aristotle on self-knowledge and friendship

volume11,no.12 august2011

Aristotle on

Self-Knowledge and

Friendship

Zena HitzUniversity of Maryland, Baltimore County

© 2011 ZenaHitz <www.philosophersimprint.org/011012/>

In memory of Ian Mueller.

M an’snatureispolitical,Aristotletellsus;heneedsotherstoliveandtolivewell.1Thegods,ontheotherhand,areperfect,self-contained,self-sufficientbeings.2Andyet,he

alsotellsus,weoughttobecomelikegodsasmuchaspossible, fol-lowingthedivinepartofournature.AsRossputsitinhismemorabletranslation:

We must not follow those who advise us, being men,to think of human things, and, beingmortal, ofmortalthings, butmust, so far as we can,make ourselves im-mortal,andstraineverynervetoliveinaccordancewiththebestthinginus;forevenifitbesmallinbulk,muchmore does it in power and worth surpass everything. [Nicomachean Ethics 1177b31–1178a2]3

Thegoodlifeforhumansimitatesdivinelifebyitsself-sufficiency,itsprovisiononitsownofwhatisworthwhile,itsrelativelackofdepen-denceonexternalgoodsandmattersofchance.Inthisway,ourcallto imitatedivine self-sufficiency seems to conflictwithourpoliticalnature,ourneedforotherpeople.

IntheNicomachean Ethics, Aristotleaddressesthispossibleconflictbetweenourpoliticalnatureandourdivinenature inways thatarenotobviouslyconsistentwithoneanother.InBook9,Chapter9,hearguesthatthehappyman,althoughheisself-sufficient,willstillneed

1. Nicomachean Ethics 1.7,1097b8–11;8.12,1162a16–19;9.9,1169b16–22;Eudemi-an Ethics7.10,1242a19–28;Politics1.2,1253a7–18;3.6,1278b15–30;History of Animals1.1,487b33–488a14.ForasynoptictreatmentofthedoctrineseeKull-man, “Man as a PoliticalAnimal inAristotle”, aswell asCooper, “PoliticalAnimalsandCivicFriendship”.

2. De Caelo279a20–22;Metaphysics 1091b15–18;Eudemian Ethics1244b8–10(cf.Magna Moralia1212b37);andassuggestedatPolitics1253a28.Idiscusssomeofthesepassagesbelow.

3. Ross,Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics.Gersonpointsoutacloseparallelbe-tween thispassageandTimaeus 90b1–d7 (Aristotle and Other Platonists, 244,255)

zenahitz Aristotle on Self-Knowledge and Friendship

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.11,no.12(august2011)

otherpeopleasoneexplanationoftheneedforfriendsinthehappylife(1169b10–13).Thecontemplativelife,ontheotherhand,evenifitrequiresacommunitytonurtureandtrainthewisebeforetheyhavematured—or to provide food, shelter, and safety—can be pursuedlargelyinsolitude.InthispassageAristotledescribesthisdifferenceintermsofthegreaterself-sufficiencyofthecontemplativeactivityandthecontemplativeperson,andonthisbasisjudgesthecontemplativelifesuperiorandmoregodlike.5Itistruethatthesenseinwhichthewisemanneedsfriendslessisambiguous:doesheneedfewerfriends,or ishejust lessdependentontheoneshedoeshave?InaparallelstatementofthedifficultyintheEudemian Ethics (1244b13–15),Aristo-tlesuggestsboththings.InwhatfollowsIassumeingeneralthatifthewisemandoesnotneedfriends,hewillnothavethem,sothatifheneedsthemlesshewillalsohavefewerofthem.6ButIalsowilldiscussthepossibilitythathemayhavefriendswithoutneedingthem,aswellasthepossibilitythatthewisemanneedsfriendsinadifferent,moreself-sufficientway.

IfAristotleclaimshere,asheseemsto,thatthecontemplativelifeissuperiorinitssolitude,hefacesproblemswithrespecttotruthaswell as to consistency. If real humanhappiness is solitary, even forcontemplators,howdoweunderstandthefigureofSocrates,accom-plishedinwisdombutsurroundedbyfriendsandcompanions?IfthewisdomofSocratesseemsnottobethekindofcontemplativevirtueAristotlehasinmind,howdoweexplainthatbothPlatoandAristotle

5. Itistruethatheusestheterm‘fellow-worker’(sunergos)ratherthan‘friend’(philos);however,giventhatfriendsarethosewithwhomweshareourbe-lovedactivities(9.12),Iconcludethatallofthewiseman’sfriends(atleast,thosewithwhomhepursueswisdom)willcountassunergoi,even ifsomesunergoi maynot count as friends. Likewise hemay have family-membersandfellow-citizenswhomaybephiloialthoughnotpartnersinthepursuitofwisdom.

6. OneexceptionthatGabrielRichardsonLearhaspointedouttomeisifthesame friendsareused fordifferentpurposesasoneprogresses: theGreektutor,necessaryformycontemplationasameanstoanend,canbecomemypartnerincontemplation,sopreservingthenumberoffriendswhilemodify-ingthetypeofneed.

friends.Likewise,inBook1,Chapter7,heclaimsaspecialsortofself-sufficiencyforthegoodthatmakesahumanlifehappy,

[N]otforonealone,livingasolitarylife,butalsoforfor-bearsandchildrenandawifeandingeneralforfriendsandcitizens.[1097b8–11.AlltranslationsbasedonRoss,withsomerevisions.]

However,inBook10,Chapter7,heclaimsthatthecontemplativelifeissuperiortothepracticalinpartbecauseofitsgreaterindependencefromotherpeople;andfurthermore,thatthewisemanwillneedotherpeoplelessthewiserheis:4

Andtheself-sufficiency(autarkeia)thatisspokenofwouldbelongmost tocontemplativeactivity.Forwhileawiseman(sophos),aswellasajustmanortherest,needsthenecessaries of life,when they are sufficiently equippedwithsuchthingsthejustmanneedspeopletowardwhomandwithwhomheshallactjustly,andlikewisealsothetemperateman, the braveman, and each of the others,butthewiseman,evenwhenbyhimself, isabletocon-template,andthebetterthewiserheis;hecanperhapsdobetterifhehasfellow-workers(sunergoi),butstillheisthemostself-sufficient.[1177a28–1177b1]

Thepracticallife,organizedaroundthemoralvirtues,requiresotherpeopleinordertoperformitsbasictasks;onecannotbejustwithoutotherstodistributegoodsto,andonecannotbecourageouswithoutlovedonestodefend.In9.9,Aristotledescribesthosewhofilltheseroles as friends, and appeals to the dependence ofmoral virtue on

4. NE 1.7 discusses the self-sufficiency of the activity that constitutes humangood;9.9discussestheself-sufficiencyofaperson;10.7moveswithoutargu-mentfromself-sufficientactivitiestoself-sufficientpeople.Itakeitapersonbecomesself-sufficientbyadoptingaself-sufficientactivityasthefinalendoroverarchinggoalofhislife.Hencehislifealsobecomesself-sufficient,al-thoughAristotledoesnotspeakthatwaydirectly.



ingonthesepointsisconsistent.Prevalentamongthesearethosewhothinkthattheself-sufficiencyofhappinessasAristotleconceivesitismeantfromthebeginningtobeconsistentinprinciplewithneedsforexternalandothergoods.10

Iwillbeginbyexplaininginmoredetailtheproblemaboutfriend-ship posed inNicomachean Ethics 9.9, first by reference to its back-groundinPlato’sLysis,secondlybylookingmorecloselyatthenotionofself-sufficiencythatgenerates it—anotionwhich, Iargue,canbeappliedconsistently throughout the NE. Iwill then turn to theargu-mentsof9.9themselves.Theseargumentshavenotbeensufficientlywellunderstoodbycommentators,andtheelaboratefinalargument(1170a14–1170b20) has long evaded interpretation and so has beenunjustlyneglected.Theargumentsof9.9,onmyinterpretation,indi-cate that theneed for friendship is indeed adifferent sort of threattoself-sufficiencythantheviciousman’sdependenceonpleasureorhonor.All thesame,Iargue,thehopethat9.9mightofferapictureoffriendshipasfullycompatiblewithself-sufficiencyisnotjustified.In the end Aristotle is left with the same counter-intuitive claim I

in1and10appealtoonesense:independencefromneed.Thepoliticallifeismoreself–sufficientthanahedonisticlife,althoughitstillrequiresotherpeopleas1.7and9.9indicate.Thecontemplativeliferequiresevenlessfromtheoutsideworldandsoisyetmoreself–sufficient.Idefendthisinterpreta-tionbelow.MydisagreementwithBrown isabouthow thepolitical life ismoreself–sufficient.Brownarguesthatotherpeopleactuallyincreaseone’sself–sufficiency,whereasIarguethatotherpeoplearealwaysaqualificationonself–sufficiency,evenifsomeusesofotherpeoplearemorecompatiblewithself–sufficiencythanothers.Thereisaquestionastohowthegreaterself–sufficiencyofpoliticalcommunitiesdescribedinPolitics1.2isconsistentwithmyaccount.Onepossibilityisthattheself–sufficiencyofthepoliticalcommunitydoesnotstrictlyspeakingincreasetheself–sufficiencyofthein-dividual;anotherpossibilityisthatthepictureofself–sufficiencyIoutlineistechnicalandspecialtotheNicomachean Ethics.

10. RichardsonLear,Happy Lives,andCooper, “PlatoandAristotleon ‘Finality’and ‘(Self–) Sufficiency’”, both defend an interpretation of self–sufficiencywherefinality,ratherthanindependencefromneed,isitscentralmeaning;seenote15.WhileStern-Gilletarguesthatfriendshipisself-actualization,andsoisconsistentwithself-sufficiency,shealsoarguesthatAristotleheldtwonotionsoftheself,oneinNE 1–9andtheotherinNE 10,sosheavoidsrecon-ciling9.9with10.7(Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship,11–35,123–145).

founded schools rather than simply perching on solitarymountain-tops?Humanphilosophyseemstobeaneminentlysociableactivity.Even if some truth couldbe found in the claim,Aristotle’s thinkingon the question looks inconsistent. If friends are a qualification onone’sself-sufficiency,asthe10.7passageabouttheindependenceofthewisemanindicates,thenitishardtoseehowAristotlecanarguethatfriendsarenothreatatalltoself-sufficiencyinhissolutiontotheparadoxofthehappyman’sneedforfriendsinNE 9.9(andin1.7ascommonlyinterpreted).7

A variety of strategies could be used either to alleviate or to ac-ceptthetensionintheNicomachean Ethicsbetweentheapparentlyfullcompatibilityofhumanself-sufficiencywiththeneedforotherpeopleseen inBooks1and9andtheclaiminBook10thatsuchaneed isanunfortunatequalificationonourself-sufficiency.Forthosewhobe-lievethatBook10anditsendorsementofthecontemplativelifearealreadyinconsistentwiththerestofthebook,theapparentinconsis-tencyinthetreatmentofself-sufficiencyneedsnospecialexplanation.8 EricBrownhasrecentlyarguedthatAristotleappealstotwodistinctand incompatiblenotionsof self-sufficiency inBooks 1 and 10:onepolitical,onesolitary.9OthershavetriedtoshowthatAristotle’sthink-

7. Forexample,bothRichardsonLearandNussbaumread1.7asshowingthecompatibility of Aristotelian self-sufficiency with communal life, althoughtheirunderstandingofwhythat’sthecaseisverydifferent(RichardsonLear,Happy Lives and the Highest Good,chapter3;Nussbaum,The Fragility of Good-ness,344–5,354–372).Iseenoreasonwhyitcannotbereadasadmittingthathumanself-sufficiencycomesalreadyqualifiedbytheneedtolivewithoth-ers,asKrautreadsit(Aristotle on the Human Good,299n28).RichardsonLearhasahelpfuldiscussionofthewaysthispassagecanbeinterpreted(Happy Lives 50,62–3).

8. SoNussbaum,Fragility, whoaccordinglycomestoquitedifferentconclusionsabout the topics of this essay (318–377, especially 373–77); cf. alsoAckrill,“AristotleonEudaimonia”;Cooper,Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.

9. ForBrown, thesolitarysenseof self–sufficiency isonewhereone reducesone’s needs towhere one needs nothing beyond oneself,while the politi-calsenseisonewhereoneprocureshelpandgoodsfromothersuntilone’sneedsaremet(“AristotleontheChoiceofLives:TwoConceptsofSelf–Suf-ficiency”).Iamnotconvincedthattherearetwosensesofself–sufficiencyforAristotleintheNicomachean Ethics.Thepassagesdiscussingself–sufficiency



hewouldn’tlove(philoi).—Definitelynot.—Andwhoeverdoesn’tloveisnotafriend.—Itappearsnot.—Thenhoware thegoodtobe friendstousgoodmenfromthebe-ginning? Theydon’tyearn foroneanotherwhenapart,becauseeventhentheyaresufficienttothemselves,andwhentogethertheyhavenoneed(chreian)ofoneanoth-er. Isthereanywaypeoplelikethatcanpossiblyvalue(peri pollou poiêsthai)eachother?—No.—Butpeoplewhodon’tplacemuchvalueoneachothercouldn’tbefriends.—True.[Lysis 215a6–c2,Lombardo,trans.]

Giventhatfriendshipfillsalackorcorrectsadeficiency,itseemstoconflictwiththeself-sufficiencyofthegoodman—andsofriendshipamongthegoodseems impossible.But,as is illustratedbySocrates’pronouncement of his passionate love for friends (211e), friendshipseemstobepursuedasfiercelybygoodmenasbyanyoneelse.Al-though thediscussionof friendshipdevelops after this point in thedialogue,itisclearthatSocratesthinksthatthisparticularparadoxre-mains,ashementionsitrepeatedlyafterwardassomethingestablished(216e1,218b,219b,220d,222cd),thelasttimeattheendofthedialogue.

