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THE NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTION

CHAPTER 11 - Principles of State Policy

Land, water and natural resource below and above the surface of the land and in thecontinental shelf and within the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of

Namibia shall belong to the State if they are not otherwise lawfully owned.

FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/1 Use of Property Rights in

Fisheries Management

D. SYMES FAO DOC. WEBSITE-Technical Papers

This paper seeks to address some of these questions from a European perspective. itbegins by briefly summarising the advantages and disadvantages of rights-basedmanagement, more generally, from a social science viewpoint. the focus then switchesto the particular circumstances of Europes fisheries, suggesting that the uniqueconditions affecting both the fisheries and their governance are perhaps less conduciveto universal and unalloyed adoption of rights-based management, but also indicatingways in which the three principal objectives of fisheries management - resourcesustainability, economic efficiency and social equity - might be pursued through asystem of differential management combining elements of both rights-based andcommunity approaches.

SOUTH AFRICA-FAO TECHNICAL PAPERS

This tension is linked directly to difficulties in first formulating and second effectivelyimplementing the new marine fisheries policy of South Africa. For instance, the formerdistribution of rights of access gave the upper hand in fisheries to relatively feworganizations, almost all of which were dominated by the formerly advantaged sector ofthe population. Tensions were created by the need to create (demographic) equity indistribution while still allowing for some of the industrial stability that had allowed

markets to be developed so effectively over the years.

The process of formulating a new marine fisheries policy was initiated by the Ministerof Environmental Affairs and Tourism in October 1994 (Cochrane and Payne 1998).The immediate background was unrest over prevailing policy, which was widelyconsidered to be insensitive to the requirements of South Africans previouslymarginalized by the policy of apartheid. In December 1994 the idea of establishing aFisheries Policy Development Committee (FPDC) to develop a Green Paper for thefisheries was mooted.

On 4 June 1996 the FPDC presented the Green Paper to the Minister. The White Paper(Anon 1997), and theMarine Living Resources Act(Anon 1998) which becameoperational from 1 September 1998, were developed from that same Green Paper.

Article 100 Sovereign Ownership of Natural Resources


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During the policy-development process three issues were not contested. They weresustainability of utilization of marine resources, the need to maintainstability in theindustry, and the need to broaden access to include previously excluded populationgroups (equity). On the other hand there were some issues on which consensus wasdifficult. These included:

i. the nature of access rights, where the key issue is the balance between the rights ofthe individual rights-holder and those of the State and

ii. the position of the user-group versus the State where the issue is the balance betweenuser-group interest and Ministerial discretion

2. THE NATURE AND ALLOCATION OF ACCESS RIGHTS, AND STAKE-

HOLDER INFLUENCE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Until 1994 (in reality, until the new Act was promulgated in September 1998), access to

resources was granted by the State in the form of annual quotas. During the FPDCprocess, the dominant concept was that of a long-term property right. Therecommendation handed to the Minister by the FPDC was essentially for an ITQ systemwith relatively modest scope for government intervention (FPDC 1996). The rationale

behind this recommendation was that long-term rights should be granted because theywould result in an increase in the stability of the labour force and in economicefficiency, while encouraging investment and sustainable resource utilization.

The Ministry in its White Paper on Marine Fisheries (Anon 1997) also supported theITQ concept, but with rights to be sold for a maximum period of 50 years, during which

period they would revert to the State. The same document recommended that thetransfer of rights would be regulated by the State to prevent concentration of rights inthe hands of the economically powerful. This regulation was considered necessary toachieve the broadening of the participation ideal. The legislature finally reduced themaximum period of holding rights to 15 years, and the principle of State ownership ofthe resources was underlined by a decision that rights would only be leased to

participants, rather than actually sold

From this brief analysis, it is clear that there was divergence in thought between stake-holders, the executive and the legislature. The stake-holders sought regulation in themarketplace, so diminishing the role of the executive. The executive, on the other hand,

attempted to introduce a market-regulated system that allowed for intervention. Thelegislature finally settled for a system in which the market would play a minimal role inthe distribution of access rights. The reluctance to leave matters with markets both onthe part of the executive and the legislature was clearly related to their consideration ofthe level of inequality in the fishing industry. However, it did broaden the definition ofstability beyond the concept of industrial stability mentioned earlier as a cornerstone ofthe new policy. It also moved stability into the sphere of politics while retaining somelevel of industrial stability.

3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING ACCESS RIGHTS IN THE

SOUTH AFRICAN FISHERIES SECTOR - THE HAKE TRAWL FISHERY


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South Africa has a coastline of some 3000km, extending from the border of Namibia inthe west to Ponta do Ouro in the east, adjacent to Mocambique. The western coastalshelf is highly productive, in common with other upwelling ecosystems around theworld, while the east coast is considerably less productive but has a high speciesdiversity including both endemic and Indo-Pacific species. The living marine resources

of South Africa have been exploited for many centuries. Industrial fisheries, however,started just after the turn of the 20th century with the commencement of the hake trawlfishery.

The hake trawl fishery is the mainstay of South Africas fishing industry. The two hakespecies are harvested, primarily off the western Agulhas Bank and the annual totalallowable catch (TAC) for the two species combined is currently just over 155 000t. Aconservative management strategy has been adopted for the stocks, in a highlysuccessful endeavour to rebuild the resource after a period of severe over-fishing bydistant-water fleets during the 1960s and 1970s. The hake fishery is dominated by twolarge companies and as a result there are high expectations for transformation within

this sector.

The hake fishery underwent unprecedented growth during the early 1960s when foreignfleets discovered the rich grounds of the south-eastern Atlantic. Catches wereuncontrolled and escalated rapidly, peaking at over one million tonnes per annum. Thehake stocks were decimated within 15 years and by 1977 the fleet was landing

primarily juvenile fish. Due to the open-access nature of the fishery and the absence ofany form of access-rights, catches in several South African fisheries started to exceedsustainable yields by the 1960 and this over-exploitation led to sharp declines in someimportant stocks. Concerns over the sustainability of the open-access fisheries led theauthorities to impose regulations such as total allowable catches (TACs), limitedseasons and area restrictions. These regulations only partially succeeded in controllingover-fishing.

At this time, a clause in the draft Convention on the Law of the Sea indicated that ifhost nations did not have the vessel capacity to harvest their stocks at MSY, foreignvessels could not be excluded. The South African government saw this as anopportunity to encourage large-scale new entrants into the fishing industry in an attemptto expand local fishing capacity. However, due to the parlous state of the resource,

potential investors were hesitant and it was left to the existing participants to investfurther in order to acquire the necessary capacity. Once this had been achieved, the

authorities promulgated an Exclusive Fishing Zone out to 200nm in November 1977and the fishery was effectively South Africanised once more. .

The South African common law had also never recognised that the sea or its resourcescould be the subject of ownership. The Commission did, however, accept the firstargument and recommended that tenure should be for a long term.

In the White Paper the Government indicated that it was of the opinion that some of theevidence over-emphasized the need for greater security and stability and pointed outthat, in practice, quotas or fishing rights were perpetuated provided the holder compliedwith prescribed requirements. It accepted the Commissions recommendations in this

regard, but pointed out that the quantum of the quota would vary each year according tofluctuations in the TAC.


