CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER I

1.1 OVERVIEWThis revised edition of Aviation Security (AVSEC) Operations Manual is prepared to implement the National Civil Aviation Security Program (NCASP). It sets forth comprehensively the various aviation security concepts, doctrines and measures as implemented by the Philippine National Police - Aviation Security Group (PNP - ASG) and specifies the various security doctrines, concepts and principles to be observed and enforced in our airports. This AVSEC Manual further contains the specific responsibilities of each key PNP-ASG officers and the duties and responsibilities of every security personnel from normal to extreme airport security operational conditions.

This manual further provides a handy reference to all PNP ASG uniformed and Civil Aviation Security Bureau, Office for Transportation Security (CASB, OTS) personnel especially those stationed in outlaying airports and contains, as well, definition of terms to ensure uniform understanding by all users.

The main purpose of this program is to enhance the security, reliability and efficiency of civil aviation in the Philippines by developing, providing and implementing regulations, standards and guidelines, the necessary safeguards against acts of unlawful interference. It aims to uphold the security and safety of the airport users, facilities and equipment within the airport complex.

The Airport Security System in the country consists of physical and electronics measures, to prevent the entry of explosives, weapons and other dangerous devices into the aircraft, passenger terminals and cargo warehouses. In order to achieve this, the PNP-ASG is conducting mandatory inspection and screening of passengers and their baggage and cargoes prior entry into the airport terminal and aircraft.1.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITYThe aircraft was originally conceived and developed by the Wright brothers (Wilbur and Orville) on December 17, 1909 to harness the concept of time and space in order to benefit humanity. Since then, the aircraft utility, capacity and configuration evolved from its early limited operational capability and upgraded to its present non-stop trans-oceanic operational capability and lift to move men, goods and services.

The first recorded aircraft hijacking transpired in Lima, Peru on February 21, 1931. It was not motivated by an ill intention because the hijacker was plainly a disgruntled family man. To assure the healthy development of the then infant international civil aviation industry, the UN created the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to ensure its growth and the safety of every flight during its first convention in Chicago, USA on December 7, 1944. The Chicago Convention established the ICAO and officially came into existence on April 04, 1947, thus becoming the permanent body under the UN Charter. The convention established 18 Annexes, wherein Annex 17 pertains to Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) which contains an obligation for States to comply and incorporate the SARPs set forth in the 18 Annexes in their National Legislation. There are three (3) more Conventions and two (2) Protocols relating to unlawful acts against civil aviation. The Tokyo Convention dubbed as the Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft signed at Tokyo, Japan on September 14, 1963. Said convention gave birth to organized aviation security in the Philippines on November 26, 1965 and came into force on December 4, 1969. However, in the immediate past, misguided individuals and groups saw in the aircraft an advantage they could utilize to extort money, advance their political causes and force governments to perform acts against its wills or negotiate over the bargaining table.

The next instrument is the Hague Convention known as the Convention for the Suppression on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed in Hague, Netherlands on December 16, 1970 and was ratified by the Philippine government on March 26, 1973. Its vital features are: the definition of unlawful seizures as a separate offense and obligation of States to extradite or punish offenders severely.

This was followed by the Montreal Convention of 1971, known as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed at Montreal, Canada on September 23, 1971 and was ratified by the Philippine government on March 26, 1973 and came into force on April 25, 1973. Its key feature is the creation of the same obligations as under the Hague Convention (extradition or severe punishment of offenders) for sabotage and armed attacks against international civil aviation facilities.

Its vital convention features were further strengthened by the Montreal Protocol known as The Protocol of Suppression for Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, which is supplementary to Montreal Convention of 1971 done at Montreal, Canada on February 24, 1988.

This was followed by the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the purpose of detection, done at Montreal, Canada on March 01, 1991. This was entered into force on June 21, 1998 by the Philippine government, that called for the interpretation of both the Convention and Protocol as a single instrument. Its key feature is the amendment in the definition of the offense to include person who unlawfully and intentionally performs an act of violence at an international airport which causes or may cause injury or death and an offense that destroys or damages any facility of an international airport or an aircraft not in service. All other general principles of international law pertaining to safety and security of civil aviation and transportation laws are likewise deem incorporated within this programme.The first recorded organized aircraft hijacking was committed against Israels El Al Airliner in 1968 by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It was followed by a series of other successful hijackings that caused untold losses of properties and lives that reached its peak in the 70s and tapered off somehow due to the effective early aviation security counter measures developed then. Intermittent attempts on hijackings were thwarted, but some well planned undertakings succeeded. Specifically, the successive seizures of four (4) aircrafts of TWA, Swiss Air, BOAC and Pan Am and their simultaneous wanton destruction before horrified television audiences world-wide in September 1970 in Jordan and Egypt airports awakened aviation security specialists on the vulnerabilities of the adopted security measures.

An unnamed American airline passenger on a domestic flight from Portland to Seattle in November 1971 perpetrated a successful hijacking for $200,000 and parachuted to safety by lowering the tailgate door of the aircraft. This was followed by three (3) more equally successful undertakings, but was stopped when the particular aircraft model was taken out of service of the American aviation industry.

The event that cause the control and minimized the unlawful interference in international civil aviation transpired when the Bonn Declaration was signed on July 17, 1978 among the seven (7) developed countries, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America obligating themselves to immediately terminate their respective air services to and from any country that refuses to comply with the Hague Convention.

Today, aviation security is an avowed national concern of democratic government primarily because of international terrorist acts sponsored by terrorist network organizations such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf Group.

1.3 EVOLUTION OF PNP-AVIATION SECURITY GROUPIn compliance with the Montreal Convention of 1971 and the Supplementary Protocol to the said convention, the Philippine government issued Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) Number 399 on April 28, 1976 creating the National Action Committee on Anti Hijacking (NACAH) with the Secretary of National Defense as Chairman and the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Public Works, Transportation and Communications, Public Information, Administrator of Civil Aviation Administration (now Air Transportation Office) and Director-General, NISA as members. Its implementing arm, the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) was organized on June 1, 1976 with the primary mission of ensuring the continued and uninterrupted operations of civil aviation industry in the country. AVSECOM was later renamed by virtue of GHQ AFP GO Number 37 as Philippine Air Force Security Command (PAFSECOM) on March I, 1986. With the enactment of Republic Act 6975, otherwise known as the Act Establishing the PNP under a Reorganized DILG and for Other Purposes, the Chairmanship of NACAH was transferred to the DILG and the mission and functions of the defunct PAFSECOM was transferred to the PNP. Executive Order (EO) Number 452 issued on April 5, 1991 provides amendment to the composition of NACAH with the DILG Secretary as Chairman and the DND Secretary as Vice-Chairman. EO 246 reconstituted NACAH into National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Anti-Terrorism (NACAHT) which took effect in May 1995, is geared towards implementing effective monitoring activities of suspected terrorist and develop capabilities of Local Law Enforcement Agencies to contain the threat of terrorism. However, on July 2, 1991, the PNP, through its Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) which was later renamed as PNP-Aviation Security Group (PNP-ASG) by virtue of Memo Circular Number 96-01 dated September 12, 1996 assumed the responsibility of ensuring the uninterrupted security operations of the civil aviation in the country. EO 336 was issued on January 5, 2000, reconstituted the NACAHT as the National Council for Civil Aviation Security (NCCAS). EO 277 issued on January 30, 2004 approving and reconstituting the National Civil Aviation Security Program (NCASP) creating the Office for Transportation Security (OTS) within the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). EO 311 issued on April 26, 2004 designated OTS as the single authority for all modes of Transportation Security in the Philippines.

1.4 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CIVIL AVIATION SECURITYIn the country, the first hijacking was made by two (2) young Filipino-Chinese students on December 30, 1952 while on board the PAL aircraft from Laoag en route to Aparri. The hijackers demanded to be flown to mainland China, however, it was intercepted by Taiwanese jets and was brought to Taipei. Thinking that it was already mainland China, the hijackers surrendered peacefully. As a result, the pilot and the flight steward were killed. After which, eight (8) more hijacking incidents transpired that were staged in the provinces to include one (1) incident at MIA (now NAIA) that interfered with our civil aviation. Out of the nine (9) hijacking cases, five (5) were terminated through skillful negotiations while four (4) incidents were successful in attaining their demands despite dilatory tactics employed by the authority.

The bloodiest hijacking occurred on May 26, 1976 on board a PAL BAC 1-11 on a scheduled flight from Davao City to Manila that was diverted to Zamboanga City. Ten (10) civilian passengers and three (3) hijackers were killed when the negotiation failed and the aircraft exploded during the assault.

