argentina - falkland malvinas islands invasion - 1982

7/30/2019 Argentina - Falkland Malvinas Islands Invasion - 1982

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Facult des Sciences sociales et politiques

Dpartement de Science politique

POLI D 434: Foreign Policy Analysis

Country: Argentina

Issue: Invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands

Period: 1982

Submitted by: Mattavelli Andrea, PINT4G1

Professor: Jean-Frdric Morin

Academic Year: 2011-2012

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PART 1 Context and Factual background

The war between Argentina and the United Kingdom known as Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982

arose over the two main islands of West Falkland/Gran Malvina and East Falkland/Soledad and

their dependencies, notably the islands South Georgia/Georgias del Sur and South

Sandwich/Sandwich del Sur. The Falkland/Malvinas Islands lie in the South Atlantic Ocean, off the

South American continent about 770 km north-east of Cape Horn and over 12.000 km from the UK.

They form an archipelago of about 200 islands spread over an area of approximately 12.000 square

km. South Georgia/Georgia del Sur is situated about 1.300 km east-south-east of the

Falklands/Malvinas and the Sandwich Islands lie some 750 km east-south-east of South Georgia.1

Argentines and the British sustain different versions regarding discovery of and sovereignty

rights over the islands until 1833. In 1833 the British occupied the islands and expelled theArgentine population that was living there. Argentina never accepted the British occupation and

from that moment onward has used every occasion to reassert its claim to sovereignty to, and

demand the return of, what it considered to be its territory. 2 Argentina has always protested at both

bilateral and multilateral level. In the 1960s in the context of the United Nations the

Falklands/Malvinas issue was included in the discussions over decolonization. The U.N. Resolution

2065/XX of 1965 asks the two governments to resolve the dispute concerning the sovereignty over

the Islands.3 Bilateral negotiations took place in 1966 and 1971 leading to an implementation of a

system of support and communication between the Argentine mainland and the Falklands/Malvinas.

On 14 December 1973 the U.N. General Assembly issued Resolution 3160, recalling its previous

documents on the subject and expressing its concerns about the fact that after eight years from the

adoption of Resolution 2065 no substantial progress had been made in the negotiations. 4 In 1976 a

shooting incident between an Argentine destroyer and a British research ship led the two countries

to recalling their ambassadors. Talks took place again between 1977 and 1979. Then the UK, after

having asked the islanders' opinion, decided to freeze the dispute for 25 years. In February 1982

Argentine and British diplomats met again. Following the Argentine invasion of the Islands on 2

April 1982 the two countries went to war. The UK won the war on 14 June of the same year.

1 Goldbat J. & Millan V., The Flaklands/Malvinas Conflict - A Spur to Arms Builds-ups, Stockholm, sipri StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute, 1983, p.1

2 Ibid., p. 53 United Nations Resolution 2065/XX, http://daccess-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/28/IMG/NR021828.pdf?OpenElement [consulted on 17/04/2012]

4 Laucirica J. O., Lessons from Failure: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy andInternational Relations, Seton Hall University, Summer/Fall 200, p. 82

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The dependent variable analyzed in this paper is Argentine's invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas

Islands on 2 April 1982.

The invasion of the islands was the key part of the Operacin Rosario. Through this action

the Argentine militaries took control over the Falklands/Malvinas by seizing the capital city of

Stanley/Puerto Argentino and establishing an Argentine administration. The next step was to pull

out most of the troops leaving only a garrison of 500 militaries on the islands. 5 The invasion was

carried out during the first hours of 2 April and was meant to be as bloodless as possible and not

affecting the life of the civil population.6 Argentina deployed 1400 soldiers that overwhelmed the 80

British militaries that were at defense of the island. None of the British were killed, one Argentine

died and two others remained wounded.7

The decision to invade the islands at that time was taken in response to the crisis over the

island of South Georgia/Georgia del Sur which acted as a catalyst in the confrontation betweenArgentina and the UK. On 16 December a scrap metal dealer called Costantino Davidoff left

