Kant's Philosophy of Science: The Transition from Metaphysics to Science

Robert E. Butts

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1984,Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1984), pp. 685-705.

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- -- Kant's Philosophy of Science:

The Transition From MetapTysics To Science

Robert E. Butts

The University of Western Ontario

1. Historical Stagesetting

For many of us nurtured in idealist ways inclining us to unwavering acceptance of Kantian principles, 1951 was a bad year. We read in Reich- enbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy of the "disintegration of the synthetic a priori". Kant had taught us that there are very general principles--each one connected to a prilr~al category of thought--that are necessary in the formation of mathematics and physics and are express- ible in nonanalytic propositions. However, since Kant's death in 1804 both mathematics and physics have developed revolutionary traits: non- euclidian geometries, new development~ in symbolic logic, relativity physics, and finally, quantum mechanics, sealed the negative fate of Kant's high principles. Henceforth we must accept that there are no non- empty claims about reality that can be counted as necessary or indispen- sable to mathematics and scjence. Kant's attempt to offer a new episte- mological guarantee of the three-dimensionality of space, and of the Newtonian character of physical motions, thus failed in the deepest sense: As a philosophy of science it turned out to be an anthropomorphic curiosity. Kant's epi stemic formal ism might we1 1 apply to macroscopic objects undergoing macroscopic movements and observed within the appar- ent three-dimensional limits of our human visual space. It fails to ap- ply in any other domains. Kant's objects of possible experience are ob- jects too limited for purposes of recent mathematics and physics.

Some proponents of positivism and logical empiricism strengthened this disintegration or dissolution of the synthetic a priori, of the central need of the Kantian system. The reigning orthodoxy in philosophy of science had no further interest in Kant's failed programme. But some of us crawled on through the dark corridors of Kant exegesis to the beat of different philosophical rhythms. We remembered C. I . Lewis' (1929) masterwork and its argument for a functional a priori, for acceptance of conceptual forms on pragmatic grounds. We remembered Arthur Pap's (1946) application of this theory to a new reconstruction of the relationship of Kant to Newton, one based on taking all Kantian synthetic a prioris to have only regulative employments. In Korner (1955, pp. 103-104) a similar view is expressed in his suggestion that Kant's synthetic a pri- ori judgements can be construed (along lines adumbrated by Kant himself)

PSA 1984, Volume 2, pp. 685-705 Copyright @ 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

as rules or imperatives for construction of sciences of a certain kind.2 For some earlier interpreters, like Cassirer, revisions in reading Kant stemmed from taking seriously for the first time the relationship be- tween the Critique of Judgement and the first Critique (See Cassirer 1921). Leanings in the direction of the imperativistic interpretation are to be found in Beck (1960, pp. 191-194) and later in Beck (1981, pp. 458-459). Butts (1984) is a sustained argument for this interpretation.

These shifts in interpretation of Kant were paralleled by the appear- ance of the first detailed attempts to study his philosophy of science since Adickes (1924) : Vuil lemin (19551, Plaass (1960). However, for most of us who had taken a continuing interest in Kant as a philosopher of science, Buchdahl's (1969 and many related essays) set the stage for a really thorough investigation of the whole range of Kant's scientific interests, and for a determined attempt to fix the limits of his philos- ophy of s~ience against the backdrop of his critique of traditional met- aphysics.

Interpretations of Kant's views on science are now appearing regular- ly; but some authors lose sight of the fact that there are central parts of his programme that any interpretation must accommodate. Attempts to understand his views on the philosophical status of science--the very same is true of attempts to understand his views on the philosophical status of morality, art, or anything else--are constrained by at least the following large parts of Kant's programme, parts that cannot be in- terpreted away without losing complete sight of Kant, without coming to see ghosts, creatures much feared by Kantians.

2. Central Tenets of Kant's Programme

I take it that one is not studying Kant unless he takes Kant to have believed at least the following propositions to be systelnatically sacro- sanct:

1) Knowledge has a dual source in sensibility and understanding: To know is to conceptualize sense-contentful intuitions of objects in space and time under the categories. 2) That which we know about space and time, the categories, pure sche- mata or rules of meaning, mathematical constructions, and pure princi- ples instancing the categories, is what we can know a priori in the do- main of the theoretical: We can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them." (Bxviii ) . 3) Objects of possible experience (knowables) are just those objects structured by the schematized categories; "experience" is categorially idealized sense-contentful intuition. 4) Concepts natively apply only to evident sense-contents (or to con- structs, in the case of mathematics); thus no conceptualization of that which transcends the realm of possible experience (the phenomenal) is possible.5) Ideas are sense-contentless forms having application in logic (in thinking, not in knowing); ideas do not present objects of possible ex- perience (knowables) . 6) Traditional metaphysics separates ideas from the dual sources of knowledge, relying solely upon appeal to logical possibility; it follows that there can be no metaphysical knowledge that derives from ideas-- there can be no knowledge of an sich reality; no a priori knowledge of

t h i n g s as they a re i n themselves. 7 ) Metaphysical ideas thus have a mere ly r e g u l a t i v e employment; they gu ide research and c o n d i t i o n sys temat ic expecta t ions ; t h e i r proper em-ployment encourages us t o s t a y w i t h i n t h e bounds o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i - ence - - i n e f f e c t , t o s e t t l e f o r t h e k i n d o f knowledge t h a t p o s i t i v e s c i - ence y i e l d s .

Perhaps many of us cou ld accept a programme as general as t h i s one, as E i n s t e i n seems t o have encouraged Reichenbach t o do i n t h e exchange i n t h e E i n s t e i n Sch i l pp volume. D i f f i c u l t i e s emerge when we t r y t o app ly t h i s general system t o t h e s p e c i f i c s of Newtonian ( o r any o t h e r ) s c i -ence. The problems stem f rom t h e f a c t t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o these seven general theses, Kant a l s o wants us t o accept t h a t a f a i r number o f non-a n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n s a re t r u e a p r i o r i ; f o r example:

a) Space i s 3-dimensional (as a " f a c t " about s p a t i a l i t y ) . b ) A l l i n t u i t i o n s a re ex tens i ve magnitudes. c ) A l l events a re Second Analogy c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d . d) With regard t o a l l changes o f corporea l na ture , t h e q u a n t i -

t y o f m a t t e r taken as a whole remains t h e same, unincreased and undiminished.

e) Every change o f ma t te r has an ex te rna l cause.

However t r o u b l i n g i t may be t o us now t o accept these more s p e c i f i c s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i s , no se r i ous s tudent o f Kant can deny t h a t he accord- ed them such a s t a t u s . a) i s something we know a p r i o r i about our space; i t i s ev iden t f rom our i n a b i l i t y t o c o n s t r u c t i n a p r i o r i i n t u i t i o n any fea tu res o f a space t h a t i s n o t 3-dimensional . b) and c ) are s t rong syn- t h e t i c a p r i o r i p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e Transcendental A n a l y t i c ; b ) t e l l s us how a l l o b j e c t s o f p o s s i b l e exper ience must be " c o n s t i t u t e d " . c ) t e l l s us t h a t whenever something dynamica l ly comes i n t o be ing o r passes ou t of being, t h e event s t r u c t u r e of i t s e x i s t e n t i a l m o d a l i t i e s can be exp l i-ca ted c a u s a l l y . Thus a) , b ) , and c ) a re proper p a r t s o f Kan t ' s a p r i o r i ep is temic fo rmal ism. What about d) and e ) ? These a re what Kant r e f e r s t o i n MAN ( a b b r e v i a t i n g D i e bfetaphysische Anfangsgriinde d e r Naturwissen-schaften) as t h e f i r s t and second laws o f mechanics. I f these a re known because of what we ourse lves pu t i n t o t h e concept o f mat ter , i t beg ins t o l ook as i f a p r i o r i t y i n t r u d e s i n t o t h a t which l ooks more and more e m p i r i c a l as we go.