A mid-air explosion happened on December 11, 1994 on PAL flight 434 when a 747 aircraft was on the last leg of its journey from Manila Domestic Airport to Narita, Japan via Cebu City. Apparently, the first generation anti-hijacking equipment was functional at the airport initial and final security gates at the time, but was not enough to detect the knocked-down parts of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that was surreptitiously smuggled inside the aircraft by a departing passenger.

Investigation revealed that the five (5) critical miniaturized parts of the knocked-down IED were carried by a mid-eastern looking passenger through the security checkpoints. Later on, the attending stewardess when shown the terrorists latest photograph identified to be that of the infamous Mahmoud Yousef, Pakistani chemical engineer, explosive genius and architect, who also bombed the World Trade Center in New York, USA, in 1993. Said passenger occupied seat 32-K and transferred to seat 22-K when the aircraft was airborne and disembarked in Mactan-Cebu International Airport. An hour before landing, the bomb claimed its lone passenger fatality a Japanese passenger seating on 22-K, however, the pilot was able to land the aircraft safely in Okinawa, Japan. The latest incident happened on May 28, 2000 involving a PAL airbus from Davao to Manila, Initial report state that Augusto Lakandula later on identified as Trance Chua who managed to sneak in a home-made cal .22 magnum revolver at the Security Screening Checkpoint. After holding the crew and passengers at bay and collecting their cash and valuables, Chua parachuted using an improvised parachute that caused his death. All of these cases transpired when the present state-of-the-art anti-hijacking equipment was not yet in place and the competency of our security personnel left so much to be professionalized. Airport complexes are vital security installations crucial to our continued growth and development as a nation. They play important roles in our national endeavor to enhance our quality of life through the unhampered movement of men, goods and services within and beyond the country.

CHAPTER II

2.1 TOTAL AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEMAirport complexes are vital security installations crucial to our continued growth and development as a nation. They play important roles in our national endeavor to enhance our quality of life through the unhampered movements of men good and services within and beyond the country. To ensure at all times the adequate protection of our airports from any form of unlawful interference, the Total Aviation Security System or simply TASS is adopted and enforced. The Police Center for Aviation Security (PCAS), being the primary operating unit of PNP-ASG, is responsible for its effective implementation in each airport complex by observing the total team approach.

Use of various security measures is a recognized concept in aviation security to plug whatever vulnerable points that may be created due to the daily hustle and bustle in the airport. Likewise, this is to attain the primary operational objective to harden our airports with adequate interconnected aviation security measures. These active security measures shall be undertaken by the dedicated PNP-ASG units for maximum effectiveness. Each airport station/terminal shall have a Station/Terminal Action Officer (SAO/TAO) who will be responsible for the overall supervision of PNP personnel and other security personnel of the airport. Aviation terrorism and acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation have its rightful antecedents that brought about the development of aviation security in the country. The security system encompasses three (3) major sub-systems that are interrelated and mutually reinforcing to blanket our airports with continuing shields of concentric and tiered levels of protection.2.2 PROACTIVE / DETERRENT SECURITY MEASURESComplementation among the various security measures is a recognized concept in aviation security to plug whatever vulnerable points / pores that may be created due to the daily hustle and bustle in the airport. Likewise, this is to attain the primary operational objective to envelop our airports with adequate interconnected aviation security measures. The various passive security measures discussed earlier will be supplemented by active security measures to overlap and strengthen existing security net. These different active security measures will independently be undertaken by separate and dedicated ASG units for optimum effectiveness. This security component represents the second layer of security systems to prevent any unauthorized individuals from gaining access into the airside or preclude anyone from breaching any established security sub-system.

The outer security layer represents the Proactive / Deterrent measures that interlock and supplement each other such as Intelligence, Investigation, Landside Patrol, Access Control, Vehicle Inspection, Security Survey, Audit & Inspection, Guard and Guard System, Lighting System and Signage. 2.2.1 INTELLIGENCEThe ability to foretell the plans, actions and intentions of individuals and groups inimical to aviation security and initiate criminal prosecution and administrative proceeding.

The known nature of organized international aviation terrorism consisting of support and hit groups behooves government to undertake preemptive steps. This is in order to prevent attempts to case our airports for its undiscovered weak points that can be exploited in tandem with local cohorts or independently by its own support group. To aggressively ferret out/discourage these probing efforts in order to undermine security operations.

The following are the duties and responsibilities of an Intelligence Offices:a. Coordinate and collaborate with other aviation security-related agencies for information exchange;

b. Coordinate with PNP/AFP intelligence community;c. Conduct counter intelligence operations to prevent unwitting and witting activities of airport personnel prejudicial to airport security;d. Launch case operations against identified airport security threat groups/personalities and initiate criminal prosecution and administrative proceeding as warranted;e. Monitor through matrix system the interceptions of prohibited/ dangerous objects/substances per airport and submits recommendations on patterns observed;f. Conduct Airport Security Inspection and Survey and submit report with recommendations specially on international airports;g. Prepare appropriate Aviation Security Advisory and Current Threat Assessment in collaboration with the Assistant Director for Operations;h. Comply with all information requirements from the Directorate for Intelligence, NHQ PNP;i. Conduct continuing Security Education and Awareness Program among PNP-ASG personnel particularly on document, physical and communications security;j. Submit Daily/Weekly/Monthly Intelligence Briefs/Summaries to the Director, PNP-ASG;k. Maintain Rogue Gallery of identified local and international terrorist personalities;l. Develop Watch / Target List and conduct background investigation of airport users/ personnel identified to be security risks; andm. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as required.2.2.2 INVESTIGATION

Judicial action is an effective deterrence to any wrongdoing. Specifically, the possibility of losing ones liberty prevents any insidious idea/misguided individuals to unlawfully interfere with the civil aviation or commit common crimes in the airport. All interceptions in the airport premises falling under Revised Penal Code and special laws will be investigated, followed up and followed through until appropriate cases are filed with our judicial authorities and pursued to finality. Personnel for this purpose are dedicated in each level of this Group.

The following are the duties and responsibilities of an Investigation Offices:a. Investigate all reported violations of law and prepare all pertinent legal documents necessary for the filing of appropriate case/s in court;

b. Inform immediately the Director, PNP-ASG (Attn: ADII) about each interception/apprehension made in AOR together with its current disposition;

c. Interview or interrogate separately and individually each witness and suspect;

d. Conduct follow-up investigations against identified cohorts of arrested individuals;

e. Establish the positive identifications of each suspect/arrested persons, take their photographs, fingerprints and inventory of their belongings/confiscated materials;

f. Ensure the integrity of all pertinent legal documents and gathered pieces of evidences;

g. Attend all scheduled judicial hearings of each case filed in court; and

h. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

2.2.3 LANDSIDE PATROL

This is conducted regularly to preempt any activities prejudicial to airport operations. Special emphasis will be given to the security gates, airline offices and other vital installation within the airport complex damaged to which hampers airport operations.

The following are the duties and responsibilities of a Landside patrol personnel:

a. Conduct daily systematic visibility patrols within vital airport facilities;

b. Be unobtrusive in conduct and project the impression of alertness, agility and competence;

c. Challenge any airport-user and vehicle within any restricted area with or without appropriate access authority and turn him over for investigation as warranted;d. Verify and act as first responder on unattended baggage;e. Report and take remedial action of any security breach during his tour of duty; and f. Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

2.2.4 ACCESS CONTROL

The airport authority/management, based on its Airport Security Program (ASP), is responsible for the issuance of personnel access passes. Authority for access into any restricted area of an airport complex is prescribed. The prescribed access pass should be worn appropriately and conspicuously (above the waistline) while its user is within the airport complex. However, this access pass can never be used as basis for exemption from required security screening. All security personnel are duty-bound to challenge and report anyone observed without the appropriate access pass within a restricted area in accordance with the established coded-access system of the airport. Prevention of passengers mix shall always be observed.

2.2.5 VEHICLE INSPECTION

The Airport management shall be the authorized body for the issuance of restricted area permits, which shall incorporate measures for the production, administration and control of permits for the authorized access of vehicles to restricted areas.