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The Legislator eventually introduced a system whereby an independent statutory body,the Quota Board, granted exploitation rights for a specific period to stake-holders, aswell as annual quotas (it also recommended that the specific period differ for thedifferent sectors of the industry). In practice, exploitation rights were awarded to allexisting stake-holders for a period of 10 years and for five years to new entrants. This

system meant that stake-holders had more security than before, but were still notguaranteed that their quotas would be renewed from year to year. In anticipation of astock recovery, the Government decreed that 20% of all TAC increases were to bereserved for distribution to new entrants. These measures resulted in the erosion offounding company quota holdings by 28% over the 20-year period following quotaintroduction. The Government therefore used the quota-management system as a tool tomanipulate market share.

The guidelines of the Quota Board provided that the quotas could be reduced orwithdrawn in certain specified situations. Examples of such instances were:

i. a reduction in the TAC.

ii. the Board being of the opinion that a redistribution of quotas was desirable.

iii. the quota-holder gave preference to employment of foreigners.

iv. non-compliance with statutory, regulatory or other requirements stipulated by theBoard or Department.

This system did not prove to be popular and especially the Quota Board was widely

criticized. Although the Board made its allocations according to a set of criteria, thequotas were generally perceived to have been allocated arbitrarily and often unfairly.Consequently, the industry became steeped in uncertainty and insecurity prevailedamongst most of the stake-holders. A paradox was that although the new Sea Fishery

Act (1988) endorsed the conditional marketability of quotas, it failed to allow fordivisibility of rights. This meant that while small companies could be bought up, thelarger companies were not able to downsize and diversify (Bross 1999)..

4. WHY THE PRE-DEMOCRACY MANAGEMENT REGIME WAS

SUCCESSFUL

Quotas in the hake fishery were introduced at a time when stocks were in need ofrebuilding. The small number of role-players meant that agreement betweenGovernment and industry was easily reached and management action could beimplemented quickly. Individual relationships between personnel within the fisheriesmanagement authority and those of the fishing companies were comfortable in thesense that in most instances, a common culture was shared (educational background,language, value systems, etc.). This homogeneity meant that a spirit of co-operationwas easily engendered between the two groups, enabling a high degree of co-management with respect to stock assessment and management procedures adopted andat the level of the Sea Fisheries Advisory Committee (the advisory body to theMinister).

GOVERNMENT FISHERIES POLICY INITIATIVES


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As stated earlier the Marine Fisheries Policy White Paper (May 1997), proposed thatrights should be allocated for a period not exceeding 50 years, and should revert back tothe State during the course of that period. The rights were to be defined as a proportionof the TAC, were to be divisible, inheritable and transferable, with the consent of theMinister. In the Bill (May 1998) and laterthe Marine Living Resources Act1998, the

right was redefined as a portion of the TAC, with the intent that quantities of fish madeavailable by increases in the TAC would be available for allocation to new entrants,echoing the policy of the previous Government. Similarly, the maximum duration of aright was reduced to 15 years.

It is clear that the ANC Government, like the Nationalist Government before it, hasshied away from a market-driven industry-structure based on the sale of rights in

perpetuity. In both instances, the Governments of the day have been intent onbroadening access to the hake fishery and on divesting control from the two largestcompanies. In 1999, these two companies still hold 64% of the hake TAC, while thefive largest companies hold a total of 71%. A system whereby rights are allocated for a

shorter period is more flexible and allows Government more opportunities for socialengineering. This must be seen against the background of inequity that prevailed for solong in South Africa and the fact that both Governments were aware that restructuringof the Industry had to take place over a number of years. Both Governments were alsoaware that under a system of freely transferable long-term rights, the rights may revert

back to the economically powerful. Although this domination is likely to lead togreater economic efficiency, the general feeling of both Governments has been that itmight also have a negative impact on the restructuring process. As far as thesustainability of the major resources in the South African fisheries are concerned, it can

be argued that even in the absence of long-term access or property rights, themanagement of the various resources has been reasonably successful.

6. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO TRANSFORMATION

6.1 Need for common purpose

The relationships and co-operation that existed between the fishery managementauthority and stake-holders under the old regime will be much more difficult to emulateduring the post-transformation era due to the diversity of cultural backgrounds nowinvolved. Differences will have to be overcome and a sense of common purpose willonce again need to be established. In particular, it is essential that the Minister,

members of the Consultative Advisory Forum and decision-makers within thegovernment agency (Marine & Coastal Management) should share this sense ofcommon purpose

6.2 Economic versus socio-economic considerations

There is a divergence in the expectations of the established industry and the aspirantnew entrants. The established industry feel that they should be permitted to continue as

before because they have taken steps to transform their companies and were highlyefficient operators earning valuable foreign currency and offering stable employment toa large workforce. The aspirant new entrants expect the Government to reallocate a

significant portion of the TAC to them.Neither expectation can be met in its entirety.While there were some small allocations to new entrants under the old legislation, the


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newMarine Living Resources Act 1998, which is envisaged to bring abouttransformation, still has to be implemented. Employment stability will be a majorconsideration in the re-allocation process.

6.3 Black empowerment - financial and capacity problems

The Governments policy to empower black people economically has resulted in anumber of schemes being initiated in the general economy. Some of these schemes arefaltering as a result of debt burdens and the sluggish growth in the economy over thelast few years.

Experience has shown that transformation will be a more gradual and multi-facetedprocess involving not only new entrants but also investments by black entrepreneurs inexisting companies. However, lessons from the fishing (and other) industries havetaught that markets, when left to themselves, tend to reinforce the existing distributionof income and assets rather than promoting diversification. In any event, this type of

approach to Black Economic Empowerment is unlikely to prove rapid enough to satisfythe enormous expectations of the electorate. The Government is therefore underenormous pressure to facilitate rapid transformation through heavy-handed intervention(Gqubule 1999).

The Government is intent upon transforming the industry so that ownership more fairlyreflects the demography of the country. However, the stranglehold by the establishedcompanies on marketing and distributional networks, domination of infrastructure and

berthing facilities and lack of access to capital, are still a reality. The highly-industrialised nature of, for instance, the hake fishery means that in addition to viablerights, new entrants will need enormous financial backing. The problem is that the

black population of South Africa has only recently been given the opportunity ofentering the mainstream economy and has yet to develop the financial muscle orcollateral required for this type of investment.

6.4 Legal challenges

There have been legal challenges against the Minister from existing rights-holderswhose rights have been reduced or taken away. As any redistribution of rights will be atthe expense of current rights-holders we expect more legal challenges in future

6.5 Compliance

In the transformation process, the Government has committed itself to the allocation ofrights to small and medium-size enterprises (SMMEs). While there are currently someSMMES that share in the TAC, the number of these companies will have to beincreased. The newly established hake longline fishery has also enabled theGovernment to bring new entrants into the industry as the threshold for entry into thisfishery is relatively low. This broadening of participation will place an additional strainon the enforcement of regulations in the fishery as there are going to be many morerights-holders than before. The broadening of participation idea has created a lot ofuncertainty among the existing rights-holders as the extent of adjustments have not

finally been set. There is a danger that such uncertainty might lead to overcatching bythose under threat.


