attitud as object-evaluation associations of varying strength - fazio (2007)

Social Cognition, Vol. 25, No. 5,2007, pp. 603-637

ATTITUDES AS OBJECT-EVALUATIONASSOCIATIONS OF VARYING STRENGTH

Russell H. FazioOhio State University

Historical developments regarding the attitude concept are reviewed, and set thestage for consideration of a theoretical perspective that views attitude not as a hy-pothetical construct, but as evaluative knowledge. A model of attitudes as ob-ject-evaluation associations of varying strength is summarized, along withresearch supporting the model's contention that at least some attitudes are repre-sented in memory and activated automatically upon the individual's encounteringthe attitude object. The implicationsof the theoretical perspective for a number ofrecent discussions related to the attitude concept are elaborated. Among these is-sues are the notion of attitudes as "constructions," the presumed malleability of au-tomatically activated attitudes, correspondence between implicit and explicitmeasures of attitude, and postulated dual or multiple attitudes.

For nearly 25 years now, a particular view of attitudes has formed theunderpinnings of my research program on the consequences of attitudesfor attention, categorization, judgment, and behavior. It was in 1982 thatmy colleagues and I first proposed that attitudes can be viewed as ob-ject-evaluation associations in memory (Fazio, Chen, McDonel, &Sherman, 1982). The perspective has proven much more illuminating(and occupied us for much longer) than we had envisioned at the time. Ithas fostered examination of a wide variety of questions regarding atti-tudes, and it continues to provide a valuable perspective for consideringnew issues. In this article, I summarize the theoretical model and someof the research findings that support it, as well as the perspective that the

Preparation of this article was supported by Grant MH38832 from the National Instituteof Mental Health.

The author thanks William Cunningham, Anna Han, Valerie Jefferis, Christopher Jones,and Natalie Shook for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Please address correspondence to Russell H. Fazio, Department of Psychology, 1835Neil Avenue, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1287; E-mail:[email protected].

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model provides regardirig some recent discussions of attitudes as cor\-structions, the presumed malleability of attitudes, correspondencebetween implicit and explicit measures of attitude, and postulated dualor multiple attitudes.

BACKGROUND

A VERY BRIEF HISTORY

Even as long ago as 1935, when Gordon AUport wrote his influentialchapter for the Handbook of Social Psychology, the term "attitude" alreadyhad a rich history. AUport provides an intriguing historical account ofthe term's early meanings. He notes that "attitude" had been used in thearts to refer to the posture of a figure in a painting or sculpture. This con-notation was evident in what was among the very first usages of the termin experimental psychology—within the study of reaction time. In thelate 1800s, numerous studies revealed that participants who were men-tally prepared to press a telegraph key upon a signal were able to re-spond more quickly than those whose attention was focused on theincoming signal itself. The importance of this state of preparedness,sometimes referred to as a "task-attitude" or "mental set," wasdemonstrated repeatedly in studies of perception and memory.

Beginning with these early tracings of the attitude concept, AUport(1935) reviewed a large number of definitions that had been offered. Hisanalysis of their common threads and tbe debates they had inspired ledAUport to propose what is certainly the most widely known of tbe earlydefinitions of attitude. "An attitude is a mental and neural state of readi-ness, organized througb experience, exerting a directive or dynamic in-fluence upon tbe individual's response to all objects and situations witbwhich it is related" (p. 810). Thus, the early references to posture andreadiness were featured in AUport's definition. However, the definitionseems to go much further when it posits that this state of readiness influ-ences a broad array of responses, which raises an important question. Ifno such influence is observable, then is there no attitude?

Therein lies what later came to prove especially controversial aboutthe attitude concept. AUport's definition, like many others in the litera-ture, presupposes behavioral responses that are consistent with the atti-tude—that is, the very definition calls for behavioral consistency.Without evidence of such consistency, the defining criteria of an attitudehave not been achieved. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, this assump-tion regarding behavioral correspondence began to be examined—andseriously challenged. Wicker's (1969) influential review of the available

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evidence suggested that verbal reports of attitudes bore Uttle relation tosubsequent behavior. Bem (1972) espoused a view of attitudes, not aspotent determinants of responses, but as epiphenomenal explanationsfor past behavior. Many attitude researchers rose to the challenge anddemonstrated that sizable relations could be observed between verbalreports of attitude and subsequent behavior under certain conditions.This is not the time to review those findings. Many pertinent reviews areavailable (e.g., Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Wallace, Paulson, Lord,& Bond, 2005; Zanna & Fazio, 1982), aU of which clearly confirm thatattitudinal reports can sometimes prove strongly predictive of behavior.

More relevant to the present concerns is what this controversy regard-ing the attitude-behavior relation implies for a definition of attitude.The fact that the answer to the question, "Is there a relation between atti-tudes and behavior?" is a resounding "sometimes" (see Zanna & Fazio,1982 for an overview of generations of research concerning attitude-be-havior consistency) suggests that assumptions regarding behavioralcorrespondence should not be a part of one's very definition of attitude.A definition that includes such a criterion is open to circularity; it essen-tiaUy "defines away" the question of attitude-behavior consistency. Ifbehavioral correspondence is not observed, there is no attitude. Hence,the very definition does not aUow for the possibility that a multitude offactors may play a role in determining whether an individual's attitudeis evident behavioraUy in a given situation. Instead of prejudging the at-titude-behavior relation, any definition of attitude should leave thematter open to theoretical and empirical investigation (Zanna &Rempel, 1988). This reasoning was very central to the model of attitudesthat I came to pursue and will expUcate shortly.

ATTITUDES: HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRUCTS?

There is, however, an additional sense in which a definition of attitudethat postulates influences on observable responses at its very core isproblematic. Is an "attitude" being viewed as a hypothetical construct?If so, in what sense is it "hypothetical": hypothetical in the sense that it isnot directly observable, or in the sense of being merely a convenient con-ceptual abstraction for describing observed covariance? Does an atti-tude "exist" as a latent variable that is presumed to play a mechanisticrole when the individual encounters or considers the attitude object, or,is it no more than a useful codeword for scientific discourse?

Classic discussions of the distinctions that might be drawn betweenvarious forms of hypothetical constructs and intervening variables in-clude MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) and Hilgard (1958). However,

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the distinction that I wish to emphasize here is most clearly articulatedby DeFleur and Westie (1963) in their influential article entitled "Atti-tude as a Scientific Concept." They contrast two different "types of latentprocess conceptions [of attitude]: (1) those which impute the empiricalexistence of a hidden mechanism, and (2) those which postulate a hypo-thetical mediating variable which is not regarded as having empiricalreferents, counterparts, or existence but which is simply a constructionwhich serves as a convenient tool for analysis" (p. 24). To exemplify thelatter category, DeFleur and Westie point to Green's (1954) conception:

Like many psychological variables, attitude is a hypothetical or latentvariable, rather than an immediately observable variable. The conceptof attitude does not refer to any one specific act or response of an indi-vidual, but is an abstraction from a large number of related acts or re-sponses. For example, when we state that individual A has less afavorable attitude toward labor organizations than individual B, wemean that A's many different statements and actions concerning labororganizations are consistently less favorable to labor than are B's com-parable words and deeds. We are justified in using a comprehensiveconcept like attitude when the man's related responses are consistent(p. 335).

Conceptualized in this way, then, "attitudes" do not exist as entitieswithin the individual. Moreover, scientific reference to "attitude" is noteven appropriate without evidence of consistent verbal and behavioralresponding. Thus, this approach once again raises the issue of prejudg-ing the attitude-behavior relation and "defining away" the problem ofinconsistency. To the extent that inconsistency is observed between ver-bal reports and behavior, there is no "attitude" (or at least should not be),not even in the mind of the scientist.