Buenos Aires aboard of an Argentine Navy ice-breaker and landed five days later in Leith, on the

island of South Georgia/Georgia del Sur. Davidoff had a regular contract with the British

government that allowed him to operate on the Falklands/Malvinas but he did not respect the

standard procedures that wanted him to stop and notify his passage at Grytviken. When the British

found out that Davidoff had been on the island they went for an inspection and found a sign with

the slogan Las Malvinas son Argentinas (The Falklands are Argentine). The British filed a formal

protest in February in which they reaffirmed their sovereignty over the islands.8 On 9 March

Davidoff informed the British embassy that he was about to sail again to South Georgia, this time

with a forty-one men team. Two days later they departed onboard the Bahia Buen Suceso and

headed directly to Leith again without respecting the formalities in Grytviken. On 19 March a

British ship found theBahia Buen Suceso at anchor, about one-hundred men and an Argentine flag

hoisted ashore.9 Two days later the ship had left but about forty men had remained on the island.

The British informed the Argentine government that those men remaining on the island were

considered as an occupying force and should be removed. On 21 March the Royal Navy's HMS

Endurance left from Stanley/Puerto Argentino heading to Leith with the task of evacuating the

Argentines. As response the Argentine government sent the naval auxiliary ARABahia Paradiso

5 Freedman L. & Gamba-Stonehouse V., Signals of War - The Falklands Conflict of 1982, London, faber and faber,1990, pp. 116, 142

6 Major Michael Norman, interview in Arthur, p. 9, cited in Freedman L. & Gamba-Stonehouse V., op. cit., p. 1137 Carlos Bsser, Operacion Rosario, cited in Gamba-Stonehouse V., The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for

North-South Crisis Prevention, Winchester, Alen & Unwin, 1987, p. 55

8 Freedman L. & Gamba-Stonehouse V., op. cit., p. 439 Ibid., p. 48

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with fourteen marines aboard to protect the workers.10

The decision to invade the Falklands/Malvinas was taken on Friday 26 March 1982 by the

new military junta that seized power in Argentina on 8 December 1981. Leading the junta was the

commander of the Army, General Leopoldo Galtieri who was joined by the heads of the Navy and

Air Force, Admiral Jorge Anaya and General Lami Dozo.11

PART 2 The decision to invade: analysis according to the Prospect Theory

Prospect theory is a descriptive model for analyzing decision-making under condition of risk. The

theory was first developed by two cognitive psychologists, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 12 who

originally applied it to behavioral economics.

According to prospect theory individuals make choices in a logic of relative utility.

Decisions are taken considering a reference point which represents the decision-maker's status quo.

Hence decisions are reference dependent.13 Individuals evaluate outcomes of their decisions

asymmetrically depending on whether they are considered as gains or as losses. Because individuals

tend to overvalue losses relative to comparable gains, decisions are taken following a loss averse

behavior. As consequence of loss aversion, decision-makers facing a situation of loss in respect to

the reference point are inclined to risky behavior in order to recover the loss and return to the

original status quo. Loss aversion introduces a bias that favors the retention of the status quo over

other options.14 This effect of the reference position is known as status quo bias.15 Thus

individuals finding themselves in the domain of losses tend to a risk-acceptant behavior.