IfordinaryfriendshipsamongordinarygoodpeoplewereSocrates’concernhere, his interest in the paradox andhis treatment of it asintransigentwould be hard to fathom.As the paradox is stated, allone needs to solve it is to assume that the goodmen in questionare imperfectlygoodandsoimperfectlyself-sufficient.Their friendswillthenfillaneed—theirimperfectgoodness—andalsoprovideagood—namely,betterachievementof thegood.Ofcourse, it ispos-siblethatPlatoeitherdeliberatelyorinadvertentlywrotesuchanon-paradoxasifitwereaparadox.Allthesame,giventheevidenceandsimplicityofthispoint,Isuspectthatwearemeanttounderstandthefriendshipofthegoodasthefriendshipoftheperfectlygood.Then,atleast,somethinggenuinelypuzzlingisatstake:namely, that friendsare qualifications on our self-sufficiency. Thatmeans that in condi-tions of perfect goodness—those held, for instance, by gods—no

haveoutlined—thatasapersongrows in contemplativeexcellence,heoutgrowshis dependenceonothers and sohis need for friends.IfAristotle is givena consistent view, inotherwords, it seems thatwhathesaysisfalse.11

I. Friendship and self-sufficiency in the Lysis

The question whether human perfection implies solitude, and sowhetherprogress invirtuealso involvesprogress insolitude, isfirstraisedinPlato’sLysis.12TheLysispresentsaseriesofparadoxesaboutfriendship, including an argument that friendship is inconsistentwiththeself-sufficiencyof thegoodman.ThisparadoxariseswhenSocrates and Lysis are discussing the attraction of like to like, andagree that sincebadmenare conflictedand so “unlike” themselves,they cannot be friendswith anyone, even themselves (214b8–d3).13 Onlythegoodcanbefriendswithoneanother.However,thisraisesaproblem:ifthegoodarefriendswiththegood,itisn’tclearwhytheywillneed eachother:

Isn’tagoodman,totheextentthatheisgood,sufficientto himself (hikonos autôi)? —Yes. —And a self-sufficient(hikanos) person needs (deomenos) nothing, on accountofhisself-sufficiency(hikanotês)?—Howcouldhe?—Andthe personwho needs nothingwouldn’t prize (agapôê)anything.—No, hewouldn’t.—What hewouldn’t prize

11. Somyinterpretationsofself-sufficiencyinNE 1.7andNE 9.9belowarenottheonlypossibleinterpretations;NE 1.7canbereadasdescribingself-suffi-ciencyasfullycompatiblewithlifewithothers,and9.9canbeunderstoodasapplyingonly to thepolitical life.However,soread,Aristotle’sviewsofself-sufficiencycannotbeconsistentbetweenthesepassagesand10.7–8,andaninterpretationthatyieldsconsistencyoughttobepreferred,otherthingsbeingequal.

12. Smith-PanglealsonoticestheimportanceoftheLysisasbackgroundforAris-totle’sdiscussionoffriendshipandusesitsthemes,includingtherelianceoffriendshiponneed,throughoutherbook(Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friend-ship,especiallychapter1).SeealsoStern-Gillet,Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friend-ship,chapter6.

13. Cf.theparallelargumentinNicomachean Ethics9.4.



derstoodas typesof independence, and sowaysofbeing completeandself-contained.16SinceAristotlespeaksin10.7ofoneactivityandonepersonbeingmoreself-sufficientthananother,weknowthatself-sufficiencyisattainedbydegrees.Contemplativeactivityismoreself-sufficientforitsexercisethanmoralorpoliticalactivityinbothsenses:moralactivityissoughtforthesakeofsomethingelse(aswellasforitself),whereascontemplation isnot,andsocontemplation ismorefinal (1177b1–22);and further, contemplativeactivity ismore freeofnecessaryconditionsthanmoralactivity(1177a27–b1;cf.1178a22–b7).Andsowereachourconclusion:Whilethepersonwhodedicateshislifetocontemplativeactivity,thewiseman,stillneedsfoodandwater,henolongerneedsotherpeopletodowhathedoes.Otherpeoplearenotnecessarytohiscontemplativeactivity,astheyarenecessaryforpoliticalactivity.Sothecontemplator,insofarasheisacontemplator,willnotneedotherpeople.17Andifhedoesnotneedfriends,itisnotclearwhyhewouldhavethem,sinceastheLysisputsit,itseemsthatwehavefriendsbecausetheyfillsomelackorcorrectsomedeficiency.18

choiceworthy. Her view runs into difficulties with the book 10 passages(1177a28–1177b1, discussed above, and 1178b32–35, below), both ofwhichindicatethatself-sufficiencyisalsotobeunderstoodasindependencefromnecessaryconditions(suchasfood,water,friends,andothersupplies).Rich-ardsonLearandCooper,alongwithHeinamanandKraut(Aristotle on the Hu-man Good,chap.5),seemtomeveryeffectiveintheirattackson“inclusivist”interpretations of self-sufficiency (for instance, Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudai-monia”;Crisp,“Aristotle’sInclusivism”;Devereux,“AristotleontheEssenceofHappiness”;Whiting,“HumanNatureandIntellectualism.”)

16. Joachimseemstounderstandself-sufficiencyinthisway,whenhedescribeshappinessas“self-completeandself-conditioned”(Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, 287)and theôria as “self-contained” (295);Bodéüsexplains that con-templativeactivityisself-sufficientbecauseunliketheotheractivitiesoftheintellect,itrequiresnothingotherthantheintellect(Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals, 176).

17. Thewisemanmaywellneedfriendsforotherreasons,forinstance,topro-videhimwithfood,shelter,andsecurity.Aristotlesuggestsat1178b5–7thatthe contemplatorwill in fact livewith others andwill thereby sometimespursuemoralactivities—onceagainemphasizingthatcontemplativeactivitywillnotinvolveothersinthesameway.

18. The connection between self-sufficiency and solitude explains why Krautcannot be correct in distinguishing, in his reading of 10.7, the solitude of

friendswillbenecessary.Butthisseemstoimplythatthemoreperfectandself-sufficientamanbecomes,thelesshewillneedfriends.Thisclasheswithacertaincommon-sensepictureof thereality,which isthatverygoodmen,Socratesforinstance,seemtoretainapassionatedesireforfriendsandseemalsotohavenofewerfriendsthanmenofmiddlingorlessergoodness.14

In thisway,although theLysisdiscussion isonlycondensedandsuggestive,itappearsonsomereflectionthattherealproblemitraisesisnothowordinarygoodmencanhavefriends,sincetheymayneedfriends to becomebetter, to correct their imperfections.Rather, theproblemisthattheperfectlygooddonotneedfriends,andsoitisnotclearwhyoneoughtnottoneedfriendslessthebetteroneis.

II. Self-sufficiency and solitude

Thesuggestivepuzzleposed in theLysis isfleshedoutwithgreatercomplexityandclarity intheNicomachean Ethics.Theretoo,Iwillar-gue,thequestioniswhetherhumanperfectionimpliessolitude,andsowhetherprogressinvirtuelikewiseimpliesprogressinsolitude.Butthequestion is, so far, obscure. It is clear enough fromour texts inBooks1and10thathappinessandself-sufficiencyarecloselylinked.Butwhyshouldapersonbecomemoresolitaryashebecomesmoreself-sufficient?Self-sufficiency in theNicomachean Ethicshas two fea-tures:somethingself-sufficient isfinal: it issought for itsownsakeand not for the sake of anything else; and furthermore, somethingself-sufficientisfree from necessary conditions.15Bothfeaturescanbeun-

14. Socrates is also portrayed in Symposium 174d–e as getting lost in solitarythought,whichindicateseitheranimpulseorcapacityforsolitude;perhapsheoughtbethoughtasamysteriouscaseontheLysisorNE picture,assome-onewhohasfriendswithoutneedingthem.Ithanktheanonymousreviewerforthepoint.

15. SoarguesHeinaman, “EudaimoniaandSelf-sufficiency in theNicomachean Ethics”, 45; innote34hepointsout that thenecessary conditionsmustbedistinctfromwhattheyaretheconditionsfor.RichardsonLear,Happy Lives, chap.3, argues (asdoesCooper, “PlatoandAristotle”) that self-sufficiencyshouldbeunderstoodonly in termsoffinality, so that thehighestgood isself-sufficient as a final end: it supplies everything needed tomake a life



primemoverdoesonlyonethingandrequiresabsolutelynothingout-sideofhimselftodoit.Self-sufficiencyisnotreferredtoheredirectly;however,intheDe Caelo,thebeingorbeings“outsidetheheaven”aresaidtobe“mostself-sufficient”(279a20–21).Thattheprimemoveristhus solitary and friendlessperhapsexplains theassumption in thediscussionoffriendshipintheEudemian Ethics1244b8–10andintheMagna Moralia 1212b37 thatGodhasno friends; andwhy, famously,Aristotle describes amanwho can live in total solitude as “a beastoragod”(Politics1253a28).

Thequestion,then,iswhatitmeansforahumanbeingtobeself-sufficient,what itmeans forahumanbeing topursuea single, self-containedactivity.AsAristotlemakesclear,atrulygod-likelifeisim-possible,sinceournaturerequiresexternalnecessities:

Happiness, therefore,mustbesome formofcontempla-tion.But,beingaman,onewillalsoneedexternalpros-perity(tês ektos euêmerias);forournatureisnotself-suffi-cient(autarkês)forthepurposeofcontemplation,butourbodyalsomustbehealthyandmusthavefoodandotherattention.[1178b32–35]

Itwouldseemtofollowthatourneedforotherpeopleislikeourneedforfood,aneedforanexternalgood,aqualificationonourself-suf-ficiencybyconsequenceofmortalweakness.Andifitispossible,byintellectualprogress,toovercomeourneedforotherpeople,atleastinourcontemplativeactivity,thiswillbetoachievegreaterself-suffi-ciencyandsogreatergod-likeness.Andsoitseemsthatasourrationalnatureisperfected,ourpoliticalnatureisovercome.

Theforegoingpicturemightbechallenged,oratleastsomeofitsharshnessmitigated, if theneed for friendscouldbeunderstoodasunliketheneedforfoodorothernecessities.Aristotleseemstosug-gestintwomajorpassagesthathappypeopleneedfriendsinawayentirelycompatiblewithself-sufficiency. If thissuggestion turnsouttobeAristotle’sconsideredview, thenAristotlewillbe inconsistent,

As Ihavealready suggested, the solitude thatAristotle seems toassociatewiththebesthumanlifeislesssurprisingthanitmightbe,sincedivinelifeforAristotleisbothsolitaryandamodelforhumanlife.19WhileNE 9.9onitsfaceshowsnoindicationofconcernwiththegodsorourimitationofthem,20in10.7–8Aristotletreatsthegodsasmodelsorparadigmsforthebesthumanlife.InthepassageIquotedattheopeningofthepaper,heexhortsusto“makeourselvesimmor-tal”asmuchasispossible;hecallsthehighest,contemplativeactivity“divine”(1177a15,16;1177b28);hearguesthatsincetheactivityofthegods is contemplative,oursmustbe also (1178b8–24); and that thelivesofmenareblessed(andhappy)totheextentthattheyresemblethe lives of gods (1178b25–27). In 10.8, Aristotle argues that divineactivity iscontemplative rather thanpractical, since it seemsunwor-thy and unnecessary for them to perform just or generous actions(1178b10–19).Thisstronglysuggeststhatthegodshavenoneedtoliveinpolitical community. InBook 12of theMetaphysics,AristotlealsocomparesthelifeofGodtothebesthumanlife(1072b13–30),sayingthat“heisalwaysinthestatethatwesometimesare”,andattributestoGodasingleactivitythat,howeverweunderstandit,seemstobetotallyself-contained:thoughtthinkingitself(1074b15–1075a10).The

contemplation from the solitudeofhappiness (Aristotle on the Human Good, 170–171). Kraut argues thatwhile contemplative activity can be solitary, ahappypersoncannotbe.Butwhilethisistrueinalimitedway,sincethewisemanneedspeopletoprovidehisfoodandsafety,thiscan’tstrictlyberight.Self-sufficiencyisacriterionforthehighestgoodandisattainedbythehappyperson.Ifself-sufficiencyimpliessolitude,asIthinkitdoes,itwillnotmakesenseforAristotletopraiseanactivityforitsself-sufficiencywhiledenyingthattheactivitywillinfactbepursuedinsolitude.Sothewisemanwillbemore solitary on account of his contemplative activity, even if he can’t becompletelysolitary.

19. ThatAristotleseesdivinelifeasamodelforhumanstoimitatehasbeenne-glected inmuchof the literatureon theNicomachean Ethics,with themorerecentexceptionsofSedley,“TheIdealofGodlikeness”,Bodéüs,Aristotle 168–179,Gerson,Aristotle 242–260,and,mostextensively,RichardsonLear,Happy Lives.

20.AsGauthierandJolifcomplain(L’Éthique à Nicomaque, ad loc.)



improvementsindicatesthatthemoreaccomplishedonegetsinvirtue,thelesserone’sneedisforothers.Ifthisiscorrect,thebestliveswillbemostsolitary—unless,thatis,onemayhavefriendswithoutneedingthem,outofagratuitousdesiretosharethegood.(Hereitwouldmat-terwhetherAristotleacceptsorrejectsakeyassumptionfromtheLy-sisdiscussion,whetherloveforanotherimpliesapriorneedforthem.)Accordingly,Iarguethatthe9.9arguments,onceproperlyunderstood,areentirelyconsistentwiththe10.7pictureofthesolitaryhappylife.

III. The arguments of 9.9

AtthebeginningofNicomachean Ethics9.9,Aristotlelaysoutopinionsheldbycolleaguesandpredecessors(suchasPlatointheLysis)ontherelationshipbetweenfriendshipandhappiness:

It is also disputed whether the happy man will needfriendsornot.It issaidthatthosewhoareblessed(ma-kariois) and self-sufficient have no need of friends; fortheyhavethethingsthataregood,andthereforebeingself-sufficient they need nothing further (prosdeisthai),whileafriend,beinganotherself,furnisheswhatamancannotprovidebyhisowneffort.[NE 1169b3–7]

Thehappymanisthoughttobeself-sufficient—heisthoughtnottoneedanything.Whythenwillheneedfriends?Friendshelpusaccom-plishwhatwecannotdoonourown(1169b6–7).Theycompensateforfailures, lacks,needsanddeficienciesthatwehave. Ifwhenwearehappywehavenosuchdeficiencies,whywillweneedthem?

Aristotledefendstheideathatthehappymanwillneedfriendsfirstbyappealingtosignsandindicatorsthatthisisthecase(1169b8–22)andthengivingtworelatedsetsofarguments,dividingtherestofthechapterintotwosections.First,Aristotlegivesageneraloutlineofthevalueof friendsasbased in sharedactivityand thepleasure in thatactivity,alongwithwaysthatone’sactivityiseasierandmoreeffectivewithfriends(1169b30–1170a13).Secondly,Aristotlegivesanelaborate

but hewill have resources to explainwhat appears to be the truthabout friendship,namely, thatwisepeoplehaveasmany friendsasanyone else. If, on the other hand, as I will argue, these passagescanbereadconsistentlywith10.7,Aristotle’sviewwillbeconsistent,butapparentlyfalse.