In contrast, DeFleur and Westie (1963) classify AUport's definition inthe first of the two categories they delineated. Because Allport refers to at-titudes as "exerting a directive influence," they characterize his definitionas including "the additional idea that the individual's behavior is some-how 'shaped,' 'guided,' or 'mediated' by some underlying process [empha-sis in original]...some 'inner mechanism,' some unobservable 'something'that constrains, influences, mediates, or otherwise determines that consis-tency will appear among the individual's responses to the attitude stimu-lus" (p. 23). As the tone implies, DeFleur and Westie are critical of theapproach, emphasizing two reasons for their skepticism. The first con-cerns conceptual imprecision and the lack of relevant empirical evidence:"...the latent process conception of attitude must be entertained as most tentative[emphasis in original]. In posing such an entity it is not precisely clear, at


least at the present time, whether the advocates have named a discovery,or discovered a name. Until the mechanisms involved in this internal la-tent process can be described more fully, the latent variable must remain'an unknown something'" (p. 24). The second point of skepticism con-cerns what DeFleur and Westie called "the fallacy of expected correspon-dence" (i.e., the presumption that both verbal reports and actions wouldbe affected by the same latent process). They questioned this presumptionon the basis of emerging evidence of inconsistency betweenverbalizations and other forms of action toward the attitude object (e.g.,LaPiere, 1934).

Although the precise meaning that is intended is sometimes not clear,references to attitudes as hypothetical constructs continue to appear inthe contemporary literature. For example, Greenwald and Nosek (inpress) assert: "Attitudes, like other psychological constructs, are hypo-thetical and unobservable." Schwarz «& Bohner (2001) are more explicitwhen they characterize attitudes as a scientific reification: "Attitudes area hypothetical construct, invented by researchers to account for a bodyof phenomena" (p. 438). In my view, and as I hope will become all theclearer shortly, this lingering ambiguity about the sense in which the at-titude concept might be viewed as a hypothetical construct has contrib-uted to the very confusion that inspired this Special Issue in the firstplace. To preview the argument briefly, a view of attitudes as hypotheti-cal abstractions that the scientific observer imputes upon targets of ob-servation invites neglect of critical questions regarding the acquisitionand use of evaluative knowledge. A functional and adaptive system forjudgment and decision making requires that individuals leam fromprior experience, that the acquired evaluative knowledge be repre-sented in memory, and that it be activated efficiently when it may proveuseful in later situations. The science is not positioned to ask these ques-tions if attitudes are viewed as a mere reification. Unless attitudes arethought to have some form of existence within the individual, we fail toacknowledge the importance of prior learning for current evaluativejudgment.

LESSONS LEARNED?

Awareness of this background regarding the history of the attitude con-cept should sensitize any attitude theorist and researcher to certain is-sues. An adequate conceptualization of attitudes must satisfactorilyaddress the matters that have proven pivotal over the last 75 years or so.To ignore the lessons that have been (should have been) learned detractsfrom the cumulative advances and progress that are so evident in the lit-

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erature. First, there appears little value to defining attitudes in such away as to rest the concept on the fulcrum of behavioral consistency. AsZanna and Rempel (1988) argued, definitions that presuppose atti-tude-behavior consistency dismiss important questions that should beopen to theoretical consideration and empirical investigation. Second,and relatedly, DeFleur and Westie's (1963) "fallacy of expected corre-spondence" must be avoided. Any theoretical model of attitudes willneed to acknowledge that behavior sometimes corresponds to verbal re-ports of attitude and sometimes does not. Third, unless the idea that atti-tudes can exert influence is to be abandoned, an adequateconceptualization of attitudes will need to embodied within a model ofthe process(es) by which such influence occurs. lust as DeFleur andWestie (1963) argued, imobservable "somethings" that remain unspeci-fied hidden mechanisms of influence should not be tolerated. Moreover,the specified mechanisms should contribute to our understanding ofwhy measures of attitude sometimes prove predictive of later behaviorand sometimes not.

ATTITUDES AS OBJECT-EVALUATION ASSOCIATIONS

With this background in mind, let me summarize the view of attitudesthat has been the focus of the research my colleagues and I have con-ducted. The model was first proposed by Fazio et al. (1982), tested in avariety of ways in subsequent research over the next decade, and mostsystematically delineated in a review chapter by Fazio (1995). In brief,the model views attitudes as associations between a given object and agiven summary evaluation of the object—associations that can vary instrength and, hence, in their accessibility from memory.

Thus, attitudes are defined as summary evaluations. However, thisshould not imply that attitudes are necessarily cold, belief-based judg-ments of favorability. The term "evaluation" is used broadly to includenot only analytic assessments but also "hot" affective reactions. LikeZanna and Rempel's (1988) formulation, the model views theseevaluative summaries as potentially stemming from beliefs, affect,and/or behavioral information. The attitude may be based on appraisalsof the attributes that characterize the object, as in expectancy-valueframeworks. It can stem from emotional reactions that the attitude objectevokes, as in the case of conditioned emotional responses. It can be basedon one's past behaviors and experiences with the object. Or, it can also bebased on some combination of these potential sources of evaluative in-formation. Relatedly, the attitude may be the outcome of a rather passiveassociative learning process (e.g., De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens,


2001; Olson & Fazio, 2001). It may be a relatively simple inference fromattitudinally diagnostic information, including freely chosen behavior(Bem, 1972), proprioceptive feedback (e.g., Strack, Martin, & Stepper,1988), perceptual fluency (e.g., Reber, Winkiehnan, & Schwarz, 1998), orease of retrieval (e.g., Brinol, Petty, & Tormala, 2006). Or, the attitudemay represent the summary product of a more active process of proposi-tional reasoning that involves careful scrutiny of the validity of informa-tion regarding the attitude object (e.g., Deutsch & Strack, 2006;Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; see alsoGawronski & Bodenhausen, this issue). The processes by which the atti-tude was formed and its informational basis may have implications forthe resulting strength of the object-evaluation association and, hence,the accessibility of the attitude from memory (see Fazio, 1995; Petty,Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). However, regardless of how it was formed,the attitude is defined as the summary evaluation, devoid of anypresumptions regarding behavioral consistency.

Importantly, the model of attitudes is very explicit with respect to thematter of attitudes being viewed as hypothetical constructs invented bythe scientific community. By viewing attitudes as associations in mem-ory, the model obviously is positing that attitudes can "exist"—that is, ifthe individual has formed any such evaluative association, then the atti-tude is represented in memory. Attitudes, then, are simply a form ofknowledge—evaluative knowledge, more precisely—and are repre-sented in memory just as any other knowledge is represented. Just as weassociate "bread" with "butter" and "doctor" with "nurse," we can asso-ciate "yuck" with cockroaches, or a sense of ecstatic delight withchocolate or single-malt scotch.

Thus, according to this view, attitudes are no more hypothetical thanany other form of knowledge. We do not speak of a person's knowledgethat ants are small, but strong (i.e, the associations between ant andsmall and between ant and strong) as a hypothetical construct. Obvi-ously, there is an element of unobservability here, just as is true for atti-tudes. As scientific observers, we have difficulty discerning whether theindividual possesses knowledge regarding the size of ants. We need topose a verbal question or observe a relevant behavior, such as the indi-vidual's muscular preparation when asked to pick up a cardboard box inwhich an ant has been placed. Likewise, we cannot see the individual'sattitude toward single-malt scotch directly, but we can inquire, we canobserve, and we can arrange tests assessing the individual's liking. Inboth cases, we can reach the conclusion that the knowledge, evaluativeknowledge in the latter case, exists.