The number of vehicle permits, as far as is practicable, shall be kept to a minimum so as to avoid proliferation of vehicles in Aircraft Movement Areas (AMA):

a. Contained in each vehicle permit are the following;

Registration number of the vehicle; Owner/operator logo of the vehicle; Validity period; Security restricted areas for which the permit is valid; and Access gates which the vehicle is allowed to use.b. Drivers of vehicles issued with restricted area vehicle permits should be qualified to drive the appropriate class of vehicle and have been given instruction in all safety requirements for the operation of a vehicle in the airside.c. The following guidelines should be observed in the movement of authorized vehicles in the AMA: Drivers of authorized vehicles must have undergone familiarization seminar on AMA layout and on rules and regulations relating to the use thereof;

During upgraded security conditions, the only vehicles authorized to gain access to the AMA are vehicles used in the airports ground operations, as all gates leading to the AMA shall be closed. All others shall have to use the public thoroughfares and park at designated parking area; Those vehicles allowed movement in the AMA shall obtain clearance from the control tower or ramp control; Airline operators service vehicles/equipment intended to be used on the appropriate route shall be properly marked with the company stickers logo etc.; Service vehicles shall display a checkered black and yellow flag measuring 10 inches by 12 inches; A rotating/alternating beacon light shall be placed on top of the vehicle while operating on the aircraft movement areas; The aircraft always have the traffic priority. Likewise, during emergencies, responding police/rescue vehicles shall have priority over all vehicles in the area; and All entry and exit gates of the airport complex shall be secured on a 24-hour basis.2.2.6 SECURITY SURVEY, AUDIT and INSPECTIONTo ensure the readiness and compliance to various security requirements in each airport complex provided in the NCASP, personnel trained on civil aviation security survey, audit and inspection should be designated. All PCAS are required to conduct in-house regular security survey, audit and inspection, Reports using the appropriate forms should be made to HQ ASG.

Security survey is conducted to determine the adequacy, appropriateness of the security measures implemented under the TASS concept. Security audit is conducted to determine whether the security measures are sufficient or needs for improvement. Security inspection should be conducted daily. It is a daily routine activity to ensure the minimum security requirement is met. Special attention should know the given on the serious security violations and deficiencies noted after the conduct of security survey, audit and inspection, The security personnel should know the results of the security survey, audit and inspection to institute appropriate corrective measures.The Terminal Facility Security Inspection (TFSI) and the aerodrome inspection shall be conducted twice daily; three (3) hours before and immediately after airport operation to sanitize and clear the airport complex in coordination with the airport management.The following are the recommended Security Audit procedures:a. Coordinate with airport management and other aviation security stakeholders; b. Brief the Audit Team on the emphases of the security audit;c. Security Audit Proper; andd. Exit briefing and preparation of report for submission to PNP-ASG, Headquarters;2.2.7 GUARD and GUARD SYSTEM

All facilities within the airport complex are deemed restricted areas. Only authorized individuals, personnel and vehicle are allowed access. Guards are posted at various perimeter posts and gates strategically established within the complex and terminal buildings. At least one (1) security personnel shall be posted to implement the access procedure.

The Guard System is composed of the following:

a. Perimeter Guards. Specific duties and responsibilities:

To inspect all perimeter fence with physical security devices; Challenge all person/vehicle access that passes his area of jurisdiction; Always be alert and report all unauthorized and untoward incident; and Perform other duties and responsibilities as directed.

b. Gate Guards. Specific duties and responsibilities: Check the access pass and enforce the Aircraft Movement Area (AMA) requirements for vehicles such as; AMA DRIVERS PERMIT, AMA STICKER, BEACON LIGHT as provided for the airport security program; In conducting vehicle search use extended mirror for under chassis inspection and visual inspection of vehicle back seats, gloves and trunk compartments for prohibited/unauthorized items and verify their company tally in/out receipts/documents; Direct authorized airport-users on foot to use the pedestrian gate provided for their access; Record the ENTRY and EXIT of all authorized person and vehicles; Inform immediately the supervisor in case of any untoward incident in his area of jurisdiction; and Perform other duties and responsibilities as directed.2.2.8 LIGHTING SYSTEM

Time is essential for airport-related agencies especially to the airline with turn around flights, aircraft to repair and on Rest Overnight (RON). All airport facilities should be well illuminated during the day and night.

The terminal building should be properly lighted during the day to prevent luggage mishandling, intrusions of unauthorized airport-users into restricted areas and proper conduct of security screening in each station. Cones of appropriate light intensity should illuminate the perimeter fence, gate and ramp areas.

Immediate replacements of busted bulbs should be immediately reported to appropriate airport authority. Likewise, back-up lighting system should be provided and protected from sabotage / theft. Ramp lightings should be sufficiently high in order not to obstruct aircraft movement and prevent accident.

There are various Types of security lighting to meet particular applications:

a. Perimeter lighting - is designed to cast a strong light on the perimeter. This may be provided by overhead lamps or by low mounted lamps that will create effect to dazzle and alter intruders.b. Area lighting - is intended to illuminate areas inside the perimeter through which intruders must cross in order to reach their objectives.c. Local lighting should illuminate those areas inadequately covered by area lighting and which may concealed intruders. All dark spots like roof, fire escapes and emergency exits should be illuminated by mechanical lighting.Flood lighting should be used to illuminate surface (ex. buildings and fences) which intruders must pass in-front to reach their objectives.2.2.9 SIGNAGE

To prevent any unauthorized access by anyone into a restricted area, appropriate signage shall be installed strategically and conspicuously within the airport complex, to guide the airport users on the right direction.

For uniformity all types of signages indoor and outdoor shall be in accordance with the standard materials, letter size, color and background as approved by the proper authority.2.3 PROTECTIVE / DEFENSIVE SECURITY MEASURESThe aircraft is the safest and most efficient mode of moving men, goods and services. It is also the most important single component in an airport. To assure its unhampered operations in our airports, different passive measures that interlock with each other are institutionalized to prevent intrusion and segregate authorized from the unauthorized airport-users and identify prohibited/dangerous objects/substances.

The middle security layer consists of Protective / Defensive security measures that are equally complementing each other like the Passenger and Baggage Screening Operation, Cargo Screening Operation, Airside Patrol & Surveillance, Ramp/Aircraft Guard, Profiling, Terminal Facility Security Inspection and Paneling.

2.3.1 PASSENGER and BAGGAGE SCREENING OPERATION The aircraft in our air transportation system cannot be over emphasized. To ensure its protection, all persons and luggage to include airline crew and departing passengers without exemption should be properly screened before boarding. Total Team approach is the guiding principle in the security operations.The concept for this security operation is primarily to ferret out prohibited/dangerous items from the persons and belongings of airport-users through electronic and physical means. The security screening operation consist of two (2) stages: a. Initial security screening of all baggage thru x-ray machines and walk-thru metal detector for the passengers and airport users at the terminal departure lobby.b. Final security screening of all hand carried/cabin baggage thru x-ray machine and walk-thru metal detector and the conduct of 100% body frisk to all passengers and airport users, immediately after immigration or terminal fee counter.Conduct of manual search of all passengers and their baggage when security screening equipment is not available, non-operational or when security screening equipment alarms to identify the items. As necessary, dedicated security screening checkpoint may be established in coordination with the airport authority. In addition, EOD / K-9 elements should be randomly deployed as part of the security screening procedure. To meet the international standards the following security equipment such as x-ray machines, walk-thru metal detectors (WTMD) and handheld metal detectors (HHMD)/scanner are used in each security screening checkpoint.

Composition of the Security Screening Checkpoint:

a. Passenger Controller - must be stationed one (1) meter in front of the screening checkpoint to regulate and control the orderly flow of the airport-users one at a time prior to passengers/baggage screening.

Duties and responsibilities: Directs the passenger to place their baggage and hand carried item large enough to conceal a weapon, explosive device or other restricted article unto the x-ray conveyor belt for x-ray inspection and/or submit the item for hand inspection. Directs passenger to divest any metal objects in pockets or that can be removed from their person or clothing. Advises the concerned to pass through the WTMD in normal/regular pace and gait; and Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

b. Baggage Feeder is the front liner in a security screening checkpoint if there is no passenger controller and positions himself/herself before the x-ray machine metal rollers. Responsible for the orderly processing, placement and distancing of each luggage and object to enable the electronic sensor to scan their contents properly. Duties and responsibilities:

Advises airport users to place each luggage flat on the metal roller and direct them to divests metal object and other personal items in their possession and place them in the divest container provided for the purpose; Places the divest container in a location where the airport user can see it while passing through the WTMD. Ensures that spaces of each luggage is at least one foot apart and acceptable through the x-ray tunnel; Directs airport-user to pass thru the WTMD one at a time; and Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

c. X-ray Machine Operator - is the one who identifies, interprets images and color codes as reflected in the x-ray monitor regarding security prohibited items (SPI) like; drugs, weapons, explosives and its components like 24-gauge wire, clock, fuse, detonator and batteries; bladed/pointed objects and corrosive substances.