The first passage suggesting the compatibility of self-sufficiencywithfriendshipisinNE 1.7,whereAristotleclaimsthattheself-suffi-ciencyofthehappylifeis“notforonealone,livingasolitarylife,butalso for forbearsandchildrenandawifeand ingeneral for friendsandcitizens”(1097b8–11).Thispassageisambiguous.Whileitmightbedescribingadifferenttypeorsenseofself-sufficiency,sothathu-manbeingsbecomemoreself-sufficientthroughothers,21itmayalsobeputtingaconditionontheself-sufficiencyavailableinpoliticallife,thus indicating thatself-sufficiency isonlypossible forhumans inalimitedway.22Morepromisingisthein-depthexaminationoffriend-shipandself-sufficiencyin9.9,whichoffersthebesthopeforaneedforfriendsthatmightbeconsistentwithagodlikelife.Thediscussionin9.9 indicates that in thehighest typesof friendship, theneed forfriends isdifferent inkindfromthat inthe lower.Putsimply, inthebest lives,a friend isnotanexternalend tobecollectedwithothergoodsbutanintegratedimprovementtoone’sownactivity.Whethertheviewoftheself-sufficientman’sneedforfriendsthatemergesfromthisdiscussionisenoughtosolvethedifficultiesIhaveoutlinedisan-otherquestion.Iwillargue,intheend,thatevenanotionoffriendsas

21. AsBrown,“AristotleontheChoiceofLives”argues.Aristotlemightseemtosupportthealternativeinterpretationof1.7in9.9itself,whenhesaysthatitseemsinappropriateforahumanbeingtobesolitary,sincemanisapoliticalanimal(1169b16–19).Butthisisapreliminaryargument,anindicationthatthehappymanwillindeedneedfriends.Andindeed,Aristotledoesbelievethatmanisapoliticalanimal,andmeanstoexplainwhyintherestof9.9.But,asIarguebelow,hismoreconsideredargumentsturnouttobecompatiblewiththe10.7qualificationonthepoliticalnatureofhumans:friendshipreliesondefect,anddefectscanbepartlyovercome.Toovercomethemincreasesone’sself-sufficiency.

22. Kraut interprets thepassagealong these lines (Aristotle on the Human Good 299n18).RichardsonLearhasahelpfuldiscussionofthewaysthispassagecanbeinterpreted(Happy Lives 50,62–63;seenote7).



Since the last argument, the argument from human nature, ismoregeneralandsinceitseemsclearlymeantastheculminationofthe previous arguments,26 I beginwith it andwill refer back to thefirst set of argumentswhen they become relevant. Its circuitous ar-gument appealing tohumannature and thevalueof friends in self-awarenesshas longpuzzledand frustratedcommentators.GauthierandJolif,forinstance,complainthatit“pretendstobemoreprofound,butisonlymorelaborious”thanwhatprecedesit.27Cooperalsofindsitunsatisfactory,28andnointerpretationIhavefoundgivesanyclearandconvincingexplanationof itscontentor itsstructure. Iwillfirstoutlinethebare-bonesapparentstructureoftheargument,explainingdifficulties thatemerge there; Iwill thenproposesolutions to thesedifficulties and explain how the argument undermy interpretationdoesnotdeservethecriticismcommentatorshaveheapedonit.

I begin by outlining the skeleton of the argument from1170a13–b19, putting down the most basic inferential steps thatAristotlemakesexplicit:

1. The life of the good man is in itself good and pleasant(since it is choiceworthybynature andpleasant in itself,andsochoiceworthyandpleasantforhim).[1170a14–20]

2. Thegoodman’sawarenessofhislifeisinitselfgoodandpleasant.[1170b1–5]

3. Asthegoodmanistohimself,soheistohisfriend(“Thefriendisanotherself”.[1170b5–7]

26.Thuswhile I agreewithPakaluk that the arguments for thedesirabilityoffriendsaremeanttoimproveinsomesenseasthechapterprogresses,Ithinkthatthefinaltwosetsofargumentsarenotstrictlyspeakingarguingtothesameconclusion.Rather,thefirstconcernsfriendsinthelifeofmoralvirtuealone,while the second includes also the contemplative life (Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII and IX, ad loc.)

27. GauthierandJolif,ad loc.

28.Cooper“FriendshipandtheGood”,341.

explanationofthegoodoffriendshipbasedonprinciplesofhumannature(1170a13–b19;hecallstheargumentphusikôteronat1170a13).23 Itisclearthatthetwosetsofargumentsaremeanttodiffersomewhatintermsofthetypesofexcellencetheyconcern:thefirstsectionfocus-esonmoralorpoliticalvirtue,emphasizingthecontemplationofprax-eisoractions(1169b35)andthepleasurethatthevirtuousmanissaidtotakein“actionsinaccordancewithvirtue”(1170a8–9).24Thesecondsectionbycontrastemphasizesthenaturalactivityofthinking(noein or noêsis;1170a17,19,32)aswellasperceptionandsomaybethoughttoincludecontemplativevirtueaswellasothervirtuousactivities.25

23.One could read phusikôteron conservatively, as Gauthier and Jolif do, andpointtotheparalleluseinNE 9.4,wherethephusikôteron argumentalsocon-cernsthedefinitionofhumanlifeasperceivingandthinkingandthesenseinwhich one’s activities and their products are one’s own. So understoodphusikôteron couldmeansimply “having todowith thenatureofahumanbeing”.However, it isalsopossible thatAristotle isappealing toa familiarcontrast between speaking logikôs versus phusikôs (see references in Ross,Metaphysics,vol2,168).Burnyeathasargued(followingSimplicius)thatthisdistinctioncontraststhingstrueofavarietyofsubjectmatters—suchastheOrganon —andthingstrueonthebasisofnaturalphilosophyormetaphysics,appealingespecially to thedistinctionbetweenmatter and form—suchasthePhysics, De Anima,andmuchoftheMetaphysics(A Map of Metaphysics Zeta, 19–25,87–125).Burnyeat’sviewfitsourpassageonaccountofthedistinctionbetweenactualityandpotentialityandbecauseitreliesonfeaturesofhumansoulfoundintheDe Anima(2.1–3).

24. Thephrase “praxeis kata tên aretên” is sometimesambiguous, as in 1099a14and20wherethecontextseemstobethelifeofvirtuegenerallyratherthanofmoralvirtuespecifically;butgiventhattheexamplesarejustandliberalactsthecontextmaybenarroweventhere.Thephraseisalsoambiguousat1176b7–9,althoughin10.7–8praxis, praxeis,andpratteinarerepeatedlyandexplicitly distinguished from theôria and the energeia of nous or theôria e. g.1178b1–2,1178b17–18,20–21.

25. The12thcenturycommentatorMichaelofEphesusclaimsthatthewholeof9.9ismeantasonlyrelevanttothepoliticallife(Commentary on the Nicoma-chean Ethics,509.17–19,27–30).Sinceheclaimstherethatthecontemplativelifedoesnotrequirefriends,Itakeitthatheinterpretsinthiswaytodefusethetensionbetween9.9and10.7.Whilethispossibilityisattractive,Icannotseewhytheconsiderationsappealedtointhelastsectionof9.9maynotap-plydirectlytothecontemplativelifeaswellastotheactivelife,sincethinkingisincludedinthenaturalactivitiessharedinfriendship.Furthermore,onmyreading,thetensionbetween9.9and10.7isonlyapparent;theycanbereadconsistentlywithoneanother.



similar people is broader than the class of friends, hewill havedif-ficultylimitingthescopeofhisargumentsonlytofriendsratherthantomuchlargergroupsofpeoplesimilartothefriend.Forexample,theargumentfromhumannatureseemstocompareextensivelythehap-pyman’sself-awarenesswithhisawarenessofhisfriend,andtodrawconclusionsaboutthevalueofthelatterfromthevalueoftheformer.Howshouldweunderstandthis?Stewartinterpretsasfollows:“Itisintheconsciousnessoftheexistenceofanotherthatamanbecomestru-lyconsciousofhimself”(392).ButasCooperpointsout(340–1),thisdoesnotseemtrue,norevenifitweretrue,woulditexplainwhyweneedfriendsratherthanjustanyoldother.Thebareawarenessofanypersonwouldprovidetheself-consciousnessStewartisinterestedin.30

Asimilarproblemarises for theargumentparallel to thisone, inthefirstargumentativesectionof9.9.Aristotleseemstoarguetherethatafriendis“one’sown”(oikeion),andsothevirtuousmanwilltakepleasureinthefriend’sactionsinasimilarwaytohisown.Theideathatafriendisoikeionplaysasimilarroleinthisargumenttotheideathatthefriendis“anotherself”inthelatterargument:

Ifhappinessliesinlivingandbeingactive(energein),andtheactivityof thegoodmanisvirtuous(spoudaios)andpleasantinitself,aswehavesaidattheoutset,andifathing’sbeingone’sown(to oikeion)isoneofthethingsthatare pleasant, and ifwe can contemplate our neighborsbetter than ourselves and their actions better than ourown,andiftheactionsofvirtuous(spoudaiôn)menwhoare their friendsarepleasant togoodmen (since thesehaveboththeattributes thatarenaturallypleasant)—ifthisbeso,theblessedmanwillneedfriendsofthissort,

30.CooperacceptsStewart’sinterpretation,and,concludingthattheargumentis“abortive”,rejectsthepassageastheauthoritativeaccountofthevalueoffriendship.OnCooper’s view, friendsarenecessary for self-knowledgeun-derstoodasknowledgeofone’scharacter,notforthemereself-consciousnesshe seesdescribed in9.9.All commentatorswith theexceptionofKosman(whosefocusistheparallelargumentintheEudemian Ethics)agreethatself-consciousness,narrowlyconceived,isatstakehere.

Concluson1.Thefriend’slifeisinitselfdesirableforthegoodman.[1170b7–8]

Conclusion2.Thegoodman’sawarenessofhis friend’slifeisinitselfgoodandpleasant.[1170b9–10]

4. The good man needs whatever is choiceworthy in itself.[1170b17–18]

Conclusion3.Thegoodmanneedsfriends.

Theargumentasstatedfacesseveralgravedifficulties.Thefirstariseswiththethirdpremise,thatthefriendisanotherself.Ifitmeanswhatitappearstomean,thateverythingtrueofone’srelationtooneselfistrueofone’srelationtoone’sfriend,itwillnotonlybefalseonitsfacebutitwillassumetheconclusionthatitisbeingusedtoshowintheargument.Theargumentwouldthenreadasfollows:

A. One’sownlife(andawarenessofit)isdesirableinitself.

B. My friend’s life (and awareness of it) is desirable in thesamewaymineis.

Conclusion. My friend’s life (and awareness of it) isdesirableinitself.

Thesecondpremiseistoobroad;itdoesnotexplainwhyitisthatthefriendisasecondselfinawaythatjustifiestheconclusion.Ifweal-readyknowthateveryrelationwehavetowardourselvesistrueofourfriend,thenthefactthatourfriendsarevaluableistrivial.29

IfAristotleisarguingfromthesimilarityofthefriendstotheirvaluetooneanother,hefacesotherdifficultiesaswell.Becausetheclassof

29.Accordingly,Stern-Gilletcallsthepremiseanapparent“deus ex machina”(140),referringtocomplaintsbyStewart,ad loc.,andHardie,Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 332.



pearstoarguefromthevalueofthinkingtothevalueoftheawarenessof thinking to the value of friends. If such an argumentwere effec-tive,itwouldseemtoestablishthatGodhadfriends,whichweknowAristotlebelievestobefalse.33Furthermore,whileawarenessofone’sfriendsmightseemtobeanimportantconditionforfriendship,itdoesnotseemtobewhatwevaluemostaboutfriendship,anymorethanbareself-consciousnessiswhatweseemtovaluemostaboutlife.Ac-cordingly,Aristotleseemstohaveputboththevalueof lifeandthevalueoffriendshiponastrangeandimplausiblefoundation.

Lastly, therearedifficultiesaboutwhatAristotlesays in thefinalargument about the type of good that friendship is and theway inwhichitisvaluable.Premise4inmyoutline,thatthegoodmanneedswhateverischoiceworthyinitself,seemstobebothfalseforAristotleandfalsesimply.Ifwhatischoiceworthyinitselfistobeunderstoodasanintrinsicgoodasopposedtoaninstrumentalone,asCooperpointsout,itwillfollowthatthehappymanneedsallintrinsicgoods—spir-itedcardgames,elegantlawndecorations,footmassages,andsoon.34 But this isneither intuitivelyplausiblenor something thatAristotleseemstothink.

In the remainder of the paper Iwill argue, in response to theseproblems:

(i) By calling the friend another self,Aristotle is not appeal-ingtoageneral,implausibleanalogybetweenoneselfandone’sfriend.Rather,heunderstandsfriendshiptoinvolvecollaborativeactivity, and so the friend is another self inthesenseofbeingahelperratherthanamirror.35

33. AsGauthierandJolifseeit,thefirstsectionofargumentin9.9properlyrec-ognizesthatwehavefriendsbecauseweareimperfectordefective;theargu-mentinthelastsectionof9.9doesnotseemtoacknowledgethis.Itisbettertoargue,theythink,asthepreviousargumentdoes,thatfriendsmakeouractivitymorecontinuousorgodlike.OntheinterpretationthatIdefend,thelast section also assumeshumandefects, and so this criticismof the argu-mentisavoided.

34.Cooper“FriendshipandtheGood”,338n5.

35. Thatthehighestformsoffriendshipinvolvecollaborativeactivityisapoint

sincehechoosestocontemplateworthyactionsandac-tionsthatarehisown,andtheactionsofagoodmanwhoishisfriendhaveboththesequalities.[1169b30–1170a4]

GiventhatAristotledrawsconclusionsaboutthesimilaritybetweenfriends and so the valueof friendship from the fact that a friend isoikeion, itmight seem thathemeansbyoikeionhere something like“similar”.Onceagain,thisishowStewartreadsit:thefriend’sactionsareone’sown“in thesenseofbeinghomoiai [similar],andrealisingtheonelawofrectitudecommontoallgoodmen.”Thegoodmanseeshimselfby“universalizinghisownconduct.…Itisnolongerhiscon-duct,buttheconductofall good men”(385–86).ButifStewartisright,Aristotle’sargumentisincoherent.Anygoodmancouldservethepur-poseStewartdescribes,whereasAristotle isdiscussing theneed forfriendsorlovedones.Strangerscouldreflectthegoodnessofthegoodman,andreadingaboutgoodmensimilartooneselfwouldservejustaswellasactually livingwith them.So ingeneral itseemsthatanyargumentforthevalueoffriendshipbasedonsimilaritywillhavedif-ficultieslimitingtherelevantsimilaritiestofriends.

Theemphasisonawareness,perception,andthoughtinthefinalargumentof9.9raisesotherdifficulties.Self-perceptionissharedwithallhumanbeings,andsoitisnotclearwhyAristotlehasnotarguedthatweoughtbefriendswithallself-perceivers,orat leastallgoodones.31Ifoneshiftsone’semphasistothethinking(noiein andnoêsis)discussedinthepassage,otherdifficultiesarise,sincethinkingisalsopropertoGodandGodhasnofriends.32Thesecondsectionof9.9ap-

31. So Pakaluk’s interpretation cannot be correct. As Pakaluk interprets (209–215),therelationamanhastohisownperceptionisvaluable,andissimilartotherelationhecanhavetohisfriend’sperception.“Sharinginperceptionisanalogoustoreflexiveperception”(215).Butthenitwillnotbeclearwhy,forAristotle,thegoodmanisnotfriendswitheveryhumanbeing,sinceeveryhumanbeingisaperceiverandapossibleobjectofperception.