Another critical aspect of the model is that it highlights variability inthe strength of the object-evaluation association. Some attitudes for

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some individuals are characterized by strong associations. Others areweaker. For still others, no summary evaluation may even be availablein memory, possibly because the object falls in a domain that carries nohedonic significance for the particular individual. So, a college basket-ball fan will have strong evaluative associations to a wide number ofteams, coaches, and players, will develop attitudes toward new playersreadily, and will experience affective reactions to certain teams' winsand losses. On the other hand, for other individuals, evaluative knowl-edge regarding all but the most heralded entities in the college basket-ball scene will be absent. In many cases, no a priori evaluation will beavailable in memory. Some individuals may exhibit a greater propensityto form attitudes across a variety of domains than other individuals do,as is apparent, for example, with respect to the individual differencemeasure of the need to evaluate Qarvis & Petty, 1996). However, sub-stantial variability across domains is to be expected, just as a function ofpeople's interests. Sports are hedonically relevant for some people butnot all. Politics can be rife with evaluative associations for some, butagain not for all. Some people have sophisticated evaluative knowledgeregarding cooking techniques, recipes, and spices, whereas for othersthese entities are tinlikely to be associated with anything other thanindifference and may even be complete unknowns.

Thus, across people and objects, attitudes necessarily vary with re-spect to their associative strength. Building upon a distinction high-lighted by Converse (1970), we have referred to this variability as theattitude-nonattitude continuum (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes,1986). At the nonattitude end of the continuum is the case of the individ-ual lacking any a priori evaluative association to the object. Due to itsnovelty or its basis in a sphere of indifference for the individual, no rele-vant attitudinal representation is available in memory. As we movealong the continuum, an evaluation is not only available but also is morestrongly associated with the attitude object. Thus, for some people, theobject-evaluation association may be such that the object is atti-tude-evoking. The associated evaluation is activated automaticallyfrom memory upon mere observation or mention of the attitude object.

Given that the term "automatic" has come to be used in multiplesenses (see Bargh, 1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Shiffrin & Dumais,1981 for relevant discussions), it will be useful to spend a moment expli-cating just what is meant by "automatic" attitude activation within ourtheoretical model. From the model's perspective, the key feature isinescapability. Encoimtering the attitude object activates the associatedevaluation without the individual's intent, and does so even if the indi-vidual is attempting to engage in some other activity. Hence, what ismost relevant to our use of the term is Shiffrin and Dumais's (1981) char-


acterization of automatic as "all processes whose initiation the subjectcannot control"—ones that occur "whenever a given set of external initi-ating stimuli are presented, regardless of a subject's attempt to ignore orbypass the distraction" (p. 117). When the object is encountered, the atti-tude is activated, not necessarily to a level of awareness, although that ispossible, but to a level of accessibility that increases the likelihood thatthe evaluation will influence the interpretation of subsequentinformation (Bruner, 1957; Higgins, 1996).

Any such automatic activation of the attitude is viewed as playing acritical role in the process by which an attitude may exert influence on in-formation processing, judgment, and behavior. Indeed, from its outset,this theoretical conceptualization of attitudes has been embodied withina model attempting to specify the process(es) by which attitudes"guide" behavior (for early discussions, see Fazio, Powell, Herr, 1983;Fazio, 1986). Thus, the MODE Model (Motivation and Opportunity asDEterminants; see Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) postu-lates that attitudes can influence behavior in a relatively spontaneousfashion, to the extent that they are activated automatically from memoryupon the individual's encountering the attitude object. By biasing per-ceptions of the object in the immediate situation, the activated attitudecan prompt attitudinally consistent behavioral responses. Moreover,this can occur without the individual necessarily engaging in anyeffortful reflection regarding his or her attitude toward the object andwithout any necessary awareness on the part of the individual that his orher activated attitude has biased construal of the object.

More will be said about attitude-to-behavior processes in a later sec-tion of this article. For the time being, what is important to note is that themodel of attitudes as object-evaluation associations of varying strengthabsorbs the earlier-mentioned "lessons." It does not presuppose atti-tude-behavior consistency as part of its very definition. Thus, it avoidsDeFleur and Westie's (1963) "fallacy of expected correspondence." Themodel is also clear about the status of attitude as evaluative knowledge,akin to any other knowledge in terms of its representation in memory.Yet, the model specifies mechanisms by which this representation caninfluence behavior and points to the strength of the object-evaluation as-sociation in memory as a determinant of the extent to which any such in-fluence is likely. Thus, the model provides a perspective as to why andhow attitude-behavior consistency varies.

Although the matter is somewhat of a digression, it will be useful tohighlight one additional point before concluding this section. The use ofthe term object-evaluation association is not intended to commit or re-strict the theoretical perspective to an associative network model ofmemory. Of course, one can view an attitude as an evaluative tag that is

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lirvked to the representation of the attitude object in memory and that hasthe potential to receive some activation whenever the object itself is acti-vated. This certainly was the dominant approach to memory at the timethe model was first proposed. However, the theoretical perspective isalso completely consistent with the connectionist approaches that haveemerged since that time. An attitude can be viewed as a pattern of activa-tion that emerges as a consequence of the cormection weights that a sys-tem has learned to apply to a set of input units (see also Conrey & Smith,this issue). Indeed, various colleagues and I have considered attitudesand attitude accessibility from the perspective of connectionist models(Smith, Fazio, & Cejka, 1996; Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004). Moreover, wehave proposed what is one of the most fully detailed connectionist mod-els of attitude development available in the literature and have con-ducted numerous simulations employing the network architecture(Eiser, Fazio, Stafford, & Prescott, 2003; Eiser, Stafford, & Fazio, 2007).Whereas an associative network approach views the attitude as a dis-crete, symbolic unit that is stored and capable of activation, theconnectionist approach views the attitude as a pattern of activation thatis generated by the learned connection strengths between units. What isimportant from the present perspective is that both approaches allow foran evaluation to be evoked when an object is encountered and bothmaintain that the likelihood of such attitude evocation is a function ofpast learning. Indeed, it is the prior learning that constrains aconnectionist network to reliably produce roughly the same pattern ofactivation in response to two similar sets of input iinits.

(SOME) ATTITUDES ARE REPRESENTED IN MEMORY

Whether one pursues an associative network or a connectionist ap-proach, there exists an abundance of empirical evidence that attitudesare represented in memory and capable of automatic activation uponpresentation of the attitude object. Briefly reviewing such evidence, be-fore turning to a direct discussion of some issues that have arisen in thelast few years regarding the attitude concept, will be valuable. The evi-dence that I wish to highlight has one central, and I believe compelling,feature. During a task or in a situation in which individuals are pre-sented with attitude objects but provided with no reason to actively con-sider their attitudes toward the objects, their performance is affected bytheir attitudes. Thus, presentation of those objects must have evoked theattitudes despite their irrelevance to the immediate task demands.

The most well-known of such research paradigms is the evaluativepriming procedure in which attitude objects are presented as primes un-


related to the participants' primary task of identifying the cormotation oftarget adjective (Fazio et al., 1986). Responding is facilitated by the pre-sentation of a prime that is evaluatively congruent with the target adjec-tive. This is not the time to review what is now a very extensive literature(see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch, 2003 for reviews). Instead, I will sim-ply highlight a few findings that are especially relevant to the argumentthat some preexisting attitudinal representation is evoked automaticallyand that the likelihood of such activation occurring is a function of thestrength of the object-evaluation association.