Unhappi ly, t h e r e i s more t o cons ider . Look a t these:

f ) Ma t te r i s t h e movable i n space. g) Ma t te r i s t h e movable i n s o f a r as i t f i l l s a space. h) Ma t te r i s t h e movable i n s o f a r as i t i s has as such a moving

f o r c e . i ) Ma t te r i s t h e movable i n s o f a r as i t can as such be an o b j e c t

o f exper ience . j) I f no (unbalanced) ex te rna l f o r c e s a c t upon a body, i t w i l l

con t i nue i n i t s s t a t e o f r e s t o r mot ion w i t h un i f o rm v e l o c i t y i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e .

k ) F=ma.

f ) - i ) a re t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f ma t te r i n t roduced i n K a n t ' s t rea tments o f , r e s p e c t i v e l y , phoronomy ( k i nemat i cs ) , dynamics, mechanics, phenomenolo-gy, i n MAN. j) and k ) are Newton s f i r s t and second laws o f mot ion. No-

tice that it would be quite possible to hold (as do Vuillemin and Plaass) that f)-i) are pure a prioris on a par with principles of the understanding b) and c), and to argue that both Kant's d) and e) and Newton's j) and k) are empirical propositions, requiring appeal to em- pirical data for substantiation.

3. Relating the Epistemic Formalism to Science

Theses 1-7 above oversimpl y summarize the general features of Kant ' s epistemology. A conceptual system is entailed by this epistemology, one having as essential elements the a priori forms of sensuous intuition, or space and time, the categories, and general semantical rules of ap- plication called schemata. The a priori conditions of knowing apply only to sense-contentful intuitions (1 -7 are supposed to guarantee this) . But what, exactly, is the re1 ationship between this epistemic formalism and observational and experimental science? Late in his life Kant will begin to write about the transition from metaphysics to physics; in what does that transition consist? Kant refers to the principles of the formalism as necessary laws of nature, and as specifying a general "metaphysics" (where, of course, by "metaphysics" Kant now means those and only those principles that can be genuinely known a priori: his epistemology re- veals these "metaphysical" principles). The four definitions of matter in MAN are principles of a "special metaphysics"; namely, the metaphys- ics of external objects, or of objects empirically discovered to be mov- ing in space, and empirically discovered to be subject to forces of ac- tion and interaction. The special metaphysics, ln other words, is an ap- plication of the general metaphysics to matter. What needs to be shown, Kant tells us, is how category-dependent concepts of matter yield ob- jects of possible experience, how the science of matter can be objec- tive. Since the specific empirical claims about material objects are re- quired to be mathematical in form, we are further required to construct a priori in intuition the idealized cases to which the special metaphys- ics will apply. Otherwise, given the epistemology of 1-7* there could be no objective content to the applied special metaphysics.

In order to highlight the issues, let us limit ourselves to discus- sion of Kant's treatment of mechanics. Mechanics takes its start from the principle:

M: Matter is the movable insofar as it has as such a moving force (p. 536)

If we give Kant his two oft insisted upon claims that both motion and force are discovered empirically (motion as simple observation of change of position of an object over time, and force as felt resistance), then M can be taken as a definition (ErkZdrung; see KRV, A728-730/8755-758) of matter in Kant's technical sense. In mathematics, the only discipline in which there are, properly speaking, definitions, concepts are made; that is, constructed a priori. The trick is to show how ordinary experi- ences of motion and felt resistance can be rendered objective; and this, for Kant, now means, mathematized. The tools required for analysis of motion will not be (to use one of Kant's favourite phrases) "borrowed from" experience. The special metaphysics introduced by taking matter in motion to be an instance of the schematized categories must instead "borrow from" general metaphysics. Indeed, the very 1 awl i keness of mech- anical principles will depend upon the strong lawlikeness conditions

laid down by the categories.

4. A Digression: Points about Lawlikeness

The space/time, schematized category structures yielded by 1-7 (call this conceptual system SC) produce a concept of Nature (capital " N u ) : "Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws" (Prolegomena, p. 294). The universal laws are the synthetic a priori pure laws of the understanding corresponding to each category. But there is also nature (lower case "n") as "the complex of all objects of experience" (~rolegomena,p. 295); in other words, as the set of idealized constructs made possible by application of SC. If na- ture [n], or some subset of [n] is going to turn out to be lawlike, it will have to achieve this by virtue of some relationship to nature [N]. If regularly associated units of observation are to be law candidates, the warrant cannot be empirical, but must come from what Kant calls the "affinity" between items sensed in the realm of appearance, and items thought in the domain of understanding. That Kant's concept of affinity is crucial to his theory of the linkage between SC and Newton's physics has been noted by some commentators, but none have offered the required explication. I hope to do so below.

5. Return to the Question of Moving from the A priori to the Empirical

If the definitionally a priori M is to be applicable, it must render possible analysis of moving forces in mathematical terms. In brief, what is at issue is that in mechanics physical objects enter into and pass out of various determinate states in space in accordance with quantities of impressed force. Kant has an a priori machinery for dealing with changes in modalities of existence: the analogies. The regulative sig- nificance of M begins to emerge when the following instantiating moves are made:

Al: In all changes of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. (First Analogy )

MI: With regard to all changes of corporeal nature, the quantity of matter taken as a whole remains the same, unincreased and undiminished. (Kant's first law of mechanics)

A2: All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect. (Second Analogy)

M2: Every change of matter has an external cause. (Every body remains in its state of rest or motion in the same direction and with the same velocity unless it is compelled by an ex- ternal cause to forsake this state.) (Kant's second law of mechanics)

A3: All substances, in so far as they can be perceived to co- exist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity. (Third Analogy)

M3: In all communication of motion, action and reaction are always equal to one another. (Kant's third law of mechanics)

Kant's arguments for the correctness of these instantiations are quite straightforward. Universal metaphysics proclaims that anything that is genuinely substantial in appearance cannot be increased or di-

minished in quantity. Here it is matter as substance that is at issue; therefore M1 instances Al, and shares its synthetic a priori character. M2 instances A2 (and shares its synthetic a priori character) because changes in physical state, like all changes, are caused, and the only causes available to us in observation of external objects are external causes. The argument for M3 as an instance of A3 is a little less direct and uncomplicated, but it is clear that Kant wants all cases of motion of objects in space to be represented as reciprocal, and if this is so, then again M3 will share the synthetic a priori character of A3. So far, we have the following structure:

M: the mechanical definition of matter explicated as follows: Al, A2, A3 as principles of SC (general metaphysics=laws of Nature [N]) MI, M2, M3 as instances of Al, A2, and A3 (special metaphysics=cases of

laws of Nature [N]=laws of mechanics)

This articulated a priori structure is to apply to (form and inform) empirical instances in a second sense of 'empirical ' (one quite differ- ent from 'empirical' in the claims that motion and force are discovered empirically). I noted above that Kant's claim that motion and force can only be discovered empirically appeals to a very ordinary sense of "em- pirical" referring to my experience of objects changing position in time, and to my experience of felt resistance. On the other hand, the "empirical" instances of a priori principles of pure physics are contin- gent descriptions of frequently noted regularities of certain sorts; they are what came to be known as phenomenal laws. SC+LM (a priori laws of mechanics) must somehow relate to empirical content in this sense if it is to be seen to form and inform a physical science. Such empirical content generalizations are thus the phenomena to be saved. Kant tells us (MAN p. 544) that the possibility of natural science (physics) rests entirely on M1 and M2 (Kant's statement of the law of inertia). One would suppose that this natural science would at some level possess rel- atively clear cases of empirical descriptions, and that these descri p- tions would serve as the content formed by SC+LM. Kant makes it clear that what is' to issue from application of SC+LM is a justification of the 1 awl i keness of the Newtonian phenomena (Kepler 's purely descriptive laws of planetary motion (KLs); Galileo's acceleration rate law (GL)) and the law of universal gravitation (LUG).

