisie.The absence of such a situation prior to the Sino-Japanese Warsuggests that the class nature of the state under the emperorsystem turned into a bourgeois one. But what makes thediscussion of the state under the emperor system difficult is

that even though a change can be seen in the class nature of

the state during the 1900s, a corresponding change cannot beseen in the form of the state that was consolidated with thepromulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1899. On thecontrary, during the same decade of the 1900s the absolutistframework of the state with the emperor at its top became allthe more solid.

Constitutional scholars and historians in this country havelong noted that the political position of the emperor under theMeiji Constitution was immensely strong. To be transmittedalong an unbroken line of succession, the Imperial Throne wassupposed to be sacred and inviolable. Under the prescriptionsof Articles 6 through 16 ofthe Meiji Constitution, the following

powers and functionsof

thestate-which

encompass virtuallyall the essential ones-resided in the emperor in a concentratedmanner: sanctioning, promulgation and enforcement of laws(prescribed for by Art. 6); the right to convene, open, close,suspend and dissolve the Diet (Art. 7); the right to issueextraordinary Imperial ordinance (Art. 8); the right to mandateinjunctions (Art. 9); the right to establish a governmentorganization and to appoint and dismiss civil and military

fficials (Art. 10); the right of supreme command andorganization of the Army and the Navy (Arts. II and 12); theright to declare wars and to conclude peace and treaties (Art.13); the right to proclaim martial law (Art. 14); and the rightto confer honors and orders and to grant Imperial amnesty(Arts. 15 and 16).

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Moreover, the emperor exercised these Imperial powersas absolute and inviolable ones. One thing needs. to be clarifiedhere, the sense in which we mean that absolutism or an absolutemonarchy is absolute. The answer in a word is that an absolutemonarch is absolute in relation to the laws of the state, freefrom any form of legal restraint. There is neither any statemachinery that is not based on his own will nor any that canoppose him. Seen from such a viewpoint, the emperor as

defined by the Meiji Constitution was certainly an absolutebeing. As explained above, the sovereignty resided in him,and the final power of decision on the will of the state belongedto him, as far as the prescriptions of the Constitution wereconcerned. Of course this did not mean that the emperor madeall the decisions himself and acted on his own. In the actualadministration of the affairs of the state, especially in thedecision of the will of the state made under the name of theemperor, both the elder statesmen-who were something likepolitical advisors to the emperor-and the Privy Council-a

consultative body to the emperor-played an important role.The elder statesmen, in spite of the fact that their existencewas not prescribed for by the Constitution, had tremendousinfluence on important governmental policies. They took partin Imperial conferences, held their own meetings, personallyexpressed their opinions to the emperor, and, from time totime, even attended cabinet meetings. In the Meiji and Taishoeras, the elder statesmen had the de facto power to makedecisions on important matters such as declaration of wars,conclusion of peace, and important affairs of personneladministration including appointment and removal of primeministers.

In this way, under the Meiji Constitutional system, thestate policies with the highest priority were made by theemperor and his close attendants such as the elder statesmenand the cabinet, with the Diet having only very limited power.Especially active among other state organs in the enforcement

of the will of the state upon the ordinary people were thephysical means of coercion such as the military forces, thepolice, the court, the prison and jails. All these state organstoo were under the control of the emperor and were called the"emperor's military," the "emperor's police," the "emperor'scourt," etc.

This being the case, it was only to be expected that thestate machinery as a whole, that is to say the composite wholeof these state organs arranged in a systematic and wellcoordinated manner, was strongly absolutist. Moreover, thisabsolutist state machinery grew even more powerful followingthe Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars. For example,the so-called three laws pertaining to civil officials establishedin 1899-the Amended Civil Service Appointment Ordinance,

the Ordinance Pertaining to the Status of Civil Officials, andthe Ordinance Pertaining to the Discipline of Civil Officials

gave birth to powerful legal and institutional barriers againstintervention into the bureaucratic machinery by the Diet andthe political parties.

It was also during this period that the military bureaucratsgained further reinforcement of their relative autonomy.Important indices of this included: the establishment of theNaval General Staff Office in 1893, the institution of thepractice of appointing Army and Navy Ministers from amongofficers in active service in 1900, the promulgation of theMilitary Command No.1 in 1907, and the revision of theOrdinance Pertaining to the General Staff Office in 1908. All

of these were meant to institutionally assure the militarbureaucrats of their political supremacy over the cabinet anthe Diet. These measures of adjustment and reinforcement othe machinery of the military bureaucrats were extended abroafor application in colonized Taiwan and colonized Korea a

well. The emperor system countered the growing clasawareness of the workers and the expansion of political partieinside Japan, and the evolution of the national resistanc

movements in the colonies by means of further reinforcing itabsolutist state machinery.

This leads to the conclusion that although the state undethe emperor system in the 1900s acquired a bourgeois naturekeeping pace with the transformation of Japanese capitalisminto imperialism, the absolutist form of state remained intactA bourgeois state (or a state under the control of the bourgeoisiand landlords) with an absolutist form-that was the historicasubstance of the emperor system at the formative period o

Japanese imperialism.A counterargument might be anticipated, one whic

maintains that, according to conventional understanding of thMarxian theory of state, the form of state is always determinesubject to the concept superior to it, the type of state. I f thJapanese state under the emperor system is regarded as

bourgeois state, its form should also be defined as that ofbourgeois state, or that of bourgeois constitutional monarchyThis is what the conventional theory of state and politicasciences would have us believe. However, in the structure o

the state under the emperor system as it was consolidated inthe 1900s, the form of state and the type of state did nocoincide. On the contrary, and quite characteristically, therwas a divergence between them. This was the undeniablhistorical reality of the emperor system. We are thus obligeto re-examine from a new theoretical perspective the relationship between the form of state and the type of state. In thhistorical case of the Japanese state under the emperor system

the essential choice does not lie between the two alternativesabsolutism and imperialism. Rather, the problem is to clarifythe structure of the paradoxical link between these two, thlink in which the factors of absolutism became more and morconspicuous as Japanese capitalism entered the stage o

imperialism. *

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Fukutake Tadashi, Rural Sociologist of Postwar Japan

by Kawamura Nozomu

Introduction

Fukutake Tadashi, born in 1917, is one of Japan'sleading sociologists. After graduating from the Universityof Tokyo in 1940, he conducted a wartime survey of aChinese village community, resulting in his first majorbook, Chugoku nosonshakai no kozo (The social structure ofa Chinese village community). It was published in 1946

immediately after the war.! In 1948 Fukutake became assistant professor at the University of Tokyo and in 1960 hewas promoted to full professor. Thereafter he publishedmany books including some English editions, of which Man

and Society in Japan (1962), Japanese Rural Society (1967),

and Japanese Society Today (1974) are especially important. 2

Because Fukutake has become the representative fig-ure of postwar Japanese sociology, a close examination ofhis work is instructive. Significantly, the end of a war ofaggression was the starting point of his sociological studiesand his main concern has been the democratization ofJapanese society. As a rural sociologist, he has been concerned primarily with the liberation of tenant farmers whohad long suffered under the domination of their landlords.Although he criticized the semi-feudal systems and supported the modernization of the family and the countryside, he did not believe that social problems in Japan wouldbe solved by capitalist modernization.

In analyzing Japanese society, one must first acknowledge that since at least the tum of the century the Japanesesocial formation has been capitalist. Japan is still the only

1. Fukutake Tadashi, Chugoku nOsonshakni no kozo (Tokyo: Daigado,1946); reprinted in Fukutake Tadashi chosakushu (The complete writings of

Fukutake Tadashi) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1975-76), Vol.9.

2. Fukutake Tadashi, Man and Society in Japan (Tokyo: University of

Tokyo Press, 1962); Japanese Rural Society (translated by R.P. Dore,London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Japanese Society Today (Tokyo:University of Tokyo Press, 1974).

12

non-Western society to have a highly developed capitalisystem, though other countries have achieved some succein following the same road. Yet studies emphasizing thunique aspects of Japanese society, like Nakane Chie'tend to treat the traits of Japanese society, culture anpersonality as if they were ahistorical phenomena, existinoutside the influence of historical periods, geography ansocial classes. 3 In contrast, Fukutake's standpoint is histoical and focuses on the study of the modem capitalist stagof Japanese society.

Unlike advanced capitalism in the West, Japanecapitalism still retains many traditional or pre-modem elments. In Fukutake's scheme of explanation, the "distotion of modernization in Japan" arose from its timingJapan's capitalistic modernization commenced at a timwhen capitalism in other parts of the world was about enter the stage of imperialism."4 According to Fukutakthe people and society of Japan can be measured against aideal yardstick, deviating from the standard. In Japathere has been neither a tradition of free citizens nor aeconomic ethic of capitalism supported by religion, as the West. He notes that in Japan, modernization cannproceed in the same manner as in the West, toward whmight be regarded as a typical civil society. He write

"from the first, Meiji government policies promoted idustrialization and greater production, national wealtand military strength. . . . That this growth was protecteand fostered from the very beginning by the national goernment meant that no truly liberal tradition developewith it. "5

3. See Nakane Chie, Tateshakni no ningenknnkei (Human relationsvertically structured society) (Tokyo: KOdansha, 1968); and JapaneSociety (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).

4. Man and Society in Japan, p. 6.

5. Japanese Society Today, p. 3.

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Fukutake is correct in emphasizing the survival of

semi-feudal elements in modern Japan. What characterized Japanese capitalism in its infancy was that industrialization came "from above," through the centralized power of

national government. Village communities were still aliveand landlords dominated the peasants, utilizing their traditional privileges in the village communities. At the time of

the Meiji Restoration, conditions had not yet matured to a

stage where the dissolution of feudalism and the development of capitalism could proceed spontaneously.

Fukutake agrees that Japan embarked on a process of

forced-draft capital accumulation, which as a result advanced at great speed. The leadersof the Meiji governmentintroduced the modern factory system from the West andestablished governmental enterprises. These were latertransferred to the' control of privileged merchants whoformed zaibatsu, giant family-controlled enterprises. Thefirst burst of industrialization after the Restoration resultedin industrial goods for military use. This sector utilizedmodern equipment from abroad. The second stage broughtthe development of the consumer-goods industries, mainlytextiles. The third stage came with the expansion of heavyindustry in general, during the time of the Russo-Japanesewar of 1904-1905. As Jon Halliday points out, "the extentto which the development of heavy industry was government-led and arms-oriented cannot be exaggerated."6

Fukutake focuses on the backward and distorted nature of capitalism in Japan. In a purely economic sense, as amode of production, it could not form the basis of society.He considers prewar Japan to have been a pre-modernsociety resting on its "old-fashioned" rural foundation. He

points out that Japanese agriculture was still essentially nodifferent from that of the feudal period and "i t is hardlysurprising that the farmers who made agriculture theirlivelihood, and the rural society which those farmers cre

ated, should have been of an old-fashioned character."7The astonishing development of Japanese capitalism,which was supported by the mechanism of cheap rice andcheap wages, also did not confer any fringe benefits butkept Japanese agriculture and "Japanese villages firmlyentrenched in their old-fashioned mould." Fukutake'sview of the development of capitalism in Japan has a number of shortcomings, however, as will become clear fromthe brief survey of the inter-war years presented below.

As capitalism developed, many changes did occur,even in rural society. With the spread of a higher stage of

commodity-based economy, the contradictions betweencapitalist production and the landlord system grew morevisible. First, from about the time of World War I, the

relationship between landlord and tenant began to change.Beginning in 1915 and building into the 1920s, tenant disputes spread throughout Japan. In 1916 and 1917, whenthey were particularly numerous, the government responded with repression; later it combined repression withattempts to adjust rents and establish schemes whereby

6. Jon Halliday, A Political History of Japanese Capitalism (New York:Pan theon Books, 1975), p. 58.

7. Japanese Rural Society, p. 8.

tenants could purchase the land they worked. The Taishoera (1912-1926) saw the rise of a movement for reforminvolving laborers, farmers, students and women, calledthe "Taisho Democracy Movement." The extension of thesuffrage in 1925 was one of its most significant products.

Suffrage, however, was limited to males over the ageof twenty, and the reform was accompanied by restraininglegislation, namely the Peace Preservation Law, which

Fukutake oversimplified the situation by asserting that al l Japanese had a feudal outlook, andthat Japanese society was more or less held together by its traditional culture.

aimed at repressing the socialist movement as well as thefarmers' and laborers' movements. Nevertheless, the widersuffrage, by undermining the basis of the landlords' domination of the village, changed the traditional power structure in rural areas. Previously, voting rights had been confined to males over the age of twenty-five who had residedin an area for two yearsor more and who had paid a land taxor some other direct national tax of more than two yen perannum. Voters had further been classified into three classesfor the municipal suffrage and two for the towns and villages. For example, in the latter category, first-class voterswere those who paid high taxes to towns or villages andcontributed half of the total amount of tax received by the

government. All the rest were in the second class. Eachclass elected half of the total assembly members. Thismeant that a member of the first class could become anassembly member with a very small number of votes.

In 1921, prior to the establishment of manhood suffrage, qualifications for full citizenship status were reducedto the simple payment of city, town or village taxes. Thereby the electorate was enlarged and the system of electoralclasses abolished. Manhood suffrage was implementedstarting with the local elections of 1926 and the generalelection of 1928, when all tax-based qualifications for suffrage were finally removed. These changes clearly reflecteda decline in the power of the landlords in the villages.

By the mid-twenties (late Taisho-early Showa) the

position of landlord declined within the ruling bloc andmonopoly capital became the dominant component.Thereafter the landlord was steadily relegated to the background. The ruling bloc after the Meiji Restoration hadconsisted roughly of government leaders descended fromthe lower echelons of the former warrior class, privilegedmerchants (who later formed zaibatsu), large landowners,the new peerage, and the court supported by the Emperorsystem. Then in the Taisho period, the zaibatsu increased inpower, and party politicians and bureaucrats appeared asnew elements in the ruling bloc. As Japanese capitalismapproached the monopoly stage, the political power oflandlords began to decline.

13

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In Japan, party politics and party cabinets were notproducts of mass movements from below. Rather, theyresulted from the initiative of big business, although parliamentary politics received its main impetus from the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1925. Also, theabolition of county offices in 1926 symbolized the rationalization of administration in the hands of liberal elements inthe zaibatsu and party politicians. In the rural areas, farm

ers of the upper stratum (not parasitic landlords) played amajor role in remolding the social order in the village. Inthe 1920s the reformist elements in big business and thegovernment attempted to resolve, from above, contradictions in the semi-feudal landlord system.

When conditions changed greatly in the 1930s, thereformists had little success. The great depression of 1929

in the United States created a serious agrarian panic inJapan, plunging Japanese capitalism into a severe crisis.Right-wing radicals and young military officers pushed fora "Showa Restoration" in order to implement the idea of"Japanism" as the solution to the crisis. After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, they embraced fascist ideas and tookan anti-zaibatsu, anti-industry, and anti-urban stand. In

Japan the fascists saw no internal means of reforming thedomestic political-economic system. To solve domesticcontradictions they turned outwards, towards aggressionand the invasion of other Asian countries. The fascists'ideology, though it took on the appearance of traditionalagrarian fundamentalism, family-ism, was no mere revivalof traditional values.

Unlike the fascist movements of Germany and Italy,which were supported by the majority of the urban middleclasses, the Japanese movement was supported by members of the rural middle class who directly cultivated theirown land and were active in the producers' co-operatives.Right-wing groups and young military officers claimed tospeak for the farmers and attacked the liberal elements inthe zaibatsu and bureaucracy. Therefore, during the early1930s, some contradictions seemed to emerge between thefascists and the traditional bases of power. But these contradictions and oppositions were purely superficial, or atmost only temporary. Since the beginning of the century,the leaders of big business and the political establishmenthad been concerned about the labor problem and otherexpressions of unrest, fearing a connection with the spreadof socialism and communism. Since there were no means ofresolving the crisis other than through oppressing both thefarmers' movement and the labor movement, and divertingfrustration outwards toward the war of aggression, theconflicts between the zaibatsu and the fascists were, as aresult, minimized. In this respect, they shared commoninterests.

"Japanism" and the myth ofthe Emperor system captured not only the attention of the military officers andright-wing groups, but also of monopoly capital. Traditional and revered symbols were manipulated to mobilizethe people for Japan's great war. Those who would notfight abroad on behalf of monopoly capital were encouraged to do so for the Emperor. Monopoly capital also tookthe initiative in building up the myth of the Divine Emperor, using it for its own profit.

A major shortcoming in the work of Fukutake is now

clear: he failed to perceive and explain the decisive role of14

monopoly capital before the war. He also overlooked thmanner in which the "old-fashioned" system functioned tenhance the political power of monopoly capital. Fukutakoversimplified the situation by asserting that all Japaneshad a feudal outlook, and that Japanese society was moror less held together by its traditional culture. I t seemincredibly naive to suggest that Japan rushed headlong intthe war only because of the lack of individualism, civilia

control or a civic social order. I f this were so, how can wexplain the similarly aggressive wars of other modernizecountries where individualism was held to be a virtue?

Fukutake believed that the major obstacle to thedemocratization of rural Japan was the minutesize of family holdings. The postwar land reformmerely transferred the ownership of land withoutany effect on the size of the holdings. The reform

left untouched the problem of atomized holdings,the cancer of Japanese agriculture.

The Question ofFeudallnftuenceon Rural Social Structure

Japanese imperialism was defeated in 1945 and greachanges took place under the American occupation aftethe war. The main reforms were the introduction of a new

Constitution, a purge of undesirable personnel from publioffice, zaibatsu dissolution (the rebuilding of Japanese captalism), and land reform. The promulgation of a new Constitution demythologized the Emperor, categorically denying him any supernatural attributes and relegating him tserve as a "symbol of the state and of the unity of thpeople." Land reform undercut the foundation on whicthe semi-feudal relationship between landlord and tenanhad rested and tended to undermine the family systemwhich had been regarded as a uniquely Japanese institution

Under these conditions the major focus oftheoreticaattention was on the democratization of Japanese societyAlong with other social scientists, Fukutake engaged i

fieldwork in rural Japan. In 1949 he published his first booon rural Japan which emphasized the importance odemocratization for the rural family and community. "Unless Japanese village society can move toward being truldemocratic," he wrote, "Japanese society will never become a stable democracy. "8 Later, during the rapid growtof the Japanese economy in the 1960s, he also pointed outhat "unless Japanese villages can somehow in the course

8. Nihon noson no shakaiteki seikaku (The social characteristics of rurJapan) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1949), p. 1.

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their transition, move towards a solution of these contradictions, Japanese village society will never become a trulydemocratic society." I t was a matter of considerable concern that "a t present one cannot hold out bright prospectsfor Japanese agriculture and Japanese villages."9 Althoughin both instances he used the same term, "a truly democratic society," his implication changed over the course of

time,as we shall see later.Fukutake believed that the major obstacle to the

democratization of rural Japan was the minute size of family holdings. The postwar land reform merely transferredthe ownership of land without any effect on the size of theholdings. The reform left untouched the problem of atomized holdings, the cancer of Japanese agriculture. At thattime, however, Fukutake believed that Japanese capitalism had already approached the monopoly stage; a movement away from small holdings could be realized, therefore, by socialist cooperation. 10

Immediately after the war Kawashima Takeyoshi published an essay entitled Nihonshakai no kazokuteki kosei(Thefamilial structure of Japanese society) (1946), in which he

argued that the democratization of Japan would fail unlessthe Japanese family system was revolutionized. 11 OtsukaHisao also wrote an article in 1946 entitled "Kindaitekiningen ruikei no sOshutsu" (The necessity of creating themodern civic type of person). 12 He too was afraid that theinstitution of democracy would be like a skeleton withoutany flesh and blood unless the people changed their valuesand gave the reforms spontaneous and voluntary support.He believed that the democratic type of person wouldemerge only when the tenants were liberated from theoppression of the landlords and a full-scale domestic labormarket was created.13

Within ten years, these two prerequisites for democracy were realized, but matters did not move in the direction Otsuka had predicted. He claimed later that he did notvisualize the early-modern European societies as a modelfor contemporary Japan. His earlier writings, he argued,were meant as suggestions on how the Japanese peoplecould assimilate new ideas and have them reflected in theirown behavior.14 Nevertheless, the misunderstandings resulted from Otsuka's failure to address the problem of classcontradictions in modern Japanese society. He did notcome to grips with the presence of big business interestsand the ability of monopoly capital to subordinate stateagencies while at the same time continuing to use theprewar vocabulary, much of which was defined in terms of

the Japanese and their uniqueness.


10. Nihon nOson rw shakaite1ci seikaku, p. 235.

11. Kawashima Takeyoshi. Nihon shakai no kazokuteki msei (Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha. 1950). pp. 24-25.

12. Otsuka Hisao. "Kindaiteki ningen ruikei no sO sOshutsu." reprintedin Otsuka Hisao. Kindaika no ningente1ci kiso (A personal basis for moderni

zation) (Tokyo: Chikuma shooo, 1948).

13. Ibid • p. 16.

14. Otsuka Hisao. "Gendai Nihon-shakai ni okeru ningenteki jokyo"[Social conditions of people in present-day Japanese society]. Sekai, August 1963. p. 108.

Fukutake's failure too lies in his overemphasis on thefeudal elements in modern Japanese society. He arguesthat "individuals can no longer be prevented from havingdesires of their own, but nevertheless the 'ie' and the'hamlet' which required the suppressionof such individuality are still living concepts. "IS Reiterating the same viewpoint, he writes:

The hamlet is still the hamlet. Just as that other important

social unit, the ie, has not disappeared, so the hamlet too,though h eadedfor disintegration, has still not arrived at thatpoint. We have not reached that happy state in which free

individual farmers can cheerfully co-operate with each

other, spontaneously and voluntarily, not as a resultof thepressure ofthe "village community."16

In this context the ie refers to the household community (hiiusgemeinschaft in German), the hamlet (mura inJapanese) to the village community (Dorf-gemeinschaft inGerman). The continued existence of the ie and the hamletdoes not result from any semi-feudal social relationships.The ie and the hamlet of today are not the same ones that

existed under the landlord system in the prewar period.After the war all farmers came to own their land and to selltheir agricultural products. They became commodity producers, even if only on a small scale. As Fukutake notes,agriculture in Japan is carried out by family labor, sincecapitalist farm management by means of hired agriculturallaborers has never developed. Under such conditions the ieand the hamlet will continue to survive, until capitalistagriculture reaches an advanced stageof development. Thecommunal characteristics of the ie and of the hamlet willlast so long as the small family holding exists. The goal is

thus not to encourage further development of capitalism inagriculture, that is large-scale capitalist farming whichwould create only a few large-scale farms at the expense of

most poor farmers. Rather, the goal is the free c0 -

operation of farmers fighting against the oppressive powerof monopoly capital.

In his 1949 book on the social characteristics of ruralJapan, Fukutake draws a distinction between the dOzoku

type of village and the ko and kumi type village, contrastingthe dozoku principle oforganization with the ko-kumi principle of organization. The former is based on lineage relationships and the latter (purposeful association) is based onneighborhood relationships.17 The dOzoku is the lineagegroup of male descent and comprises families branching offthe main parent family. I t takes on a pyramidal structure,typically with the original family at the top, then its branch

families and finally their branch families (from the originalfamily's point of view grandchild-branch-families). Ranking within the dozoku depends upon the antiquity of thefamily's branching and on the directness of its descendents'relat ionships with the original family.

The problem of how the dOzoku can be related to thesocial structure of the village community will be examined


16. Ibid., p. 87.

17. Nihon noson no shakaiteki seikaku, pp. 34 ff.

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later. Here it must be noted that in the prewar period thestudy of the dozoku was the main theme of rural sociology.At that time, studies of the ie and the hamlet were relatedto the ideology of "Japanism." For example, YanagidaKunio, skeptical as to whether imported theories such asMarxism could explain the dynamics of Japanese society,believed that Japanese folklore provided a rich source of

inspiration for the development of indigenous theories. Hisstudies of local customs in various parts of Japan led him toevaluate highly the ability of the ie to perpetuate itself.Already, earlier, he had identified individualism as a deviant form of behavior which served only to undermine thevalue placed on lineage. IS Moreover, the main principle of

the ie was none other than the main principle of theEmperor system. He argued that the nation was more thanthe sum of its individual members, and that the uniquenessof the Japanese ie was rooted in the fact that the Japanesepeople had lived and served the Emperor as the originalfamily for over a thousand years. 19

Yanagida also explored the oyalmta-kolmta relationship in traditional rural society. He distinguished between

concepts such as oyalmta (one who takes the role of thefictive parent) and umi no oya (biological parents). Accordingly, kokata (child) is not necessarily someone linked to anoyakata through blood as is the case with natural parentsand children. Yanagida emphasized that the terms wereoriginally used to indicate the leader-follower relationshipwithin the social unit in which work was organized in theextended family (dozoku). He noted that these fictive kinship ties played an important role in social relationshipsamong households.

Exploring in more detail the structure and functions ofthe dozoku, Aruga Kizaemon developed many themeswhich Yanagida had initially identified. In particular, hedistinguished between the internal and external relations of

the family. He described the distinction as follows:

The system ofthe extendedfamily is characterized by both an

internal structure ofrelationships in which each family mem

ber is connected subordinately to a patriarch and an external

structure according to which each extended family is con

nected subordinately to the head ofthe lineage group. 20

According to Aruga, the major structural feature of

Japanese society was its familial principle of organization.This principle applied not only to the family, but even tothe community and to "the state. " The overriding principleof "concentric hierarchies" meant that each group had itsown subunits oforganization, while also being part of somelarger organization. The Japanese state or nation was seenas being the ultimate unit of organization, the Emperorserving as the patriarchal head of the national family. Justas the relationships between members of the family were

18. Yanagida Kunio, Noseigaku (Agricultural administration), 1902-1905, in Yanagida Kunio Shu (The writings of Yanagida Kunio), Vol. 28(Tokyo: Chikuma shobO, 1962), p. 195.

19. Yanagida Kunio, lidai to nOsei (The Age and Agriculture), inYanagida KunioShu . Vol. 16 (Tokyo: ChikumashobO, 1961), p. 39.

20. Aruga Kizaemon, Nihon kazokuseido to kosakuseido (Japanese FamilySystem and Tenant System), (Tokyo; Kawade shobO, 1943), p. 722.

hierarchical, so too were relations between main anbranch families or between the Emperor and "hpeople. "2 1

Aruga 's belief in the importance of a peculiarly Japanese national character can be seen in the following passage

Though I do not deny the existence ofsocial classes in Japan

I believe that the Japanese have a consciousness somewha

different from thatfound in the West. Western social organization is based on the individual and has developed alon

horizonta l lines. For example, the political system revolve

around the interaction among representatives from eac

social class. Japanese social organization, however, i

based upon the vertical or hierarchical links betwee

oyakata and kokata or between main and branch familie

within the dOzoku. 22

Thus Aruga attacked the Marxist theoryof class struggle and lauded the Japanese national character during thPacific War, a time when the state was brutally suppressinclass struggle and Marxist theory. On one point Aruga'offensive against left-wing scholars is well-founded. H

criticized the Marxist theorists who defined a nago (a kinof kokata) as a serf, and saw the labor performed for myosh

(a kind of oyakata) as being equivalent to labor rent. ThMarxists believed that in Japan too, the forms of the feudarent developed sequentially as labor, product, and finallmonetary rent. Aruga pointed out that the labor of nag

was not the corvee of feudal Japan. The labor of the nagwas not a feudal labor rent but a form of the kolmta

household labor for the oyalmta within the extended familsystem.23 Of course, he argued that these social relationships between the oyakata and kolmta were merely manifestations of the Japanese national character. In statementbased on historical data, Aruga was more carefully qualified, noting that the independence of subordinate nago o

kokata was the major characteristic of feudal TokugawJapan (1603-1867).

Aruga mustered a considerable amount of empiricaevidence to demonstrate that the oyalmta-kolmta relationship within the large extended family was carry-over fromearlier times and existed as such before the small landholding families gained their independence. Yet he exaggeratethe nature of oyakata-kolmta relationships before the feudaTokugawa era and gave ideological support to such relationships by claiming that they were the essence of Japanunchanging national character. In this regard, then, haligned himself with ultra-nationalism as defined by thpeculiar intellectual milieu of the 1930s and early 194Os.

Fukutake, on the other hand, assumed a coincidencbetween ranking based on descent and ranking based oeconomic standing, and argued that the dozoku type ovillage developed into the ko-kumi type. The dozoku hasignificance only when the ranking of its descent relationships was supported by real economic power, and paraleled by landlord-tenant relationships. Only in this cas

21. Ibid., p. 726.

22. Ibid. , p. 323.

23. Ibid., p. 612.

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could the original family exercise strong control over all theother members of the group. But even in the feudal era,that was very rarely the case. More often the original familywould fall into decline and its branches would becomemore powerful.

Fukutake later modified his typology, noting that "the

dozoku group centered on a cultivating landlord could

hardly be said to be typical of the modem period whenJapanese agriculture was characterized by the parasiticlandlord system. "24 But, he continued to argue, "the

dozoku group is, however, undeniably important as a basicpattern for the social structure of Japanese villages."25 He

admitted that the dozoku groups had been developed alongwith the cultivating landlord system at the end of the feudalera, and not with the parasitic landlord system in modem

Japan. As noted earlier, the typical dozoku groups were notfound in the feudal era when the oyakata's extended familyhad dissolved and most kokata-peasants became independent. The dOzoku groups under the cultivating landlordwere not a prototype but were only seen in the late developed areas where a cultivating landlord happened to

ensure his agricultural labor force through oyakata-kokatarelationships. So Fukutake admitted that "even where theywere typically found it was, in fact, fairly rare for there to

be an orderly pyramid of an original stem family, stemfamilies and branch families left intact. "26 Therefore, inthe more advanced areas, the absence of such oyakata

kokata relationships was typical by the Meiji era.Concerning this typological dichotomy, Isoda Susumu

tried to draw a distinction between the family-status typeand the non-family-status type villages. 27 He establishedthese two types in a contemporaneous rather than historical way. Under the landlord system in modem Japan, thedeterminant of family status was not descent, but landownership. Therefore the non-family-status type village

was usually found in the mountain and fishing villageswhere the differentiation of arable land ownership wasundeveloped and big landlords were absent. Unless thevillage community invariably has a hierarchical structure,the direction of development from dozoku to ko-kumi is verydoubtful. The dozoku type and ko-kumi type of villagescould exist side by side in the same historical period. On

this point Fukutake was theoretically confused. 28

Fukutake on Japan's Postwar Democratization

As mentioned previously, immediately after the warFukutake argued that the democratization of rural Japanwould be possible only through socialist co-operation be

tween farmers. Awaiting socialist democratization, he wasskeptical of capitalist modernization. In his later books,

24. Nihon noson no shakaiteki seikaku. p. 40.

25. Japanese Rural Society. p. 66.

26. Ibid., p. 65.

27. See, Isoda Susumu, (ed.), SonrakukOzo no kenkyu (A study of villagestructure), (Tokyo: Tokyo Dai gaku shuppankai, 1955), chap. 1.

28. See, Kawamura Nozomu and Hasumi Otohiko, "Kindai Nihon niokeru sonrakukozO no tenkai katei" (The development process of the

village structure in modem Japan), Shiso. May-June , 1958.

however, he altered his position and supported the policiesof the government designed to promote "modernization"and "rationalization" of agriculture by the removal of parttime farmers.

The overall defect of Fukutake's sociologicaltheories is his underestimation of the oppressivepower of monopoly capital. The basis of the antidemocratic elements in Japan is none other thanbig business. For the democratization ofJapanesesociety, it is more important to fight capitalisteconomic and social development in the interestsof the profits of big business than it is to eradicatethe survival of pre-modern elements in familiesan d villages.