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7. CONCLUSION

As far as the sustainability of the major resources in the South African fisheries areconcerned, it can be argued that even in the absence of long-term access or propertyrights, the management of the various resources has been reasonably successful.

Success in implementing the new policy will likely depend upon the success with whichthe three cornerstones (sustainability, stability and equity) are married in the globalinterests of the country. A marriage of two entities is, as we know, fraught with somedifficulty. How then will we fare in addressing all three in an optimal manner? The keyto this lies in a balancing-act based on the rational utilization of the resources,something based in turn on a knowledge of the resources.

Future generations of South Africans will tell us how successful we have been in ourbalancing-act. In essence, and for a multiplicity of reasons, we dare not fail. Regardingthe rights-regime, we believe we are on the right track and are positive that the currentsystem whereby the state has scope for intervention is the only way in which to ensure

that a redistribution, leading to equity, will take place. Once this has occured, a moreclassical ITQ system might be introduced

MOVING THROUGH THE NARROWS: FROM OPEN ACCESS

TO ITQS AND SELF-GOVERNMENT - A. SCOTT

4.1 Limited licensing as a right of entry

As with other topics in this review, I have been unable to find a good chronology of theintroduction of limited licensing. In Canada it was being phased in under new

legislation in the 1960s and maybe other jurisdictions had started earlier.(Wilen 1989 p.250) Today limited licensing is widespread, especially, I believe, where fishstocks aremigratory or straddle jurisdictional boundaries.

It was perceived that gear limitations and closures were inadequate to deal with theproblems mentioned. Therefore there was a search for a system that would reduce theamount of effort (rather than limit its form and timing). The answer seemed to be toreduce the number of vessels, and this was done by focussing on the licence. Previouslythe licence in itself had played no part in regulation, as a drivers licence is notimportant for dealing with traffic congestion. The innovation was to re-interpret thelicence as a kind of ticket of entry. Every vessel had to have one.

4.2 Transition by grandfathering

Seen in retrospect, a limited-licensing regime was not very different from what hadpreceded it. But the transition caused a great deal of upset, so different did it seem fromfree and open access. It was introduced when there was already over-fishing. To be sold

politically as a system that would benefit already hard-pressed fishermen, the newscheme had to be based on the existing fleet and their crews. It was infeasible to start allover again, perhaps allocating a limited number of licences by a lottery, by tendering

bids, or by an open auction sale. True, there was sometimes a reservation of a numberof licences to be held for particular classes: foreigners, or aborigines, or owners of

particular kinds of vessel or gear, and so on. Apart from these reservations, the new


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licenses were simply handed out to those who claimed to have recently been fishing.This was the now-familiar grandfathering approach.

4.3 Getting to the right number of licences

Limited licensing puts no limit on a vessels catch (apart from that already imposed byexisting gear and closure regulations). So, by itself, it could not bring the fleets catchdown to the TAC. So the governments had to think of supplements to limit licensing.They came up with quite a variety. One was to do nothing, allowing fishermanretirement or death to gradually reduce the number of licences. A second was to makethe licences transferable, allow a market to develop, and buy some back at the market,or at a fair price. A third way was to buy back some vessels, with the licencesattached.

4.4 Success?

Limited licensing has not been a great success. For one thing, fleet sizes were rarelyreduced to the right level. When these schemes were still being discussed, fishermenmade sure they would be eligible, so that in the transition period the number of activevessels actually increased. In the early months of buy-back schemes, the prices of theremaining licences increased. Naturally, the remaining fishermen began to speculate onhow high the increases would go. As a result most vessel owners held on, refusing tosell at the fair offer prices.

The schemes did not reinforce the regulations in place for other reasons. Fish stockswere subject to increasing fishing effort exerted by a slowly-decreasing number ofvessels. The catches increasingly consisted of young fish. Neither total catch nor catch-

per-unit-effort increased significantly.

Third, the cost of fishing continued to increase. The remaining vessels had still tocompete with each other for the catch. The open periods continued to shorten and thegear regulations continued to increase the time and equipment needed to fill up a vessel.To these private costs must be added the increasing public costs of enforcing the TAC.

4.5 Significance

In spite of this near-failure to accomplish what was hoped for it, limited licensing had

very significant features, some accidental and some by design, that prepared theregulators and the fishermen for what was to come next.

It created a sort of marriage between the fleet and the stock. In large and offshorefisheries, a group of vessels and their owners were directly associated with a singlespecies, or stock, or fishing ground. Those who wanted to lower costs and improveefficiency had to think about the specific fish stock being exploited; while thoseconcerned about a fishstock had to consider the distinct part of the industry that washarvesting it. It created an incentive for the fishermen to assist the administrators inenforcing the regulations, for there was no doubt about who was hurt when theregulations were flouted.


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It also created an incentive for the fishermen to develop a helpful relationship betweenthemselves and the regulators. It became obvious there were insiders who held licences,and outsiders who could now be ignored. The insiders had in common an interest inconserving and improving the stock. The previous fierce, perpetual, wrangling, inwhich the regulators were regarded as stupid policemen to be defied and evaded could

now be seen in need of replacement by joint consultation and collection of information.

Indeed these opportunities and incentives were evident, but they were eclipsed byrivalrous, competitive, fishing behaviour. It was clear to many fishermen that theycould individually do better by getting a larger part of the TAC for their own class, portor group of vessels than by helping to increase the stock to be fished for by everyone.This involved devoting ones time to fighting the system rather than using it. Theincentives to work together created by limited licensing were overwhelmed byincentives to conceal, evade, discourage and free-ride separately. Hostility, distrust andobstruction were words used to describe the atmosphere in some important fisheriesinto which a system of limited licensing had been introduced.

4.6 Focus on the licence

Finally, by being limited, fishing licences became important in themselves. They hadcome into existence as convenient cogs in a registration and administration system,having what outsiders may call bureaucratic functions. Until the 1960s it would have

been possible to abolish ocean fishing licences, and vessel licences, and many otherkinds of paperwork, without plunging the regulatory system into complete chaos.

To my mind, the forward-looking importance of limited licensing lies in the wordlicensing. The license had became a permit, a certificate, that showed one had had aright to fish in a specified place and time. Those who had no licence had no such right,and if they did fish they were in a fundamental sense committing trespass. It was nolonger just for the convenience of the administrator but was a control against otherfishermen. Further, the group of licence holders was seen by certain courts to haverights, not only to hold a public right to fish, but of something like ownership: in earlycases of oil pollution, and in the 1960s, the local licence holders did, as a group, windamages or settlements against leaking tankers that had damaged their fishery.

One can see that the licence now gave its holders rights with new attributes:

i. Quality of title and security. Licences were no longer free, a casual privilege to behanded out and withdrawn at the whim of the state. Many fishermen had to argue or payfor them. Having forced the fishermen to take the licence seriously, the state had now todo the same. It had to resist the temptation to cancel them, take them back or reducetheir content, but rather to honour them. And, it had to protect the holder against thosewho claimed they had a better right to a holders licence than the holder himself inorder to protect the quality of title.

ii.Exclusivity. There was no longer open access. As I said, some people might fish butothers might not. As the latter were now excluded, the rights of those who might fishwere far from being perfectly exclusive, but they were more exclusive.