32.Accordingly,GauthierandJolifcomplainaboutthisargumentthatawarenesscannotbethebasisoffriendship,sinceGodispureawareness,andhehasnofriends(761).



IV. Collaboration

Thefinalargumentof9.9reliescruciallyontheideathatthefriendisanotherself.Whatdoesthismean?WefindinthetextoftheNicoma-chean Ethics twodifferentuses:

Version 1.AnyrelationIbeartomyself,Ialsobeartomyfriend.[1166a31]

Version 2.Afriendfurnisheswhatonecannotprovideonone’sown.[1169b7–8]

Inthefirstcase,thefriendisasortofmirrorordouble;inthesecond,heisahelper.37Whichversionisappropriatehere?Thefirst,takenonitsown,runs intotheproblemsinthisargumentthatwehavemen-tioned:itjustifiestoomuchandmakestheconclusionthatfriendsarevaluabletrivial.Thesecondversion,introducedinthissamechapterandcontext,faresbetter;indeed,itendsupsolvingmanyoftheappar-entdifficultiesinthechapter.Thisisnottosaythatsimilarityamongfriendsisunimportant,butthatthetypeofsimilaritypropertofriend-shiphasitsorigininsharedactivityandcollaborativeactivityratherthanviceversa.38

Aristotleisemphaticontheimportanceoflivingtogetherforfriend-ship;ashesaysin8.5,“Thereisnothingsocharacteristicoffriendsas

37. AsStewartinterpretsit:“asupplementaryself”(384).IamindebtedtoKos-man“AristotleontheDesirabilityofFriends”,whichhasavaluablediscussionoftherolethisconceptionofthefriendplaysintheparallelpassageoftheEudemian Ethics.

38.See1155a32–35foranendoxicclaimthatlikenessfoundsfriendship;itdoesnotseemthatAristotleeverendorsesthisclaim.Aristotlecallsvirtuefriend-ship“thefriendshipofthegoodandofthosewhoaresimilarwithrespecttovirtue(homoiôn kat’ aretên)”(1156b7–8)andallfriendship,hesays,is“accord-ing to a certain resemblance (kath’ homoiotêta tina)” (1156b19–20).He alsoseemstoequatefriendshipandlikenessat1159b2–6.Thislastpassagemaybethekeytounderstandingtheothertwo;Aristotleisthereconcernedaboutequalityratherthanotherformsofsimilarity,asheemphasizesthatthe“like-ness”ofvirtuefriendsmeansthatneitherdoesabaseserviceforanother.

(ii) Oncethecollaborativenatureoffriendshipisunderstood,itcanbeseenthat thefinalargumentdoesnotrelyonacomparisonbetweenself-awarenessandtheawarenessofsomeone else, but on collaborative thinking andperceiv-ing, taken to cover a broad variety of life-activities. Theemphasis on the value of life, perception, and thought,whileapplying,broadlytaken,toavarietyoftypesofvirtuefriendship,alsoexplainsthespecialwayinwhichfriendsmaybevaluableincontemplativeactivity.

(iii) ThecollaborativenatureoffriendshipalsohelpstoshowthatAristotleisnotarguingthatfriendsareintrinsicgoods,butratherthattheyareatypeofexternalgoodIwillcall“integrated goods”.36 Integrated goods can have both in-strumental and intrinsic value even for virtuous people,so indicating that intrinsic value is not their key feature.Theirkeyfeatureisthattheyimproveandaugmentwhatthegoodmandoesalreadyratherthanprovidingoutsidesupplies or supplements. Accordingly, they are compat-iblewith the self-containedunityof thehappyman in away that they are not for the vicious man. Nonetheless,theydependonhumandefect,andtheneedevenforsuchfriendsdiminisheswithgreatercontemplativeexcellence.

well-discussedbyKosman,“AristotleontheDesirabilityofFriends”;seealsoCooper“FriendshipandtheGood”,346ff.Theimportanceofcollaborationinunifyingthefriendsisneglectedbyalltheothercommentators.See,forex-ample,SmithPangle’spuzzlesoverhowafriend’sactivitycanreallybeone’sown(SmithPangle187,189);andKahn’sclaimthatonlybypositingnous asthetrueselfsharedamongfriendscanthefriendsshareeachother’sexcel-lenceintherightway(“AristotleandAltruism”,34–5).

36.Thisparticulardivisionofexternalgoodsintotypeshastodowithwhoval-uesthemandthusthewaytheyarevalued,sothatthevirtuouspersonvaluesthemonewayandtheviciouspersonanother.Thisisadifferentsortofdivi-sionintotypesthanthemorecommonlydiscusseddivisionbetweeninstru-mentsandthingswithoutwhichhappinessisdamaged.



thecaptureofadangerouswildboar.Aristotlemarksascharacteris-ticofgoodfriendshipsasopposedtobadthattheyare“augmented”41 andthatthefriendshipsimprovethefriendsbytheiractivities.WhatdoesAristotlemeanwhenhesaysthatthefriendshipsofthegoodare“augmented”?Isuggestthatthebetteractivitiesinvolvecollaboration,hence that the friendshelpeachother inwhateverproject isunder-way:theyacttogetherandinconcertforsharedgoals.42

Ifweseecollaborationasassumedinthebackgroundofthediscus-sionsof9.9(wherethefriendshipofthegoodisassumed),theargu-mentsmakemoresense.Thefirststretchofargumentthatthefriendisoikeionandsohispraxeisarepleasanttobeholdcanbeseentoassumethatthesharedpleasureispartofasharedproject.Ibeholdmyfriend’sactionswithpleasurebecause insomesense theyaremine—eitherbecause I share theaction inaproximate sense,killingawildboar,conqueringTroy,orbecauseIshareit inabroadsenseaswhenmyfriendisafellow-contributorinwhateverwaytothegoodofourpo-liticalcommunity.Thisiswhytheconsiderationsaboutthefriendasoikeionandsopleasanttobeholdgoalongwithconsiderationsaboutthewaysthatthefriendisanaidtoactivity:lifealoneismoredifficult(1170a5);itiseasiertobecontinuallyactivewithfriends(1170a5–6);goodfriendsprovidepracticeingoodness(1170a11–13).

Aristotlemakes explicit the valueof collaboration in thehighestfriendships toward theendof thefinalargumentof9.9.At theendof his long comparison of the good man’s self-awareness with his

41. “Augmented” (sunauxanomenê) modifies “friendship” (philia) but Aristotlemustmeanthatitaugmentsthefriendsthemselvesandtheiractivities.Plea-sureissaidtoaugment(sunauxanein)activityat1175a30.

42. Onemightquestionthelimitationofcollaborationtofriendshipsofthegood:agangofwickedbanditscollaborate in theft.However,as is the themeofmanyabanditmovie,sincethegoal(acquiringwealth)iszero-sum,thecol-laborationisbothfragileandlimited.SincethekeygoodsforAristotle(moraland intellectual virtue) are not zero-sum, collaboration in the best friend-shipscaninvolvetrulysharingagoal(e. g.,victory,truth)withoutlosstotheothers;accordingly,thesefriendshipsarecollaborativeinamuchdeeperandmorerobustway.

livingtogether”(1157b19).39Livingtogethermeanssharedactivity,asisemphasizedmostclearlyattheendofthediscussionoffriendshipinNE 9.12.There,itisclearthatsharedactivityiscommontoalltypesoffriendship.Twogluttonsmaycookandfeasttogether;soldierfriendsfighttogether;philosopherfriendsthinktogether:

Whatever ‘tobe’means foreachtypeofmen,whateverit is forwhosesake theyvalue life, in that theywish tooccupythemselveswiththeirfriends;andsosomedrinktogether,othersdice together,others join inathleticex-ercisesandhunttogether,orphilosophizetogether,eachtypespendingtheirdaystogetherinwhatevertheylovemostinlife;forsincetheywishtolivewiththeirfriends,theydoand share in those thingswhich they count aslivingtogether.Thusthefriendshipofbadmenturnsouttobe an evil thing…while the friendshipof the goodisgood,beingaugmentedbytheircompanionship;andtheyarethoughttobecomebettertoobybeingactiveandbyimprovingeachother.[1172a1–13]

Here Aristotle describes a list of activities some of which are sim-ply shared (drinking together); some are competitive (playingdice, athletic contests); while others are collaborative (hunting orphilosophizingtogether).40

Onenaturalthoughtsuggestedbytheexamplesinthepassageisthat the sharing of activities is different in different types of friend-ship.Drinkingwithsomeonemay increase thepleasureofdrinking,butultimatelythefriendsaresimplydoingthesamethinginthesameplace.Whereasphilosophizingwithsomeone,orhuntingwiththem,involves sharing a goal: the solution to ametaphysical problem,or

39.Cf.1158a23,1171a2–3,10,and1156b26with1156a27.

40. Isettoonesidethequestionastowhethercompetitivefriendshipisproperlysharedactivityorcollaborativeactivity.Itseemstovarybycontext:gamblingtogetherseemsnotcollaborativebutratherzero-sum;whereasathleticcon-testscouldbeacollaborativepursuitoffitnessorphysicalexcellence.



tobechosenandloved(haireton kai philêton),andthatwearebyvirtueofactivity(i. e.bylivingandacting),andthattheworkisinawaytheproducerinactivity(energeia);heloves(stergei)hiswork,then,becausehelovestobe.Andthisisnatural(phusikon);forwhatheisinpotentiality,hisworkmanifestsinactuality(energeia).[1168a3–9]

Justasartistsbecomeattachedtotheirinanimateproductsonaccountoftheirattachmenttotheirownactivityandwhatitmeanstobeforthem, so those benefiting others become attached to the object oftheirbeneficialactivity.Thetreatmentofthisassomethingnaturalorphusikos,andtheconnectionoffriendswithactivityversuspotentiality,echoesin9.9;wewillreturntoitlater.Thepassageforthemomentisvaluableasanexampleofawayanotherpersoncanbeunifiedwithhisfriend’sactivityandcanbevaluedbecauseofthevalueofthatac-tivity.Itismysuggestionthatcollaboratorsinothercontextsfunctionsimilarlyinhumanactivitytothewaythebeneficiariesdohere.44

Notonly is theaffectiveattachment toone’sactivityextended totheobjectofthatactivityandparticipantsinthatactivity,but—asiscrucialforthe9.9discussions—one’sownactivityisalsopleasant.SoinNE10.4:

44. Anearlierpassageparalleltotheoneaboutbeneficiariesisthediscussionofthelovebetweenparentsandchildren,whereAristotlesaysthatparentslovechildrenastheirproducts,andthataccordinglythechildrenare“otherselves”(1161b27–31).Itakethisasevidencethatitistheintegrationoftheotherper-sonintoone’sownactivitythatmakesthemotherselves.Millgram,“AristotleonMakingOther Selves” (followedbyReeve,Practices of Reason, 181–183),alsotakes thesepassagestoprovidehelp inunderstandingwhythe friendisanotherself.However,hisviewtakestheanalogytoparentstobemuchcloserthanmine;heemphasizesthecausalrolethatthefriendsplayinmak-ingeachothervirtuoustobeginwith.RichardKraut,Aristotle on the Human Good, 143,takesasimilarview.Whiletheformationofcharacterisonewaythatthefriendshelpinvirtue,itisnottheonlyway.Accordingly,Iemphasize(moreplausibly,Ithink)themoregeneralrolefriendsplayinimprovingandaugmentingvirtuousactivity.Ialsoargue,contra Millgram,thatwhatmakesapersonwhatheisisnotvirtueassuch,butperceptiveorintellectualactivity.

awarenessofhisfriend,Aristotlepausestomakeitclearthatheisnotdrawingacomparisonatall,butisdescribingcollaborativeactivity:

So[thegoodman]mustbeawarealsoofhisfriendthatheis,andthiswillhappeninlivingtogetherandinshar-ingdiscussionandthought.Forthisiswhatlivingtogeth-erforhumanbeingsseemstomean,andnotasforcattle,grazinginthesameplace.[1170b10–14]

HereAristotlecontrasts themerelysharedactivityofcattle (andhu-man gluttons)with the collaborative activity of philosophic friends,who think and discuss in common and so help one another toachievesharedgoals.

Theargumentthatcollaborationandcollaborativeactivityplaysakeyroleintheargumentsof9.9isstrengthenedbyacomparisonbe-tweenthe9.12passageandotherpassageswhereAristotlediscussesthetransferinvaluefromouractivities(andwhatitis“tobe”forus)tothepeopleinvolvedinouractivities.Soin9.7whenAristotledis-cusseswhybenefactorslovewhomtheybenefitmorethanviceversa,heexplains (inconsiderationshealsocallsphusikôteron, at 1167b29)thatthebenefitedareanextensionofthebenefactor’sactivityandsoofwhatheis:43

This iswhat thepositionofbenefactors is like; for thatwhich theyhave treatedwell is theirwork (ergon), andtherefore they love this more than the work loves hismaker.Thecauseofthisisthat‘tobe’istoallmenathing

43. See also NE 9.4, where Aristotle discusses the love of the good man forhimself:

Hewishesforhimselfwhatisgoodandwhatseemsso,anddoesit(foritischaracteristicofthegoodmantoexerthimselfforthegood),anddoessoforhisownsake(forhedoesit forthesakeofthethinkingpartofhim(dianoêtikon),whichisthoughttobethemanhimself);andhewisheshimselfto liveand tobepreserved,andespecially theelementbyvirtueofwhichhethinks.For‘tobe’isgoodtothegoodman,andeachmanwisheshimselfwhatisgood….Andsuchamanwishestolivewithhimself,anddoessowithpleasure.[1166a14–24]



thingsaredefinedbytheircharacteristicactivities,theseactivitiesarealsowhatweare.Accordingly,weidentifywithouractivitiesandtheirproducts;wevaluethemasextensionsofourselves.Likewise,thosewithwhomwe share our activities, especially thosewho share ourgoals andhelpus achieve them,will bevalued,desired, and foundpleasantbecauseoftheroletheyplayinouractivity.Theintegrationofthepersonintoouractivitiesmakesthem“anotherself”.