Under rapid economic growth, agriculture ceased tobe the main stream of economic development. Farmerswho could not maintain their livelihood by agriculturealone became part-t ime farmers, and the agricultural laborforce came to consist increasingly of women and old men.In order to rescue agriculture, Fukutake demanded structural reform: "if a decline in the agricultural populationmeans a decrease in the number of farms and an expansionin the average size of holdings, this is something very much

to be desired from the point of view of agricultural development. "29 The problem, according to him, was that adecrease in the agricultural population did not necessarilyimply a decrease in the number of farming households. Inthis sense he supported the Basic Agriculture Lawof 1961,

the preamble of which states:

It is a duty springingfrom our concernfor the public welfare,

and a necessary complement to the mission of agriculture

and agriculturalists in our society, to ensure that those

disadvantages resulting from the natural, economic and so

cial limitations ofagriculture are corrected, to promote the

modernization and rationalization of agriculture while re-

specting the free will and initiative ofthose engaged in it, and

to ensure that the nation's farmers can enjoy a healthy andcultured livelihood not inferior to that of other members ofthe population.30

In line with the Basic Agriculture Law, the government has since implemented the Structural Improvement


30. "Nogyo Kihonho" (Basic Agriculture Law), 1961, in The Commission of Inquiry into the Basic Problem of Agriculture, Forestry andFisheries, (ed.), Nogyo no kihonmondai to kihontaisaku (Basic problems andbasic policies of agriculture), (Tokyo: Norintiikei kyiikai, 1961).

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Table 1.

Numbers of Fann Households by Full-time and Part-time Status

Year Full-Time Part-Time Total Numbers of1st class 2nd class Households

(%) (%) (%) (%) (1,000)

1950 50.0 28.4 21.6 100.0 6,176

1955 34.8 37.7 27.5 100.0 6,0431960 34.3 33.6 32.1 100.0 6,0571965 21.5 36.7 41.7 100.0 5,6651970 15.6 33.6 50.8 100.0 5,402

1975 12.4 25.4 62.1 100.0 4,9531980 13.4 21.5 65.1 100.0 4,661

Source: Agricultural Census of each year, c ited from Norintokei (Agriculture and Forestry Statistics) (Tokyo: Norintokei kyokai, 1982), p. 123.

Program. Poor farmers and part-time farmers have protested, believing this program to be a program for pushingout the poor farmer. Fukutake did not see it that way."These moves cannot simply be dismissed," he said, "asthey frequently are by some critics, as ' the policy of wipingou t the poor farmer.' "3 1 According to Fukutake, even i fpart-time farmers with tiny holdings had farmed co

operatively, little progress would have been achieved. TheStructural Improvement Program was open to criticismbecause it contained no provisions for aiding the migrationof poor farmers. "What is necessary," he stressed, "is thatthe poor part-time farmers should be, not wiped out, butmade able to transfer to some other occupation withouthardship or insecurity. "32

Fukutake failed to consider whether in fact the capitalist system is able to transfer these poor farmers to otheroccupations without creating hardship. Did he really expect conservative politicians closely aligned with big business to do anything of the kind? The ideal of a smoothtransition contrasts sharply with the reality of the dekasegi

(seasonal workers from poor agricultural households).

Clearly, the nature of the co-operation he expects haschanged from a socialist orientation to a capitalist one.Co-operation among poor farmers is rejected, and c0

operation among the upper stratum of farmers after thepoor part-time farmers are "transferred"- no t "wipedout"- to other industries is considered the only means tosolve the present stagnation in agriculture.


32. Ibid.

However, the real changes did occur in a way differefrom Fukutake's expectations. For example, the total numbe r of farm households decreased from 6,176,000 in 1950

4,661,000 in 1980. In addition, between 1950 and 1980 tratio of persons engaged in agriculture (including forestand fishing workers) to the total work force decreased fro44.6 percent to 9.8 percent. But such changes did not crea

favorable conditions for agriculture. Statistics show ththe number of part-time farm households increased fro50.0 percent of the total in 1950 to 86.6 percent in 198Especially those who had mainly engaged in other occuptions (the second class part-timers) increased from 21percent in 1950 to 65.1 percent in 1980 (see Table 1).

Thus most farmers who cannot maintain their livehood solely by agriculture do not abandon their farminbut become part-time farmers. Of course, some smfarmers do resign from agriculture. As shown in Table the actual numbers of farmers who cultivate land of lethan one hectare decreased from 4,420,000 in 1950

3,157,000 in 1980, and the total numbers of farmers dcreased from 5,931,000 to 4,496,000 in the same peri

(from these figures the Hokkaido district is excluded bcause of its specific agricultural conditions). The numbeof relatively large farmers who cultivate more than thrhectares increased slowly from 27,000 in 1950 to 105,0001980. Nevertheless, one cannot conclude from such dathat a real tendency towards capitalist agriculture existsJapan. During the 1950s, farmers who cultivated less thone hectare of land decreased while cultivators of betwe1.0 and 1.5 hectares increased. But in the 1960s and 197the latter began to decrease, and in the 1970s only farmewho cultivated more than 2.5 hectares increased. On tother hand, the ratio of farmers who cultivated less th

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one hectare decreased only from 74.5 percent in 1950 to farmers of the upper stratum might occur regardless of

70.2 percent in 1980. That is, in 1980, only 4 percent of all their co-operation. But, since it is impossible to transferfarm households, or only 187,000 out of a total 4,4%,000, them and since they should not be "wiped out," they havehave favorable conditions for the development of fanning. to be protected and guaranteed as stable small farmingNonetheless, they have little opportunity to expand their enterprises. Through the stabilization of their production,farming by purchasing or borrowing land from small they could co-operate spontaneously and move towardfarmers. non-capitalist large-scale farming.

Fukutake thinks that the problems of Japanese agri From such a standpoint, Fukutake has attacked theculture derive from the small sizeof family farming. There left-wing parties for their "formalistic" policies, saying thatfore he supports policies which promote the migration of "the left-wing part ies have succeeded in making only a verysmall farmers from rural areas. He considers that further weak impact on the farmer and their policies are highlycapitalist development of agriculture could solve the pres formalistic and lacking in appeal." According to him, whenent crisis of agriculture in Japan. But, as we have seen the socialist and communist parties attack the governabove, under the control of big business which supports the ment's policy of improvement of the agrarian structure asliberalization policies of agricultural products, agriculture "wip ing out the poor farmers," or when they talk of coitself faces great difficulties. The crisis of agriculture in operative management as the solution to the problems of

Japan is the crisis of the small farming enterprise. If , as the disintegrating intermediate stratum, they can hardlyFukutake mentions, the smooth transfer of small farmers expect to win the confidence of fanners who vote for theto other occupations was possible, then the development of Liberal Democratic Party. He claims that, by the standards

Table 2.

Fann Households by Scale of Cultivated Land

1950 1955 1%0 1965 1970 1975 1980

(Hectares) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) (1,000)

Under 0.5 2,468 2,285 2,275 2,0% 1,999 1,984 1,848

0.5-1.0 1,952 1,955 1,907 1,762 1,604 1,436 1,309

1.0-1.5 945 981 1,002 945 868 727 660

1.5-2.0 363 376 404 407 404 349 327

2.0-2.5 132 147 156 170 162 163176

2.5-3.0 48 54 59 71 74 82

3.0-5.0 26 28 34 36 55 67 905.0- 1 1 2 2 5 9 15

Total 5,931 5,806 5,823 5,465 5,174 4,818 4,4%

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Under 0.5 41.6 39.3 39.1 38.4 38.6 41.2 41.1

0.5-1.0 32.9 33.7 32.7 32.2 31.0 29.8 29.1

1.0.:...1.5 15.9 16.9 17.2 17.3 16.8 15.1 14.7

1.5-2.0 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.4 7.8 7.2 7.3

2.0-2.5 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.63.0

2.5-3.0 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.83.0-5.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.0

5.0- L 0.1 0.2 0.3

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 1 ~ . 0 100.0 100.0 100.0,"

Source: Agricultural Census for each year, cited fromNorinlou; (Agriculture and o r e s t d ~ t a t i s t i c s ) (Tokyo: Norintokei kyokai, 1982), p. 125.

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Table 3.

The Class Structure ofJapan

(in percent)

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Capitalists 1.9 2.0 2.7 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.7

Persons in security services 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4

Self-employed proprietors 58.9 53.2 45.7 38.3 34.8 29.4 27.3

Agriculture, forestry and fishing 44.6 37.7 30.6 23.0 18.1 12.7 9.8

Mining, manufacturing, transportation and communication 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 7.3 6.8 6.7

Sales 6.2 7.0 6.2 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.7

Services 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.6 2.7

Professionals and specialized technicians 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4

Working class 38.2 43.6 50.5 56.9 60.1 65.0 66.6

Salaried employees 11.9 12.5 14.2 17.0 18.7 21.9 23.3

Productive workers 20.0 22.4 27.8 29.2 29.6 28.7 28.5Nonproductive workers 4.3 6.8 7.8 9.3 10.5 12.2 12.4

Unemployed 2.0 1.9 0.7 1.4 1.3 2.3 2.5

Source: Cited from Fukutake, Japanese Society Today, p. 26. Data of 1975 and 1980 are added from the Census of each year.

ofthe advanced countries, the "poor-farmers" ofJapan areby far the worst off; and that even the "upper stratum" of

farmers must co-operate if they are to have any future. 33

He places priority, however, on the co-operation of upperstratum farmers over that of "poor farmers." Fukutakeadvises the left-wing parties that "when it becomes clearthat the hopes of progress by individual management areillusory and if, at this time, the radical parties can offerconcrete plans to substitute for that illusion, then and onlythen can one expect any new developments in the farmers'political attitudes. "3 4 Fukutake's conclusion is that theright to co-operate is reserved for farmers of the upperstratum. In Japanese Society Today (1974), he also arguesthat agriculture cannot be saved unless some measures aretaken to enable large numbers of people to leave the farmsand to develop a system which promotes some form of

co-operation among those families that remain in agricuIture.35

Once again he reveals the illusion that the policy oftransferring farmers to other occupations without risk ofunemployment can indeed be successfully implemented.Fo r example, he criticizes the Socialist Party for its weak

response to the needs of farmers, and for its protesagainst the conservatives' policy of discarding poo

farmers, but he fails to offer any practical alternative. Hmerely writes that "the socialists should have foreseechanges in the structure of rural society, and should havassured farmers that unlike the government party it woulfind ways to create employment opportunities for them sthat even if they left the farms they could get jobs withouhaving to worry. "36 According to Fukutake, the reformist"conservatism" is far worse than the conservative"reforms. "

Yet, Fukutake acknowledges that governmental agricultural policies are fundamentally adapted to the inteests of big business. He points out that although the LiberDemocratic Party has been at great pains to speak of thneed for modernizing agriculture and to stress its determ

nation not to sacrifice the farmers' interests, "nationpolicies are in essence always attuned to the interests of bbusiness and when they speak of consideration for agricuture and for farmers there is always the proviso: in so far athis does not clash with business interests or hinder thedevelopment. "37 Acutally Fukutake himself emphasizethe need for modernizing agriculture and calls on the na

33. Ibid., p. 221.

34. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 143.

35. Japanese Society Today, p. 50. 37. Japanese Rural Society. p. 195.

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tional government to "wipe out" the poor farmers fromrural areas, not in the interests of big business, but for thesake of the farmers themselves.

Fukutake describes the class structure of Japan todayas comprising a handful of capitalists, an old middle class ofindependent proprietors (mainly farmers and shop owners), the new middle class (consisting of a small number ofservice workers and specialized technicians), and finally

the working class which includes salaried workers (seeTable 3).

Table 3 also clearly reveals a steady decline in selfemployed proprietors. By 1980 the proportion of farmershad fallen to less than 10 percent. However, the workingclass had come to occupy two-thirds of the total. From thepoint of view of class rule, the capitalist's domination of theworking class is equally clear. In Japan as well as otherindustrial societies, the capitalists and top managers of

large corporations, who ally themselves with politiciansand high-ranking bureaucrats, have become the rulingclass. Thus Fukutake writes,

The roughly 100 Japanese corporations capitalized at one

billion yen or more constitute no more than 0.1% of allenterprises, but own half the total capital. Moreover, thegreater part of industry is virtually controlled by a few giantenterprises. The large number of small enterprises and thehigh degree ofmonopoly control are two striking features of

Japanese industry. It is those who control the giant enter-prises that run Japan.38

As Fukutake admits, the national government is controlled by the power of monopoly capital, and the dictatesof capital are given priority over social welfare. The"miracle" of rapid economic growth since 1960 has depended among other things on immense environmentaldestruction. Such serious problems as pollution, traffic

congestion, population imbalance, income inequality, destruction of agriculture and small enterprises, and socialtension are all the direct results of a deliberate policy whichthe government adopted for capital accumulation, and notthe unavoidable "by-products" of technological development. In fact, economic policies catering to big businesshave increasingly destroyed the livelihood of many people,and the national and local "development" plans havethrea tened the survival of communities and exploited theirinhabitants' land, labor and lives. I f this is true, how canFukutake look so favorably on the conservatives'"reforms"?

In the period immediately after the war, "modernization" was seen as equivalent to democratization, although

the conservative government and big business were alwaysopposed to "modernization" that aimed to expand the civilliberties and rights of the people. Since the early 1960s, theterm "modernization" has been appropriated entirely byconservative ideologues in order to sell their own policiesfor economic development. In Fukutake's case, "democratization" initially meant the movement toward "socialism" or "socialization," but later it came to mean the

process of "capitalization" and, in this sense, "modernization" in its more recent usage. This corresponded to thenational policy of dedication to building up an extraordinarily high rate of economic growth. As the original goal of

"democratiza tion" was buried in oblivion, Fukutake's owndefinition of it also changed.

Fukutake altered his position after the tension generated by the AMP039 demonstrations of 1960 had

receded. At that time a growing concern with "modernization" was evident. While serving as the American Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer was active in propagating "modernization theory" as a counter-model to offsetthe influence of Marxism and socialism. "Modernizationtheory" was born out of an ideological competition inwhich two parties claimed that they were the true interpreters of the Japanese experience. Within this framework, it isno t surprising that Reischauer's activities have been referred to as the "Reischauer offensive" by Japanese intellectuals on the left. The design of this "modernization"approach was succinctly stated by Princeton historian,Marius Jansen:

...the important thing is that people read, not what they

read, that they participate in the generalized function ofamass society, not whether they do so asfree individuals, thatmachines operate, not for whose benefit, and that things

are produced, not what is produced. It is quite as "modem"

to make guns as automobiles, and to organize concentrationcamps as to organize schools which teach freedom. 40

In this statement three basic characteristics of the"modernization" approach stand out: the belief in progress, the belief in rationality, and the normative judgmentthat mechanization or industrialization is good. The scholars adopting the "modernization" approach tried to sum upJapan's experience in terms of a model characterized by

gradual and non-revolutionary development along capitalist and even "democratic" lines. In Japan, this approachwas quickly adopted by sociologists of the functionalistschool. For example, in 1964 Tominaga Ken'ichi wroteShakai hendo no riron (Theories of social change), in whichhe used the vocabulary of Parsonian "system theory" tocriticize Marxist theories of social change. The varioussocial problems and contradictions resulting from Japan'srapid development he dismissed as minor and temporaryaberrations which simply represented the "time lag" bywhich "social development" followed economic development. He optimistically claimed that this temporary dislocation would disappear as soon as "social development"caught up with economic development.41

Fukutake's viewpoint is, of course, different from such

39. AMPO refers to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In 1960 there weremany demonstrations against the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,and the ensuing mass demonstrations brought down Prime Minister KishiNobusuke's government.

40. M.B. Jansen, "On Studying the Modernization of Japan," Asian

Cultural Studies, no. 3 (October, 1962), International Christian University, Tokyo, p. 10.

41. See, Tominaga Ken'ichi, Shakai hendO no riron (Theories of social38. Japanese Society Today, p. 27. change) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1964).

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"modernization" theorists. But his stance is ambivalent.On the one hand, he stands against the rule of monopolycapital and government which speaks in favor of its interests. On the other hand, as in the case of the StructuralImprovement Program of Agriculture, he actually supportsthe modernization and rationalization policy at the cost ofpoor , part-t ime farmers' interests. Fukutake dreams of theconstruction of a new type of community combining agri

culture and industry into one entity. For rural society tomove toward the development of new communities, themajority of the poor, part-time farmers must make a complete break with farming.

In Japanese Society Today, Fukutake stresses the im-portance of social welfare and writes that "the level ofsocial welfare must rise even at the sacrifice of growth in theeconomy." He concludes that "Japan must become a society which truly guarantees to everyone, whether he canwork to his fullest capacity or is unable to work, 'a healthyand cultured life.' "4 2 The goal is admirable, but how canwe attain it without controlling the great power of bigbusiness? The overall defect of Fukutake's sociologicaltheories is his underestimation of the oppressive power of

monopoly capital. The basis of the anti-democratic elements in Japan is none other than big business. For thedemocratization of Japanese society, it is more importantto fight capitalist economic and social development in theinterests of the profits of big business than it is to eradicatethe survival of pre-modern elements in families and villages.

Conclusion

Japanese society today is capitalist society. As capitalist countries, the United States, West Germany and Japanare similar, but of course every modem capitalist societyhas its own character, historical traditions, political process, and indigenous elements which are neglected when wetalk about capitalist society in general. Modem society in

Japan has different cultural traditions from modem Western societies. As a historical fact, capitalist society firstappeared in Western countries, and since these countriesshared common Mediterranean cultural traditions the ini-tial formulation of the theory of modernization tended toignore the experiences of non-Western societies. One result is that people have tended to confuse modernizationand Westernization. In Japan, indigenous elements haveoften been regarded as deviations or distortions-aberrations not in keeping with the main course of modernization.

On the other hand, Japan as a late-developed capitalist country has retained many pre-modem and communalrelationships in families and communities. Traditionalvalues which emphasize communal interests are preservedin the everyday life of the common Japanese. This culturaltradition originates from actual realities of centuries ofcommunal life in the small household enterprises. Thus onecould claim that further capitalist development should beencouraged. Also one could idealize the model of Westernadvanced industrial societies and encourage Japan to strivetoward this ideal. But further "modernization" or "ration

42. Japanese Society Today, p. 153.

alization" in Japan would not resolve contradictions andproblems in Japanese society today. Japan, as well as manyother Western countries, has faced many difficulties whicthe capitalist system itself has initiated. The dominance omonopoly capital has brought disastrous situations for thJapanese people. "Modernization" policies aim not to dis

solve feudal or semi-feudal relationships but to reorganizthem and facilitate the rule of monopoly capital.

The main obstacle to democratization in Japan is nothe existence of small household enterprises but big monopoly capital. In order to realize a new egalitarian humasociety in which each individual can freely develop his oher potential and attain self-realization, the power omonopoly capital must be abolished. Exactly this is whaFukutake fails to posit in his theoretical frame of reference

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Political Protest in Prewar Japan: The Case of Fukushima Prefecture

by Roger W. Bowen

Just over one hundred years ago "modern" Japan

experienced its first non-samurai-Ied political protest whichchallenged the legitimacy of the Meiji State. The event isknown as the Fukushima Incident, taking its name from theprefecture in which it occurred. In Fukushima in 1882,thousands of farmers, teachers, priests, businessmen, local

government officials, and craftsmen, affiliated with or belonging to the new Liberal Party (Jiyuto), organized tax boycotts,

anti-labor conscription movements, anti-government rallies,

court litigations, petition campaigns, and finally massiveprotest demonstrations before eventually being brutally suppressed by the government. The basic issue which they sofervently contested was the central government's presumedright to determine local taxation, roadbuilding and administra

tive policies. Acutely aware that Tokyo's powers if leftunchecked could do serious harm to the interests of the landed

and commercial elites of the prefecture, these same elitesassumed the leadership roles in the Incident. The couched theirgeneral demand for greater powers of self-government in therhetoric of natural rights.

Man is a creature deriving freedom from heaven. Hetherefore has the rights of freedom. On this depends his

happiness. Whenhe

loses his rights he cannot secure thesafety of his life or his property; he cannot have nor enjoyprosperity; it does not take a scholar or a genius to knowthis . ... To protect our [natural] rights we need [legal]rights in our country and in our society.

More than six decades passed before language remarkablysimilar to the above words was incorporated into Japan'spostwar constitution drafted under American aegis. Today,

I. Quoted in Roger Bowen, Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 227.

23

nearly forty years later and over a century after the FukushimaIncident, thousands more Fukushima citizens are fighting to

secure, in the words of their forebears, "the safety of ... lifeand ... property." The issue has changed, however. Todaythey are protesting the construction of several nuclear powerplants in their prefecture. But the older themes of center versusperiphery, and safety of person and property, are still beingechoed. Said one protester:

Let me teach you something good. Electric power used inTokyo is not generated in Tokyo. The noise and radiationgenerated up here is not sent through the wires reachingTokyo . ... My house is here. I live here. I do not want tobecome a martyr for someone else. 2

The citizens of Fukushima of both 100 years ago and of

today, whose voices have been heard only because they joinedpolitical protests, have not been anti-modern provincialistsinveighing against progress per se. Rather, they seem to beself-interested moderns intent upon protecting their lives andproperty against Tokyo's grand designs for developing the

crowded Japanese archipelago. The protest strategies they haveadopted, the political organizations they have created or joinedfor purposes of protesting, the self-justificatory ideology they

have employed, and the State's response to all these, serve asexcellent indices for interpreting changes and continuities inthe character of Japanese state and society over the past 100years.

The purpose of the paper is to offer some very tentative

observations about the changes in state and society in Japanduring the past century that have been suggested by the limitedcase studies of political protest in Fukushima prefecture.

2. Quoted in Kenmochi Kazami, Genshi hanto [Nuclear Archipelago] (Tokyo:Matsuzawa, 1982), pp. 355-56.

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Characteristics of Fukushima

Fukushima's representativeness makes it possible to drawconclusions about the experience of political protest for allJapan from the experience of this one prefecture. Befitting itsrank as Japan's second largest prefecture (after Hokkaido) and

first in population of all six Tohoku prefectures, Fukushima'shuman and economic geography exhibits the same sort of

variation as does Japan as a whole. There are three naturalregions in the prefecture-the coastal east, the central plains,and the mountainous west-which developed over the pastcentury along distinctive paths according to the natural andhuman resources of each.

On the coast, the southeastern town of Taira served as thehub of industrial and commercial activities that built up aroundfarming, fishing, and mining interests. By the time of the FirstWorld War coal-mining, cement factories, mining-machineryfactories, and fishing industries dominated the economy.

The central part of the prefecture, stretching on both sidesof the north-south railroads which cut the prefecture in unequalhalves, developed around the prefectural capital of FukushimaCity. Because it served as a railroad terminal, it became the

central market for goods manufactured and grown in other partsof the prefecture. By the 1920s it was famous for sakeproduction, silk-reeling, cotton-spinning, printing, stockbreeding, export companies and, of course, government. It

shared with the western part of the prefecture the task ofgenerating hydro-electric power.

Of the three regions, the west developed least quickly.The market centers were Wakamatsu and Kitakata wherelacquerware, silk, cotton, tobacco, carrots, and rice were tradedand sold. Cottage industry was far more important to the localeconomy than was factory industry. Here also economic powerwas concentrated in the hands of relatively few largelandowners who controlled all phases of production and saleof rice, silk, and lacquerware. Largely because of the pervasiveinfluence of a few large landowners over the economy of theregion, the Nippon Times could characterize the west as lateas 24 February 1949 as "an area pervaded by feudalism."3

While no one of the three areas experienced appreciablymore political protest than the others, political protest in eacharea can be attributed largely to the differing effects thateconomic change had on the population of each area.

Fukushima Incident, 1882

In 1882 the fifteen-year-old Meiji government beganimplementing a policy of building roads that would connectoutlying markets and administrative centers with the centralgovernment in Tokyo. Its purpose was the two-fold one of

consolidating central rule and developing an infrastructure forcommercial activities in what was still a largely agrarian-basedeconomy. Still bothered by a multitude of problems of

governing, ranging from samurai disaffection to foreigneconomic and political pressure, the ruling oligarchy did not

3. Quoted in Chalmen; Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa (Berkeley:Univen;ity of California Press, 1972), p. 96; for a lengthier statement onFukushima's demography, see ShOji Kichinosuke, Kindai chihO minshii undo

shi [A History of Modern Regional Democratic Movements], Vol. II (Tokyo:

Kokura shoten, 1 9 7 ~ k p p . 124-26.

hesitate to use repression to quell dissent generated by itspolicies of consolidation.

In principle those living in the areas most affected by thepolicies of consolidation, such as Fukushima, did not objecto the development of a commercial infrastructure so long asthe attendant increase in taxes was equally shared by the centraand local governments and so long as those affected were

granted rights to help determine the course the new roads wouldtake. The latter was deemed critical by the thousands of risingcommercial farmers who wished to minimize the expenses o

transporting their products to the market. The course a roadwould take could mean the life or death of a traditional marketown, especially since in the 1880s the roads in question wouldlink Fukushima with the Yokohama export markets. For thesericulturalists in the west and central part of the prefecturethe only real silk market was the export market. These two "solong as" conditions, set by Fukushima farmers, defined theparameters of the Fukushima Incident of 1882.

Early that year a bureaucrat was sent from Tokyo toassume the governorship of Fukushima. He arrived with a planfor building a road whose intended course bore littlerelationship to the commercial centers which local powefigures depended upon and wished to see developed; and he

carried a plan for taxation which relied more heavily on risinglocal tax revenue than on national. The new governor's planmet with immediate resistance. Those who initiated the protesagainst he road scheme were, not surprisingly, the wealthiecommercial farmers who had the most to lose and who alsohappened to be locally elected Jiyl1to officials, some of whomheld seats in the prefectural assembly. Virtually all of thos

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who began the protest claimed that the road "was arbitrarilydecided" and did not follow a route "in accord with the interests

of the people in the area."4 Subsequent resolutions in the

JiyiitO-controlled prefectural assembly censuring the governorand his road plan were initiated by the Jiyiito landowners most

affected by the plan.

The government's undisputed success insuppressing both the local party leaders and thegrassroots movement which formed aroundthem [in the Fukushima Incident of 1882] sentunmistakable signals to the national leadershipof the party: protest parties based on principlesfundamentally in conftict with the principles of

central oligarchical rule would not be permittedin new Japan.

The Jiyiit6-Liberal (or Liberty or Freedom) Party-was

founded in late 1881 by dissident ex-samurai and wealthy

commoners who had been excluded from positions of powerin the ruling oligarchy. While the national leadership and in

some instances the local Jiyiito leadership subscribed to elitist

principles of leadership, they nonetheless embraced thedoctrine of natural rights because its democratic inclusiveness

helped in attracting a large popular following. By openlytouting the doctrine and by carrying its message of equality inthe countryside, the Jiyiito quite naturally set itself up as aparty of protest. Against a government rigidly based on rule

by oligarchical decree in the name of the emperor, the Jiyiitocalled for constitutional rule, representative assemblies and

local self-government.In the Fukushima Incident it was the local Jiyiito which

led the tax boycotts and the demonstrations, and eventually itsleadership wrote a secret pact to overthrow the "oppressivegovernment which is the public enemy of freedom" in the name

of inherent natural rights to life, liberty and property. 5 The

issue of the roads, entirely rooted in elightened self-interest,served merely as the precipitant for raising the larger issues oflocal self-rule and constitutional representative government thatwould protect the natural rights of property owners.

The government's undisputed success in suppressing boththe local party leaders and the grassroots movement which

formed around them sent unmistakable signals to the nationalleadership of the party: protest parties based on principlesfundamentally in conflict with the principles of central

oligarchical rule would not be permitted in new Japan. Whatwould be permitted, and this was the message of the 1889

constitution, were political parties represented in the Diet(parliament) whose membership was restricted to the larger

4. See Appendix A in Bowen, Rebellion.

5. Ibid., p. 237.

2S

tax-paying property owners, the very sort that led the Jiyiitoprotest in Fukushima. In this way the Meiji state effectively

co-opted the liberal leadership by adopting a limited liberalconception of law-making. Its effect in Fukushima was to put

an end for the next forty years to the protest role of politicalparties as representatives of a larger population. The Meiji

system of rule was thereafter based on the state 's accommoda

tion of landowner parties and with that change, one-time

enemies of authoritarian rule became permanent allies.

Rice Riots, 1918

For the three years following the Fukushima Incident thereoccurred numerous Jiyiito-related protests and armed rebellions

which also called for democratic representative governmentand greater powers of local self-rule. In this respect the 1882

episode in Fukushima was very much a part of a largernationwide protest movement known as the freedom andpopular rights movement (jiyu minken undo). I f the movement

had a real end, it was with the dissolution of the Jiyiito in late1884. Party politics as the politics of protest againstauthoritarian rule experienced a very real eclipse until the1920s. The Rice Riots (kome sOdo) of 1918 were no exception,

though they were a nationwide event and reached an importantlevel of intensity in Fukushima.

The Rice Riots began in Toyama prefecture on the JapanSea in late July 1918, toward the close of the First World War.

The causes of the riots are well known: a war-producedinflationary spiral at a time when wages were decreasing pushed

the cost of the staple food of the Japanese beyond the purchasingpower of the average citizen; the problem was accentuated by

hoarding and market speculation and rumors that rice was beingexported to client states and the military overseas just when

an unusually poor harvest was creating shortages at home; andwithin Japan shifts in population from country to town were

creating a new urban market where demand and ability to pay

outstripped that in the very rural areas where rice was grown.The anomaly of rice producers, usually tenants, forced to

forego consumption while urban workers enjoyed filled bowls

was an outrage to rural folk"Anywhere from 600,000 to a million people in thirty-seven

of Japan's forty-five prefectures took part in the riots,

prompting the government to mobilize the army, local police,

and army reservists in over sixty cities, towns, and villagesthroughout Japan. For forty-five days the rioters, largely

consisting of members of the lumpen proletariat and lowermiddle class, attacked and seized control of rice stores, policestations, pawn shops, and factories before being stopped. 7

Some 6,650 people were arrested and convicted of crimesranging from riotous action to arson and robbery. The rioters

were not the only victims. Occurring only shortly before Japanwas forced into an unpopular peace treaty ending the First

World War, the riots served as additional evidence of thebankruptcy of the so-called transcendental governments and

6. See George Totten, "Labor and Agrarian Disputes in Japan FollowingWorld Warl," Economic DevelopmentandCultural Change. 9 (October 1960):

193; and Shinobu Seisaburo, TaishO seiji sh i [A Political History of the TaishiiPeriod], Vol. II (Tokyo: Kawabe shobO, 1953), pp. 542,560,572.

7. Ibid., p. 657; and Shoji Kichinosuke, Kome sOtJij no kenkyu [A Study ofthe Rice Riots] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1957), pp. 3 ~ .

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helped to usher in what is know as the first genuine partygovernment and the beginning of "Taisho democracy. 8

The riots of Fukushima closely paralleled the disturbancesthat occurred elsewhere, showing very clearly that the "riots"

consisted of something more than the spontaneous action ofmere mobs seeking to gratify hunger pains. The rice riots in

Fukushima reveal highly organized protest activity thatreflected the economic and social changes which had gone on

since the 1882 Incident but had yet to find concrete politicalrepresentations.

Following the arrest of as many as two thousandparticipants and the imprisonment of scores of Jiyiito leadersin the wake of the Fukushima Incident, the political parties inthe prefecture ceased operation for several years before

re-forming as elitist organizations. It could hardly have beenotherwise. The voting laws which accompanied Japan's newemperor-centered constitution of 1889 restricted the franchisefor national Diet elections to males, twenty-five years or older,

who paid more than fifteen yen in direct property taxes. In thecase of the first election in 1890, only 13,923 or 1.45 percentof Fukushima's residents qualified to vote. 9 Likewise, thenumber of eligible voters in the prefectural assembly elec

tions-where tax requirements were not as onerous-variedfrom county (gun) to county, ranging from .86 percent of thepopulation in the poverty-stricken county of Minami-Aizu to10.35 percent in agriculturally rich Tamura county, with amean voter eligibility of 4.07 percent by county prefecturewide.'o And as tax qualifications for candidates to stand forelection were even more severe at both the prefectural andnational assembly levels, the electoral system became onewhere the wealthier property owners elected the wealthiest of

their kind to office, which at this time meant landlords in thisstill overwhelmingly agricultural economy. Such remainedessentially the case-landlord control of the Diet andprefectural assemblies-until at least 1925 when electoral lawswere changed, though the trend for landownership to be

concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, and hence for tenancyto rise, was not reversed until after the Second World War."Even after 1925, the conservatism of the major parties was sofirmly entrenched and so deeply tied to state rule that the influx

of non-landowners into the electoral process made littledifference.