Duties and responsibilities:

Checks the operational status of the machine before assuming duty; Focuses on the job and be guided with the following three (3) threat signs on the monitor screen: Obvious threats are clear images/color codes of SPI like firearms, explosives and pointed/bladed weapons or any of these components that calls for the assistance of the Armed Supervisor. Possible threats are suspicious unidentifiable images/color codes denoting SPI or parts thereof, that needs physical inspection of the suspected baggage. No threat means the luggage is clear of any SPI and therefore acceptable for loading into the aircraft; Stops the conveyor belt and inform immediately the Armed Supervisor in case of any Obvious Threat and the Baggage Inspector in case of Possible Threat in a particular luggage and its exact location; Observes at least 20 minutes rotation and accomplish the X-ray Operator Log Sheet; Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.d. Baggage Inspector - conducts the systematic physical inspection of suspected luggage for SPI in the presence of the owner under the supervision of the armed supervisor witnessed by an airline staff or any airport authority until the suspected item is found, verified and identified. Duties and responsibilities:

Establishes the identity of the rightful owner of a suspected luggage through his/her valid airline ticket and other documents prior to the conduct of baggage inspection either random or Possible Threat; Coordinates with the X-ray Machine Operator the exact location of the suspected item/s inside the luggage; Informs the Armed Supervisor about the need for physical inspection; Requests the rightful owner of the suspected luggage to open for manual inspection in the presence of the Armed Supervisor witnessed by the airline staff or any airport authority. In case of electronic gadgets, requires the owner to personally operate the same before removing all its batteries; Prevents the rightful owner to have physical contact with the content of his luggage during the conduct of systematic physical inspection; Turns over to the Armed Supervisor all SPI found during the inspection for proper disposition; and Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

e. Body Frisker conducts body frisking of all airport-users every time the Walk-Thru Metal Detector (WTMD) alarms and resolve by the use of Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD) on both Initial and Final Security Screening Checkpoint (SSCP). In addition, conduct 100% body pat-down at the final SSCP. Duties and responsibilities:

At the Initial SSCP, when the airport user passed thru the WTMD and there is no alarm, the body frisker will allow them to proceed to the check-in counter, however, if the WTMD alarms the body frisker shall use the HHMD to resolve the caused of alarm; At the Final SSCP, when the airport user passed thru the WTMD and there is no alarm, the body frisker will allow them to proceed at the 100% pat down area. If the WTMD alarms the body frisker shall direct the airport user to remove the shoes and to divest all metal objects and placed them on the divest container for x-ray examination and require the airport user to pass thru the WTMD and if it alarms for the 2nd time, HHMD shall be used to resolve the caused of alarm and allow the airport user to proceed at the 100% pat down area; Turn-over to the Armed Supervisor any SPI found from the airport user during the search for proper disposition; and Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

f. SSCP Armed Supervisor - oversees the Uniformed and Non-uniformed personnel for the consistent performance of their duties and responsibilities at each SSCP. Duties and responsibilities:

Ensures that all anti-hijacking equipments are operational and passed the mandatory operational testing and properly recorded in the equipment logbook; Inform the Terminal Action Officer (TAO) and coordinate for the immediate repair/maintenance of defective anti-hijacking equipment with the concerned authority; Supervises the performance of each member of the SSCP; Acts as witness and prevent the passenger to hold any item inside his luggage during the conduct of manual inspection; Resolves any misunderstanding between any member of the SSCP and/or airport-user; Assumes control over the confiscated/surrendered SPI and deposits in a box provided for the purpose; Coordinates with the appropriate airline and government agency for the off-loading passenger and his luggage as warranted; Reports any breach of security to the Station Action Officer for corrective measures and/or proper disposition; and Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

Other security personnel that support the security screening checkpoint;

a. Terminal Action Officer (TAO) - is primarily responsible for the supervision and management of all security screening checkpoint teams in the terminal/airport station. Duties and responsibilities:

Conduct accounting and dissemination of security issuances and directives from Hqs, PNP-ASG and Airport Authority to all incoming duty security screening personnel prior to deployment to their respective SSCP; Ensures the proper conduct, efficiency, adequate manning and the presence of the Armed Supervisors in every SSCP in the terminal/airport station at any time of each shift; Inform and submit report to the Chief, PCAS/station of any untoward incident or significant development in his area of responsibility; Monitor and provide security assistance to any VIPs and members of the diplomatic corps; and Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed;b. Protocol Officer/Firearm Facilitator assist the SSCP armed supervisor in monitoring the individual performance of uniformed and non-uniformed personnel at each SSCP and acts primarily as fire armed facilitator and /or protocol officer who provides VIP facilitation.Duties and responsibilities:

Supervises the safe unloading of the turned-in firearm using the designated clearing box and ensures that policies and rules in firearms handling are strictly observed; Verifies the authenticity of each document presented by the firearm holder like license, memorandum receipt, permit to carry and/or authority to transport; Records all pertinent data in the log book provided for the purpose; Properly transfers the turned-in firearms to be contained in a sturdy bag to the concerned airlines and ensures proper receipt thereof. No passenger should be allowed to turn over his/her firearm directly to the airline; and Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.2.3.2 CARGO SCREENING OPERATION

The PNP-ASG shall ensure the proper implementation of security measures relative to screening and administrative procedures to all outgoing cargo. Coordination should be made to Airlines, freight forwarders, postal authorities and courier companies to establish accountability for the security of all consigned cargo.

Cargo Security procedures at the acceptance, storage/staging and aircraft loading area should be developed and updated per Airport Security Program (ASP) to ensure that no prohibited and dangerous items shall be loaded on board the aircraft. EOD/K-9 teams should be randomly deployed as part of the cargo screening operation.

Composition of Cargo Security Screening Operation:

a. PNP Cargo Screening In-Charge responsible for the supervision of the cargo security screening of all cargo before loading on board the aircraft.

Duties and responsibilities:

Supervise the X-ray operator of the airline or cargo operator in the performance of their duties and responsibilities; Monitor all activities within his areas of responsibilities; Coordinate with the airline/cargo security supervisor for the list of authorized personnel involved in x-ray security screening procedures; Inform the cargo security team leader and/or PCAS/Station Hqs of any prohibited/contraband items detected by the cargo x-ray operator who will in turn dispatched investigator for proper disposition ; Ensures that all cargo found with possible or obvious threat image are properly inspected in the presence of a cargo representative and a Bureau of Customs (BoC) Examiner Effect the arrest of any person for violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate charges; Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

b. PNP Cargo Staging Area Security In-Charge responsible for the cargo security at the staging/storage area.

Duties and responsibilities:

To prevent pilferage/tampering or switching of screened cargo at staging/storage areas of the airline/cargo operator prior to heir transport to the aircraft; Counter check access pass and courteously challenge all persons loitering within the cargo staging/storage area; Coordinate with the customs, airline and cargo security supervisor for the list of authorized personnel involved in cargo handling operations at the staging/storage areas; Inform the cargo security team leader of all incident and any unusual observation in the area thru any means of fastest communications; Effect the arrest of any person for violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate charges; Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

c. PNP Cargo Security Escort Screened Cargo from the staging/storage areas to the aircraft. Duties and responsibilities:

Prevent pilferage and tampering of the screened cargo while on transit from the airline/cargo staging/storage to the aircraft; Coordinate with the customs and airlines cargo security supervisor for the list of authorized personnel involved in cargo handling operations from the cargo warehouse to the aircraft; Inform the cargo security team leader of all incident and any unusual observation in the area thru any means of fastest communications; Effect the arrest of any person for violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate charges; Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

2.3.3 AIRSIDE PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE

Aside from the checkpoint and visibility patrols conducted on the landside, preventive foot and motorized patrol within the airside shall also be conducted regularly to preempt any activity prejudicial to airport operations. Special emphasis will be given to the AMA, ramp, cargo/baggage hold areas, power generators, terminal, radar, control tower and other identified vulnerable facilities.The airside of the airport should be kept under surveillance with the use of CCTV if possible. This is to ensure that any untoward development can be easily monitored and immediately attended to by the patrol teams. a. Foot and Motorized Patrol Teams - are joint by law enforcement and security teams led by PCAS/Station personnel organized to conduct patrol at the airside of the airport. Duties and responsibilities:

Conduct routine foot and motorized patrols within the airside of the airport; Act as first responder on reported or discovered unattended baggage; Exercise operational supervision to all security complement detailed in the airside of the airport; Ensure that the runway and taxiway are swept for debris and obstructions and looks out for any security breach in the perimeter fence; Effect the arrest of any airport-user and vehicle operator within any restricted area without appropriate access authority for violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate charges; Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.2.3.4 RAMP/AIRCRAFT GUARD The most important element of the middle security layer who controls the authorized access of service, maintenance, catering and airline flight crews around the aircraft. Duties and responsibilities: Ensures that he positions himself/herself near the aircraft parking bay ten (10) minutes before arrival and departure of the aircraft; Supervise the airline security in the conduct of physical inspections of the tool box/bags and cleaning equipment of airline flight crew and maintenance personnel and check their access before they will be allowed to enter the aircraft; Effect the arrest of any airport-user and vehicle operator within any restricted area without appropriate access authority for violations of the revised penal code and other special laws and turn over to the investigation section for filing of appropriate charges; Inhibits anybody from using the aircraft belly as standby point; Inform the Terminal Action Officer of all incident and any unusual observation in the area thru any means of fastest communications; Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

2.3.5 PROFILING

This is another effective preemptive security measures that can ferret out or deter would-be terrorists to attempt any form of unlawful interference to civil aviation. It is primarily based on the careful evaluation of gathered intelligence and operational information regarding impending threats of terrorism or peak hour airport operations that may be taken advantage of by misguided individuals/groups.

Profiling, however, should be properly planned, organized and executed in a judicious and courteous manner at the landside security checkpoint, curbside, lobby prior to initial and final security checkpoints and other restricted areas to prevent unfounded accusations of harassment from departing passengers. Guidelines to be followed by the profiler

Observe and record behavior of the selectee, nationality, description, age and number of baggage.

Record the number of companion/s, nationality, description and age who accompanied the selectee.

Record the type of vehicle, color, make, model, plate number and other distinguishing markers/logos.

Coordinate with the security personnel at the passenger entrance gate to check and verify the ticket and travel documents of the selectee.

Coordinate with the SSCP armed supervisor for the conduct of rigid security inspection on the selectee and his baggage.

Selectee and his baggage shall be subjected to additional security screening with the use of drugs and explosives trace device. (if available)

a. The following are sample questions that might be asked during profiling:

Who packed your luggage? Do you know the content of your luggage?

Where was the luggage kept after it was packed?

For how long and where did it transpire? Who has access to it? Does the luggage contain packages from friends? Do you know or personally seen the contents of the package? Who knows that you were scheduled to depart today?b. The following are to be observed by the profiler but not limited to: Eye movement

Eye contact Nervousness with no apparent reasons Inappropriate clothing/attire Sweating in the area with controlled air environment Unnecessary movement2.3.6 TERMINAL FACILITY SECURITY INSPECTION (TFSI)

TFSI is conducted three (3) hours before the start of terminal operation and one (1) hour after to ensure that the airport is sterile and secured from sabotage, infiltration and other acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation. The security inspection is normally done by a composite team of PNP-ASG, airport authority and airline security personnel, such as: briefing/debriefing of security personnel

activation/deactivation of Anti Hijacking Equipment (AHE)

paneling of the airport terminal/facilitiesa. Team Composition of TFSI: PNP-ASG Terminal Action Officer Team Leader PNP-ASG K-9 and EOD Teams Airport Duty Manager/Action Officer or representative from the airport authority Airline Security RepresentativeAirport Police/Contracted Security Agencies/Airport Civil Security Force

b. Procedures to be followed in the conduct of TFSI; TFSI shall be conducted three (3) hours before and one (1) hour after the flight operations.

Terminal Action Officer to coordinate with Airport Authority with the conduct of TFSI.

The Airport Duty Manager or Representative from the Airport Authority will notify representatives from the Airline, Airport Police/Airport Civil Security Force/Contracted Security Agency for the conduct of TFSI.

Operational testing of AHE simultaneously with the inspection by the TFSI team.

TFSI team will conduct paneling by levels to ensure full coverage of the areas.

Passenger terminal shall be closed and no movement of personnel or passenger shall be allowed during the inspection. Announcement will be made thru the Public Address System.

After TFSI report shall be submitted by the TAO for the information of GOC and the Director, ASG.

Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

2.3.7 PANELING

Paneling is being conducted by EOD and K-9 personnel to determine the presence of any explosive substance, incendiary material or IED component in all facilities, baggage, vehicles and aircraft. Duties and responsibilities: Conduct regular or routine paneling of vital airport facilities particularly on the security screening gates, AMA, ramp, cargo/baggage hold areas, power generators, fuel depot, lobby and airline offices; Conduct random K-9 searches on luggage of departing passengers; Inform the TAO of any untoward or significant incident as soon as it arises; Respond to report on the presence of Unattended Baggage (UB); and Perform such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

2.4 REACTIVE SECURITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT MEASURES The inner security layer depicts the Reactive / Crisis Management measures that are mutually exclusive with each other developed to respond to and to manage contingencies. It includes procedures on Incident Management, Explosive Disposal and Clearing & Armed Intervention.Murphys Law states that If anything happens, it will, at the worst moment is a recognized phenomenon despite efforts to envelop our airport complexes with adequate concentric layers of protective and preventive security operations. The threat to civil aviation is like Sword of Damocles hanging overhead and should not be treated lightly.

In the event of the occurrence of a crisis situation, the established security operational plans intended specifically to respond, manage and mitigate security/emergencies that may transpire in our airport complexes, e.g. bomb threat, hijacking and airport emergencies. Each incident should preferably be nipped in the bud during its incipient stage to ensure its early resolution and prevent protracted and costly and embarrassing crisis incident situations.2.4.1 INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

In cases of acts of unlawful interference to Civil Aviation, appropriate pro active security operations is undertaken by the PNP-ASG in coordination with the airport authority/management through its Airport Crisis Management Group/Committee based on the provisions of the NCASP/ASP to resolve the situation and without unduly jeopardizing other on-going unaffected airport security operations. This is because adequate protection of lives and properties in the airport at any time is the avowed mission of the PNP-ASG.

A crisis has four (4 known stages that must be recognized and appropriately handled in order to avoid escalation. Each stage has its characteristics and defining traits. It is akin to a fluid, unstable and dynamic; its progress should be controlled. Remember, a brewing crisis cannot be seen, touched, heard, tasted or felt.

a) The First Phase is the Prodromal or the Warning Stage characterized by existence of perceptible or imperceptible signs. An example is an accumulation over time of ignored and neglected minor and seemingly harmless security violations and deficiencies that may collectively trigger a proverbial spark as occurred in an spontaneous explosion that would result in a conflagration; as exemplified by mounting indifference and complacency to the required standard security procedures or by a well-planned event of terrorist.

b) The Second Phase is the Acute Stage known as the turning point for the worst. Ideally, a crisis should be resolved in its incipient stage. However, once an incident is allowed to progress to this stage, only damage control techniques could only be instituted to prevent or delay/control the turn of events for the worst. In the aviation security front, this is likened to an access and control by the hijackers of an aircraft.

c) The Third Phase is the Chronic Stage characterized by the aggravation of the unfolding events marked as the point of no return. In such situation, the hijackers begin to harm or kill their hostages and press hard for the immediate granting of their demands.

d) The Final Phase is the Crisis Stage wherein the reaction unit is ordered and dispatched to terminate the impasse and has initiated the launching of surgical operations.