Early research concerning the attitude-nonattitude continuum waspremised on the notion that, when directly queried about their attitudes,individuals with stronger associations would be able to respond morequickly than those with weaker or absent associations. Thus, latency ofresponse to a direct attitudinal query was employed as a dependentmeasure assessing such attitude accessibility. T'hese experiments suc-ceeded in identifying a number of variables that decreased the time thatindividuals required to report their attitudes, including direct experi-ence with the attitude object (Fazio et al., 1982), inference from free-cho-sen as opposed to manded behavior (Fazio, Herr, & Olney, 1984), andmost relevantly, repeated attitudinal expression. Noting and rehearsingthe association in an early phase of the experiment enhanced the speedwith which individuals could later indicate their attitudes (Fazio et al.,1982; Powell & Fazio, 1984). Numerous later experiments have em-ployed both this latency measure of associative strength and the attituderehearsal manipulation within the evaluative priming procedure. Prim-ing effects have been stronger for attitude objects involving strongerobject-evaluation associations (see Fazio, 2001 for a review).

Just as object-evaluation associations can be strengthened by re-hearsal, they can be weakened by repeated nonuse. In a recent series ofexperiments (Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Vanous, Ho, & Fazio, 2007), atti-tude objects from one of two sets that involved strong evaluative associ-ations (e.g., holiday, disease) were presented repeatedly (e.g., 40presentations of each object name) in a task in which the automaticallyactivated attitude was irrelevant. Participants were required only to re-cite the object word aloud as it gradually emerged from a rectangularblock of masking dots. Presumably, attitudes were automatically acti-vated upon presentation of the objects, at least early in the task, but theywere not of any use. When participants later underwent a priming pro-cedure that included these words, as well as the set of control objects,they displayed less evidence of attitude activation in response to thewords that had been repeatedly presented in the earlier task. Such con-sequences of repeated nonutilization of the attitude were observed evenwhen the two phases of the experiment were separated by a 24-hour de-

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lay. Thus, experimental manipulations that serve to strengthen, or toweaken, object-evaluation associations have a corresponding effect onthe likelihood of automatic attitude activation.

A conceptually parallel finding regarding the moderating role of atti-tude strength has been observed at the level of an individual difference.Hermans, De Houwer, and Eelen (2001) compared individuals who hadscored extremely high or extremely low on Jarvis and Petty's (1996)Need to Evaluate Scale (NES). The scale assesses the extent to which in-dividuals report having attitudes and evaluating objects regularly. TheNES moderated the magnitude of the typical evaluative priming effect,with the higher-NES participants displaying greater evidence ofautomatic attitude activation.

Importantly, evidence that at least some attitudes are represented inmemory and can be evoked automatically extends well beyond theevaluative priming paradigm. A variety of findings point to an influenceof attitudes on tasks during which individuals experience no need toconsider their evaluations of the presented objects. For example,Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (1992) observed effects of attitude accessi-biUty on a variety of tasks related to visual attention. More atti-tude-evoking objects—whether measured via latency of response to aquery or experimentally manipulated—attracted more attention. Whenpresented as distractors, attitude-evoking objects were more likely to benoticed incidentally in one such experiment, and more likely to interferewith performance of a visual search task in another.

In research concerning the construal of multiply categorizable objects.Smith et al. (1996) demonstrated that categories made more atti-tude-evoking by virtue of an attitude rehearsal manipulation were moreinfluential. Tlie more attitude-evoking categories were more likely togovern interpretation of the multiply categorizable objects. When the ob-jects (e.g., sunbathing, Pete Rose) were presented as cues in a cued-recalltest, they more effectively cued the categories for which object-evaluationassociations had been strengthened than categories from a control set(e.g., cancer versus beach, and baseball player versus gambler, depend-ing upon which had been assigned to the attitude rehearsal task versusthe control task). In one experiment, this effect was observed despite theimposition of a delay of one fuU week between the attitude rehearsal ma-nipulation and the cued recall test. Recent research by Ferguson, Bargh,and Nayak (2005) has yielded related evidence regarding the impact ofautomatically activated attitudes on construals of subsequently pre-sented stimuli. Although associative strength was not included as a factorin the design, positively and negatively valued attitude objects were se-lected as stimuli on the basis of normative data showing them to involverelatively strong object-evaluation associations. Subliminal presentation


of these object names influenced how subsequent ambiguous stimuliwere categorized. The ambiguous objects were more likely to be classifiedas relating to a more positive category when they had been precededsubliminally by a positively valued object.

Conceptually parallel effects have been observed with respect to pho-tos of multiply categorizable persons. In a two-session experiment,Fazio and Dunton (1997) first assessed participants' automatically acti-vated racial attitudes via an evaluative priming procedure. As is typicalin such research, a full range of attitude estimates were obtained. Someparticipants showed evidence of automatically activated negativity inresponse to Black faces; for others, positivity was evoked; and for others,neither occurred. In the second session, participants made similarityjudgments of pairs of stimulus persons who varied in race, gender, andoccupation. Those similarity judgments were more strongly influencedby race for those participants for whom race was more attitude-evoking,in either the positive or the negative direction. In other words, acurvilinear, U-shaped relation was observed between the estimates ofautomatically activated racial attitudes and categorization by race. Ap-parently, individuals for whom race was attitude-evoking were morelikely to have their attention drawn to the target's skin color and, as aresult, to use race (as opposed to gender or occupation) more heavily as abasis for judging similarity.

As an additional example of research demonstrating that attitudes canbe evoked and exert an influence in situations in which they are not rele-vant to task demands, we can consider experiments that have examinedthe effects of accessible attitudes on sensitivity to changes in the appear-ance of the attitude object (Fazio, Ledbetter, & Towles-Schwen, 2000).This work involved "head-and-shoulders" photos of undergraduates.At the beginning of the experiment, participants were exposed to thesephotos multiple times and each time expressed their attitudes (how at-tractive they personally found the photo) or engaged in a control task(estimating the individual's height). A subsequent task involved thepresentation of these original photos, as well as computer-generatedmorphs representing varying degrees of change from the original pho-tos. Participants were to note whether any given photo was exactly thesame as one presented earlier or different in any way. The two condi-tions did not differ, in either error rates or latencies, when judging theunchanged stimuli, thus establishing that the original photos were en-coded equally well. However, the conditions did differ with respect tothe morphs, especially with respect to those that more closely resembledthe originals and, hence, were likely to evoke the previously rehearsedattitude. The attitude rehearsal participants had relatively more diffi-culty detecting the presence of change (either more errors or longer la-

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tencies to answer correctly, across the various experiments). They alsoperceived less change when they did detect it, viewing the morph as rel-atively more likely to be a different photo of a person seen before than aphoto of a novel person never before seen. Thus, stimuli that werechanged, but remained sufficiently similar to the original to evoke the at-titude associated with the original stimulus, were assimilated in thedirection of the attitude. This assimilation apparently contributed to aninitial sense of familiarity with the changed stimuli, making thedetection of change relatively more difficult.

Finally, research by Chartrand and Bargh (1999, as discussed in Bargh& Chartrand, 1999) has examined the interesting possibility that differ-ential mood states can sometimes arise, for seemingly unknow^n rea-sons, simply as a function of repeated exposure to valenced stimuli. Inthe context of an alleged visual acuity task that involved indicating asquickly as possible the side of the screen on which flashes appeared, par-ticipants were subliminally exposed to four nouns numerous times. Thebetween-subjects design involved nouns that normative data hadshown to be strongly positive (e.g., music, friends), strongly negative(cancer, cockroach), weakly positive (parade, clown), weakly negative(Monday, worm), or neutral (building, plant). Relative to the neutralcondition, subliminal exposure to the objects involving strongevaluative associations, but not those involving weaker associations, in-fluenced subsequent mood reports. Thus, repeated automatic activationof positivity (or negativity), as a result of the exposure to objects involv-ing strongly associated positive (or negative) evaluations, generated apositive (or negative) mood.