Party politics in Fukushima mirrored the national trend of

convervative landlord domination. Because of electoral lawsthe reconstituted parties in the 1890s and later had nocompelling reasons to build wide popular bases of support orto represent the interests of the non-landed against statistpolicies, except in instances where state policy ran counter tothe interests of the landed elite themselves. 12

8. General Terauchi's government fell; Hara Kei of the Seiyiikai became the

first party premier. The Japan Times Mail, an English-language newspaper of

the time, reported as early as 17 August that "Government May Have toResign" because of its "utter failure to foresee and to deal promptly with thepresent situation [the riots]."

9. Fukushima ken shi, 16[A History of Fukushima Prefecture] (Tokyo: Yiigen

Kaisha, 1969): Seiji, 2: 56-57 [Heareafter abbreviated FKS].

10. Ibid., pp. 100--101.

II . Shoji, Kindai, Tables 9, 10, II (pp.17-18).

12. FKS, 16-46.

It was precisely people from such political"out-groups" who participated in Fukushima'sRice Riots [in 1918]. Industrial workers, daylaborers, jinrikisha pullers, printers, fisher

people, small company employees, constructionworkers, miners, drygoods salespeople, restaurateurs, silk weavers, and a kaleidoscopicarray of other urban and rural workers joinedin forty days of demonstrations, meetings,petition drives soliciting the assistance of thewealthy, and robbery and looting throughoutFukushima.

Evidence for this proposition is seen clearly in the politicacareers of one-time popular rights activists and FukushimIncident participants who had been imprisoned between 188and 1889. In the 1890, 1892, and 1894 and, in several cases

later elections, Kono Hironaka, Aizawa Yasukata, HirajimMatsuo, Shirai Enbei and several other Incident leaders whhad been convicted of conspiring to overthrow the state, werelected and reelected to the national and prefectural assembliesBesides campaigning on the popular national issue of riddinJapan of the unequal treaties imposed by the West a quarte

of a century before, they ran on the issue of reducing the lantax on the propertied. Except for Kono, \\ho once suggestea broadening of the franchise, the position these onetimactivists took was conservative and statist. 13 Kono, so move

by patriotic zeal following Japan's victory over China in 1895even announced in 1897 that he was quitting the reconstituteJiyiito because he felt it had outlived its partisan purposes.Dozens of other onetime popular rights activists followed hilead and joined the "establishment party" (kisei seit6) , thKenseito. The impact of Kono's defection was felt iprefectural political circles as well, because the vast majorit

of Jiyiito prefectural assemblymen also quit the party to joithe Kenseito. 's Many of those who felt Kono had betrayed thparty had by late 1900 joined the other of the two establisheparties, the Seiyiikai of oligarch Ito Hirobumi. 16

The Rice Riots in Fukushima serve as a reminder that thelectoral system, dominated by landed interests, failed to keeup with the dramatic changes in society and economy that too

place between 1890 and the First World War. By 1918agriCUlture in Fukushima accounted for only half of the valuof all goods produced in the prefecture (down from two-thirdas late as 1912) and employed only 56 percent of the workin

13. Ibid., pp. 45-54. The one instance when Kono is known to have supportea universal franchise law occurred in February 1902; See FKS, p. 133.

14. Ibid ., pp. 61-63.

15. Ibid., p. 102.

16. Ibid., pp. 104-5.

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population (down from about 67 percent in 1910).'7 Because

of the industrial boom and expansion of the economy producedby World War I, the manufacturing, mining, service (retail)

and livestock sectors of the economy were outpacingagriculture.'"By 1918 the industrial sector, though employing

only 4.16 percent of the work force, was accounting for wellover 25 percent of the gross prefectural product. By 1918 nearly

16 percent of the working population was employed in theservice sector and another almost 5 percent in banking and

government service. Miners, not even accounting for .2 percentof the working population, nevertheless produced more than10 percent of the prefecture's total wealth that year.'· In otherwords, there existed highly productive, numerically growingblue and white collar workers whose contributions to the

economy were in no way compensated by a right to participatein the electoral process and be represented by a party. They

remained politically insignificant because they paid no landtax, the prerequisite for engaging in legal politics.

It was precisely people from such political "out-groups"who participated in Fukushima's Rice Riots. Industrialworkers, day laborers, jinrikisha pullers, printers, fisherpeople,

small company employees, construction workers, miners,drygoods salespeople, restauranteurs, silk weavers, and akaleidoscopic array of other urban and rural workers joined inforty days of demonstrations, meetings, petition drives

soliciting the assistance of the wealthy, and robbery and lootingthroughout Fukushima. 20

The riots began in Fukushima City, the prefectural capital,on 13 August and then moved on to the regional towns of

Wakamatsu in the west and Koriyama in the east on the 16thand 17th. In these urban centers the riots began with peacefuldemonstrations involving several thousand people at each site,demanding that rice merchants offer "bargain sales" (rembai).Graffiti and insulting posters were written or tacked onto theshops of the presumed hoarders. But besides the rice sellers,

who often were simply merchants for the large landlords, thedemonstrators also targeted landlords, loan dealers, banks,manufacturing companies and construction firms, insisting on,as the case may be, low interest loans, rent reductions, higherwages, and the like. Refusal of demands usually meant looting.Instances of demonstrations before government offices, in

which demands included the granting of greater powers of localself-nile (which translates at this time into lower taxes) or

government intervention to control prices were also reported. 2'With minor variations, such was the nature ofthe activities

of the "rioters" in 6 cities, 16 towns, 3 farming villages, 3fishing villages, and,2 mining towns across the prefecture. Thescale and size of the "riots" were heaviest in the cities where

anywhere from five to ten thousand people participated.

Generally speaking, the greater the number of participants, thegreater the level of violence that followed the refusal or denialof their demands. In the towns, 300 to 500 participants wasthe average turnout, several hundred in the mining towns, and

17. ShOji, Kindai, p. 9; and Shoji, Kame sjjtJ6, p. 114.

18. Ibid., p. !OJ.

only a score or so in the villages. Violence was highly specific

for the most part, directed mainly at those rice dealers andmerchant-landlords widely suspected of artificially inducingshortages and high prices.22

The riots are as important for what did not happen andwhat happened in their aftermath as for what actually tookplace at the time. What did not happen was a collectively

organized appeal for assistance or mediation to party politiciansor prefectural government figures. The only two parties

represented in the prefectural assembly, the majority Kenseikai(successor to Kono's Kenseito) and the minority Seiyukai, were

indifferent to the rioters' concerns. As the prefectural historycharacterized the parties' position,

In the prefectural assembly that year [I918} there occurredabsolutely no debate concerning policy toward the riots.The members of the two parties, the Kenseikai and Seiyukai,as always the centrists, were too tightly glued to the greatlandlords and wealthy entrepreneurs and would not serveas spokesmen for the poor farmers and urban working classpeople.23

Rather, the parties supported the government in its policy ofarmed suppression of the rioters by the military.

The urban and rural poor, the industrial working class,and the shopkeepers who joined the riots knew enough not toexpect party or government intervention in their behalf; hence,they made no entreaties. Because the rioters had no access toofficial channels for voicing their demands, their demonstrations, meetings, leafletting, and other organized protest activitywere labelled "riot" (sodo) by the authorities. In this sense,

"riot" becomes the official term used to describe protest by thepolitically unrepresented rural and urban lower classes.

The kame soda was the last significant collective protestthat enjoyed no genuine political representation in Fukushima.Thereafter a plethora of political groups emerged, each

representing different segments of the lower classes and givingmeaning to the term Taisho democracy. The connection

between the riots and the emergence of the new political groupscan be understood by looking at the aftermath of the Rice Riotsin Fukushima.

Taisho Democracy, 1920s and 1930s

Shortly after the First World War ended, depressionbegan. As with the rest of the country, in Fukushima the effectsof a sudden end to the war-related boom and inflationary spiralbegan to be felt by late 1919.24 Taking 1901 as the base yearfor indexing the value of production ( l 00) , the value of

agricultural production in Fukushima reached 553 in 1919

before precipitously dropping to 302 in 1920. Industrialproduction and mining likewise hit highs in 1919 at 581 and1,110 respectively before falling to 383 and 897 in 1920.2s

Rates of tenancy and unemployment rose accordingly.

22. Ib id., pp. 110--11,115; Shoji, Kome sjjtJ6, passim.

23. FKS, p. 118; The Seiyiikai seized control of the prefectural assembly thatyear for the first time, indicating that the rice riots may have discredited the

19. Shoji, Kindai, p. 9; and Shoki, Kame sodo. pp. 114-15. Kenseikai administration.

20. Shoji, Kindai, pp. 98-100, passim. 24. FKS, p. 18.

21. Ibid., pp. 116, 127, 129. 25. Shoji, Kome sod6, p. !OJ.

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In recognition of the economically troubled times as wellas the recent spurt in industrialization, the attendant growth of

the labor force, urban growth, an increase in rural tenancy,and an internationalization of the Japanese market and society,various organizations came into being that sought to representpolitically all these new unleashed social forces. The Yllaikai,Japan's first labor union (founded in 1912), which had

established two branches in Fukushima as early as 1914,reorganized as the Nihon R6d6 S6d6mei in 1919.26 In 1922Japan's first Farmers Union (Nihon N6min Kumiai) and Japan'sfirst communist party were also organized. Industrial strikesand landlord-tenant disputes led by local groups in Fukushimaaffiliated with the larger national organizations began in earnestfor the first time. Eight labor strikes in 1919 and scores of

landlord-tenant disputes following the organization of the unionserved notice to the prefectural authorities that the times hadchanged. 27 In reaction to these instances of political activity inFukushima and elsewhere around the nation, the governmentissued a series of repressive laws in 1922 and 1923 intendedto counter what they regarded as radical, subversive movementsin town and country.28

Urban and rural workers were not alone in organizing andprotesting in Fukushima following the Rice Riots. In earlyJanuary 1919, school teachers and newspaper journalists fromall over the prefecture gathered in Shinobu to discuss how theymight contribute to promote "a trend of thought calleddemocracy (minshushugi)."29 In the same spirit, in May 1919,some 2000 railroad workers, salaried middle class workers andcity employees demonstrated in Fukushima City in oppositionto a proposed increase in city and prefectural taxes. Theylaunched a "Movement to Reform City Government" (shisei

sasshin undo), in the process urging the public "to stop obeyingblindly and begin pushing for the just rights of all citizens. Weourselves should force reform of city government."3O They wonpart of their fight as city officials retracted the plan to increase

property taxes.This sort of temporary alliance between workers and

middle-class salaried employees was consistently reforged inthe next five years during the struggle for universal franchise.Beginning in late 1919, throughout Fukushima dozens of new

suffrage groups, such as the Association for EstablishingUniversal Suffrage, Youth for Reform League, ConstitutionalYouth Party, and Society of World Workers, organizedthemselves quite separately from the two establishment parties

and proceeded to demonstrate for the vote.First the newspapers and then ultimately the establishment

politicians began echoing the views of the disenfranchised,leading in 1925 to the passage of the Universal (male) SuffrageLaw by the 50th Diet. But the victory of the suffrage groups

was bittersweet. Ten days before the establishment partiespassedtbe voting law, they passed the draconian PeacePreservation Act. This law made it a crime to advocate a change

26. FKS, p. 135.

27. Ibid., pp. 139-40; and Nomin sogo undo shi [A History of the FannersUnion Movement] (Nagoya: Nichikei Nogyo Shimbunsha, 1960), Appendices,

p.30.

28. FKS, p. 139.

29. Ibid., p. 141.

30. Ibid.

in the emperor system or in the system of private property.Naturally it was invoked against socialist groups, especially

those active in the labor and tenant organizations, and wasused most notoriously on 15 March 1928, Japan's Night of theLong Knives, as police mobilized in thirty-one prefectures,including Fukushima, to round up 1,568 left-wing organizers. 3l But the important point to be made is that with these two

acts of parliament, the vote and the Peace Preservation Act,the negative effects of the latter going far to nullify the positiveeffects of the former, the establishment parties provedthemselves once again to be the ever-obedient servants of thestate.

The rising popular parties (minto) of the lateTaisho and early Showa periods (1922-1940)were effectively tethered by legalized suppressionintended to negate the growth of democraticforces after the passage of manhood suffrage.

In Fukushima, at least, Taish6 democracy struggled toremain alive despite the Taish6 state's attempts to stifledemocratic dissent. Following passage of the suffrage law avariety of renewed and new political groups emerged inFukushima to protest unsatisfactory social conditions. Thoughthese groups often worked together, their membership overlap

ped, and they shared the same objectives, the six mostimportant political movements and organizations in theprefecture will be dealt with separately below. They are: theproletarian parties, the consumer union movement, theright-wing organizations, the citizens movement, the tenanunions, and the labor unions.

Proletarian parties (musan seito) began organizing inFukushima in 1927 with the establishment of a Social Masses(Shakai Minsh1it6) branch in Fukushima city, then three years

later another branch in the Iwashiro district and three yearsafter that another in Koriyama. In important respects the SociaMasses Party served as the political arm of the S6d6mei labofederation. Its introduction into the prefecture was followed in

1929 by the establishment of two branches of the Labor-Farme

party (Zenkoku R6n6t6). The illegal Japan communist party(JCP) under the guise of the Political Research Society (SeijKenkyl1kai) began organizing in industrial areas as early as1925 before going underground in 1927 and encouragingindividual members to join branches of the other proletarianparties and labor unions and also to create various youthleagues. By 1929 the JCP in Fukushima was publishing it

31. Shoji, Kindai, p. 150; and Nihon minshU rekishi, Vol. 8 (TokyoSansh6do, 1975), pp. 169-170.

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own newspaper but, like the party, it never fared very well asthe authorities were relentless in hounding it.

The membership figures of the different proletarianparties, though probably a poor indication of their popularityand the extent of their influence, are unimpressive. The SocialMasses Party's branch in the mining area of Joban boasted 420members by 1928 and the Koriyama Ronoto branch had 518

members by 1931, but as few as six members made upFukushima City's Social Masses Party branch in 1927.32

Membership in the consumers union movement (shOhi

kumiai undO) cut across the membership of the proletarianparties, the labor unions, and the tenant unions. The originsof the movement date back to the 1890s in Fukushima whenthe first union was started by railroad workers, but themovement only took off after the Great Depression. Though,once again, membership figures are an inadequate measure of

influence, by February 1931 there were thirteen unions with amembership of 516 people, concentrated mainly in Somacounty. Two years later, deeper into the depression, at leasteight more unions were formed around the prefecture, addingseveral hundred more members. Soup, sake, rice, knitted

goods, stationery, and other sometimes scarce items wereamong the goods that the unions sold at discounted prices totheir members. As the unions became better organized theybecame more political and issued position papers and draftedcharters that reflected the social class of their membership. Theobvious political aspects of the unions show they were anti-war ,anti-imperialism, anti-company unions, anti-big capitalist,pro-union (labor and tenant), and for the rights of free speechand assembly. A very concrete action they took was to providefinancial aid to striking tenants and workers. 33

Much the same sort of socioeconomic and political changethat spawned the proletarian parties and the consumerunions-the impact of the depression and the failure of theestablishment parties to represent the interests of the lower

classes-gave rise to right-wing organizations in Fukushima.The rightist organizations drew not only from the sameconstituency-the lower and lower middle classes-but also,quite naturally, sprang up in many of the same areas of theprefecture.34

Between 1927 and 1934, forty-eight groups with acombined membership of about 3,000, taking such names asCitizens' Association for a New Japan (Shin Nihon KokuminDOmei) and Greater Japan Producers' (Dainihon Seisanto),sprang up allover the prefecture, professing loyalty to nationand national socialism. A majority of the rightist organizationswere located in the cities and towns of the coastal region, inDate county, and in Fukushima City, that is, in the industrialand mining areas. They were led by army reservists, hospital

administrators, journalists, village heads, priests, and shopkeepers.36 Their declared enemies were "individualism,liberalism and capitalism" and the "left-wing of the socialistsand communist movements."37

32. ShOji, Kindai. pp. ISO, 161, 167.

33. Ibid., pp. 167-74.

34. FKS, pp. 339-44; Shoji, Kindai, pp. 174-77.

35. Ibid., p. 176.

36. FKS, p. 343.

37. Ibid., p. 327.

Citizen movements (shimin undo), so called because beingurban-based they drew on city-dwellers of all classes, alsodeveloped into a political force in Fukushima in the late 1920sand 1930s. As much as anything, they grew out of a widespreadreaction to the ill-effects of unplanned capitalist growth in thecities.38

One of the more dramatic of the citizens' movements

occurred in the citiesof

Fukushima, Taira, Koriyama, andWakamatsu in 1927. The precipitating issue was the TobuElectric Company's decision to increase the electric rates of

all consumers even though high demand for electricity by newfactories had prompted the decision. The decision threatenedespecially the very poor people and many of the small- andmedium-sized factories in the towns. Initially after the ElectricCompany announced the hike, the Koriyama branch of theNihon ROdo labor union led in protesting the rate hike, but asthe protest movement developed during the year, otherindustrial workers, farmers, merchants, miners, shopkeepers,small manufacturers, and restaurateurs joined.39 When negotiations between leaders of the movement and the electriccompany failed, violence broke out in Koriyama City once the

police ordered the crowd of four or five thousand gatheredoutside the negotiation site to disperse. A combination of

repression and government support for the power companyensured defeat of the movement.

Participants in the consumers, citizens and rightistmovements may have simultaneously been members of anyone of the new political parties of the Taisho period, but theorganizations of rural tenants and urban workers were eithercreations or affiliates of the proletarian parties in the prefecture.This was both a blessing and a liability; the connection was ablessing for the organizational experience of the parties thattenants and workers could draw upon when first setting up theirunions, but certainly a liability during periods when the partieswere rent by factionalism, personal and ideological, and when

they were targets of government repression. This happenedmost of the time. Consequently, workers and tenants primarilydepended on the more stable and accessible unions of whichthey were a part and on which they depended for protectionof their interests.

In the case of poor farmers and tenants, one suchorganization, the All Japan Farmers Union (Zen Nihon NominKumiai DOmei) which prospered in Fukushima, offered itsmembers a "Farmers Song" (1926) that captured in succinctterms the farmers' dilemma and the means necessary to escapefrom it.

As our lives are threatened

the nation's foundations tremble

while capitalism prosperswith the law on its side.

Organization! Forming groups

offarmers united in Justice.This will strengthenthe foundations ofa new Japan.40

38. ShOji, Kindai. pp. 178-79.

39. Ibid., pp. 189-90.

40. Quoted in the "Forward" to Nomi" sogo undO shi.

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Such sentiments, equally serviceable to the right or theleft, found their most organized expression in Fukushima inthe actions and pronouncements of the left, but only after 1927to any significant degree. Previously, tenant organization hadbeen negligible and tenant protest activity sporadic. Between1917 and 1928, only fifty-nine tenant-landlord disputesoccurred in the prefecture, forty-six of which in 1926-28. Fewhad the backing or force of a large (trans-village) organization. 41

Only in 1928 was there a sudden increase, reaching a pinnaclein 1936 when 455 tenant disputes and strikes occurred, secondin the nation only to Yamanashi prefecture. Moreover, therewas a close correlation btween the rising number of disputesand the growing number of unions and union membership.42

In 1925 there were only 23 local tenant unions in Fukushimawith a membership of 1,426; in 1931 there were 53 unionswith over 3,000 members and by 1935 nearly 7,000 memberswere organized into 130 unions. 43

Organization efforts by tenant unions, especially thoseaffiliated with the Nihon Nomin Kumiai, became particularly

intense in the sericultural regions of Shinobu, Date and Adachiwhen silk prices plummeted because of the depression. 44 Theother major union in the prefecture, the Zen-No Zenkoku KaigiFukushima-ken Hyogikai, especially prominent in Onumacounty, had branches in five other counties as well. Of thetwo, the latter was the most radical politically, having a closeaffiliation with the communist Labor-Farmer Party. TheFarmers Union was closely associated with the center andcenter-left factions of the Social Masses Party.4S Nonetheless,both tenant union organizations in Fukushima were highlyvulnerable to government repression; especially after 1932,

arrests of tenant union leaders in Fukushima became commonplace.46

The main purpose of the tenant unions was to help securerent reduction and secondarily to counter the growing landlordunions (jinushi kumiai) and government-sponsored "concialia

tion unions" (kyochO kumiai). But in addition to these goals,the unions also engaged in more overt political activities. In1935, for instance, the unions in Fukushima ran their own

candidates for seats in the prefectural assembly. In 1936 theyorganized a petition campaign to force the central governmentto pass legislation protecting the tenants' right to cultivate, thatis, the right not to be evicted. And in 1937 in Fukushima City,the more moderate of the two large unions celebrated theanniversary of the founding of the movement by featuringspeeches by leaders of the Social Masses Party who exhortedtenants to fight for a tenant protection law, special loans totenants, lower rents, greater powers of self-government, andagainst fascism. 47

Later in 1937, after Japan invaded China, tenant unions

in Fukushima, as elsewhere in the nation, followed thepragmatic path chosen by their union federations and party

41. Ibid., pp. 4--6 (Appendices); FKS, p. 698.

42. Nomin sogo undo shi, p. 31 (Appendices).

43. Ibid., p. 20.

44. Ibid., p. 699; ShOji, Kindai, p. 158.

45. Ibid., pp. 156-57; Nomin sogo, p. 699; FKS, pp. 626-28.

46. ShOji, Kindai, pp. 157-58.

47. FKS, p. 646.

leaders and joined patriotic farmer organizations in support ofnational unity. The impact of the war on the tenant movementwill be taken up below.

The labor movement in Fukushima followed a pattern of

activism quite similar to the tenant movement. In its originsin the Meiji period the labor movement was an outgrowth of

the mechanization of the silk industry, mining industry, andthe railroads. But up until the First World War labor activityin each of these industries was limited for special reasons: thesilk industry was largely cottage-based and staffed primarily

by women workers who were culturally oppressed and thereforepolitically quiescent; mining was so localized in the east aseasily to permit containment of miner agitation to that area;and the railroad workers, so vital to the centralization process,formed a sort of labor elite whose high wages made themlargely indifferent to political activism. The strikes in theseindustries that did occur before the war were usually of verylimited duration and of low intensity, and they were carried

out independently of any outside organizations. Only after thewar when the labor force expanded and as new machinerieswere installed in a process of "rationalization" (gorika) did themovement take off. 8

Politically significant organization began only in 1927with the formation of the Joban Regional Coal Miners Unionwhich was affiliated with the socialist labor federation of NihonROdo Kumiai Domei. In the year of its founding the MinersUnion was the largest in the prefecture with over 3,000members organized in eight different locals. 49

The other principal labor federation active in organizingworkers in the prefecture was the Nihon Rodo KumiaiHyogikai, which like the tenant hyogikai was one of the most

radical and therefore under constant seige from the authorities.This union organization enjoyed its greatest successes amongworkers in the printing industry in Fukushima. so The left wing

of the Social Masses Party supported this federation, while the

centrist factionsof

the Party supported the Domei.S1

Between 1927 and May 1934, ninety-seven labor disputesand strikes occurred in the prefecture over the issues of wages,

working hours, safety conditions, and so on. Though it is notclear how many of these were supported by the unions, sevenof twenty-five disputes occurring between 1925 and 1927 didinvolve union support.S2 It seems safe to conjecture that a much

higher percentage had union support between 1928 and 1935when union activity was peaking.

Mter 1935 protest activity by Fukushima labor groupsfollowed the national pattern and sharply declined. The salutaryeffects of Japan's "second industrial revolution" coming in thewake of the colonization of Manchuria were being enjoyed byFukushima workers. Unions became correspondingly less

militant, especially after the July 1937 Marco Polo BridgeIncident. By late 1937, in an open expression of support forthe China War, organized labor renounced the right to strike(a "right" they never legally enjoyed), and organized labor's

48. Ibid., pp. 348-78.

49. Ibid., p. 404.

50. ShOji, Kindai, p. 152.

51. Ibid., p. 153

52. FKS, pp. 408-9; Shoji, Kindai, p. 155.

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principal political supporter, the Social Masses Party, patrioti c a y declared its support for the war. Then in 1938 the sameparty supported in parliament the National Mobilization Law,clearing the way for total worker allegiance to the New Order(shintaisei). By 1940 all parties, including the establishmentparties, dissolved themselves in favor of national unity undera one-party imperial state. 53

Itwould be a great mistake to leave the impression thatthe labor movement in Fukushima collapsed or failed because

federation and/or party support succumbed to the excesses of

patriotism. As much as anything, union activism disappearedbecause the economy was not yet ready for it. It is well toremember that nationally not even 8 percent of all factory~ o r k e r s were ever organized into unions in the prewar period,10 large part because of the industrial dualism that characterizedthe period. As late as 1934, 56.5 percent of all workers wereemployed by small enterprises with 5 to 9 workers, and another39.7 percent were employed by medium-sized concerns having10 to 99 workers. 54 In such situations paternalism, not unions,served as the grease to prevent friction between labor andmanagement.

In Fukushima the situation was similar. In 1932 aboutone-half of all factories employed fewer than 10 workers; about40 percent of all factories employed from 10 to 30 workers;only 33 factories in the prefecture employed more than 100workers.55 Moreover, women made up more than half theindustrial and mining labor force of 33,439 in 1934, 15,500of whom worked for menial wages in the large clothing andweaving industry. 56 Very few unions penetrated any of theseenterprises. Where the unions were successful in organizingworkers---in railroad yards, electrical companies, cementfactories, steel factories, mining equipment manufacturers, andin the mines--they were also successful in the immediatepostwar period when a rebuilt Communist Party oversaw theirefforts.57 In such industries political protests and strikes

resumed almost as if the war had never intervened, indeed,almost as if the war had given labor organizing a boost incredibility and legitimacy that it never enjoyed in the prewarperiod. 58 Because of increased industrialization and production

during the war years, a greater number of laboreres, many ofthem Koreans "imported" from the colony during the war and

forced to work under slave-like conditions, were fully preparedafter the war to strike against the deplorable working conditionsthey had so long been forced to endure. The New Order, itwould seem, gave rise to something much newer than its

architects had ever envisaged.It might be suggested that the war had much the same

effect on the tenant unions. By the last year of the war theNew Order was encouraging greater agricultural production by

rewarding tenants in Fukushima, who tilled almost 35 percent

53. FKS, p. 204,481-82; and Stephen Large's excellent newhook, Organized

Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981), esp. pp. 167-68.

54. Quoted in Ibid., Ch. 4, quoting Lockwood, Economic Development

(Princeton), Table IS, p. 202.

55. FKS, p. 457.

56. Shoji, Kindai, p. 154.

57. Ibid., Part HI, passim.

58. FKS, pp. 483-90 ; cf. Johnson, Conspiracy, pp. ~ 1 0 0 .

of all land, a four-times greater cash bonus than the landlordsreceived.59 Producers, rather than owners, were being rewardedfor the fruits of their production, which is precisely what thetenant unions had sought since the 1920s. Indeed, the rapidresurrection of almost 100 tenant unions in Fukushima withintwo months of the end of the war served notice to the defeatedgovernment and to the Allied Occupation that democratic land

reform was going to have to implemented quickly.60

Conclusion

Political protest in "modem" prewar Japan, to the extentthe Fukushima case is representativeof the national experience,

was l a r ~ e l y democratic in intent. In the early 1880s farmers,the mamstay of the economy, sought to make the centralgovernment more accountable to the wishes of propertyowners. Most dramatically demonstrated by the tax boycott,the theme of no taxation without representation was clearlystated. The "Rice Riots," the most apparently anomie of thevarious incidents studied, can be interpreted as the outcry of

the poor and hungry in behalf of instinctive notions of fairnessand equity at a time when they were shut out from a political

system. The establishment parties could not conceive of aP?litical solution to t.he problems of the economicallydIsadvantaged. The VarIOUS movements of the twenties andthirties explicitly sought political solutions to the economicproblems the lower classes faced. They sought representation10 those areas of the public domain where their interests weremost at stake. As they could not gain entry into the established

p o l ~ t i c s the period, they created their own organizations~ h ~ c ~ tned to forge out of a mass of politically impotentmdlVlduals a collective power that the state would have torespect.

The "development" of political protest in Fukushima, ifsuch a term has meaning, reveals a political system of

remarkable continuity operating within the circle of stateoverlordship. The political system, by which I mean electoraland administrative politics, consistently served rather than

i n f i u e n ~ e d (let alone resisted) the state's primary activities of

e x p ~ n d m g . the. e c < ? n o ~ y , strengthening the military, protectingthe lmpenal mstltutlOn, colonizing overseas territories andsuppressing democratic, therefore dissident, groups at home.The sole possible representatives of popular will, the parties,were early on, as the Fukushima Incident helps illustrate, madei n t ~ e l i t i ~ t i n s t i t ~ t i o n s designed to facilitate the linkage of theSOCIally mfiuentlal strata with the state. The kisei seito or

" e s t a b l i s h ~ ~ n t parties" were exactly as their name suggests.The nsmg popular parties (minto) of the late Taisho and

early ShOwa periods (1922-1940) were effectively tethered by

legalized suppression intended to negate the growthof

d e ~ < > < : r a t i c forces a ~ t e r the. passage of manhood suffrage.Asslstmg, perhaps mfiuencmg, the state's containment of

democratic forces was the "double dual economy," doublebecause the dual economy applied in both the agricultural andindustrial sectors of the economy. Farmers were badly dividedalong lines of ownership between non-owners (tenants) and

59. ShOji, .Kindai, p. 17; Ann Waswo, Japanese Landlords: The Decline of

a Rural ELlie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 136.

60. FKS, pp. 736-39.

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owners (self-cultivating and landlords); workers were no lessdivided between the very few large industrial concerns where SIMULTANEOUSCLOTHAND PAPERunion federations could operate and the many small factoriesand cottage industries where an objectively oppressive paternalrule prevented horizontal relationships from emerging. Betweentenant and landlord, between laborer and factory owner, stoodonly a few tenant and labor unions. Had there been no warand had the economy continued its gradual levelling process,

allowing more wealth to "trickle down" to workers, perhapsstronger unions and even stronger popular parties would havebecome better representatives of the economically disenfranchised.

Yet in a time of militarization of the world economy, of

steady imperialistic advances by Japan and other major powers,so-called barely democratic nations like Japan (and Italy)required greater internal order to be able successfully to takeadvantage of external disorder. Wars of territorial andeconomic aggrandizement, in Japan's case at least, requiredthe total mobilization of the nation's resources. That thisoccurred just at the time when democratic forces at home wereorganizing at an unparalleled rate is a factor of timing tooimportant to overlook. The timing is crucial and the comparison

with Europe unmistakable. Peter Merkl points out the "crucialtiming of fascist revolution at the precise point wheredemocratic mass participation is in the offiing for a society in

cataclysmic transition. After all, European fascism is aperversion of incipient democracy. "6 1

"Cataclysmic" is not a word that would be used by many,save extreme rightists of the period, to describe the period of

the twenties and thirties, though few would deny that"democratic mass participation was in the offing." But that wasnipped in the bud by the 1937 China War and the fascisticorganization of society in mobilizing for the Pacific War andin this sense helped Japan out of the political impasse posedby rising democratic forces. And it would seem that thecathartic effect of the war paved the way for a resurgence of

these same democratic forces in the postwar period.

*61. Peter Merkl, "Democratic Development, Breakdowns, and Fascism,"

World Politics 34, I (Oct. 1981): 118-19.

This publicationis available in microform.

