atomic bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki strategic analysis

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Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and NagasakiMatin Zuberia

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To cite this Article Zuberi, Matin(2001) 'Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki', Strategic Analysis, 25: 5, 623 — 662To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09700160108458986URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160108458986

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Atomic Bombing Of Hiroshimaand Nagasaki

Matin Zuberi

AbstractOn the Hiroshima Cenotaph are inscribed the words: "Please rest in peace, for

the error will not be repeated". Was the error the atomic bombing or Japanesemilitarism? On August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay, piloted by Col. Paul W. Tibbets,dropped the world's first atomic bomb on Hiroshima and gave the world "a peepinto hell". And on August 9, 1945, the town of Nagasaki was subjected to the samehorrible fate. August as a month became synonymous with the Apoclypse of Hiroshimain 1945. Originally intended as a deterrent to the German threat, the atomic bombbecame an offensive weapon to be used to coerce Japan to surrender and bringWorld War II to an end. This article discusses this major shift in policy and recallsthe history of one of the most devastating events of our times.

The voice of the wavesThat rises before meIs not so loudThat I am left behind.

Minutes before the plane carrying the atomic bomb took off for its destination,Hiroshima, Chaplain -William Downey recited in a richly resonant voice before theassembled crew a prayer that he had especially prepared for the occasion:

Almighty Father, who wilt hear the prayer of those that love Thee, we pray Thee to be withthose who brave heights of Thy heaven and who carry the battle to our enemies. Guard andprotect them, we pray Thee, as they fly the appointed rounds. May they, as well as we, knowThy strength and power, and armed with Thy might may they bring this war to a rapid end.We pray Thee that the end of the war may come soon and once more we may know peaceon earth. May the men who fly this night be kept safe in Thy care, and may they be returnedsafely to us. We shall go forward in trusting Thee knowing that we are in Thy care now andfor ever. In the name of Jesus Christ, Amen!.2

A Special Bombing Mission, with Col. Paul Tibbets as its leader, was stationedon the island of Tinian in the Pacific. Laboratory facilities along with scientists fromthe Los Alamos laboratory for the final assembly of the bombs and for the experiments

Dr. Matin Zuberi is a former professor of Disarmament at SIS, JNU, and presently a member of the NationalSecurity Council.

Strategic Analysis. Vol. XXV, No. 5© The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima 623

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to be conducted during the fateful missions were also set up. Some of these scientistsflew in the accompanying planes that were virtually flying laboratories. GeneralCurtis LeMay, who later became the first commander of the US Strategic AirCommand, brought with him to Tinian the order that set the date for the atomicstrike as August 6, 1945. Hiroshima was the primary target while Kokura andNagasaki were the secondary and tertiary targets respectively. Tibbets, pilot of theplane that was to drop the bomb on Hiroshima, got his mother's name Enola Gaypainted on the aircraft. Unknown to his companions, he carried a small box containingtwelve cyanide capsules that were to be distributed to the crew in case of any crisisduring the flight over Japan.1

The take-off weight of the plane was 150,000 pounds, including 9,000 poundsof the bomb and 7,000 gallons of fuel. Fearing the possibility of a crash during thetakeoff, Captain William Parsons decided to defy explicit orders by not arming thebomb before the takeoff. At 7:30 a.m. on the way to Hiroshima, he inserted theexplosive charge and the detonator into the bomb.4 As he was the only man on theflight who knew every detail about the bomb, he arranged for a pistol to be usedagainst him in case of any danger of his being captured by the Japanese. After thebomb was finally ready for use, Tibbets addressed the crew: "We are carrying theworld's first atomic bomb." It was inscribed with messages to the Japanese people,some of them obscene. At 8:16:2 A.M. Hiroshima time on August 6, 1945, havingtravelled a distance of about six miles, the bomb exploded over Dr Shima's clinic.The temperature at the core of the glowing fireball was 50,000 degrees. As etherealglow illuminated the cockpit of the plane and the crew had "a peep into hell". Theplane made three circles around Hiroshima taking photographs and completingexperiments while shock waves from the blast were bouncing it higher.5 Themushroom cloud was visible from the plane for 373 miles in its return flight.

In my mind's eye, like a waking dream, I could still see the tongue of Tire at work on bodiesof men.6

The "Atomic Bomb Countermeasures Committee" of the Japanese War, Navy,and Home Ministries denied the possibility of an atomic bomb and merely sentphysicist Yoshio Nishinà to find out what kind of bomb had destroyed Hiroshima.Nishina, in a letter to an associate, wrote that if the Americans had actually droppedan atomic bomb, it was time those involved in the Japanese bomb programmeincluding himself "should commit harakiri." The time of the suicide was to bedecided on his return from Hiroshima: American and British scientists had won abig victory over the Japanese. "Their character", according to him, "exceeded thelevel of our character." After completing his investigations in Hiroshima, Nishinaproceeded to Nagasaki.7

The idea of a second atomic strike originated from a coterie of officers consistingof General Leslie Groves, the domineering officer who pushed the Manhattan Projectat a fast pace, and his close aides, Admiral Purnell and General Farrel. It was Purnellwho first proposed that it would take two atomic bombs to bring about Japan's

624 Strategic Analysis/August 2001


surrender, the first to demonstrate its power and the second to convince the Japanesethat the United States had a large arsenal.8 Groves eagerly accepted the proposalbecause it fitted into his own schemes of things. He knew that two bombs werebeing fabricated, based on the supply of enriched uranium from Oak Ridge andplutonium from Hanford; the destructiveness of the two types had to be demonstratedduring the war. It was also assumed that the second atomic strike should be launchedsoon after the first. As early as July 24, Groves started pressing the scientific teamon Tinian to speed up the second bombing.9 The civilian leadership never articulatedthe strategy of two speedy atomic blows; the coterie around Groves simply assumedthat it was merely a tactical matter not requiring a political decision.

'The controlling factor," according to Groves, "was the date by which a sufficientamount of plutonium could be processed and delivered... After that, all that wasneeded was suitable weather."10 The date chosen for the second attack was amazinglydecided not in Washington but on Tinian Island. The destruction of Nagasaki couldhave been avoided if Washington had retained control over scheduling of the bombingraids. Japanese leaders were not given sufficient time to absorb the shock of theHiroshima disaster, Groves was in a tearing hurry to drop the second bomb. As theforecast was of bad weather, the Nagasaki bombing was brought forward from thetentative schedule of August 11 to August 9. The scientists, dog-tired, warned thatthe hurried schedule would prevent them from completing their final preparationsfor the bomb." Groves would not allow anything to delay the second atomic strike;he decided to take the chance.

Remembering their former Berkeley colleague Riyokichi Sagane, who wasprofessor of physics at the University of Tokyo, physicists Luis Alvarez and RobertSerber decided to send him a letter appealing to him to inform the Japanesegovernment about the impending nuclear devastation. Alvarez, who later won theNobel Prize, drafted the letter and Serber and another colleague, Philip Morrison,edited it. Then Alvarez wrote out the final version and made two carbon copies,sealed them into envelopes, and taped them to the three parachute gauges to bedropped from the second plane as the bomb fell from the first.12 The message stated:"Within the space of three weeks we have proof-fired one bomb in the Americandesert, exploded one in Hiroshima, and fired the third this morning." The threephysicists from Los Alamos assured Sagane that they deplored "the use to which abeautiful discovery has been put!" They, however, added a warning: "We can assureyou that unless Japan surrenders at once this rain of atomic bombs will increasemanifold in fury."1? Sagane saw the letter only after the Japanese surrender. He latergave it to his former American colleague.14

The bomb was loaded in the aircraft called Bock's Car, named after its usualCommander Frederick Bock, late on August 8. Major General Charles Sweeneypiloted it. The bomb was four a half feet wide, ten and a half feet long, and weighedfive tons." The takeoff, according tó the senior scientist on Tinian, Norman Ramsay,was at 3 a.m., "We all aged ten years until the plane cleared the island", he recalled.16



Bock's Car was bedevilled by problems all the way to Nagasaki. Its fuel transferpump was defective and 600 gallons of fuel were uselessly trapped in a reservedtank. This reduced flying time. Despite detection of this problem, it was decided topersist with the flight. The primary target, Kokura, was enveloped in a thick cloud.The plane circled three times over the city waiting for a parting of the cloud allowingvisual bombing. Because of the shortage of fuel, the mission could have been abortedand the plane could have returned to its base. Instead, pilot Major General Sweeneydecided to rush to Nagasaki, the secondary target. That city too was covered in acloud. By then, the fuel was sufficient only for one pass over the city. At thebombing altitude of 37,000 feet and carrying a bomb weighing 10,000 pounds, fuelconsumption was rapid—over 1,000 gallons per hour.17 Encountering a thick cloudover Nagasaki as well, it as decided to defy explicit orders for visual bombing. Thebomb-bay door had already opened when suddenly there was a large hole in thecloud and the entire city was visible. Thus, the fate of Nagasaki was sealed at 11:02A.M. local time on August 9.

Visible shock waves reached the aircraft. As a reporter, specially assigned towitness the explosion from the aircraft, wrote; "We watched a giant pillar of purplefire 10,000 feet high, shoot upward like a meteor coming from the earth instead offrom outer space...- It was a living thing". Even as he watched "a giant mushroomcame shooting out of the top to 45,000 feet...seething and boiling in a white furyof creamy foam, a thousand geysers rolled into one. It kept struggling in an elementalfury, like a creation in the act of breaking the bounds that held it down." Thegigantic cloud grew even bigger and "seemed to be laughing at its victims downbelow". The giant thunderclap was followed by a continuous roar and then thesilence of death. As Bock's Car was rushing away from the mushroom cloud, SecondLieutenant Nobukazu Komatsu and his crew were heading right into it. His planewas flying at 10,000 feet, and it passed through the ominous cloud in eight minutes.18

Out of the 6,250 gallons of fuel the plane had started with, not counting thetrapped fuel, it had just seven gallons of fuel left when it had a bumpy landing aboutten feet short of the end of the runway in Okinawa." According to Alvarez, f\eNagasaki mission was "as abominably run a raid as any in the history of strategicwarfare." He also takes the bit about a hole in the cloud before the bombing "witha grain of salt" because the bomb missed the target by two miles that was a reasonableradar error in those days.20

It was an astonishing feat to restore power supply for the entire city of Nagasakiby the evening of August 11. The odious job of cremating the thousands of "unknown"dead was assigned to a group of workers; 16 gallons of sake were brought, and eachworker was allowed a glass of sake both before and after his time in the field. It washoped that the potent drink would keep them sane.21

As the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a uranium bomb, which had never beentested before, the Hiroshima bombing was actually a test. When a team of Americanscientists visited the devastated ruins of the city shortly after the Japanese surrender,



Dr. Masao Tsuzuki, a radiobiologist sarcastically said to Philip Morrison: "I did theexperiment some years ago, but it was on rats. But you Americans—you are wonderful.You have made the human experiment". Narrating the episode, Morrison wrote, "Noone could fail to carry the scar of such a cutting thrust." There was, however, noneed to apologise, and American science and industry did not bear the guiít for thosetragic deaths. It was a total war, a war for the survival of culture.22 Interestingly, theJapanese scientist avoided any reference to the Japanese bomb programme.23

It was a plutonium bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki. A similar device hadbeen tested on July 16, 1945. As one Manhattan scientist wrote, "The Hiroshimabomb was easy; no effort at all, except the separation of uranium 235...The plutoniumbomb was the challenge and the triumph of Los Alamos." The scientists chosen toassemble it "were considered the lucky ones; others stood by, ready to be called tomount the next weapon."24 Could it be that the effect of this bomb dropped from anaircraft on a city was also conceived as an experiment? Ever since the end of thewar, world public attention has been focussed on Hiroshima; and Nagasaki becamea forgotten city. As the saying goes, 'To be atom-bombed is bad, but to be secondis worse!"23

II

There were various alternatives to bring about the surrender of Japan, especiallyafter the German capitulation on May 8, 1945. Conventional bombing, naval blockade,invasion of die Japanese islands, and atomic bombing were the four military options.Then there was the "Russian option"—exploiting the shock of a Soviet declarationof war against Japan. This was part of the .agreed war plans of the Allied Powers.There was also a diplomatic option: modification of the terms of surrender.

Conventional Bombing and Naval Blockade

General Billy Mitchell had written in the 1930s that Japanese cities were idealtargets for aerial attack- Those cities, "built largely of wood and paper, form thegreatest aerial targets the world has ever seen...Incendiary projectiles would bumthe cities to the ground in short order."25 General LeMay assumed command of thestrategic bombing of Japan in January 1945. His bombers were now burning themday after day. On the night of March 9, 1945, 334 bombers attacked Tokyo with2,000 tons of incendiary bombs. It was till then the most destructive conventionalair raid in history. Robert Gullian, a French journalist, observed Japanese "utteringcries of admiration" at the unholy beauty of what they were witnessing. The city was"illuminated like the forest of brightly lighted Christmas trees." The bombs, visiblein a grandiose spectacle, "descended rather slowly like a cascade of silvery water."They "scattered a kind of flaming dew that skittered along the roofs, setting fire toeverything it splashed and spreading a wash of dancing flames everywhere."27 In theensuing firestorm, a quarter of the city was destroyed. The crew could smell burning



flesh and felt that they were flying in Dante's Inferno. All Tokyo was visible fromthe air. As the bombers returned, the glow of the fire could be seen for 150 miles.This raid caused more deaths than the number killed in Hiroshima. On May 23, thebombers dropped 3,646 tons in incendiary bombs on Tokyo. The bombs were droppingfor two hours at the average rate of 1,000 bombs per second. Tokyo was then deletedfrom the list of incendiary targets.