What we would like to have (and what Buchdahl repeatedly reminds us Kant does not intend to give us) is a deductive structure in which in- ferential moves from SC through LM to the descriptions of the phenomena and universal gravitation are perspicuously valid. However, if the com- bined propositional resources of SC and LM are deductively to entail KLs, GL, LUG, then the structure SC+LM must itself have empirical con- tent, and this is exactly what a structure of synthetic a priori princi-ples cannot have. It may seem paradoxical to suggest that Kant thought so outrageous a thought, but it seems to me that he held in all serious- ness the view that SC and LM have no empirical consequences, in the strict sense of not deductively entailing any specific observational consequences. This being so, it does not follow, as Buchdahl wants us to believe, that the connection between SC, LM and the empirical descrip- tions involves a "looseness of fit" that permits SC to survive all changes in the foundations of sciences like physics. SC may be program- matic and "hard core" in some restricted sense for Kant, but given his insistence in MAN that LM laws do instance SC and that no other LM laws

are conceivable (constructible), it seems to me to be unwise to attri- bute to Kant's philosophy of science the extremely generous looseness Buchdahl insists upon. Before proceeding to discuss what I take the con- nection between SCtLM and the descriptive laws to be, let me make some further brief remarks on Buchdahl's interpretive programme.

6. Additional Thoughts about the "Looseness of Fit" Interpretation

In the paper he delivered at the 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Salzburg, Austria (July 12, 19831, Buchdahl seems to me to have so complicated and loaded the "loosen$ss of fit" interpretation that it simply sinks under its own weight. In a figure that accompanied his paper, Buchdahl sketched the "methodological components of scientific theory", and he suggested in discussion that complete mastery of the diagram will give all that Kant's philosophy of science yields, and will show that no arguments exist in Kant that link the components. Buchdahl's reading now commits Kant to three "ontologies" and to such a host of general and special rules as to make almost any alterations in the substructures falling under SC justifiable, even to the point of receiving a Kantian transcen- dental justification of developments in alternative geometries and quan- tum physics. The typescript contains this extraordinary passage (pp. 23-24) :

However, this 'looseness of fit' which surrounds the rela- tions between the phenomenological and the ontological aspects of [the probative, explicative and systemic components of a Kantian scientific theory], and indeed, between these three com- ponents themselves, has the advantage of not bringing the cen- tral themes of Kantian transcendentalism crashing down every time there is a change in the paradigms of natural science. Lack of appreciation of the 'looseness' has led most Kant scholars-- we need only think of the case of Reichenbach--to the opposite conclusion. Against this, Kant's transcendental approach, in its application to both the ontology and the phenomenology of theory construction, turns out to be something much more informal, much more subtly and messily articulated, more tentative and general, than the usual, more formal, elucidations of the so-called 'transcendental argument' would lead us to expect. Evidently it is not so much a matter here of any formal deductions, or of the demonstration of the uniqueness and necessity of this or that 'a priori' condition; still less ...should Kant be saddled with the absurdity of having wanted to prove the 'a priori certainty', of, for instance, Newtonian mechanics; after all, he did say, in CpR (A480/B508), that "in natural science...there is en!iess conjecture, and certainty is [here] not to be counted upon.

I applaud, and have tried to stress in (1984), the implications for a partially pragmatic reading of Kant's intentions at one level (teleolog- ical judgement) that Buchdahl's stated position yields. But surely Buch- dahl has gone too far. We have already seen that there is a close fit between what I have been calling SC and LM, and I will develop other as- pects of close fit below. Furthermore, although we may not prefer a Kant who limited his view to the sciences and the philosophical resources of his day, I am bound by historical candor to have to say that Buchdahl is mostly wrong in what he says in this passage, one that I take it summar-

izes his position as of the date of the Salzburg Congress. There are two sources of error, each one important in its revelation of truths about Kant's philosophy of science.

Before identifying what I take these errors to be, I will partially concede an important related point. I think the best argument for the "looseness of fit" interpretation is given in Buchdahl (1969, p. 657ff). Here it is suggested that Kant needs an argument for the credentials of science that is not fully binding because he needs room to move from man as observer to man as actor. The resolution of the second and third an- tinomies of the first Cri t ique , and of the antinomy of the third Cri-t i q u e , and Kant's requirement of freedom in morality, all become suspect if the links in the chain between transcendental epistemology and any particular empirical scientific programme are twisted too tightly. How- ever, I should point out that I do not think the tensions Buchdahl al- ludes to require his "looseness of fit" moves. In (1984, Ch. 1x1, I pro-duce a complex exegetical argument starting from the fact that the third Crit ique antinomy is resolved by showing that requirements of both mech- anism and teleology are regulative, rather than constitutive of nature. I then apply this admission to Kant's resolution of the fourth antinomy (there is a necessary being/there is no necessary being), one again based on appeal to antinomial differences as regulative. Finally, I ar-gue that the resolution of the third antinomy (freedoddetermini sm) is itself a case of the resolution of the fourth, so that ground is already prepared for the resolution of the third Crit ique antinomy in Kant's resolutions of the third and fourth antinomies in the first Crit ique. The point is that all three antinomies are resolved by reformulating what look like substantive epistemic clashes between propositions as methodological clashes between arguments for adopting or rejecting rules. If these moves are correct, then Kant's attempt to validate New- tonian physics at the level of special metaphysics in no way threatens his full philosophical programme. The problem of how tight or loose is the fit between transcendental principles and pure principles of physics (and empirical science), is thus an irrelevant question once we see that for Kant it is all a matter of formulating the arguments for recommend- ing adoption of these rules (SC rules) for constituting possible objects of experience, rather than others. And those arguments have entirely to do with elimination of the case for classical rational metaphysics; in short, with elimination of appeals to logical possibility as the test of truth, and replacement with appeals to what can in principle be empiri- cally or mathematically instanced in ways that human observers can be said to understand.

To return to what I take the revealing errors to be, note first that Buchdahl Is position fails to locate what for Kant can be the only "on- tology", and it is an ontology of physical objects, of bodies empirical- ly ascertained to be in motion in three-dimensional space. This is stated clearly in Crit ique of Judgement (pp. 181-182), although it had already been established as a stable consequence of the programme in KRV. At the cited place, Kant distinguishes between transcendental prin- ciples as principles representing a priori the universal conditions un- der which objects can be cognized by us, and metaphysical principles, or principles representing a priori the conditions under which objects whose concepts are given empirically "may be further determined a pri-or i" (emphasis supplied). Thus he states that we can hold as true tran- scendentally that all bodies as substances change always for cause; but

i t i s a metaphys ica l p r i n c i p l e t h a t such causes a re always e x t e r n a l . Now--and t h i s i s c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t - - i n t h e former case, bodies a re thought o n l y th rough what Kant c a l l s " o n t o l o g i c a l p red ica tes ' ' (and he s ta tes t h a t these a re t h e pure concepts o f t h e unders tand ingzthe ca te - g o r i e s ) ; i n t h e second, o r metaphysical , case, t h e concept o f a movable t h i n g i n space i s i n t roduced . However, once t h i s f u l l e r concept o f body i s on t h e scene, " i t may be seen q u i t e a p r i o r i t h a t t h e l a t t e r p r e d i -ca te (movement o n l y by means o f an e x t e r n a l cause) app l i es t o body". I have sketched above t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e pure concept (Second Analogy c a u s a l i t y ) and t h e p r i n c i p l e o f i n e r t i a . I n t h e f u l l e s t sense t o be found i n t h e w r i t i n g s o f Kant, bo th t h e t ranscendenta l and t h e meta- phys i ca l p r i n c i p l e s are s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i .