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§AMIRAMIN

THE FUTURE OFMAOISMl

translated by Norman Finkelstein

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A third and final part compares the Maoist to the revisionist approach todevelopment, particularly regarding revolutionary class alliances, linkingthe future of Maoism to the nature of worldwide revotution.

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Art, Children, and the Bomb

by John W. Dower

Among the various arguments which were advanced byAmericans in the summer of 1945 in support of using theatomic bombs against Japan, there is one that has been generallyneglected. We might call it the concept of idealistic genocide.

This line of reasoning, endorsed by a spectrum of eminentmen associated with the Manhattan Project, held that the worldat large would never be able to imagine the awesomedestructiveness of the new weapon unless it was actuallydemonstrated in combat for all to see. To convey the urgencyof arms control in the future, it was necessary to first createan unforgettable atomic wasteland in the present.

This chilling line of thought has proven to be both naive

and prescient. The arms race occurred despite the immediateshock of the bombs, but the memory of Hiroshima andNagasaki remains absolutely central to peace movementsthroughout the world. No slogan is more graphic than "NoMore Hiroshimas." No voices are more eloquent than the criesfor peace of the hibakusha atomic bomb victims).

At least two strong forces work against the perpetuationof these memories of August 1945, however. One is thetechnocratic jargon of the managers of the arms race, whoselanguage is often deliberately meant to confuse the public andplace the human and moral aspects of nuclear confrontationbeyond the pale of "realistic" discourse. The other counterforceis the simple passage of time itself. Memories fade and die if

Copyrieht C 1980 by Toshi Maruld

special efforts are not made to preserve them for succeedinggenerations.

Not surprisingly, it is the Japanese who have done themost to preserve the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Theiranniversary observances serve this purpose, and the memorieshave been recreated over and over again in prose, poetry, andthe graphic arts. It is noteworthy, moreover, that Japanesechildren share in these expressions, and much of the work onthe bomb is specifically directed to them.

By contrast to the Japanese, youngsters elsewhere in theworld generally have been shielded from exposure to intimate

and graphic depictions of the atomic-bomb experience. In theUnited States, this was readily apparent prior to the televisionshowing of "The Day After" late in 1983, when self-styledexperts of every stripe debated how old one should be beforebeing allowed to watch this film about the nuclear destructionof a Midwestern city. In 1982, a team of American educatorsrepsonsible for preparing a teaching unit on nuclear issues formiddle-school students actually adopted a policy of using nographics whatsoever, on the grounds that young people couldnot cope with their traumatic impact.

These are serious, legitimate concerns, and in Japan too,more cautious and conservative voices have argued that graphicdepictions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are "too blunt" or "toocruel" for children. These were, in fact, the very phrases used

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Copyright © 1978 by Keiji Nakazawa

N ~ O f t : A 1 CONTROl- YOURSEtr!

WE ARE ALL S1RWIN6 FOP- -ntE.

VlOOR'f Of JAPAt-l ... 'fOUR

c.oNDLtt IS" OISfPACE. To

IHE. EMPIREI!

SHlTf UP!(I ' T 6E CAU..ED ATAArtbR JUST eErAuseI FARn:.D •••

when (in the first instance) the serialization of Japan's mostfamous cartoon-style depiction of Hiroshima, Barefoot Gen,

was terminated by its original publisher in 1974. And the phraseused was "too cruel" in a case of textbook censorship in 1982,when the Ministry of Education refused to recertify a text thatincluded among its illustrations a detail from one of the famous"Atomic Bomb Panels" (Genbaku no Zu) painted by the

husband-and-wife team Iri and Toshi Maruki.In Japan, however, the political significance of the debate

over exposing children to depictions of nuclear destruction isclearer than in other countries, for it is transparently tied upwith the issue of accelerating remilitarization and more activeJapanese support of American global anti-communist policies.Japanese educators, politicians, and parents alike are acutelysensitive to the importance of historical consciousness in

shaping the political inclinations of the young; and the treatmenof World War Two in the schools and mass media now play

a central role in the struggle to control this critical aspect oeducation and socialization. For the large number of Japaneswho are too young to remember the war, the atomic bomb ithe single most unforgettable symbol of a dark recent past.

In Japan, for adults and children alike, recollection of th

atomic-bomb experience thus leads inexorably to a host o

intertangled non-nuclear issues. The bomb is placed in a contexof militarism and imperialism, for example, and eventuallracism and prejudice enter the picture and even the identity o

"victim" and "victimizer" begins to blur. Thus, we soon learthat tens of thousands of Koreans were in Hiroshima when thbomb fell, and the Japanese hibakusha continued to discrimnate against their Korean fellow sufferers in medical treatmen

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and even disposal of the dead. Afterwards, the Japanese

hibakusha themselves were forced to endure discrimination atthe hands of other Japanese.

Both the Marukis and Nakazawa Keiji, the author of

Barefoot Gen, have introduced such themes in their atomicbomb art, and have gone on to address other non-nuclearaspects of the war and postwar period as well. After completing

their fourteenth major panelon

the Hiroshima motif in 1972,the Marukis turned their extraordinary talents to depictions of

the Rape of Nanking, Auschwitz, and the victims of theMinamata mercury poisoning. Nakazawa's cartoon books,which have been assembled in a 19-volume "peace comics"collection in Japanese, include such subjects as the Japaneseinvasion of Manchuria. He and the Marukis have also usedtheir art to record the exploitation of the people of Okinawaunder both Japanese and U.S. rule.

The Japanese art of the atomic-bomb experience also

leads, at least potentially, in another direction: to skepticismtoward authority. It is not anti-American per se, but rather astark reminder of what was done by both the Japanese andAmerican sides four decades ago in the name of patriotism andhigh ideals. This is not conducive to seeing current globalconflicts in black-and-white terms. And in contemporary Japan,

where the ruling groups are deeply concerned with reinstiIIing"love of country" and consolidating a highly paternalisticdemocracy, any such encouragement of skepticism towardauthority is extremely discomforting to the elites. It is, in fact,

all the more unsettling because, by all available evidence,young people as a whole respond positively and maturely to

these materials. Barefoot Gen, which has now been expandedinto a 7-voIume paperback edition in Japanese (each volumeis over 250 pages), continues to enjoy immense popularity ten

wAR JUST MAKES us UNHAPPY.JAPAN HAS TO WALK THE WAYOr.

PEACE-NOT WAR .. I BELIEVE 1l11S.

Copyright © 1978 by Keiji NakazawaYOU TRAITOROUS SUBVtR$IVE

YOVR THOUGHTS ARE M N G E ~YOU'RE NOT GOING TO BE LET 'E?y WITH THIS II'LL STRAIGHTEN OUT YOOR SPIRIT

FCR Y i ~ O U ~ ! ~ _ ~ . t l

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years after the original serialization was terminated. Themuseum in Saitama (the Maruki Bijitsukan) in which theMarukis' "Atomic-Bomb Panels" are displayed is visited bythousands of school-children annually (I myself have watchedthem become absorbed in these masterworks of high art). Andin 1980, Toshi Maruki, herself one of Japan's best-knownillustrators of children's books, published a picture book forvery young readers titled Hiroshima no Pika which quicklybecame well known.

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Copyright © 1980 by Toshi Maruki

Western artists and illustrators have not ventured to engagethe atomic-bomb experience at these levels of sustainedintimacy, but several of the Japanese works, including the bestones for children, are available in translation. Toshi Maruki'sHiroshima no Pika, published under the same title in English,won several prestigious American prizes in 1982. The firstvolume of the lengthy Barefoot Gen series, based onNakazawa's own experiences as a boy of six living inHiroshima when the bomb fell, can be obtained in an excellent

37

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black-and-white English version; for young readers, it is hardto imagine a more vivid and engrossing introduction to life inwartime Japan, the bomb experience itself, and the ordeals of

the survivors. This famous Gen series was inspired by a shortversion of his experiences done by Nakazawa in 1972, and in

1982 this was made available in a standard colored comic-bookformat in English under the title I Was There.

Gen can be read as meaning "root" or "source" in

Japanese, and in the introduction to the first English volume

of his famous series, Nakazawa explains how he came to callhis semi-autobiographical protagonist Barefoot Gen:

I named my main character Gen in the hope that hewould become a root or source of strength for a generation

of mankind that can tread the charred soil of Hiroshimabarefoot and feel the earth beneath their feet, that will have

the strength to say "no" to war and nuclear weapons ....I myself would like to live with Gen's strength-that is myideal, and I will continue pursuing it through my work.

Out of the terrible destruction has thus emerged a heightenedcommitment to creativity. Adults may ponder this. Childrenseem to appreciate it intuitively. For them, art may be the mostconstructive medium through which they can begin to come to

grips with the nuclear world they have inherited. *

AND...

"Tl\ISIS ...~ ~ ~ £11<0 ..

LOOK GEN/LOOK AT •ALL lliEl<XlJSTS/


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~ ~ ~ I E d u C o m i e sbox QOlLl6S&n frAn"S'ocalif. ' C l q O

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After the War: Translations from Miyamoto Yuriko

by Brett de Bary

Introduction

Within a year of the end of the Pacific War on August15, 1945, Miyamoto Yuriko had written two companionnovels, The BanshU Plain (Banshii Heiya) and The Weathervane

Plant (Fiichiso), both descriptive of her experiences in the

weeks and months immediately following the surrender. Thefact that this pair of novels, written by an author who had beenunder constant police surveillance and whose works had beenbanned during much of the wartime period, received the

Mainichi Cultural Prize for 1947, is as indicative of thedramatic transformation of the Japanese literary scene in thewake of defeat as it is of the timeliness of Miyamoto's subjectmatter. The Banshu PLain remains one of the most soberlydetailed literary evocations of Japan in August and September1945, while The Weathervane PLant provides an account of

Yuriko's reunion with her husband, Communist Party leaderMiyamoto Kenji, after his release from twelve years of wartimeimprisonment. In The BanshU PLain, Miyamoto's viewpoint ispanoramic, her attention outward-turned; The Weathervane

PLant focuses on the inner workings of Yuriko's marriage andoften reads as a probing, even sadly resigned, attempt to takestock of the "fit" between her feminism and her personal life .

Translated below are excerpted chapters from the two

novels. The first is the opening chapter of The Banshu Plain,containing a depiction of the day of Japan's surrender whichis one of those written most closely in time to the actual event.The setting of the chapter is a town in Tohoku, rural northernJapan, where Yuriko, represented by the character Hiroko, wasliving as an evacuee at the war's end. The chapter captureswell the sense of numbness and moral confusion with whichmany Japanese responded to the news of surrender-Hiroko's

evasive brother, a Tokyo professional, cannot explain what is

happening to his children, while the local farmers take to drink.For Miyamoto, this is symptomatic of a Japanese lack of innerresources with which to deal with defeat, a "moral bankruptcy"which becomes the major theme of the novel and which she

40

sees as the most tragic legacy of the war. The PeacePreservation Act, which Miyamoto refers to in both novels,

was originally passed in 1925 and prescribed heavy penaltiesfor participation in a broad range of political and culturalactivities defined as subversive of the Japanese government.The provisions of the act were made more stringent as the warprogressed. It was on the basis of this law that Yuriko'shusband, Miyamoto Kenji, was imprisoned for 12 years and

that Yuriko herself was arrested, detained for brief periods,and kept under surveillance during the war.

Although Hiroko expresses concern about the fate of herimprisoned husband Jiikichi (Miyamoto Kenji) throughout The

BanshU PLain, it is only in The Weathervane PLant that thesubject of their reunion is taken up. The heady renascence of

political and cultural activity among Japan's left-wing intelligentsia that resulted from the dismantling of the wartimePeace Preservation Laws forms the background for this intimateportrait of a marriage. While the novel is infused with a senseof the tranquil joy that Yuriko, then age forty-seven, must haveexperienced at being reunited with her husband after twelvelong years, the couple's adjustment to living together again is

shown as often painful. Despite many years of activism in the

socialist women's movement, Hiroko is cut to the quick whenJiikichi intimates she has become "too tough," too independent,living alone during the war; throughout the novel she is unableto reconcile her self-assertiveness with her need for herhusband's approval. The disparity Hiroko senses between herinner strength, tempered during the war, and the accommodations she makes to her husband, is depicted in a particularlysubtle and moving way in Chapter Four, translated here.

The measured rhythm and self-contained lyricism of

Miyamoto's prose in these excerpts is reminiscent of the styleof "I-novelist" Shiga Naoya, whose works Miyamoto studiedas a young woman.

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The BanshU Plain, Chapter 1

It was the evening of August 15, 1945. In the dining

room, where an ancient clock hung on the wall, Yukio's wife

Sae was setting the table for the family's dinner. "What doyou think, Papa ..." she called to her husband. "It's all rightto turn the lights on tonight, isn't it?"

From the verandah off the dining room, the Adatara

mountain range was visible in the distance, to the south of

them. Yukio had spent the entire afternoon in silence, smokingand staring at the mountains. "I don't know ..." He turnedto his wife, in the utterly unhurried manner that was

characteristic of him, and looked into her face intently for afew moments. "Maybe it would be safer to leave them turnedoff a bit longer."

"All right." The compliant Sae continued setting the plates

out on the table.Hiroko sat at one end of the table, helping her

four-year-old nephew Kenkichi finish his meal before the othersstarted. The subdued tone of the dialogue between her youngerbrother and his wife, who had still not fully recovered fromtheir sense of shock, resonated with her own mood.

For the past few days this region of Tohoku had swelteredunder a heat wave. Deep cracks had appeared in the parched

clayey earth in the yard outside the house. And at about fiveo'clock every morning, with roars that seemed to tumblestraight down out of the glittering azure sky, a large formation

of bombers would attack.

Last night, just as on the night before and on the nightbefore that, the air raid siren had sounded about 11 p.m. and,

until 4 or so the next morning, hundreds of B-29 bombers, in

wave after wave, had filled up the windless summer night sky.

A barely audible radio broadcast had given Akita Prefectureas the destination of the planes, but no one in the village placed

much faith in the report. Earlier, when the railroad depot andthe military installation in this village (where the Tomii familywere living as evacuees) had been severely bombed, the airraid siren had only sounded several minutes after the first attack.

Yukio and Hiroko had kept watch all night on the 14th.The moon had come out late that evening, revealing in its dim

light the gently swaying fields that lay just beyond the verandah,the one closest to the air raid shelter, where Hiroko and herbrother-in-law had been sitting in silence with the rain shuttersthrown wide open behind them. In the intervals between the

passing of the American planes, the village civil defense teamwould relay their messages. One of the voices was a woman's.

"En-e-my!" Hiroko felt saddened as she listened to the slenderthroat strain to prolong each syllable. The sound floated

intermittently across the sweet potato patch, which was coveredwith mist, from somewhere near the large pond. Was it a sense

of the importance of her duty that made the middle-agedwoman's voice seem to tremble? The voice brought to Hiroko's

mind a desolate shack on the outskirts ofthe town. She picturedthe sweaty, entangled bodies of several children sleeping under

a worn mosquito netting, the sleeping face of a grandmother.Surely there was no man in that house.

Hiroko approached the mosquito netting where Sae had

retired to sleep with her three children as quietly as possible,but no sooner had she peeked inside than Sae asked, in a polite,concerned voice, "How are you? You must be exhausted. Is

Papa still up, too? What a noise they made last night!" A small,carefully enclosed oil lamp had been set beside Sae's pillow,

just large enough to light the way if she had to escape withthe children. The blue sheen of the mosquito netting and the

intricate shadows cast by the lamp made Sae' s beautiful noselook sharp and severe against the white pillow case.

With a roar that seemed to shave the earth right off the

fields, the last formation of bombers passed. Afterwards, nomatter how intently they listened, the sky was empty. Hirokosuddenly felt the strength rush out of her body.

"It must be over." Sae had inched out from under the

mosquito netting. She unfastened the stringsof

her air raidhood, shaking her head as if it had been a real nuisance towear it. Yukio had stood, shoes and all, on the step outsideand lit a cigarette. On the first puff he had taken a deep, deepbreath that indented both his cheeks.

On the day of the 15th, before they had finished a late

breakfast, the air raid siren sounded again."It's the midget planes!" Twelve-year-old Shinichi's eyes

were wide with excitement. As he dashed out of the house, hestopped to put on little Kenkichi's air-raid hood and to lead

him into the shelter. Just three days ago, when the nearbymilitary installation and airstrip had been bombed for an entire

day, it had been done by a formation of midget planes.

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"Mother! Hurry! Hurry!" Sae, bearing her sickly oldestdaughter in her arms, came in and sat in the innermost part of

the shelter. Above the hand-dug trench into which the familyhad crowded, summer grass grew thickly. When it looked as

if Kenkichi was about to cry from boredom, Hiroko pluckedsome wild flowers and had him hold them in his fist as shemade up a little story. But just over three hours later, at 11:30,it was suddenly quiet.

"That's funny. The planes are all gone. Really." Shinichishouted down in a disbelieving voice, as he surveyed the skywith his telescope from the roof of the shelter. Up untilyesterday, when the midget planes had appeared they wouldattack repeatedly until the sun set.

"Strange things do happen . . .""Maybe they took a break: for lunch. They'll be back."Despite these skeptical comments, they poured out of the

air-raid shelter with slightly lightened hearts. Everyonereturned to the dining room.

Sae asked if they should eat right away, or listen to theradio broadcast. Earlier there had been an anouncement thatthere would be an important broadcast at noon today.

"Let's wait. We had a late breakfast," said Yukio. "Sister,is that all right with you?" Hiroko agreed.

Shinichi had put himself in charge of the radio and waswatching the clock. In a few minutes, a tape recording of theEmperor's voice came on. But the voltage in the radio wasvery low and the feeble voice, uttering strangely formalphrases, was exceedingly difficult to understand. Shinichi,amazed that it was the Emperor's voice he was listening to,kept adjusting the sound. When the volume was clearest, thespeech was just barely intelligible. Even Kenkichi was listening

quietly in Sae's lap. As the tape continued, they caught thephrase, "We have no choice but to accept the PotsdamDeclaration." Hiroko, who had been standing near theverandah, edged,in spite of herself, toward a spot just besidethe radio. She pressed her ear against it. This circuitous, nearlyincomprehensible speech was a declaration of unconditionalsurrender.

When the voice stopped, she looked at her brother andhis wife. "Did you understand what he was saying? It's anunconditional surrender."

The tape was followed by an announcement from theCabinet. Then that, too, was over. No one spoke until Yukiouttered, as if in complete disgust, "Incredible!"

Given what had just happened, Hiroko was astonished athow quiet everything around them was. The air burned in theblistering August afternoon; hills and mountains were enveloped in boundless heat. But in their town there was not asound. No voice broke the silence. Hiroko felt as if her entirebody reverberated with it. At some point between noon andone o'clock on August 15, while all of Japan was mute and ata loss for words, history had turned this great page in silence.

This stillness that had immobilized this small town in Tohokualong with the heat-what could it be if not a moment of

convulsion in that terrible history in which, up until this veryday, Hiroko's life itself had been painfully caught up? Hirokoshuddered.

Sae, with Kenkichi in her arms, stepped out onto theverandah and quietly wiped away tears. From the back hermatronly figure, clad in the work pants she had worn evenwhen she went to bed at night, conveyed a mixture of reliefand let-down she could hardly articulate.

Shinichi's sunburnt cheeks seemed to have turned togooseflesh in patches and his eyes shifted from his parents toHiroko.

"Auntie, is the war over?"

"It is.""Japan lost?""Yes. Japan lost.""Really? It's an unconditional surrender?"Hiroko was both moved and vaguely frightened by the

expression on the youth's clean-cut countenance--a sense of

humiliation that cut him, personally, to the quick. Of course,she realized, Shinichi had believed in all sincerity that Japanwould win the war.

"Shin-chan," she addressed him slowly, "right up untiltoday all they told you, at school and every place else, wasjust that Japan would win. There were lots of times whenAuntie wanted to tell you something different, but I was afraidthat if you heard one thing here and something else at school,

you wouldn't know what to believe. That's why I never talkedto you about it."

For the fourteen-year duration of the war, Yukio's familyhad quietly skirted the edges of the catastrophe, sustaining onlythe most minor shock waves. Yukio had been exempted frommilitary service for a slight physical defect that did notincapacitate him in any way. That had been the primary reasonfor their good fortune. The so-called "peaceful" constructionwork that Yukio had been involved in as an engineer had feltthe impact of the economic blockade. This had caused ashort-term crisis in liquidity. But they had skillfully managedto stay afloat on the tide of the wartime inflation. Just a yearand a half ago, Yukio and his family had evacuated to this

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country house where his grandfather had spent his decliningyears.

Hiroko had often harbored doubts about what was reported

in the newspapers and the bulletins from the Imperial Agencyduring the war. Usually, the reports seemed either barbaric orunbearably tragic. For a person like Hiroko, it was natural to

discuss these reactions. Sometimes Yukio would express vagueagreement with her, puffing on a cigarette, but often he wouldchide her for taking things too seriously. "There's nothingpeople like you and me can do, after all. Whatever they say,we should just keep our mouths shut." A dark, severe look

would come into his eyes. This aspect of Yukio became morepronounced as the war progressed. Sensing that his anxietyextended to the matter of what his son was told, Hiroko hadkept most of her observations to herself.

The paralyzed silence of the village had continueduninterrupted from noon through evening and into the night ofthe 15th.

The next morning, Hiroko, in a bright peaceful atmospherethat she felt strangely unaccustomed to after all this time,changed out of her workpants and started a letter to her husbandJiikichi, who was in prison in the Abashiri Penitentiary. * Shesat at the desk her grandfather had prized and upon which,during her childhood, her grandmother had always carefullyset out a bronze water container, Chinese porcelain inkstone,and other writing utensils. Today the desk, reflecting theturbulent and unstable life of the family who lived in the house,was littered with clumsily written exercises Shinichi had beenassigned to do while school was in recess due to the air raids,

and with partially nibbled pieces of com left by Kenkichi.After writing a few lines, Hiroko stopped to muse. Surely

Jiikichi, behind his high, small cell window at Abashiri, hadheard that the war had ended. Jiikichi, who had lived out the

last twelve years in prison. Jiikichi, who had smiled throughthe glass panel of a prison visiting room in June, just before

she had moved from Tokyo to Tohoku, and said, "You'll bethere half a year, ten months at the most ..." With what

emotions would someone like Jiikichi learn of the end of thewar? A silent cry of victory welled up in Hiroko's breast.

Over the years, she had written more than one thousandletters to him, and all had been inspected by prison censors.

As she and Jiikichi had developed an understanding betweenthemselves, and as their methods of expression had becomemore and more deft, they had been able to infuse evendescriptions of the natural scenery with their delicatecommunication as husband and wife. But today, as she beganthis letter, Hiroko sensed only irritation at the pathetic skill

she had mastered. There was something she wanted to askdirectly, something which was the main point of her letter. It

could be written in a single line. But even now, she was unableto write it. When will you come home? That was all that Hirokowanted to write. When, indeed, would Jiikichi come home?

For over fourteen years, the provisions of the PeacePreservation Law had been so stringent there was barely roomto breathe. The government had gone so far as to import aNazi-style system of detention centers. According to therecently announced resolutions of the Potsdam Conference,

* The Abashiri Penetentiary was in Hokkaido.

this law, which bore down like a heavy weight on their smallcountry, was to be dismantled and abolished immediately. But

Japan's rulers had divulged information about this set-back inround-about phrases that those working in the fields and the

factories could not readily comprehend. Hiroko glimpsed inthis the wiliness of a group straining to hold on to the lastvestiges of its power. What were they trying to do with thePeace Preservation Law? In what manner, in what areas, might

they be able to maintain it?A wariness on this point, a painful insecurity which would

be difficult for someone who had not experienced it to

understand, made Hiroko stop writing. The simple phrase "I'm

happy," so direct in expression, was something she couldn'tfeel safe putting in a letter to Jiikichi. Too open an outpouringof her emotion might provoke instant retaliation from someunforeseen direction, in the form of nasty behavior toward

Jiikichi, who was tenaciously struggling to maintain theminimal conditions for physical survival. With each line shepenned, Hiroko's pulsating spirit twisted and turned as if in

agony. She thought of Jiikichi, who with his shaven head anddull red prison uniform still had eyes bright with expectationfor the future. When the heat generated by her contortions

struck his palm, how would he look back over the years thetwo of them had spent united, but separated by space and time?Hiroko's sense that today she had unexpectedly come to thebnnk of a steep incline was surely vividly shared by Jiikichi.

She felt this strongly.Beyond the sliding doors that Hiroko's desk faced was a

verandah. Until just yesterday the family, thrown into a panicby the air raids, had left it open all night long. Their rucksacksand several bundles tied with cloth were there, along with oilcans they had packed with edible provisions. Everything theyhad hastily set out was still standing there. This morning, tworain shutters were still pulled across the verandah, and fromone of the knotholes a hot ray of sun penetrated the gloom

inside the house.It

fell across Hiroko's wicker travelling trunkthat had been tightly bound with cords.Hiroko wanted to go and live in Abashiri, where Jiikichi

was in prison. As a writer who had some flexibility in choosingwhere she would live and work, Hiroko had made this decisiontoward the end of July. One day, a letter she had addressed inall good faith to Jiikichi in Tokyo's Sugamo Prison was returned

to her bearing an official label explaining that the addresseehad been transferred to Abashiri. Discovering the word"Abashiri" in blurry characters on the cheap paper of the label,Hiroko felt as if her center of gravity had been wrested awayto some distant place. Until that moment, Abashiri had beenonly a name to her. Yet, confined as Japan was, countless

mountains and rivers now lay between Hiroko and the place

where Jiikichi had been sent. As the air raids increased inseverity and it was even rumored that American troops mightland on Japanese soil, there were times when Hiroko fearedthose mountains and rivers might cut them off from one anotherfor years.

Hiroko had been living in her younger brother's vacatedhome in Tokyo when she learned of Jiikichi's transfer. As

quickly as possible, she had arranged for someone to look afterthe house and had moved to this town in Tohoku. She hadgone to the train station and travel office several miles fromthe house to ask about buying a ticket across the Tsugaru straits.While waiting for the ticket to become available, she had startedher preparations for her journey.

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As far south as Tohoku, where Hiroko was, the mountainswould change color in August. In Abashiri, the autumn mist

had probably already appeared. Hiroko hoped she could at leastmake the passage cross the straits to Hokkaido before snowsqualls from the Sea of Okhotsk made the roads impassable.Selecting items which would be suitable for living in a coldclimate, Hiroko had packed her trunk in the sunlight of a

summer afternoon. She hadn't the vaguest idea what kind oflife she would lead in Abashiri, where she didn't know a singlesoul. Wherever Hiroko had moved during the war, the

probation officer consistently forbade her to socialize with otherpeople. Recently, it had become difficult for her to travel bysea, even alone and empty-handed. She couldn't carry any of

her belongings with her. Nevertheless, Hiroko kept Abashiri,the place where liikichi lived, uppermost in her mind, and shereacted with alarm each time there was another air raid overAomori. The city of Aomori had been bombed, and over halfthe ferry boats that took people to Hokkaido had already beendestroyed.

Hiroko took out a stamp and put her letter, in which shehad written that if she could get a ticket she would be in

Abashiri tomorrow, in an envelope. Yet she wondered if herwicker trunk would ever really cross the sea. A thoughtfulacquaintance in Tokyo, concerned about the fact that Hirokohad decided to travel to Abashiri, where she knew no one, hadwritten to friends in a nearby city to ask them to help her.

After what seemed an interminable wait, Hiroko had heardfrom the man. In characters hastily scrawled on a postcard, hehad informed her that their area, too, had recently beensubjected to air raids, that the people he knew had either beenevacuated or killed, and that therefore it would be difficult forhim to assist her-perhaps she should discuss the matter withher husband and postpone her journey.

"You might wish to discuss the matter with your husband . . ." the man had written, as if Hiroko were planning atrip to some place he knew nothing about! The message on thecard palpably conveyed the distracted state of the kindlygentleman who had written it, his eyes darting about his

surroundings as the vortex of war closed in upon him. To besure, Hiroko mused, he had also taken into account the fact

that she was a woman under surveillance.Although Hiroko had come to this town in Tohoku simplyto live for a time with her younger brother, the local SpecialPolice Officer had investigated her relationship even to peoplewho came to the house on ordinary buiness. Sae had been toldthat, because the local officials were quite considerate, if shesubmitted the name and age of any visitors to their home shewould immediately be granted a supplementary rice ration. Saehad been happy to comply. When the police officer laterquestioned Hiroko about people who had come to the houseon such trifling business she wondered how he ever knew aboutit, it turned out these were all names which had been submittedto him in relation to the rice ration. When Hiroko mentionedthis to Sae, Sae raised her eyebrows and seemed taken aback.

"Is that what they were doing?"In the face of all this, Hiroko was still trying to travel to

Abashiri.When she went to get some paste to seal her envelope,

she heard an unfamiliar male voice in the dining room. Theman was speaking loudly, already rather drunk.

"I tell you, sir, if it weren't for a time like this, absolutelyout of the ordinary, I wouldn't be so bold as to come callingon you ..."

Yukio made a polite response."Anyway, now it's all over, what's a man to do but have

a drink or two? It don't make sense, none of it, so who cares?How about it, sir? Our sake isn't altogether low class. We putit through a cloth of pure cotton, y'know. Come on, sir. We're

acquainted with each other, after all . . ."Hiroko put on her geta and went around to the back door

of the kitchen, which was shaded by an apricot tree. Sae wassquatting on the earthen floor with a pile of firewood to oneside of her, peeling potatoes and listening to the exchange in

the dining room."A visitor?" Hiroko asked.Sae nodded her head, looking somewhat put out."Who is it?""It's Mr. Oto from Yota's place."The man worked at the control association in the town.Hiroko went out to mail her letter at the post office on

the comer, with little Kenkichi at her side. The place had thetypical look of a town which had grown up on the site of a

Meiji frontier settlement; until yesterday military trucks andmotorcycles had sped back and forth along the broad highway.Today, there was not a single one to be seen. The still, desertedroad was whitened with dust and Hiroko could glimpse Mt.Miharu off in the distance beyond the patches of cucumber andpumpkin that had been planted in the open spaces between thelow, squat houses along the road.

When Hiroko returned down the dirt road she saw,emerging from the gate near the cedar grove, Yukio, in hiswhite shirt, with Mr. Oto's arm flung over his shoulder.

After the fifteenth, all radio entertainment shows werehalted, throughout the nation. Instead, day and night, the radiocarried demobilization instructions for the army and navy and

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directives for those in the local reserve forces and pilot trainingschools. Interspersed with these were explanations of theseverity of the atomic bombing catastrophe to which the citiesof Hiroshima and Nagasaki had fallen victim, and of the fearfulpower of the atomic bomb. To forestall a run on the banks,there were broadcasts proclaiming the nation's economicstability. The Minister of Agriculture announced that there was

no need for anxiety about the food situation. The Minister ofEducation declared that Japan would be reconstructed as anation of culture and peace. One after another, announcementsfilled the air of the country town, as if the silence of aninterruption in radio broadcasting would be unendurable. Inevery house, radios were simply left running, and people

listened attentively. Yet their faces, as they listened, registereda profound aimlessness and confusion they seemed helpless toexpress in words. Up until today, they had been like playersin a tug of war, determined to win, pulling with might andmain on their cable. That cable had suddenly snapped. Now,before they had even had a moment to tumble backward onthe rebound, a different cable was being thrust at them andthey were asked to grab on. How must they feel?

That night, for the first time in six months, the lights inthe Tomoi household shone brightly, illuminating every nookand cranny on the heavy, old-fashioned beams and floorboardswhich had been blackened by years of smoke. At some point,unbeknownst to anyone, a large round weight stone used formaking pickles had tumbled down out of the high shelf in thekitchen. When it suddenly became visible tonight, they allburst out laughing. Hiroko, wearing a tennis shirt for a blouse,had the feeling that even the outlines of her own body emergedmore distinctly in the unfamiliar brightness. Outside, theelectric lamp beside the well was turned on, and through thewindows behind the raindoors that, for the first time in manydays, had been thrown open at the end of the corridor, Hirokocould clearly see the dark yard and its overgrown flower garden.