Japanese urban areas were being destroyed at an incremental cost of about $3million per square mile; this was substantially cheaper than the first atomic bomb.28

By July 1945, more than 41,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on Japanesecites.29 The toll of incendiary bombing was heavy. About 40 per cent of the urbanarea of 66 Japanese cities was attacked; and 2.2 billion civilian casualties, including9 million deaths, were inflicted. And 22 million people were rendered homeless.30

"Shortly", noted the US Air Force's Combined Intelligence Committee, "Japan willbecome a nation without cities."31 Air Force General Arnold asked LeMay in Junehow long the war would last. LeMay replied, "Give me thirty minutes and I'll giveyou the date." He then came up with September 1, 1945, when he would have runout of targets.32 The naval blockade was strangling the Japanese economy besidescutting off far-flung Japanese forces from their supplies. A Japanese study conductedby Rear Admiral Tagaki had concluded as early as March 1944 that Japanese lossesof shipping were prohibitive and raw materials could no longer be imported.33 TheServices were competing, not only for their role in bringing about the surrender butalso for the post-War prestige and appropriations. The navy and the air force hopedthat the naval blockade and strategic bombing respectively would suffice, while thearmy considered an invasion necessary for the termination of the war.

Japanese Peace Moves

A new government headed by Admiral Kantarop Suzuki, a war hero who hadseen action in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of1904-05, had come to power in April 1945. He had to select members for theSupreme Court for the Direction of the War. He picked Shigenori Togo, an outspokenproponent of ending the war quickly, as his foreign minister. The navy and the armynominated their own ministers. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and General KorechikaAnami respectively. (The army minister was often called the war minister.) The twochiefs of staff were Yoshijiro Umezu of the army and Soemu Toyoda of the navy.Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Marquis Koichi Kido was the link between theSupreme War Council and Emperor Hirohito.34 With the German surrender on May8, 1945, Japan alone faced a most formidable military coalition; its relations witheven the Soviet Union, which had not yet declared war against Japan, weredeteriorating rapidly.

On May 11, while Robert Oppenheimer and his colleagues at the Los Alamoslaboratory were selecting targets in Japan for the nuclear attack, Suzuki, Togo,Yonai Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda—the Big Six—met in Tokyo to consider their



country's options. In view of ominous Soviet troop movements, it was decided tostart negotiations with the Soviet Union, the objective being Soviet mediation inobtaining acceptable terms of surrender. Fanatical elements within the Japaneseforces were also active. Vice-Admiral Takajiro Onishi, who had introduced thekamikaze tactics, boasted about 20 million suicide fighters.33 At his own initiative,Hirohito summoned the Supreme War Council on June 22, the day Okinawa fell. Hedesired studies made for the termination of the war and asked that a special envoybe sent to Moscow.36 Kido was the central figure in the group of Japanese leadersseeking negotiated peace. Foreign Minister Togo was pressing Ambassador NaotakeSato in Moscow to request the Soviet government to use its good offices to obtainmodification of the Allied terms of surrender. All that was needed was an assuranceregarding the retention of the emperor. It was proposed that Prince Konoye be sentas an envoy to Mosocw. The Togo-Sato messages were quickly decoded because theUS navy cryptographers had broken the Japanese codes.37 Soviet leaders, however,delayed contacts with Sato; they "let the Japanese dangle at the end of the Moscowwire as long as possible". Had they pointed out the futility of -apáñese hopes, Tokyomight have directly sued for peace with the Western powers.38 Truman and hisadvisers were aware of these Japanese peace feelers. Moreover, the Japanese militaryattache in Switzerland, General Okamoto, and Navy Commander Fujimura were incontact with American secret agents for months.39

The Russian Option

The main American anxiety regarding the prospect of an invasion of the Japaneseislands centred on the Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria. It was feared thatas American troops landed, this army would be summoned to reinforce Japaneseresistance, thereby, causing heavy American casualties. Fui ihese reasons, the JointChiefs of Staff desired "Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with herability to engage in offensive operations." Roosevelt succeeded in obtaining Stalin'sassurance at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 about a Soviet declaration ofwar against Japan three months after the German surrender.40 Soviet entry into thePacific War was greatly feared in Japan. The Supreme War Council stated that "oncethe Soviets enter the war, Japan will face inevitable defeat."41 Truman again soughtthis assurance at the Potsdam Conference. Stalin confirmed it. He also personallytold Truman and Bymes about a Japanese request to send Prince Konoye, and readout his answer. He hastened to add that the Japanese approach did not indicate anywillingness to surrender unconditionally but was calculated to obtain Soviet supportin furtherance of Japanese objectives.42 Reassured, Truman wrote in his dairy onJuly 18, "Japs will fold up before Russia comes in."43

Modification of Terms of Surrender

Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, who had been ambassador to Japanfrom 1932 until 1941, advocated retention of the Japanese emperor, as a constitutional



monarch. With his intimate knowledge of Japanese society, he emphasised the centralrole of the emperor, who could even facilitate an orderly capitulation of all Japanesetroops in distant theatres of the Pacific War. Modification of the terms of surrendercould avoid further loss of life. "The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender bythe Japanese", Grew wrote in a memorandum of May 28, 1945, "is their belief thatthis would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and theinstitution of the Throne." If some indication could be given that the Japanesepeople would be permitted to determine their future political structure, they wouldhave a face-saving device without which surrender would be highly unlikely. NavySecretary James Forestall, and a large group of civilian and military officials sharedhis views.44 Secretary for War Henry Stimson, a man of tender conscience, alternatedbetween worrying about the consequences of the atomic bombing and being excitedby the prospect of having what he called the "royal straight flush."43 Throughout thiscrucial period, he wavered from one position to the other as his capacity to influencedeclined. At times, he shared Grew's anxieties regarding the demand for unconditionalsurrender. Grew met Truman on June 18 to press his point of view, knowing theJoint Chiefs of Staff were to meet at the White House within a few hours.

Proposed Invasion of Japan

The crucial meeting on June 18 was convened by Truman to discuss the invasionplan, Operation OLYMPIC, scheduled to begin on November 1, 1945. Chief ofArmy Staff General George Marshall, a representative of Air Force General Arnold,Truman's Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy and Admiral King, Navy Secretary Forrestal,Secretary for War Stimson and Assistant Secretary for War John McCloy attendedthe meeting. Strangely, neither Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew nor any otherrepresentative of the State Department was invited. The day before the White Housemeeting, McCloy had told Stimson that there were no more Japanese cities to bebombed, no more carriers to sink or battleships to shell; some other means toterminate the war should be explored.46

General Marshall strongly supported at the White House" meeting the need tobring Red Army into the military equation. "The entry of Russia", he said, "on thealready hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them intocapitulation". As the political leaders thought of the bomb not as an entirely newforce of destruction but merely a more powerful weapon, one would expect that atthis meeting there would be serious consideration of the possible use of the bomb.The fact that thç bomb had not yet been tested does not explain why Truman'smilitary advisers did not explore its possible use. This is all the more puzzlingbecause General Marshall later revealed that the original invasion plan called forusing nine atomic bombs in three strikes. Nevertheless, the startling fact is thatnobody mentioned it until at the end of the meeting when the participants werepicking up their papers, Truman said to McCloy: "You didn't express yourself andnobody gets out of this room without standing up and being counted."



McCloy said, "We ought to have heads examined if we don't explore some othermethod" to bring about the surrender of Japan. He then suggested a political solutionand raised the question of giving a warning to the Japanese about the possible useof the bomb. "Well, as soon as I mentioned the 'bomb'...even in that select circleit was a sort of a shock", McCloy later revealed. "You didn't mention the bomb outloud...It just wasn't done." A kind of shudder seemed to go through the room in theWhite House at the first mention of the word. He added that the United States' moralposition would be enhanced if Japan were given a "specific warning of the bomb."47

Truman indicated to McCloy that his own thinking was along similar lines and askedhim to take up the matter with James Byrnes, who was soon to be appointed secretaryof state. Byrnes, however, was opposed to any "deal" involving the retention of theemperor.48 He feared a backlash; the war propaganda had depicted the emperor asan arch criminal and the atrocities committed by Japanese troops had inflamedAmerican public opinion.

Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945

On June 26, Stimson, Forrestal, Grew, and McCloy agreed that a clarificationof the terms of surrender should be issued before the invasion and with "ample timeto permit, a national reaction to set in." McCloy was asked to prepare a draft of whatbecame the Potsdam Declaration. It contained an assurance that Japan could have a"constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty." James Bymes, Truman's mentorin the Senate and old rival for the post of vice-president, took over on July 3, assecretary of state. "A little sheepish", in the words of a recent commentator, "thathe, not his mentor, was in the White House, Truman deferred to Byrnes' judgement."The recent biographer of Byrnes has summarised his agenda on the nuclear issue.He was opposed to sharing the 'secret' of the bomb with the Soviet Union; he waskeen to use the bomb "as quickly as possible in order to 'show results';" and hewanted it to be "used without warning."49

On July 16, the British Chief of Staff Alan Brooke argued in favour of retentionof the emperor at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The American JointChiefs of Staff wanted the emperor's position safeguarded for military reasons. Theyeven arranged the British Chiefs of Staff to persuade Churchill to discuss modificationof the terms of surrender with Truman. On July 18, however, they shifted theirposition. They now wanted the sentence assuring a constitutional monarchy to bedeleted; but, at the same time, they were anxious to utilise the emperor's authorityto enforce surrender. General Marshall cautioned against any move to remove theemperor because it could lead to a "last-ditch defence by the Japanese". Stimsonalso pleaded with Byrnes for an explicit warning about the destructiveness of thebomb and for an assurance regarding constitutional monarchy after the war. Byrnescut him off by saying that he had already persuaded Truman to delete such assurancesfrom the Potsdam Declaration. Thus, while practically every senior American civilianand military adviser, with the exception of Bymes, as well as Churchill and his top



military advisers, urged a negotiated surrender, the assurance regarding a constitutionalmonarchy in the draft document was deleted.50 Snch an assurance would haveamounted to changing the Allied policy of unconditional surrender. This would havenecessitated obtaining Soviet consent, as Stalin consulted Truman and Churchill onhis response to the Japanese peace moves. Byrnes, however, was determined to keepthe Soviet Union out of the war in the Pacific. Thus, the Declaration merely promised"a peacefully inclined and responsible government" that was to be "established inaccordance with the freely expressed .will of the Japanese people." It did notcontain any warning about the destructiveness of the new weapon, but called uponJapan to surrender unconditionally or face "prompt and utter destruction."51

Mokusatsu

American planes dropped thousands of leaflets over Japanese cities explainingthe Declaration. Unless Japan surrendered unconditionally, Otaru, Akita, Hachinoke,Fukushima, Urawa, Takayama, Iwakumi, Tottori, Imabaru, Yawata, Miyakonojo,and Saga would be bombed. Significantly, the nuclear targets, Hiroshima, Nagasaki,Kokura, and Niigata were not mentioned.52 Foreign Minister Togo wanted theDeclaration to be treated "with utmost circumspection" and favoured an effort toobtain a clarification and, if possible, mitigation of its terms, through the SovietUnion. Representatives of the army urged total rejection. The Cabinet finally decidedto publish the Declaration without any comment, pending clarification of Sovietintentions. Prime Minister Suzuki, addressing a Press conference on July 28, said hisgovernment had "decided to mokusatsu it." This colloquial expression is susceptibleto various interpretations: moku means " to keep silent" and satsu means "to kill".53

The expression was meant to imply "to kill with silence", "ignore", or, "treat withsilent contempt." Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu had advised Suzuki to use theexpression. Togo later said that mokusatsu was a flagrant violation of the Cabinetdecision to "withhold comment". The Japanese response was taken as more hostilethan it actually was; it was dismissed as a contemptuous rejection of the PotsdamDeclaration.54

Ill

Japan 'Always' the Target

Originally intended as a deterrent to a German threat, the atomic bomb becamean offensive weapon to be used against Japan. How did this major shift in policyoccur? British intelligence had concluded that German scientists would not be ableto produce the bomb in the foreseeable future. The estimate in the ManhattamProject was that the bomb would be available by August 1945. The military situationin Europe indicated that not only was it not needed to deter a German bomb, it wasnot even required to bring about the German surrender. Moreover, it was realisedthat the bomb would be too heavy to be dropped on Germany by an American plane



in the European theatre. It could, however, be done from a British Lancaster; but aforeign plane, obviously, could not drop an American bomb on which $2 billion hadbeen spent. The B-29 could certainly do the job against Japan from American basesin the Pacific.55 This major policy decision—shifting the target of the bombs fromGermany to Japan—occurred without any formal scrutiny of its political implications.56

Manhattan scientists, when recently told about Japan being always the target, wereamazed and shocked; they believed the bomb was being produced only as a deterrentagainst Hitler's feared bomb.37

The earliest recorded discussion of a combat use of the bomb was at a meetingon May 5, 1943, of the Military Policy Committee, with General Groves virtuallyits executive officer. Significantly, this was only five months after the chain reactionachieved by a team led by Enrico Fermi. There were still scientific and technologicalunknowns then about producing the bomb. A suggestion to drop the bomb on Tokyowas rejected because it was feared that it might not explode. The meeting concluded,"The best point of use would be on a Japanese fleet concentration in the Harbourof Truk" because the Japanese "would not be so apt to secure knowledge from it aswould the Germans"5* This is an interesting case of an embryonic form of nucleardeterrence already in operation. The mere knowledge of a German bomb programmewas a deterrent! Had the Americans known about Japan's small scale bomb effort,the committee might have had second thoughts about the bomb's use on a Japanesetarget.59 Roosevelt and Churchill later agreed that when the bomb was finally available,"it might perhaps after due consideration, be used against the Japanese, who shouldbe warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender. '>60 Roosevelt'sadvisers were not informed of this secret commitment. As we shall see later, neitherwas mature consideration given to the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki,nor was a warning of such a disaster given to the Japanese leaders. Soon after, theMilitary Policy Committee discussed the criteria for the selection of targets. It wasdecided that the targets should be undamaged from conventional bombing so that theeffects of the bomb could be accurately assessed.