I may have belabored the point, but these various findings all illustratean influence of attitudes, especially ones involving stronger object-eval-uation associations, on subsequent task performance or judgments. Im-portantly, this influence is evident even though the subsequent situationprovides no reason for actively considering those attitudes. Thus, visualsearch performance, cued recall, judgments of similarity, perceptual as-similation, and reports of current mood were all affected by the presence(sometimes subliminal presence) of attitude-evoking objects. The find-ings converge on one fundamental conclusion. At least some attitudesare represented in memory, and they are activated automatically whenthe attitude objects are encountered.

(SOME) ATTITUDES ARE CONSTRUCTED

As emphasized by the notion of object-evaluation associations varyingin strength and the attitude-nonattitude continuum, not all objects are


represented in memory with strongly associated evaluative linkages.Yet, situational demands sometimes force individuals to makeevaluative judgments and decisions regarding novel entities (e.g., theprospect of dining at a newly opened restaurant or voting for a newlyemerging candidate for public office) or alternatives within what is typi-cally a domain of indifference (e.g., persons who are barely attentive tocollege basketball during the regular season, but annually enter bracketsinto an NCAA tournament pool). In such cases, attitudes need to be con-structed. The effort and deliberation devoted to such construction willvary as a function of just how motivated the individual might be to reachan accurate assessment (Kruglanski, 1989; Fazio, 1990; Tetlock & Kim,1987). An evaluation may be constructed relatively effortlessly on thebasis of sheer resemblance to entities for which one already has attitudesrepresented in memory (e.g., Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken,2002; Gilovich, 1981; Shook, Fazio, & Eiser, 2007), or, the individual maydeliberate extensively about the specific attributes that characterize theentity and their favorability (e.g., Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990).

Because attitudes vary in strength, they are differentially sensitive toinformation that is salient in the immediate situation. Such a theoreticalassertion is by no means novel. Indeed, Bem's (1972) impactful proposalthat "individuals come to 'know' their own attitudes, emotions, andother internal states partially by inferring them from observation of theirown behavior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs"was accompanied by the proviso that such attitudinal inference pro-cesses occur "to the extent that internal cues are weak, ambiguous, oruninterpretable" (p. 2). A considerable amount of evidence has accumu-lated in support of this reasoning. The relevant research typically as-sumes a particular form. A manipulation makes salient either positive ornegative information related to the attitude object, and the impact of thatmanipulation on subsequent attitudinal reports is compared in twosamples that differ with respect to some index of the strength of the par-ticipants' initial attitudes. For example, Chaiken and Baldwin (1981) em-ployed a linguistic manipulation, based on earlier research by Salancikand Conway (1975), to make salient to individuals either pro-ecology oranti-ecology behaviors that they had performed. Due to how the ad-verbs "occasionally" and "frequently" were paired with various ecol-ogy-related behaviors, participants found themselves indicating thatthey had performed many pro and few anti behaviors, or vice versa. Thislinguistically biased review of their past behaviors led participants todifferential views of their favorability toward environmentalism. How-ever, it did so more for some individuals than for others. In an earlier ses-sion, participants had been administered various measures ofattitude—a cognitively oriented measure based on an expectancy-value

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framework and a more affectively oriented measure. Only individualswho had responded relatively inconsistently across the two differentmeasures, suggesting that they lacked clear knowledge of theirattitudes, were influenced by the linguistically biased recall of pastbehaviors.

Similarly, Hodges and Wilson (1993) examined the moderating role ofattitude accessibility on the effect that analyzing reasons has on attitudi-nal reports. Immediately after explaining the reasons for their attitudes,people report attitudes that are very consistent with the valence impliedby the now very salient reasons that they articulated. However, theseeasily verbalizable reasons may be an unrepresentative subset and,hence, may be somewhat discrepant with the individuals' attitudes andwith their prior reports (see Wilson, Hodges, & LaFleur, 1995). Hodgesand Wilson (1993) found that the extent to which such consequences oc-curred varied as a function of the accessibility of individuals' attitudes.Those who responded relatively quickly to an attitudinal query at Time1 were less influenced by verbalizing reasons for their attitudes at a latertime than were those who responded slowly. The latter group—thosewith lower attitude accessibility—displayed a stronger correlation be-tween their Time 2 attitude reports and the favorability implied by thereasons they articulated and, as a result, a weaker correlation betweentheir Time 1 and Time 2 reports. These differences occurred despite thefact that the two groups displayed equivalence in terms of the extent towhich the reasons they generated were consistent with the Time 1 rat-ings. Thus, even though they verbalized equivalently unrepresentativereasons, individuals with greater attitude accessibility were less influ-enced by these momentarily salient reasons when they were reportingtheir attitudes at Time 2, and their reports displayed greater stabilityacross time.

Relatedly, many additional studies have found the stability of attitudereports over time and/or resistance to counterattitudinal information tovary as a function of attitude accessibility (e.g., Bassili, 1996; Bassili &Fletcher, 1991; Fazio & Williams, 1986; Zanna, Fazio, & Ross, 1994).Moderating effects of the sort reviewed in this section clearly illustratethe importance of attitude strength. Contextually salient informationcan influence the attitudinal ratings that people provide at any givenmoment in time, but the extent of that influence varies. When objects arerepresented in memory with relatively weakly associated (or absent)evaluative linkages, individuals faced with a query, or some other situa-tional demand for evaluative judgment, will need to construct an atti-tude. Hence, they will be more affected by the currently salientinformation than individuals for whom a preexisting evaluativeassociation is activated automatically.


PROBLEMS WITH A STRONG "ATTITUDES ASCONSTRUCTIONS" PERSPECTIVE

In light of the research summarized in the preceding section, I have toadmit to some bewilderment regarding recent discussions portrayingall (or virtually all) attitudes as momentary constructions (e.g., Schwarz& Bohner, 2001; Zaller & Feldman, 1992; see also Schwarz, this issue).These formulations view attitudes as evaluative judgments that are al-ways computed from scratch on the basis of information that is accessi-ble at that moment, as opposed to their being represented and activatedfrom memory. Thus, the strong version of this perspective is contrary tothe evidence that at least some attitudes are represented in memory andexert influence even when individuals have no reason to reflect upon,retrieve, or construct evaluations.

The argument typically advanced as the reason to entertain a con-structionist perspective centers on the contextual dependence ofevaluative judgments. There can be no question that attitudinal reportscan be influenced by salient contextual information. We already havehighlighted some such evidence, for example, Chaiken and Baldwin(1981) and Hodges and Wilson (1993). However, this research demon-strates not orUy contextual dependence, but also moderation of thisdependence as a function of attitude strength.

In my view, then, the strong constructionist perspective is contra-dicted by existing data. In addition, as Fazio and Olson (2003a) argued, itis characterized by an inherent logical problem. To illustrate, let us con-sider an individual confronted with a situational demand that requiresevaluation of attitude object X. Because X is novel (e.g., a new automo-bile model or a political candidate) and bears no obvious resemblance toobjects toward which attitudinal associations exist in memory, the indi-vidual will need to engage in some degree of construction. Presumably,the individual will compute an attitude toward X on the basis of what-ever attributes of X happen to be salient at the time. Let us presume thatthese include attributes A, B, and C. If these attributes are themselvespositively valued, then the individual will conclude that X is positive. Ifthey are predominately negative, then X will be viewed as negative.From where, though, did the evaluations of attributes A, B, and Cemerge? Why did they take on positive or negative value? The strict con-structionist perspective has to maintain that the attitudes toward the at-tributes were themselves the outcome of a construction process. So,salient attributes of A—a,, aj, and ag—inform the computation of the atti-tude toward A. But, why does aj assume a particular valence? Obvi-ously, the B construction process is open to a problem of infinite regress.