Bathed in light at last, every comer of the ancient house seemedto take on a fresh, new life. Yet how sharply that same light,in hundreds of thousands of other homes throughout Japan,must illuminate the place by the hearth of one who would neverreturn! When Hiroko thought of this, the joy she felt as lightsurged through the house was accompanied by a pang of sorrow.

That night, in the brightly lit atmosphere that exposedeven more glaringly than usual the feeble, inept quality of thegovernment broadcasts, they listened to the news that theSuzuki cabinet had resigned. The Higashikuni cabinet hadtaken its place.

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The Weathervane Plant, Chapter 4

Jiikichi worked at the table that was large enough to sit downat, writing. Beside the table they had set a Japanese style desk,where Hiroko was making a clean copy of Jiikichi's draft.

"That's funny. My feet are cold."

1iikichi gazed into the sunlight off the southern verandah,as if in disbelief that he could feel a chill when its rays wereso warm. It was a tranquil afternoon in early November.

'The chrysanthemums are usually beautiful at this timeof year," said Hiroko, throwing a blanket over his legs. "Butnone of the flower shops in this area survived the bombing."With their neighborhood surrounded on all sides by rubble, thequiet brightness of late autumn seemed unusually expansivethis year. At night, the whistle of the steam engine in Tabatasounded as if it was just around the comer.

"I wish, just for once, 1 could get a good pile of charcoalburning for you in the hibachi. But I guess there's not muchchance of it," said Hiroko.

"That's all right. Now that I'm home I can put on as manylayers of clothing as I want to when it gets cold." 1iikichi spokewithout putting his pen down, and went back to his writing.

After spending so many years without the basic humancomfort of warm food, 1iikichi was now fond of heatingpractically everything he ate. Hiroko might bring a plate of

freshly cooked tempura-style vegetables to the table and 1iikichiwould still say, "I bet these would taste even better if we grilledthem," and warm each piece over the electric burner beforeeating it. "Let's warm this up!"-whether it was tea, soup, orwhatever, Jiikichi heated things up as if all life's pleasures

were best warm.Hiroko experienced these little pleasures of Jiikichi's

vividly. A few minutes ago, when she had put a kettle of water

on the burner, Jiikichi had commented, "I seem to be drinkinga lot of green tea these days." He seemed surprised. "I neverliked it that much before."

"It's the same for everyone. There's nothing else to drink.Did you hear what they used to do with the left-over tea leaves?When the war first started they fed them to the horses. Thenthey told us to eat them."

"I ate them, too. In prison. I was constantly hungry."They went back to work for a while, until Hiroko came

to several lines she couldn't make out. "Where does this partgo?" She handed the draft, which was full of erasures, up to

Jiikichi. "Right after the line that says, 'In view of the PotsdamDeclaration.", He traced the lines with his eyes. "Right here."He showed Hiroko the place he had marked with his pen. ' ' 'In

the future, we should adhere rigorously ... '"

"All the way to there? You're jumping allover the place,aren't you?"

They became silent again. But gradually Hiroko's copyingbegan to outpace Jiikichi's writing. She filled the idle spacesby making tea or going downstairs to do some preparation fordinner, while Jiikichi, totally oblivious to her comings and

goings, continued to work with a will, in a manner which wasboth relaxed' and concentrated. Sitting with her chin in herhands, Hiroko drank in the atmosphere. When had she everworked so happily and with such a sense of fulfillment, as ifshe were shaking sleek, ripe ears of grain from their stalks?

The sliding doors of the three-mat room behind them wereopen. Hiroko's eyes wandered to the room and she stared atit. The afternoon sun lit up the shOji. A folding bed was storedagainst the wall. Hiroko could see the intricate pattern madeby the metal bars of the bed when it was folded in three, andthe patches of rust on the nickel-plated springs. When she hadleft this house to go to Abashiri, when 1iikichi had been in the

penitentiary there, she had folded up this bed and put it in thecomer. There it had stayed, collecting a light film of dust, until

this very day. When Jiikichi had returned home and discoveredit, he had remarked, "That's handy. We can use it to rest onduring the daytime." But Hiroko had had no inclination to openup the bed.

There was one scene that always came to mind whenHiroko looked at that single-mattress bed. It was the scene of

a spare, six-mat, second-story room, with a small latticewindow on the east and a bare balustrade along the southwestwall. This bed stood alongside the lattice window, coveredwith a light-blue-striped towel on which had been set a flimsypillow. To the right, at the entrance to the room, was a largewriting desk. Between the desk and the bed there was just twomats of open floor space. From afternoon to evening the westernsun, only partially screened out by a bamboo blind, beat downon the worn brown mats, the bed, and the desk, making theroom broil. One could smell invisible particles of dust burning.The air was relentlessly dry. The afternoon sun was trulyblinding.

This was the second-story room that Hiroko had lived infor four years. She would write there with a towel clenched inone hand, feeling as if she were gasping in the dry air.

The room had a narrow balcony for drying clothes. Onthe balcony stood a large pot with a weathervane plant in it.I t was mid-summer, 1941. Since Hiroko had been banned frompublishing her work from January of that year, she was barelymanaging to eke out an existence. Jiikichi, who was in SugamoPrison at the time, had not supported the idea that she should

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struggle against all odds to go on living alone. He proposed

that she live with the family of her younger brother Yukio.Without wishing to oppose 1iikichi, Hiroko had not takenreadily to the idea. She had lived apart from the family housefor twenty long years, and to those who were in the old housenow, it would appear that Hiroko was moving back becausethe difficult life she had embraced, not out of necessity but outof her own desire, could no longer sustain her economically.

Jllkichi told her it was out of a base concern for saving facethat she declined Yukio' s invitations. He wrote this in a letter.

Three years previous to this, Hiroko had also been banned

from publishing for a year and several months. But at that timeshe had not been alone. Several close friends were in the samesituation. In those days, the capacity to be outraged by suchtreatment was still alive in most writers, and Hiroko did not

feel isolated in her distress. There were always people shecould talk to.

Three years later the situation was utterly changed. ThePeace Preservation Laws, like a barbed wire fence, had created

an impassable no-man's land between writers who were"banned" and those who weren't. Moreover, while both themorale and the economic situation of writers who were active

on the front line in China and Manchuria were flourishing,Hiroko's position was like that of a lone wall on a river bank,

holding out against the pressure of the swollen waters whichcame flooding over it. It was not merely that Hiroko was in aprecarious situation economically, she was suffocating spiritually. Should she confide in 1iikichi her sense that she wasbeginning to choke for lack of air?

During the few minutes that she was able to visit face toface with Jllkichi-just that brief interval-Hiroko would feelrelieved and would be able to smile. It pleased Jllkichi to seeher chatter brightly. But as soon as she would leave the prisonand stop to visit Yukio's family (her friends' homes were too

far away), whose every word and gesture seemed utterlydivorced from her inner life, she would hurry home, thankful

that at least she had some place where she could live alone.But how hot and dry that second-floor room was! How

clumsy, how dull the sheen, of that huge desk where all herwriting was locked away!

One evening Hiroko, with nowhere else to go, wanderedout into the marketplace in front of the station. Outside a plantshop where the blinds had already been drawn, a line of pottedweathervane plants stood on the sidewalk. The plants had justbeen watered, and Hiroko took an extraordinary delight inlooking at the profusion of narrow leaves, still beaded withwater and glowing green beneath the electric light. She had tohave one. In an elated mood, she bought a pot, had someone

deliver it to her later that night after the shops were closed,and set it out on the balcony.

For a few days Hiroko, whose life no longer had roomfor such quiet, routine activities as spreading dripping laundryout to dry, watered the plant on her bare balcony faithfully.But her situation was worsening, and as her composuregradually disintegrated, the dry, tortuous summer took its toll,even on the poor weathervane plant. At some point, a few

withered leaves appeared. Hiroko glared at them. But shestopped watering the plant.

When she tried to recall it now, Hiroko couldn't even

of wind and for a few seconds the clover which bloomed alongthe embankment would be a confused, trembling mass. Hiroko,with her frayed nerves, one day sensed with a start that hersoul was shaking as violently as the clover. It was as if all herpent-up feeling had been made visible there. Night andmorning, Hiroko had slept and risen in the bed that was storedagainst the wall. At the very sight of it the memories of thatparched summer, when she had nowhere to tum, rose up in

her mind.She had bought the bed in early summer, 1935. Early one

morning Hiroko had awakened to find a man in a fedora peeringat her from behind the screens in the rented room where she

slept in that bed alone. He was a special police officer whohad come to arrest her, and who had broken into the room byjimmying open the bathroom door.

After Hiroko had moved out of her room and had turned

it over to a friend, the plant on the balcony had dried up andbeen thrown away. But there was another weathervane plantthat was sharply etched in her memory. It was the trim littlepot that stood in front of the window of Cell No. to, Women'sWard, Sugamo Detention Center. Although Hiroko had pressedthe plant as close to the window as possible, not even the tips

of its slender leaves stirred. No matter how often she lookedat it or how patiently she waited, she had never seen the leavesmoved even once by a breeze, even in the middle of the night.The building she was detained in, which had a slanted glassroof like a greenhouse, broiled and steamed in the heat of thehottest summer in sixty-eight years.

Hiroko felt choked by these memories. Could she evertell all, all of it to 1iikichi? It was only after he had returnedhome that she had been able to relax, liberated from the tensions

that had threatened to destroy her; it was only then that shecould perceive clearly what she had been struggling against allthose years and how unnaturally stiff she had appeared to thoselooking at her from the outside. A friend of Hiroko's, who had

herself been involved in a very complex situation when Hiroko

knew her, had written a short story about two sisters with verydifferent personalities. At one point, the younger sister, whosees herself as a woman of feeling, says to her chaste anddutiful older sister, "But come now, your reputation is thepride of the whole family!" Although to an outsider these wordswould appear to have nothing to do with Hiroko, she couldstill hear her writer friend's distinctive voice addressing themto her. When she had read the book, she had stopped and staredat the line. A feeling that was difficult to put in words hadflared up inside her . . . was it something she would ever beable to talk about?

She went over and put her hand on the shoulder of J ukichi,who was still writing. "What is it?"

"Please let me write." She took his empty hand in hers.

"Please. I want to be active politically, but be sure I have timeto write."

Jukichi smiled warmly into Hiroko's flushed face, andwith a touch of amusement. "Now, now. Calm down." Withthe same fingers that held his pen he traced a pattern, like amagic charm, on Hiroko's brow. "Let's not misunderstandeach other. Hasn't it been I who has been urging you to write?"

They were involved in the formation of a new literaryassociation around that time. Critics, poets, and novelists

remember what she had eaten to keep herself alive. She could whom Hiroko had not worked with for more than ten yearsremember the stalks of blooming clover near the Sugamo were coming together again to raise a cry from the heart of a*tation. When the electric train sped past there would be a blast nation whose lips were no longer sealed.

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Socialist Development: The Political Economy

of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam

by Jayne Werner

Introduction

Since reunification in 1976, Vietnam's faltering economyhas produced a crisis of grave proportions, the causes of which

are not yet fully understood. The drawn-out consequences of

45 years of war and international isolation are obviouslyimportant elements affecting the Vietnamese economy, but thecrisis has continued-if not worsened since the end of the war.!Grain production-16.2 million tons in 1983-has not keptpace with consumption needs. Official figures indicate thatduring 1983 per capita food production was 296 kg., up froma 1978 low of 243 kg., but still well below war-time levels. 2

Central to the debate about Vietnam's economy is an

assessment of agricultural cooperativization. Agriculturalcooperatives, in place in northern Vietnam since the late 1950s,were designed to increase agricultural productivity, a promisewhich has yet to materialize. It is clear that agriculturalcollectives must be evaluated politically as well as economically, and there is a strong argument to be made for the factthat their political successes have been greater than often

1. Vietnam's small industrial capacity was crippled by the war, urban centersin the south became dependent on foreign military and economic aid, andprograms of "forced urbanization" created severe rural/urban imbalances. U.S.diplomatic and economic isolation has played a role in Vietnam's economic

difficulties and Vietnam's cold war with China has been costly, but the breakwith China and the military occupation of Kampuchea exacerbated existingeconomic problems-they did not create them. By the time Vietnamese troopswent into Kampuchea, the 1976-1980 Five Year Plan was already beingscrapped. The economic crisis in Vietnam is thus not directly linked to theVietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.

2. Calculations made by Alec Gordon, "Vietnam's Food Crisis," paperpresented to the conference "A Critical Examination of Vietnam's Economy,"

Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, June 1982. Figures for 1981 and 1983are from the Weekly Bulletin, published by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,Permanent Mission to the U.N., October 4, 1983, p. 5. Average caloric intake

in Vietnam is well below world standards-I 800 calories in 1979 comparedto the world average of 2590 calories. See the Bulletin d'lnfonnation et de

Documentation, published by the Association d'Amitie Franco-Vietnamienne,Nos. 52-53, SeptembrelDecembre, 1983, p. 4.

acknowledged. The economic issues are a good deal moretroubling.3

During the war years, agricultural collectivization provided a crucial political bond between village and state, whichsustained nation-wide mobilization against the AmericansUntil 1975, however, villagers in the north had a good measurof economic autonomy. Higher-level producers' cooperative(hop tae xa) tended to coincide with the traditional village (lang

or xa). Production at the local level aimed at self-relianceAlthough national unity (and party control) were unassailableduring the war, economic links between state and locality were

tenuous; economic administration was fragmented and infrastructural development was weak. 4

3. Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, Towards Large Scale Socialist Agricultura

Production. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975.

4. See Nguyen Tu Chi, "The Traditional Viet Village in Bac Bo: ItOrganizational Structure and Problems," Vietnamese Studies, No. 61 (Hanoi

FLPH, n.d.). Traditionally, village and state were integrated through thCouncil of Notables and its administrative agents, the ly dich, who ran theveryday affairs of the village and "defined the options and measures aimedat conducting the affairs of the village and the nation" (lang/nuoc). By the19th century the ly dich had become, for all practical purposes, the executors

of state directives (trat). Ly dich conferred access to communal land to mal

peasants, by which they gained entrance to the adult community. Ly dich alsocompiled the tax and land registers which gave public citizenship to malesand with it an obligation to pay taxes, do corvee labor and be available formilitary duty. The allocation of communal land to male villagers on behalf othe village and the nation (lang/nuoc) required villagers to defer to the exactionof the nation (nuoc).

The second mechanism of state legislation was the statutes of the village(huong-uoc), a codified set of laws which included prohibitions, rewards andpunishments for certain types of behavior, and compensations for meritorioudeeds. Huong-uoc were, according to Nguyen Tu Chi, "a masterly combinationof village traditions and state power."

The third mechanism was the tutelary spirit of the commune, which

defined its personality and provided a focus for village/state identification. Thecult of the tutelary spirit or the thanh hoang (the "spirit of the ramparts andthe moats"), around which the spiritual life of the village revolved, wa

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With the end of the war, the peasantry's willingness to

produce for the state weakened. Since the supply of consumergoods was very sparse and access to agricultural inputs suchas fertilizer, equipment and seeds was limited, peasants simplycurtailed their transfers to the state in like manner. The statewas as a result obliged to devise stronger incentives to motivatepeasants to raise productivity and release their surplus to state

collection agencies. In addition, drastic cuts in aid from theSoviet Union and China, poor weather and profound politicaldisputes within the Vietnamese COll)lIlunist Party itselfcombined to produce an agricultural crisis of immenseproportions, which peaked in 1977-78. The Party respondedto the crisis with a series of economic reforms, designed tospur agricultural productivity, and initially known as the "SixthPlenum Reforms," following the sixth plenum of the fourthparty congress in the summer of 1979.

Decentralization of Production: Subcontracting and

the "Family Economy"

A central aspect of the new reforms is the system of dualcontracts between the state and peasant producers. Thesecontracts oblige peasants to deliver a negotiated amount of

grain to the state in exchange for the state's obligation to supplyfertilizer, seeds, and certain kinds of equipment at a reasonableprice to the peasants. In 1981, the key policy of subcontractingagricultural tasks to families was introduced, known as thekhoan san pham ("contracted products") or subcontracting.Subcontracting has proved to be very successful. After a year'stime, production in some cooperatives was said to be up by30 percent. 5 The contract system provides incentives toincreased output by setting a quota of production at averagedlevels which is to be sold to the state at state prices. Theproducers can keep the surplus and dispose of it as they desire.For agricultural products, free market prices are considerablyhigher than state prices,6 so that with the new system peasantshave the opportunity to increase their income and their purchaseof consumer goods, which provides incentives for theproduction of these goods.

The widespread adoption of subcontracting, in additionto the system of private plots in existence since the beginning

of collectivization, has reduced the role of collective structuresin agricultural production to the point where non-collective

practiced at the village dinh or communal hall. State power conferred identity

and legitimacy on local spirits which were the focal point of village festivals,

ceremonies, and competitions, all contributing to a strong sense of communallife.

Communist party rule restored the nation to the village. by achievingnational independence. The local party leadership, transformed in its classbasis, found itself in the same position vis-a-vis the state and village as the ly

dich. The local party as the agent of the state was obliged to collect taxes,

procure grain and mobilize military manpower for the state. The party rulesof the village cell were derived from national party statutes. Land was allocated

through the party appartus.I am not suggesting that "national integration" was or is weak in Vietnam,

because I see cultural and political dimensions to integration that have beenhighly cohesive. However, labor productivity and agricultural production havebeen two weak points in'the system.

5. Interview with Huu Tho, agricultural editor ofNoon Dan, 8/26/82, Hanoi.

6. For instance, peasants sell rice to the state for 2.6 dong per kilo, 3 dongin the south. On the free market, peasants can sell rice for 10-12 dong a kiloand upwards (1982 prices).

forms of production now equal collective structures inimportance. Since productivity has been found lacking,agricultural reform necessarily has involved questions of unitproductivity, be it the cooperative, the team, or the family.This in tum has entailed questions of centralization vs.decentralization and local autonomy vs. state control.

Both subcontracting and private plots rely on the family

or household as the unitof

production. As family formsof

production, they involve different types of relations withcollective structures. Private plots in Vietnam are farmed on"5% land," or land which is owned by the family and whichconstitutes about 5 percent of the total collective land. Farmingon 5% land bears no formal relationship with the agriculturalcooperative. Subcontracting, another form offamily production,consists of the family signing a contract with the collectiveunit (the cooperative or the team) for farming on state-ownedland, that is, on land owned by the cooperative. Responsibilityfor fulfilling the contract lies with the family, which allocateswork based on relations within the household.

It can be argued that decentralized forms of productionincrease productivity, but they do so by strengthening local

autonomy at the expenseof

the state. In Vietnam, decentralization in agriculture has shifted responsibility for productiondown from the level of the cooperative to the production team,and from the team to the family. Half of the six agriculturaltasks formerly performed by the agricultural cooperative arenow performed by the family as a result of the adoption of

subcontracting.7 The three new tasks taken over by the familyare transplanting, weeding, and some harvesting. Plowing,water control, and pest control, with the remaining harvesting,are still performed by the cooperative using collective labor.It is mainly women's work, rather than men's work, that has

been de-collectivized and reverted back to the family, with aconcomitant loss in the role in productionof the collective-unitleaders at the level of the cooperative management committee

or the team, many of whom were women. As collective unitsof production lose their role in production, the state finds itsleverage vis-a-vis the localities reduced. Non-state mechanismssuch as the family and the market have picked up the slack.

Thus economic reforms in the form of moves towarddecentralization seem to call into question the original socialistvision put forward by the party. Especially troubling are theincrease in women's work and domestic labor as a solution tothe economic crisis and the decline in participation of womenin social production and public life.

The pros and cons of subcontracting are debated openlyin Vietnam. Party cadres appear to dislike the contract systemfor ideological reasons, but since the results have been good,the party leadership has been reluctant to abandon it. Many

officials argue that subcontracting is a temporary measure, andthat following this period of crisis, it will prove to beunnecessary and can be scrapped. Others argue that individualand family forms of farming are "appropriate" to anunderdeveloped economy which relies primarily on manuallabor, has limited mechanization, and virtually no small-scaleindustry.8 Despite intense debate, subcontracting has proved

7. Interview with Huu Tho, 8126/82, Hanoi.

8. Interview with Nguyen Huy, Deputy Director of the Economics Institute,

8/23/82, Hanoi.

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its usefulness and probably will not be abandoned in theforeseeable future. Its benefits were recently affirmed at the4th party plenum (5th party congress) in mid-1983. 9

Agricultural cooperatives in the north which the writerhas visited since the adoption of subcontracting have generallyreported substantial gains in production. As a rule, cooperativeswith production problems have stood to benefit more from

subcontracting than those with no problems in meeting theirquota. But even successful co-ops or state-aided co-ops("model" co-ops), most of which adopted the contract systemlater than the weaker co-ops, have reported progress. Adoptionis voluntary but presumably the party line is a very effective

means of persuasion.At Yen So co-op near Hanoi (Thanh Tri district), which

I visited in 1980 and 1982, families exceeded their quotas byan average of 200 kg. in paddy in 1982, which they were ableto keep as surplus. O This co-op achieved self-sufficiency inrice in 1982 without state aid, I was told, which suggests it isa strong co-op. Half of the agricultural work here is carriedout by individual or family labor under contract to thecooperative, and the remaining half is organized by the

management committee of the cooperative. Family andindividual contracts are made for transplanting, weeding, andharvesting, whereas the cooperative manages plowing, irrigation, and pest control. The contract system is also used for pigproduction. After raising a fixed quota, extra pigs can be soldon the free market at the family's profit."

At Dong Hoa co-op in Thai Binh province, the contractsystem was adopted rather late because the peasants were not

enthusiastic about implementing a new policy. Nevertheless,it did spur production; 50 percent of the families exceeded theirquota.'2 Pigs and fish are also raised under the contract system.

It was explained that peasants now enjoy the system becausethey can use additional labor to advantage. That is, leisurehours spent working for the cooperative are remunerated-once

the quota is met, the surplus belongs to the producer. Familylabor in this context becomes particularly valuable.

The standard of living at Dong Hoa is still low, andself-sufficiency in rice has been achieved only with great effort.Average per-capita paddy production used to be 95 kg., but

with assistance from the state in the form of irrigation and newseeds per-capita production went up to 240 kg. With grain

self-sufficiency state aid ceased.At Nguyen Xa village in Thai Binh province, famous for

its traditional water puppets, the agricultural co-op registereda 7 percent increase in family income after a year's adoption

9. Hoang Tung, "Some Views on Thoroughly Understanding the Resolutionof the 4th Party Central Committee Plenum," Noon Dan, 30 August 1983, in

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Asia andPacijic, 14 September

1983.

10. Talks with the Manager and Deputy Manager of the Agriculturalcooperative. Visits were made to the northern and the southern parts of Vietnam

in the spring of 1980 and in August 1982. During both month-long trips Ivisited the following provinces: province of Hanoi city, Ha Nam Ninh, ThaiBinh, Hai Hung (in the north); Ho Chi Minh province, Tay Ninh, An Giang,Hau Giang, Cuu Long, Dong Nai, Tien Giang (in the south).

II . In 1982, a pig raised in Yen So sold on the free market for twice as much

as the state price.

12. Talks with the Chairperson of the Commune People's Committee and theManager of the cooperative. Mine was the first foreign visit this co-op had

received.

of the contract system." Nguyen Xa is a successful co-op

a fertile valley and has invariably met its production quodespite vagaries in agricultural policies. After the contrasystem was adopted, it was explained, work was more intensivand of better quality.

The contract system is also used for handicrafts, whicprovide over 40 percent of the income at Nguyen Xa. Th

handicrafts co-op, in which women make up 90 percent of thlabor force, manufactures carpets and mats. Each loomoperated by a worker in a large, one-story farm-type stuccbuilding. Half of the building is devoted to carpets, the othhalf to multicolored mats. The quota for carpet production12 sq. meters a month, for which workers get 25 dong a meteIf they produce over that, as most do, they getthe same amounFor the mats, the quota is 160 sq. meters a month (pay: 2 don

a meter). The average monthly production for carpets is 1meters (2 meters above quota), for mats, 180 meters (20 meteabove quota). Handicraft workers thus average around 350-36dong a month. The cooperative sells the mats, exported to th

Soviet Union, for 45 dong a meter, making a handsome profeven after administrative and building expenses are met.

The contract system has stimulated production, but iextensive adoption has put most of agricultural labor under thcontrol of the family, In addition to the reversion to the famiof half of what the cooperative previously managed, the famialso reaps the fruits of its labor from the private plot. Incomfrom the private plot is known as the "family economy" (kin

te qia dinh). The family economy alone comprises 40-6percent of total peasant income.'4 Therefore, if this can b

quantified, roughly 75 percent of agricultural labor, accordinto source of income, is now being carried out by the familand the rest is collective.

The family economy is quite distinct from the contrasystem. Peasants practice highly-productive intensive farminon 5% land and, in some cases, obtain four crops a year o

this land. Vegetables, fruit, pigs and poultry-all fetching gooprices on the free market-are preferred, although rice is alssometimes grown. In suitable areas, mulberry trees ansilkworms are raised on 5% land rather than collectively sinctheir cultivation requires intensive effort. (This is the case, fo

instance, in Dong Hoa commune.) The family economy supplie90 percent of the pork and chicken produced in Vietnam anmore than 90 percent of the fruit. 15

Although the family economy is highly productivofficially it is considered to be a "subsidiary" economy. It

also sometimes termed a "supplementary economy" becausworkers and civil servants can have a "family economy" tooTeachers can tutor on the side in addition to their regulemployment; doctors working for a state enterprise can treat

few private patients. The deputy-director of the EconomicInstitute in Hanoi illustrated this point by saying that his wif

and children make clothes that are sold to the state. (He sayhe cannot take part-he already works 14 hours a day for thstate). So the family economy, according to the official view

13. Talks with the Chairperson of the People's Committee and Manager

the Agricultural Co-op.

14. This is my own estimate, based on a reading of the Hanoi press anextrapolating from averages of the eight co-ops I have visited to date.

15. Noon Dan, 8/23/82.

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is the economy of work done in the family, at home, or on the

side.The bounty of the family economy reflects the economic

difficulties of Vietnam. In other socialist countries, it isreported in the Hanoi press, the family economy contributes

about 30 percent of the over-all GDP. Nhan Dan frequentlycarries articles on this subject concerning the situation in theUSSR and Eastern Europe. In Vietnam, the state economic

sector fails to provide enough work to sustain full-time laborforce participation. Workers in industry and agriculture maywork only Y2 or 2/3 of the year. Factory workers are sometimesturned away at the door (they receive 70 percent of their salaryif laid oft),'6 if repairs on equipment are slow or shipments of

raw materials have been delayed. Even village carpet-makingin rural cooperatives can be held up by lack of raw materials,as the wool is provided by the state and in some cases the statecannot meet the demand.

Agricultural co-op workers may only work 150-180 daysa year, although the obligation for both men and women is to

work 200 days a year in collective production. The "subsidiary"economy can also boost incomes considerably, sometimesmore than state employment.

The contract system, although it applies to work for thecooperative or the state, operates according to some of thesame principles. It seeks to utilize labor more rationally andproductively and increase the number of worker-hours inproduction. It also seeks to motivate workers, especiallyagricultural workers, to invest more time and effort in theirwork and increase their respect for the common property in

agricultural equipment, livestock, and the land.Low labor productivity is not always the cause of

production difficulties, however. Peasants may not meet theirquotas due to corrupt or inefficient management which assigns

the best land, tools, and even livestock, to cadres' families. Itis difficult to say how prevalent this is, but it comes up inone's conversations with top economic specialists. The truefigures for production, in fact, might well be higher because

peasants underreport their yields and purposely lag behind inmeeting their quotas. Since the state does not always fulfill its

part of the bargain-prompt deliveries of fuel, fertilizer,adequate power and electricity-the incentives to tum over thefruits of one's labor to the state are not always there.

There appears to be little debate about the permanentinclusion of the family economy in the socialist system inVietnam. It is likely to remain in effect for the indefinite future,but subcontracting may be shorter lived. In the short run,

subcontracting is in the individual interest of the producer. Atthe same time, it undermines collective spirit, cooperation, and

the cooperative structures. While subcontracting rewardsindividual initiative, it encourages peasants to underreport theiryields. It is difficult for the state to police production reports,especially if the cooperative management has its own figures

to hide.Furthermore, subcontracting has de-collectivized entire

operations that were formerly run by the cooperative, whichwill arguably be more difficult to transfer back to collectivemanagement. For instance, in 1980 when I visited Yen So

16. According to Nguyen Huy, Vice-Director of the Economics Institute,

Hanoi, 8123/82.

cooperative outside Hanoi, pigs were being raised in a newly

built, impressive series of roofed pig-stalls and the co-opproduced 150 tons of pork that year. It seemed to be an efficientoperation. Two years later when I returned to the co-op, Inoticed the pig stalls were empty. Pig production had been

de-collectivized and transferred back to the family. Less porkwas being produced, which is ironic considering the goal of

increased productivity with contracting. Some of the stalls were

being converted into buildings for the expansion of handicraftproduction (embroidered silk and carpets). This mayor maynot have been a "rational" move on the part of the co-op, butcertainly handicraft production is highly lucrative since it isgeared to the export market. The embroideries being manufactured were beautifully done, but the efforts and the obviouspride of the co-op leadership in 1980 in having built up a ratherlarge-scale piggery went for nought. It should be noted pigsare raised not only for meat but also for manure, a vital local"raw material" in light of chemical fertilizer shortages.

Comments have also been made in Nhan Dan, the partypaper, about the spirit of collective endeavor being adverselyaffected by the contract system. 17 Obviously good party

leadership at the local level is important to manage a balanced

application of the policy and provide guidance for the wiseinvestmentof surplus income. It has been found that as incomesrise, peasants prefer putting their money into brick houses andexpensive furniture to investing it in fertilizer or tools to maketheir agricultural work more productive. 8

Furthermore, the contract system actually penalizes thosefamilies who make the most sacrifices for the country, sincefamilies from which males have been mobilized for militaryservice lack the labor power to profit from the contract system.Invariably those families with more pairs of hands have more"extra" time to subcontract to the cooperative than those whoselabor power is limited. In the co-ops I visited the deleterious

effects of the contract system in this regard were invariablypointed out. It was explained that families whose male members

were in the army were far less enthusiastic than those whowere not and that the co-op had in effect to assume the

responsibility to aid those families with men in the army.

It is difficult to see how long this situation can continue.In Nguyen Xa, 90 percent of the families have men in the

army, which does not seem to have affected production orparty loyalty, but Nguyen Xa is clearly an atypical commune.Its revolutionary roots go back to the first liberation war, andone of its leaders is a former provincial party cadre. 19

At Dong Hoa commune, 50 percent of the families havemen at the front and these families experience greaterdifficulties in their living conditions than non-combatantfamilies. At Yen So, I was informed 80 percent of the familieshave sons and fathers at the front.

17. There was an important debate in Nhlin Dan on the contract system inJanuary-March 1982.

18. Huu Tho referred to this problem in our discussion, and it is noticeablein many villages, where one sees fancy altar tables and china cabinets adorningeven the simplest houses.

19. A revolutionary martyr, Nguyen Chat Xe, came from Nguyen Xa, andparty loyalty has always been very strong. During the French War, the French

suffered a big defeat near there. One thousand men from Nguyen Xa joinedthe army during the U.S. war, some families contributing three to five sonsto military service.

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Also, families with war dead and war invalids suffer and

need compensation or special benefits from either the commune

or the state. In some co-ops, these families are allocated the

best land for subcontracting and their quotas are reduced. The

state sells them paddy at reduced prices and will give them

advances on their workpoints before the harvest. Furthermore,

the mass organizations like the Fatherland Front and the

Women's Union have developed special programs to help war

families.Yet subcontracting may lead to extreme inequalities in

income and undermine collective unity as well as the spirit of

collective sacrifice which has been one of the strongest bonds

between peasant and state in Vietnam.