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iii. Transferability. Some of the early systems had licences that were not transferable.Those who had them could use them till they died, but they then reverted to the state.Whatever their initial feelings, this non-transferability became unpopular with thefishermen. Their licence had some value, but they could not cash in on it or pass it totheir heirs, or use it as security for a loan. They agitated to have licences made

transferable, and found ways to evade the prohibition. Soon, nearly every type oflimited licence had become transferable, or marketable.

These three attributes, or characteristics, partial as they were, complemented each other.For example, transferability was more valuable if the licences were more secure, andalso if they had a longerduration (yet another characteristic.) A good title and securitywere worthwhile obtaining if the right had some exclusivity. And so on. Those whoacted politically to get more of one attribute in their local limited-licence scheme foundthemselves promoting the inclusion of all three.

5. PROPERTY

5.1 Characteristics of property rights

This account now jumps from this history of regulation to a short survey of whatproperty is. In doing so the issues that have to do with personal property, with movableassets are disregarded and focus on real property in soil, minerals, water and othernatural resources. We start with a piece of land. The person with ownership rights overit has powers to use and cultivate the land; to sell or rent it to others and to receive andkeep its rent or yield.

What is it that gives the rights holder these powers? It is the collection ofcharacteristics of the particular property right he owns. Its a mistake to think that oneeither has a property right or has not. Most systems of law make provision for a varietyof rights. All standard or well-known property rights have some of each of the siximportant characteristics, but in different amounts. If the right has too little of therelevant characteristics, it is still a property right but it does not enable the holder tofully exercise certain powers - some, but not all.

Before turning to rights over a fishery, consider a simple example. To serve thoseattending a fair or festival in the country a farmers field has been turned into a parkinglot. When a driver enters the lot he receives a ticket. The driver owns the ticket and

whatever it entitles him to. The ticket represents a feeble kind of property right usuallyknown as a licence. A licence can be issued by a private property owner like a farmer,or by the government in the form of a variety of licences and permits to do things thatwould otherwise be trespasses or illegal. The parking licence gives our driver very few

powers: he cannot transfer it to someone else, nor change or manage his part of theparking lot, nor get income from it. He cannot do these things because, although hislicence has some of all the essential characteristics, it has not enough.

This is as true of a fishing licence as it is of a ticket in a parking lot. Consider thefollowing six characteristics:

i. The first is exclusivity, the right to use and manage a resource without interference.The more sources of potential interference, the less the exclusivity. Every kind of


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property right hassome exclusivity, and the fee-simple ownership held by some farmerscomes close to putting the owners on isolated desert islands, nearly 100 percentexclusive. Now consider a right to use a fishery. To what extent can the right-holderexclude others from the powers of ownership (to use and manage the fishery, to sell thefishery, and to take income from it)? If the right is over an isolated fish-pond in the

country, the right is nearly 100 percent exclusive. But if is merely an entitlement to fishfor a pelagic species in the high seas, it has close to zero percent exclusivity.

ii. The second characteristic is duration. This is the period the holder is entitled toexercise the powers of ownership. Property rights range from a term of a few hours to anumber of years. Some kinds of right that are short of exclusivity can nevertheless havea long duration. The ordinary fishing right has a duration of one year, renewable. If it isexpected to be automatically renewed, then its effective duration is much longer.

iii. Security, orquality of title, is the third characteristic. If an outsider can successfullyeject a possessor because his title is difficult to prove or wrongly based, the right is not

secure. If the original owner can, at will, take back possession from a person to whomhe granted a lease, the lease is not secure. If the government can interfere with thefisherman without notice and reduce his powers or the size of the estate, the fishermansright is insecure.

iv. The fourth characteristic is transferability. In the countryside, farm land has longbeen bought, sold and bequeathed. In fisheries waters, however, the licence was at firstnot transferable. Why should it be? Anyone who wanted a licence could get it free fromthe government. But when fishing rights began to acquire more of the exclusivitycharacteristic, there emerged a demand for the right to be transferable.

There are two other property-rights characteristics, divisibility andflexibility; they aresometimes treated as a subset of the characteristic oftransferability.i. The fifth characteristic is divisibility. When a fishing right is divisible its holder has

powers to change the scale of his/her enterprise. The ownership can be made joint orsingle. The size or quantify of the thing owned, such as hours of fishing, a territory or aquota, can be split. If the holders right is also transferable, the holder can assemble

parts of rights to match the scale of the resource or the fishing vessel. Divisibility isincreased by adding to the permissible number of joint owners, or the number of unitsinto which the thing owned, may be split.

ii. A right can gainflexibility in many ways. Typically Rights have conditions orstipulations. The more easily these can be relaxed in special circumstances, such as anunexpected change in fish migration or population, or in the seasonality of the market,the more flexible the Right is. Payments obligations can also be made more flexible,e.g. when holders may pay for the right by a royalty instead of by a set rental (when theroyalty is based on net revenue instead of on weight of catch). Typically, flexibilitytransfers risk of unexpected events from the user/holder of the right to the leassor.

These characteristics are not abstract. One can think of ways of measuring each ofthem. In addition to their conceptual measurability, they are valuable. The more of acharacteristic a Right has over a piece of land or water, the more valuable it is to its

owner. This is because having more of these characteristics enables the holder to catchfish at lower costs, to improve the size or the quality of the catch and the stock, to sell


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his catch at the best going prices, to reduce his transactions costs with other fishers, andto reduce the risk of being ejected or dispossessed of some of the powers thattraditionally go with ownership of a natural resource.

Security and duration, if they increase together, justify the holder in looking ahead, to

husband the stock by adjusting present catches with respect to total amount, age,gender, size and season, to buy durable vessels and equipment, to eject trespassers, andimprove, or protect, habitat. In such ways, having more of the characteristics in onesownership rights not only allows one to do more things, but it creates incentives to dothem. The incentives are current and expected future income, and, if there istransferability, a higher payment to be received when the holder retires or dies. If rightsare widely transferable, then an exchange or market in them will develop. If so, thosewho can find better things to do with their time and capital can leave, and those bettersuited or having more time, a closer location, a better vessel, more risk-taking

propensity, etc. can buy in. Their trades may be permanent, or for a few days or months.

5.2 The standard property rights

Of course, if one wants to hold rights over a particular piece of land, or a fishery, onecannot just acquire it with whatever blend of the six characteristics one wants. Usuallyone must accept one of a few standard interests or tenures: allodial title (or variants withnames like freehold, fee simple, free and common socage, or patent); leasehold (with avariety of characteristics added or taken away with conditions or covenants written inthe bargaining); easements; profits; and some special ones with names like miningclaim; appropriative water right; tree-cutting licence; pollution right; and so on.

At the end of the scale there are standard rights having very little exclusivity. Under thecommon law there are: individual licences; co-ownerships (including joint ownershipand ownership in common;) and free-and-open-access (in Roman law called res nullius)of which most fisheries may be examples, especially a fishery on the high seas. Thereare really not many of these standard blends or categories. Very rarely, the legislatureor the courts re-defines one of them, in effect changing its mix of characteristics.