Operation Silver Plate

General Groves persuaded the air force in September 1944 to create a specialgroup consisting of over 1,500 men, codenamed Operation Silver Plate, to starttraining for the atomic bombing. Col. Paul W. Tibbets was selected as its leader.Detailed instructions about the technical aspects of the bomb were given to thegroup at Los Alamos. Scientists disguised as sanitary engineers discussed the complexprocess of dropping the atomic bomb with members of this group. At one suchmeeting, Robert Oppenheimer startled Tibbets with the remark: "Colonel, your biggestproblem may be after the bomb has left the aircraft. The shock waves from thedetonation could crush your plane. I am afraid that I can give you no guarantee thatyou will survive."61

An ordnance group was assembled; it included one convicted murderer, three



men guilty of manslaughter and several felons who, after escaping from variousprisons, had joined the army under false names as the safest place for them to remainundetected. Their special technical expertise was spotted during a worldwide searchof the American armed forces. The criminals were naturally delighted with thesecurity arrangements. They were told that if they did their job well, their dossierswould be given to them along with matchboxes after the war was over.62 They weredazed and stunned by this turn in fortune's wheel and worked with redoubled energy.

The group under Col. Tibbets was later moved to Havana to get accustomed toflying over long stretches of water. Then it was moved to the island of Tinian in thePacific for further training. Laboratory facilities for the final assembly of the bombwere also established on the island. In order to accustom the Japanese to the sightof a small group of American planes flying over their country, the group begantraining flights in clusters of three planes and dropping a single bomb before returningto the base. It was hoped that this practice would enable the planes carrying thebombs to do their job without any Japanese opposition.63 Tense and chain-smoking,Oppenheimer gave last minute instructions for the Hiroshima bombing: "Go to seethe target. No radar bombing... Of course it doesn't matter if they check the dropwith radar, but it must be a visual drop. If they drop it at night there should be amoon; that would be the best...Don't let them detonate it too high. The figure fixedis just right. Don't let it go up or the target won't get as much damage."64

President Roosevelt had never mentioned the bomb project to Vice PresidentTruman. As a Democratic senator presiding over a special investigating committee,Truman had tried in March 1944 to probe the expensive Manhattan Project. Stimson,who persuaded him to discontinue with his investigation, described Truman in hisprivate diary as "a nuisance and pretty untrustworthy...He talks smoothly but actsmeanly." Roosevelt's sudden death on April 12, 1945 now catapulted the pryingsenator into the presidential chair. When Stimson and Groves gave a detailed briefingto the new president on April 25, Groves told him that Japan had "always been thetarget" of an atomic strike. It seems to have been an automatic assumption. OnlyUndersecretary Robert Patterson questioned this assumption after the defeat ofGermany.65

Selecting the Targets

The next stage was the establishment of a committee to select the targets.Groves himself suggested to General Marshall that someone should be appointed totake charge of operational planning. Marshall retorted, "I don't like to bring toomany people into this matter. Is there any reason why you can't take this over anddo it yourself?"66 Groves was only too eager to take control of the bombing operation.This decision, taken casually, institutionalised in the person of Groves the nexusbetween the development of the bomb and its operational control. He had a stakein its early combat use. His style was to take initiatives, leaving the onus for rescindingthem on his superiors, Stimson and Marshall, both of whom were too burdened to



spare time. Groves then brazenly decided to cricumvent a formal consideration ofthe atomic strike by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He discussed the bombing of citiesonly with Stimson and Marshall; he knew that Admiral Leahy, Truman's Chief ofStaff, was opposed to the use of the bomb, making it extremely difficult to obtainthe approval of the Joint Chiefs. Groves had by then accumulated enormous powerand had in effect usurped a political role by default.67 He now headed what amountedto a "nuclear strike command, with fifteen aircraft and...two atomic bombs." Andhe was determined to use them.68

The Target Committee had more scientists on it than military officers. Groves,General Louise Norstad of the air force, Robert Oppenheimer, the great mathematicianJohn von Neumann, and William Penney who was a member of the British team atLos Alamos and was an expert on explosives, served on it. Groves, at its firstmeeting on April 27, 1945, insisted on visual, not radar, bombing. This necessitatedclear weather. A number of cities including Tokyo, Hiroshima, Kyoto, Nagasaki,and Yokohama were listed "for study". Hiroshima was the largest city untouched byconventional bombing. Neumann's calculations, however, revealed that its surroundingmountains were not sufficiently close to enhance the bomb's effects.

The committee meeting on May 11 narrowed the list to five target cities. The"AA" targets were Kyoto, Hiroshima, Kokura, and Yokohama. Niigata was labelleda "B" target. All these doomed cities were to be exempted from conventional bombingand "reserved" for an atomic strike. The committee held its final meeting on May28. Groves especially wanted Kyoto as a target because it was large enough to gaincomplete knowledge about the effects of the bomb. The Target Committee gavepriority to it because its residents were "more highly intelligent and hence betterable to appreciate the significance of the weapon! " If the highly intelligent peopleof Kyoto survived from the nuclear blast, the committee presumably expected themto tell the rest of the world how deadly the bomb was!69

Stimson found himself presiding over the incessant torching of city after city inJapan. He discussed the matter with Truman on June 6. He did not want his countryto "get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities," and he was also afraid thatJapan might be "so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon would not have afair background to show its strength." Truman "laughed and said he understood."Stimson, however, was determined on a comparatively minor issue: despite GeneralGroves repeated efforts, he deleted Kyoto from the list of doomed cities. He toldGroves. "This is a question I am settling myself. Marshall is not making that decision."It must be remembered, however, that Stimson was not keen to save the lives ofKyoto's residents but only wanted to save its cultural relics so that the Japanesewould not be too embittered to become allies in the post-War world.70

The sagacious General Marshall, according to McCloy, had maintained that theuse of the bomb had such enormous political consequences that "he looked to the •civilians to make the decision in regard to the bomb" and that he did not presumeto exercise any direction over it.71 This was a balanced view of the appropriate



relationship between the civilians and the military in the nuclear age. Even on May29, Marshall said the bomb "might first be used against straight military objectivessuch as a large naval installation." If necessary, it should be used against a numberof "large manufacturing areas" after a warning so that people had an opportunity toflee from the doomed area. He emphasised the moral value of advance warning toJapan: "Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear", he said.The United States, he warned, "must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium

' which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force.'-72 It must,however, be added that Marshall had no military incentive to oppose *use of thebomb. "For him", as Barton Bernstein has rightly pointed out, "nuclear weapons aridinvasion were likely alternatives, and he wanted to avoid invasion."73

IV

As the Manhattan Project reached its final stage, there were rumblings ofdiscontent and doubt among some scientists. Ironically, the German surrender onMay 8, 1945, did not slacken efforts at Los Alamos. The race against a Germanbomb had already been turned into a race against the war itself. "I don't think",Oppenheimer later confessed, "there was any time when we worked harder on thespeed-up than in the period after the German surrender and the actual combat useof the bomb."74 Those who had doubts and anxieties found the presence and adviceof Oppenheimer most reassuring. They were, of course, unaware of his deepinvolvement in the selection of targets and the training of the crew that was to dropthe bombs. Working at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago,however, were three of the most politically concerned scientists: Nobel Laureate,James Franck, Leo Szilard, and Eugene Rabinowitch. Franck had joined the projectonly after being promised that he would be given an opportunity to give his viewson the use of the bomb. The indefatigable Szilard, whose restless mind first perceivedthe possibility of an atomic bomb, was to make personal efforts to warn decision-makers of the grave consequences of a military use of the weapon. Rabinowitch laterbecame the co-founder and editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

The Interim Committee and the Scientific Panel

Meanwhile, Stimsón appointed an Interim Committee to deliberate and advisehim on future developments relating to atomic energy. Chaired by Stimson, it includedhis trusted aides Harvey Bundy and George Harrison. Other members were UnderSecretary of State William Clayton, Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard,Truman's representative James Byrnes and three barons of science—Harvard PresidentJames Conant, Vannevar Bush, and Karl Compton. In view of the growing unrestwithin the Manhattan Project, it was considered advisable to appoint a ScientificPanel. Concerned about the post-War diplomacy of his country, Conant advised thatthe government should obtain the full support of the scientists so that there wouldbe "no public bickering among experts" when secrecy would be lifted. He



recommended the names of Robert Oppenheimer, and Nobel Laureates ArthurCompton, Ernest Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi. The first three were administrators ofthe Manhattan Project. Fermi, according to Conant, was "a quiet, non-political typeof scientist." Obviously, the panel was to perform the role of a surrogate for thescientists, not to speak on their behalf.73

Except for Stimson and Bard, as well as General Marshall and Groves whoattended the meetings of the committee by invitation, other members were notfamiliar with the military operations against Japan. As Oppenheimer later recalled:"We didn't know beans about the military situation in Japan. We didn't knowwhether they could be caused to surrender by other means or whether the invasionwas really invitable. But in the backs of our minds was the notion that the invasionwas inevitable because we had been told that."76 The committee members sharedsome unstated assumptions: that the bomb was a legitimate weapon to be used inwar; that the American public would support its use; that it would have a profoundimpact upon Japanese leaders; and that it would have a salutary effect on post-Warrelations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the structure of the committee, its crowdedagenda, and its cursory knowledge of the military situation did not allow a detaileddiscussion of alternative options for the surrender of Japan.77 The Military PolicyCommittee and the Target Committee controlled by Groves, however, were takingcrucial decisions.

Szilard was disturbed by the composition of the Scientific Panel because itsmembers "were men who could be expected to play ball on this occasion". He triedto convey the views of those scientists who were agitated about the possible use ofthe bomb to Truman, whose office directed him to meet James Byrnes. Truman hadalready decided to appoint the former senator as his secretary of state; Szilard wasunaware of this secret decision. Szilard met Byrnes on May 28, 1945, three daysbefore the crucial meeting of the Scientific Panel with the Interim Committee. WhenSzilard suggested that the Soviet Union might soon produce nuclear weapons, Byrnesobserved that "General Groves tells me there is no uranium in Russia". Szilardsuggested that the United States should refrain from testing its bomb, thereby givingthe Russians the impression that the Manhattan Project had failed. This would havebeen a truly curious culmination of the project. The politically astute future secretaryof state revealed his grasp of the American political process as well as his awarenessof the concerns of the nuclear scientists. He asked Szilard: "How would you getCongress to appropriate money for atomic energy research if you do not showresults from the money which has been spent already?"

Szilard and Byrnes did not speak the same language and their concerns were indifferent time-frames. Szilard was worried about the dire consequences of the suddenuse of the bomb, while Bymes was measuring the impact of the bomb on post-Wardiplomacy. Bymes asked: "Well you come from Hungary. You would not want theRussians to stay in Hungary indefinitely". Szilard was "flabbergasted by theassumption that rattling the bomb might make Russia manageable"; the suggestion



offended his "sense of proportion". Hè thought to himself how much better theworld might be had he "been bom in America and become influential in Americanpolitics and had Byrnes been born in Hungary and studied physics".78 Byrnes, inturn, found Szilard too aggressive, and whose "desire to participate in policy-making"made an unfavourable impression on him.79 Scientists should do their work in theirlaboratories .and leave the conduct of war to others.