Women and "Family" Production

In the long run, the shift of economic policies toward

family forms of production conflicts with the goals of raising

the status of women and promoting sexual equality. The new

policies will have deleterious effects on women unless

conceived as short-term measures to solve the crisis in food

production. Indeed, the condition of women and the women's

movement has declined since the mid-1960s when NorthVietnam was battling the air war against the U. S. 20 This is in

part due to the increase in family forms of production, but also

to the deteriorating economic situation.

Under the contract system, the tasks that have been

subcontracted to the family are mostly women's work-trans

planting, weeding, some harvesting. In fact, one estimate is

that women are performing 90 percent of these subcontractedtasks.21 Women also perform most of the labor in the

"subsidiary economy of the family" and indeed participate in

family production far more than in collective production. Now

that the family pays more attention to the work being performed

in subcontracted tasks women have to work harder and longer

hours. At Dong Hoa co-op in Thai Binh province, I was

informed women are even doing the plowing because theycannot wait for the men to do it. Therefore their work load has

considerably increased with the contract system.

The contract system has helped to increase family income

but it has also decreased the time women need for rest, to

supervise their children, and to attend to their own health needs.

There appear to be no statistics on the effects of the contract

20. See Werner, "Women, Socialism, and the Economy of Wartime NorthVietnam, 1960-1975," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XIV, Nos.

2 & 3 (Summer/Autumn \981), pp. 165-190. In this article I argue thatwomen 's status and position in society rose considerably during the war because

of the initial effects of cooperativization, war-time mobilization of males, andparty policies to promote the training and promotion of women cadres andlocal leaders. In a conversation with Nguyen Khac Vien in Hanoi in August1982, I discussed my assessment, with which he agreed, that the women's

movement had declined since the war. This conclusion is also reinforced bya frank and self-critical examination of the Women's Union by Mme. NguyenThi Dinh, President of the Women's Union, in a speech given to the 5thCongress of the Women's Union, held in Hanoi in March 1982. In this speech,

Mme. Dinh describes the great difficulties facing women in Vietnam today,which the Women's Union has been slow to respond to. She says the number

of women cadres has declined, and implies conditions for women haveworsened. See Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh, "Report of the Central Committee of

the Vietnam Women's Union to the 5th Congress of Vietnamese Women,"

Hanoi, 1982.

21. According to Huu Tho, interview, Hanoi, 8122/82.

52

system or the family economy on women's health, misca

riages, and infant care, and these investigations are a pressin

need. Also, the scientific institutes are neither serious

studying problems of women's work nor focusing specifical

on the participation of women in the labor force, Indeed the

appear to be no policies regarding women's labor as such.

Those agencies responsible for women's welfare must

of two minds about the contract system, as perhaps the wom

producers and local Women's Union officials are themselveThe role of the Women's Union is to help women with fami

problems and encourage them in specific areas. For instanc

in Dong Hoa commune, where silk-worm raising is importan

the Women's Union decided that all of its members wou

plant ten mulberry trees and encourage non-members to pla

two or three in their courtyards, The work of the Women

Union is therefore closely tied to production and is oriented

helping those families with production difficulties. It is th

most important communal mass association in terms

assistance to war families, along with its affiliate organizatio

the Association of Combatants' Mothers. Membership in the

women's organizations can be quite high: in Nguyen X

membership in the Women's Union was 450, in the Associatio

of Combatants' Mothers 170. In Dong Hoa, the Women

Union had 450 members. Each of these villages has

population of about 600 people.

Of all the mass associations, the Women's Union is b

far the most important because it deals directly with productio

via the majority of producers (women). The Women's Unio

plays a multifaceted and vital role in the implementation

economic policy, its economic responsibility outweighing ev

its social obligations. The Women's Union has develop

programs to practice intensive cultivation, to increase acreag

devoted to cultivation, including subsidiary crops, to ado

new seeds, to prepare manure, to encourage soil improvemen

water conservation, and improve livestock raising. Loc

branches of the Women's Union, in cooperation with the loc

party cell, design and publicize slogans such as "three hen

per family member," "two-three pigs per family." The

slogans are directed towards women, who in family productio

raise the chickens and the pigs. The Women's Union al

sponsors emulation drives for transplanting rice, silkwor

raising and livestock breeding. These drives encourag

competition for higher output and provide awards for mod

producers.

The Women's Union has been actively involved in helpin

families to achieve self-sufficiency in grain production and

meet their quotas and in campaigns to encourage sales

surplus rice to the state. There has also recently been a stron

emphasis in Women's Union activities in the local areas o

encouraging peasant women to practice thrift. Whenevertalked with Women's Union officials at the provincial or th

communal level, this aspect of the work of the Women's Uniowas usually mentioned.

Local branches of the union also operate as a sort of soci

welfare agency. They try to help women with medical problem

or family difficulties, to make their lives easier. They eve

help with field labor if need be, and give advice on selectio

of seeds and fertilizers, as well as plan meetings to exchang

farming experiences and talks about improving women

condition. In some cases they supervise the distribution of foo

aid from the co-op or state to needy women and children. The

also encourage women to sell their surplus farm products the state.

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In its social programs, the Women's Union promotes thecurrent party line regarding women-"New women build anddefend the homeland"- and encourages women to practicefamily planning, to raise their children well, and develop "newtype" socialist families, which means encouraging children tohave socially responsible attitudes. Political activities includepolitical sessions to make women aware of their rights and

duties and explain party and state policies.There are a number of contradictions between familyforms of production, especially the contract system, and other

policies like population policy. Current population policy is tolimit births to two children per family, yet Vietnam has oneof the highest birthrates in Asia. There are no reliable statistics,but it may be as high as 2.8-2.9 percent per annum. 22 Thecontract system promotes a greater birth rate; the more hands forextra work, the greater the income. Families which have five

or six children are doing well under the contract system. Indeedpopulation policy and even family policy seem looselyimplemented, especially in comparison to economic policy.Population campaigns are evident in roadside and ferry-side"billboards" (signs painted on near-by farm buildings) such as

pictures of a happy couple with two children, with the slogan"Two Children per Family." But an official (a woman) at onecommune remarked that "family planning is encouraged here-our goal is three children per family."23

Population policy appears to be poorly coordinated andunfocused indeed. While the government encourages family

planning, there is no nationally coordinated program to supportit. Local branches of the Women's Union are also moreconcerned about economic policy at the moment than familyplanning. Monetary supplements are still being given tofamilies with more than two children. The Ministry of Healthgives families 5 dong a month for the third child up to thetenth child. Housing policy is contradictory. I f there are twochildren a family is allocated an extra six square meters in the

ctiy, with nine square meters for a three child family, and soon.24 These interrelated policies remain uncoordinated.

The contract system may also conflict with educationalpolicy. The pressures to mobilize women's labor haveundoubtedly led to adolescent girls dropping out of schoolearlier than their brothers.

One other important aspect of women's labor needs to bementioned. This is handicrafts production, which in recentyears has seen a tremendous expansion. Family forms of

handicraft production exist, but handicraft co-ops in almostevery commune are being expanded or newly developed forall kinds of products. These include carpets, mats, embroideries, knitted and other apparel, wicker-work, lacquerwork, ceramics and glassware, furniture and silver-ware. Craft

co-ops also produce spare parts, work-tools, motors, bicycles,bricks and small machines for the home market, and

22. Different agencies give different statistics. The Sociology Institute claims

the birth rate is 2.5 percent per annum, and the Women's Union gives thefigure as 2.3 percent. A demographic survey for Vietnam has yet to be done.

The Sociology Institute has completed a survey for Hanoi, with findings that

the population rate is 2.24 percent per year.

23. Yen So Commune, interviews, 8/25/82.

24. According to Do Thai Dong, the Vice-Director of the Sociology Institute,

interview, Hanoi, 8/23/82.

transportation equipment like carts and sampans. Everycommune appears to be searching for ways to expand handicraftproduction for the export market.

In fact craft production is seen as somewhat of a panaceafor agricultural difficulties. Workers in craft co-ops have thepotential of making higher incomes than those in agriculturalco-ops, and those communes with 50 percent or more of their

income from crafts are much richer than non-diversifiedcommunes. Crafts are also being promoted by the state becauseof their adaptability to local, low-scale conditions, theirflexibility alongside family production, their absorption of

surplus rural labor, their production of much needed consumergoods, and their ability to contribute, eventually, to regionalindustry.25 Craft production requires more initial investment on

the part of the commune (for buildings and raw materials) butonce production is under way it produces more income because

craft prices are market-determined and higher per worker-hourthan rice prices, which are deliberately kept low by the state.

Handicraft work not only pays more to the workers in wagesin comparison to rice production, the workload is also lighter.

In some communes, women workers provide virtually all

the labor in the handicraft co-ops. The handicraft co-ops I havevisited employed women workers almost exclusively (incarpets, mats, embroideries, textiles). According to theWomen's Union, women make up 85 percent of the workersin handicrafts,26 but at the communal level the percentage isprobably higher.

Women's labor in the countryside is thus of double value,although it is not yet recognized as such, contributing to bothagricultural production and to the new forms of industrialproduction. Women's labor in family production is not asvisibly paid as it is in collective work where womenindividually collect wages in cash or kind.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the increase infamily labor for women in recent years is connected to the

decline in their public position. This does not mean that themany profound changes and improvements in women's lotsince the August Revolution are now being reversed. It is nowan accepted pattern of village life for women to play a roleand voice an opinion in the "affairs of the nation and thevillage." Their educational and medical opportunities havevastly improved, as have those of their children. They playa

greater role in the affairs of the family and attitudes havedemonstratively changed, especially among younger women.

As far as family relations with the state are concerned, itshould be noted that the nuclear family has been thepredominant kinship unit in Vietnam since pre-colonial days.Consumption, production, residence, and ancestor worship

were organized mainly by the single family (a couple and their

unmarried children). Extended family forms of residence wererare, unlike in China, with more positive implications forwomen's position. Furthermore, although women's politicaland social participation were restricted, they virtuallymonopolized the local trade and marketing networks, whichperiodically kept women away from home. Income from trade,in addition to agriCUltural work, was often a substantial

25. A recent issueofVietnamese Studies is devoted to handicrafts (No. 62).

26. Women' s Union of Vietnam, Women o/Viet nam, Statistical Data. Hanoi:Vietnam Women's Union, 1981.

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contribution to the family purse, and its sole source was women.

women.

In addition, although women were not given access tocommunal land (their names did not appear on the communaltax and land registers), they did have the right to own privateland, with the titles in their own names. Thus as private land

encroached upon public land in the 18th and 19th centuries,

women probably benefitted from this trend as well. In aninvestigation of the private land registers in Tu Liem districtnear Hanoi, it was found that women constituted one-fourth

of the private landowners. Generally speaking, they ownedless land than men, amounting to 3 mau (10,000 sq. meters)

on the average. 27 Neighborhoods of small families constitutedthe basis of peasant society, where residential relations tookprecedence over the patrilineage (ho) and extended family

allegiance. Lineage relations were also weakened by stratifiedrelations within the village which had already produced many

inequalities.Women thus occupied a somewhat ambiguous position

toward the state when the Communist party came to power.Land reform and cooperativization eliminated the class basis

of society and weakened the power of the lineage. The smallfamily cell, however, was strengthened by social change, aswell as women's position in it. Cooperativization, even duringmore radical phases of land policy than the current one, always

rested on family production and women as "family producers."This mutually reinforcing relationship in fact served the systemwell during the liberation war. But on the other hand the state

promoted women's equality (nam-nu binh dang), granted equalrights to women in the land reform, established the legal basisof women's equality, and established pressure points and lobby

groups within the state and party structure to improve women'slivelihood. Of these, the Women's Union was the stateorganization par excellence devoted to improving women's

position.

Conclusion: Agricultural Productivity and

Socialist Transition

It has been argued that private plots and by extensionother forms of family farming like subcontracting provide a

way for socialist economies at a low level of development touse "surplus labor," that labor which cannot be entirely utilizedby the collective, to their greatest advantage. In this sense,

moves toward decentralization and contracting to the family

unit are methods to "control surplus labor." As such they are"realistic" accommodations to conditions and constitute apositive contribution to production. 28

Implicit in this argument is that such socialist economies

are at a very low level of development, in effect, arenon-industrialized. The poorly developed industrial sector iswhat makes the collective economy weak. Under these

conditions, family forms of production stimulate labor

27. Nguyen Duc Nghinh, "Land Distribution in Tu Liem District Accordingto the Land Registers," Vietnamese Studies. No. 61. In the villages of this

district, according to the land registers of the Nguyen dynasty, family landtook up 6.27 percent of the total land acreage.

28. Nguyen Huu Dong, "Agriculture collective, agriCUlture familiaie,economie socialiste: quelques h y p o t h ~ s e s , " op. cit.

productivity since peasants are more highly motivated when

their immediate self-interest is taken into account.This view is challenged by the argument that "surplu

labor" in cases such as Vietnam's is often performed at thexpense of collective labor. Peasants have a choice-and they

choose to reduce their contribution to collective labor anddevote themselves to their private plots. The incentives fo

their behavior in Vietnam come from the fact that prices onthe free market for food produced on the private plot are much

higher owing to their scarcity in the collective sector. The faultherefore lies with the planning apparatus and the system o

distribution which is unable to supply sufficient amounts o

meat, fruit, vegetables, and other products needed by thconsumer. The fault does not lie with the individual producewho may lack sufficient "socialist consciousness"; she or he i

merely responding to economic realities. 29

More basically, there is good reason to question whethe"surplus labor" actually exists. I f 75 percent of agricultura

work is being performed by de-collectivized labor, and if mos

of this labor is being performed by women, it is difficult tosee how women's labor can be termed "surplus labor." Family

formsof

labor add to the work women already have, rathethan take up the slack in their collective labor or their leisurtime. The labor they performed in their collective work that i

now subcontracted is the same work. Women's collective labohas been reduced because the contract system has been adopted

and the same may also be the case for private-plot labor. Familylabor increases women's work-hours, rather than taking up idl

hours. Women now perform three types of labor: domesticlabor (for which they are unpaid); family labor, private-plo

and contract labor (for which they are paid by the task or theproduct); and collective labor (for which they receive wages)

Following the end of the war (1975), women's labor for themost part has fallen outside of collective labor. As has been

shown, the value of women's labor is linked to the prominence

of the family economy and is in large part responsible for theincrease in food production associated with the contract systemWhile on the one hand, women's labor is thus contributing to

increased productivity, on the other, the form in which it isbeing done reduces women 's autonomy and places them undegreater family control. This situation threatens to underminethe advances that have been made by women during the wa

and the principles of women's liberation that the revolutionhas been based upon.

It can be seen from the above that the labor process inVietnam has not been fundamentally transformed by thecooperativization of agriculture. Even the reorganization o

agricultural production with collectivization did not represena new labor process, as such. Rather, cooperatives were and

have been collective organizations to manage agriculture, at arudimentary level; distribute social security; organize collectivecare for children, the old, and the sick; and run public schools

and health facilities, which they fund themselves. Cooperativesshould be seen less as "units of production" than as "structuresof distribution."30 The real transformation of labor in Vietnam

29. U Thanh Hoi, op. cit.

30. See A.D. Magaiine, "Cooperative et transformations du p r o c ~ s du travaidans I'agriculture vietnamienne," Critique Socia/iste. No. 46, 2"-3" trimestre1983.

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will occur when agricultural tasks become mechanized, atwhich time the labor process will be reorganized. This willnecessitate intervention from the state.

As the above discussion has indicated, intervention fromthe state may be difficult. The state's wartime politicalsuccesses were achieved on the basis of considerable economicautonomy for Vietnam's peasantry. Peasant loyalty to the"nation" is sometimes juxtaposed to peasant suspicions of the

"state."*The wartime experiences of the party have cautioned party

leaders against squeezing the rural populace too hard. I t appearsunlikely, therefore, that "development" in Vietnam will occuras a result of the exploitation of the peasantry. The neweconomic reforms, especially subcontracting, are noteworthyfor their attention to strengthening the incomes of ruralinhabitants. It is an observable fact in Vietnam that peasantslive better than city dwellers. Taxation policies and even pricepolicies which could control peasant income for the sake of

state capital accumulation have not been fully implemented. Itmay well be that agrarian collectivization will not provide thebasis for development as such. Given the nature of thepeasant-state relationship in Vietnam, economic developmentmay require massive external assistance to finance capital-intensive projects in key sectors such as hydro-electric power,transportation, petroleum, steel and cement, fertilizer and otherareas. This would at least provide the infrastructural capabilityto meet rural demands on a consistent basis for agriculturalinputs and some industrially produced goods.

In the absence of a clear foreign threat, the Vietnameseleadership will need to reassess and revitalize its ties with localsociety.31 As it has begun to do so, it has encountered a majorcontradiction between its political and economic goals. As asocialist government, Hanoi would like to incorporate itspeasantry into a centralized political system, abolishing thetraditional and highly individualized peasant producer once andfor all. The need to increase economic productivity, however,has necessitated decentralization, which has in tum reinforcedthe nuclear family as the basic unit of production. This notonly runs the risk of weakening the bonds between peasant andstate, it also threatens to undermine the gains made byVietnamese women since the beginning of the war of resistance.

As Vietnam grapples with these dilemmas, it should betaken into account that development contains an element of

desire and capacity of a populace to achieve national goals.This voluntaristic aspect of the process depends in large parton the cohesion and will of a people, and it is too soon to tellhow the ability to muster these resources mayor may not affect

the final equation. ** Ho Chi Minh was the symbol par excellence of the nation; the extractivefunctions of the national government are taken to be the "state."

31. My thinking on state-peasant relations has been considerably aided by athoughtful conversation with Pham Huy Thong. 12/6/83, New York.

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The Dark Valley Illuminated:

Recent Trends in Studies of thePostwar Japanese Economy

by Laura E. Hein

Historians are continually fascinated by the way a new

idea, seemingly independently and simultaneously, emergesfrom many minds at once. Such ideas step assuredly into themental environment that has been prepared for them by materialconditions, but they seem to belong so naturally that it is easyto forget to question how they arrived. In the case of historiansthis often involves a re-examination of a historical period. Themost recent years to emerge, reorganized in a novelinterpretation, are those of World War Two. In several recentpublications the war has been described as the crucible forJapan's postwar growth. This presents the embryo of a newtheory of the origins of Japanese economic growth, competingwith the earlier explanations of culture, miracles, and rationaland evolutionary modernization.

This new emphasis on the war suggests some fresh

directions for research on such topics as postwar labor relationsand industrial policy. It also raises questions about therelationship between war and the Japanese economy that arerelevant today to the current debate on rearmament. Thisresonance with contemporary events is hardly surprising.Following E.H. Carr's dictum that the historian's topic, aboveall, reveals the age of the historian, the echoing refrain to thequestion "what is new?" is always "why now?"

Chalmers Johnson's historical study of the Ministry of

Trade and Industry is a striking example of the increasedemphasis on the war years and the effect of the war experienceitself on postwar Japan (MITI and the Japanese Miracle,Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). Johnson arguesthat Mm's powers were foreshadowed by wartime economic

centralization and by mobilization of the economy inbureaucratic hands as part of the war effort. He backs hisargument up with specifics: for example, the Ministry of

Munitions established a presence in electric power developmentand airplane manufacture which its successor, MITI, retainedafter the war. Furthermore, Johnson argues, industrial policyitself was a child of the war effort which only matured in lateryears. Emblematic of the new prestige of industrial policy, theMinistry of Munitions finally achieved coveted office space inKasumigaseki shortly after it was established in November1943 (Johnson, p. 169).

Johnson's insights into the impact of wartime mobilizationon bureaucratic centralization are corroborated by a recently

translated book by Nakamura Takafusa (The Postwar Japanes

Economy: Its Development and Structure. Tokyo: Universiof Tokyo Press, 1981, originally published in Japanese 1980). Although Nakamura's first chapter is entitled "Prepartion through Destruction: The Wartime Economy," he argufor a much more positive legacy. At the very outset he writes:

To a real extent the system which was created during thwar was inherited as the postwar economic system. Thindustries which were expanded during the war became thmajor postwar export industries; and the postwar nationlifestyle. too. originated in changes that began during thperiod of conflict (p. 3).

Farther into his book, Nakamura details his argument length, stressing the fact that the effect of reorienting th

economy to meet wartime demands was of greater long-tersignificance than was the war destruction itself. This extendeto the structure of the economy.

The chemical and heavy industries had far more plant anequipment capacity during the war than prior to it. Thconspicuous reductions in light industry capacity. particularly textiles. were due more to wartime conversion military production and scrapping ofequipment than to wadamages. This shift in emphasis formed the basis for thheavy and chemical industrializationfollowing the war (pp14-15).

Industrial organization was similarly reoriented during th

war, according to Nakamura. The famed subcontractin

system, while first appearing before the war, emerged on large scale in the munitions-related plants. Nakamura explainthat

large firms in the military industries had at first made it rule to produce everything in-house. including parts. Bthey developed a system of sub-contracting parts and othwork out to small and medium-sized firms as an emergencmeasure to facilitate production increases . ... Here lie thorigins ofthe long-term postwar relationships between sma

enterprises and their patron or "parent" companies (pp15-16).

Similarly, in-firm production techniques, product standardiza

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tion, and technical training all developed under the stimulusof war. Nakamura places the origins of yet another importantaspect of interfirm relations squarely in the war years. This isthe bank-centered grouping known as the keiretsu, and iscertainly one of the most distinctive features of the present-dayJapanese economy. He argues that this arrangement dates fromthe spring 1944 "System of Financial Institutions Authorized

to Finance Munitions Companies." In 1944 the leadingeconomic sector was, of course, the set of firms supplying thegovernment-coordinated military effort.

The government, in turn, designated "authorized financial

institutions" for the munitions companies and arranged for

these institutions to provide an unimpeded supply ofneededfunds to the companies. The arrangement was so contrived

that other financial institutions, as wel las the Bank ofJapanand the government, were to back the authorized institutions

so that they would not lack for funds (pp. 16-17).

These relationships reappeared in the late occupation years as

the keiretsu.

While Nakamura concurs with Johnson in arguing that

MITI's power was first amassed during the war, he extendsthe argument to other economic ministries. In particular, hebelieves that the Bank of Japan's "window guidance"techniques were developed through experience with wartimecontrols (p. 18).

Labor-management relations similarly owe their form inlarge part to a wartime institution, the Patriotic IndustrialAssociation (Sangyo Hokoku Kai). Chapters ofth is associationwere established by government decree in each firm as anexplicit replacement for labor unions. They were organizedalong military lines with the company officials occupying theleadership spots. The primary functions of the organizationwere to maintain production and ensure industrial discipline,not to protect workers. Nakamura's contention that the form

associated with this coercive institution was carried over intothe contemporary period as the "enterprise union" is supportedby a recent book on the 1945-47 labor movement by Joe Moore(Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 1945-1947,

Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983). Mooredetails the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of labor organizersimmediately after the war to build democratic industry-widelabor organizations and block government and industry effortsto retain the authoritarian core of pre-surrender labor in

stitutions.In other recent developments, a panel at the March 1983

meeting of the Association for Asian Studies focused on the"trans war" continuities of aspects of the Japanese politicaleconomy. One of the participants, Richard Samuels, argues

like Nakamura and Johnson that the postwar pattern ofbusiness-government relations in the energy industries is basedon relations established in the 1934-1945 period. (Within thatframework, however, Samuels differs sharply from Johnsonon the question of the relative power of government andbusiness within the economy.) Another panelist, SheldonGaron, detailed the continuity of bureaucratic personnel whomade labor policy from 1939 through the 1950's, as well asof their policies. Andrew Gordon disagreed with Nakamuraand Moore's thesis that enterprise unions owed much to thewartime Patriotic Associations, arguing that that body waslargely ineffective, but he stressed the wartime origins of theseniority wage system.

Jointly these authors cover many of the most conspicuous

aspects of the postwar Japanese economy: industrial policyand the role of the state in the economy, industrial structl)reincluding keiretsu and sub-contracting, enterprise unions, andthe postwar sectoral shift toward heavy industry. These featuresare attributed not to Japanese culture, not to a miracle, not tothe slow, rational modernization of the economy, but to military

mobilization and the reorganization of the Japanese econornyfor the purpose of conquering much of Asia. The implicationsof this analysis have yet to be fully explored, and I can only

begin to do so here. How does the new focus on the wartimeeconomic mobilization as precursor to the postwar economycontribute to existing debates about Japan?

One implication of this approach is to minimize the

importance of the Occupation-era reforms. When the centralfocus is on the direct continuity between wartime and

contemporary economic institutions, the Occupation reformsbecome either ineffective or a minor a b e ~ t i o n . (As isdescribed below, this notion of an interrupted historical trend

is not new but has been moved slightly forward chronologically.) The emphasis on the war also steers Western scholars

away from dating the period of modern Japan from August1945; rather, Westerners are drifting toward the Japaneseemperor-centered dating system which begins a new era withthe current reign in 1926. This Showa dating structure itselfacts to minimize the Occupation years and!\tresses thecontinuous flow of events from 1926 to the present. No longeris the war set apart; the roads out of the "dark· valley" aresuddenly being illuminated and the territory 100kl' surprisinglyfamiliar.

A second major implication derives from the fact thatthese observations paralleled studies done of tQe. Americanpostwar economy. Very much like Japan, the e x p e r i ~ ~ c e of

mobilizing for and fighting a "total war" acted, to centralize

economic organizations, legitimize bureaucratic planning of

the economy, standardize production t e c h n i q u e s ~ n d enhancetechnical training procedures. (For example" see C.harlesMaier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundati0'.ls.of AmericanInternational Economic Policy after World War n" in Bt;twe,fln

Power and Plenty, Peter Katzenstein, ed., MaQison, WI:

University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.) . :These parallels suggest directiqRs fot the, continuing

debate over the uniqueness of Japanese.eCQoomk i,nstitutions:

while the specific forms of the e i r e t s u . ~ the enterprise unionmay be unmatched in other nations, the,impact of .total warmobilization on Japan closely resembles,the effect on otherindustrialized, capitalist countries. The b i ~ o r j p ~ l j . m ~ t Qf anexperience like the Second World War, whether o n y i ~ o r or

on vanquished, seems to transcend c u l t u r a l : v ~ t i o n s " , .These studies of the war econOlllY d,\(fer from, earlier

research in yet another way. Previou& $1Udies pfwelWStwar

Japanese economy have revolved around. t)te w ~ l e d e b a t e :was there a secret to Japan's e c o n Q l n i c ) : s u c c e / l s ? T h e - A A r ~ l ebelievers have generally ignored the p r e - s w ; r e M ~ r h i s t o r i ~ a lexperience although some have .argued,that . prewar v¥ue

structures play a central role in postwar ~ o n Q r n i c ~ l a t i o n s .These scholars stress the utter collapse f t h ¢ , J a p a n e ~ e q o n o . m yin 1945 to highlight the contrast i t h J a p a n ; t w e ~ t y y e a r s l a t e r .(Probably the best-known proponent Qf thisargumen,tis thelate Herman Kahn in The Emerging Japanese Sw'et;state:

Challenge andResponse, Englewood l i f f s , N J ; . J 7 e n t ~ c e - H a l l ,Inc., 1970.) This argument has become a bit p u t m ~ e d in

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scholarly circles but much of the best research in the field hasbeen dedicated, in part, to refuting it by unearthing the rational,historical roots of the postwar boom. Significantly, untilrecently most Western scholars have skipped over the war yearsin their analysis of the relationship between the prewar andpostwar economies.

For example, Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, in

their influential monograph, Japanese Economic Growth:Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century (Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, 1973), argue that Japanese economicgrowth occurs in "long swings" which connect the economyof the 1930s directly to that of the 1950s. Since the decade inbetween is by definition abnormal (although distortions causedby the First World War, the colonization of Formosa, Korea,and of Manchuria are not), Ohkawa and Rosovsky simply left

those years out of their statistical calculations. Similarly, W. W.Lockwood echoes this assumption of economic abnormalityand, therefore, irrelevance. ''The bitter experience of WorldWar II, followed by the reforms of the Occupation, permittedthe nation once more to resume the trend interrupted in 1931"("Japan's New Capitalism" in Lockwood, ed., The State and

Economic Enterprise in Japan, Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1965). This thesis of an interrupted historicaltrend is echoed in many analyses of the political system, whichstress the link between "Taisho democracy" and postwar partypolitics and skip over the "dark valley" in between.

The basic assumption underlying the thesis of theinterrupted trend is that the war was an aberration in Japan'sotherwise smooth path to modernization and development. Thisapproach, which John Dower, after Yoshida Shigeru, calls the"historic stumble" theory, has often resulted in an a prioriassumption that the vast economic and social changes of

wartime Japan were of minor relevance to the present (Dower,Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the JapaneseExperience, 1878-1954, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1979). In this view, it was as if the nation had gotten lost ina dark cavern for a few years; once it had returned to the rightpath, the experience was over. This analysis tended to see onlythe war-related factors that hampered the process of "normalization" (such as the destruction offactories) and not those thatchanged the Japanese economy in new ways.

By stressing continuity between the war and the present,the new arguments outlined earlier implicitly reject the notionof an "historic stumble." They also strike at the assumption

that Japan has been evolving into a more modern anddemocratic society since the Meiji Restoration, for thisassumption has been closely tied to the practice of ignoringthe war as an aberration, or assuming that Japan has inheritedthe democratic traditions of Taisho without being tarnished by

the authoritarianism of early ShOwa. The direction of postwarchange, however, is not at all clear.

There are two logical directions one could go afterrecognizing the contribution of the war to the contemporaryJapanese economy. The first is to reexamine postwar economicinstitutions with a fresh eye to the repression and instabilityinherent in their formation. This is of necessity a critical eye,but it does not imply a wholesale condemnation of Japan'spostwar economic structure. Rather it clarifies the role thatstate power and military force has played in organizing thatstructure.

For example, the argument that the postwar enterpriseunion grew out of the wartime Patriotic Associations raises

interesting questions. The mandatory organization was not up for the benefit of workers or even the enterprise itseRather, it was a state-sponsored means of securing productivand obedience. The fact that this structure was retained afthe war suggests that it was probably useful to the enterpriand/or labor later, but this is a more complex developmethan previously argued. It is certainly not simply a manifestati

of a culturally derived paternalistic corporate family. Tcoercive roots of the institution suggest that there was somconflict over its adoption. The role of harmonious valuremains important at the level of justification of the institutioexistence but perhaps not at the level of causation.

The other possible response is to admit the role of the wwithout accepting the reality of the wartime oppression of tJapanese and other Asian peoples. This solution is essentiato justify and recast the war as the precondition for economgrowth. This is curiously reminiscent of the argument that tAmericans did the Japanese a favor by bombing all thobsolete plants. There is precedent for this type of schola

recasting of Japanese history.In Japan the dominant Marxist analysis of mode

Japanese history has been that "feudal legacies" such as claoppression and bureaucratic disdain of ordinary people livon into the twentieth century. In response to this argumeWestern scholars, led by John Hall, have thoroughly redefinfeudal Japan as a nearly modern, nearly democratic era. In tHall analysis, the Tokugawa legacies to modern Japan aindeed strong, but they are positive bequests. Tokugawcentralized feudalism has been completely recast as legalistfair, and as "a rather good sort" of political system. Tundoubted economic vibrancy of the period has bereinterpreted as an integral part of samurai rule rather thanan unwelcome development that proceeded in spite of tShogunate's best efforts to quash it.

My fear is that, in a parallel way, the World War II peri

will be mined only for positive legacies; scholars will excavafrom the wartime archives only those historical facts whisupport the conclusion that global conflict contributed Japan's economic growth.