S t i l l , i t may seem g r a t u i t o u s thus t o suggest t h a t Kan t ' s t ranscen-den ta l on to logy i s l i m i t e d t o what we can know a p r i o r i o f bod ies . What o f t h e sou l? I have no space t o repeat here my account o f K a n t ' s r e j e c - t i o n o f any o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s f o r t h e soul (see Chapter V i n 1984). Perhaps i t w i l l s u f f i c e i f I r e f e r t o h i s statement i n MAN (pp. 542-543) t h a t because t h e thought "I"i s no t a concept a t a l l , bu t an i n n e r per - cep t i on , we cannot c l a s s i f y t h e thought o f t h e sou l as a substance, and hence n o t as permanent. K a n t ' s p o i n t i s c l e a r : "Substance i s p o s s i b l e o n l y i n space and accord ing t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f space, and hence i s p o s s i b l e o n l y as o b j e c t o f t h e ex te rna l senses". L i k e i t o r not , t h e values o f t h e o n t o l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e s i n Kant ' s t ranscendenta l system can o n l y have bodies moving i n space as ins tances. And i f t h e forms o f SC are o n t o l o g i c a l p red i ca tes , and LM laws a re cases o f SC p r i n c i p l e s , then I do n o t see how wf can w i t h reason argue t h a t SC and LM f a i l t o share t h e same onto logy. And when t h e o n t o l o g i c a l p red i ca tes n a t i v e t o SCtLM a re f u l l y a r t i c u l a t e d , as Kant t r i e s t o do i n MAN, i t i s e q u a l l y d i f f i - c u l t t o see t h a t t h e f i t i s as thorough ly l oose as Buchdahl wishes. Th is i s no t t o argue t h a t K a n t ' s foundat ions f o r phys i cs are s t u r d y charac- t e r s t h a t w i l l always stand up, b u t i t c e r t a i n l y does s u s t a i n t h e t r u i s m t h a t Kant thought phys ics has foundat ions , and t h a t these must be sys- t e m a t i c a l l y and o n t o l o g i c a l l y beholden t o genera l metaphysics o r t r a n -scendental epistemology.

7 . Return t o t h e Ques t i on o f R e l a t i n g Foundat ions t o Emp i r i ca l Science

That which mo t i va tes Buchdah l 's second mistake--now formula ted as a misread ing o f what f o l l o w s f rom f a i l u r e o f deduc t i ve connect ions t o h o l d between statements c o n t a i n i n g o n t o l o g i c a l p red i ca tes and those con ta in -i n g e m p i r i c a l ones- - is h i s i n c l i n a t i o n t o t h i n k t h a t t h e sentences mak- i n g up t h e p a r t s o f t h e Kant ian programme f o r phys i cs are a l l o f t h e same l o g i c a l t ype . Kant i s o f course h i m s e l f r espons ib le f o r a c e r t a i n amount o f misunders tand ing r e s u l t i n g f rom h i s t a l k about p r o p o s i t i o n s as judgements. I f we t r a n s l a t e ' judgement ' as t h e more manageable ' p ropos i - t i o n ' , and then t h i n k t h a t K a n t ' s system i s a nes t o f deduc t i ve l y a r -ranged p r o p o s i t i o n s runn ing f rom t h e pure p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e understand- i ng , th rough t h e a p r i o r i laws o f pure phys ics , down t o t h e emp i r i ca l laws t h a t a re d e s c r i p t i o n s o f no ted r e g u l a r i t i e s , we are bound t o have problems. As I suggested above, we cannot o b t a i n t h i s deduct ive nes t i ng un less t h e pure p r i n c i p l e s become impure. So Buchdahl i s r i g h t about t h e r e be ing no c l e a r deduct ive road f rom SC t o e m p i r i c a l phys ics . But i ns tead o f conc lud ing a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t looseness o f f i t i s t h e order of t h e day, he ought t o have l a t ched onto t h e second way i n which Kant t a l k s about concepts and p r i n c i p l e s ; namely, as ruZes. This would have

led him to a correct account of the relationship between SCtLM and the empirical laws of physics, and to appreciation of the further point that it is not deductive connection, but affinity, that Kant places at the center of his account of the relationship between formal rules and em- pirical descriptions. I will now develop each of these points in turn.

I suggested in the opening section of this paper that what we might call the dreaded Reichenbach threat can be countered by appeal to some other resources supplied by his fellow positivists. Schlick and Mach both began to think of the various sentences used to formulate scientif- ic laws as being of different logical types, and Pap explicitly proposed that we distinguish between regulative principles employed to develop systems of various kinds, and the descriptive sentences formed by appli- cation of the rules. I mentioned that a similar view was expressed by Korner. I propose now to outline what Kant's philosophy of physics looks like if we take this imperativist line (one that underwrites my inter- pretation of Kant's philosophy of science in my 1984). We have seen the following structure articulated by Kant (limiting ourselves again to discussion of mechanics) :

SKETCH I LEVEL I: M

LEVEL 11: Al, A2, A3 LEVEL 111: MI, M2, M3 . .

LEVEL IV: KLs, GL, LUG

What a staunch rationalist will want is for Levels I1 and 111 deductive- ly to entail level IV empirical generalizations. In the absence of such connection, what is the systematic relationship between the empirical Level IV and higher levels? I propose that we think of Kant's system, not as a logically connected set of propositions, but as a structure with two types of sentences: rules and descriptive generalizations. This procedure will be consistent with two things Kant says often: categoriesand space and time are a priori forms organizing empirical contents; and concepts and principles can be viewed as rules. Now what we get is this variant on Sketch I:

SKETCH I1

SC=a set of general rules for the construction of any objects that can be humanly knowable; universally applicable rules of formation for statements about the worldtthe general semantics supplied by the schemata (Butts 1984, pp. 151-168)

LM=Kantls pure laws of mechanics now construed as rules for analyzing motiono in ways compatible with the generalconstraints of SC

KLs, GL, LUG as empirical descriptions (general statements, not rules) formed by application of the synthetic a prioris of SC and LM as regulative principles. Schematically, %etch I1 looks like this:

RULES OF FORMATION: SC LM

CONSTRUCTIONS: MCs

SC and LM rules tell us how to arrive at the empirical laws, how to pro- ceed in formulating them. As Pap suggests, we can think of the law of inertia as being synthetic a priori (and in a limited sense immune from revision) in the functional or pragmatic sense of a priority. Together with Nf~ton's second law "F=maU, it defines a method of analyzing mo- tions. From the standpoint of methodology, Newton's first and second laws are of quite different types from, say, the law of universal gravi- tation. Indeed, the laws are used in the derivation of the law of uni- versal gravitation fron~ Kepler's laws of planetary motion. One helpful way of formulating the point at issue is offered by Pap:

[Newton's] second law can be formalized as a conjunction of two general statements, of which the first is a real definition and the second an existential statement: 'F=ma4, and 'they are forces which are relatively simple functions of distance. The existential component of the second law is a general statement, an existential quantifier occurs in it. The law of gravitation, now, is a verifier of this general postulate, in that it indi- cates a definite force, viz., gravity, which satisfies the con- dition of being a relatively simple function of distance. Gravi- tational attraction is a value substitutable for the argument of the function 'relatively simple function of distance.' (1946, p. 48).