The Interim Committee held its fourth meeting on May 31, 1945, to which theScientific Panel was also invited. Stimson and General Marshall tried to 'manage'the scientists and to impress upon them how seriously members of the committeeviewed their assignment. Stimson observed that the bomb was not a military weaponbecause it introduced "a revolutionary change in the relations of man to the universe."In his diary, he noted with satisfaction that the committee members succeeded inimpressing the scientists that they were dealing with the matter "like statesmen andnot like merely soldiers anxious to win the war at any cost." Moving on to adiscussion about the use of the bomb, Stimson said that it should make a "profoundpsychological impression on as many inhabitants as possible." At the suggestion ofConant, it was decided that "the more desirable target should be a vital war plantemploying a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses."

Oppenheimer proposed several simultaneous atomic strikes, a proposalimmediately opposed by Groves. He was against a rush job; moreover, he wantedto collect information about each successive atomic strike sufficiently distinct fromthe conventional bombing programme. He then complained that the Manhattan Projecthad been "plagued since its inception by the presence of certain scientists of doubtfuldiscretion and uncertain loyalty." Groves had been especially suspicious of Szilardand was furious with him for his unauthorised meeting with Byrnes. The committee,however, asserted that "nothing could be done about dismissing these men until afterthe bomb had actually been used or, at best, until after the test" had been conducted.According to Arthur Compton, it was "a foregone conclusion that the bomb wouldbe used. It was regarding only the details of strategy and tactics that differing viewswere expressed."80 The committee reconvened the next day and on the advice ofJames Byrnes, formally adopted a resolution saying that the bomb should be droppedon a war plant surrounded by workers' homes and that "it be used without warning."81

Groves had authoritarian and anti-Semitic views that made him suspicious ofSzilard, while Szilard considered Groves to be the greatest fool in the ManhattanProject. In October 1942, Groves had even drafted a letter to be signed by Stimsonrequesting the attorney general to keep Szilard under detention for the duration ofthe war. Stimson, however, refused to sign it. Groves then assigned special agentsto monitor Szilard's movements.82 Their reports occasionally read "like a script fromMarx Brothers." In June 1943, he directed that "the investigation of Szilard shouldcontinue despite the barrenness of the results."83



The Franck Committee Report, June 11, 1945

The day after the Interim Committee meeting of June 1, Compton solicitedproposals from his colleagues at the Chicago laboratory for the Scientific Panel'sconsideration. A committee chaired by James Franck, and including Szilard andRabinowitch, hurriedly produced a report. Disclaiming any authority to pronounceon problems of high strategy, the Franck Report explained why the scientists werestraying beyond their narrow field of specialisation. They found themselves "byforce of events during the last five years, in the position of a small group of citizenscognizant of a grave danger for the safety of this country as well as for the futureof all other nations, of which the rest of mankind is unaware". This was a grave self-indictment indeed, coming as it did from the scientists who had lobbied for themaking of the bomb and had tirelessly worked to make it a reality.84 It was a modest,contrite protest.

The report maintained that the manner in which the new weapon was usedwould determine the future course of history. It warned, "The race for nucleararmament will be on in earnest not later than the morning after our first demonstrationof the existence of nuclear weapons." It suggested a demonstration of thedestructiveness of the bomb before representatives of member countries of the UnitedNations on a desert or a barren island. It might later be used against Japan with thesanction of the United Nations and after an ultimatum to surrender.85 The report,with a covering letter by Compton that was rather a dissent than an endorsement ofits recommendations, was delivered to Stimson's office. Neither the Scientific Panelnor the Interim Committee considered its recommendations. Members of the FranckCommittee waited in vain for some reaction; they could "as well have dropped thisreport into Lake Michigan."86 Crucial decisions were being taken elsewhere.

The Scientific Panel met at Los Alamos on June 15-16, 1945. Scientists werealready worried about future funding for research in atomic energy; the Panel, thereforerecommended that the Interim Committee should encourage it with an annual budgetof $1 billion. It also recommended that along with Britain, the Soviet Union, France,and China be told about progress in the bomb project and the possibility of .itsimminent use. The Panel disclaimed any special competence in solving the complexsocial, political, and military problems presented by the advent of atomic power. Atthe same time, it was aware of an obligation to use the weapon to help save Americanlives. It, therefore, categorically stated, "We can propose no technical demonstrationlikely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct militaryuse."87

The Interim Committee, at. its final meeting on June 21, simply reaffirmed theearlier decision that the weapon be used at the earliest opportunity, and that it beused without warning. It recommended that Truman should inform Stalin at thePotsdam Conference about the bomb project and that the United States intended touse it against Japan. Under Secretary Ralph Bard of the Navy Department, increasingly



uneasy about the decisions of the Interim Committee, submitted a memorandum onJune 27 stating that Japan should be given a "preliminary warning for say two orthree days" before the bomb was dropped. This was necessary because of the positionof the United Siates "as a great humanitarian nation." He suggested that emissariesshould contact Japanese representatives and warn them about the impending use ofthe bomb, with assurances regarding the future status of the emperor. Bard wasopposed to dropping the bomb without warning.88 He resigned on July 1, 1945.

The Scientists' Petition

Szilard was not aware of the Trinity test of July 16 when he circulated a petitionthat was eventually forwarded to Truman. Many eminent nuclear physicists signedit. Most chemists were, however, conspicuously absent from the list of signatories.The final version of the petition, dated July 17, 1945, warned that there was no limitto the destructive power that would become available in the course of the developmentof nuclear weapons. Therefore, "a nation which sets the precedent of using thesenewly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear theresponsibility of opening.the door to an era of destruction on an unimaginablescale". Referring to the danger of the sudden annihilation of cities in the UnitedStates and other countries, it stated that the prevention of such a danger was "thesolemn responsibility of the United States—singled out by virtue of her lead in thefield of atomic power". It further added that the material strength that this leadconferred on the United States entailed "the obligation of restraint"; any violationof the obligation would weaken the moral position of the country "in the eyes of theworld and in our own eyes". The petition urged Truman to exercise his powers ascommander-in-chief not to resort to the use of the bomb unless the terms of surrenderhad been made public in detail and had been categorically rejected by the Japanesegovernment. Szilard knew the circulation of a petition might not have the desiredresult. For the reputation of the scientists in the next few years, however, it wasdesirable that a minority of them "should have gone on record in favour of givinggreater weight to moral arguments and should have exercised their right given tothem by the Constitution to petition the President".89

Szilard sent a copy of an earlier draft to his friend Edward Teller for circulationin the Los Alamos laboratory. In his covering letter dated July 4, 1945, Szilardadmitted that "on the basis of expediency, many arguments could be put forwardboth for and against our use of atomic bombs against Japan." American scientists,however, were in a position to raise their voice on moral grounds "without runningrisks to life and liberty" even if they incurred the displeasure of those in charge ofthe Manhattan Project. He added that the American people were unaware of thechoices being made on their behalf; only the Manhattan scientists were "in a positionto form an opinion and declare their stand." Teller showed the draft petition toOppenheimer with whom he wanted to be on friendly terms. Oppenheimer wascritical of the Chicago scientists in general and Szilard in particular. He maintained



that scientists had no right to influence political decisions. He conveyed to Teller "inglowing terms the deep concern, thoroughness, and wisdom with which these questionswere being handled in Washington." Conscientious men who "understood thepsychology of the Japanese", and who had crucial information that scientists did notpossess, were taking momentous decisions.90 This homily came from a scientist whohad been deeply involved in the selection of targets and the training of the crew forthe atomic bombing!

Teller's own views on the subject are of interest because of his subsequent rolein the nuclear arms race. In a letter to Szilard dated July 2, Teller said that he hadparticipated in the bomb project because of scientific curiosity and had no hope ofclearing his conscience. 'The things we are working on are so terrible that noamount of protesting or fiddling with politics will save our souls." The accident thathad resulted in the production of "this dreadful thing" did not involve a responsibilityof "having a voice in how it is to be used". This responsibility had to be shifted tothe American people and an "actual combat use" of the bomb might make themaware of its dangerous consequences. He felt that he would not be doing the rightthing if he "tried to say how to tie the toe of the ghost of the bottle" from whichthe scientists had just helped it to escape.91 Teller sent this convoluted letter knowingthat Oppenheimer would certainly see it because all mail was censored.

Groves declared the scientists' petition a classified document thereby restrictingits circulation. He also asked Compton to commission a poll among the Chicagoscientists to counter the impact of Szilard's activities. Determined to stop a dissentingvoice of scientists from reaching Truman, he held the petition until August 1, whenhe was assured from the Tinian Island that the bomb was ready for use againstJapan. Groves then forwarded it to Stimson who was still in Potsdam.92 There is nodocumentary evidence to suggest that Truman ever saw the petition addressed tohim.

Oppenheimer's role at this critical time is of great significance. In January 1945,physicist Robert Wilson arranged a meeting of Los Alamos scientists to discuss,"What shall we do about the Gadget?" The assembled scientists discussed whetherthey should continue with their work on the bomb when they knew that Germanywas essentially defeated. Oppenheimer, having failed to persuade Wilson not to callsuch a meeting as the security staff would object to it, attended it and put forwardan ingenious argument for the production and use of the bomb. It was absolutelyessential, he observed, to demonstrate the destructive potential of the bomb beforethe establishment of the United Nations so that it could effectively deal with theproblem from its inception.93 Oppenheimer, as director of the project, had developeda stake in its use. He had convinced his colleagues that "the decisions were in thehands of wise and humane people" and the scientists could not influence themdirectly.94 He was, moreover, being cross-examined by the security staff regardinghis past associations and his loyalty was implicitly being questioned. James Conantalso thought that only a combat use of the bomb would alert world public opinionabout the nuclear danger.95



Other scientists in the Manhattan Project wondered, after producing the bombat great cost, how the American government could justify not using it to saveAmerican lives. Were not American servicemen part of the nation ? If the weaponproduced in the American laboratories could save their lives, why should it not bedropped on Japanese cities?96 The scientists were not aware of the military situationand the impending collapse of Japan. Crucial decisions were already taken; theirreports and petitions were duly filed for the record. The conflicting pressures underwhich the various segments of the Manhattan Project were working, the secrecysurrounding the whole project, making it difficult for scientists in one laboratory tocommunicate freely with their colleagues in other parts of the Manhattan Project,and the total insulation from those involved in the actual conduct of war, renderedthe scientists' efforts futile. Moreover, many of them were not fully aware of thedeep involvement of Oppenheimer and other members of the Scientific Panel in thedetailed planning of the use of the bomb. They looked upon these popes and cardinalsof nuclear physics as their spokesmen in the corridors of power. Ironically, manyscientists who, before the atomic bombings, were most critical of the bomb's surpriseuse, did not publicly condemn it afterwards.97 They simply avoided discussion on itfor tactical reasons. Interestingly, Edward Teller felt strongly that dropping thebomb "without prior warning or demonstration was a mistake." He later commentedon the remarkable coincidence that the scientists who favoured prior warning toJapan later supported the development of nuclear weapons, while those whorecommended immediate use of the bomb "argued after the war for the cessation ofall further development."98 Nobel Laureate Isador Rabi asserted in 1949 that "thewailing over Hiroshima finds no echo in Japan." As it was a legitimate target, theJapanese were glad that anything happened to stop the insane war. He, however,added that "with sufficient propaganda, they might in time be induced to feel thatthey were greatly wronged. Hiroshima, by the way, is largely rebuilt."99

Trinity Test, July 16, 1945

A detailed report on the successful Trinity test, communicated ' miman atPotsdam, described the explosion as "unprecedented, magnificient, beautiful,stupendous and terrifying." It referred to "the strong, sustained, awesome roar whichwarned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous todare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to the Almighty."100 While from thatmoment, American use of the atomic bomb against Japanese targets became animpending possibility, it did not lessen the importance of Soviet support to the wareffort in the Far East; substantial technical problems of atomic bomb-deliveryremained. Soviet assistance in engaging the Kwantung Army in Manchuria waswelcome; but Russian participation in the occupation of Japan was an unwelcomeprospect. Anxieties about the human cost of the projected invasion were now replacedby confidence in the bomb as a weapon of intimidation. "Neither the President",



wrote Byrnes, "nor I were anxious to have them (the Russians) enter the war afterwe had learned of this successful test. " Stimson agreed with this assessment. "Thebomb as a mere probable weapon had seemed a weak reed on which to rely, but thebomb as a colossal reality was very different", he wrote. In a letter to his wifeMargaret, Truman confessed: "All of us wanted Russia in the Japanese War. Had weknown what the Atomic Bomb would do, we we'd have never wanted the Bear inthe picture."101

Stimson succeeded in persuading Truman at Potsdam to drop Kyoto from thetarget list. A message was then sent to Washington suggesting the inclusion ofNagasaki. While Kyoto met all the prescribed criteria for atomic bombing, the oddfact is that Nagasaki did not. It was not on the reserved list and had beenconventionally bombed. Moreover, the city was long and narrow, divided betweentwo ranges of hills that would have the effect of deflecting the blast wave of theexplosion. There was ari intense debate in Washington about the suitability of Nagasakias a target.