The context for this fear is the current rearmament debain Japan. Crudely put, the Japanese government, backed the American government, wants to rearm on a large scaThe majority of Japanese people are against the plan partbecause of memories of the last war. A major element of tgovernment's response to this anti-military attitude has beto try to blur those memories. The Ministry of Educatiowhich has betrayed a shrewd understanding of the useshistory in its censorship of school textbooks, is trying to prevetransmission of the bitter memories to Japanese children. T

meaning of World War II is a major political issue today. Ththen, is the problem which scholars as participants in their owsociety must face. As researchers carry their lamps amattocks into the unexplored recesses of World War research, it is important to remember that whatever is broug

to light will have an impact on the rearmament debate. *

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Review

by A.D. Haun

The life and works of Nakano Shigeharu, (1902-) areof interest to Western readers for several reasons: his involvement in radical politics, his experimentation with newliterary forms, and his contributions to the left-wing literary movement. As an author he moved from early commitment to the thirty-one syllable tanka poetic form to freeverse, journalistic polemics, and proletarian writings. Hisliterary radicalism paralleled his attachment to Marxistpolitics.

Nakano entered the German Literature Departmentof Tokyo Imperial University in 1924. The next year, hejoined the New Man Society, a group described in de Bary'sintroduction as "Japan's first Marxist student organizationand a center of intellectual ferment on the Tokyo Uni-

versity campus" (p. 1). Over the next two years, Nakano'smain contribution to student debates on the issues of theday consisted of critical articles on the arts and politics.

The translator sees this period as a time when thewriter was tom between his leanings toward traditionalrural society and filial obligations to his father-whowanted him to take over the family farm-and his commitment to the new, urban way of life, with the excitement of

radical politics and cultural activity. From 1928 to 1932Nakano was active in the left-wing literary movement as aneditor and contributor of articles to radical journals. De

Bary summarizes his work as an effort to find a balancebetween "revolutionary consciousness in literature" (p. 3)on the one hand, and aesthetic demands and "the experien

tial reality of Japanese life" (p. 3) on the other.Authors active in the left-wing movement soon came

under police surveillance. Radical writing was banned,political organizations were repressed, and writers werecensored or arrested. Nakano was arrested three timesbetween 1928 and 1932 for his literary and political activity,including membership in the Communist Party which hadgone underground after being prohibited by the PeacePreservation Law. He was released after admitting hisparticipation in an illegal organization and promising not toresume such activity. This "ideological conversion" wasimportant in the lives of several Japanese intellectuals like

THREE WORKS BY NAKANO SIDGEHARU:THE HOUSE IN THE VILLAGE, FIVE CUPSOF SAKE, THE CREST-PAINTER OF HAGI.

Translated by Brett de Bary. Cornell East AsiaPapers no. #21. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1979.159pp.

Nakano. I t involved the physical rigors of arrest and imprisonment, as well as the psychological wounds that aroseafterward.

De Bary points out that this turning point in Nakano'scareer is related to his "emergence as a mature novelist"(p. 4). One work from this period is the autobiographicalstory, "A House in the Village" ("Mura no ie") whichdeals with his re turn to his rural home after leaving prison.A later article by Nakano on the officers' rebellion of

February 26, 1936, was banned. He was under surveillancefrom 1936 to 1945 and was banned from publishing between 1937 and 1938. Nakano registered protest by maintaining silence instead of expressing patriotic support of thewar.

After the war, Nakano resumed the life of a Communist Party member and radical writer. The long story"Five Cups of Sake" ("Goshaku no sake") and the shortstory "The Crest-pa interofHagi" ("Hagi no monkamiya")came from the early postwar body of writing. He publishedlonger works as well, such as Pear Blossoms (Nashi no

Hana), based on the experiences of his rural childhood. I t

won the Yomiuri Prize in 1960. His political activity was notsatisfying, however. Following a clash with the leaders of

the Communist Party, he was purged in 1964. De Barynotes that his relationship with the Party, "though oftentense and beset with adversities, was a major source of

creat ive energy in his literary career" (p. 6).Nakano's works, including the three translated here,

are similar to much of modem Japanese literature in thatthey incorporate a great deal of autobiographical material."The House in the Village" centers on the conversionexperience, as do literary works by several authors of

Nakano's generation. Historical incidents are also alludedto in the other works. "Five Cups of Sake" discusses thepromulgation of the new constitution during the Occupation, while "The Crest-painter of Hagi" contains obliquereferences to the Pacific War and its aftermath.

The interplay of incident, characterization, andatmosphere is more effective in "The House of the Village"than in the other two stories. The autobiographical story

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line depicts the arrest, imprisonment, conversion, and release ofthe young hero, Benji, partly through narrative, andpartly through flashbacks in the main character' s mind. Thetext is mostly concerned with the hero's thought processes,his motives for behaving as he does, and the conflict between him and his family, especially his father Magozo.Magozo is the only other fully drawn character, and heappears more vivid and convincing than his son. Benji

seems weak-willed and inconsistent-not a very admirableor interesting personality. Other characters are either mentioned in conversation or in flashbacks. They are sketchedbriefly, and serve as foils to illustrate the conflicting personalities and viewpoints of the father and son.

One conflict is caused by their divergent ways of life.Magozo represents the rural setting of old Japan and thecontinuity of traditional values, especially the importanceof family obligations and patriarchal authority. Benji'sfather is not entirely old-fashioned, though. As a successfulfarmer, land-holder, and part-time businessman, he is arespected and important figure in the small communitywhere old ways of life and thought still prevail.

In contrast, Ben i prefers the new, foreign ways, rep

resented by the city, the university, and left-wing politics.He resists his father 's influence by refusing to shoulder theresponsibility of taking over the family farm. But his resistance proves to be self-centered and conditional. Whenarrested, imprisoned, and physically and psychologicallypressured to renounce Communism and to demonstrate hisloyalty to the government, he gives in. I t is true that he onlycomplies with the minimum requirements and is still underpolice surveillance when he is released and sent to hisfather's home. Nevertheless, both father and son feel thatBenji has been more weak-willed than others in the sameposition. His "conversion" provokes a sense of shame andguilt.

Magozo feels contempt for his son's turning away fromhis former views and his comrades who remained loyal tothe Communist movement. The father feels that his son'sspinelessness renders worthless all his left-wing writing andthat Benji should now begin a self-respecting and responsible life as a farmer. In the end there is a standoff. Benjistubbornly maintains that he wants to continue writing, inspite of his father's ridicule and his own sense of shame.

Most of the story's first part is taken up with Benji'sflashbacks to his pre-prison activity, his life in the city, andhis mental arguments with himself as he tries to rationalizehis decision to recant in prison. The first half of the storyreads like a conventional first-person novel (shishosetsu),

the personal narrative style of fiction popular in modern

Japanese literature.This type of writing tends to become tedious and repetitious, because after a time it appears that the narrator is

mostly interested in talking endlessly of his own affairs.The verbose review of one's personal life seems done not somuch for the purpose of examining motives, or clarifyingthe proper course of action to take next, as simply for layingout everything in the open. The narrator seems to be selfabsorbed rather than interested in life in the larger worldoutside his own mind.

The most prominent feature of the second half of thestory is Magozo lecturing to his son on the difficulties thathe, as the father, had in keeping the household together,

an d in particular, his frustration at trying to deal with son. In the course of Magozo's argument, the mastrength, confidence, and determination become evidein contrast to his son, who is flabby, self-centered, airresolute. The father carries out his responsibilities, whexpecting others to do the same. Benji lacks a strong seof obligation toward members of his family, his comrain the Party, and even himself. Magozo sets standards

himself and tries to live up to them, whereas his son hlittle clear idea at this point of where he belongs. It seeincongruous to call Benji the "hero" as he is not a herindividual. The contrast between the two men extends evto their physical features: the father, though nearly seveyears old, is more vigorous and powerful than his muyounger son, who is physically frail and subject to illness

The story is more successful as an evocation of moand character types than as a portrayal of Benji's psyclogical conflicts. Perhaps the work is too short to allow an adequte development of the theme. A longer nomight show the evolving personality of the hero, descrthe conflicts within the family in greater detail, and explthe psychological processes that led the imprisoned Co

munists to convert or to stay loyal to their comrades. Ththe themes of ideological conversion and intergenetional, urban-rural conflict would be more persuasive. Ais, the reader is not completely convinced of the historiand social importance of the issues because they are nadequately explaineed in "The House in the VillagThere is not enough analysis of the protagonist's personity to make his decisions seem significant and convincinThus, the story succeeds neither as psychological fictinor as a realistic development of plot. I t does not seembe a completed work. In these respects, it shares the prolems of the first person narrative genre.

The next story, "Five Cups of Sake," emulates an Japanese literary form, "following the brush" (zuihitsu

the rambling, impressionistic essay which allows the writo muse on whatever comes to mind. It is frustrating to resuch works, because they tend to lack the coherence of

essays as the genre developed in Western literature. "Five Cups of Sake" the writer indulges in a protracnarration of what is on his mind, talking to himself, and committing himself to persuade the reader of a particupoint of view.

The work is structured around a fictional conventithat supposedly holds the work together, namely thaschool principal spends an entire night writing a letter tstudent, with a supply of sake to fortify himself. I f

accept the convention of late-night activity under the inf

ence of alcohol, then that might account for the incoheredisconnected quality of the composition. The writer discses the reform of the Emperor system, the farcical naturesome of the new democratic institutions of Occupation-eJapan, and the clash with the persistent tradition of

thoritarianism. These issues may be significant enoughwarrant an actual essay, editorial, or article, but couchedthe loose, sprawling style of this work, the result is dappointing.

Too long and repetitious to hold the reader's attetion, it is the most difficult and inaccessible of the thpieces because of the random, casual style, which fasomewhere between the bounds of personal narrative a

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impressionistic essay. Although Nakano fictionalizes in"Five Cups of Sake" to the extent that he presents the essayas a letter is written from one person to another, de Baryidentifies in the story a mixture of-not necessarily in-tegrated or balanced - "personal reminiscence, prosepoetry, and political commentary" (p. 12).

I f the author had concentrated on one theme and

adhered to one form, the piece would be more enjoyable toread and the author's line of thought easier to follow. Thereis sufficient material in Nakano's own experience concerning, for example, the importance of the mass media insociety, their obligation to serve the public well, and Communist Party activity in the educational system to justify hiswriting a straightforward political essay concerning theCommunist movement and their publications. In fact, hewrote an article on cultural affairs for Red Flag (Akahata)

shortly before this piece appeared.The point of the authyor's arguments is diluted further

as he wanders into another area of interest, the Emperorand the postwar role of the monarchy. These musings areeven more personalized, idiosyncratic, and discursive than

the discussion of the Communist Party's problems, whichat least has the conviction and clarity of a debate on practical matters reflecting Nakano's personal knowledge andexperience. Some of his ideas are well-reasoned-such asthe need for a change in the Emperor's status and in theattitudes of the public toward the throne-but they arehard to pick out from the abundance of more personalcomments.

Finally, "Five Cups of Sake" contains the personalnarrative of the high school teacher who is supposedlywriting the essay/letter. This alone would provide in-triguing material for an independent story on the impact ofthe war on teachers and students. The moral dilemma ofthe teacher, who tries to protect his students from the

intrusion of the outer world, especially the militarismprevalent then, makes for provocative reading by itself.But the effect is vitiated by the rambling style of so much ofthe rest of the story.

This work can be enjoyed more for its individual partsthan for its overall effect, since the concerns of the teacher/writer are so varied. The variety of topics and opinions is sogreat that it is hard to know what to think of the whole,however much a reader may admire the components.

"The Crest-painter of Hagi" is much shorter than theother two stories, yet it is similar to them in its tone,technique, and general impression. The piece has little byway of a plot or directly stated resolution. Because Nakanoresorts frequently to flashbacks to minor events in the

narrator's life and concentrates more on mood, atmosphere, and description than on narrative, action, or character development, it would be more accurate to call thisstory a sketch.

The story concerns the narrator's trip to the town of

Hagi, where he is supposed to settle a dispute betweenParty members. Given the rather isolated setting andminor mission, the narrator has occasion to wander aimlessly around the town. The stroll provides the pretext fordescribing the physical surroundings and recalling events inthe past which are tenuously connected with the present.

The sights of the town and the reminiscences which areevoked serve no specific purpose, nor do they necessarily

lead to a significant action or to important decisions by thenarrator. The descriptions and reminiscences, like the mus-ings in "Five Cups of Sake" and similar "follow-the-brush"writings, appear to be more for the gratification of thewriter than the reader.

Since it is not completely clear what the point is, it isdifficult for the reader to become emotionally or intellectu

ally involved. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect to find aclearly defined purpose from the immediate act of writingin this style. Such pieces are moderately entertaining, but itis a mistake to burden them with too great expectations.The feelings that are evoked by such a story or sketch arelikely to be a slight nostalgia or melancholy of the kindoften encountered in Japanese literature, rather thanstrong emotion of any kind.

A large section of this third piece is taken up by adescription of how the narrator comes across a particularkind of candied fruit in a shop and of memories of someyears ago evoked by the sight of the fruit. For example, hewonders whether he should take some home as a souvenirfor his daughter, muses at length over his usual neglect of

such souvenir-buying, and debates with himself whether tomail the package or carry it. Following this rambling sequence, he comes to another minor episode, when he sees thecrest-painter and reads a broader significance into this.

In telling about the woman who paints crests,Nakano's narrator describes in detail how she appears asshe bends over her work. He takes such a long time to cometo the point and labors so much over the description thatthe reader supposes that it must symbolize something, thatthe scene of the woman and the emotions aroused by itshould lead up to something. But in the end, the emotionalbuild-up dissipates and we are left feeling rather deflated,as though we expected too much.

De Bary states that the story deals with the realization

that the Pacific War is over and that people must come toterms with it. The outward connection to the war, otherthan the reminiscences called up by seeing the candiedfruit, is the narrator's realization that the crest-painter is awar widow. The narrator expresses sympathy for the lossesof wartime which are symbolized by this individual tragedy,bu t draws no conclusions. I t seems that the author hasdrawn at tent ion to this phenomenon as something remarkable in itself, without connection to anything else.

On the one hand, we can appreciate the skill withwhich the author uses images and associations to portrayincidents, sketch striking visual impressions, and evoke anatmosphere. All ofthis , as de Bary notes, connects Nakanowith the Japanese lyric tradition of word play and associa

tive imagery which are so important in tanka and haiku. Onthe other hand, it is somewhat disappointing and frustrating to see little of substance beyond this. I t is a problem thatexists in a good deal of Japanese writing, especially inessays and personal narratives, wherein writers draw attention to details and minor features of their works, so as toinspire moods and create atmosphere. The elements, feelings, and incidents can be appealing on a small scale and areimpressive close to the eye. But much of this writing lacks astrong, substantial basis underneath the intricate surfacedetail.

Similarly, the elements of these three pieces byNakano are attractive in themselves, but seem loosely as-

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sembled when it comes to viewing each work as a whole. I tis as though in concentrating on the fine details, the authorhas forgotten to relate them to one another within anoverall scheme. The individual components seem to beassociated by accident as much as by design and could berearranged without changing the overall effect. Each element may relate to the segments immediately adjacent to

it, but the effect of the whole would not be seriously alteredif any particular element were omitted. I t is discouraging tosee the gifts of someone like Nakano widely dispersed insuch works instead of being concentrated on achieving amore singular objective.

Works such as the three here may be too esoteric-toobound up with events and the atmosphere integral to the

Japanese experience-to be readily enjoyable to an ousider. Explana tory notes might make them more accessibas social documents but cannot make them universalappealing as works of art. Nakano deserves credit for atempting to tackle in fictional form such significant socthemes as the war period and the new constitution, but teffort is not altogether successful. De Bary has shown sk

and dedication in presenting such a challenging and important author to a wider public and in providing importabackground notes which help us to understand Nakanowork. We may hope that more of his writings will becomavailable to the general audience, so that we can have

more balanced appreciation of his achievements. *

'DAY OF INFAMY' - FDR . . . . OR 'YEARS OF INFAMY' - Michi Weglyn

l ) ~ ~ Y ( ) N I ) P l ~ A R L HARl30R Some Historical Consequences of the Pacific Crisis 1941TRENCHANT REVISIONIST

CRITIQUE UNDERMINES by James]. MartinJames J. Martin is a historian and editor specializing inAmerican intellectual history, contemporary diplomaticthought and practice, and analysis of the fonnation of

public opinion. He is a graduate of the University of

Michigan (M.A., Ph. D.) and, following aquarter of a century in the educational world. is now engaged

in independent writing andeditorial work.

~ X C E R P T Ssnorl ly af t er Gen. Mars"all ~ a n ' S h " d early Saturday a H ~ , ""on . Dec. &. the J ~ p a n . Memorandum 902 f rom TOk,yO l:Iegan to corne Hl. and " , h L I ~ tne JaPdnes.. Embassy

In WUhington wa. b u ~ y taking I I down, unknown 10 tMm, t h e Ame r t ca n ,ntel l 'gence

,ntems were dOin,. the same, ' l id ""ollerlong ,\ 'nto Engl "h ,omewha! IHter, And tr", nad catastrophiC con$<lquences Th " comboned Army .n d Navy team of co d e ·

b r " ~ k e " were nOI only mOre succeS!lul l!'lan tn .. J a p a n e s ~ EmM,w people ,n (".om)(\ 9 up w,tn an EngliSh I,nguage . . . . ~ I o n of this memoranOum. 3, ,0 well ahUO of Ihe latter Tne d,fflcult,es of Ih . E"mbany decooers leO to a O e l ~ y hl (u,n"hing thelf d'Plomal, with a lIerslon in time to make tne scheduleo preseMat'on al Ihe SIMe O . partm ..nl. compounOlng the" problem with a c c u ~ l I n n s of PlanneO dece,t to Caller Ihe alf al laCK on Hawaii u a con ... Q u e n ~ e .

Sut thli le9,nO does nol fil w,ln Ihe facts. Even Ihe Japanese educalor-hlstoroan Sa!:>u.o lenag•• Ihough !:>ilterly hostH. to the JaPanele '8g,m.. whiCh lOOK Japan ,nto war with the U.S.A., exonerates them of Ih . ~ l m o S i unille. \.ally-heid notion In me u.s',A. that tney had "planned ill perfidiOUS attaCk wllhaul any p,lor warning." Tn"

., ",ncorrect," lenaga flatly declared. It was tile Japanese gove,nm ..nl ' , clea, ,no tention to nohfy the Siale Depa.tment "immediately oefore the attaCK'" at Pearl

Ha'bor that dlplOmat.c .e la l io '" were conslde.ed broKen, but th .. lormal nollee wa, delayed because "Ihey had difficulty with the lasl long me ...."'e frnm TOkyO." (lenag', ThtJ Pacific w",.. 1931'1946, N.w York: Pantheon 600 '< ' . 1978. p_ IJb,)

"Pearl Harbor. Anler;;edenls.

BackgrOUnd and Consequences"and "The hamingor Tokyo Rose."

7 I ~ ~ e / : ' ~ ~ ~ e ; ! ; r i ! ~ ! r 0/

permission of Ralph Myln,Publisher, Inc., P.O. Box IS33,Colorado Springs, Colorado 1l0901.

The renew of YRIJ' o l l , . ~ m ) '2 r t ! : ' ; ' : 1 : ~ : , r ; r ~ ! : ~ : : , o ; mby permiwon or l Iben"i .n Review

Inc., San Francisco, ('a1irornia 94111Previously unpublished material

mcorporatt:d In I h i ~ t:dilioD copy' - - - -____ ---' right by James J, Martin, May 1981

71P lHlfltry

I- II)LOWSHARE PRESSRRI. LITTLE CURRENT. ONT. POP IKO CANADA

62

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http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/conslde.ed

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The Beginnings of a FeministConsciousness: A Review Essay

by Sandra Buckley

There have been many English-language histories of theMeiji-Taisho period, but for the most part the writers of thesehistories have ignored the existence of women as effectivelyas the Japanese governments of the time would have liked todo themselves. However, as Sharon Sievers makes clear, thegovernment was no more able to ignore the voice of Japanesewomen during the Meiji and Taisho periods than it is today.

The extremes to which the Japanese state was willing togo to obstruct and discourage the activities of Japan's earliestwomen activists is the best testimony to the potential politicalforce they represented. Article 5 of the Meiji constitution-theexclusion of women from all political activity-was the most

blatant expression of the government's concern over the threatposed to its nationalistic policies by women's protests. AsSievers points out, it is no longer satisfactory to simply go onlumping the women's movement together with the popularrights movement. The introduction of Article 5 and otherdiscriminatory policies, and the government's determinationover the next fifty years to retain the most restrictive elementsof its anti-women legislation, are proof of the seriousness withwhich the government treated the political activity of women.Why then have western scholars of Japan not treated Japanesewomen with the same seriousness?

The first sign of any serious attempt to redress the balancein western scholarship came from Joyce Lebra et al. in theirvolume of essays Women in Changing Japan (1976). Those

familiar with the Lebra book will be aware of the uneven qualityof the essays, but despite this the overall impact of the workwas still significant. Essays such as those on factory womenand women's suicide rates exposed the holistic theories of ahomogeneous, happy Japanese family/nation for the fallaciesthey are. The cracks these essays left in the image of Japan soenthusiastically peddled by Japanologists in the seventies (andstill today) allowed many readers-non-specialists, studentsand, one suspects, even some Japanologists-their first viewof Japan as experienced by the majority of Japanese women.Susan Pharr (Political Women in Japan. 1981) and Joy Hendry(Marriage in Changing Japan. 1981) followed Lebra severalyears later. Both works stop short of making any significant

Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of FeministConsciousness in Japan, by Sharon L. Sievers.

Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1983. 240pp., $22.50.

The Hidden Sun: Women of Modern Japan, byDorothy Robins-Mowry. Colorado, WestviewPress, 1983.

political interpretations of the mass of data they collectedbetween them. The language of both Pharr and Hendry is thelanguage of the establishment upon which they have dependedfor so much of their data. Both works were written entirelywithin the context and limitations of the paradigm which somany Japanese women (feminist and non-feminist) are fightingto dismantle.

The next work to appear in the tradition of Lebra et al.was Alice Cook and Hayashi Hiroko's Working Women in

Japan: Discrimination. Resistance and Reform (1980). Thewillingness of the authors to confront the exploitation of womenhead on, which is implicit in the title, runs through the fabric

of the entire work. Hane Mikiso in his Peasants. Rebels andOutcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan discloses a fewmore flaws in the portrait of the happy Japanese family/nation.Prostitution, for example, is brought out of the "family"cupboard to be aired publicly.

Sievers' Flowers in Salt is a history of the emergence of

the Japanese women's movement during the Meiji and Taish6periods. As she traces the activity of textile workers, ChristianReformists, Socialists and the New Women of the Seitosha(Bluestockings), Sievers creates a history of dissent. Flowersin Salt is also a history of the State's concerted and ongoingefforts to obstruct and restrict the activitiesof anti-establishmentwomen. The forms of government interference includeddiscriminatory legislation, the support of pro-establishment

women's groups, harassment and imprisonment. Sievers'portraits of Fukuda Hideko, Hiratsuka Raicho and KishidaToshiko are welcome tributes to these pioneers of a radicaltradition. The choice of these women over more conservativewomen such as Shimizu Toyoko, Tsuda Umeko or HatoyamaHaruko, serves the dual function of undermining both the mythof the homogeneous, non-radical Japanese and the popularimage of the passive Japanese woman. Sievers' respect for thework of these women is implicit in the care and detail of herresearch into their lives. This same respect is evident in herwillingness to stand back and allow her subjects to speak forthemselves. The intelligence, eloquence and confidence of

these voices is a strength of Flowers in Salt. Japan's earliest63

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feminists speak out and demand the attention of the modemreader. Sievers deserves praise for her skillful use of quotations

and her thoughtful and lively translations.In her treatment of radical women Sievers is inevitably

drawn into the area of debate between patriarchal-capitalist andMarxist feminists (Michele Barrett's Women's Oppression

Today offers a good summary and bibliography). The followingquote from Fukuda is as relevant to the current debate as it

was to the socialist women of Meiji-TaishO Japan.

Unless the (communist) system is carried out, the achievement of

voting rights, of opportunities for women in universities, courts

and the government bureaucracy, will benefit a few elite women.

... As there is class struggle among men, so there will be class

struggle among women. (Fukuda, 1913, quoted in Sievers, p. 178).

As early as 1884, Kishida showed an inclination to encompassthe exploitation of women under a broader umbrella of

economic exploitation.

Accepting the right of those with superior force to dominate those

who are weaker, whether man over woman, or Western nation

over Asian nation, was an argument for savagery, not civilization.

(Paraphrase of Kishida, 1884, in Sievers, p. 39).

There has been a shift in Sievers' own position since her articlein Signs, "Feminist Criticism in Japanese Politics in the 1880s:The Experience of Kishida Toshiko." Sievers has moved awayfrom the traditional view of Kishida as a mere drawing card

for the Liberal Party (a passive voice), to a more serioustreatment of Kishida's political career.

Although she occasionally refers to the gap between theurban, educated women who form the focus of her study andrural or working women, Sievers does not locate herself inrelation to either side of the class-gender debate-then or now.

Sievers is drawn into the debate through the political positionof the women she gives voice to, but stands on the sidelinewithout engaging herself in it. Sievers seems confused when

she asserts on one page that "what Japanese women neededwas something to make them realize how similar theirexperiences were ..." (p. 129) only to state on the next pagethat "class and political divisions were apparently too great to

permit a unified front."The institutionalization of the capitalist class structures

which divide Japanese women to this day date from the period

of Sievers' study. While Sievers refers to the emergence of

these class structures in discussions early on of textile workersand the "Victorian lady" of the Rokumeikan period, thedistinction between elite and working women-a distinctionwhich was much clearer then than in these days of the ideologyof the middle-class-bulge-becomes less clear as the workprogresses. Flowers in Salt is a political history rather than an

economic history. I t is also worth noting the political risks oftreating these two as discrete areas of analysis. This is perhapsnever truer than for the history of women. Can the extent of

the Japanese state's resistance to calls for political equality forwomen be understood without reference to the interests of

industry? At a time when up to 60 percent of the workforcewas female, is it surprising that even some non-socialist womenconsidered class struggle a prerequisite for women's equality?Sievers' concentration on political reform groups tends to

exclude the less organized resistance of rural and factorywomen. The predominance of urban, educated womenapparently accounts for the absence of any reference to the riceriots of 1918 in which rural women played a significant role.

64

The rural workers of poor fishing and farming villages carrimuch of the burden of the early industrial and urbdevelopment. However, any discussion of the relationshipthe women who constituted the membership of the RefoSociety, the Blue Stocking and the socialist movements to thpoor rural sisters would have required Sievers to engage in tclass-gender debate.

Flowers in Salt falls short of being a feminist account

Meiji-TaishO women, that is, an account based on femintheory. It is a history of feminism, not a feminist history. The

comments should not detract from the important contributiof Sievers' research, for this work has broken the ground fa new school of Japanese studies informed by the developmenof feminist theory. Flowers in Salt marks the beginnings o

feminist consciousness in Japanese studies.

Another book to appear in 1983 on the subject of womenhistory was Dorothy Robins-Mowry's Hidden Sun. This bois the product of the author's experience and research overten-year period in Japan as an officer of the United StatInformation Service attached to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo

There is no space here even to begin to address all t

problemsof

Robins-Mowry's treatmentof

pre-Meiji womenhistory. Let it suffice to say that in attempting to cover the fi1,600 years of recorded history, an area with which the wri

is clearly unfamiliar, in fewer than thirty pages, all thatachieved is a confusion of historical and mythical "fact"-icluding various of the myths which constitute the archety''The Japanese Woman."

Chapter Two is called "The Way of Modernization." Hethe stark contrast between Robins-Mowry's book and Flowe

in Salt is clear. Compare their disparate readings of the sammoments in history. Sievers' treatment of the "textile workerleaves no doubt as to the dreadful conditions these wom

worked under. Robins-Mowry on the other hand, whdescribing to some extent the harshness of factory condition

comes across as patronizing. In one place she focuses on t"pitiful little songs" sung by these "spinning girls." The almofairy tale quality of "spinning girls" is reinforced by treproduction of the painting of Empress Haruko's visit to t

Tomioka Mill. The illustration is a total romanticization of tworking conditions of the women who are not, anyhow, evthe focus of the painting. The humid, steamy conditions whiate away at the health of the young workers are transformhere into a romantic mist, framing the imperial presence.

Naruse Jinz6 is, to Robins-Mowry, a progressive an

influential educator; in Sievers his institution is described "little more than a finishing school for upper-class womenTo Robins-Mowry, Kishida Toshiko was "brilliant anbeautiful" and "enchanted her audiences." This is a far c

from the woman whose attacks on the Japanese family systeled to the disruption of her meetings by authorities and heventual arrest.

Sievers devotes a whole chapter to the socialist anwould-be assassin Kanno Suga, while Robins-Mowry does neven mention that the leader of the "plot to assassinate tEmperor" which led to a massive crack-down on aanti-government activity was a woman. The failure to identithe leader of this plot as a woman is one of the earliest examplof Robins-Mowry's determination throughout The Hidden S

to deny, or at best ignore, the strong historical links betwethe left and the women's movement in Japan. Although she one point acknowledges that "on the local level women mo

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often find help from leftist or progressive anti-establishmentgroups," the activities of socialist and communist women areonly occasionally referred to. When they do appear it is usuallyonly to be derided in a frighteningly McCarthy-like tone.

Socialist or communist attention to women's issues isscorned as election "tactics" while the LOP's failure to do thesame is described as "heeding too little the changing needs and

expressions of the people." The activity of Communists in theOccupation period is described as fanning out to "penetratelabour unions, schools, organizations." The quotation, "a tinygroup of people can lead a large number of foolish people,"is an insult to the communist workers, unionists, educators andpoliticians of the day. The sourceof this quote is only identifiedin a later footnote as Hashiguchi Toshiko, an LOP stalwart.

The Fujin Minshu Kurabu (Women's Democratic Club)was established in 1946 with the "blessing and advice of

SCAP." The group announced that a "time has finally comein which we can think, choose, and act of our own accord forour happiness." Less than two years later the group had fallenvictim to "red guard tactics" and lost SCAP support. We aretold elsewhere that at the same time (1948) the Occupation

"cracked down" on Japanese Communism. So much for"freedom to act of our own accord." The account of the"Communist infiltration" of the International Congress of

Mothers is not only neurotically anti-communist but elitist.Communist influence is explained as the exploitation of

women, while "ordinary women" are described as naive pawns.The message is clear-no intelligent woman would become aCommunist and all communist activity is suspect andreprehensible.

Anti-V.S. activity is treated in much the same way. The1960 AMPO crisis is described as "nasty violence." We aretold of the concern of "sensible Japanese people" that the crisiswould damage democracy, while the massive non-partisanopposition to this newest of Japan 's unequal treaties disappears

under the McCarthyite rug.Robins-Mowry repeatedly attributes the success of indi

vidual women and organizations to their exposure to Americanand Christian influences. Much credit is also given to theOccupation and the 1946 Constitution. Robins-Mowry defendsthe "separate approach" of Occupation women's policies, buther simplistic arguments will not pacify the women who arefighting the current constitutional battle against the discriminatory legislation which encodes the "separate" ness of women

a legal heritage for which they have the Occupation to "thank."The repeated emphasis on the "V.S. -connection," thoughpresented as proof of ongoing cooperation, can only infuriateJapanese feminists by its implicit denial of the initiatives of

Japanese women activists and the independent status of the

movement in Japan.A corollary of the ChristianJV. S. emphasis is the frequent

assumption that what Japanese women mean by equality isachieving the life-style of a middle-class American woman.Progress towards equality is confused with increased consumercapacity and leisure time. The term "women" is often used todescribe the specific category of urban, educated, middle-classwomen. The book is dominated by the history of the successof women of this one group. The women who work within theexisting political framework-"establishment women"-are

the focus. This is not surprising given Robins-Mowry's ownaffiliations. In her position as Women's Activities Officerattached to the V.S.LS. the writer was able to collect a

considerable bibliography of materials as well as establishcontacts within certain areas of the women's movement.Robins-Mowry's bibiliography and the mass of statistical andother detailed information contained within this book will beof value to the student of women's history. The accounts of

women's participation in citizen's consumer movements andthe "clean elections" campaign are the more informative

sections of this book. Readers familiar with the life of IchikawaFusae will be sympathetic to Robins-Mowry's extensive tributeto Ichikawa.