My interpretation of the relationship between a priori principles and empirical descriptions finally construes a1 1 a priori principes as rules; the interpretation confirms that Kant's interest was methodolog- ical: All that we contribute a priori to things we use in the service of ever more detailed investigation of the phenomenal. In thus suggesting that Kant's a priori principles have all of them only regulative employ- ment, I am mindful of his distinction between constitutive and regula- tive employments of principles, but on my reading this distinction does work only within objectively constituted experience. Kant's ontological predicates, in other words, specify an ontology that is never an sich, but is always operative only within the domain of the phenomenal.

This interpretation of judgements or principles as rules is not novel (I have mentioned some of those who earlier urged this emphasis). What has not been sufficiently emphasized (and what the bewildering detai 1s of Buchdahl's working out of his correct insight obscure) is that the transition from metaphysics to physics is for Kant based on appeal to methodological considerations. This appeal is first made in Critique of Pure Reason, and is worked out still further in Critique of Judgement. In the Opus postwmun (GesmeZte Schriften XXI, XXII) Kant refers to the methodological 1 ink as the doctrine of scientific research (Nuturfor- schung=scrutatio naturae), a doctrine that would set forth the subjec- tively valid principles for conducting research. Such principles would be valid a priori (in my language, would finally receive their warrant from SC) (XXI, p. 168, p. 360; XXII, p. 312). The only discussion I know of in English of Kant's fragmentary treatment of the transition in these volumes is in Werkmeister (1980, Ch. VI). This discussion is itself fragmentary, but, as usual, Werkmeister's references are scrupulously complete and helpful. In my discussion of affinity below, I will refer to one of Kant's own specific examples of how this methodology works. In general, the strategy always takes the form of reconstituting an empty idea of reason as a rule for conducting systematic (logic governed) re-

search.

8. Affinity: the Linchpin of Kant's Methodology

I want to end this essay by close discussion of some methodological matters only briefly sketched in (1984). If what I urge above is right, there is no direct deductive connection between the principles of the schemati zed categories, the pure 1 aws of natural science, and observa- tional and experimental laws. Questions remain: What is the connection between the rules and the descriptions? What, if anything, guarantees that the rules will apply? How can we know, if at all, that Nature [N] universally and necessarily structures nature [n]? One thing is abun- dantly clear: For Kant the answers to these questions cannot be gotten by consulting experience. The lawlikeness of descriptive laws is not em- pirically justified. Laws of (empirical) association are fully contin- gent. That some regularly associated sets of events and objects enter into full natural laws cannot ever be a consequence of the associations themselves, however strong and recurrent they may be.

Indeed, in the first edition of KRV Kant suggests that empirical as- sociation is a "mere consequence" of a higher form of composition of t$ manifold of appearances: a consequence of transcendental affinit2. When we postulate that in some cases at least regularly associated sets of appearances require us to have fixed expectations about the course of nature [n], we do so on the basis of the "affinit2 of the manifold" (A1 13, 114). Transcendental affinity is thus a compel 1 ing logical fea- ture of apperception: That all appearances must be united in one con- sciousness is the logically necessary precondition of the objectivity of any possible experience. From which Kant appears to conclude that there must be objects with constant qualities, and events with repeated fea- tures, in nature [n]. But this is only to repeat a fact of logic about transcendental apperception: In order for there to be objective knowl- edge all predicates must unite in a single logical subject. And this condition, although clearly necessary for any regularity at a1 1 (includ-ing lawlikeness in nature [n]), is just as clearly not sufficient to warrant the strong conclusion that transcendental affinity has empirical affinity as a "mere consequence". What would the sufficient condition have to be? Kant goes on at A114 to suggest that the connection between transcendental and empirical affinity only holds by virtue of the fact that we have to deal with aggregates of appearances, suggesting there- fore that in addition to the necessity of apperception, we would require noumenal regularity--what we cannot ever have for Kant: Knowledge of regularities connecting things as they are in themselves. Beck suggests (1981, p. 4571, and I think the suggestion is correct, that this threat- ened line of metaphysical retreat may be the reason why the section I am discussing was deleted by Kant from the second edition.

And so again we raise the question: What warrant have we, if any, that affinity at the level of logic is captured by affinity at the level of empirical happening? What common source or ground weds empirical law with transcendental principle, nature [n] with Nature EN]? What catalyst links these dissimilars? The short answer: The common principle unifying particular empirical laws and a priori principles is the

subjectively necessary, transcendental presupposition that this dismaying, unlimited diversity of empirical 1 aws and this

he te rogene i t y o f n a t u r a l forms does n o t be long i n na tu re [ na tu re [n] ] , t h a t , i ns tead , n a t u r e i s f i t t e d f o r exper ience as an em-p i r i c a l system th rough t h e a f f i n i t y o f p a r t i c u l a r laws under more genera l ones. (First Intro, p. 209) .

That t h e r e can be a l e g a l mar r iage o f t h e d i s s i m i l a r s represented by em- p i r i c a l laws and by a p r i o r i SC laws i s a r e g u l a t i v e l y presupposed con- d i t i o n o f assurance t h a t we can c a r r y o u t t h e s c i e n t i f i c programme, t h a t t h e p r o j e c t i n i t i a t e d by SC (and t h e pure laws o f phys i cs ) can be suc-c e s s f u l l y pursued. We have no access t o knowledge t h a t n a t u r e [ n ] i s an sich l a w l i k e ( t h a t God i s i n h i s t ranscendent heaven and a l l i s w e l l w i t h t h e s c i e n t i f i c w o r l d ) , and l o g i c a lone cannot g i v e us any assurance o f a n i e taphys i ca l l y grounded mar r i age o f f o rm and ma t te r . R igh t s o f k i n - s h i p a re here e s t a b l i s h e d as r e g u l a t i v e o n l y ; t h e y a re r i g h t s we r e q u i r e o f ou r systems, no t , as Kant says, o f ou r n a t u r e [ n l .

R e g u l a t i v e a f f i n i t y as a methodo log ica l concept had been d iscussed by Kant i n KRV i n t h e p i v o t a l appendix "The Regu la t i ve Employment o f t h e Ideas o f Pure Reason" (A657-663/B685-691). Three ideas o f reason y i e l d maxims ( p r i n c i p l e s t h a t a re s u b j e c t i v e l y necessary i n t h e a t tempt t o r e a l i z e t h e i n t e r e s t s o f reason) t h a t govern ou r search f o r taxonomies o f n a t u r a l forms, ou r phenomenal s c i e n t i f i c p r o j e c t s : t h e ideas o f homo- gene i t y , v a r i e t y and a f f i n i t y . The cor respond ing p r i n c i p l e s a re those o f homogeneity, s p e c i f i c a t i o n and c o n t i n u i t y . The f i r s t b i d s us seek u n i t y i n v a r i e t y ; t h e second, v a r i e t y under u n i t y ; t h e t h i r d , u n i t y i n v a r i e t y and v a r i e t y under u n i t y "as a l l s p r i n g i n g f rom t h e same stem". The p r i n - c i p l e o f a f f i n i t y u rges upon us r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i n a proper c l a s s i f i c a - t i o n o f n a t u r a l k i n d s s t r i c t r i g h t s o f k i n s h i p must be observed. The p r e s c r i b e d c o n t i n u i t y o f forms i s , however, an idea, n o t a concept ap-p l i c a b l e t o o b j e c t s . I t i s a requ i rement on t h e f o rm o f ou r sys temat ic p r o j e c t s i n , $ o i n g science; i t i s n o t a f e a t u r e o f e i t h e r Nature [N] o r na tu re [ n l .