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Ultimately, some relevant evaluation—some outcome of prior learninghistory—needs to be represented in memory.

The importance of prior learning points to yet another conceptualproblem v ith the strong constructionist perspective. What kind of infor-mation processing system would not learn from its computational ef-forts? Would any functional system, once it has concluded that X isgood, lose all trace of its construction output? Would it have to"recompute" entirely from scratch with no savings in releaming the nexttime a situation demands an evaluative judgment of X? If attitudes areviewed as evaluative knowledge, akin to any other knowledge, whywould such knowledge not accumulate over time? Associative modelsof learning and memory call for the development or strengthening of anexcitatory evaluative link. Connectionist models call for a change in thelearned weights connecting the input units and the output.

Social and cognitive scientists do not question that people readily ac-quire semantic knowledge. They learn that the probability of encounter-ing "butter" is greater given the presence of "bread" than its absence,that the probability of seeing a "nurse" increases in the presence of a"doctor." Research on impression formation and social perception hasrepeatedly demonstrated that perceivers develop associations betweena target person and traits that characterize the person's behavior (e.g.,Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Uleman, 1999). Why should evaluativeknowledge be any different?

Even concepts that at first require extensive computational resourcesclearly benefit from learrung. A young child performs basic arithmeticoperations such as addition by counting. So, to determine the total num-ber of balls that are available, the child points and counts the two redballs, "one, two," and continues counting "three, four" while pointing tothe two blue balls. Knowing the principle of cardinality, the childproudly announces that there are "four" balls. The answer is obviouslythe outcome of a construction process. However, over time and withpractice, the child needs to rely less and less on pointing, counting, andprocedtural rules. The child comes to know that 2 + 2 = 4. The output ofthe previous constructions is learned and represented in memory as thesum of two sets of two. Again, why should evaluative knowledge be anydifferent?

On the basis of these arguments alone, I fail to see how a strong "atti-tudes as constructions" perspective can be granted credence. Nor am Ialone. Even proponents seem to agree: " . . . we adopt a strong version ofa construal model, assuming, for the sake of the argument, that respon-dents always [emphasis in original] need to compute a judgment fromscratch and can't recall their previous evaluations. As anyone who re-members that a movie was "boring"—^but can't recall any relevant de-

ATTITUDES AS OB|ECT-EVALUATION ASSOCIATIONS 621

tails—realizes, this extreme assumption is unrealistic" (Schwarz &Bohner, 2001, p. 444). It is this very unrealism that necessitates consider-ation of an attitude-nonattitude continuum. Attitudes are evaluativeknowledge represented in memory, but there will be objects for whichindividuals lack such knowledge and, hence, need to construct overallevaluations on the basis of whatever relevant information they canaccess from memory or whatever the situation makes available.

However, the outcomes of any such construction efforts are not for-gotten. To the contrary, they facilitate progression from the status of anonattitude toward the status of a strongly associated evaluation thatcan be activated automatically when the object is encountered. This atti-tude development has functional value for the individual, enabling effi-cient and relatively effortless appraisal of the object. Eor example,attitude rehearsal has been shown to ease later decision making, de-creasing the resources that are needed to reach evaluative decisions.When asked to make rapid decisions about their preferences betweenpairs of objects, individuals who had earlier been induced to developand rehearse attitudes toward novel objects displayed less cardiovascu-lar reactivity than individuals who had been exposed to the objectsequally often but in the context of a task that was unrelated to attitudes(Blascovich et al., 1993; Fazio, Blascovich, & DriscoU, 1992). Likewise,less reactivity was exhibited when individuals made decisions involv-ing objects for which they had earlier rehearsed attitudes than objects forwhich they had not (Blascovich, et al., 1993). Activation of the rehearsedattitudes during the pairwise preference task apparently made the deci-sion task less demanding. Fewer resources were required to cope withthe demands of the task (see Fazio, 2000 for an extensive discussion of re-search related to the object appraisal function of attitudes). Thus,position along the attitude-nonattitude continuum influences the verynature of the evaluative judgment process.

THE MODEL'S PERSPECTIVE REGARDING A FEWCONTEMPORARY ISSUES

RESPONSES TO EXPLICIT MEASURES OEATTITUDE ARE VERBAL BEHAVIORS

I have tried to be careful and precise in this article about my use of theterm attitude versus individuals' reports of their attitudes. Responses toa verbal query should not be viewed as attitudes per se. They are verbalexpressions of the attitude, subject to many forces beyond the influenceof any evaluative associations that might exist in memory. The distinc-

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tion is one that attitude theorists have long recogruzed. In his classic arti-cle "Attitudes can be measured," Thurstone (1928) used the term"opinion" to refer to "a verbal expression of attitude" and argued that anopinion merely "symbolizes an attitude" (p. 531). Although Thurstoneadvocated using "opinions as the means for measuring attitudes," henoted that "neither [a person's] opinions nor his overt acts constitute inany sense an infallible guide to the subjective inclinations and prefer-ences that constitute his attitude. Therefore, we must remain content touse opinions, or other forms of action, merely as indices of attitude" (p.532).

Thurstone was concerned that a person's verbal behavior may be in-fluenced by factors in addition to the attitude. He specifically made ref-erence to possibilities ranging from intentional misrepresentation in theinterest of avoiding outright dispute with others to less than frank ex-pressions stemming from courtesy. However, there are many factors inaddition to self-presentation concerns that can make responses to verbalqueries poor indices of the attitude of interest. As many survey research-ers have noted (e.g., Schuman & Presser, 1981; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001;Tourangeau & Rasinksi, 1988), even well-intentioned responding to averbal measure of attitude is a complex process involving issues of ques-tion comprehension, scale interpretation, and the use of appropriatestandards of comparison. In this sense, verbal reports of attitudes are al-ways constructions, and those responses can be influenced by construalsand standards that bear little relation to what the survey researcherintended.

Correspondence between Implicit and Explicit Measures. Even if the"communication" between the questioner and the respondent has pro-ceeded as intended, the verbal report may be influenced by many factorsin addition to the evaluative association represented in memory. By notrequiring direct reports, implicit measures of attitude aim to provide amore proximal estimate of these attitudinal representations than is pos-sible with explicit measures. This difference alone may result in an ob-served discordance between the attitude estimates provided by implicitand explicit measures. My colleagues and I have approached this issueof correspondence between implicit and explicit measures from the per-spective of the MODE Model of attitude-behavior processes (Fazio,1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Fazio & Olson, 2003b). Because re-sponding to an explicit measure is itself a verbal behavior, it can beviewed as related to the multiple attitude-behavior processes that formthe focus of the MODE Model. The verbal expression may stem from arelatively spontaneous process involving the direct influence of the au-tomatically activated attitude on the immediate perceptions of the atti-tude object noted in the question. Alternatively, it may stem from a very


deliberative analysis of the attributes that characterize the attitude ob-ject, provided that the individual has both the motivation and the oppor-tunity to engage in such effortful reflection. Finally, the verbal responsemay stem from what the MODE model refers to as mixed processes, in-volving both automatic and controlled components. In such cases, theverbal expression may be influenced not only by the relevant automati-cally activated attitude, but also by the downstream consequences ofany number of motivational factors. Individuals may be so concernedabout accuracy that they check the implications of the activated attitudeagainst their knowledge regarding the attributes of the object, instead ofjust "going with their guts." Sufficiently motivated individuals maycompare the activated attitude for its consistency with various internalstandards and cherished values. Of course, as Thurstone noted, theymay "spin" their attitudes so as to make their verbal responses morepalatable to the apparent audience.