Bombing Order, July 25, 1945

Then on July 23, Groves revised the directive he had prepared as early as May1945. Eventually dated July 25, the bombing order, signed by Marshall's deputy

. General Thomas Handy, was addressed to General Carl A. Spaatz, commandinggeneral of the newly created United States Strategic Air Force. It listed Hiroshima,Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki for visual bombing after August 3, 1945, dependingon weather conditions. The plane with the bomb was to be accompanied by anotheraircraft carrying scientific personnel to record the effects of the explosion. "Additionalbombs" were to be delivered "as soon as made ready."102 Thus, the bombing ofHiroshima and Nagasaki resulted from a single order. Moreover, it was deliberatelyworded to allow considerable latitude to the field commander for the exact date,timing of attack, and choice of targets. There is no evidence that Truman ever sawthe order. Copies of this order were to be personally delivered to the SupremeCommander of Allied Forces General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, commanderof the American Fleet in the Pacific; they were, thus, being informed of the existenceof the bomb at the last possible moment. Had bad weather not delayed the bombingof Hiroshima, MacArthur would have learnt about it on the very day it was dropped.On being the last commander to be briefed, MacArthur laconically observed. "Thiswill completely change all our ideas of warfare". Originally it was thought that averbal order could suffice, but General Spaatz insisted that "if I am going to kill100,000 people, I'm not going to do it on verbal orders. I want a piece of paper".103

In an extraordinary sequence, instead of being contingent on the Japanese responseto the Allied ultimatum issued from Potsdam, the bombing order was issued a daybefore the warning. It only increased the velocity of the military wheels that hadbeen set moving much earlier. As far as Groves was concerned, Truman's decision"was one of noninterference—basically a decision not to upset the existing plans."104



The exact date for the bombing depended on weather forecasts. General CurtisLeMay had reached Guam to take charge of the operation. He had already establishedcontact with Mao Zedong's guerillas who, in return for medical supplies and materials,had agreed to send him regular weather forecasts.103 These reports proved to beinvaluable for American pilots operating from Chengtu airfields and droppingincendiary bombs over Japanese cities. The pilots often drank toasts to Mao Zedong.LeMay continued to rely on these weather reports even when he moved to Guam.These reports to American forces in the Pacific were supplied in good faith as partof the Allied effort against Japan. The Chinese were, however, completely unawareof American intentions of dropping the atomic bomb on Japanese cities.

Policy-makers were planning to drop at least three bombs in August and morein September. Physicist Philip Morrison remembers that at Los Alamos "a date nearAugust tenth was a mysterious final date" that those readying the bomb "had to meetat whatever cost in risk or money or good development policy."106 The third bombwas to be dropped on Kokura around August 20. On the morning of August 10,physicist Robert Bacher was supervising at Los Alamos the transfer of a completedplutonium core tö San Francisco and then to Tinian. He saw Oppenheimer runningtowards him. He had received an urgent call from Washington telling him thatTruman had ordered the atomic bombing to stop. This decision not to drop the thirdbomb restored Truman's control over the policy process. Commanding General ofthe Air Force Henry H. Arnold later confessed that "the abrupt surrender of Japancame more or less as a surprise."107

According to a secret agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill, British consentto the war-time use of the bomb was obligatory. In view of the ravages of war,Britain was keen on an early end to hostilities. British forces were poised for aninvasion of Malaya that would have involved heavy casualties. British consent was,therefore, promptly given. In Churchill's words, the atomic bombing "was nevereven an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement..."108

VI

A Cluster of Catastrophes, August 6-9, 1945

Hiroshima's history as a military centre began with the Sino-Japanese War of1894-95; it played the same function during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. OnMonday, August 6, an air raid warning was sounded at 7:09 a.m. As there were nobombers to be seen, at 7:31 a.m., there was an all-clear sign. Shortly before 8o'clock, there was another air raid warning and three B-29s were winging their waytoward Hiroshima through the clear blue sky. The bomb released the equivalent of13,500 tons of TNT. "Almost all watches and clocks had been destroyed...thepeople of Hiroshima had...a different sense of time: all that day of August 6 theywondered how soon they would die and how soon the people around them woulddie. That was the only sense of time that remained for them."109



On August 8, Foreign Minister Togo showed the emperor preliminary reportsfrom Hiroshima. Physicist Yoshio Nishina came to the office of Secretary to theCabinet Sakumizu and said in a tremulous voice: "It can only be an atomic bombto cause such havoc. We scientists must apologise to the nation for our incompetence."Premier Suzuki declared, 'This is not a defeat of the Japanese armed forces at thehands of US forces, but rather the defeat of Japanese science and technology by UStechnology. Therefore, the military should not speak of prestige.""0 The same dayForeign Minister Molotov received Ambassador Sato at 3 p.m. Molotov curtly toldhim that from August 9 the Soviet Union would "consider herself in a state of warwith Japan."1" Stalin honoured his promise to Roosevelt at Yalta by declaring waragainst Japan three months to the day after the surrender of Germany. An hour aftermidnight, Tokyo time, the Red Army crossed the Manchurian frontier in fulfillmentof Stalin's promise at Yalta and Potsdam. Since the Kwantung Army in Manchuriawas Japan's main fighting force in case of invasion, the rapid advance of the RedArmy had a devastating effect on the morale of the Japanese leadership. WhenSuzuki was told that the Manchurian defences were hopelessly inadequate, hemuttered, 'Then the game is up." Suzuki and Togo had pinned their hopes on Sovietmediation to mitigate the terms of surrender. These hopes were now shattered."2 Asecond bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The Soviet declaration of war wasovershadowed by the atomic bombings.

The First Imperial Decision

The Japanese Supreme War Council assembled on August 9 at 11 A.M. at thevery moment when the bomb was being dropped on Nagasaki. Unaware of thisdisaster, the Japanese leaders continued to argue their conflicting points of view.Umezu asserted that the Japanese troops had not yet been defeated, and that theword "capitulation" could not be found in the country's military dictionary."3 TheSoviet declaration of war was a greater stunning blow than the disaster reportedfrom Hiroshima. The Council was evenly divided on the question of the terms ofsurrender. Members were not discussing whether to surrender but whether to insiston one or four conditions. Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai were for acceptance of thePotsdam Declaration, provided the imperial institution or kokutai was retained. Anami,Umezu, and Toyoda insisted on three additional conditions: voluntary withdrawal ofJapanese forces overseas under their own commanders; no Allied occupation ofJapan; and those responsible for the war to be tried by the Japanese themselves.Togo argued that the four conditions would not be acceptable to the Allied Powers.In the midst of this deadlock, one of the prime minister's aides burst into the roomto announce the bombing of Nagasaki. An "impassioned" discussion followed andthen the War Council adjourned, still split three against three. The 16 members ofthe Cabinet met in the afternoon. Again there was no consensus. Nine voted foracceptance of the Potsdam Declaration with a proviso regarding kokutai, four wantedthe three additional conditions to be fulfilled, and three were undecided."4



Suzuki then resorted to an unprecedented device—holding a meeting of theSupreme War Council in the presence of the emperor. "It was, as though, to breakthe fatal deadlock, the chessboard king was to be not only allowed to place himselfin check but also granted the freedom of movement of the queen.""5 Shortly beforemidnight on August 9, the Council assembled in the underground shelter of theimperial palace. President of the Privy Council Baron Kichiro Hiranuma and foursecretaries of the Council were also in attendance. The emperor entered the shelterat 2:30 in the morning of August 10 and sat in front of a gilded screen. His adviserswere wearing either military uniforms or formal morning dress and were perspiringprofusely. The heated arguments were again rehearsed and the deadlock was repeated.According to Emperor Hirohito's own version given before the Tokyo War CrimesTribunal, "Everyone agreed on the condition to preserve the kokutai. " War MinisterAnami, his cheeks wet with tears, insisted on the three additional conditions.Otherwise, the courageous fight must continue and the Japanese people would "findlife in death!" Suzuki then walked up to the table where the emperor was sitting. "Ipresent myself humbly at the foot of the throne," he said, "and I request YourImperial Majesty's opinion as to which proposal be adopted." With "visible emotionwelling up within him," Emperor Hirohito said the people were suffering terribly;in view of the atomic bombing and the Soviet attack, Japan "could not but acceptthe terms of Potsdam." All those present broke down, with some throwing themselvesforward—arms outstretched, prostrate on the tables, sobbing unashamedly." Tearsflooded the emperor's eyes, and he concluded that he could not stand "the disarmingof loyal and gallant troops and punishment of those responsible for the war"; "thetime has come to bear the unbearable." He added, "I swallow my tears." As onemember present on this fateful occasion reported: "All of us listened to the Emperor'sdecision with sobs. The Emperor, too, wiped his cheeks many times with his whitegloved hands." He then left the room."6 The Cabinet met on August 10 at 3 a.m.Togo proposed acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding thatit did not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majestyas a Sovereign Ruler."

The American Reply

The Japanese surrender terms were received in Washington the same day at 7:33a.m. But there was a fly in the ointment; an assurance was needed regarding thestatus of the emperor. This unexpected turn of events led to frantic consultations.Truman summoned Bymes, Stimson, Forrestal, and Leahy for consultations. Stimsonand Leahy said the emperor's help would be needed in obtaining surrender ofscattered Japanese troops. It was of vital importance for Stimson to get Japan underAmerican control "before the Russians could put in any substantial claim to occupyand help rule it." Byrnes, however, still feared a backlash. The demand forunconditional surrender was made before the two bombs were dropped and beforethe Soviet Union was a belligerent. "If any conditions are to be accepted", he



insisted, "I want the United States and not Japan to state the conditions.""7 Britishand Soviet, and Chinese consent was also needed.

Stalin's armies were racing across Manchuria; there was no time to lose. Trumanasked Byrnes to draft a reply to the Japanese surrender offer. The carefully draftedreply contained the sentence: "From the moment of surrender the authority of theEmperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to theSupreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deemsproper to effectuate the surrender terms." This assurance implied the retention of theemperor. Through deliberate ambiguity, Japan's conditional surrender was beingaccepted; but, at the same time, the fiction of unconditional surrender could bemaintained. British and Chinese consent was easily obtained. Since the Soviet Union,Molotov said to American Ambassador Averell Harriman, did not consider theJapanese offer as unconditional surrender, the Red Army would continue its advanceinto Manchuria. After an unsuccessful attempt to get a Soviet commander share theoccupation of Japan with MacArthur, Soviet consent to the American draft reply wasfinally obtained. The text was transmitted to Tokyo on August 11. The irony ofByrnes' eventually coming round to accept conditional surrender was not lost onStimson. He scribbled in his diary that the continuance of the Japanese imperialdynasty was the issue he feared would cause trouble. The initial draft of the PotsdamDeclaration contained an assurance about a constitutional monarchy. He added,"The President and Byrnes struck that out."ni

The Second Imperial Decision

The Japanese Cabinet met at 3:00 p.m. on August 12 to consider the Americanreply. Togo argued that despite the authority of the supreme commander, the positionof the emperor remained unimpaired. President of the Privy Council Hiranuma,however, maintained that "the freely expressed will of the people" mentioned in thePotsdam Declaration could not alter the status of the emperor ordained by "divinewill." Anami was for fighting to the bitter end. Togo was on the verge of resigningwhen Suzuki unexpectedly opposed acceptance of the Allied terms. Kido, however,persuaded the wavering Suzuki to follow the emperor's desire for an immediatepeace. The Cabinet deadlock was repeated at the Supreme War Council that met at8:30 a.m. on August 13. The stalemate persisted at another Cabinet meeting later inthe day. Thirteen members voted in favour of acceptance of the American reply andthree against."9

Meanwhile, Truman and his advisers were getting impatient; they had waited forthree days for a Japanese response. "Never", Byrnes recalled, "have I known timeto pass so slowly." In order to coerce Japan's ruling elite, American planes droppedthousands of leaflets on Tokyo containing the text of the Japanese offer of surrenderand the American reply. When Marquis Kido was handed one of these leaflets, hehad a fright. "The soldiers knew nothing of our plans for surrender", he laterconfessed. "If they saw the leaflets; anything could happen. " Kido rushed to the



emperor. Suzuki, also sought an audience. It was for the first time that the twohigh dignitaries together were meeting the emperor. Hirohito then decided to callan Imperial Conference consisting of 25 members; they included members ofthe Cabinet and of the Supreme War Council, and the president of the PrivyCouncil.