Conversely, individuals tend to risk-averse behavior when they find themselves in the domain of

gains. Individuals tend to value what they have more than comparable things they do not have, 16 this

is known as endowment effect.17 Therefore decision-makers are hardly likely to risk something

they posses for something they could obtain. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) 18 also showed that

10 Freedman L. & Gamba-Stonehouse V., op. cit., p. 6411 Freedman L., Official History of the Falklands Campaign: v. 2 - The 1982 Falklands War and Its Aftermath,

London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005,p.153.12 Kahneman D. & Tversky A. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2,

Mar., 197913 Tversky A. & Kahneman D., Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, The Quarterly

Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 4, Nov., 1991, p. 1039

14 Tversky A. & Kahneman D., 1991, op. cit., p. 104215 Samuelson & Zeckhouser [1988], cited in Tversky A. & Kahneman D., 1991, op. cit., p. 1042

16 Levy J. S., Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science,Kluwer Academic Publishers, No 135, 2003, p.216

17 Thaler 1980, cited in Levy J. S., op. cit., p. 216

18 Tversky A. & Kahneman D., Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, The Journal of Business, Vol. 59, No.4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, Oct., 1986, pp. S251-S278.

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individuals overweight outcomes that are certain, this is known as certainty effect. 19 Gains,

contrary to losses, are quickly included by individuals in their status quo causing a renormalization

of the reference point.20 This effect is known as instant endowment effect.21 A change of reference

point causes a change in preference of choice, this effect is defined as preference reversal. Thus

central to prospect theory is how decision-makers frame the reference point. The frame that a

decision-maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the

norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker. 22

Kahneman and Tversky distinguish two phases in the choice process. In the editing phase

the actor identifies the reference point, the available options, the possible outcomes and the value

and probability of each. In the evaluation phase the actor combines the values of possible outcomes

with their weighted probabilities to determine the preferred prospect or choice. . 23

The junta as unitary actor

In this part of the paper Prospect Theory is applied in order to explain the decision taken by the

Argentine government of carrying out a military invasion over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands on 2

April 1982. The theory is designed to explain the behavior of a single agent decision-maker. At the

time of the invasion Argentina was ruled by a military junta consisting of three people: the

commander of the Army General Leopoldo Gualtieri, the head of the Navy Admiral Jorge Anaya,

and the head of the Air Force General Lami Dozo.

In the following analysis it is assumed that the junta acted as a unitary actor as it is reported that

during the crisis over South Georgia the three chiefs worked very closely and in general agreement

with each other, furthermore the final decision on the military intervention was taken even in

secrecy of the Foreign Minister24 Costa Mndez who had followed all last negotiations on the case.

Central to the analysis of the decision process that led to the invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas is

the framing of the reference point around which the decision has been taken. In this case

evaluative framing25 occurred. Argentina's reference point concerning the Islands was the

19 Tversky A. & Kahneman D., 1986, op. cit., p. S266

20 Levy J. S., op. cit., p. 21821 Kahneman et al, 1990, cited in Levy, Levy J. S., op. cit., p. 218

22 Tversky A. & Kahneman D., The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, Science, New Series, Vol.

211, No. 4481, Jan. 30, 1981, p. 45323 Kahneman D. & Tversky A., 1979, op. cit., cited in Levy J. S., Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The

Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict , International Political Science Review / Revueinternationale de science politique, Vol. 17, No. 2, Crisis, Conflict and War. Crise, conflit et guerre, Apr., 1996, p. 186

24 Perkins, Operation Paraquat: The Battle for South Georgia, cited in Freedman L. & Gamba-Stonehouse V., op. cit., p.

6725 Mintz A.& Redd S. B., Framing Effects in International Relations, Synthese, Vol. 135, No. 2, Decision Theory,

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territorial status quo of 1833 which constitutes the core independent variable. Therefore Argentine

decision-makers perceived themselves as being in the domain of losses and, as consequence, acted

under the influences of the status quo bias and showed a risk-seeking behavior.

The reasons why Argentina opted for a military intervention can be found in the junta's perception

of the situation and therefore in how possible solutions were evaluated. Jervis26 furnishes

explanations of how decision-makers perceive the world by illustrating how they learn from history

and how domestic politics and individual training have influence on their decisions. As previous

international events provide the statesman with a range of imaginable situations and allow him to

detect patterns and casual links that can help him understand his world, 27the junta could take into

account at least two antecedents in which the UK gave up the control over colonial territories.