V. “Sharing discussion and thought”

SofarIhavesuggestedthatcollaborativeactivity,ratherthansimilar-itybetweenfriends,isthebasisforthevalueoffriendstooneanother.ThisfitsneatlywithAristotle’ssummaryofthe9.9discussionatthebeginningof9.12:

Does it not follow, then, that, as for lovers the sight ofthe beloved is the thing they lovemost, and they pre-fer thissense to theothersbecause it ismostofall theseatandsourceoflove,soforfriendsthemostdesirablething(hairetôtaton)islivingtogether?Forfriendshipisapartnership(koinônia),andasamanistohimself,soheistohisfriend;nowinhisowncasetheperceptionthatheisdesirable(haireton),andsothereforeinhisfriend’scase;andtheactivityofthisperceptioncomestobewhenthey live together, so it is natural that they aim at this.[1171b29-a1]

Herewefindtheemphasisonlivingtogetherandtheideathatlivingtogetherinvolvespartnershiporsharedgoals.45Wealsofindsumma-rizedthesecond—stillpuzzling—aspectofthelastargumentof9.9:thatone’sownself-awarenessseemstobecomparedwithawarenessofthefriend;andthisawarenessseemsmeanttoexplainthevalueofthefriend.

45. For the idea that friendship involves koinônia see 1160a8–30 esp. 29–30;1161b11–15.

Onemightthinkthatallmendesire(oregesthai)pleasurebecause theyall aimat life; life is anactivity, andeachman is active about those things andwith those facul-ties thathemost loves (agapai); e. g. themusician is ac-tivewithhis hearing in reference to tunes, the studentwithhismindinreferencetotheoreticalquestions,andsoonineachcase;nowpleasurecompletestheactivities,andthereforelife,whichtheydesire(oregontai).Itiswithgoodreason,then,thattheyaimatpleasuretoo,sinceforeveryone it completes life,which isdesirable (haireton).[1175a10–20]

Theparallelwith9.12isstriking;inbothcases,Aristotledescribesthelovethatwehavefortheactivitiesthatconstituteourlifeandtheirob-jects.Thedifferenceisthatheretheloveisalsoconnectedtotheplea-surethatcompletesthoseactivities,whereasin9.12itwasthefriendswithwhomwesharethoseactivities.

So in 9.9Aristotle emphasizesnot only collaboration—aswhenfriendshelpustocontemplateourownactionsbetter—butalsothepleasurethatsuchcollaborationbrings(1169b32,1170a1,4,9;1170a20,26,1170b1–5,10,15).Aristotlemakesitclearthat,ingeneral,theplea-sureconnectedwithanactivityintensifiesitandhelpsustodoitbet-terthanwewouldhaveotherwise(1175a28–b1).Isuggest,then,thatpleasureisconnectedwithcollaborationinthreeways.Firstofall,thepleasure thatwe naturally take in our own activity transfers to thepleasurewetakeincollaborativeactivityandinourcollaborators,asinthecaseofbenefactors.Secondly,collaborationremovesobstaclesto certain actions and activities, improves their quality overall, andtherebymakesthemmorepleasant.Further,suchpleasureitselfhasanamplifyingeffectonouractivity,makinguspursueitwithgreaterintensityandmorecontinuously(1170b5–8).

Withthesepassageswehavetheresourcestoseeinwhichdirec-tionthetwomainargumentsruninNE 9.9.Theactivitiesthatconsti-tuteourlifearedesirableandpleasant,andbecauseforAristotleliving



argumentof9.9beginsfromthedefinitionofahumanbeingas“per-ceptionorthought(aisthêsisornoêsis)”,47andperceptionofone’sownactivityandtheactivityofthefriendiswhatseemsmeanttoestablishthevalueofthefriend.Howoughtwetounderstandthis?Isuggestfirstofall thatthemoralactionsunderconsiderationinbothplacesarepartlycontemplative,andthatthisisimportantlyconnectedwithourpleasureinmoralaction.Secondly,Isuggestthatinthefinalargu-ment(asdistinctfromthefirst),Aristotlemeanstoincludenarrowlycontemplative friendship, and further that narrowly contemplativefriendship involvesakindofself-knowledge.So—albeit inahighlyspeculativewayinbothcases—Imeantoaccountfortheemphasisonperceptionandthought,andfortheemphaticallyreflexivelanguage.

Moral virtue as Aristotle understands it has a contemplative as-pect.48Itisseeninthefirstpartofthe9.9argument,wherethetheôria ofgoodactions isdescribed (1169b33–35, 1170a2–3). ItappearsalsowhenAristotledescribesthefriendshipofthegoodmanwithhimselfin9.4,sayingthat:

He wishes to spend time with himself, since he doesthiswithpleasure;forhehasagreeablememoriesofthepast,andgoodhopesforthefuture,andsuchthingsare

47. De Anima 2.2–2.3 andNE 1.7 (1097b34–1098a4) both give perception andthoughtaskindsoflife,althoughthoughtasdistinguishedfromperceptionistreatedinthoseplacesasessentialtohumanbeings.TheclaimthathumanlifeisconstitutedbyperceptionandthoughtappearsintheProtrepticusB72–B92(Düring),inpassagesechoingMetaphysics1,asexplainingwhypercep-tionandknowledgearemostdesirableandchoiceworthyinlife:ourdesireforperceptionandknowledgeexplainsourdesire for life itself.AsDüring(Protrepticus,242–246)pointsout,thesepassagesarealsocloselyrelatedtoEE1244b24–29,inthecontextoftheEudemianargumentthatthehappyman,althoughself-sufficient,needsfriends.TheEudemianargumentisquitediffi-cultandthetextcorrupt;seeKosman,“Aristotle”,foraninterpretationsimilarinmanyrespectstomyinterpretationofNE 9.9.

48. IdiscusstheimplicationofthispointforthedefinitionofhappinessintheNicomachean Ethics inaforthcomingpaper,“HappinessisContemplation”.

Inthecontextof9.12,thisaspectoftheargumentseemslessmys-terious.Thecomparisonbetweenthefriends—“asamanistohimself,so he is to his friends”—is put squarely in the context of living to-getherandpartnership(koinônia).Accordingly,weoughtexpectthattheperceptionorawarenessinquestionisnotonlysimilaroranalo-gousbutisrathersharedorcollaborativeawarenessconnectedwithsharedorcollaborativeactivity.Andindeed,thisisjustwhatAristotlegoesontosuggest:inthepassagefrom9.12wecitedearlier,friendsseektosharealloftheiractivitiesincommon,drinking,dicing,andphilosophy.ThisoughttellusthatAristotleisnottalkingaboutbareself-consciousnessat allbut rather consciousnessas integrated intovarious life-activities—for example, in the pleasure or appreciativeawarenesswetakeinourvariousactivities.

Sincetherangeoflife-andfriend-activitiesareincludedexplicitlyin9.12,andsince9.12isclearlysummarizing9.9,itseemsreasonabletoconcludethatAristotlehasasimilarlybroadnotionofself-conscious-nessin9.9andthathemeanstheretosuggestabroadvarietyoflife-activities—althoughnowundertheconditionthatthemenaregood.Andsoweoughtseetheargumentasquitegeneral:whatevervirtuousactivitiesfriendsdotogether,theywilltakepleasureineachotherbe-causeofthepleasureintheactivityitselfandbecauseofthehelptheysupply tooneanother.Thus theawarenessof life and itsgoodnessdescribedinthepassageshouldimplyawarenessofalifeinitsfullestsense—ofawholehumanlife,notjustbareself-consciousness.46

Still,moreneedstobedonetoreconciletheseclaimswiththeover-whelminglyreflexivelanguageofthefinalargumentof9.9,andwiththe emphasis on perception and thinking rather than on a broadervariety of activities. 9.12 emphasizesperceptionof one’s ownbeingandthatofone’sfriend;thefirstsetofargumentsin9.9alsoinvolveseeingthefriendandbeholding(theôrein)virtuousactions.Thelatter

46.AsKosmansuggests(“AristotleontheDesirabilityofFriends”,152–3).Hisar-gument,likemine,reducestheapparentdifferencebetweentheNicomachean andEudemian accountsoffriendship,asforinstanceKennyseesit(Aristotle on the Perfect Life,chap4,esp.51).



notbesurprising,sincein10.4–5Aristotleindicatesthatallpleasureisconnectedwitheitherperceptionorcontemplation(1174b14–1175a3,andthroughout thesechapters).53Theperception inquestion in9.9,then, isplausiblyunderstood tobeappreciativeperceptionoraware-ness, not simply thebareperceptual capacities required toperformbasicphysicaltasks.54

Iconcludethatinthefirstsetofargumentsin9.9,Aristotleextendstheappreciationofone’sownmoralactionsasanindividualtoactionsthatwesharecollaborativelywithothers.Theactionsofourfriendsare ours because we collaborate with them. Since they are easiertobehold and so to appreciate (1169b33–35), sincebeholding themis pleasant (1169b32–1170a1, 1170a4, 8–11) and since in other waystheyaidusinactionandingrowthincharacter,theyareneededinamorallyvirtuouslife.

What thendoesAristotleadd in thefinalargument fromhumannaturein9.9?Firstofall,thefinalargumentismoregeneralanddoesnotrelyonspecialfeaturesofmoralaction.Perceptionorawarenessdoesnotonlyprovidethecrowningpleasureforalifeofmoralvirtue.Itiswhatahumanbeingis;itispartofwhatconstituteshisessence.Our friendsand their actionsare “ourown”because in some sense

nous(1168b28–1169a6).Butheistherecontrastingsomeonewhoacts(gen-erally) inaccordancewith reasonwith someonewho followshispassions.Weshouldnotexpectpreciseindicationsofthepsychologicalsourceofthepleasureinmoralactioninsuchacontext.Cooper’sviewthatthepleasureinquestionwillbecomplex,involvingaspiritedloveofthekalonandarationalloveof thegood, seemsmoreplausible (“Reason,MoralVirtueandMoralValue”,278).Itisnotobviouswherethesimpleadmirationofgoodactions(inoneselforothers)fitsintoAristotle’spsychologicalpicture.

53. Bostock“PleasureandActivity”,convincinglyarguesawaythecounter-exam-ples;thepleasuresin,say,housebuildingarepleasuresintheperceptionofhousebuilding.Theconnectionbetweencontemplation(inthebroadsense)andpleasureexplainswhyReevecannotberightthatthevalueofcontem-platingactions is instrumental: tounderstandbetterhowtoperformthem(Practices of Reason,180).

54. ThiscaseisstrengthenedifGonzaleziscorrectthatforAristotle,thepleasureinsightisessentiallyconnectedtoseeingthekalon(Gonzalez,“AristotleonPleasureandPerfection”,151–154).

pleasant; also hismind (dianoia) iswell-furnishedwithsubjectsforcontemplation(theôrêmata).[1166a23–27]49

Thetypeofcontemplationorappreciationdescribedinthesepassagescouldbeunderstoodintwosenses.Inoneway,one’sintellectorprac-ticalreasonmayappreciatethegoodnessinherentinamoralaction.50 In another (not mutually exclusive) way, the contemplative aspectofmoralvirtuecouldalsobeunderstoodasconnectedtothemoralagent’sactingforthesakeofthekalon;51nobleactionsareappreciatedforthemselvesjustasotherbeautifulthingsare.Sothefirstsectionofargumentin9.9concludeswiththefollowingconsideration:

Thegoodman,insofarasheisgood,enjoysactionsinac-cordancewithvirtue,andheispainedbybadones,justas amusician takespleasure inbeautifulmelodies (tois kalois melesin)butispainedbyuglyones.[1170a8–11]

Inthesepassages,theself-consciousawarenessofmoralactionisclear-lyandexplicitlyrelatedtothepleasurethatitprovides.52Thisshould49. Aristotlemaybesuggestingcontemplationproperinthelastphrase;theuse

ofdianoia certainly suggests this,although theorêmata,on themodelof9.9,couldbeinterpretedmorebroadly.

50.Asisperhapssuggestedin9.8,wheregoodactionsaresaidtogratifynousorthemostsovereignpartofourselves(1168b28–1169a6).Seenote52.

51. Thecourageousmanactsforthesakeoforbecauseofthekalon(1115b12–13,b21–24;1116a11,15;1116b3,31;1117a17,b9,b14);thetemperateman(1119b16);thegenerousman (1120a24); themagnificentmanacts for the sakeof thekalon,and“thisiscommontoallofvirtue”(1122b6–7).BothCooper,“Reason,MoralVirtue,andMoralValue”, andRichardsonLear,Happy Lives, chap.6,and“AristotleonMoralVirtueandtheFine”,emphasizetheorderly,determi-nate,“beautiful”aspectofthekalon.Forotherhelpfuldiscussion,seeTaylor,Aristotle,86–92,andRogers,“Aristotle’sConceptionofTo Kalon”.

52. RichardsonLeararguesthatthepleasureinthekalonisanintellectualplea-sure(“AristotleonMoralVirtueandtheFine”,129–131.) Itseemsright thattherewouldbearationalpleasurefrommoralactionconnectedtoappreci-atingthatonedoes indeedhavethecorrectgriponthepracticalgood.Allthesame,RichardsonLear’sevidenceforherviewstrikesmeassomewhatweak.InNE 9.8Aristotledescribesthegoodmanactingforthesakeofthekalon and at the same time pleasing “themost sovereign part” of himself,



sophisticated,philosophicalunderstandingofone’sownnatureasahumanbeing.

SimilarreflexivityisattributedtothehumanintellectinDe Anima 3.4:onceknowledgeisacquiredbyaperson,inthinkingthatknowl-edgehethinkshimself,inthathethinkssomethingthathasbeenin-corporatedintohim:

Whenthemind(nous)hasbecomeeachofthethingsthatitknows,assomeonelearnedwhenactiveissaidtodo(and this happens,whenhe is able to be active onhisown),eventhenthemindisinawaypotential…more-over,themindisthenabletothinkitself.57[429b6–10]

Thegeometerthinksaboutthegeometrythathehaslearnedandthathasbecomeapartofhim;thestudentofnaturesimilarlyabout theformsinnaturethathehasstudied.58

Thelanguageofthe9.9passage,however,byemphasizingaware-nessofperceptionandknowledgeandtheirgoodness,andbyempha-sizingthattheyarewhatahumanbeingis,suggestsmorethanthat.The language of the passage—for example, “life is by nature good,andperceivingwhat isgoodpresent inoneself ispleasant”(1170b1–3)—suggests that the good man thinks about the goodness of hiswholelife.Thiscouldcoverarangeofstates,fromawarenessofthegoodnessofhisactions,asinthepreviousargument;toawarenessofthegoodnessofhisspecializedknowledge,asIhavejustsuggested;ortoaquitebroadappreciationofhiswholelifeasaperceiverorthinker,ofwhatitistobeahumanbeing.Thislastappreciationisabroadtype

57. Itakeitthatnous thinkingitselfheremeansthinkingtheacquiredform,notthebareintellectitself.ContrasttheinterpretationofHicks,ad loc.