5.3 Who holds the right?

5.3.1 Which government may grant a fishery property right?

One of the unsettled questions about fishery-rights systems is whether the governmentis prepared to admit that the right that it distributes qualifies as a standard property rightunder the local law of property. Here are two reasons, good and bad, why it may not.

i. A legalistic/constitutional reason is that, in some states the fisheries are undergovernment control, but the government has never acquired a property-like interest overthem. There is a legal maxim to the effect that a person/government cannot grant toanother what it does not hold itself. This may also happen in a federal country. It mayalso happen because a fishery is outside national waters. If so a government may havesovereign rights as against another, but cannot, according to the maxim above, grant

property rights in fisheries to individuals.


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ii. A bureaucratic reason is that fishery administrative agencies, accustomed to makingand enforcing regulations, are unwilling to share their powers with property owners.

5.3.2 Who may hold a right?

To whom may the government grant an individual fishing right? In the old days, in anopen-access fishery on the high seas with large vessels, the licence to fish was usually, I

believe, issued to the vessel - the vessel had a licence attached. However, as fisheryregulation has moved in the direction of a system of individual rights, there is atendency to vest the right in a person.

Doing so still leaves a choice. Should the person be the vessel owner - possibly abusiness corporation? Should it be a group of such individuals, a sort of co-ownership?Or should it be all the owners of all the vessels, in effect creating a co-operative orcommunal proprietorship or leasehold or licence over all the fishery?

Some experts raise objections to making the vessel owner or owners the units of fisheryright-holder. They suggest that this system tends to unfairly exclude the hired captainand the crew. In many fisheries - but by no means all - the crews are paid in the form of

percentage shares of the receipts from sale of the catch. These experts suggest that theindividual property rights in the fishery should be further divided according to the crew-shares on each vessel. Sometimes this idea seems rather visionary and theoretical, but ithas been a political issue in Iceland.

5.3.3 A property right over what?

In all situations where there are private property rights over natural resources, there issome uncertainty under the local system of law about the subject of the right. Exactlywhat is it that the right-holder owns? Take the owner of an exclusive mining right.From what may he exclude other miners? All the land, rock and minerals below thesurface? All the minerals, or just those that are valuable? When half the minerals have

been removed, does the holder of the right still own the rockwall and roof making upthe chamber around them? May he exclude a neighbour who wants to use the chamberas a tunnel or a drainage pipe? These varieties of exclusivity have been worked over inlocal courts, and all are possible, in special circumstances.

There is a similar range of possible subjects of water rights on a river. If a farmer has an

exclusive right to divert water to his land, does the exclusivity apply to the water itself,or just to the right to divert it? Does the exclusivity prevent a farmer upstream fromdiverting the flow? Does he own the flow he might divert but does not?

Similar questions to these are found in fisheries. Usually in older systems of lawswimming fish cannot be anyones property. Only when they have been caught andreduced to possession by being brought on deck, say, does anyone own them. But thereare exceptions. The old laws do also allow swimming fish that are in a lake or a private

pond to be privately owned, even though they have not been caught. Sometimes theowner of inland fishing rights can rent his rights by the hour, another type of ownership.And, under the old customary laws of whaling, certain whales that a vessel had failed to

capture, but had escaped, could still belong to that vessel even though it was latercaught and brought alongside by another vessel.


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What will be the usual subject for modern fisheries rights is not yet clear. Take thevariety ofinshore property rights. The owner of rights over an inshore fishery couldhold exclusive rights to set up fixed gear - as in Japan. Or, as in other countries, theholder could own a right to use any gear or even, own the fish that have not yet beencaught in a bay, fjord or lagoon. As for offshore fisheries within the EEZ, it is too early

to say over what thing the right holder is going to have exclusive rights.

The economic and legal decisions are still being made. Francis Christy will be talkingabout the advantages and difficulties of exclusive territorial or area rights. To many itseems reasonable that, even on the high seas, one holder should have a monopoly of anarea that is delimited on a map. South Africa has used this approach. Economists havelong discussed setting up a private sole ownership of a particular stock of a particularspecies in a particular location, but there are no real-world examples, onshore oroffshore water. What did emerge, in the 1960s and 1970s, and what I will be talkingabout, is the modern development of the limited-licensing fisheries regime: theexclusive individualproperty right to land a certain numberof fish, in a certain

location, of a certain species, during a certain period. This is the individual or vesselquota, to which I now turn.

6. INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS - ITQs

6.1 The innovation: the quota as a development of existing licensing schemes

The ITQ, as it emerged in Iceland and New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s was thelatest development of the fishing nation progression from open access to regulatedfishery to limited licensing. The administrators who introduced it were trying toimprove the existing managerial regime. They looked for a scheme with greaterenforceability, more revenue for government and a smaller need for a costlygovernment presence. Its introduction was perhaps made easier because in bothcountries the fishermen were in the process of expanding into the widened territorialsea. Probably in neither country did the official innovators think in terms of the creationof property rights. That is also true of fisheries elsewhere that have more recently comeunder individual quota management systems. Indeed, many governments havediscouraged their fisheries agencies from using the word property.

6.2 Characteristics of ITQs

In nearly all cases, ITQs were introduced to replace an earlier exclusive system suchas limited licences. There were exceptions, such as that for the northern tuna inAustralia and some offshore stocks in New Zealand neither of which had yet beenunder any kind of exclusive regulation. The holder acquired a numerical quota,denominated in pieces or by weight.

These schemes distinguished between two types of quota. One was the absolute amountthat a vessel might take from the TAC in a season; the other was the ongoing

percentageshare of the TAC to which the quota holder was entitled every season. Theinitial distribution might be in terms of absolute quotas, but was implicitly in terms of a

percentage share. In most quota fisheries the ongoing share percentage was based on

the holders share on the catch in previous years under licensing. In some new fisheries- without a history - the holders were given, or were sold, equal shares.


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In most places a politically-motivated attempt was made to steer the quotas toindividuals. In the case of Canadas Enterprise Allocation Scheme, the quotas weredistributed, from the beginning, to a few large companies. There are probably otherexceptions to the individual orientation. In most schemes, except those in NewZealand, there was no intention of charging an initial price, rental, royalty or tax.

The administrators started off many schemes nervously, giving the quota rights orlicences a limited duration. However, this feature has usually been relaxed, perhaps bymaking renewal more-or-less automatic. Likewise, administrators initially refused tomake most schemes transferable or marketable, or achieved the same effect by limitingthe amount of quota that any holder could sell, or acquire. Fishermen soon expressed ademand for transferability, and/or evaded the limitations. Most laws were changed, andthe IQ or IVQ became an ITQ.

6.3 Not a new kind of title to resources

The quantitative feature of the quota licence was a novelty in ocean fisheries, but thegeneral idea had long been familiar to participants in other natural-resource sectors.Government disposes of the resources from public land in quantitative terms, and oldand new holders of the resources trade all or parts of the amounts they have acquired.For example, in agriculture, farmers buy and sell livestock by the head or the pound,not attached to or confused with the land on which the stock is located. Farmers alsoacquire, rent and sell water for irrigation. In the power production industry it is notunusual for the trade to be in terms of cubic feet of river flow, or even in terms ofhorsepower.