The overall command of an incident at the national level is exercised by the Office of Transportation Security (OTS). However, the initial reaction to a crisis situation outside Metro Manila is the responsibility of the PNP Regional Director under whose area of jurisdiction the affected airport is located. When the Director, PNP-ASG arrives at the area, he takes over the command and control of the crisis resolution actions from the Regional Director.In the event of crisis, the C, PCAS with jurisdiction over the concerned airport is the On-site Commander and will take order from the Director, PNP-ASG upon the arrival of the latter.

a. On-Site Commander duties and functions:

Inform the Director, PNP-ASG by fastest means of communication; Activates the On-site coordinating committee by coordinating with the airport authority for the convening of the airport crisis committee; Coordinate with the airport authority and airline security for the transfer of the aircraft to a designated Isolation Parking Area IPA;

Establish tighter security at the IPA, outer and inner perimeter of the airport complex; Gather initial information about hijackers, passengers and involved aircraft and relay them to HQ ASG (Attn: GOC). Specifically, required data is the number, organization/affiliation, armaments and demands of the hijackers and their identities and nationality, the passengers, the aircraft, its registry, model, and destination;

Establish the Advance Command Post (ACP) and coordinate with the airport authority for the staging area of the SOU or Police/ Military Reaction Unit; Designate a media coordinator and press briefing area to control the movement of members of the media; and

Request for technical and medical support personnel from the nearest PNP/AFP unit with jurisdiction over the area;

Designate an official negotiator and assistant;

Perform all other duties and responsibilities as directed;

b. Incident Management StaffThe HQ PNP-ASG Staffs shall automatically be converted into an Incident Management Staff (IMS) to assist the Director, PNP-ASG in effectively managing and resolving the instant Aviation Security Crisis Situation. Responsibilities of the IMS:

Establishment of the Command Post;

Planning of negotiation tactics and strategies;

Appointment of trained negotiation;

Initiate coordination with airline airport authority, concern affair for technical assistance; Deploy it of SOU personnel when necessary;

Perform other tasked as directed.]The following are tasking of each PNP-ASG Staff Officer1. Director, ASG (DASG) Incident Commander Appoint member of the negotiating team and guide the conduct of negotiator;

Prepare timely report about the incident for the information of CASS, OTS and C, PNP; Gave the order for the final option for armed intervention;

Perform other tasked as directed by the CMC.

Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) will act as the alternate IMS commander in case the Director, ASG is not available and perform other tasked as maybe directed.

2. Deputy Director for Operations (DDO)

Prepare the plan releases to be issued by ADPCR/PIO;

Assist the incident commander in the negotiation process; and

Perform other task as directed.

3. Assistant Director for Personnel and Records Management (ADPRM) Coordinate with concerned PCAS Chief for the required personnel support;

Provide a comprehensive personnel disposition plan and estimate of the of the situation to the incident commander; Initiate generation of additional personnel through General Service Office;

Provide administrative support to the IMS; Issue orders of personnel to be dispatched; and Perform other tasked as directed.

4. Assistant Director for Intelligence and Investigation (ADII) Gather information and updates about the hijackers, their identities, organization, cohorts, weapons, the passengers and the affected aircraft to support the negotiating and assault than intelligence update;

Dispatch intelligence operatives to the site with their monitoring equipment;

Prepare intelligence estimate of the situation for the incident ________ debriefs the released passengers;

Organize a penetration decoys and follow-up team for dispatch; Secure the Passenger Number Manifest (PNM); General Declaration and relevant flight documents;

Update and validate watch list on major threat groups and finish the tasked units; Conducts appropriate investigation of arrested hijackers and prepare required legal documents for filing of appropriate charges in court; and Performs other tasked as directed.

5. Assistant Director for Operations (ADO) Overseas the implementation of appropriate operations plans and progress of the operations of the tasked units;

Coordinates with affected airline and alerts ACTF for deployment; Periodically briefs Director, PNP-ASG and submits reports to NHQ PNP and OTS; Designates qualified negotiators to back up those already at the site and arranges for their transport; and Performs other tasked as directed.

6. Assistant Director for Logistics (ADL) Provides necessary supply support to meet operational requirements to be dispatched to the site without delay; Arrange for transportation support to ferry required support personnel to the holding area in coordination with the ADO; Arrange for the communication equipment needed at the IMS, commo link with the hijacker and on site coordination committee coordination with ADTS; and Performs other tasked as directed.

7. Assistant Director for Technical Service (ADTS) Coordinate with concern agency for the installation of communications link between the hijackers, On-Site Crisis Committee and IMS; and Performs other tasked as directed.

8. Assistant Director for Police Community Relations/Public Information

Officer (ADPCR/PIO) Coordinates with ADL for the release of required medical supplies and the ADI for the names, addresses/telephone numbers and nationalities of the passengers contained in the PNM;

Insures the proper conduct of Passenger Assistance effort to inform their nearest of kin and the extension of necessary medical services to the injured or those in safe of shock; and Performs other tasked as directed.

9. Assistant Director for Human Resource and Doctrine Development

Assists in the conceptualization of appropriate crisis management strategy to be implemented; Culls operational data as basis for programming training courses and for enhancing aviation security doctrines; and Performs other tasked as directed.

10. Assistant Director for Comptrollership

Coordinates with CASS, OTS for the required financial support; and Performs other tasked as directed.

11. Group Legal Officer

Renders necessary legal assistance required; and Performs other tasked as directed.

12. Public Information Officer

Establishes a Media Coordinating Center and the procedures to be followed by members of the media; Conducts periodic press briefing as appropriate; Accredits members of the media and their equipment; Controls the movements of members of the media during the incident; and Performs other tasked as directed.

13. Non-Aviation Security Related Airport Emergencies

Airport emergencies such as aircraft crashes, terminal and other airport emergencies like facility fire, earthquake, inundation, typhoons and power failure due to sabotage of power generator and navigational aids will be dealt with appropriately due to its threat to security. This is because the airside is the exclusive jurisdiction of PNP-ASG and public safety is one of the major concerns of the PNP. These unintended or intended incidents may have been deliberately initiated to divert our attention in order to penetrate the airport premises via the backdoor.

The following are the responsibilities of concerned PCAS Chief:

Immediately determines the exact location and cause of the emergency;

Conducts quick inventory of available personnel and dispatches them to the site in coordination with the airport authority; Establishes control over the site and protect its integrity;

Coordinates for the required emergency assistance like firefighting, medical, evacuation and recovery of equipment;

Insures protection of lives and damage to properties;

Submits report of action taken to Director, ASG (Attn: ADO); and Performs other tasked as directed.

2.3.2 EXPLOSIVE DISPOSAL AND CLEARING

a. Bomb Threat Response The mode of conveying the threat information specifically intended to disrupt airline operations should dictate the appropriate actions to undertake which fall on the following manner: by phone, written and personal delivery. Any threat information should be treated seriously. Some individuals motivated by greed, revenge and hatred or political agenda might attempt to delay, disrupt and jeopardize airline/airport operations to the inconvenience of departing passengers and causing unnecessary airline expenses.

The centrality of pinpointing the exact location and time of supposed explosion of the alleged bomb can greatly assist in the initiation of appropriate remedial bomb recovery procedures.

Positive Target Identification (PTI) System should be implemented if feasible by the Chief PCAS/DSAO. In this case, certified bomb threat assessors are designated by the airport authority/management to evaluate the threat whether it lacks credibility and therefore does not justify extra precautions or is credible that merits intermediate or complete countermeasures. Otherwise, the assessment should be done in coordination with the airport authority/management; Chairman, Airline Operators Council (if feasible); and airline concerned.

In all of the situations mentioned below, the DSAO; PCAS Chief; ASC; Director, PNP-ASG; and the affected airline should immediately be informed as soon as the threat arises. They should then be informed of the result of the paneling and render safe procedure as soon as it is completed as basis for clearing the aircraft. Furthermore, necessary coordination should be made with medical, fire and airport authority/management in all cases of bomb threat.

b. By telephone

Primarily, the telephone provides a cloak of anonymity and is a preferred method to relay bomb threat. To thwart this malicious intention, the following action should be observed by PCAS and other subordinate offices: Bomb Threat Checklist should be provided and made accessible and conspicuous in each telephone set in the airport; (Appendix MM Bomb Threat Checklist) Words uttered by the caller over the telephone should be recorded and analyzed while he is encouraged to divulge the exact location and specific time of explosion of the alleged bomb; Dilatory tactics by referring him to a supervisor should likewise be attempted to determine the aforementioned information; Regional accent and any background noise picked up by telephone receiver should be monitored while accomplishing the checklist; HQ ASG (Attn: ADO) should be notified in case of a bomb threat without delay; Monthly Bomb Threat Report together with the accomplished Checklist for each incident should be submitted to HQ ASG c. By Written CommunicationThe written communication bearing the threat information should immediately be evaluated and handled properly before competent authorities are able to examine it for tale-tell evidences in it like fingerprints, handwriting styles and minute traces of sticky substances invisible to the naked eye. The accompanying envelop particularly its postmarks can provide the location and date it was sent. d. Personal DeliveryWhen the threat information is conveyed through the use of a courier, the person should be held to determine relevant information on his physical attributes, occupations and motive, etc. When the courier leaves, efforts should be exerted to identify the mode of transportation, direction he took and his companions.e. Procedural Response on Bomb Threat If per chance, the exact location of the bomb in the airport complex is elicited and the bomb is within the airport building or facility, the orderly evacuation of the affected building or facility, if necessary, should be ensured. In other cases, the following actions depending on the specific situation should be undertaken: f. Baggage Already Loaded in Aircraft that is on the Ground Before Boarding The aircraft should be boarded by a designated uniformed security personnel, towed to the designated Isolation Parking Area (IPA) and provided with adequate perimeter security thereat; Baggage should be unloaded from the aircraft and systematically lined up at a safe distance away from the aircraft and other airport facilities; Paneling shall be conducted by K-9/EOD personnel to isolate the suspected baggage. It shall then be brought by the EOD personnel to the designated isolation area and render safe procedure undertaken; Paneling of other areas of the aircraft should be done by K-9/EOD personnel; and Positive passenger-baggage match-up shall be undertaken prior to reloading of baggage into the aircraft.g. Baggage Not Yet Loaded in the Aircraft When the baggage is reported to be in the baggage build up area, EOD/K-9 personnel should conduct paneling thereat to locate and isolate the particular baggage. The suspected baggage should be brought by the EOD personnel at a safe distance away from the terminal or at the designated isolation area and render safe procedure undertaken;