58.Onnous becomingtheobjectofthought,cf.DA 429a24;430a1,3,18;431b20;onthelearnedmanbeingabletoactonhisownonceeducated,cf.417a27,417a16–28. For a helpful discussion of this kind of subject-object identityinthecontextoftheparallelEudemian treatmentofthevalueoffriendship,seeKosman, “Aristotle” 141–145. Foradiscussionof subject-object identityin theNE discussionofpleasure, seeGonzalez, “AristotleonPleasureandPerfection”.

theyareus.This isnot tosay thatourselvesareconflated insomewoollypseudo-mysticalway;ourfriendsareusinaconcretesense,inthattheysharetheactivitiesthatconstitutewhatweareandhelpuswiththem.SoAristotleemphasizesrepeatedlybyconnectingfriendswithwhatitistobeorto einaiforaperson.

Second, Isuggest that thegeneral focusof thefinalargument in-cludescontemplativeactivity,andthatinthiswayitextendsthescopeof the previous argument beyond morally virtuous activities.55 Foronething,noein andnoêsisarementionedrepeatedlyinthispassage(1170a17, 19, 32–33) and their pairingwith aisthanesthai as kinds oflife strongly suggests that Aristotlemeans to indicate high-level in-tellectualactivityasheoftendoeswiththisvocabulary.56Further,thediscussioniscappedoffwithareferencetophilosophizing,“sharingdiscussionandthought(koinônein logôn kai dianoias)”.Lastly,thereflex-ivelanguagealsopointstocontemplativeactivity.Awarenessofone’slifeandthewaysinwhichitisgood,whileitcan(andought)includeasimplejoyinone’sgoodexistence,canalsobetakentoincludequite

55. MichaelofEphesussaysitdoesnot;seenote25.Kraut,Aristotle on the Human Good,135,alsoarguesthatahappypersononlyneedsfriendsbecausehehastheethicalvirtues.

56.Sonous, noein, andnoêsisareused in theDe Anima,wherekindsof lifearediscussedmostextensively. (SeeBurnyeat,Aristotle’s Divine Intellect, fordis-cussion).Noêsis appearsonlyhereintheNE.TheNicomachean Ethicsandtheotherethicaltreatises,whilegivingnousaspecializedsenseasahigh-levelintellectual virtue, sometimes refer to nous or noein in a practical context:practicalnous defined,NE 1139a33;choiceas“desiderativenous”, NE1139b4;assourceoflaw,NE 1180a22;nousmakesadifferenceinaction,1144b12;asasourceofmovement,1150a5;thegoodmanobeys,1169a18;inexpression‘nous exein’,“havingsense”:NE 1110a11,1112a21,1115b9;cf.EE 1214b31,1237b38,1246b14;personsmayhavethesamethoughtswithoutactingthesameway,Magna Moralia1212a18–21.SeealsoDe Motu Animalium701a7,11,13(thinkingthepractical syllogism);701a30,33 (thinkingassourceofaction);701b20–22,35(thinkingabouttheobjectsofpursuitandavoidance);cf.also703b36.Nous isalsosometimesusedintheNE inageneral,non-specializedsense,aswhenitdistinguishesadultsfromchildrenandanimalsat1144b9(cf.1180a18withEE 1240b34);noein isalsousedinanapparentlygeneralwaytodescribetheeffectsofpleasureonthinking(1152b18),butthepassageisendoxic;soalsonousin1168b35.Whetheritisusedinageneralsenseorinthespecialsenseat1155a16isunclear.



VI. How is friendship a good?

So far, Ihaverevised theoutlineof thefinalargument that theself-sufficientmanneedsfriendsasfollows(changesinitalics):

1. Thelifeofthegoodmanand the virtuous activities implied by itareinthemselvesgoodandpleasant(sincethey arechoice-worthybynatureandpleasantinthemselves,andsochoice-worthyandpleasantforhim;1170a14–20).

2. Thegoodman’sawarenessofthese activitiesisinitselfgoodandpleasant(1170b1–5).

3. Friends share collaboratively in these activities and help to achieve their goals (“Thefriendisanotherself”;1170b5–7).

Conclusion1:Thefriend’svirtuous activities aredesirableforthegoodman(1170b7–8).

Conclusion2:Thegoodman’sawarenessofhis friend’svirtuous activitiesisinitselfgoodandpleasant(1170b9–10).

4. The goodman needs whatever is choiceworthy in itself(1170b17–18).

Conclusion3:Thegoodmanneedsfriends.

Themeaningofthefirstpremisesandthetransitionfromthemtotheconclusions should be considerably more clear. However, Premise4remainsnecessary for thefinalconclusionandstill facesaglaringproblem.Itsuggests,firstofall, thatfriendsareintrinsicgoods;andsecondly,thatthegoodmanneedsallintrinsicgoods.

OneindependentreasontodoubtthatAristotlemeanstoarguethatfriendsareintrinsicgoodsin9.9isthathetreatsthemasinstrumental

levelofcontemplation,whilealsoallowingthefinalargumentof9.9tobemoregeneral,andsotoapplytonon-contemplativefriendshipsorcontem-plativefriendshipsofasecond-rate,casual,orinferiornature.

ofself-knowledge—knowledgeofwhatoneis,ofone’snatureanditsdefininggood.59Sothepassagedescribesself-knowledgenotatallasabareself-consciousnessbut ratherasawarenessofone’smoralex-cellence;knowledgeofthespecialtruthsofone’sexpertise;or,asthelanguageofthepassagesuggests,knowledgeofwhatoneis,ofone’snatureandwhatitsgoodconsistsin.60

Ifthesespeculationsarecorrect,Aristotle’svagueandabstractlan-guageinthispassagehasapurpose:itmeanstocapturearangeofcas-eswhereagoodmantakespleasureinhisfriends;theweakersenseinwhich onemight delight in his team–mate’smaking a particularspectaculargoal;thestrongersenseinwhichaphilosopherdelightsinaparticularlyproductiveconversationwithaphilosopher–friend;andthereflectiveperson’sdelightinhisnatureasahumanbeing,whichheshareswithhisfriendsbothbecausetheyarealsohumanbeingsandbecausetheyarecollaboratorsinhisgoodhumanactivities.61

59. Itshouldbeclearthattheself-knowledgeIdescribeisquitedifferentfromtheone thatCooper treats as central toAristotle’s accountof thevalueoffriendship(“FriendshipandtheGood”,341–344),followingtheMagna Mora-lia (1213a10–26)andinterpretingNE1169b28–1170a4initslight.Onmyview,NE1169b28–1170a4oughtbeunderstoodasdescribingappreciativepleasureatbeholdingandunderstandingtheactionsofthefriend.Likewise,theself-knowledgeinthelatterargumentisnotknowledgeofone’scharacterasintheMM,butknowledgeofone’snature.

60.In Plato’sPhaedrus 230a, Socrates explains that hewants to know himself,whichheglossesasunderstandingwhattypeofthingheis,whetherheisabeastoragod.Likewise,atAlcibiades 129a–130e,SocratesexhortsAlcibiadestoseektrueself-knowledge,notknowledgeofaparticularindividualselfbutof “theself itself”, thehumansoulorhumannature. IanMuellerdiscussesthe prevalence of this kindof self-knowledge in ancient philosophy in anunpublishedtalk,“KnowthyselftoIthinkthereforeIam”.Walkerhasaveryinterestingdiscussionoftheroleofthediscussionofself-knowledgeinPla-to’sAlcibiadesinNE 8–10,althoughheinterpretsthesharedknowledgeof9.9assharedawarenessbasedonsimilarityratherthancollaborativeawareness(“ContemplationandSelf-AwarenessintheNicomachean Ethics”.)

61. Thecollaborativecontemplationofone’snaturehereneednotinvolvea“no-eticconflationofthefriends’selves”,contra Stern-Gillet(Aristotle,140).Norisitnecessary,onmyversionofthe9.9argument,tosupplythesamenessofnousamongallhumanbeings(Kahn,“AristotleandAltruism”,34–40).Allthesame,aninterpretationofnousasasharedselforasGodiscertainlycompat-iblewithmyinterpretation.Iwishtoallowforthissortofthingatthehighest



commentators,arguinghereforitsintrinsicgoodness.66Theappealtoinstrumentalconsiderationswithinthechaptersuggeststhatintrinsicvalue is notAristotle’s primary concernhere, and a look at parallelpassagesconfirmsit.Theprinciplewithwhichtheargumentbeginsisthatwhatisgoodbynatureisgoodforthegoodmanandpleasantinitself(1170a14–16).Aristotleindicatesthatthisissomethinghehassaidbefore(eirêtai).TwopassagesintheNE seemrelevant:one,theattributionofthenaturallypleasanttothegoodmaninthediscussionofexternalgoodsin1.8;two,thegoodmanasthestandardforthetrueobjectofwishinBook3:67

Nowformostmentheirpleasuresareinconflictbecausethesearenotbynaturepleasant,buttotheloversofwhatisnoblethethingsthatarepleasantbynaturearepleas-ant;andvirtuousactionsaresuch….Theirlife,therefore,hasnoneedofpleasureasasortofadventitiouscharm,buthasitspleasureinitself.[1099a11–16;cf.1152b26]

[Wesaythat]assuch(haplôs)andintruththeobjectofwish68isthegood,buttoeachpersontheapparentgood;

66.SoIrwinunderstandsit(Nicomachean Ethics,297);seealsoCrisp,“Aristotle’sInclusivism”,129–131.Itisalsoworthrememberingthatintrinsicvaluemaystillbeconditional;onmyview,forAristotlefriendshipmayhaveintrinsicvalue(aswellasinstrumentalvalue),butonlyonconditionthatone’sactivityisdefective.

67.Ross’stranslationandGauthierandJolif,ad loc.,pointtothesepassages.IfwelookoutsidetheNE,wefindcloserparallels:“Agoodman(agathos)isoneforwhomthenaturalgoods(ta phusei agatha)aregood”(EE 1248b25–6;naturalgoods here are honor,wealth, bodily excellences, good fortune, and pow-er);and“Thegoodman(spoudaios)isheforwhom,becauseheisexcellent,thethingsthataregoodassuch(ta haplôs agatha)aregood”(Pol. 1332a21–5,where“goodsassuch”areoppositetopovertyordiseaseandsoareplausiblyexternalgoods).Cf.alsoMagna Moralia1183b27–35.ThePolitics passagealsomakesanexplicitback-reference;itseemstomepossiblethattheEudemian passage(orsomecommonlycirculatedequivalent)istheback-referenceinthatcaseandinNicomachean Ethics9.9.

68.This seems equivalent to boulêton phusei (the object of wish by nature) at1113a20–21.

goodsbothwithinthechapter(aswhenfriendsaresaidtoofferacer-taintraininginvirtueat1170a11–13)andoutsideofthechapter.Friends,forAristotle,aregoodsoffortune,bycontrastwiththegoodsofthesoul, virtue, pleasure, or knowledge (1169b8–10, 1099a32–b1). Anexternalgood,whetheragoodofthebodylikehealth,oragoodoffortune like a friend, is goodbecause it removes an impediment tovirtuousactivity.62InNE 1.8,Aristotlemakesadivisionintheexternalgoodsbetween those that arevaluable as instruments, asmeans toanend,andthosewhoseabsenceblemisheshappinessinsomeway.63 Friendsarethererankedamongtheinstruments.64

DoesthefinalargumentofNE 9.9changethestatusof thegoodof friendship by claiming that a friend is “good by nature” and so“goodin itself”, “pleasant in itself”,or “choiceworthy in itself” for thegoodman?65Whileintrinsicvaluemaybeimplied—andindeed,theroleofsharedactivityandpleasureinfriendshipsupportsitshavingboth intrinsic and instrumental value—Aristotle is not, pace some

62. NE 7.13,1153b14–21.Aristotlesometimesranksthegoodsofthebodyamongtheexternalgoodsalongwiththegoodsoffortune,butsometimesmakesathreefoldcontrast.For furtherdiscussionandanaccountofwhat itmeansfortheexternalgoodstoremoveimpediments,seeCooper,“AristotleontheGoodsofFortune”;Brown,“WishingforFortune”;andReeve,Practices of Rea-son,159–167.

63. NE 1.8,1099a31–b8.Cooper,“AristotleontheGoodsofFortune”,arguesthatthesecondclassofexternalgoods,those‘thelackofwhichmarshappiness’,remove impedimentsbyprovidingopportunities forvirtue,as forexamplegood looksprovidemoreopportunities for temperance.MyconcernaboutCooper’sviewisthatitassimilatesthesecondclassofexternalgoodstothefirstclass, thosethataregoodas instruments invirtuousactivity.Likewise,itseemstobepossiblethatthesecondclassofgoodsremoveimpedimentsinadifferentway—for instance,byprovidingpleasuresappropriatetothevirtuous life. Brown adds that painmay diminish virtuous activity for thesamereason.Ifindthispointtobehelpfulandsympathetictomyownview,althoughIamconcernedthatBrowndoesnotbindexternalgoodscloselyenoughtovirtuousactivity(“WishingforFortune”,esp.234–238.).

64.AsCooperargues,“AristotleontheFormsofFriendship”,theinstrumentalityoffriendshipingeneralisnotincompatiblewithfriends(evenutilityorplea-surefriends)beingvaluedforotherreasons,i. e.,fortheirownsake.

65. 1170a14–16,19–20,21–22,26;1170b1–5,9–10,14–15



1.8.Itissuggestedherethatsuchgoodsaregoodassuch(andsogoodforthegoodperson)butnotgoodforeveryone.Whatisgoodassuchisgoodforthegoodpersonbecauseitisorderedbythecorrectfinalend(1152b3;cf.EE1227a6–22)andsoisintegratedwithvirtuousactiv-ity.Suchthingsare“goodandpleasantinthemselves”,notprimarilybycontrastwithinstrumentalgoodsbutbycontrastwiththebenefitsandpleasuresattainedbyviciouspeople,whichareeitheronlyapparentlygood(sincetheyarenotgoodforthem)orgoodinawayextrinsicandadditionaltotheiractions(andsonotintheactivitiesthemselves).

Things“goodbynature”or“choiceworthybynature”donotfeaturemuchintheNicomachean Ethics,buttheydoappearinthediscussionofpleasureinNE7.4,wheretheyareidentifiedas“victory,honor,wealth,andgoodandpleasantthingsofthissort”(1147b29–31);“gain”isaddedtothelistat1148a26and“parentsandchildren”at1148a30.71Suchthingsaregoodbutnotgoodforeveryone,sincetheycanbeusedwronglyorsoughtinexcess(1147a31–32,1148a32–b2).“Goodorchoiceworthybynature” thusseems tobeused inasimilarwayas “goodassuchorwithoutqualification(haplôs)”.72Sounjustmenpursuethingsthataregoodassuch—thegoodsoffortuneorexternalgoods—butmorethantheyought(1129b2–3;cf.1134a34,1134b4,1137a27).