Never the less , Nature [N] forms a s e t o f u n i v e r s a l laws. To h o l d t h a t n a t u r e [ n ] has an a f f i n i t y f o r Nature [N] i s t hus t o say o n l y t h a t we must proceed as i f a l l o f t h e l o g i c a l parsimony and s i m p l i c i t y possessed by Nature [N] can be found t o be shared by t h e two natures , because we r e q u i r e t h a t t h e r e be s imple laws f o r t h e sake o f do ing e m p i r i c a l s c i -ence. The common ground f rom which s p r i n g bo th Nature [N] and na tu re [ n ] i s t hus t h e o rde r o f l o g i c as sys temat ic f i t . The p r i n c i p l e o f a f f i n i t y , a t t h i s h i g h l e v e l , i s a p r i n c i p l e which, i f v i o l a t e d , leads t o unc lea r ep i s temo log i ca l b l ood l i n e s and b l u r r e d metaphys ica l r i g h t s o f posses-s i on . I n a w o r l d o f humans made so t h a t t hey can know God d i r e c t l y , God would t u r n o u t t o be t h e source and goal o f t h e a f f i n i t y . I n K a n t ' s wo r l d , t h a t source and goa l i d e n t i f y o n l y t h e focus imaginarius. But t h e i d e a l o f reason g i v e s good focus indeed. I f we t h i n k o f t h e Kan t i an sys- tem as a taxonomy o f what can be known, one whose p r i n c i p l e s a re those o f t h e schemat ized c a t e g o r i e s a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o sense i n t u i t e d s , t hen there is no good reason n o t t o ex tend SC expec ta t i ons t o t hose p r i n c i - p l e s i n s t a n t i a t e d by m a t t e r i n mot ion; and there is no good reason n o t t o suppose t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f laws o f pure phys i cs i n t h e f o r m a t i o n of e m p i r i c a l laws cannot y i e l d a l a r g e number o f such laws a l l hav ing t h e same l aw l i keness f e a t u r e s as t h e laws o f SC and o f pure phys i cs . Here t h e a f f i n i t y r unn ing th roughout t h e ep is temology as a c l a s s i f i c a -t i o n scheme i s a c o n t i n u i t y o f k i nds o f forms o f laws w i t h i n c r e a s i n g expec ta t i ons o f e m p i r i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n as t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a l m a n i f o l d

i s specif ied ( i n Kant's technical sense) . Because of the assumption of cont inui ty of forms, there wil l never be a point a t which we a r r ive a t the infima species, and t h a t there will always and forever be more law forms t o wri te down increases the likelihood t h a t we can someday get confirmations (o r di sconfirmations) of lower level descr ipt ive laws hav- ing the required form. And so t o construe the epistemological taxonomy as the never-ending generator of more and more laws of g rea te r and greater s p e c i f i c i t y (and commonness of forms) i s t o render i t the equiv- a len t of Kant's ins i s tence t h a t we lose nothing i f we s e t t l e f o r a t -tempts, in pr inciple never-ending ones, t o explain the phenomenal domain t o which a l l genuine knowledge claims a re d i rec ted .

The s t r ik ing thing about Kant's regulat ive pr inciple of a f f i n i t y i s t h a t we can e a s i l y produce h i s to r ica l cases t h a t exactly f i t what he had i n mind a t the level of methodology. I t may be t h a t f i n a l l y even sympa-t h e t i c readers of Kant wil l continue t o balk a t the demand (thought t o be qu i te excessive) t h a t we employ SC pr inciples (and principles of pure physics as wel l ) as the only ones applicable in the production of empir- ical science. A n a l t e rna t ive i s so t o generalize the pr inciples as t o make them vacuous and uncontentious. This has been done, f o r example, by those p o s i t i v i s t s who, l i k e Arthur Pap, suggest t h a t the pr inciple of causa l i ty of the Second Analogy be viewed as transformable i n t o the reg- u la t ive dema?$ t h a t we invest igate nature on the assumption t h a t i t wil l y ie ld laws. I think the Second Analogy does give warrant f o r t h i s r u l e , but t h a t i s not a l l Kant intended. These matters of large-scale in te rpre t ive emphasis aside, as a f ina l point about the continuing in-t e r e s t of Kant's discussion of lo f ty regulat ive pr inc ip les , I want t o turn a t t en t ion t o his own example of how t h e assumption of a f f i n i t y , the assumption of common source or l i a b i l i t y t o f i t a common pat tern of uni- t y , portrays a methodological s t rategy of great i n t e r e s t and importance.

The pr inc ip le of a f f i n i t y gives us subject ive assurance of the s t a -bi l i t y of things grouped under kinds, and a l so assurance of s t a b i l i t y y:propert ies of things and the forces or powers t h a t hold them together . In an example, Kant has us begin with the imperfect empirical observa-t ion t h a t the planets move in c i r c u l a r o r b i t s . Subsequently, we not ice deviat ions from c i r c u l a r o rb i t ing , and we " t race the deviations t o t h a t [ force] which can change the c i r c l e , in accordance with a f ixed law, through a l l the i n f i n i t e intermediate degrees, i n t o one of these diver- gent o r b i t s " ( t h e discussion of Kant ' s example follows A662-663/B690- 691). This i s t o assume t h a t the movements of the planets t h a t a re not c i rcu la r will approximate t o the propert ies of a c i r c l e , and t h i s y ie lds the idea of an e l l i p t i c a l o r b i t . [In l a t e r language, one might suggest t h a t we a re here "co l l iga t ing" the paths of c e l e s t i a l objects under the idea of c i r c u l a r path.] We now observe t h a t comets deviate even fur ther from t r u e c i r c u l a r paths, and by appl icat ion of the same reasoning--as- suming a f f i n i t y of kinds of motion under a common principle ( i n t h i s case, the same force t h a t causes the deviations)--we conclude t h a t they move in parabolic courses. What we are doing, Kant thinks, i s discover- ing, by employment of the pr inciple of a f f i n i t y , "a unity in the generic forrlls of the o r b i t s , and thereby a unity i n the cause of a l l the laws of planetary motion, namely, gravi tat ion." We then go fur ther i n our a t -tempt t o explain by the same principle a l l observed variat ions and de- partures from the discovered ru les . And

Final ly, we even go on t o make addi t ions such as experience

can never confirm, namely, t o conceive, i n accordance w i t h t h e r u l e s o f a f f i n i t y , h y p e r b o l i c paths o f comets, i n t h e course o f which these bodies e n t i r e l y leave our s o l a r system, and passing f rom sun t o sun, u n i t e t h e most d i s t a n t p a r t s o f t h e un iverse, a un i ve rse which, though for us unlimited, i s th roughout h e l d t o - gether by one and t h e same moving force. (emphasis supp l i ed ) .

C o l l i g a t i o n leads t o " c o n s i l i e n c e " . Reasoning under t h e g u i d i n g p r i n c i - p l e o f a f f i n i t y b r i n g s phys i ca l specu la t i on t o t h e common p o i n t , t h e f i x e d law, t h e source o f a conf i rmed exp lanat ion . I n t h i s r o l e , a f f i n i t y i s an i n d u c t i v e methodo log ica l p r i n c i p l e par exce l lence, and one d iscus- sed w i t h approval under o t h e r names.