There can be no doubt, however, that The Hidden Sun iswritten in the poijtical tradition of the Mandarins. It is thereforeonly appropriate that the foreword should be written by EdwinReischauer. He describes Japanese women as combining"meekness and ironlike strength, docility and domesticdominance, gentle beauty and daring action." Robins-Mowry

m i ~ f r u s t r a t e , even anger, a feminist reader, but she can onlygain by comparison with this attempt of Reischauer's to addresswomen's history-an area he has successfully ignored or

misrepresented for some forty years now. Although we mightshare Reischauer's hope that much more will be written about

women in Japanese society, let us hope that future research inthe area will follow in the alternative tradition begun by Lebra,

Cook and Sievers. *The

Berkeley Journal of Sociology

A Critical Review Volume XXIX 1984

Terry Strathman on Child-Rearing and Utopia

Martin Gilens on The Gender Gap

Denise Segura on Labor Market Strati8cation and Chicanas

Jennifer Pierce on Functionalism and Chicano Family Research

Jeff Holman on Underdevelopment Aid

James Jasper on Art and Politics

Individuals: $5.00Institutions: $12.00

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Review

by Audrey Kobayashi

The contention of this book is that i t is necessary to studypolitical activity at the level of the common individual. Thisposition is in clear contrast to the common assumption thatindividuals are ineffectual in asserting their political rights,unaware of political issues and unimportant in the course of

national history. Bowen has aimed his study deliberately at theactions and associations of the commoners involved in theMeiji popular rights movement. He focuses upon three gekkajiken ("incidents of intensified violence"}-the FukushimaIncident of 1882 and the Kabasan and Chichibu incidents of1884---seeking "to learn why they happened; what they tellabout general social, economic, and political conditions; andwhat consequences they had for society and politics as a whole"

(p.6).This work challenges the "failure thesis," advanced in a

number of Western interpretations, that there is no historicalprecedent in Japan for the extension of democracy and civilrights and that Japan's past provided neither a basis for thesuccess of ''TaishO Democracy" nor for a popular challenge tothe authoritarianism, ultra-nationalism and militarism thatdominated the 1930s. Bowen's approach takes the effectivenessand representativenessof institutional-level politics for granted.It assumes that the failure of democracy at the institutionallevel precluded the possibility of resisting political andeconomic oppression by those without institutional power,much less changing things for the better.

The first chapter provides a descriptive account of the

three incidents and introduces some of the major figuresinvolved. In the Fukushima incident, local residents reactedagainst demands for taxes and corvee labor to complete a roadscheme for the self-serving purposes of a corrupt governor.The Kabasan incident involved a small group of radicalopponents to political repression following the Fukushimaincident, and was initiated in a spirit of revenge against thesame governor. The Chichibu incident occurred on a largerscale, as an attempt to organize commoners to achieve debtdeferment, tax reductions and an end to usury. The three eventswere dissimilar in terms of duration, number of participants,degree of violence involved, as well as in their "precipitatingcauses," the specific circumstances towards which the rebel-

REBELLION AND DEMOCRACY IN MEWJAPAN: A STUDY OF COMMONERS IN THE

POPULAR RIGHTS MOVEMENT, by RogerW.

Bowen. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1980, 367 pp., maps and

figures.

lions were directed. Nonetheless, Bowen claims that they wfundamentally linked in that their "underlying causes" stemmed from the social, economic and political constraiunder which the Meiji commoner lived. All occurred opposition to a recognized governmental authority. All begwith organized, lawful attempts to initiate reform, but lagave way to radical factions that saw violence as the meffective means of struggle. All involved an alliance betwethe Jiyfito (Liberal Party) and local farmers. The analysisthe underlying causes in the bulk of the book is in termstwo broad areas: the circumstances within which rebelloccurred and the role ofcommon ideology in bringing it abou

Chapter IT analyzes concrete historical circumstances.

presents the paradoxical situation faced by the Meiji farmwho confronted a range of new "rights" defined within a frmarket economy: rights of contract, property ownership, aaccess to the market and to the accumulation of capital. At same time the right to subsistence, guaranteed under Tokugamoral economy, was threatened by the exigencies t

accompanied the new rights, in particular, the obligationstaxation and the intensifying effects of monopoly and usuRights guaranteed in theory could not be translated inpractice, and rebellion occurred in order to overcome obstacto economic rights. Bowen rejects "the commonly held bewhich says that 'unique Japan' could not have experiencanything akin to Western liberalism," in favor of the Marxposition that the Japanese popular rights movement occurr

within a context in many respects similar to that of Westebourgeois liberalism, characterizing a particular stage in tdevelopment of capitalism:

heavy and arbitrary taxation following on the heels operiod of prosperity; the commercialization of agricult

to a significant extent; a sharp drop in demand commercial products, accompanied by indebtedness, baruptcy, loss of landownership, and the corresponding into tenancy; the consciousness of agricultural produc

that they lack the political rights necessary to defend theconomic rights as producers; the rise of an oppositmovement whose platform promises producers the politi

66

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rights they lack; and the social fact that the leaders of the necessitated changes in the form and rationale of revolt, andopposition are generally educated, relatively wealthy, and, that in the Japanese popular rights movement the rationale was

for the moment at least, believe that their interests coincide provided through the incorporation of Western notions of

with those of the uneducated and relatively poor but "natural rights" as expounded in the theories of Locke,nonetheless small capital producers. (p. 176) Rousseau, Jefferson, Mill and, especially, Spencer. They all

The parallel with Western revolutionary history is drawn,however, only "insofar as it has been shown that certain regions... exhibited economic, social and political features whichcould have engendered a liberal revolution" (p. 75). This doesnot in any sense imply a reduction of Japanese conditions tothose of the West; nor joes it mean the above-cited factorsshould be called determinants. Rather than providing asimplistic shopping list of possible causes, Bowen attempts toshow that the conditions of developing capitalism occurredthroughout Japan in. various local economies.

The rebellions occurred in areas where, particularly in thesericulture industry, the money economy was well established.These were areas ofcomparative wealth which were nonethelesshighly susceptible to the vagaries of market conditions. Againstthis economic background, Bowen claims that the sufficientcauses for rebellion in these particular areas depended uponthe l ~ v e l of recognition among the participants that they mustacqurre a greater measure of political power. It is suggested,paradoxically, that it was the awareness of the freedomstheoretically guaranteed within a market economy that led torebellion against the constraints imposed in practice by themarket economy's more insidious results. The issue becomes:"did this development of a liberal economy affect the farmers'

consciousness of their political rights and how was thisconsciousness expressed?" (p. 128).

The discussion of political consciousness tries to establisha relationship among three elements: the individuals involvedin the rebellions, the ideas which justified the rebellions, andthe means by which they were organized. Chapter III provides

p r o ~ l . e s of p a r t i c ~ p a n t s in each of the incidents: over ninety

mdividuals are dIscussedin

terms of residence, age, status,occupation and property relations. Although the data availableare limited and do not fully represent the thousands involvedin the incidents, they do provide grounds for a number of

general observations. Most of the participants were young, of

heimin (commoner) status, and farmers, though a variety of

rural occupations and economic status groups were represented.Yet most were not poverty-stricken and a few were evenwealthy. The leaders especially tended to come from only afew geographical regions. Bowen's intent is to show the socialmake-up of the groups and to assess how this make-up relatedto the possibility of revolution. Not all of the factors chosenfor analysis, especially age, provide much indication of thecauses of the incidents. The most significant conclusion that

Bowenis

able to drawis

that those participants for whominformation is available came predominantly from the class of

small landholders, the sector of society in which the economicconditions for a liberal revolution might well be found.

Despite the limited value of the discussion of individualsto understanding the overall causes of the incidents, theimportance of certain individuals who were instrumental in theorganization of the incidents is clearly demonstrated in ChapterN, in which is developed the major theme of the book: therelationship between ideology and social organization. Thecentral thesis is that the shift from the older moral order of

subsistence farming to a new moral order of capitalism indeed

67

supported the principle of equality within a society of property

owners based on a capitalist economy. No claim is made thatthere was a direct embracing or understanding of liberal ideas

by all commoners, but only that the influence of thoseintellectuals who did embrace them was sufficient to establishthe beginnings of "rice-roots democracy."

At this point the argument is on rather uncertain ground.While it. is easy to show that western theories of natural rightswere bemg read and advocted by Japanese intellectuals, it isvery difficult to assess the influence that those intellectualsexerted on the ordinary farmer. Upon Bowen's evidence, whichincludes the fairly high degree of literacy in the countrysideand the existence of popular songs espousing a natural rightsdoctrine, rests only a tentative claim that commoners couldhave been exposed to, and influenced by, such ideas. Evenfairly conclusive evidence of interaction between the commoners and those who held certain doctrines tells us rather little of

the actual expression of the ideas, or of the form ofunderstanding achieved by the commoner who might have been

exposed to them. Subsequent discussion of the "force" of ideasin guiding the development of history is both mystifying andempirically unsubstantiated.

The book is saved from a headlong plunge into idealismby its culminating emphasis on the more pragmatic issue of

!he organization of the rebellions. This emphasis shows thatI d e a ~ , how.ever they are conceived, are expressed only in

S p e C I ~ C a c t i ~ n s , .and t h e ~ e f o r e must be understood in the lightof therr practical mtegratlOn at every social level. Thus a secondedge to the book's thesis claims that the organizational formsused to propel e a ~ h of the incidents led to differences amongthem. Three major factors are identified: the degree of

awareness of oppression, the type of recruitment withindifferent traditional forms of socialization, and the methods of

continuation. Bowen argues that the direct influence of naturalrights doctrine was much stronger in the Fukushima andKabasan incidents than it was in the Chichibu incident whichinvolved a larger number of commoners and a much morespontaneous form of organization. Concern there was for theamelioration of immediate conditions, rather than for funda

m e n t ~ r e ~ i s i o n . of social order. The most significant aspectof thIS discusslOn IS the type of relationship which existed

a m o n ~ the a c t o ~ s . In each case it derived from traditionallye s t a b h ~ h e d r e I a ~ l O . n s that defined such things as class, patronageor mantal affiliations. Bowen reminds us that "events" suchas the. gekka jiken are historical conceptions only if it is

r e c o g ~ l ~ .that they are p e ~ t u a t e d by individuals acting withother mdividuais and withm an established structure of socialrelations, that structure being continued and transformed in theprocess.

S e v e r ~ . ~ i ~ t s ~ o n n e c t Bowen's work with the expandingfield of Mel]I hlstonography. The first lies in recognition of

!he degree of regional variation in Meiji Japan and of theImportance of this variation in influencing the course of localhistory. Differences existed both at the prefectural level in

terms of concentrations of certain economic conditions andsocial forms, as well as at the local level, where elements ofcooperative enterprise, communal ties, strength of leadership

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and specific traditions of landholding and familial relationsdictated that each social group stood as an expression of itsown history. For example, the book discusses the specificconsequences of a new road project for the participants of theFukushima incident and the effects of Meiji economic policieson the sericulture industry in all three areas, showing thatalthough the parameters of the market economy may have beenset consistently throughout the country, the particular situations

that developed within those parameters varied. Such discrepancies further justify the importance of understanding anysituation in terms of concrete, historical praxes.

A second point concerns the degree of continuity betweenthe Tokugawa and Meiji regimes. In Bowen's estimation, thereoccurred among the commoners a major shift in ideologicalperspective from the "benevolent lords and honorable peasants"· conception of social order within which Tokugawa

uprisings occurred, to the liberal democratic ideology thatfuelled the Meiji incidents. Despite the fact that there waswidespread de facto participation in a market economy wellbefore 1868, this shift occurred, Bowen claims, because thede jure status of the Meiji capitalism made a profounddifference to the development of heiminshugi (consumerism).

A similar argument could be made with respect to other aspectsof Meiji liberalism, such as the right to private ownership of

property, the growing independence of the family, and theexpansion of individual occupations. This discussion of thesignificance of explicitly legal reforms casts new light uponthe moral economy debate, and underscores the need for moredetailed studies of Meiji conditions.

Conspicuously absent from Bowen's discussion arereferences to class structure, either as it changed in the courseof ideological shifts in the Meiji period or as it may have playeda part in the development of the popular rights movement.Implicit in Bowen's argument is that the class system in Meiji

Japan derived not from categories imposed by a system of

capitalist production (although this may indeed have become

the case subsequently), but from the hereditary classificationsestablished during the Tokugawa period. This situation isdirectly linked to the way in which the development of politicalactivism received traditional justification and occurred indifferent forms through local indoctrination. For Bowen, thesefacts provided strength to the organization of the gekka jiken;class divisions were transcended in a common ideologicalpursuit. Opposed to this interpretation is what seems to be themore popular one which claims that the failure of the gekkajiken was in part a result of the class contradictions inherentin the alliance of small farmers and landlords. 2 Resolution of

the issue surely lies in ascertaining what exactly determinedthe outcome of the uprisings. Was it the ability of both smallfarmer and landlord to draw upon traditional bonds of social

relationship in order to organize common activity? Or did themarket economy create sufficient social divisions to curtail thesuccessful achievement of democratic reforms by splintering

1. Irwin Scheiner, "Benevolent lords and honorable peasants: rebellion andpeasant consciousness in Tokugawa Japan," Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner,eds., Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period, 1600-1868 (Chicago andLondon: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 39-62.

2. See Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels, and Outcastes: The Underside of

Modern Japan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. 22-27.

the effects of common activity against a bulwark of politioppression and economic deprivation? Bowen offers sointriguing suggestions as to the relationship between the twbut because he fails to address the issue directly by specifyeither conflict or change in status as the dominant factor, final position is equivocal. The issue of whether class is indean issue remains unresolved.

It is partly this weakness that requires the reader in

end to make an overwhelming leap from a claim concernithe development of liberal reform principles during the 188to a diagnosis that the strength of liberal ideology was bbroadly based and increasing. The first claim is well supporby Bowen's empirical evidence, but I find less convincing suggestion that the effects of this movement were not in thimmediate results (which were firmly squashed by the powof governmental authority), but in that they germinated dur

the 1880s, took root during the "TaishO Democracy" of

1920s, and finally were allowed to burgeon in the post-WoWar IT reform movement. Contrary to the expressed intentioof the author, this is a lapse back into the practice of pull"ideas" out of their specific material contexts. One can shBowen's faith in the ability of the commoners to organize th

activities toward a common goal of overcoming politicaleconomic oppression, redefining their circumstances as thbecome aware of their own power as a group. One can arecognize that this has happened in Japan throughout the pcentury, in circumstances perhaps less dramatic than thosethe gekka jiken in question. We await, however, a mcomprehensive empirical study that will provide evidencedevelopment and continuity in the rural democratic movemeand that will provide due analysis of the changing structureclass relations over that period of time.

Important questions for further study arise from the bosuch as the nature of rebellion and of commoner politiorganization, and the paradoxes of Meiji society, with combination of marlcet freedom and political and econom

restriction. The book represents a challenge, not only to rethsome of the complacent assumptions upon which events ofMeiji period have been interpreted, but also to continempirical studies of historical conditions in specific localitieventually to provide a strong basis for comparative understaing. Above all, it stands as a reminder that the comm

individual can never be ignored. *

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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~TH E SARAWAK CIllNESE, by John M. Chin.Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Review ix, 158 pp., iIlus., maps, bibl., index. (Oxford inAsia paperback series.)

by Kenyalang

Chin's The Sarawak Chinese is a welcome addition to

the only other serious work on the Chinese in Sarawak,T'ien Ju Kang's The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study ofSocialStructure. t In this slim volume, the former Principal Welfare Officer of the Ministry of Welfare Services, Sarawak,Malaysia, traces the history of the Chinese in Sarawak fromthe self-governing kongsis in the West Borneo goldfields inthe eighteenth century to their uneasy position in the 1970s.The Sarawak Chinese, the author claims in the preface, is

written primarily for the general reader but it also aims to

serve as a basic introduction to more detailed studies on thesubject by other researchers. I t is in the light of the latterthat this review must be read.

Of the nine chapters that make up the book, the eightthat examine the relationships among the social, economicand dialect groups within the community, and the treatment by the "authorit ies" in the pre-Malaysia period of thisminority, "whose contribution . . . has been largely responsible for the State's growth and development" (Pre

face), make interesting reading. The last and ninth chapteris a straight-forward account of Chinese participation inparty politics in the Malaysian period with little analysis.

Th e Chinese presence predated the creation of Sarawak, on the island of Borneo, by the Englishman, JamesBrooke, in 1841. This was a part of the periodic migrationfrom the "Middle Kingdom" that was to scatter Chinese tothe four comers of the world in search of fortune which the

1. T'jen, Ju Kang. The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure.

London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1953.

individual' Chinese hoped to bring back for his retirementin his birth-place. The Chinese-finding themselves in the

anarchic environment of West Borneo-transplanted theirtraditional village organization of the South Chinese socialstructure to form kongsis, mining-and-agriculture cooperatives, for their governance and self-protection, and to secure their livelihood. Marshalling anthropological and historical evidence, Chin builds up a convincing case for thelegitimate position of the kongsis in the evolution of theautonomous Chinese Hakka communities in Sambas,Montrado, Bau and other Borneo goldfields, as opposed to

the conventional view of their origin in the secret TriadSociety. All this is set against the background of Dutchimperial expansion inland from the Borneo coast. By 1854

the Dutch had vanquished the strongest of these kongsis,an d the scene in the book shifts to the Bau Kongsi justbeyond what became the Dutch sphere of influence in theEast Indies.

The first half of The Sarawak Chinese, culminating in

the turning-point of the "Chinese Rebellion" of 1857, is themore significant part of the book. The conventional view of

this "rebellion" puts the onus on the "treacherous"Chinese of the upriver Bau Kongsi for having attempted acoup d'etat against the legitimate government of RajahJames Brooke at downriver Kuching. Chin's account,based on oral history and European sources, argues convincingly that the Chinese were not entirely blameworthy.In particular, he points to the "curious" episode where theChinese "rebels," having overran Kuching on the fatefulday in 1857, did not rape the women or raze the town, butinstead retreated, leaving most of the town people unmolested. They also left a message for Rajah James Brooke

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to the effect that the line has been unbroken, and Chin remarks

"river water does not trespass on well water," that they

would not interfere with him so long as he did no t interfere

with them and confined himselJto the districts he governed. 2

Chin adds interesting details to the "thesis" of theAmerican scholar, Craig A. Lockard,3 first advanced in anarticle in 1978, in which the "rebellion," set in the widerBorneo context, is seen as part of a well-established WestBorneo pattern of rivalry between a self-governing uprivermining settlement and a downriver trading port-in thiscase, one ruled by an Englishman who was beginning toextend his fief-for the resources of the same river basin.For some odd reason, nei ther Lockard's article nor JamesJackson's path-breaking monograph4 on the goldfields of

West Borneo is mentioned in Chin's footnotes or bibiliography. The "Chinese Rebellion, 1857" is indeed a misnomer for Chapter Four of The Sarawak Chinese, but theimmediate result of the conflict was the near-massacre of

the Chinese at Bau. The long-term effect was equally disastrous: a lasting stigma, if not odium, to plague generationsof Chinese in Sarawak. Henceforth, although immigrationwas encouraged under the second Rajah, Charles Brooke,the community was kept under watchful eyes, and Chineseindustry and business acumen were harnessed to the economic development of the State. Rajah Charles Brookeasked the Chinese he brought in to grow rice but such wasthe influence of the external world economy that the settlers invariably turned to cash crops like pepper, gambierand rubber.

The rest of the book is uneven. In a sense, the secondhalf comes as a disappointment after the promise held outby the refreshing first halfof the book. More than a centuryof history-roughly between 1863 and 1979-is covered ineighty-five pages, but the ground scanned is mostly descrip

tion, and tantalizingly brief at that, of surface events thatadds little to what one reads in the standard history textbooks on Sarawak/Malaysia. Few names of the notablefamilies in the mercantile elite that continued to dominatethe import-export business in the decades after the 1930sare mentioned. Their inter-family and patron-client relationships are not delved into, and the linkages with theircounterparts and the agency houses in Singapore are notexplored despite a chapter on "Pre-war Social and Economic Organization." Even less is said about the post-warevolution ofthe mercantile elite.

The personae of the Chinese notables come alive inthe vignettes sketched by Chin. Representing the ChineseHokkien mercantile group in Kuching who had supported

Rajah James Brooke against their "fellow countrymen"from upriver Bau in 1857, these notables succeeded morein amassing personal fortunes because of their official connections than in fighting for the rights of their lessprivileged fellows as citizens of the new state. Since 1857,

2. John M. Chin The SarawakChinese (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UniversityPress, 1981), p. 36.3. Lockard, Craig A. "The 1857 Chinese Rebellion in Sarawak: A Reap·praisal," The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. IX (1) (March 1978):

85-98.4. Jackson, James C. The Chinese in the West Borneo Goldfields: A Study inCultural Geography. Hull: University of Hull, 1970.

the social and economic power wielded by a select group

wealthy merchants and others as recognized leaders co

tinued to ensure that the Chinese Chamber of Comme

remained the primary political link between the governm

and the Chinese people. 5

There was much to be desired about the leadership, whi

in spite of the compromises made with the "enemy" durthe Japanese Occupation during World War II, continuto be accorded official recognition by successive govements. The community tended like water to try to findown level and did not always follow.

Chin's characterization,

In the past, lack ofproper understanding ofthe Chinese w

of life, their cultural differences and social background

successive administrations in Sarawak to think of them

aliens and to regard their intentions and motives with m

trust'

has a familiar ring about it beyond the shores of SarawWritten from "the Chinese perspective,"The Sarawak Chin

offers insights that counterbalance the hagiographic tedencies of most histories written from the "top" lookdown. It is, therefore, regrettable that, in the conclusiothe author allows his sanguine feelings as a citizen of Maysia-of which Sarawak is now a part-to get the betof his judgment as a historian. For instance, the admonitito the Sarawak Chinese leaders to give up ambitionspersonal aggrandizement to serve the needs of thpeople, and the assertion that the days of political oportunism are over are contradicted by the behavior of mercanti le elite which Chin described earlier in his book

It is perhaps difficult for the author, having spent a time in government service, to shake off the bureaucra

mind-set with its infinite capacity for rationalizations tfly in the face of facts. In the same concluding paragraphe applauds Malaysia's "assiduous practice of parliametary democracy" (p. 132). This is laudable only if one wto compare Malaysia's record with the worse of her neigbor's and ignore inconvenient facts like: the suspensionthe Sal'awak State Constitution by the Federal Govement in 1966 to remove unconstitutionally the recalcitrChief Minister, Stephen K. Ningkan; the suspension of General Elections in peaceful Sarawak in May 1%9; tsuspension of the Constitution of Malaysia at the satime; and the subsequent blackmail of the oppositiparties into cooperating with the Federal Governmeprior to the restoration of "parliamentary democracy."

Chin's undemanding style, clear maps and ampblack-and-white photographs make The Sarawak Chinese

easy-to-read history book. The author will have achievhis purpose in the long run of encouraging more detaistudies on the subject by other researchers if readewhose appetites are whetted by the first half of this intduction to the subject, are provoked into questioning muof the "conventional wisdom" in the second half of

~ ~ . *5. Ibid., p. 110.

6. Ibid., p. 132.

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Review

by Brad Geisert

Chi's main thesis is that the Guomindang regime'spreoccupation with military power, dating from at least1927, prevented it from dealing effectively with China'ssocial, economic, and Political problems. An additionalthesis is that, like a straw breaking an already emaciatedcamel's back, "the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45 represented a. stress beyond the KMT's coping abilities andeventually forced it to collapse" (p.3). However, the bookis more disparate than these theses would indicate, as Ch'itraces Guomindang military strategy, party factionalism,regionalism, personnel management, taxation policy, anda host of other concerns. Not surprisingly, considering thewide field of vision of the work, the treatment of many of

these areas is shallow.Ch'i is undoubtedly correct that the Guomindang re

gime had a predilection for military solutions to problems,though it was seldom as candid about this as the 1936government publication which stated: "i t is an undeniablefact that [our control of] the localities depends on suppression (chen-ya) by the armed forces."1 However, Ch'i's explanation of the origin of the Guomindang's "politics of

militarization" is less satisfactory. He points the finger of

accusation at: 1) the Guomindang's decision during theNorthern Expedition to strike easy deals with NorthernWarlords-and the concomitant necessity to redress thepreponderance of military power those regionalists retained; and 2) Jiang Jieshi's peculiar attraction to bushido

and other militaristic streams of thOUght. Unfortunately,Ch'i passes over some of the most salient causes of militarization, a phenomenon hardly found exclusively in theGuomindang regime.

The sad fact was that from the early 1800s on, Chinahad been undergoing a creeping militarization of everylevel of her society and politics. Village and local politicswere increasingly dominated by local military power. At

NATIONALIST CIHNA AT WAR:

MILITARY DEFEATS AND POLmCALCOLLAPSE, 1937-45, by Hsi-sheng Ch'i. Ann

Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1982.309 pp., index, $20.00.

the root of this process of militarization was the lack oflegitimacy of any set of elites, indeed the lack of any set ofvalues held by all or most Chinese that could legitimizeanyone in power. Thus, all power was illegitimate, andbeing so could only be generated by controlling and applying the means of violence (or by assembling a set oflegitimizing values and in some way rallying the Chinesepeople to those beliefs). 2 To be sure, Ch'i understands thislegitimacy problem, as indicated by his criticism of Jiangand the Guomindang for failing to mount an "ideologicaland organizational offensive" (p. 10), though he fails topursue this as a cause of militarization.

Still, it could be argued that the Guomindang's re

liance on military approaches was less thoroughgoing thanCh'i would have us believe. As Ch'i observes, many of theregime's difficulties stemmed from the continuing existence of regional military forces. In this very importantrealm Jiang foreswore aggressive military solutions, choosing instead to construct ad hoc political coalitions of regional militarists through negotiation, rather than preemptively moving to wipe them out militarily. What Ch'i calls aGuomindang strategy of pursuing "easy military victory"(p. 233) was actually a policy of seeking an easy politicalsolution. Likewise, if Jiang sawall problems from a militaryvantage point and sought military solutions to all difficulties, it is curious that he moved as slowly as Ch'i says he didin modernizing and expanding the armies he himself con

trolled (p. 37).Ch'i does not succeed, to my satisfaction, in demon

strating that it was truly the bias toward military solutionsand analysis that doomed the Guomindang. Many of thefailings of the regime seem in no way to have been dictatedby emphasis on military affairs. Corruption, lax administration, inefficient taxing systems, and regional insubor

2. Guy s. Alito, "Rural Elites in Transition: China's Cultural Crisis and1. Jiangsu sheng zhengfu mishu chu, San nian lai Jiangsu sheng zheng the Problem of Legitimacy," Select Papers from the Center for Far Easternshuyao (Zhenjiang, 1936), baoan section, introduction, p. 1. Studies, 1978-79, No.3, pp. 218-275.

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dination are hardly things willingly embraced or toleratedby militaristic dictators, no matter how narrow their intellect or horizons. Additionally, it could be argued thatleaders at all levels of the regime tended to rely on administrative tinkering, reorganization, and reshuffling of

offices at least as often as identifiably military approachesto problems.

The major importance of the book lies less in its somewhat strained thesis than in its engagingly new interpretations in other areas. For example, Ch'i provides plausiblerationales for the Guomindang army's all-out defense of

Shanghai-which decimated China's best-trained and-equipped armies. He holds that Jiang bet most of his forcesin a Shanghai stand: 1) in order to pursuade regional military leaders to fight Japan by demonstrating that he was notholding his own troops in reserve; 2) because Shanghai wasthe hub of Jiang's power base and the heart of China'seconomic resources, and he could not afford to lose it (itwas also, Ch'i says, the most heavily fortified area in Chinaand presumably the easiest to hold); 3) because the Chinesesuccess in holding the Japanese around Shanghai in 1932

had resulted in the conclusion by Chinese military leadersthat fighting in urban areas somehow canceled out"Japanese superiority in firepower, mobility, and logistics"(p. 46). Thus Ch'i rejects the common view that the disastrous Shanghai strategy of attempting to hold Shanghai atall costs was a ploy by Jiang to grab world attention, sympathy, and aid. It was, he says, the opening curtain in aChinese strategy of fighting a war of attrition.

Many who have written on wartime China have feltthat the Guomindang's policies and war strategy were designed more to prepare for eventual war with the CCP thanto defeat Japan. Ch'i's analysis of politics within theGuomindang regime creates the impression that Jiang andhis advisers were more concerned about regional military

leaders than about competition with the CCP.On e bloody flag often hoisted by both CCP and Guo

mindang polemicists has been that the opposition partybore less of the brunt of Japanese attacks and ei ther foughtin a lackluster fashion or sat back avoiding any significantengagements with the Japanese in order to save its forcesfor the coming civil war. Neither side will find completevindication in Ch'i's book. He argues that even after thebattle of Shanghai the Guomindang launched a militaryoffensive-the disastrous winter offensive of 1939-thusproving that it had not yet adopted a strategy of holding itsforces in reserve. Later, after the miserable failure of theoffensive, and especially after the Japanese Ichigo offensive, the Guomindang armies were simply too weak to do

other than bide their time. In other words, planning forcivil war had little to do with the Guomindang sitzkrieg. Hisline on Ichigo is that the Guomindang troops (and particularly the crack units aligned with Jiang) bore the fury of

Japanese armored thrusts, so much so that Ichigo verynearly sealed the fate of Jiang. In Ch'i's view Ichigo, likethe failed winter offensive and the Shanghair defeat, dramatically shifted the military balance in China, strengthening the hand of regional militarists vis a vis Jiang. ThusJiang's power was slipping away during the war. Increasingly, rather than effectively imposing his will on theChinese army, Jiang had to negotiate with its various regional leaders. Seen from this perspective, Jiang's re

luctance to relinquish complete control over the armyU.S. General Stilwell stemmed from the fact that Jiahimself never had such powers to give away.

Historians of CCP military strategy will undoubteddebate Ch'i's analysis of the evolution of CCP militatactics. Most notably, he outlines a significant shift in tearly- and mid-1940s from reliance on guerilla soldiers atactics toward emphasis on regular army forces and larengagements (pp. 122-128).

Ch'i's presentation is marred by a few minor incuracies (for example, Sun Yat-sen's death is wrongdated 1924) and the prose is occasionally poorly edit(e.g. the author identifies Jiang Jieshi as an "it"-p. 2Yet Ch'i is a pioneer stepping into an academic wilderneHis book and Lloyd Eastman's soon-to-be-released woare virtually the sole scholarly studies of the Guomindain the Sino-Japanese War. Ch'i'smonograph is a useful aessential work for all who would understand the fate of

Nationalist regime. *

Pacific

Affairs COURTSHIP, LOVE, AND MARRIAGE IN

CONTEMPORARY CHINA

INTRODUCTI ON Marilyn B. YoungMARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND THE STATE

IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA Margery WolfMAKING A FRIEND: CHANGING PATTERNS

OF COURTSHIP IN URBAN CHINA Gail HenbanerPRIVATE ISSUES, PUBUC DISCOURSE:

THE UFE AND TIMES OF YU LUOJIN Emily HonigAPPENDIX: THE MARRIAGE LAW OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF CHINA (1980)

THE CAROUNIANS OF SAIPAN AND TH E

COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERNMARIANA ISLANDS William H. Alkire

PAKISTAN'S SEARCH FOR A FOREIGN POUCYAFTER THE INVASION OFAFGHANISTAN W. Howard Wriggins

NUCLEAR PROUFERATION: SOUTH ASIMfPERSPECTIVES Review Article A.bok Kapur

BOOK REVIEWS

Vol. 57, No. 1: Summer 19&t

\n Intt1rnational H('rie" (If .\sia and tilt' Parilit"

Published Quarterly

PACIF1C AFFAIRS

University of British Columbia Vancouver, Be, Canada V6T lW5

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