Early in thediscussionof friendship,Aristotleappeals to thedis-tinctionbetweenwhatisgoodassuchandwhatisorappearsgoodto

71. IntheEudemian Ethics,naturalgoodsandgoodshaplôsareexplicitly identi-fied in the termsdescribedhere; seeEE 1227a18–30 (discussedbyWoods,Eudemian Ethics, 148–150) and EE 7.15 (Woods, 176–180). Natural goodsare identified as “honor, wealth, bodily excellences, good fortune, power”(1248b27)and“bodilygoods,wealth,friends”(1249b16).

72. InLorenz’sdiscussionofthispassage,healsoconcludesthatAristotlemeansthatthesethingsarechoiceworthynotasgoalsbut“assuchandingeneral”.However,hedoesnotseetheconnectionbetweenthingschoiceworthybynatureandthingsgoodhaplôs —northereferencestonaturalgoodsintheEu-demian Ethics —andsomissesanumberofrelevantparallelpassages(“PlainandQualifiedakrasia”,78,83–86).Accordingly,whilehedrawsthecontrastasbetweenthingsgoodassuchbutbadinparticularcircumstances(aswhenvaluablegoodsmustbethrownoverboardinastorm),thecloserfitisinfactthecontrastbetweenwhatisgoodassuchbutbadfortheviciousperson.

thatwhichistrulyanobjectofwishisanobjectofwishtothegoodman(spoudaiôi),whileanychancethingmaybesotothebadman,asinthecaseofbodiesalsothethingsthatareintruthwholesomearewholesomeforbodiesinagoodcondition,whileforthosethatarediseasedotherthingsarewholesome.[1113a24–28]

Thesepassagesdistinguishtherealgoodfromtheapparentgood,andmarkthegoodman(spoudaios)asthestandardfortherealgood.Hispleasures,unlikethoseofthewickedman,areinhisactivitiesthem-selves;theyarenotsoughtasendsexternaltohim.Thelanguageof9.9isthusfirstofallthelanguageofobjectiveversussubjectivegood-ness:whatisgoodassuchversuswhatappearsgoodorisgoodonlyunderspecialcircumstances.69“Initself”refers,nottointrinsicasop-posedtoinstrumentalgoods,buttogoodsinternaltoactivities—whatIwillcall“integratedgoods”—asopposedtogoodssoughtasexternalends,which Iwill call “additivegoods”. It is important that inmanycases the same good—say, honor—can be additive for one person(thepersonwithciviccourage;NE 1116a17–19,29)andintegratedforanother(thegreat-souledmanofNE 4.3).70Thedistinctionhastodowiththewaythatthegoodisvaluedbytheagent,asbeingorderedunderitsproperend.

Thecontextofthefirstpassageaboveaboutthegoodbynatureandwhatisgoodforthegoodmanisthediscussionofexternalgoodsin

69.Whatisonlyapparentlygoodandwhatisgoodonlyinspecialcircumstancesareofcoursedistinctfromoneanother.InthesepassagesAristotleseemstothinkthatthecasescoincide:whatisnaturallygoodorgoodassuchalsoap-pearsgoodtoviciouspeople,eventhoughthesegoodsarenotinfactgoodforthem,justasfoodgoodforahealthypersonisnotinfactgoodforasickperson.SeediscussioninWoods,Eudemian Ethics,148–150,176–180.

70.I take it thatwhatdistinguishesciviccouragefromrealcourage is that thekalon endisexternaltociviccourage,butinternaltotheactionitselfinrealcourage; thecourageousman’sactionsarekalon,and that ishisaim. I takeitthathonorisintegratedforthegreat-souledmanbecauseitistheproperornamentofthevirtuethatheseeks;thatitisnothisendisclearbyhisnotcaringmuchforit(1124a16–17).



toneedfriends.Butthat issurelynottrue.Forwehavesaidattheoutsetthathappinessisanactivity;andactiv-ityplainlycomesintobeingandisnotpresentatthestartlikesomepieceofproperty.[1169b23–30]

HereAristotlecontraststhehappyorgoodman’sfriendswithfriendsofutilityandpleasure,andsaysthatthelatterprovidesupplies“fromtheoutside”thatthegoodmanwillnotneed.Thegoodman’sfriendsareratherconnectedwith thecoming-into-beingofhisactivity.Thebadman’sfriendswillbeexternalmeanstogoodsoutsideofhisactiv-ityitself,andso“additivegoods”;thegoodman’sfriendswillbeinte-gratedintohisactivitiesandso“integratedgoods”.

The distinction between additive and integrated goods, and theconnectionbetweenintegratedgoodsandactivity,arealsousedin9.9intheargumentfromhumannaturetodistinguishthefriendshipsofthegoodfromthefriendshipsofthebad:

Life (to zên) is among the things good and pleasant inthemselves.Foritisdeterminate(horismenon),andthede-terminatebelongstothenatureofthegood.Forwhatisgoodbynatureisalsogoodtothegoodman(ho epieikês);onaccountofwhichitseemspleasanttoallmen.Butoneoughtnottakeintoaccountthewickedandcorruptedlife,noralifeinpain;forsuchalifeisindeterminate(aoristos),justasarethethingsbelongingtoit.[1170a19–24]

DeterminacyandindeterminacyaresometimesusedinAristotleanal-ogouslytoformandmatter,actualityandpotentiality.74Tobedetermi-nateforahumanbeingistobeactualized.Theactualityinquestion

74.Goodmenaremoredeterminate(hôrismenon)thanbadones(Protrepticus 33[Düring]); form identifiedwithhôrismenon andcontrastedwithmatter (De Caelo 312a16);potentiality rankedwithmatterand the indeterminate (aoris-tos),actualitywithformandthehôrismenon(Metaphysics13.10.1087a15–19);whatispotentialandnotactualisaoristos(Metaphysics4.4.1007b29);matterandaoristosusedinterchangeably(Physics209b9).

aparticularperson,inordertodistinguishthefriendshipsofthegoodfromthefriendshipsofthebad:

Thetruestfriendship,then,isthatofthegood,aswehavefrequently said; for that which is without qualificationgoodorpleasantseemstobelovableandchoiceworthy,and for each person thatwhich is good or pleasant tohim;andthegoodmanislovableanddesirableforboththesereasons(1157b25–27;cf.1156b12–14).

Aristotle thenapplies inBook8 theprinciple thathehasapplied inBooks1,3,5,and7toexternalgoodsgenerallyandtofriendsinpar-ticular.Hedoessobecause,asintheothercases,hewantstodistin-guishthegoodman’spursuitofsuchgoodsfromtheuniversalpursuitofsuchgoods.

Turning back to 9.9, it becomes abundantly clear that this isAr-istotle’sconcern.Aftergivingsignsor indicationsthat it is falsethatthehappymanisfriendless,Aristotleturnstothefirstmajorstageoftheargument,askingwhattruththerecouldhavebeenintheparadox(giventhesignsof its falseness).Herespondsbydistinguishingutil-ityandpleasurefriends—thefriendsofthevicious(1157b1–3)—fromvirtuefriends,concludingthatitsauthormusthavebeenthinkingthatsinceagoodmanwillnotneedfriendsofutilityandpleasure,hewillnotneedfriendsatall:73

Ofsuchfriends[usefulpeople]indeedtheblessedmanwillhavenoneed, sincehealreadyhas the things thataregood;norwillheneedthosewhomonemakesone’sfriends because of their pleasantness, or he will needthemonly toasmallextent (forhis life,beingpleasant,hasnoneedofpleasurebroughtinfromtheoutside);andbecausehedoesnotneedsuchfriendsheisthoughtnot

73. IfthisismeanttobeanaccountoftheLysis,itishighlyslanderous,sincethequestionthatintroducestheparadoxthereisaboutwhetherthegoodwillbefriendswiththegood,andsoitisraisedespeciallyforvirtuefriendship.



other words, the friend’s goodness and pleasantness are intimatelyboundupwiththegoodnessandpleasureofhisownlife.Thatisbe-cause a goodman’s life consists of virtuous activity rather than theacquisitionofexternalends.Whenapersonactswithexternalgoodsas anend,his friendsarevaluedonly incidentally (kata sumbêbekos;1157b1–5, 1156a16–17); theyprovidegoods tohim “from theoutside(epeisaktos)”(1169b26–27).Bycontrast,thegoodman’sfriendsprovidemoreandbetterofwhatthegoodmanhasalready.

Toreturn,atlonglast,totheinitialquestionofthissection,whatdoesAristotlemeanwhenhe says that friends are choiceworthy inthemselves?Hemeans that friendsarechoiceworthy inorder tobefully and properly active, that they improve our virtuous activitiesratherthanprovidingnecessitiesforourbaresurvivalorforexternalgoodsthatarenotproperlyintegrated.Inotherwords,hemeansthattheyareintegratedgoodsratherthanadditivegoods.Why,then,doesAristotlesaythatthehappymanneedswhateverischoiceworthyforhim?Mysuggestionisthatwhatischoiceworthyforthehappymanissomethingthatiseitherasupply(whichheneeds)orsomethingthathelpshimdobetter,arespectinwhichheislacking.Inotherwords,wedesireandchoosewhatwelackinonewayoranother.77Sinceex-ternalgoodsaregoodbecausetheyremoveimpediments,theirvaluedependsonthoseimpediments.Lackanddefectcanthusbeseenasbackgroundassumptionsofthewholediscussionoffriendship,asin

77. Tointerpretthepassagesthiswaymightseemtogoagainstthegrainoftheirlanguage: forexample,Aristotlesays thatsince thehappymanchooses tobeholdgoodactions,hewillneedfriends(1170a2–3)andinthefinalprem-iseoftheargumentfromhumannature,hesaysthatthehappymanneedswhateverischoiceworthyforhim(1170b17–18).SoAristotleseemstoinferaneedfromadesire(orfromchoiceworthiness),whichsuggeststhatdesireisaconditionforneedratherthanviceversa.(MythankstoEricBrownforthepoint.)Iproposethatthedesirebeseenasasignofneedratherthanasa condition for it.The inference fromdesire toneed is licensed, then,notbecauseadesireproducesaneed,buttheotherwayaround:whereweseeadesire,weknowthatthereisalsoaneed,sinceneedisabackgroundcondi-tionfordesire.IfIamcorrectthatthevalueoffriendsdependsontheirroleincollaborativeactivityandinhelpingtoactualizethehappyman’sincompleteordefectiveactivity,theproposalseemsquitereasonable.

hereseems,asintheearlier9.9passage,tobetheactualityofeudai-monia,virtuousrationalactivities.Afriendmayhelptoinitiateactivity,aswhenwecannothuntawildboaronourown;ortoimprovewhatwearealreadydoing,aswhenweare furnishingagrandtempleortheatreforourcity;ortohelpperfectouractivity,bymakingitmorepleasant. In contemplation, friends may help us in actualizing our-selvesbyhelpingustointernalizemoreformsofknowledge,aswhentheyteachusgeometry;ortheymayhelpcompleteourstudyofna-ture;orinotherwaystohelpmakedeterminatethepotentialinherentinourcapacitiestoknow.Pains,ontheotherhand,orthe“alien”plea-suresofacorruptlife,aredestructivetoourproperactivities,makingthemhardertoundertake(inthecaseofpain,1175b16–24)oractivelyinterfering(inthecaseofalienpleasures,1175b1–24).75

Tosummarize,itisclearthatAristotle’smainconcerninthechap-teristodistinguishthegoodnessandpleasureoffriendshipforgoodmenfromthegoodnessandpleasureoffriendshipforbadmen.76ItisinthiswayanextensionandclarificationofhisearlierdistinctionsinNE 8.2–4.Here,thetypesoffriendshiparenotdistinguishedbytheirinstrumentalversusintrinsicvaluebutrather,as is foundelsewhereindiscussionsofexternalornaturalgoods,between,ontheonehand,whatisgoodandpleasantbynatureandingeneraland,ontheother,whatisgoodandpleasantforaparticularperson.Foragoodman,afriendisvalued—likeotherexternalgoods—byreferencetohisend,virtuousactivity.Accordingly,thefriendisintegratedwithhislife:in

75. Pleasure, like friendship, is foravirtuouspersonan integratedgood: it im-provesvirtuousactivity.Althoughitisagoodofthesoul,andsoaninternalrather than an external good, it is likewise associatedwith activity that isunimpeded (1153a12–15, 1153b14–19). Activity can be impeded by internalfactorslikepainorfatigue;butitcanalsobeimpededbylackofmoneyorpoliticalpower,orbythelackofotherpeopletoacteitherasbeneficiariesorascollaborators.Pleasure,likefriendship,isconnectedwiththeabilitytodothingsmoreeasily.

76. In the parallel discussion in theEudemian Ethics, Aristotle poses a similarparadoxabouthowpoliticalhumanbeingscanresembleself-sufficientgods,andsuggests that thesolution lies inunderstandingvirtue friendship(7.12,especially1244b4–17).ForafullaccountoftheEudemian passages,seeKos-man,“AristotleontheDesirabilityofFriends”.



differenttypesoffriendshipcanalsobeseenasconnectedtogreaterandlesserdegreesofself-sufficiency.

Thetypeofneedinthehigherfriendshipsismorecompatiblewithself-sufficiencythanothertypesoffriendshiporothertypesofneed.Agangofpiratescollaborateforthesakeoftreasure:theyrelyononeanotherforthesakeofafurtheroutcomeexternaltothem,acquiredwealth.TheSpartansatThermopylae,bycontrast,collaborateintheirowncourage:theydonotdependonsomefurtheroutcome,victoryor loss, for their courageous activity to be properly done. Indepen-dencefromtheneedfor furtheroutcomes(finality) isoneaspectofself-sufficiency.TheSpartansalsoattaingreaterself-containedunity.Unlikethepirates,theirend—courageousactivity—issharedamongthemwithoutmutualloss.Thegainofoneisnotthelossofanother.Noraretheyresourcesforoneanotherinthesameway:therewere300SpartansatThermopylae,buttheremighthavebeen200or1000,whereasthepiratesarenumberedandunitedonlybytheirusefulnesstooneanother.

Just asmoral friendship ismore self-sufficient than pleasure- orgain-seeking friendship, contemplative friendship is more self-suf-ficient thanmoral friendship.TheSpartans atThermopylaedidnotneed victory, but they did need invading Persians.80Contemplativefriends rely on fewer things outside of themselves: they need onlyeachother’sknowledgeandintellectualpower,allofwhicharefullyintegratedintotheperson.Thisgivescontemplativefriendshipmoreself-containedunity.Thisseemstruewhenthefellowcontemplatorspursuethespecialsciences—geometry,astronomyandothertheoreti-calornaturalforms—sincethosesciencesareincorporatedintothefriends themselves and so their contemplation involves contemplat-ingoneanother.81 Still, theunityof contemplative friendship isper-

80.SeeAristotle’sdiscussionofleisureandtherelianceofmoralvirtueonuncho-sencircumstancesatNE 1177b4–26.