Comparable events occurred over the Suez Canal in 195628 and in Rhodesia in 1981.29 Thus the

military option was evaluated to likely result in a success. Looking at the past another element was

clear to the junta, diplomatic efforts never achieved any considerable result regarding the question

of sovereignty. Thus resolving the current crisis through diplomacy was considered to be rather

likely to fail. Another cause that needs to be taken into account is the fact that since the militaries

sized the power in 1976 the extensive use of force in order to repress any challenge or threat to the

regime became a regular domestic practice. The framework within which the Argentine decision-

makers looked at the international situation was therefore influenced by the domestic practice. 30 The

nature of the regime, military, was also a component that was favorable to the solution of a crisisthrough a military option. As a person's perceptual dispositions are influenced by his tasks and

training31 it is plausible to estimate that the Argentine junta, composed by three high rank

militaries, viewed a military invasion as the best possible solution.

Crucial external intervening variables were the geographical position of the islands and the small

number of troops protecting them. The fact that the islands lie at a great distance from the British

coast made clear that an invasion carried out through the deployment of a considerable number of

men and means would be successful. Therefore certainty effect occurred and the junta overweighted

the invasion option. Moreover the Argentines believed that the British had already sent military

reinforcement to the islands; this made the situation extremely urgent in the eyes of the junta that

May, 2003, p. 195

26 Jervis R., Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976, pp.

217, 283, 286 andJervis R., Hypotheses on Misperception, World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3, Apr., 1968, p. 47027 Jervis R., 1976, op. cit., p. 217

28 Arquilla J. & Moyano R. M., The Origins of the South Atlantic War, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 33,No. 4, Nov., 2001, p. 742

29 Freedman L. & Gamba-Stonehouse V., op. cit., p. 10

30 Jervis R., 1976, op. cit., p. 28331 Ibid., p. 286

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considered the immediate invasion the only way to prove its strength and eventually force Britain

to engage in substantive negotiation on sovereignty, and to ensure that the United Nations and the

United States took the issue seriously and helped bring the negotiations to a successful

conclusion.32

PART 3 The decision to invade: analysis according to the Poliheuristic Theory

Poliheuristic theory is a model to analyze decision-making that takes into account both cognitive

and rational theories. Poliheuristic theory is described by Mintz and Geva in 1997 33 and postulates a

decision-making process segmented in two stages. In the first stage the decision-maker applies

cognitive shortcuts to the problem in order to identify the possible solutions to it. This corresponds

to the cognitive approach. In the second stage the decision-maker analyses the possible solutions

taking into account each one's costs and benefits. This corresponds to the rational choice approach.

Therefore Poliheuristic Theory is a model that describes both how decision-makers make decisions

and how they choose within the possible alternatives.34 In the first stage the decision-maker uses

heuristics (cognitive shortcuts) following a noncompensatory and nonholistic principle in order to

identify and organize the foreign policy options into separate dimensions. Such dimensions,

generally are diplomatic, military, economic, and political. 35 By simplifying complex foreign policy

decisions through cognitive shortcuts, the decision-maker focuses on dimensions of decision. The

nonholistic principle implies that the decision-maker does not take into account all the possible

choices at his/her disposal but focuses on a very restrictive set of alternatives and dimensions. 36

The noncompensatory principle implies that once the dimension which is essential for the decision-

maker is identified any option that is considered to be unacceptable on such dimension will not be

chosen, even if it scores high (it compensates) on an other one. As policy makers are political

actors whose self-interest in political survival is paramount37

the effects of a policy on domestic

politics are central to the decision process. Therefore the political dimension is not compensable

and substitution effect does not exist between this dimension and the others.