The Imperial Conference met in the air-raid shelter of the imperial palace at10:30 a.m. on August 14. The conflicting arguments were repeated once again.Suzuki then apologised to the emperor for the continuing deadlock. Hirohito thentold a hushed audience that he had decided that the American reply was acceptable.He then made an allusion to the humiliating intervention by Russia, Germany andFrance after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, forcing Japan to disgorge some ofthe fruits of its victory over China. "The decision I have reached," he said, "is akinto the one forced upon my grandfather, the Emperor Meiji, at the time of the TripleIntervention. As he endured the unendurable, so shall I, and so must you." Heordered an Imperial Rescript to be prepared so that he could address the Japanesepeople. Brushing a white-gloved hand across his eyes, Emperor Hirohito left theroom. All those present "began crying and two ministers collapsed, sobbinguncontrollably on the floor."120

Since June 1945, Emperor Hirohito had argued with his military commanders attheir own level. Confronting their repeated assertions of the will to fight to the bitterend, he said, "The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always beena discrepancy between plans and performance." Since this had been the case in thepast, how could the Japanese armed forces repel the invaders?121 It was, nevertheless,a traumatic moment for the fanatical elements within the armed forces. The titularheads of the Japanese armed forces may have reluctantly acquiesced in the emperor'sdirective; but those hotheads were resentful and plotting a coup or a final suicidebattle. Kido was the main target because it was believed he had misguided Hirohito;he could not venture out of the imperial palace for fear of assassination. Anami, whohad bowed to the emperor's decision, declared that anyone acting against it wouldhave to do so over his dead body. Nuclear physicist Tsunesaburo Asada reportedthat the naval authorities had arrived at a horrible conclusion. "// was to isolate allthe Japanese physicists in the caves of Nagano prefecture and to have them producea bomb...The Navy had no intention to surrender."122

The Cabinet approved the final draft of the Imperial Rescript and the emperormade a recording of it that was safely hidden. The conspirators even took over theimperial palace for a while. The rebellion was soon suppressed. General Anami'sposition throughout the final crisis was ambivalent. He insisted on three additionalconditions before acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Otherwise, he was forfighting to the bitter end. He, however, refrained from submitting his resignation thatwould have automatically led to the collapse of the Cabinet. He could not allow histroops to overturn the emperor's final decision. True to the Samurai tradition, hecommitted harakiri by slashing his stomach with a sword; at his request, his brother-



in-law helped him thrust a dagger in his throat. His body was found in a pool ofblood with the head in the direction of the imperial palace. A bloodstained papercontained his last message: "Believing firmly that our sacred land shall neverperish, I—with my death—humbly apologise to the Emperor for the great crime."Was it the crime of the part he played in the war or the crime of defeat andsurrender?123

The Japanese people heard the voice of. the emperor for the first time at noonon August 15, 1945, and were stunned by his message. It was a carefully contrived,evasive message. The "war situation has developed", it said, "not necessarily toJapan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against herinterest." This was an oblique reference to the Soviet declaration of war. Moreover,the enemy had begun to "use a new and most cruel bomb." Continuation of the warwould have caused not only the downfall of Japan "but also the destruction of allhuman civilisation." According to "the dictates of time and fate", therefore, he had"resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come byenduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable." Thus, Hirohito, "in hisdivine benevolence" was saving all human civilisation from destruction. "As a resultof the bombs", observes one commentator, "the Japanese had been transformed fromaggressors to saviors, a magnificent feat of public relations." Hirohito's decision iscalled seidan or sacred decision.124

Why Japan Surrendered?

Since the surrender occurred shortly after the atomic bombings, a myth developedthat the bomb saved American lives. Modification of the terms of surrender,guaranteeing the future of the imperial dynasty, would have terminated the warmuch earlier. Japanese military officers who possessed "a scintilla of realism and asense of responsibility" looked upon "the last battle" as a bargaining counter toobtain a negotiated surrender. By offering conditional surrender in their note ofAugust 10, Japanese leaders were willing to take the risk of additional atomicbombing as well as of last-ditch resistance. As an old RAND study concluded, 'Theatomic bombs, far from being the 'controlling' factor, caused no significantreorientation of attitudes, no manifest change in point of view." The main factortriggering the timing of the offer was the Soviet declaration of war because itdispelled the illusion of Soviet mediation. If the bombs had been dropped but theSoviet intervention had not occurred, Japanese leaders would have still pinnedtheir hopes on Soviet intentions.125 The British assessment as well was that "theRussian declaration of war was the decisive factor in bringing Japan to acceptthe Potsdam declaration."126 The atomic bombs killed one-seventh as manyJapanese as the incendiary bombing. "Since Tokyo was not directly affected bythe (atomic) bombing", Army Vice-Chief of Staff Torashiro Kawabe later pointedout, "the full force of the shock was not felt." In comparison, the Soviet entryinto the war was a much greater shock. Chief of Staff Admiral Toyoda confessed



after the war that the Russian attack rather than the atomic bombs hastened thesurrender.127

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not a decisive factor even in thesequence of events leading to the surrender. The army refused to discuss surrenderat a meeting called soon after the Hiroshima bombing. The atomic bombings had"little or no impact on the Army's position." Had the civilian members of theSupreme War Council tried to surrender at that stage, there might have been a coupled by senior military officers. After the Soviet attack across the Manchurian frontier,however, its representatives participated in the discussions. The atomic bombing had"little or no impact on the army's position."'28 The Supreme War Council continuedto be evenly divided after the disaster of Hiroshima; the same division persisted after 'the Nagasaki bombing and the Soviet declaration of war. The deadlock continuedeven within the Cabinet and the Imperial Conference. It cannot be denied,however, that the bomb did hasten the Japanese decision-making process. As theJapanese did not know that the United States had used its entire nuclear arsenal, theyhad to reckon with the grim prospect of additional bombs being dropped on theircities.

There was an important domestic factor as well impinging on the Japanesedecision. As early as February 1943, Kidó had a long conversation with PrinceKonoye who "repeatedly spoke of the necessity of terminating the conflict as soonas possible lest unsettled internal conditions lead to^an intensification of Communistactivity within Japan." The stark choice, in his view, was between early cessationof hostilities or ultimate victory of Communism.129 Soviet intervention threatenedthe survival of the imperial institution. Hirohito ordered his troops to stop fightingbecause its prolongation "may eventually result in the loss of the very foundationon which our Empire exists." Despite the fact that "the fighting spirit of the Imperialarmy and navy" was "still high", he was negotiating peace "for the sake of maintainingour glorious national polity."130 The Japanese ruling elite feared that the peoplemight become restless and unruly. Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa admitted on August12, 1945, that the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war were "in a sense,gifts from the gods!" They provided a perfect excuse to terminate the war withoutlosing face.131

The rapid succession of events created the illusion that atomic coercion broughtabout the Japanese surrender. Such a focus on the timing of surrender ignores aseries of preceding developments. Japanese leaders were fully aware that their countryhad been defeated but were unwilling to accept unconditional surrender. It wasmilitary vulnerability rather than civilian vulnerability that accounted for the Japanesesurrender. The pulverisation of Japanese cities had resulted in millions of deaths andhorrendous destruction. More than 10 million Japanese had fled from the bombedurban centres. Naval blockade had completely stopped all foreign sources of supply,crippling the economy and undermining military effort. With the fall of Okinawa inJune 1945, American tactical air power brought Kyushu within its range. And the



rapid collapse of the Manchurian Army was a warning that the Japanese armedforces would not be able to cope with the invasion of the Japanese islands. Allfactions within the ruling elite had supported, however unwillingly, the peace feelersand Soviet mediation to mitigate the terms of surrender.

It was the American failure to distinguish between defeating Japan and obtainingits surrender that prolonged the war. "The Japanese surrender" according to theRAND study, "illustrates the use of a defeated power's residual strength, combinedwith an insular position and an extreme will to fight, for the purpose of obtainingpolitical concessions in return for surrender."132 The only substantive change was inthe American position. Thus, after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, theUnited States agreed to the continuation of the imperial dynasty. Hanson Baldwinrightly pointed out, "We demanded unconditional surrender, then dropped the bomband accepted conditional surrender." The United States was thus "twice guilty."133

When the army historians in 1946 prepared their account of the atomicbombings, however, Secretary of War Robert Patterson said their statement thatby June 26, 1945, the Japanese leaders had decided to surrender unnecessarilydepreciated the contribution of the bomb. He interceded to ensure that the bombingsrather than Soviet entry into the war were decisive in bringing about the Japanesesurrender.134 •

VII

The Anxieties of the President of Harvard University

An overwhelming majority of Americans supported the dropping of the bombon Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Opinion polls conducted shortly after the war showedthat 4 per cent Americans supported the atomic bombings, 23 per cent weredisappointed that more bombs were not dropped before the Japanese surrender, andonly 5 per cent were critical of the decision.135 Time magazine in its August 18,1947, issue almost implied that the Japanese people were grateful for what hadhappened: "Hiroshima and its fellow bomb victim, Nagasaki, are the most pro-American cities in Japan," it reassured American readers. American visitors, it added,were "bombarded with questions as to how Hiroshima can be made a mecca (sic!)for peace-loving pilgrims. Hiroshimans feel that The Bomb purged them of all warguilt."136

There were some voices of protest and anguish as well. In order to assess theeffects of strategic bombing on Germany and Japan, the American governmentconstituted a Strategic Bombing Survey consisting of a staff of over 1,000 militaryand civilian experts, including Paul Nitze, George Ball and John Kenneth Galbraith.It produced 316 volumes—208 reports on Germany and 108 pertaining to thebombings on Japan. Paul Nitze supervised the detailed report on Hiroshima andNagasaki and since then has been one of the most influential members of the Americanstrategic community. It concluded, "Certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in



all probability prior to November 1,1945, Japan would have surrendered even if theatomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, andeven if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."137 This conclusion suggestedthat the atomic bombings lacked a compelling military necessity. Moreover, TheNew Yorker devoted the entire issue of August 31, 1946, to an explosive article byJohn Hersey. Published as a book, it immediately became a bestseller.138 A respectedjournalist, reviewing it, described the bombing as "the crime of Hiroshima andNagasaki."139

President of Harvard University James Conant perceived a backlash against thebomb. This "rubbed a raw nerve" in the generally unemotional scientist who feltobliged to orchestrate an early response. It was necessary for world peace, he felt,that "the American people stay tough in regard to the use of the bomb." They had"to get the past straight" before they could prepare for the future.140 He was worriedbecause the "spreading accusation that it was entirely unnecessary to use the bombat all" was coming not from professional pacifists and religious leaders but from asmall minority of the "sentimental and verbally minded" people in contact withAmerican boys and girls in schools and colleges. As educators of the futuregenerations, they could 'distort' history. Conant wanted to shape Americans'perception of their own leaders coping with troubling dilemmas and looked forsomeone who could speak with authority on the subject. No one could do it better,he thought, than the highly respected former Secretary for War Henry Stimson. He,therefore, requested Stimson to write an article justifying the use of the bomb.Because of his public stature, a mere recital of the facts leading to the bombingwould be sufficient; this would eliminate possibilities of attacks by the criticsnecessitating a reply from the former secretary.141

Stimson, who had agonised more than any other close adviser of Truman aboutthe course of events leading to the bombings, reluctantly agreed to write the suggestedarticle. His former aide Harvey Bundy and General Groves sent suggestions anddrafts. The ghostwriter was a junior fellow of Harvard University, McGeorge Bundy,who later became national security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.Conant closely supervised the venture and gave editorial advice to the ghostwriter.His suggested revisions, deletions, and proposed additions were equally revealing.He urged McGeorge Bundy to eliminate all references to the issue of unconditionalsurrender because, in his view, it diverted "one's mind from the general line of theargument." As the above narration has shown, an overwhelming majority of Truman'scivilian and military advisers had favoured an assurance about retention of theemperor. Stimson's own pleas for such an assurance had been rejected. By gettingany reference to it deleted from the article, Conant was arranging the writing of'history with a purpose.' It was like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Conantalso wanted it to be mentioned that the scientific leaders of the Manhattan Project,including members of the Scientific Panel, did not protest against the bombings; thiswas necessary in order to counter the impression created by some scientists that they



were against the use of the bomb. He asked Bundy to offer his apologies to Stimsonin case he saw the "mutilated manuscript."142

Henry Stimson Justifies the Bombings

Stimson's article entitled 'The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" appeared inthe February 1947 issue of the Harper's magazine; permission was given to othermagazines and newspapers to reprint it without any charge. His main argument wasthat the American objective from the beginning was "to be the first to produce anatomic weapon and use it." The bomb was considered "as legitimate as any otherof the deadly explosives of modern war. The entire purpose was the production ofa military weapon; on no other ground could the wartime expenditure of so muchtime and money have been justified." He implied that the only alternative to the useof the bomb was an invasion of the Japanese islands, planned for November 1945,that would have continued until the latter part of 1946. He was informed that itwould have cost "over a million casualties to American forces alone." America'smilitary allies would have suffered additional losses. No responsible American leader"holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities, could have failed to use it andafterwards looked his countrymen in the face." He disclosed that the UnitedStates had only two bombs at its disposal and, therefore, could not afford to wastethem for demonstration purposes. The decision to drop the bombs was, heinsisted, "carefully consfdered." The bomb was "a psychological weapon"; theJapanese became so subdued that their surrender was brought about withunprecedented ease. American lives were saved and the agonies of war shortened.The alternative of a Soviet attack on Japan was not mentioned. Nor was there anyexplanation offered for the Nagasaki bombing. Stimson concluded with theremark that "this deliberate,- premeditated destruction was our least abhorrentchoice."143