81. Thisistricky,Ithink,becauseindividualsmatterlessincontemplationthaninmoralvirtue.Itismyimpression(Ican’tdefendithere)thatbothPlatoandAristotlethinkthatknowledgeisinherentlysharable;whileofcoursediffer-entpeopleknowdifferent things,what theyknowcanalways inprinciple

thediscussionofexternalgoodsgenerally.78Thedependenceofouractivitiesonexternalgoodsisamatteroftheirdefectiveness,asisourrelianceonothersforcollaborativehelp.Seenthisway,thedifficultieswiththe9.9argumentwementionedearlierareavoided.Thehappymanwillneedall integratedgoods,that is,everythingthatcanhelphim perform his virtuous activities better. So he may need amuse-mentstorestorehisspirits,ordecorationsthatmayproperlymanifesthisgoodness toothers.Buthewillnotneedall intrinsicgoods,norwillheneedeverysingleinstanceofanaturalgood.Hisneedistobefurtheractualized;nothingbeyondwhathelpshimdothisisneeded.

If this is correct, then the last premise of the 9.9 argument isrepaired, and the argument from human nature can be seen asundeservingofthecriticismithasreceivedfromcommentators.

VII. Friendship, self-sufficiency and the imitation of God

I have argued that thedifferencebetween friends forbadmenandfriendsforgoodmencanthusbeseenaspartlyamatteroftheself-containedunityofthegoodlife,orderedundertheproperend,versusthepatchworkviciouslifeofoneexternalgoodsoughtafteranother,withtheusefulorpleasantfriendsdiscardedastheendortheappe-tite inquestionchanges (1156a21–1156b6).Thereasonwhyexternalgoodsornaturalgoodsaregoodforthegoodmanisthattheyareallintegratedintohisactivity.Hiswealthisintegratedintomagnificentcivicprojects;hisvictories intohiscourageousandprudentactions;hishonorintohisgreatnessofsoul.79Since,asIarguedearlier,self–sufficiency forAristotle is amatterof self-containedunityand inde-pendencefromexternalnecessities,thedifferenttypesofunityinthe

78.Begorre-Bretsuggeststhattheparadoxissolvedbecausethehappymandoesnotneedfriendstofillalack,buttoperformfineactions.However,itisnotclearwhy,ifthehappyman’sactionisinsomewaydeficientwithoutfriends,hisfriendsdonottherebyfillalack.Alack,asIunderstandit,isjustsomefailureordeficiency, and friendsdo satisfy sucha lack for thehappyman(Éthique à Nicomaque,121).

79.SeeReeve,Practices of Reason,167–173,forapowerfulargumentthatallofthemoralvirtuesarerelatedtoexternalgoods.



perfectingit.Hewillachievegreaterself-containedunitythisway,andsogreaterself-sufficiency.Thuscontemplativefriendshipisnotonlymore self-sufficient thanmoral friendship, since it relies less on ex-ternalcircumstances,butalifeofcontemplationallowsthewisemangreaterindependenceevenfromthefriendshehas,andthemoresothemoreheknows.

OneconsequenceoftheviewoffriendshipAristotleoutlinesin9.9isthathumanbeings,throughvirtuefriendshipofbothkinds,imitatethe self-sufficiency thatAristotle elsewhere attributes toGod.84Thehighestfriendshipshaveakindofself-containedunitythatresemblestheultimate self-containedunity found amongAristotle’s divinebe-ings.Thisresemblancecanbeunderstoodbothformallyand—underonecommoninterpretationofAristotle’sGod—substantially.

Virtue friendship formally resembles Aristotle’s God in being anearerapproachtopureactivity.Friendshelpustoactmorecontinu-ously(1170a6–8);Aristotle’sGodisalwaysactive.85Moreover,friendssupply what we cannot do on our own; Aristotle’s God is entirelyself-sufficientandneedsnothing fromtheoutside.86WhileAristotlearguesin10.7–8thatsolitaryself-sufficiencyisavailabletocontempla-torsandismoregod-likethansharedactivity,hesuggestsin9.9thatsharedvirtuousactivityallowsgreateractualityandgreaterachieve-mentforhumanbeingsthanviciousactivity,andinthiswaygreaterapproximationtogod-likeactivity.

84.ThisissuggestedbyKosman,“Aristotle”144–145;however,KosmanneglectstheNE 10.7passageandclaimsthathumanbeingsonlyimitateGodthroughsocialactivity,whereasIarguetheyalsodobybecomingwiseenoughthattheydonotdependonothers.

85.Godsalwaysenjoypleasures,whilewedonot:1154b20–28;humansarenotabletoactcontinuously(1175a3–6,1176b34–35);contemplationasthemostcontinuoushumanactivity(1177a21–22).

86.Itisimportanttoseethatotherpeopledonotincreasetheself-sufficiencyofindividuals,asBrownarguestheydo(seenote9).Humanbeingsimitatedi-vineself-sufficiencybycollaborating—thatis,inawaythatshowstheirlackofself-sufficiency.Thatvirtuefriendshipismoreself-sufficientthanviciousfriendshipshouldnotobscurethispoint.

hapsclearestwhentheycontemplatetheirownnatureandthegood-nessofhumanlife—theirownselvesinabroadersense.Inthisway,whetherspecialknowledgeorknowledgeofhumannatureisunderconsideration, contemplative friends are not only collaborative con-tributorstocontemplationbutalsoitsobjects.Theunitybetweenthesubjectandobjectoftheseactivitiesimpliesindependencefromneed,especiallyexternalneeds,andsoself-sufficiency.82

However, despite the greater compatibility with self-sufficiencyfoundinhigherfriendships,itremainstruethatfriendsascollabora-tors remove impediments to activity and so areneededonaccountofone’sdefects.Assuch,friendsimplyalackofself-sufficiency.Thisis seenby the fact that friends remainexternalgoods, andexternalgoodsarequalificationsonself–sufficiency.Inthepassagefrom10.8Icitedabove(1178b32–35),ourdependenceonexternalprosperityiscitedasanindicationofourlackofself-sufficiency.83Theuseofactual-ityandactivityintheseargumentsalsoshowsthis.Humanbeingsarenotpureactivity.Theycanalwaysbefurtheractualized:theycandowhattheydostillbetter,moreoften,ormoreindependently.

Inthecaseofmoralaction,thebackgroundconditionsforfriend-shipdonotdecreasenomatterhowvirtuousoneis:beingperfectlycourageous neither ends war nor allows one to carry it out single-handedly. But the need for contemplative friends will be graduallyovercome as one reaches higher levels of intellectual achievement.Thewisemanwillgraduallyacquiremoreknowledgetocontemplateon his own, and he will need friends less for help in acquiring or

be sharedwith others.When I discuss geometrywithmy friend,what heunderstandsbecomeswhat I understand (givengood circumstances). Thegeometryitselfissharedbetweenus.Sothecontemplationoftheotherper-son’sknowledgeandthecontemplationofmyownknowledgeareonlyinter-estinglydifferentwhenoneismoreignorantthantheotherortheyareeachignorantindifferentrespects.

82.SeeGonzalez,“PleasureandPerfection”,forarelateddiscussionofdegreesofcompletenessofactivityandsubject-objectidentity.

83.Soalsoissuggestedbythedependenceofexternalgoodsonluck;seeReeve,Practices of Reason,159–167,withreferences.



describedtwowaysofimitatingGodthroughfriendship:greaterunityand integration; and acquisitionof essences tooneself and activelythinkingaboutthem.

VIII. Defective animals

Despitetheapproximationtodivineactivitythatvirtuefriendshipal-lows, itstillreliesonhumandefectivenessandimperfection,onthehumaninabilitytobefullyandproperlyactiveonourown.Becausetheaccountofintegratedfriendsin9.9asIhaveexplaineditreliesonourdefects,ourneed for “supplementaryselves”,our inability todothingsperfectly,ithasbeenshowntobefullyconsistentwiththe10.7account,despiteinitialappearances.Theneedforfriendsisrevealedinbothchapterstobesomethingthatanindividualofhighabilitycanprogressively,ifnotcompletely,overcome,evenifthisisnotexplicitintheearlierchapter.

However,Aristotle’sfailurewithrespecttothetruthstillremains.Itdoesnotseemtrue,astheSocratesoftheLysisandthePlatooftheAcademyvividlyillustrate,thatthewisestmenneedfriendstheleast,northat(asAristotlemayalsomean)theyneedfewerfriends.Allthesame,thisiswhatAristotlesaysinhispraiseoftheself-sufficiencyofthewiseman in 10.7. Inmaking this claimhe emphasizes that col-laboration,whileareasonableapproximationofdivineunityandself-sufficiency,isasecond-rateoptionthatthevirtuousmancanatleastpartiallyriseabove,ifhebecomessufficientlywise.Andsoourneedforfriendsdoesindeedreflectafailureonthepartofhumanbeingstoachievethehighestgood.

Onefinalquestionliesopen,namely,whetherthewisemanmayhavefriendswithoutneedingthem,for instance,outofagratuitousdesiretosharethegood.Socrates,itmightbethought,issurroundedbyfriendsandcompanions,buthedoesnotdependonhisfriends;hewouldbejustaswelloffwithoutthem.89 Inthiscase, friendswould

89.ThomasAquinasmakessomethinglikethissuggestionwithregardtofriend-shipinheaven,thatiftherewereonlyonesoulenjoyingGod,hewouldbehappy;butiftherewereoneotherpersonthere,hewouldlovetheotheras

Furthermore, since friendship in 9.9—whether a friendship inmoral virtueor in contemplation—has a contemplative aspect, andsince friends areportrayed as extensionsof oneself andone’s activ-ity, friendshipprovidesa formof self-contemplationandself-knowl-edge.Assuch, itresemblesGod’sownself-contemplativeactivityasdescribedinMetaphysics 12.7.Contemplativefriendship,totheextentthat it includes appreciative knowledge of one’s nature, resemblesGodyetmorethanmoralfriendship,whereoneonlyappreciatesthegoodnessorbeautyofone’sactions.

For those interpreters of Aristotle’s theologywho see Aristotle’sGodasaself-thinkerwhosethinkingisradicallyunlikeours,orasapurelyformalmetaphysicalplace-holder,87onlysomuchcanbesaidaboutthewaysinwhichhumanfriendshipimitatesdivineactivity.Butfor interpreterswhoseeAristotle’sGodasthinkingformsoressenc-es,andsoeithercloselyanalogousorpartlyidenticalwithahumancontemplator, other formsof resemblancewill also be possible.88 Ifcontemplativefriendscanuseeachother’sknowledgeofessences,ei-thertomakeupdefectsintheirownknowledgeortoactualizemorefullytheknowledgetheyhave,theywillbecomemoregodlikeindo-ingso.Totheextentthatacontemplatorcanacquiremoreformsandgreaterfacilityonhisown,hecanalsoapproachGoddirectly;totheextentthatahumanbeingcontemplatesformsoressences,inhimselforothers,hewillbecometheGodwhothinksalloftheessences.If,rather,hisintellectissimilarbutindependent,hewillresemblehimthegreaterhisaccesstotheessencesofthings;themoreheacquirestheseessencesforhimself,ratherthanrelyingonothers;andthemorehethinksthem.Fortheselatterinterpreters,then,Aristotlewillhave

87.SoNorman,“Aristotle’sPhilosopher-God”,chargesofRossthatforhimAristo-tle’sgodis“narcissistic”;seealsoLear,Aristotle,300.Wedin defendstheradi-caldifferencebetweendivinethinkingandhumanthinkingagainstNorman(Mind and Imagination in Aristotle,229–245).

88.Norman,“Aristotle’sPhilosopher–God”,arguesthatthehumanintellectisinfactthedivineintellect,orapartialortemporaryversionof it,asBurnyeatdoesalso(Aristotle’s Divine Intellect).



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simplybeamatterofindifferencetothewisemanasfarashisowninterestsareconcerned—hewouldnotnecessarilybesolitary,butifsolitary,hewouldnotmissthefellowshipofothers.Thisview,itoughtbenoticed,isnotpossiblefromtheperspectiveoftheLysis,whereadesirelikephilia —thelovepropertofriendship—impliesalackoraneed.DoesAristotlerejectthispartoftheLysisparadox?Thereisnoevidencethathedoesrejectit,andthejustificationoffriendshipinthebestlifein9.9isquiteclearlyintermsofneed.Thepointseemsyetclearerwhenwecomparethedivinecase:itseemsthatAristotle’sGodisfreeofanydesireoraffect.90Hiscausalpoweristhroughthedesiresorlacksofothers.Andthislackofdesireorloveseemsconnectedtohisperfectionandhisself-sufficiency. In theabsenceofevidenceal-lowinglovewithoutneed,andinthefaceofsomeevidenceagainstit, it seemsbest to conclude that thispossibilitywasnot, in fact, inAristotle’smind,andsothatthewisemanwouldindeedbecomemoresolitaryashisneedforothersdecreased.91

aresultofhisloveofGod(Summa Theologica 2.1,Q4.8).(Hedoesarguethatfriendshipisnecessaryinearthly life,sothatagoodman’sactionsmaybe“donewell”.)

90.In10.8Aristotledoessuggestthatthehappymanwillbe“mostdear”tothegods (theophilestaton) and that gods care in someway for virtuoushumanbeings.However, thispassageseemsbaldly inconsistentwiththemorede-velopedtheologyofMetaphysics12.7;unlesssomephilosophicsensecanbemadeofthecareofAristotle’sgodforhumans,Ithinkthispassagemustbetakenasinsomewaymetaphorical.

91. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the Princeton philosophydissertationseminar; the2002Oxfordgraduatephilosophyconference;St.John’sCollege,Annapolis; the “NewVoices InAncientPhilosophy” confer-enceatCambridgeUniversity;andHumboldtUniversityinBerlin.Mythanksto theseaudiences foragreatdealof illuminatingdiscussion, inparticulartoMichaelAhern, EricChwang,Katharina Fischer,Mera Flaumenhaft,Mi-chaelFrede,andHendrikLorenz.DavidCharles,mycommentatorattheOx-ford conference,helped clarifymyargument and convincedme thatpartsofmy then-view needed abandoning. Jonathan Beere, John Cooper, BradInwood,CristinaIonescu,PatrickMiller,KieranSetiya,RachelSingpurwalla,andJamesWilberdingallgavevaluablecommentsonpreviousdrafts.Iamespecially grateful to EricBrownandGabrielRichardsonLear for very ex-tensiveandchallengingsetsofcomments.ThispapertookitsrootswhenIwasstudyingancientviewsofself-knowledgewithIanMuelleratChicago.Idedicateit,ingratitude,tohismemory.



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