32 Freedman L. & Gamba-Stonehouse V., op. cit., p. 68

33 Geva N. & Mintz A. The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking, pp. 81-102 in Geva N. & Mintz

A., Decision-making on War and Peace - The Cognitive-Rational Debate, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 199734 Ibid., p. 81

35 Ibid., p. 9136 Mintz A., The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making, The Journal of Conflict

Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 4, Dec., 1993, p. 598

37 Mintz A., How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.48 No. 1, 2004, p. 7

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In the second stage the decision-maker selects in an analytical way the preferred option among the

remaining restricted range of alternatives, choosing the one which allows higher benefits and lower

costs/risks. Considering that noncompensatory political constraints in nondemocratic societies are

different from those imposed on democratic leaders38 the noncompensatory political loss aversion

can be operationalized in several ways, including: potential collapse of the regime; threat to power,

dignity, honor or legitimacy of a leader; demonstrations, riots and so forth.39

When the crisis over the South Georgia Islands occurred the Argentine junta had to chose between

firmly reaffirming its sovereignty claims over the Falklands/Malvinas or preserving good

relationships with an important economic partner. Because the Argentine government created high

expectations in the population regarding the reacquisition of the islands by Argentina, the junta did

not have other choice than to act resolutely. The Falklands/Malvinas issue was an argument that wasa fundamental part of the so called proceso that was launched in 1976 by the first military junta,

which aim it was to secure Argentina's national borders by resolving issues concerning them.

Moreover, in the period immediately preceding the invasion, right after the last round of talks were

held in New York on 26-27 February, the main Argentine newspapers reported that the Argentine

Ministry of Foreign Affaires took the possibility of invading the islands in consideration.40

Therefore, given the already strong popular aversion to the government, and the recent dispute with

Chile over the Beagle Channel that saw Chile as the winner, a weak response to the problem would

have led to increasing riots and demonstrations, and ultimately threatened the survival of the

regime. As it always proved to be unsuccessful, the option of resolving the dispute through

diplomacy was not even taken into consideration. The diplomatic way never improved the

Argentine rights over the Falklands/Malvinas neither resulted in favor of Argentina in the dispute

over the Beagle Channel's islands. On the economic and strategic dimension Argentina had the

option of cutting the communications between the mainland and the islands, making them even

more isolated. This option was risky and probably ineffective because in order to connect the

islands to the mainland the British could have asked Chile for support with which the British

already had good relations.41 The result would have been to strengthen the alliance between two

enemies, situated close to Argentine borders.

The military option was deemed to be the best way to force the UK to reconsider Argentine claims

of sovereignty. Moreover the junta had the perception that the British government did not have a

38 Ibid., p. 539 Ibid., p. 9

40 Makin G. A., Argentine Approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas: Was the Resort to Violence Foreseeable?,

International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 59, No. 3, Summer, 1983, pp. 400, 40141 Gamba-Stonehouse V., op. cit., p. 104

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great interest in the islands and estimated that the British would not undertake such a long

navigation to directly re-seize them. Therefore the possibility of retaliation was not seriously taken

into consideration. Given the good international relations that Argentina had, the invasion was

expected to be supported by the major world powers. The junta considered that any proposition

forwarded by the British in the context of the United Nation would have been obstructed by the

USSR.42 Moreover, the junta expected the USA to remain neutral43 or to stand on the Argentine side

given the fact that the junta was an ally in the fight against communism and actively supported the

USA in their operations in Central America.

The costs of an invasion were considered to be very low given the fact that the islands lie right in

front of the Argentine coast and far away from the UK and that the number of British troops

protecting the islands was small. Contrary, the benefits were considered to be very significant. A

successful operation would have had great positive impact both domestically and internationally.Domestically, the junta would have gained legitimacy to the Argentine people. Internationally,

winning a confrontation with one of the world's most important players would have meant for

Argentina to become the leading country in the South American region and rise to be considered a

first level global player.

PART 4 Considerations

Prospect theory demonstrates that decision-makers' individual perceptions and predispositions are

the key elements for understanding how a certain choice is made. Nonetheless the theory also

demonstrates how these individual factors are influenced by the surrounding environment.