Thus we see t h a t , f o r Kant, a f f i n i t y even pe rm i t s us, as a ma t te r o f j u s t i f i e d s c i e n t i f i c procedure, t o i n f e r beyond t h e l i m i t s o f already given consequences o f c o n t r o l l e d obse rva t i on and exper iment. Indeed, i t warrants i n f e r e n c e beyond t h e l i m i t s o f any possible such consequences (as i n t h e case o f i n f e r e n c e t o un i ve rsa l g r a v i t a t i o n ) ; b u t never, o f course, beyond t h e l i m i t s o f p o s s i b l e exper ience. (Reca l l : t h e subjec-t i v e necess i t y o f t h e r u l e o f a f f i n i t y cons t ra ins research s t r a t e g i e s , i n c l u d i n g s t r a t e g i e s o f i n d u c t i v e i n fe rence ; i t does n o t e n t i t l e us t o f l i g h t s o f c o n s t i t u t i v e metaphysical fancy . No r u l e o f method speaks t o t h e r e a l i t y o f o b j e c t i v e f i n d i n g s . ) The conf idence i n our i n d u c t i v e ca-p a c i t y t o i n f e r beyond t h e l i m i t s o f p resent and i n p r i n c i p l e conf i rma- t o r y exper ience does not , then, r u n counter t o K a n t ' s t h e s i s o f t h e pos- t u l a t e s o f e m p i r i c a l thought i n genera l :

Our knowledge o f t h e ex i s tence o f t h i n g s reaches ...o n l y as f a r as pe rcep t i on and i t s advance accord ing t o e m p i r i c a l laws can extend. (A226/B273).

I n d u c t i v e i n fe rences grounded i n assumed a f f i n i t y do depend upon r e l a t e d c l u s t e r s o f e m p i r i c a l gene ra l i za t i ons ; i t i s t h e postulated c o n t i n u i t y of forms o f laws t h a t l i c e n s e s i n fe rence beyond t h e known c l u s t e r .

For those r e q u i r i n g something o t h e r than t h e s u b j e c t i v e assurance o f t h e v i a b i l i t y o f methodo log ica l maxims, Kant can o n l y o f f e r h i s b r i e f comments on what he c a l l s " d o c t r i n a l b e l i e f " , commitment t o t h e c o r r e c t - ness o f t h e o r e t i c a l c l a ims t h a t i s analogous t o "pragmatic b e l i e f " i n t h e rea lm o f t h e p r a c t i c a l (A823-825/B851-853). I n t h e i n t e r e s t o f he lp - i n g h i s p a t i e n t , a p h y s i c i a n must a c t even i n those cases where he does n o t know t h e exact n a t u r e o f t h e i l l n e s s . The touchstone o f h i s b e l i e f i s a ques t i on o f how much he w i l l b e t on an expected outcome o f h i s ac-t i o n . Analogously, t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t must o f t e n face t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which he t h i n k s h i m s e l f t o have s u f f i c i e n t t h e o r e t i c a l grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g a c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n , even though t h e r e e x i s t no present means o f o b t a i n i n g c e r t a i n t y , as i s always t h e case a t t h e l e v e l o f con-t i n g e n t e m p i r i c a l science. Here i t i s apparent ly a ques t i on o f how much one i s prepared t o r u n conceptual r i s k s : how much o f one ' s p u t a t i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d sc ience one i s prepared t o j e t t i s o n i f t h e outcome were t o t u r n ou t t o be o t h e r than what one d o c t r i n a l l y be l i eves . K a n t ' s example i s t h i s one:

I shou ld be ready t o s take my a l l on t h e content ion- -were i t p o s s i b l e by means o f any exper ience t o s e t t l e t h e ques t i on - - t ha t a t l e a s t one o f t h e la nets which we see i s i nhab i t ed . Hence I

say that i t i s not merely opinion, b u t a strong belief , on the correctness of which I should be prepared to run great r isks, that other worlds are inhabited.

Kant was prepared to hazard a great deal in those cases where what one hypothesizes about the course of nature [nl conforms to the condi- tions of SC knowing. I think i t i s for th i s reason that he takes so ser-iously the question of a priori foundations of knowing in natural sc i -ence. In the absence of the subjectively necessary maxims of method with their limited a priori guarantees, we run the large risk of losing con-ceptual sanity. I t i s one thing to hypothesize categorial poss ib i l i t ies that are out of range of what we now know; i t i s quite another deliber- ately to exaggerate those poss ib i l i t ies , betting, as does the c?$ssical metaphysician, too l i t t l e on outcomes too important to underbid.

We have seen that Kant appears to be content to se t t l e for a marriage of formal law and descriptive law that i s , in a l i t e ra l methodological sense, a marriage of convenience. The principle of causality and the law of universal gravitation are kith and kin only because, though dissimi-l a r , they are similarly focused. To bring them together in any more met- aphysically compelling way would require that the focus of our scientif-i c imagination turn into that big double-barreled shotgun in the sky, threatening to spray the not-yet-united lovers with an inf in i te collec-tion of forever diverse and variegated noumenal buckshot. Kant taught us, to his everlasting credi t , that the ammunition chambers of that imagined gun are phenomenally empty, nu1 1 and meaningless--in principle and always.

Notes

' ~ o t that t h i s was the f i r s t philosophical expression of dissatisfac-tion with Kantian synthetic a prioris; for example, the Reichenbach-Ein- stein exchange in Schi lpp (1949, p p . 289-311 ; 676-679) had already neat- ly arranged the relevant debating points.

fr he sources were rich ones: Lewis and Dewey, Mach and Schlick. I t became clear by the 1950s that we were going to have to get used to very different styles of thinking about the a pr ior i .

3~ s t a r t was made at the Third International Kant Congress; see the papers by Buchdahl and Palter, and my comments, in Beck (1972, p p . 149-199). Brittan (1978) makes a worthwhile contribution to our understand-ing of some aspects of Kant's philosophy of science; Kitcher (1983) re- pays very careful study; al l of us eagerly await publication of the re-sul ts of Michael Friedman's study of Kant's philosophy of physics (pre- sented in seminars at University of Western Ontario in Spring 1984). Kant's philosophy of mathematics has been studied by Hintikka (eg., 1969), Parsons (1971) and Kitcher (1975). Palter ( in Beck 1972), Harman (19821, Okruhlik (1983) and Duncan (1984) deal with Kant's Die metaphys- ische Anfangsgriinde der Baturwissenschaften. Harper (1981) contributes much to our understanding of the logic of the Second Analogy. These se- lective references do not exhaust the good work that has been done re-cently.

4 ~ a n t mentioned the p o s s i b i l i t y of a second special metaphysics, t h a t of "objects" of internal sense, or of the soul . However, he required of a proper science t h a t i t s subject matter be mathematizable; contents of inner sense a re not mathenlatizable; therefore a science cannot be devel- oped on the basis of the special metaphysics of the soul . Only bodies moving in space can be objects of proper science. I argue elsewhere t h a t t h i s accounts f o r Kant's c l i n i c a l and nosological i n t e r e s t in psychical phenomena: He replaces the impossible science of the soul with a behav- i o u r i s t i c psychopathology, one whose nosology of mental disorders groups deviat ions from normal schemati zed category knowing i n t o c l i n i c a l syn-dromes (Butts 1984, pp. 298-310).

5 ~ h e ins i s tence t h a t natural science must be e s s e n t i a l l y mathematical i s c l e a r l y s ta ted in MAN, p . 470. That a l l objects of possible experi- ence must be mathematical idea l iza t ions (cons t ruc t s ) of appearances i s a central claim of the transcendental programme. See KRV A162-176/B202-218; A142-43/B182-83.

6 " ~ e t a p h y s i c a l and Internal Realism: the Relations between Ontology and Methodology in Kant ' s Philosophy of Science". Typescript copies were d i s t r ibu ted t o those who attended the session.

7 ~ a n t i s here ta lking about empirical natural science, not about the metaphysica2 foundations of natural science, as he makes c l e a r in what follows the quoted l i n e . Conjecture i s typical of the former, a p r io r i ce r ta in ty i s a fea ture of the l a t t e r , as we have seen.

8 ~ h i s discussion necessar i ly bypasses what i s a t another level a cru- c i a l problem f o r Kant: What about the ontological s t a t u s of moral agents? or persons? Since pract ical reason can only postulate such "ob- j ec t s" on analogy with objects resu l t ing from schematized categories , what ontological s t a t u s can be accorded them: useful f i c t i o n s ?