When the baggage is already in the container van or in the baggage cart, the van or the cart should be brought to the designated isolation area and the baggage lined up. Paneling should be conducted by K-9/EOD personnel to locate the suspected baggage and render safe procedure undertaken.

h. Baggage Loaded and Passengers aboard in the Aircraft If the aircraft is not yet ready for take-off, all passengers and crew with their hand carried luggage should be required to disembark immediately; If the aircraft is ready for take-off, it should be towed or directed to proceed to the designated IPA. The crew and passengers should then be directed to disembark from the aircraft with their hand-carried luggage and brought back by shuttle bus (if available) to the pre-departure area inside the terminal;

Passengers and their luggage should be isolated while inside terminal to prevent passenger/luggage mix. Movement of the passengers while thereat should be closely monitored by security personnel; Baggage should then be at the same time unloaded from the baggage hold of the aircraft and systematically lined up for paneling by K-9/EOD personnel. The suspected baggage should then be isolated and brought by the EOD personnel at a safe distance away from the aircraft or to the designated isolation area and render safe procedure undertaken; Other areas of the aircraft should also be paneled by K-9/EOD personnel;

When the aircraft and baggage is cleared, security re-screening of crew, passengers and their hand-carried luggage should be undertaken at the terminal;

Prior to boarding and loading of baggage, positive passengerbaggage match-up shall be done; and

Unclaimed and/or unidentified baggage should be isolated and secured and turned over to affected airline for proper disposition.

i. Aircraft In-Flight

The control tower should be informed about the threat and be required to direct the Pilot-In-Command of the aircraft for the immediate landing and parking of the aircraft in the designated IPA to initiate the implementation of the airline emergency plan;

When the aircraft is already in the IPA, procedures in para 4.3.2.3. should be implemented.

2.3.3 ARMED INTERVENTION

The Aviation Counter Terrorism Force (ACTF) is the special unit of the Group tasked to conduct counter-terrorism measures to prevent and resolved any unlawful interference to civil aviation especially when there is a need for armed intervention and bomb threat clearing operations. In case of hijacking incident, ACTF will deploy SOU personnel to secure the affected area while the negotiation is ongoing and to conduct aircraft assault in case the negotiation fails. The following are the duties and responsibilities of concerned unit commanders:a. Commander, ACTF Alerts and deploys SOU and K-9 personnel;

Organizes reserved elements for further deployment;

Monitors developing situation;

Advises Director, PNP-ASG on courses of action that can be taken; and

Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.b. Chief, SOU Immediately places his personnel on standby alert status;

Practices aircraft assault with the aircraft model similar with the affected aircraft;

Establishes staging areas for assault teams;

Deploys snipers and spotters at the designated areas as appropriate; Performs counter hijacking assault operations upon direction of the Director, ASG?

Ensures the proper identification/segregation of hijackers and passengers after the incident; and Employs EOD personnel for a bomb clearing operation when necessary. Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

Chief, K-9 Unit

a. Places his personnel on standby alert status;

b. Conducts paneling of affected areas as directed;

c. Coordinates with the SOU for deployment; and

d. Performs such other duties and responsibilities as directed.

CHAPTER III

EXCEPTIONAL SECURITY SCREENING1. VIPs and Diplomatsa. The President, Vice President and visiting Heads of States are exempted from security screening. However, their luggage may be screened electronically, if requested.

b. Sealed diplomatic pouches in the couriers possession are not subject to manual search. However, personal luggage of the courier should be processed in the normal manner.c. Exemption from screening may be extended to Head of Diplomatic Missions and their personal effects if advance coordination are made.

2. Passenger under Escort

a. Certain dignitaries, VIPs, witness under protective custody or prisoners in-transit will be escorted by armed law enforcement officers (LEO) from PNP-ASG upon request in coordination with other airport authorities. Armed LEO escorts which are not organic at the airport shall deposit their firearms at the initial screening checkpoint consigned by proper receipt.b. Dignitaries with appropriate/advance coordination with the airport authorities will be notified into private or special screening process.c. Security personnel accompanying foreign dignitaries must have advance coordination with the airport authorities. Only designated Air Marshals on duty with MOU with the Philippine Government will be allowed to board the aircraft with authorized firearms.

3. Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)

At the airport, on duty uniformed officers with proper credentials, serving as law enforcement officers such as PNP-ASG in prescribed uniform, may pass through the checkpoint without full screening.

4. Classified Materials and Diplomatic Pouches

a. Passengers with diplomatic pouches must make prior arrangements with airport authorities and airline concerned for these items to be exempted from screening.

b. Upon presentation of the appropriate identification and documentation describing the materials to be exempted form screening to the checkpoint Supervisor, the material designated in the documentation may pass through the checkpoint without being x-ray or searched.

c. The person carrying the materials must be screened in the same manner as other passengers. It is the classified materials or so called diplomatic documents placed in a sealed diplomatic pouch that are exempted from normal screening but not the person or other baggage.

5. Extra-ordinary Items

a. Some religious articles, medical lifesaving and scientific items, legal evidences and crematory containers (burial urns) may be exempted from x-ray inspection and/or manual inspection if they cannot be opened without damaging it or its content. However, proper documentation and chain of custody will be scrutinized. Prior arrangements must be made with airport authorities and airline concerned where the passenger is traveling.

b. The passenger must have documentations to verify the contents of the item to be exempted and personal identification. The passenger should undergo the standard screening procedures.

6. Infants and Small Children

a. Passengers traveling with infants or children shall be asked to remove child from child carrier device and should carry the child carrier device shall be passed through the x-ray machine.

e. Be sure that the child carriers are not placed on the x-ray machine conveyor belt until the child has been removed.f. If the passenger does want to remove the infant from the carrier, the infant in the carrier must pass through the walk-thru metal detector. When the metal detector alarms, both must be cleared by the hand held metal detector for alarm resolution.g. Children in strollers should be removed from the stroller and be required to pass through the metal detector. If the child cannot walk, the child should be carried and passed through the walk-thru metal detector by the person accompanying the child. When the metal detector alarms, both must be cleared by the handheld metal detector. Enough alarm between the person coming the baby and the baby for alarm resolution.h. The stroller should be cleared through the x-ray. Nevertheless, special scrutiny should be taken to ensure that pockets or container on the stroller and the under side are all inspected.7. Physically Impaired Personsa. Physically impaired persons, e.g. incapacitated / stretcher-borne passengers (or their escorts) should be interviewed for the cause of the ailment and medical certificate or proof of their condition should be inquired. b. With the gathered information, security screeners shall conduct the Pat Down Search using the handheld metal detector to subject passenger and be sensitive to his condition. They shall pay particular attention to the blanket, clothes/carriage pockets, linings and covers. c. Wheel chairs and hand carried baggage to be brought into the aircraft should be screened electronically. d. Unauthorized access to airport of wheel chairs should be prevented to prevent substitution and insertion of prohibited/dangerous objects. e. All crutches, walking aids and baby carriages should likewise be screened electronically. Scratches and other recent disturbances in the metal surfaces of screws and joints should be looked into since they are indicative of effort to insert prohibitive substance in the frame/tubing and canvas/leather double linings/ pockets of carriage, wheel chairs, and crutches.