Therefore according to Prospect Theory the context in which decisions are taken is determinant on

the decision-maker and consequently on the final outcome. What most importantly influences the

decision-maker's perception of a problem is the domestic environment. In this case study it is

evident that the reference point which included the Falklands/Malvinas as part of the Argentine state

was determined by internal dynamics. A good example for such internal dynamics is represented by

the text books used in Argentine schools that for generations fostered the belief that Argentina

should have the sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas.44 Such belief was rooted in all ranks of

the Argentine society, including the militaries where the junta came from. Consequently, the

42 Forlati L. & Leita F., Crisi Falkland-Malvinas e Organizzazione Internazionale, Review by Teson F. R., The

American Journal of International Law, Vol. 81, No. 2, Apr., 1987, p. 558

43 Ibid.

44 Escude C., Argentine Territorial Nationalism, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, May, 1988, pp.139-165

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Theory does. Nevertheless, considering the consistence between the two, it is possible to say that

decision-makers act in a not fully rational logic of relative utility in the first moment when facing a

problem. They need to decide which kind of action needs to be taken and then act as fully rational

agents when it comes to deciding how the chosen action is to be carried out.

What is clear from the study of foreign policy is that the available information is determinant in the

conduction of the analysis. Such information is easier available when foreign policy of democracies

is studied. In fact, the type of regime strongly influences the production and the diffusion of

information and it is clear that the level of transparency is higher in democracies than in other types

of regimes. Furthermore the institutional structure of a democracy is more favorable to the foreign

policy analysis because the organization of a state in a plurality of organs allow a more extensive

production of information that represent different perspectives. In contrast, in autocracies theinformation is not transparent and the power is concentrated, hence the production and the

availability of information are limited and homogeneous. Therefore the study of a foreign policy of

a democracy is more likely to be accurate and objective as different sources of information can be

cross-checked. In contrast, the study of an autocracy's act of foreign policy, especially when it is

conducted a considerably long time after the event, it is likely to result in being influenced by those

who collected the information and presented them in a way according to their personal interests and

views. This would explain the existence of vast literature that interprets the invasion of the

Falklands/Malvinas as a diversionary action. The diversity of availability of information, type of

regime and institutional structure of countries result in the fact that not all models of decision-

making processes are suitable for studying any act of foreign policy.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

FREEDMAN, Lawrence & GAMBA-STONEHOUSE, Virginia, Signals of War - The Falklands

Conflict of 1982, London, faber and faber, 1990

FREEDMAN, Lawrence, Official History of the Falklands Campaign: v. 2 - The 1982 Falklands

War and Its Aftermath, London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005

GAMBA-STONEHOUSE, Virginia, The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis

Prevention, Winchester, Alen & Unwin, 1987

GOLDBAT, Jozef & MILLAN, Victor, The Flaklands/Malvinas Conflict - A Spur to Arms Builds-

ups, Stockholm, sipri Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1983

JERVIS, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, Princeton

University Press, 1976

Articles

ARQUILLA, John & MOYANO, Rasmussen, Mara, The Origins of the South Atlantic War,

Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, Nov., 2001, pp. 739-775

ESCUDE, Carlos, Argentine Territorial Nationalism, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 20,No. 1, May, 1988, pp. 139-165

FORLATI, Laura & LEITA, Francisco, Crisi Falkland-Malvinas e Organizzazione Internazionale,

Review by TESON, Fernando R., The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 81, No. 2, Apr.,

1987, pp. 556-562

GEVA, Nehemia & MINTZ, Alex, The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking,

pp. 81-102 in GEVA, Nehemia & MINTZ, Alex, Decision-making on War and Peace - The

Cognitive-Rational Debate, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1997

JERVIS, Robert, Hypotheses on Misperception, World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3, Apr., 1968, pp.