' ~ 0 t h SC and LM require t h a t objects of proper science be mathematiz- able; mathematics constructs i t s objects ; hence we must have a s e t of MCs (mathematical construct ions) yielding the physical meaning of each LM. For example, the second Kantian law of mechanics ( the pr inciple of i n e r t i a ) provides part of the ontology of bodies by allowing construc-t ion of motion as an object of possible experience through provision of a "geometrical curve whose direct ion a t each point i s determined by the tangent ( the geometrical representation of the f i r s t der ivat ive, which i s iden t ica l with veloci ty, i f the horizontal axis of the coordinate system represents the time) ; and the physical meaning of the tangent i s j u s t i n e r t i a l motion." (Pap 1946, pp. 43-44). Constructions are of course required f o r each of the Kantian pr inc ip les in pure physics; they pro-vide i n t u i t i v e warrant f o r the poss ib i l i ty or i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the concepts involved. There i s no space here t o deal with the c ruc ia l ly im- portant Kantian idea of constructions in any d e t a i l .

' O ~ a n t does not l i s t "F=man as a law of motion, although h i s discus- sion ind ica tes t h a t he accepts "ma". Did he r e a l i z e t h a t the law of in-e r t i a i s a special case of "F=maU, where F=O? See Okruhlik (1983, pp. 252-253) f o r a br ief discussion of Kant's f a i l u r e t o mention e x p l i c i t l y Newton's second law. I suspect t h a t Kant's f a i l u r e t o record acceptance of the i d e n t i t y has t o do with h i s conviction t h a t forces are not f u l l y cons t ruc t ib le , hence cannot be f u l l y avai lable f o r mathematical t r e a t -

ment. Throughout his career he wanted t o re ta in the idea of some kind of empirical access t o fo rces , and f o r him forces manifested in the motions of objects given in space and expressed as external re la t ions between such objects were f i n a l l y the best candidates. Such "transeunt" forces replaced the empirically inaccessible immanent forces of Leibniz.

''some words about the word. Kant uses both Affinitdt and Verwandt-schaft in f i r s t Critique. In AnthropoZogie (Sect . 31, 31c) he uses Ver-wandtschaft and the Latin affinitas. Affinitas means relat ionship through marriage ( a s in the Church of England Comon h.ayer "Table of Kindred and Aff in i ty" ) . Verwandtschaft shares these connotations; Affin-itdt should probably be construed as Kant's preferred technical term, although he uses Affinitdt and Verwandtschaft interchangeably and with- out d i s t inc t ion in f i r s t Critique ( f o r example, A657-663/8685-691). In Anth. 31c h i s examples are c a t a l y t i c in te rac t ion of chemical substances and marriage. Aff ini ty names a kind of re la t ionsh ip between d i ss imi la rs , and uni tes through a common ground or source. In methodological contexts the r u l e of a f f i n i t y enjoins us t o search f o r what Whewell cal led "con-s i l i e n c e " : systematic unif icat ion achieved by a convergence of i n i t i a l l y unrelated inductions. Shortly we will see t h a t Kant's favouri te example of systematic unif icat ion or consi l ience i s one shared by Whewell: uni-versal g rav i ta t ion .

l L 1 cannot develop the point here, but what I am saying about system- a t i c organization of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes as Kant viewed i t seems t o me t o confirm Kitcher 's (1983) claim t h a t f o r Kant a s c i e n t i f i c theory i s a "projected order of nature". Much t h a t I argue f o r in (1984) de- pends upon accepting Ki tcher ' s correct ins igh t .

13''1n so f a r as the term ' sc ience ' e s s e n t i a l l y connotes an a c t i v i t y aiming a t the discovery of laws, the pr inciple of causa l i ty , interpreted as an imperative, may, indeed, be said t o be presupposed by the very p o s s i b i l i t y of science: science i s the successful response t o the imper- a t ive expressed by the pr inc ip le of causa l i ty . On t h i s point philoso-phers as widely opposite in t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards Kant's c r i t i c a l ide-alism as Schlick and Cassirer seem t o agree." (Pap 1946, p. 68) . Kant does suggest t h a t the Second Analogy i s grounded in the pr inciple of s u f f i c i e n t reason: "The pr inc ip le of s u f f i c i e n t reason i s thus the ground of possible experience, t h a t i s , of object ive knowledge of ap-pearances in respect of t h e i r re la t ion in the succession of t ime" (A201/8246). However, as we have seen, ins tan t ia ted by matter in motion, the p r inc ip le of causa l i ty leads us t o have strong expectations about the specific explanatory framework t h a t wil l cor rec t ly expl icate cases of observed motion. The agreement a t t r ibu ted t o Cassirer and Schlick thus seems of l i t t l e consequence.

1 4 ~ tt h i s s tage s p e c i a l i s t s in the thought of Kant wil l want t o re-mind us t h a t the problem of property s t a b i l i t y i s important f o r Kant in a number of re la ted contexts. A t A90/8123 he recognizes the problem: "Appearances might very well be so const i tuted t h a t the understanding should not f ind them t o be in accordance with the conditions of i t s uni- t y . Everything might be in such confusion t h a t , f o r instance, in the s e r i e s of appearances nothing presented i t s e l f which might y ie ld a r u l e of synthesis and so answer t o t h e concept of cause and e f fe$ t . This con-cept would then be al together empty, n u l l , and meaningless. Even empir- ical memory (reproductive imagination) requires s tab i 1 i t y of propert ies:

"If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, some- times heavy ...my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar." (A100-101). At least some of these specialists will also want to hold that Kant's argu- ment in the transcendental deduction yields justified objective grounds for stability of properties. I think, however, that here we must score one for Buchdahl. Lawlikeness of empirical laws presupposes stability of properties, but the assumption of stability of properties rests on the principle of affinity--a subjectively valid regulative principle. Here there is a "messy" articulation, rather than a clinching argument. In the absence of an sich realist convictions, it is extremely difficult to argue into existence a stable and epistemologically reliable external world.

15~fter presentation of the paper, my colleague Margaret Morrison re- minded me of the passage in which Kant states that principles like af- fini ty "carry their recommendation directly in themselves" (KRV, A661/8689), and warned that unless I can give an appropriate reading of Kant's claim here, the appeal to a pragmatic justification of subjective principles is unavailing. This is a well-taken point, and one worth careful development. My suggestion is that Kant is here pointing out that the success of the principles as methodological components of New- ton's (essentially correct) physics is one that can be universalized by being "represented as objective" in much the same way as are aesthetic judgements of taste. This would be consistent with Kant's belief that Newtonian physics (including its methodology) is the best exunrple of successful science. The suggested reading a1 so brings judgement of the acceptability of methodologies within the ambit of judgements of taste. Thus we might say that one who rejects the described Newtonian methodol- ogy is guilty of poor "epistemic" taste. This exegetical line, one that brings Kant's thought closer to that of Nelson Goodman and (perhaps) to that of Putnam, is one that obviously requires more extensive working out than can be accomplished here. Kant's suggestions concerning univer- sal izabi lity of subjective maxims and public consensus are at (KRV, A820-22/B848-501, and at (cr i t ique of Judgement, Sect. 40).

References

References to Kant's works follow page numbers of the Academy Edition. Translations from the first Critique are modified from Kemp Smith. Other translations are mine, except for Meredith (third critique) and Haden (First Introduction to the Critique of Judgement). I have abbreviated the latter First Intro, the first Critique, K R V , and Die metaphysische Anfangsgiiinde der Naturwissenschaften, MAN. First Critique references follow the usual A and B notation for the first and second editions.

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