As Barton Bernstein has observed in his remarkable analysis of the origin and-political functions of Stimson's article, its tone was "not one of celebration" butrather of necessity and grim duty. It avoided issues that would have raised awkwardquestions. "Calm, authoritative, and often seeming matter-of-act, it was a skillfulbrief presentation as a virtual narrative of events. It seemed honest and open, andnever defensive." Ghostwriter McGeorge Bundy wrote to Stimson about the article'simpact on his friends who fell in Conant's unkindly category of the "verbal-minded": "I think we deserve some sort of medal for reducing these particularchatterers to silence." Stimson told Truman that his article was "intended to satisfythe doubts of that difficult class of the community which would have charge of theeducation of the next generation, namely educators and historians."144 Joseph Grewchided Stimson for not mentioning in his article the issue of assurance regarding theemperor.143



The Hiroshima Myth

For many years, Stimson's.account became the standard history of the atomicbombings. It became an article of faith that the alternatives before Truman were theloss of half a million American lives during a projected invasion of Japan or the useof the bomb. This assertion was designed to give legitimacy to the bombings; itblocked a detailed analysis of other options available in August 1945. Theannouncement by Truman on August 6, 1945, however, made no mention of thenumber of American lives saved. Then on December 15, 1945, he asserted: "Itoccurred to me that a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood wasworth a couple of Japanese cities and I think they were and are." Truman's memoirslater inflated the figure to half a million lives saved. The "verbal-minded" educatorsand historians have now pointed out that all the estimates Truman received werewell below half a million fatalities. For a balanced estimate of likely deaths ofAmerican servicemen during the projected invasion of Japan, it is worth rememberingthat the entire World War II cost the United States about 292,000 battle deaths and672,000 wounded.146

James Conant was happy with the justification. If "propaganda against the useof the atomic bombs had been allowed to grow unchecked", he wrote to Stimson,"the strength of our military position by virtue of having the bomb could have beencompletely weakened".147 The entire structure of nuclear strategy is thus dependenton the justification of the bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is remarkablethat "the president of the country's leading institution of liberal learning, havingset in motion a process leading to the publication of the facts about an event,should intervene in order to censor details he judged it undesirable for the public tolearn."148

Many senior military advisers of Truman had varying degrees of reservationsregarding the use and effectiveness of the bomb in bringing about the surrender ofJapan. Admiral Leahy, who chaired meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had moralcompunctions about the use of the bomb. He wrote after the end of World War IIthat the use of "this barbarous weapon" was of no material assistance to the wareffort and "in being the first to use, we had adopted the ethical standards commonto barbarians in the dark ages." General Arnold of the US Army Air Force wasconvinced that conventional bombing would be sufficient to bring about the Japanesesurrender as Japan had lost control of the air. General McArthur was informed ofthe very existence .of the bomb only five days before the bombings when he wasgiven a copy of the order. He subsequently stated on many occasions that the atomicbombing was completely unnecessary. Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific FleetAdmiral Chester Nimitz said, "The complete impunity with.which the Pacific Fleetpounded Japan at pointblank range was the decisive factor" in Japanese efforts toobtain acceptable terms of surrender; "the atomic bomb merely hastened the processalready reaching an inevitable conclusion". General Curtis LeMay maintained that



the war would have ended within a few weeks; "the atomic bomb had nothing to dowith the end of the war". These retrospective conjectures may reflect the normaltendency of officers, engaged in a savage military conflict and fully cognisant of theimpending defeat of the enemy, to be keen to partake of the glory of victory. Theatomic bomb tended to minimise the sacrifices their Services had made. But GeneralEisenhower, supreme commander of Allied Forces in Europe, had also expressedhis misgivings to Stimson during the Potsdam Conference because he believedthat Japan was already defeated and that atomic bombing was "completelyunncessary."149

British Nobel Laureate P.M.S. Blackett first put forward the theory that theatomic bombings were not so much the last gasps of World War II as the openingshots of the Cold War. His main argument was that the invasion of the Japaneseislands was scheduled tö begin on November 1, 1945, and as the German surrendertook place on May 8, 1945, the Russian entry into the war against Japan wasexpected by early August 1945. The rush to drop the two bombs could be explainedas an attempt to end the war before Russia entered it. As for the American argumentabout the mere coincidence of those events without any preconceived plan, Blackettwondered about this "curious preference to be considered irresponsible, tactless,even brutal, but at all costs not clever".150 This view was earlier contested bymany American scholars; but the weight of scholarly opinion now supports theconclusion that the bomb was used as a terror weapon in order to shock the Japaneseinto surrender and the Russians into an appropriately conciliatory mood after thewar.

Thomas Schelling, one of the most influential civilian strategists in the UnitedStates, has discussed the implications of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Acountry, which had only two bombs at its disposal, decided to use them in order to"stun the enemy into surrender". It was an attack on cities with large populations."With a moderate pretense at military-industrial targeting", the two cities were bombedwithout any warning, "depleting the "arsenal completely." The bombing of Nagasakiso soon after the first attack could only give the impression to the victims that morebombs were to follow. This initial use of the bomb as a weapon of terror hasdetermined the subsequent elaboration of nuclear strategy. Schelling, however, addedthat he did not imply anything "derogatory or demeaning about strategic nuclearforces" but it is "worth'remembering" this significant aspect of the use of the bomb.Without giving sufficient time to absorb the shock of Hiroshima, another bomb wasdropped on Nagasaki. That was certainly a terror bomb for "it suggested a willingnessto use the weapon without compunction; it was not in any sense a "demonstration",since a demonstration had already been made." Victor Weisskopf, a-ManhattanProject scientist, says the Nagasaki bombing "was a crime". His colleague BertrandFeld has commented on "its senselessness, its complete irrationality", and "itsinexcusable and wanton disregard of human life." Barton Bernstein, the Americannuclear historian who has extensively examined archival material, asserts that the



bomb was used as "a terror weapon". It was designed to produce "the greatestpsychological effect against Japan" and "as a bonus, cow other nations, notably theSoviet Union."131

VII

The American occupation authorities imposed a total ban on the publication ofany information regarding the agonies of the survivors of the bombings. More detailswere published only after the Japanese peace treaty was signed in 1951. It was,however, not until 1973 that the American government returned to Japan about20,000 items, including 2,000 photographs, which contain the most harrowing detailsof this casual slaughter.

A Japanese committee for the compilation of materials on the damage causedby the two bombs published a massive report in.1981.l52 It states that the bomb "wasdropped directly on cities whose people had no way to anticipate, or to protectthemselves from, its enormous destructive power." Japan was already on the brinkof surrender. The objective was "to establish clearly America's post-war internationalposition and strategic supremacy in the anticipated cold war setting." The reportcategorically states, "This historically unprecedented devastation of human societystemmed from essentially experimental and political aims".1*3 It asserts: 'Themagnitude of the killing is, in essence, better termed genocide—if not also sociocide,biocide, and earthcide—for it is a complete negation of human existence."154 It alsoindicts the Japanese government for its callousness towards the victims, "From thetime of the bombings to the end of the war—when the victims' needs were mosturgent" it "simply left them to fend for themselves."155

Japan was not just a helpless victim in the last stages of the war. Its record ofaggession, its nerve gas attacks on China and bacteriological experiments inManchuria, the fanatical manner in which its troops behaved in the theatres of war,and its atrocious treatment of Allied prisoners of war had inflamed world publicopinion. The Japanese kept captured American soldiers "locked for.years in packingcrates" and gleefully used "bayonets on civilians, on nurses and the wounded."There was much sadism and brutality on the other side as well. American soldierswere proud to possess "well-washed" Japanese skulls and "plenty of Japanese goldteeth were extracted—some from still living mouths—with Marine Corps Ka Barknives." The situation grew so scandalous that the commander-in-chief of the PacificFleet issued an order in September 1942 that said: "No part of the enemy's bodymay be used as a souvenir." In the vicious battle of Okinawa, "123,000 Japanese andAmericans killed each other." It was a "war without mercy". American soldiersheard about the end of the war, according to one account, "with quiet disbeliefcoupled with an indescribable sense of relief...Except for a few widely scatteredshouts of joy, the survivors of the abyss sat hollow-eyed and silent, trying tocomprehend a world without war."156

There were unprecedented gestures of amity between the United States and



Japan after the war. General Curtis LeMay, having directed the incendiary andatomic bombings, was decorated with the First Class Order of the Grand Cordon ofthe Rising Sun for helping Japan build her air force after the war. Minora Genda,who had masterminded the raid on Pearl Harbour, was later awarded the AmericanLegion of Merit.157

On the Hiroshima Cenotaph are inscribed the words: "Please rest in peace, forthe error will not be repeated." It is not clear whether the error was the atomicbombing or Japanese militarism.

NOTES1. Franck W. Chinnock, Nagasaki: The Forgotten Bomb (London, 1970), p. 207.2. Quoted in Gordon Thomas and Max Mogan-Witts, Ruin from the Air (London, 1982 edition), p.

390.3. Ibid., p. 397.4. Peter Goodchild, Oppenheimer (London, 1983), p. 158.5. Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, pp. 400, 420. and 428-434; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the

Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), p. 710; Robert C. Batchelder, The Irreversible Decision 1939-1950 (Boston, 1962), pp. 99-100.

6. A poem by Masuji Ibuse quoted in Rhodes, n. 5. p. 712. Among those who died in Hiroshima•were 23 American servicemen. According to a Time magazine report: "Some months after the warended, a former Japanese policeman gave US occupation authorities twenty-three sets of dog tags(identification discs) that had been taken from US prisoners of war who were in Hiroshima whenthe bomb was dropped," Quoted in The Pacific War Research Society, The Day Man Lost:Hiroshima, August 6, 1945 (Tokyo, 1981), pp. 292-293. A group of 14 Japanese scholars producedthis book after three years of research. The US government has never officially acknowledged thedeath of the American prisoners of war. Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomband the Grand Alliance, (New York), 1975, p. 233.

7. Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After (New York, 1984), pp. 298-299, 302-303.8. W. Craig, The Fall of Japan (London, 1967), pp. 75-76.9. Stanley Goldberg. "What Did Truman Know, and When Did he Know it?", Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists. May/June 1998, p. 18.10. General Leslie M. Groves, Now It Can be Told (New York, 1983 ed.), p. 308.11. Rhodes, n. 5, p. 738.12. Luis Alvarez, Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicist (New York. 1987), pp. 144-145. Alvarez is

reported to have said: "We wanted some method of testing the effectiveness of the bomb overenemy territory." FJ.P. Veale, Advance to Barbarism: The Development of Total Warfare FromSerajevo to Hiroshima (London, 1968), p. 353.

13. The full text of the letter is reproduced by Nobel Laureate Arthur Holly Compton in his AtomicQuest (New York, 1956), p. 258, and in Chinnock. n. 1, pp. 213-214.

14. Alvarez, n. 12, p. 145.15. Chinock, n. 1, p. 9.16. Goodchild, n. 4, pp. 161-162.17. Chinock, n. 1, p. 25.18. Ibid., pp. 124-126, 168-174, 178.19. Ibid., p. 167.20. Alvarez, n. 12, pp. 145-146.21. Chinnock, n. 1, pp. 226-227.22. J. Harberer, Politics and the Community of Science (New York, 1969), pp. 192-193.



23. Wyden, n. 7, pp. 86-88, 185-187; Robert J. Lifton, "The Hiroshima Connection", The AtlanticMonthly. November 1975, p. 88.

24. Bertrand T. Feld, A Voice Crying in the Wilderness: Essays on theProblems of Science and WorldAffairs (Oxford, 1979), pp. 300-302.

25. Chinnock, n. 1, p. 290.26. Quoted in H. Bruce Franklin, War Stars (New York, 1988), p. 98.27. Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power (New Haven), 1987, pp. 276-277; Robert

Gullian, I Saw Tokyo Burning (Garden City, N.Y., 1981), p. 184. LeMay later told a correspondent,"I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal. Fortunately, we wereon the winning side." Quoted in Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb(New York, 1995), p. 21.

28. General H.H. Arnold in Dexter Masters and Katherine Way, eds., One World or None (New York,1946), p, 26.

29. Mark Sheldon, "The Logic of Mass Destruction" in Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifschultz. eds.,Hiroshima's Shadow (Stony Creek, 1998), p. 57.

30. Richard A. Pape, "Why Japan Surrendered?", International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, Fall 1993, p.163.

31. Quoted in Dennis D. Wainstock. The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Westport, 1996), p. 9.32. Sherry, n. 27, p. 300.33. Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat (Stanford, 1958), p.