8. Intransient Passengers

a. In-transit and transfer passenger and their cabin baggage may be subjected to security check before continuing the flight. However, measures must be established to control these passengers and their cabin baggage in order to prevent unauthorized articles form being taken aboard the aircraft. b. Special precautions taken to control transfer and transit passengers and baggage should include surveillance of transit areas (arrival/departure halls) and baggage storage and sorting areas. Where a transit or transfer passenger has had access to checked baggage or baggage collection areas, the passenger needs to be re-screened before re-boarding or having any contact with other screened passengers. c. In-transit passengers should be permitted to remain on board the aircraft, if they so wish, unless required to disembark for a technical reason or unless the aircraft needs to be searched for security reasons. d. Flight under an increased threat situation, all passengers and their cabin baggage must be offloaded during the transit stop and to conduct an inspection of the interior of the aircraft where passengers have had access during the flight to ensure that no items have been left aboard, should a passenger attempt to disembark as mentioned in.

9. Person-In-Custody

The following guidelines and procedures shall be strictly followed:

a. The airport management/authority and the PNP-ASG and the responsible representative of the operator must be properly notified before the date s proposed to transport a prisoner, or soon as practicable in an emergency, of the identity of the person being escorted, the flight on which transportation has been arranged, and whether or not the escorted person is considered dangerous.

b. An operator should not accept a prisoner and escort (s) as passengers unless concurrence has been obtained in advance from the States and other operators that may be involved en route and at the intended final destination. In such cases sufficient advance notification must be given the operator so that prior agreements can be obtained.

c. Escorting officers should ensure that a prisoner does not carry contraband, weapons, matches or other potentially dangerous items.

d. Escort should be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event they determine that restraint is necessary. Under normal circumstances a prisoner should not be shackled to any part of the aircraft, including seats, tables, etc.

e. Escorts should not be carry mace, tear-gas or similar incapacitating gas generating devices on board an aircraft.

f. Escort should adequately identify themselves to security personnel, policing authority officers on duty and flight attendants, requesting that their presence on board and seat assignment be transmitted to the pilot-in-command, who should acknowledge receipt of this information.

g. Escorted persons should be boarded before all other passengers and disembarked after all other passengers have left the aircraft.

h. They should be seated as far to the rear of the passenger cabin as is possible but not in a lounge area or next to/directly across from an exit.

i. They should only be seated in a roe of two or more seats and at one escort should sit between the escorted person and any aisle.

j. Not intoxicating beverage should be served escorts or prisoners while on board the aircraft.

k. Prisoners may be served food at the discretion of escorts but should not be provided with metal utensils or a knife.

10. Screening Procedure in Other Cases

a. Religious, medical, scientific and life-saving objects, legal pieces of evidences and crematory containers which are difficult to manually inspect may be exempted from screening if authentic documents are presented attesting to their true nature/state. b. The x-ray machines installed at the airports are film safe/friendly, loaded still and video cameras should be screened electronically. c. Infant on a carriage/stroller should be removed from it and carried by an adult through the walk thru metal detector while the carriage/stroller itself should be screened electronically. (Appendix X) d. Cigarette packs, infant/liquid formulas, canned goods, writing implements (ball/fountain pens), books, newspapers, magazines and electronic devices carried by the airport-user should be screened electronically and manually. e. During x-ray machine downtime caused by brown out or mechanical defects, all of these items and similar objects should be either visually scrutinized, folded and inspected for carved-out portions that may carry weapon that can be used to interfere with civil aviation.11. Visually Impaired Passengers

If a visually impaired passenger is traveling without a companion, he/she must be escorted by the airline staff and should be required to pass through the normal screening procedures. They must divest themselves of metal canes or other guide devices before walking (or being assisted) through the walk thru metal detector.

12. Hearing Impaired Passengers and Passengers with Luggage Barriers

They should be processed using the standard screening procedures. Face the passengers and speak clearly and slowly, pointing or pantomiming the necessary actions and/or movements which maybe useful to help communicate with the passenger.

13. Passengers with Pacemakers or Other Implantable Medical Devices

Passengers should be searched by hand winding the body areas away from the device. A pat down search can clear the area where the device is implanted. The passenger will be subjected to a whole body pat down search.14. Wheel Chaired Passengers

a. They should be asked if it is possible for them to pass the walk thru metal detector or stand far enough away from the metal wheelchair to allow a handheld metal detector search. If this option is impractical, the passenger should be processed using the appropriate method. b. If this is not possible, request the passenger for a whole body pat down search. Always search the wheelchair to make sure that there re no weapons or explosive devices concealed in any part of the chair. Hand-carried items should pass through x-ray screening. c. Wheelchairs should be searched systematically from the backrest leather canvass, the external pockets, going to the arm rest, down to the seat cover from front and back. Inspect properly the wheel of the chair and the adjusting gear for any signs of tampering to ensure or parts of an explosive are hidden thereat. d. Direct the handler of the wheelchair to pass through the walk thru metal detector for normal screening process and the hand carried luggage to pass through the x-ray machine. e. Advise the handler to standby and wait until the inspection of the handicapped passenger and wheelchair are completed before reconciliation. f. Nitroglycerine in its original liquid form is a highly volatile detonating explosive. It is highly unstable and toxic which render its transport unsafe and very risky. To secure its safe transport, this explosive must be stabilized with the use of absorbent materials like pulp woods. macerated dried leaves, fowls feather, cloth, tissue, foam or cotton. Nitroglycerine is any form has a PUNGENCY odor. g. Require owners of bottled liquid to open the same and sample a gulp in your presence. h. Stuffed toys, pillows, blankets, hallowed-out transformer toys, dolls, figurines and electronic devices loaded with PUNGENT SMELLING pulp woods, macerated dried leaves, cloth, foam, feather, tissue, cotton and other absorbent materials should be considered suspect and its owner held for complete pat down and further investigation. i. Traveling/ladies bags and luggage should be probed for the presence of false bottom by comparing its actual physical depth with that of its probable true depth. Presence of disturbances in the lining and seams should arouse suspicions. The pockets, sidings and linings should be checked for any bulge or wet, pungent portions j. Contact lens container, ointments and balms should be opened and smelled for PUNGENCY. Cotton/pulp stabilizers should be inspected. The bottom of infant formulas should be probed for its true content and sampled by its owner.15. Shipment of Firearms and Ammunitions Aboard Aircrafta. Pertinent papers, such as authority/license to carry, memorandum receipt (MR) and Mission/Letter Orders (MO/LO) stating the area covered and the duration of the mission of the passenger carrying his personal or issued government firearms and ammunition shall be checked by ASG duty personnel. The duty personnel shall then record such firearm or ammunition check in a logbook provided for the purpose. b. Passenger/s, whether members of the PNP/AFP or not, found carrying firearms and/or ammunition without necessary supporting papers shall be immediately apprehended for proper investigation/disposition in violation of PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294. c. Any passenger with valid firearm documents but refuses to surrender his firearm/ammunition shall be denied boarding the aircraft. d. Firearms/ammunition found in hand carried/checked-in baggage with or without pertinent documents shall be likewise seized. e. Passenger with firearms and ammunitions, covered with pertinent papers, shall be required to unload his firearm/s of bullet/s and clear same in the firearm clearing box provided before the initial security screening checkpoint, duly supervised by the PNP-ASG Firearm Facilitator.16. Safety Procedures in the Clearing of Firearms by the Owner Unloading a Pistol

a. The owner shall be required to grasp the gun using his/her strong arm with trigger finger out of the trigger guard while the gun muzzle is pointed towards the Firearms Clearing Box. The weak arm of a right-handed person is his/her left arm while his/her right arm is his/her strong arm and vice versa;

b. He shall then press the magazine release latch to release the magazine with ammo and give it to the Firearm Facilitator;

c. He shall disengage the safety lock and pull back the slide using the weak arm;

d. If the chamber load does not eject, he shall repeat previous step, open bolt and visually ensure that there is no live ammo inside the chamber;

e. He shall then turn-over the pistol to the Firearm Facilitator;

Unloading a Revolver

a. The owner shall likewise grasp the revolver using his strong arms and point the muzzle towards the box. He shall then press the chamber latch to swing out the chamber and press the chamber rod out downward to eject the bullets; b. The owner shall then turn-over the ejected bullets and revolver to the Firearm Facilitator; c. The Firearm Facilitator shall ensure that the chambers of the revolver are cleared.

17. Handling and Shipment of Firearms Replica, Toy Firearms and Toy Explosive: a. Firearms and explosives replica are prohibited either as a carry-on item