454-479

KAHNEMAN, Daniel & TVERSKY, Amos, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under

Risk,Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2, Mar., 1979, pp. 263-292

KINNE, Brandon J., Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective,

International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 114-128

LAUCIRICA, Jorge O., Lessons from Failure: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, Seton Hall

Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, Summer/Fall 200

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LEVY, Jack S., Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for

International Conflict , International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science

politique, Vol. 17, No. 2, Crisis, Conflict and War. Crise, conflit et guerre, Apr., 1996, pp. 179-195

LEVY, Jack S., Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science, Kluwer Academic

Publishers, No 135, 2003, pp. 215241

MAKIN, Guillermo A., Argentine Approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas: Was the Resort to

Violence Foreseeable?, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol.

59, No. 3, Summer, 1983, pp. 391-403

MINTZ, Alex, The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making,

The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 4, Dec., 1993, pp. 595-618

MINTZ, Alex & REDD, Steven B., Framing Effects in International Relations, Synthese, Vol.

135, No. 2, Decision Theory, May, 2003, pp. 193-213

MINTZ, Alex, How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective, The Journal ofConflict Resolution, Vol. 48 No. 1, 2004, pp. 3-13

TVERSKY, Amos & KAHNEMAN, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,

Science, New Series, Vol. 211, No. 4481, Jan. 30, 1981, pp. 453-458

TVERSKY, Amos & KAHNEMAN, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, The Journal

of Business, Vol. 59, No. 4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, Oct., 1986,

pp. S251-S278.

TVERSKY, Amos & KAHNEMAN, Daniel, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-

Dependent Model, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 4, Nov., 1991, pp. 1039-1061

Others

United Nations Resolution 2065/XX, 16 December, 1965,

[http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/20/ares20.htmconsulted on 11/05/2012]

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Rglement sur le plagiat

Jury du Dpartement de science politique

Adopt le 1er dcembre 2009

Considrantque le plagiat est une faute inacceptable sur les plans juridique, thique et intellectuel ;

Conscient que tolrer le plagiat porterait atteinte lensemble des corps tudiants, scientifiques et

acadmiques en minant la rputation de linstitution et en mettant en pril le maintien de certaines

approches pdagogiques;

Notant que les tudiants sont sensibiliss aux questions dintgrit intellectuelle ds leur premire

anne dtude universitaire et que le site web des Bibliothques de lULB indique clairement comment

viter le plagiat : (www.bib.ulb.ac.be/fr/aide/eviter-le-plagiat/index.html)

Rappelantque le plagiat ne se limite pas lemprunt dun texte dans son intgralit sans emploi des

guillemets ou sans mention de la rfrence bibliographique complte, mais se rapporte galement lemprunt de donnes brutes, de texte traduit librement, ou dides paraphrases sans que la rfrence

complte ne soit clairement indique ;

Convenant quaucune justification, telle que des considrations mdicales, labsence dantcdents

disciplinaires ou le niveau dtude, ne peut constituer un facteur attnuant.

Prenantnote de larticle 1 de la Loi relative au droit dauteur et aux droits voisins du 30 juin 1994, de

larticle 66 du Rglement gnral des tudes du 3 juillet 2006, du Rglement de discipline relatif aux

tudiants du 5 octobre 1970, et de larticle 54 du Rglement facultaire relatif lorganisation des

examens du 9 dcembre 2004;

Le Jury du Dpartement de science politique recommande formellement dattribuer systmatiquement

aux tudiants qui commettent une faute de plagiat avre la note 0 pour lensemble du cours en

question, sans possibilit de reprise en seconde session.

Moi _______________________________________________, confirme avoir pris connaissance de ce

rglement et atteste sur lhonneur ne pas avoir plagi.

Fait ___________________________________________________

Le ______________________________________________________

Signature de ltudiant ______________________________________

argentina - falkland malvinas islands invasion - 1982

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