155.34. Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 16-21.35. Murray Sayle, "Did the Bomb End the War?", The New Yorker, July 31, 1995, pp. 50-52.36. Wainstock, n. 31. p. 29.37. Ibid., pp. 30-33.38. Kecskemeti, n. 33, pp. 181-185.39. Ibid., p. 187.40. Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New

York, 1995), pp. 91-92.41. Ibid., p. 117-118.42. Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Palo Alto, 1954), p. 129.43. Robert L. Messer, "New Evidence on Truman's Decision", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

August 1985, p. 55.44. Alperovitz, n. 40, p. 45.45. "The Stimson Diary", entry for May 14, 1945, in Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, p. 549.46. Alperovitz, n. 40, p. 68.47. Len Giovonnitti and Fred Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (New York, 1965), pp. 134-136.

Emphasis in the original, Alperovitz, n. 40, pp. 68-69, 73-74.48. Alperovitz, Ibid., p. 70.49. Evan Thomas, "Why We Did It", Newsweek, July 24, 1995, p. 26; David Robertson, Sly and Able

(New York, 1994), p. 410.50. Alperovitz, n. 40, pp. 298-301; Wainstock, n. 31, p. 73; Giovanitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 219-220.51. Giovannitti and Freed, Ibid., p. 226. Emphasis in the original.52. The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, p. 215.53. Ibid., p. 216.54. Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 229-232; Kecskemeti, n. 33, pp. 190-191; Wainstock, n. 31, pp.

76-77; George Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years (New York, 1970), p.33.

55. Carrol Quigley, "Pervasive Consequences of Nuclear Stalemate" in Paul R. Baker, ed., TheAtomic Bomb: The Great Decision (Hinsdale, 1976), pp. 155-156.

56. David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (London, 1980), pp. 128-133.



57. Arjun Makhijani, "'Always' the Target?', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1995,pp.23-27.

58. Robert C. Williams and Philip L. Cantelon, eds., The American Atom (Philadelphia, 1984), p. 5.Italics added; Barton J. Bernstein, "Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking AboutTactical Nuclear Weapons", International Security, vol. 15, no. 4, Spring 1991, p. 151.

59. The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, pp. 201-202.60. Roosevelt-Churchill Hyde Park Aide-Memoire, September 19, 1944, quoted in Williams and

Cantelon, n. 58, p. 45. Italics added.61. Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, p. 65.62. Ibid., pp. 142-145.63. Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (Princeton, 1961), p. 71.64. Quoted in Thomas Powers, Heisenberg's War (New York, 1993), pp. 463-464.65. Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered", Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1,

January/February 1995, p. 139; Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World,1939-1846, vol. I: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Pennsylvania,1962), p. 343.

66. Groves, n. 10, p. 267.67. Ibid., p. 271; Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula (Boston, 1970), p. 95.68. Sayle, n. 35, p. 54.69. Wyden, n. 7, pp. 193-197. Italics added; Otis Cary, "Atomic Bomb Targeting—Myths and

Realities", Japan Quarterly, vol. XXVI, no. 4, October-December 1979, pp. 506-514.70. Bernstein, n. 65, pp. 146-147, Groves, n. 10, p. 273.71. Giovonntti and Freed, n. 47, p. 137.72. Wyden, n. 7, p. 159; Bernstein, n. 65, p. 143.73. Barton J. Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945", Political Scence

Quarterly, vol. 90, no. 1, Spring 1975, p. 51.74. Quoted in Ferenc Morton Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice (Albuquerque, 1984), p. 25.75. Sherwin, n. 6, p. 169; Leon V. Sigal, "Bureaucratic Politics & Tactical Use of Committees: The

Interim Committee & the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb", Polity, vol. X, no. 3, Spring 1978,pp. 340-345.

76. US Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of HearingsBefore Personnel Security Board, Washington DC. 1954, p. 34.

77. Sherwin, n. 6, p. 203.78. Spencer R. Weart and Gertrude Weiss Szilard,' Leo Szilard: His Version of the Facts: Selected

Recollections and Correspondence, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass, 1980) pp. 183-186. "Byrnes tuckedSzilard's memo into his suit coat pocket...and Szilard later imagined that the memorandum stayedthere—all the way to the dry cleaner." William Lanuette. Genius in the Shadows: A Biographyof Leo Szilard (New York, 1992), p. 266.

79. James Byrnes, All in Our Lifetime (New York, 1958), p. 284.80. Compton, n. 13, p. 238.81. Sigal, n. 75, pp. 346-351.82. The letter, dated October 1942, contained the sentence: "It is considered essential to the prosecution

of the war that Mr. Szilard, who is an enemy alien, be interned for the duration of the war."Lanuette, n. 78, p. 240.

83. Sigal. n. 75, pp. 249-250.84. Brian Loring Villa, "A Confusion of Signals", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1975,

pp. 36-43.85. For the complete text of the Franck Report, see Alice Kimbal Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The

Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-7 (Chicago, 1965), pp. 560-572; Weart and Szilard, n. 78,pp. 211-213.

86. Wyden, n. 7, p. 168.87. Williams and Cantelon, n. 58, pp. 63-64; Arthur Steiner, "Baptism of the Atomic Scientists",

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1975, pp. 21-28. Italics added.



88. Batchelder, n. 5, pp. 58-59.89. Wean and Szilard, n. 78, pp. 211-213. For the full text of the petition and names of the scientists

who signed it, see Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29. pp. 553-555.90. Edward Teller, Better A Shield Than A Sword (New York, 1987), pp. 56-57; Edward Teller, The

Legacy of Hiroshima (Garden City, NY, 1962), p. 13.91. Teller, Ibid., pp. 58-59.92. Lanuette, n. 78, pp. 273-275.93. Wyden, n. 7, pp. 147-148. Oppenheimer later admitted that he had promoted the military use of

the bomb. "We were concerned", he later publicly stated, "we were rightly and somewhat desperatelyconcerned, that these weapons...should be manifest to all men to see and understand, that theymight know what future war would be...It would not have been a better world if the unrealisedpossibility of these terrible weapons had been a secret shadow on our future." Quoted in Rhodes,n. 27, p. 203; S.S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Bethe, Oppenheimer and the MoralResponsibility of the Scientist (Princeton, 2000), pp. 153-154.

94. David H. Frisch, "Scientists and the Decision to Bomb Japan", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,June 1970, p. 111.

95. James G. Hershberg, "James B. Conant and the Atomic Bomb," The Journal of Strategic Studies,vol. 8. no. 1, March 1985, p. 83.

96. Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment (Oxford, 1985), pp. 155-158.97. Michael J. Yavenditti, "The American People and the Use of the Bomb on Japan: The 1940s",

The Historian, 36, February 1970, pp. 237-238.98. Teller, n. 90, p. 60.99. Quoted in Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light (New York, 1985), p. 192.

100. Williams and Cantelon, n. 58, pp. 52-53.101. Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, p. 206. Italics in the original: Paul Boyer, Fallout: A Historian

Reflects on America's Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons (Columbus, 1998), p. 25.102. The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, p. 204. Emphasis added.103. Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, pp. 339 and 358; Kenneth M. Glazier, "Administrative and

Procedural Considerations," in Baker, ed., n. 55, p. 121.104. Groves, n. 10, p. 265. Emphasis added.105. Rhodes, n. 27, p. 20; Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, pp. 123, 340 and 377.106. Philip Morrison, "Blackett's Analysis of the Issues", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February

1949, p. 40.107. Quoted in Bernstein, n. 73, p. 52: Goldberg, pp. 18-19; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Perils and

Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb," PacificHistorical Review, February 1977, pp. 9-10.

108. Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, p. 313.109. The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, 253.110. Chinnock, n. 1, p. 251.111. The Pacific War Research Society, n. 6, pp. 300-301.112. Sayle, n. 35, p. 56; Kecskemetic, n. 33, pp. 184-185.113. Butow, n. 42, pp. 162-163.114. Wainstead, n. 31, pp. 95-96; Ian Buruma, "The War Over the Bomb," The New York Review of

Books, September 21, 1995, p. 30.

115. The Pacific War Research Society, Japan's Longest Day: The Story of Japan's Struggle toSurrender-August 1945 (Suffolk, 1969), p. 29. The room in the underground shelter was only 18feet by 30, and "being poorly ventilated, was a small inferno..." Ibid., p. 31. The narration ofevents, including an attempted coup, eventually leading to Japan's surrender was prepared by agroup of 14 Japanese scholars.

116. Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 96-100; Buruma, n. 114, p. 30; Wyden, n. 7, pp. 300-302; Giovannitti andFreed, n. 47, pp. 275-278; Butow, n. 42, pp. 168-175; The Pacific War Research Society, p. 301-302.

660 Strategic Analysis/August 200J


117. Quoted in Sayle, n. 35, p. 59.118. Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 102-105; Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 282-288. Emphasis in the

original.119. Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 108-110.120. Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, pp. 292-294. Emphasis in the original. Wainstock, n. 31, pp. 111-

112.121. Butow, n. 42, p. 175.122. Quoted in Giovannitti and Freed, n. 47, p. 300. Emphasis in the original.123. Ibid., pp. 296-304; Sayle, n. 35, p. 60.124. Buruma, n. 114, p. 30; Sayle, n. 35, p. 60.125. Kecskemeti, n. 33, pp. 198-206.126. Major General S. Woodburn Kirby quoted in Pape, n. 30, p. 157.127. Pape, n. 30, pp. 187-188.128. Ibid., pp. 187 and 191-192.129. Butow, n. 42, p. 17 f.130. Sayle, n. 35, p. 60.131. Quoted in Buruma, n. 114, n. 31. Emphasis added.132. Kecskemeti, n. 33, p. 210.133. Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York, 1949), p. 92.134. Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon (New York, 198), p. 210.135. Messer, n. 43, p. 51.136. Quoted in Yavenditti, n. 97, p. 233.137. US Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War, Washington DC, July 1, 1946,

p. 13. General Groves immediately rejected the survey's conclusion138. John Hersey, Hiroshima (New York, 1946). Its immediate effect, according to a perceptive observer

of American thought and culture, was curiously ephemeral and elusive. "Like the funeral ritualsthat provide a socially sanctioned outlet for grief and mourning, Hiroshima may have enabledAmericans of 1946 both to confront emotionally what had happened to the people of Hiroshimaand Nagasaki and, in a psychological as well as a litteral sense, to close the book on that episode."Boyer, n. 99, p. 209.

139. Norman Cousins. "The Literacy of Survival", The Saturday Review, September 14, 1946, reproducedin Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, p. 305.

140. James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age(New York, 1993) pp. 298 and 304. See especially chapter 16.

141. Barton J. Bernstein, "Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History", in Bird and Lifschultz,n. 29, pp. 163-196, Alperovitz, n. 40, p. 449.

142. Alperovitz, Ibid., pp. 448-457.143. Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Bomb", reproduced in Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29,

pp. 197-210.144. Bernstein, n. 141, p. 176.145. Ibid., p. 179.146. Barton J. Bernstein. "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half a Million American Lives' Saved

by the Bomb: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth", The Journal of Strategic Studies,vol. 22, no. 1, March 1999, pp. 54-95; Rufus E. Miles. Jr., "The Strange Myth of Half a MillionAmerican Lives Saved", International Security, vol. 10, n. 2, Fall 1985, pp. 121-140.

147. Alperovitz, n. 40, p. 459.148. Louis Menand. "The Quiet American", The New York Review of Books, July 14, 1994, p. 18.149. Alperovitz. n. 40, pp. 321-365.150. P.M.S. Blackett, Fear, War and the Bomb (New York, 1949), pp. 137-139.151. Thomas C. Schelling, "The Terrorist Use of Nuclear Weapons," in Bernard Brodie, Michael D.

Intrigrator and Roman Kolkowicz, eds., National Security and International Stability (Cambridge,Mass., 1983), pp. 209-225. He had earlier written that against "defenceless people there is not



much that nuclear weapons can do that cannot be done with an ice pick." Thomas C. Schelling,Arms and Influence (Yale, 1966), p. 191; Menand, n. 148, p. 18; Victor Weisskopf, The Joy ofInsight (New York, 1991), p. 156; Feld, n. 24, p. 89; Bernstein, n. 65, p. 142.

152. The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs inHiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects ofthe Atomic Bombings, translated by Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swain (New York, 1981). It isthe product of four years of labour and contains 39 closely printed pages of bibliography withabout 1,000 entries.

153. Ibid., p. 335. Italics added.154. Ibid., p. 340. Emphasis in the original.155. Ibid., p. 339-340. For an interesting review of the American reviews of Ibid., see Glenn D. Hook,

"A Review Essay", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 12, no. 2, 1982, pp. 51-54.156. Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb," in Bird and Lifschultz, n. 29, pp. 216-217.

Emphasis in the original. This highly emotional and angry piece by a professor emeritus ofEnglish at the University of Pennsylvania, who would have been among the American servicemenparticipating in the invasion of Japan, is in response to the American critics of atomic bombings.On John Kenneth Galbraith he remarks: "What did he do in the war? He worked in the Officeof Price Administration in Washington. I don't demand that he experience having his ass shot off.I merely note that he didn't."

157. Thomas and Morgan-Witts, n. 2, p. 453.



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