In the petroleum and natural gas industries, ownership is in volume terms, and firmstrade underground units with each other. In the lumber industry on private lands,milling firms acquire rights from landlords to cut certain lengths or volumes of timber.In all these cases, the deed may specify the place where the resource is located, butthose who are trading are less interested in the location than in the amount of ore,lumber, oil, trees, water, etc. to be removed. This was also the ITQ approach to natural-resource trade: the individual does not acquire a right to a minutely-defined area, but toa minutely-defined amount within a general neighbourhood.

7. THE PROPERTY RIGHT CHARACTERISTICS OF ITQs

7.1 Listing the characteristics

Governments protest that according to their intentions, an ITQ is not a piece ofproperty. Nevertheless, at this stage the evidence is that the fishery quota, or quota-licence, is a form of standard individual property right, with its own blend ofcharacteristics (Scott 1989 pp. 11-38; Devlin and Grafton 1998 pp. 68-100). It isdescended from the historic ocean freedom to fish, a liberty or licence that had almostnone of the characteristics of property. It has emerged from reforms to the limitedlicence, a simple licence with added exclusivity and transferability.

It has features strikingly like those of quantitative water rights, oil rights and other real

interests in land, long known to the common law, all having well-established property-


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like features. What is more, it has more than trivial amounts of the essentialcharacteristics of a property right, e.g.:

i.Duration: All quota shares have a life of more than one season. Some seem to bepermanent. All can be renewed.

ii.Exclusivity: A quota licence is much more exclusive than what went before it whichis a great change. But the holders right is merely in co-ownership with other holders;and is merely a right over the catch and not over the stock. Neither the swimming fish,nor fish yet to be born, nor the fish habitat have been exclusively assigned to anyindividual or collectivity. However, in most instances, an individuals right to a share ofthe catch is equivalent to a right to a share of the stock. That is, to have a 1% share in aTAC is implicitly to have a 1% share in the fishstock from which it is caught. Everyother possible shareholder is accounted for by the initial distribution of the quotas andsubsequent transfers. Further, because of the long duration of quota rights, to have a 1%share in the catch implies having a 1% share in future catches, and this, given stock

dynamics, is equivalent to having a 1% share in the fishstock.

This is an important result: because the quota allots a share in the collective right tocatch fish, it must implicitly allot the same share of the of ownership right over thestock. But a percentage share of the stock is notexclusive ownership. The person goingfishing with an ITQ has impressively more exclusivity than his ancestors with theirinherited open access to the fishery. But his share gives him little or no power over themanagement of what he owns. Managerial powers are diffused and dissipated amongthe fishermen and the administrators.

iii. Transferability (and divisibility): Like limited licences, quotas have becomemarketable. Private brokers, groups of fishermen and governments have establishedexchanges on which they can be traded. They acquire present values, related to theshare of the net present value of the catch in future years. These present values areaffected by speculation and hedging which can add to, or reduce, the fluctuations,uncertainty and risk in their values. In these respects their transferability is like that ofcertain well-established types of property value in land or natural resources. Further, in,

perhaps most, ITQ systems, the quotas are highly transferable in the very short run -rights to catch and land fish can be rented by the trip, by the week and by the season.

iv. Security and quality of title: There is nothing in the ITQ rules that makes the quota

right more secure than the older licences that went before it. There can still be disputesabout who owns a quota, and there can still be inconstant governments thatunexpectedly revise the system, depriving the holders of some of their quota.

Nevertheless, the marketability and bankability of quotas, similar to that of other kindsof real property, seems to have heightened the reluctance of administrators or

politicians to reduce the value of the system by casual changes in the law that governthe powers of a quota-holder.

To summarise, in the introduction of the ITQ, especially in offshore fisheries, thefishermen were transported from holding the individual powers inherent in an ordinarytransferable license, with a little inherent exclusivity, to holding a property right with

enforceable characteristics, in positive amounts, of long duration, transferability,exclusivity and security.


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7.2 Fishermen acting like a property owner

Proprietary behaviour by fishermen was a major step with widespread effects. Forexample, take husbandry. The fishermens sometimes shrill, negative, obstruction of

policies about the amount, and especially the distribution, of the catch has given way to

paying serious attention to the biologists proposals for increases or decreases in thestock. Where once the individuals right to fish was a thing to be battled for; theircollectively-owned stock had become a natural asset to be enhanced.

Or, take enforcement. ITQs did not cure some fishermens incurable addiction togetting around the rules, to catching and landing more than their entitlement, and tofree-riding on the efforts of others. Indeed, preventing their cheating has now becomemore complicated and costly. On the other hand, once the group of fishermen sawthemselves as the owners of valuable rights to the fishstock, they began to disapproveof cheating. They no longer indulgently ignored or covered up the infractions of others,for they now saw the others as thieves. It became worthwhile to obey the rules oneself,

if doing so discouraged cheating by others. This has led to a new helpful attitude, bornof ownership, that has prevented sky-rocketing official enforcement costs.

Finally, take competitive behaviour and uniform behaviour. Fishermen whose rightshad been grandfathered in from older forms of fishing licences still tended to act asthough they were in a contest. Who could find the fish first? Who could get the largestload on their vessels? Whose vessels had the greatest speed, capacity and versatility?Under ITQs however each soon learnt that the other vessels were not his antagonists.As long as each respected their quota limits, there was a greatly-reduced need to behaveuniformly and rivalrously. Like a property-owning farmer, each could bring in hisharvest without worrying about whether his neighbour had forestalled him. Some could

perhaps stretch their fishing to a year-round activity while others could make theopposite decision: taking their share of the harvest when it suited them, fitting in theharvest of one species in one season with that of other species in other seasons. Somecould fish slowly, with modest vessels, others could speed on super-vessels with largercrews and versatile gear.

MET

Geographic Location


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The Republic of Namibia is a vast, sparsely populated country situated along thesouth Atlantic coast of Africa between 17 and 29 degrees south of the Equator.

With its surface area of 824 268 square kilometres, Namibia is the 31 st largestcountry in the world. It stretches for about 1 300 km from south to north andvaries from 480 to 930 km in width from west to east.

Namibia's Climate: MET

The Namibian climate varies from arid and semi-arid to subtropical with thegenerally temperate desert coast offering sometimes fog-ridden days with

temperatures between 5 C and 20C. The central, southern and coastal areasconstitute some of the most arid landscapes south of the Sahara. The hottestmonths are January and February, with average day temperatures varyingbetween 9C to 30C. During the winter months that stretch from May to

September minimum temperatures can fluctuate between 6C and 10C at nightto recover to 20C after 11:00 in the day. Frost occurs over large areas of thecountry during winter, but in general winter days are clear, cloudless and sunny.

Overall Namibia is a summer rainfall area, with limited showers occurring fromOctober and building up to peak in January and February.

Namibia, previously known as South West Africa, is

bordered by South Africa in the south, Angola andZambia in the north and Botswana and Zimbabwe

in the east. The oldest desert in the world, theNamib Desert stretches along the whole west coast

of the country, while the Kalahari Desert runs alongits southeastern border with Botswana.