According to the MODE Model, then, any attitudes activated auto-matically by the mention of the attitude object in an explicit measure aremerely a "starting point" for the verbal behavior. Whether the verbal re-sponse reflects the attitude will depend on the motivation and opportu-nity factors. Verbally expressed judgments occur farther "downstream"than the automatic activation of any relevant attitude and may be influ-enced by motivational factors that can override the effect of the automat-ically activated attitude. For these reasons, greater correspondencebetween implicit and explicit measures is expected when the motivationto deliberate and/or the opportunity to do so are low. When both arehigh, any additional information that the motivated individual consid-ers has the potential to produce discordance between the verbal re-sponses and the attitude estimated by the implicit measure. Thisreasoning has received empirical support in a number of investigationsconcerned with race-related judgments (see Fazio & Olson, 2003b for areview).

Neither Unconscious nor Dual Attitudes. Importantly, from the per-spective of the MODE model, any observed discordance between im-plicit and explicit measure does not necessitate reference to theunconscious (e.g., Banaji, 2001) or to dual representations of attitude(e.g., Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). As Fazio and Olson (2003b)emphasized, no implicit measure speaks to the question of whether indi-viduals are or are not aware of their attitudes. Additional evidence, wellbeyond the administration of an implicit measure, is required to makeany such inference (see Olson & Fazio, 2002, for an example). In addi-tion, no explicit measure guarantees the existence of a distinct represen-tation in memory, independent of the attitude that is automaticallyactivated when the object is encountered. Responding to the explicit

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measure is an exercise in verbal behavior and, hence, does not speak tothe presence or absence of preexisting representations.

ON THE PRESUMED MALLEABILITY OFAUTOMATICALLY ACTIVATED ATTITUDES

Research involving implicit measures of attitude focused at first ontheir correspondence with explicit measures and their utility as predic-tors of judgments and behavior. However, interest in the possibility ofchange in automatically activated attitudes, especially prejudice,spawned research in which impHcit measures served as dependentmeasures. The findings (see Blair, 2002 for a detailed review) revealedwhat has been viewed by some as a surprising sensitivity of implicitmeasures to immediate contextual factors and, hence, has raised ques-tions about the relative stability versus malleability of automaticallyactivated attitudes. In my view, the case for malleability has been over-stated. What has been observed is malleability of the scores on the im-plicit measure. I do not regard such findings as necessarily indicativeof malleability of the attitude. Instead, the malleability may be moreprecisely pinpointed as stemming from either the malleability of themeasure or the malleability of the attitude object. It is important thatthe distinctions not be blurred.

Malleability of the Measure: The IAT's Sensitivity to Extrapersonal Associa-tions. Considerable recent research has demonstrated that pre-exposureto different kinds of information influences Implicit Association Test(IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) scores (see Blair, 2002 for areview). Essentially, salient positive information about a given categoryproduces IAT scores indicative of more favorable evaluations. Such ma-nipulations have involved exposure to movie clips that depicted Blacksat a harmonious family event versus an argumentative, gang-relatedscene (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001), presentation of a series of eitheradmired Black individuals and disliked Whites or disliked Blacks andadmired Whites (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001), assigning participantsto interact with a Black partner who occupied a superior or subordinatetask role (Richeson & Ambady, 2003), exposure to violent and misogy-nous rap music (Rudman & Lee, 2002), and introduction to the IAT (spe-cifically as a procedure for assessing prejudice) by a Black versus aWhite experimenter (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). Yet, such find-ings do not constitute unambiguous evidence for the inference that auto-matically activated attitudes have been modified. The critical issue inneed of resolution is whether such contextual manipulations (a) pro-duce an actual change in the relevant mental representation, to which


the IAT is sensitive, or (b) simply render momentarily salientinformation that assists the participant with the response-mappingproblem posed by the IAT.

The findings that my colleagues and I have recently accumulated re-garding the sensitivity of the IAT to extrapersonal associations lead meto favor the second alternative, or at least to the belief that considerablecaution is required in drawing any inferences about attitude change onthe basis of such IAT findings. Extrapersonal associations—ones thatneither form the basis of the individual's attitude nor become activatedautomatically in response to the object—can influence the IAT as it is tra-ditionally implemented. Especially relevant is research in which both at-titudes and extrapersonal associations were experimentally created inthe lab (Han, Olson, & Fazio, 2006). Participants formed a preference forone novel stimulus over another, with the former being described inways that made it objectively far superior. They were then exposed tothe videotaped comments of two young boys who expressed opinionsthat were either consistent with that preference or incredulously incon-sistent. The results revealed that those who were given attitudinally in-consistent extrapersonal associations were able to use that informationto facilitate coping with the incompatible mapping problem posed bythe traditional IAT. They exhibited a significant reduction in their pre-sumed preference for the objectively superior of the two stimuli, com-pared to those who had received the consistent extrapersonalassociation. This attenuation of the IAT effect occurred despite the factthat the participants rated the sources of the attitude-inconsistentextrapersonal information as irrational and foolish. On the other hand,the extrapersonal associations did not influence either a subliminalpriming measure or a version of the IAT that was "personalized" and,hence, less susceptible to the influence of extrapersonal associations(Olson & Fazio, 2004). These measures proved sensitive to the attitude,regardless of the congruency of the extrapersonal information. Thus, thevarious findings noted earlier regarding contextual sensitivity mayreflect the influence of momentarily salient extrapersonal associations.As such, they may point more to the malleability of the IAT than to themalleability of attitudes.

Malleability of the Attitude Object: Let's not forget Asch. Some of the re-search illustrating contextual sensitivity has employed, not the IAT, butan evaluative priming procedure. When Black faces are presentedwithin the background context of a church interior, they prime lessnegativity than when the context is an urban street corner or a jail(Wittenbririk et al., 2001; Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004). Simi-larly, current motivational states have been shown to influence the eval-uation that is primed by the presentation of a related object. Water

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primes more positivity when individuals are thirsty (Ferguson & Bargh,2004), food stimuli activate more positivity when individuals are hun-gry (Seibt, Hafner, & Deutsch, 2007), and cigarettes prime morepositivity when heavy smokers are in a state of deprivation as opposedto having just had a cigarette (Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin,2003). Whether the context is internal or external to the individual, find-ings of this sort need not be interpreted as evidence of the malleability ofautomatically activated attitudes or of objects being associated withmultiple attitudes. Instead, they may represent varying construals of theattitude object.

This is the very issue that Asch (1948) addressed long ago when he ar-gued against the "doctrine of suggestion, prestige, and imitation" as theexplanation for the often-observed finding that a statement is evaluatedmore positively when it is attributed to a more prestigious source. Henoted that the finding need not presuppose that "an unchanged object ofjudgment undergoes change of evaluation" (p. 255) as a function of theprestige of the individual from whom it emanates. The apparentchanges in evaluation may be due to "a change in the object of judgmentrather than in the judgment of the object" (p. 256). To use the classic ex-ample, "rebellion" does not refer to the same entity when attributed toJefferson versus Lenin. Thus, the statement that "a little rebellion, nowand then, is a good thing and necessary in the political world as stormsare in the physical" is evaluated differently due to a change of meaning.The importance of such change of meaning has been documented re-peatedly in research concerning impression formation (e.g., Hamilton &Zanna, 1974; Higgins & Rholes, 1976).