The country is demarcated into 13 regions, namelythe Caprivi, Kavango, Kunene, Omusati,

Ohangwena, Oshana and Oshikoto regions in thenorth, the Omaheke. Otjozondjupa, Erongo and

Khomas Regions in the central areas and theHardap and Karas regions in the south.


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SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (NDP2)

2001/2002 - 2005/2006

The national development strategy for Namibia consists of a long and mediumterm development perspectives. The Second National Development Plan (NDP2)was prepared soon after completing the execution of NDP1, whose five-yearimplementation ended during the financial year 1999/2000. The launching ofNDP2, during 2001/2002 fiscal year, has provided the much needed continuityand consistence in the application of the countrys development strategy.

The Second National Development Plan was prepared through wider participationof stakeholders during the various stages of its preparation. Early in the planningprocess, consultative meetings and workshops, at both national and lineministries, were held to discuss the issues and threats to sustainable developmentin Namibia, and on which basis a vision for NDP2 was developed and undertakento guide the drafting of chapters. As soon as the draft chapters became available,participatory mechanisms were set up for the screening and reviewing of, andconsolidation of the comments and suggestions made into the draft chapters.

Participants were drawn from the government and non-government sectors, suchas Trade Unions, NGOs, Civil Society, Donors, Governors and their officials,

parastatals, private sector representatives. Cabinet Ministers participated actively

both during the workshops and during the drafting of sector and cross-sectoralchapters.

Representatives from the University of Namibia participated in the planning

process through sectoral planning committees which were set up for the purposeby line ministries. We have therefore, succeeded in making the NDP2 planning

process more consultative than was the case in the past.

Growing more conscious of the fact that Namibias continued economic growth

depends very much on its rich natural resources and unique arid environment, wehave in NDP2, initiated the difficult, but necessary process of taking into account

environmental and sustainability aspects in sectoral, cross-sectoral and regional

development planning. Harmonization of the draft chapters and the establishmentof the plans internal consistency was carried out by the National PlanningCommission in consultation and collaboration with line ministries and regionalauthorities.

The Second National Development Plan, is made up of three volumes as follows:

Volume One Macroeconomic, Sectoral and Cross-Sectoral Policies;

Volume Two Regional Development Perspectives; and

Volume Three - Public Sector Investment Programme

Volume One is divided into four parts:

Part One: Overall Review of the Economy;

Part Two: National Development Objectives and Strategies;

Part Three: Sectoral Development; and

Part Four: Cross-Sectoral Policies.

Volume Two on the other hand consists of an introduction which is a generalchapter discussing general regional issues common to all regions and thirteen

chapters representing individual regional development programmes.

Volume Three is made up of all the programmes and projects presented inres ective cha ters of NDP2. It includes those ro ects cate orised as To be


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BRIEF ON AQUACULTURE FOR THE FISHERIES INDUSTRYBOOK. (HAMUKUAYA, 2002)

Aquaculture commenced in the late 1800s with introduction of carp, bass and

tilapia to state-owned dams. There was negligible production up to the mid-80s, then private sector interest increased. Namibias fledgling aquaculturesector has great development potential for:

Mariculture (at Oranjemund, Luderitz, Walvis Bay, Swakopmundand Henties Bay)

Inland fresh water species along the southern and northern riversof Namibia and existing dams

The Ministry has established a new Directorate of Aquaculture. This willoversee implementation of the new Aquaculture legislation, administration and

planning for the aquaculture sector. The Directorate aims to create anenabling environment for aquaculture development in Namibia.

Crucial to the successful development of aquaculture in any country is to firstset in place a proper policy and legislative framework. Namibias aquaculturepolicy is laid out in the policy paper: Towards the Responsible Developmentof Aquaculture (2001). The main policy objective is the responsible andsustainable development of aquaculture to achieve socio-economic benefitsfor all Namibians and to secure environmental sustainability. Other legislativedocuments in place are the Aquaculture Act No. 18 of December 2002 andthe Regulations on Licensing of 3rd December 2003. Regulations concerning

import and export control are at an advanced stage.

The Government foresees the role of aquaculture to enhance food security,reduce poverty, generate employment, improve rural livelihoods and increaseinvestment. Namibias productive advantages for aquaculture developmentcan be summarized as follows:

Policy and legal framework already in place for the development of aresponsible aquaculture sector.

1,500 km largely uninhabited coastline.

Excellent security along long stretches of coast. High primary productivity of marine waters.

Very low aerial and water pollution levels.

Perennial rivers, lakes and dams currently not utilised for aquaculture.

Availability of inexpensive fish by-products from established fishprocessing sector for inclusion in wet aqua-feeds.

Already well-established processing, packaging and marketing systems.

Commercial marine aquaculture is currently dominated by oyster production inWalvis Bay, Swakopmund and Lderitz. Seaweed (Gracilaria verricosa) is

grown by one company in the Luderitz lagoon while another farm also atLuderitz has started Abalone (Haliotis midae)culture production.


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Although culture of freshwater fish is in its infancy, excellent freshwaterculture development potential exists along rivers such as the Okavango,Kunene, Chobe, Orange and Zambezi, as well as lakes such as Oponono,Engombe and Tamanzi, as well as the Olushandja - Etaka reservoir.

The Ministry is currently involved in developing pilot-based intensivefreshwater aquaculture in the Omusati, Caprivi and Kavango Regions. Thelong-term strategy of this activity is to apply the lessons learned to otherregions. Local species already adapted to culture requirements shall be thefirst priority (e.g. catfish and tilapia). Tilapia (Oreochromis andersonii) andcatfish (Clarias gariepinus) are currently produced commercially, for exampleat Hardap.

STASTISTICS (MFMR Website)

Employment

Fishing Rights LicensesRevenueTAC's LandingsValue of Landings

Employment

The fishing industry is a source of considerable employment in Namibia. Currently, theMinistrys estimates of the industrys workforce suggest that total employment is in therange of 14,500 to 15,000 people. Table 10 shows the employment on fishing vessels

by fishing method. It also gives the proportion of Namibians employed in fishing crews.That proportion has been steadily increasing from 47% in 1996 to 66% in 1998. On-shore workers are predominately Namibian; of the current 8,000 to 8,500 workers, atleast 95% are Namibian.

Table 1: Employment on fishing vessels and proportion of Namibians, 1995-1998

1994 1996 1997 1998

Total Namibian Total Namibian Total Namibian Total Namibian

Pelagic 445 94% 476 95% 427 97% 562 96%

DemersalTrawlers 2,001 72% 2,514 72% 2,263 79% 2,036 83%

Longliners 426 71% 502 75% 386 92% 176 91%

Midwater trawl 2,409 1% 2,141 5% 2,100 8% 1,606 6%

Linefish 342 95% 294 99% 277 100% 316 100%

Crab 147 46% 118 53% 73 64% 101 65%

Rock Lobster 674 99% 541 99% 525 100% 429 100%

Deep water 261 70% 139 78%

Tuna 1356 33% 940 65% 957 63% 1218 76%

Total crew 7,800 47% 7,526 57% 7,269 60% 6,583 66%
http://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#Employmenthttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#Fishing%20Rights%20Licenseshttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#Revenuehttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#TACs%20Landingshttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#Value%20of%20Landingshttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#Employmenthttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#Fishing%20Rights%20Licenseshttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#Revenuehttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#TACs%20Landingshttp://www.mfmr.gov.na/Fisihing%20Industry/stats.htm#Value%20of%20Landings


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Number and duration of Fishing rights

The total number of existing rights in 2003 was 159. Table 2 shows the number andduration of existing harvesting rights for each species. In 1n 2002, 4 out of 17 mulletsright holders expired.