In parallel fashion, I would argue that water is not the same attitudeobject when one is thirsty as when not, a given food is not the same objectwhen one is hungry versus sated, and cigarettes are not the same atti-tude object when a smoker is in a state of craving versus not. Likewise,situational cues can lead to varying construals of any given object. Thevery same African American male wiU conjure very different interpreta-tions depending on whether he is dressed in a three-piece suit versusgang attire. Virtually all persons, objects, and issues are multiplycategorizable. It is how an object is construed at any moment in time thatdetermines attitude activation (see Barden et al., 2004; Fazio, 1986; Fazio& Dunton, 1997; Lord & Lepper, 1999; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999; Smith etal., 1996 for discussion of such categorization processes). Thus, it is notsurprising that the attitudes activated in a priming experiment may varyas a function of the effect of current concerns and context on construal ofthe objects.

I do not mean to imply that automatically activated attitudes are inca-pable of change. To the contrary, I believe that some research findings


provide evidence strongly suggesting that appropriately designed so-cial influence techniques can produce an actual change in the represen-tation of the attitude (e.g., Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, &Russin, 2000; Olson & Fazio, 2006; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001).However, given the abundance of evidence regarding the relative stabil-ity of accessible attitudes over time and their resistance tocounterinformation (see Fazio, 1995 for a review), I am skeptical that themere contextual salience of counterattitudinal information has any im-pact on the attitude representation. To me, it seems far more likely thatany such empirical demonstration reflects the malleability of the im-plicit measure or the malleability of the object than the malleability of theattitude itself. In any case, I would urge that researchers recognize thesemultiple possibilities and exercise caution in the inferences that aredrawn from the observation of change in implicit measure scores.

ATTITUDE AMBIVALENCE

It is rare for any given object not to be characterized both by some attrib-utes that might be considered positive and by some that might be con-sidered negative. This creates the potential for the experience ofambivalence when judging the object or making an approach/avoid-ance decision. To the extent that the individual lacks an accessible atti-tude and is forced to construct an evaluation on the spot in response to averbal query or a need for action, the individual may experience ambiv-alence if both the positive and the negative features of the object are sa-lient (Newby-Glark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). However, the essenceof more reasoned forms of attitude development is an integration of anysuch conflicting information into a summary evaluation. Once formed,and associated with the attitude object, this summary evaluation effec-tively resolves the ambivalence. In future similar situations, the objectwill evoke the summary evaluation, instead of requiring continued con-sideration of the attribute information. Thus, ambivalence amounts topre-decisional coriflict and can be obviated by the activation of a rele-vant summary evaluation developed at an earlier point in time. Accord-ing to the MODE model, individuals may revisit the attribute level, ifthey are sufficiently motivated and have the opportunity to do so(Fabrigar, Petty, Smith, & Crites, 2006; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990).However, when either motivation or opportunity is lacking, the earlierformed summary evaluation will predominate.

It is important to note that the potential for ambivalent reactions to anattitude object relates very closely to the fact that most objects can be con-strued in multiple ways. Ambivalence is often portrayed, as I have

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framed it above, as stemming from the subordinate attribute level (e.g,Kaplan, 1972). One is tom by the object's obvious possession of both pos-itive and negative features (e.g., chocolate cake is both delicious and fat-tening). However, ambivalence can also be viewed as an issue ofcategorization (see Fazio, 1994 for an earlier discussion of this perspec-tive). To which category does the object belong? This moresuperordinate emphasis highlights that the object can be construed inmultiple ways. In many situations, contextual cues and current motiva-tions may foster a particular categorization. In the context of a self-in-dulgent dinner celebrating a significant life event, the chocolate cake islikely to be categorized as a wonderfully tasty dessert and evoke nothingbut positivity. Shortly before or after a visit to the gym, the same cakemay be quickly relegated to the fattening category and evoke negativity.When contextual cues are less dictating of the categorization outcome,one construal may still be more likely to predominate over the other as afunction of the individual's own proclivities. As noted earlier while dis-cussing the influence of attitude accessibility on categorization, the moreattitude-evoking possibility is at an advantage (Fazio & Dunton, 1997;Smith et al., 1996.) Thus, committed and successful dieters are likely tohave developed such strongly associated negativity to fattening foodsthat they are more apt to "assign" the chocolate cake to the category of"fattening" than are individuals who have the advantage of a high me-tabolism (see Ferguson, 2007; Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003for related research findings). Neither of these two types of individualsis likely to experience much ambivalence. Ambivalence is more likely toarise in situations in which, and among people for whom, potential cate-gorizations essentially compete for attention. Viewed from this perspec-tive of superordinate categorization, the ambivalence stems, not fromthe simultaneous activation of positive and negative sentiments, butfrom shifting (possibly rapidly shifting) construals of the attitude object.When categorized in one way, the chocolate cake evokes positivity.When categorized in another way, it activates a negative attitude. Thus,it is the malleability of the attitude object, not the malleability of theattitude or the possession of multiple attitudes toward the object, thatdictates the experience of ambivalence.

Such a view has important implications for the measurement of atti-tudes and attitude ambivalence. When we as researchers ask individu-als for their evaluations of an object, we often do so in a rather abstractmanner that lacks specific contextual cues. As a result, we may be re-questing evaluation at a more superordinate level of categorization thanrespondents typically employ for that object or set of objects. Individu-als' awareness of the potential for multiple categorizations and theirconsideration of varying evaluations may prompt them to express rat-


ings indicative of ambivalence, effectively noting that their evaluations"depend" on the details. However, in a specific situation, any such am-bivalence may not be experienced because sufficient cues exist to disam-biguate the categorization and, hence, prompt activation of the attitudeassociated with a single category.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The major message that I hope this article has succeeded in communi-cating can be summarized in two words. Attitudes exist! They are not ascientific reification. They are not hypothetical constructs. Attitudesare evaluative knowledge, represented in memory in the same way asany other form of knowledge. They summarize our prior learning withrespect to the valence of the outcomes produced by a given object. Assummary evaluations associated with the representation of an attitudeobject, these attitudes can be activated from memory automaticallywhen the object (or a sufficiently related object) is encountered. Ac-cording to the MODE Model, such automatically activated attitudesserve as the "starting point" for our appraisals of the object in the im-mediate situation. When either the motivation to deliberate further, orthe opportunity to do so, is lacking, these immediate perceptions willinfluence evaluative judgments, verbal expressions, decisions, andovert behavior in a relatively direct manner. In this way, the evaluativeknowledge that we have acquired as a result of our prior learning his-tory—our collection of attitudes—proves to be very functional. Atti-tudes simplify our day-to-day existence, enabling efficient appraisalof the objects that we encounter. Although relatively thoughtless, theseappraisals promote approach behavior toward objects from which weprobabilistically will experience pleasure and avoidance of objectslikely to produce pain. Thus, attitudes form the cornerstone of a trulyfunctional system by which learning and memory guide behavior in afruitful direction.

It is important to recognize, however, that the direct "downstream"consequences of automatically activated attitudes are not inevitable.The automatically activated evaluation is a starting point or defaultvalue, but its influence can be overridden. Under some circumstances(the presence of both motivation and opportunity), individuals maycheck the validity of their irrunediate appraisals against other knowl-edge that they have regarding the attitude object, or examine its consis-tency with motivational goals to which they aspire. Such knowledge andmotivational forces can attenuate the impact of the automaticallyactivated attitude or even produce an effort to correct for its influence.

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Responses to explicit measures of attitudes are themselves verbal be-haviors. They are expressions of the attitude, not the attitude per se. Aswith any behavior, these verbal expressions can be influenced by notonly any attitude that is automatically activated but also downstreammotivational forces. Hence, discordance between implicit measures as-sessing the automatically activated attitude and explicit measures canoccur, especially under conditions characterized by a motivation to de-liberate and the opportunity to do so. The discordance is readily tinder-standable in terms of motivated correction for the influence of theautomatically activated attitude. In and of itself, then, any such discor-dance does not require reference to the unconscious or to dualrepresentations of attitudes in memory.

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