Table 2: Number and duration of existing harvesting rights as at December 2003

Vessel Licenses

The number of licensed vessels operating in Namibian waters from 1999 to 2003 isindicated below. A total of 279 vessels were licensed for commercial fishing in 2003

Table 3: The number of licensed vessels by fishery, 1996-1998

FisheryDuration of Rights

Four-year Seven-year Ten-year fifteen-year Twenty-year Total

Hake 0 10 6 22 0 38

Monk 0 2 2 5 0 9

horse Mackerel 0 0 11 1 0 12

Large Pelagic 3 1 3 12 0 19

Red Crab 0 1 2 0 0 3

Rock Lobster 0 0 1 20 0 21

Line Fish 1 1 2 8 0 12

Orange Roughy 0 0 5 0 0 5

Pilchard 0 7 5 10 0 22

Mullets 0 0 0 13 0 13

Seals 0 2 1 1 0 4

Guano 0 1 0 0 0 1

Total 4 25 38 92 0 159


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Revenue Generated

The Fisheries sector plays a key role in generating revenue for the State. Revenues aregenerated through various fees and levies. Table 4 shows revenue from various fees andlevies collected from 1999 to 2003. During 2003, N$ 100 227.000 was collected fromthe fishing industry.

Fishery 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Small Pelagic 33 30 26 25 20

Demersal

Trawlers 97 111 128 114 100

Longliners 20 24 38 10 8

Midwater 26 26 24 20 26

Deepwater 6 5 3 6 5

Tuna 54 56 68 71 49

Linefish 25 26 22 26 19

Crab 3 2 2 2 3

Rock lobster 27 29 29 38 42

Monk 0 0 0 23 21

Total 293 309 340 335 279


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Table 4: State Revenue from the fishing industry, 1999 2003 ( N$ thousands, current

value).

TAC's and Landings

The setting of Total Allowable Catches is one of the main management measures to

prevent overexploitation of Namibian fish stocks. TACs are set for most commercialspecies in Namibia. Table 12 shows the TACs set by fishery during 1999- 2003

Table 5: Total allowable catches 1999-2003 (metric tonnes)

During 1999 to 2003 periodthe average yield from allmarine fisheries amounted to595,150 tonnes. Adverseenvironmental conditionsexperienced prior to 2002resulted in below-averageyield during the 1999 2001

period, but catches rosesteadily thereafter. A

moratorium for pilchard was declared in 2002. However, anchovy and horse mackerel

allocations to the pilchard fishery operators as relief helped offset the impact of a zeroTAC for pilchard. This stock conservation measure has paid off, as the volume of

Fees 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Quota fees 91 100 76 125 69 900 100 011 74 437

Marine Resources Fund levy 13 229 11 027 9 211 15 794 12 042

By-catch fees 9,001 10 300 12 800 15 788 13 561

License fees 172 185 172 286 187

Total revenue 113 502 97 637 82 083 131 879 100 227*

* Note: Figures for 2003 are provisional. Arrangements are in place to collectoutstanding quota fees during 2004

2003

Pilchard 45,000 20,000

Hake 275,00 180,000

Horse mackerel 375,000 350,000

Crab 2 000 2 000

Rock lobster 350 400

Orange roughy 6 000 2 650

Alfonsino n/a n/a

Monk n/a 12 500


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pilchard landings recorded in 2003 is twice the amount realised in 2001. Landings fromother major fisheries also recorded a moderate increase in 2003, except for the monk,crab and rock lobster fisheries. Table 6 gives the total volume of marine fish productionduring the 1999 2003 period

Table 6: Harvest of the main commercial species 1999 -2003 (metric tonnes exceptseals)

2003

22 255

189 305

360 447

13 135


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6 603

3 371

269

2 092


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In addition to fish, seals and seaweed are also harvested in Namibia. The harvest ofseals and seaweed is given in Table 7

Table 7: Seal and seaweed harvest, 1999-2003

33 644

631 119


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2003

34 000


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Fisheries Economic and Production Indicator

The final value, i.e. the value of fish in its final form valued at export prices, ofNamibia fish production has increased from N$2,5 billion in 2000 t0 N$3.3 billion in2002 mainly due to value additional by onshore fish processing. In 2003, the final valueof production indicates a 7% increase compare to 16% in 2002. this relative smallincrease in mainly the result of the adverse effects of the strengthening of the NamibianDollar against the US Dollar, which impacted in a decline in prices. The value ofexports closely follow the final value of production as can be see from the table 8 belowsince an estimate 97% of Namibian fish production is exported.

Table 8: Fisheries Economic and Production Indicators, 1999 -2003

288


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2003

lue of Production (N$ in million)

2 637.7

3.668.0

lue of Exports (N$ in million)

3 506

27.6%


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Contribution to GDP

The contribution of the fishing industry to gross domestic product (GDP) measures thevalue added to Namibia from fish production. It is essentially the gross income earned,that is, wages and salaries, gross profits, and indirect taxes. It is much less than the

value of production. GDP looks only at production by resident producers and thusexcludes foreign vessels that operate in Namibia on temporary basis.

In 2002 the sector contributed N$2 311million (7.3%) of the GDP, compared to N$ 1939 million (7.0%0 to GDP in 2001, making it the second largest contributor to GDP.Adverse environment conditions and prolonged winter conditions also affected the

processing sector in 2001 and it resulted in a reduced contribution of the processingsector to fisheries contribution to GDP. However, despite the decline in the processingsector, total fisheries contribution to GDP increased in 2001 to 7.0% and continue toincrease in 2002 to 7.3% mainly due to improvements in the hake, pilchard and mid-water trawl industries. In 2003, the contribution of the fisheries sector to GDP has

shown an increase in both the fishing and processing onboard and processing onshoresector to 7.8%, due to continued improvements in the landings of the demersal andmidwater sector.

Table 9: Contribution of the fishing industry to GDP (current values in $ millions)

2003

1 627

899


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Namibia Fishing Industry

REFERENCES

Marine Resources Act (Act No. 27 of 2000), Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resourceof the Republic of Namibia.

2 526

7.0%


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Namibias Marine Resources Policy (2004). Towards Responsible Development andManagement of the Marine Resources Sector. Ministry of Fisheries and MarineResource of the Republic of Namibia.

FAO (2004) Information on Namibias Fisheries Management System for the FAO

Digital Atlas, Rome

FAO (2004) Fisheries Country Profile, Rome

Greenpeace International, (1993). It cant go on Forever, The GlobalOverfishing. www.archive.greenpeace.org/oceans/globaloverfishing. 01/03/06

The Environmental Consequences and Economic Costs of Depletingthe Worlds Oceans, January 2003

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