apophasis in plotinus - a critical approach, sells

8/2/2019 Apophasis in Plotinus - A Critical Approach, Sells

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Harvard Divinity School

Apophasis in Plotinus: A Critical ApproachAuthor(s): Michael SellsSource: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 78, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 1985), pp. 47-65Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509593

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HTR 78:3-4 (1985) 47- 65

APOPHASIS N PLOTINUS:A CRITICALAPPROACH*

Michael SellsHaverfordCollege

To most modernsensibilities,Gnosticismhas a strongand evendangerousppeal,requently nderothernames,butNeoplatonismscarcelymovesanyone n our time. William amesreacted o theNeoplatonicAbsoluteor God, the One and the Good, by sayingthat "the stagnant elicityof the absolute's wnperfectionmovesme as littleas I move it." No one is goingto arguewithJamesnow.HaroldBloom'

Is apophasisdead? Can there be a contemporary pophatic heology, orcriticalmethod, or approachto comparativereligion and interreligiousdialogue? If such approachesare possible, then a resource of virtuallyunfathomable richness lies largely untapped. I suggest that apophasishas much to offer to contemporary hought and that, in turn, classicalapophasiscan be criticallyreevaluatedfrom the perspectiveof contem-poraryconcerns.Plotinus was not only a founder of apophasis n the West, but alsothe author of what remain some of the most challengingand radicalapophaticpassages. This essay is simultaneouslya reinterpretationofthose passagesand a reconsideration rom an apophaticperspectiveofcontemporaryssues in languagereferenceand the generationof mean-ing. Such a discussion must enter into the world of Plotinianlanguage,a world of constantly shifting reference and perspective, of radical,*Thispaperwas presentedat the panel of the InternationalSociety for Neoplatonic

Studies, AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,Western Division (Chicago,25 April1985).The initialresearchwas aidedby an Andrew Mellon grantand by the hospitalityof Stan-ford University's departmentsof ReligiousStudies and Classics. I owe specialthanks toBernardMcGinnfor his carefuland challenging eadingsof earlierdrafts.I HaroldBloom, Kabbalah nd CriticismNew York:Seabury,1975) 18.


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HARVARDTHEOLOGICALREVIEWsometimes violent, alterations of linguistic structure, of a continualmovement from paradoxto paradox;in short, a world in which theground continuallyfalls out from underfoot as one walks. Despite itsinitial strangeness, I will argue that this is an interpretiveworld verymuch our own.Regress romReference

"The beyond-being"does not refer to a some-thing since it doesnot positany-thing,nor does it "speakits name" (Plato Parm 132a 3). It merelyindicatesthat it is "not that." No attemptis madeto circumscribe it. It would be absurd to circumscribe thatimmense nature. To wish to do so is to cut oneself off from itsslightesttrace. (Enneads5.5.6.11-17)2

For Plotinus, "being" implies form and thereforea delimited entity(horismenon,5.5.6.1-11).3 He is thus led to call the unlimited the"beyond being" (epekeinatou ontos). However, it is not only beingthat implies delimitation. The very act of namingdelimits. A name's2 All references are to Plotinus, Plotini Opera(ed. Paul Henry and Hans-RudolfSchwyzer;3 vols.; Paris:Descl6e de Brouwer;Leiden:Brill, 1951, 1959, 1971), cited bystandardEnnead, reatise,section, and line number. Plotinusspeaksof his firstprinciplewith the personal,masculinepronoun (autos), and with nonpersonal erms such as theGood (to agathon),the One (to hen), and the beyond-being. In orderto emphasizehiseffort going beyond delimitation,I vary between masculineand neuter forms in mytranslations. In composingthe translationsused in this study, I have tried to preservethe distinctivetone of the version of StephenMacKenna Plotinus 5 vols.; London:TheMedici Society, 1921-30]), sometimes echoing a MacKennan urn of phrase. ThoughMacKenna's ranslationhas been supercededby the Englishof A. H. Armstrong(Lon-

don and Cambridge,MA: LCL, 1966-85), the Frenchof E. Brehier(Paris, 1924-38),the Italianof V. Cilento (Bari/Laterza: 947-49), and the German of R. Harder(Ham-burg, 1956-62), its lyrical ntensityis often unique in expressingdeeperPlotinianreso-nances. Even as newer translationsbased upon modern editions replaceit in scholarlydiscussions,MacKenna'swork continues to standforth as a remarkableiteraryachieve-ment, and a compelling nterpretationby translation)of Plotinus.There is a largemodern literatureon Plotinus,and it would be long to cite it all fairly.This essay is based upon readingsof the passagescited, and other similarpassagesthatlend themselves to a rigorousapophaticreadingand defense of Plotinianapophasis. Ishould pointout that Plotinus'spassagesvaryin degreeof apophatic ension. Some pas-sages are apophaticallymore rigorousthan others. This treatmentfocuses on the mostpurelyapophaticpassages n Plotinus and does not attemptto give a comprehensiveviewof his corpus.31 translatedto on and ousiathroughoutas "being," and ta onta as "beings." ForPlotinus, "being" is primarilyhe objectof a reference,and thus any form of referentialentification.

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MICHAELSELLSreferent is, by the act of naming, marked off in some manner fromthose things which it is not. It is a tode ti, a some-thing, a delimitedentity. If denominationand reference are necessarilyacts of delimita-tion, how is it possible to refer to the unlimited (aoriston)? Namessuch as "the One," or "the beyond being" cannot refer to the unlim-ited since, insofar as they refer, they delimit. "We find ourselves in anaporia,agonizingover how to speak. We speak of the ineffable;wish-ing to signify it as best we can, we name it" (5.5.6.23-25).This agony (odis-the term can also mean birth pang) resulted in anew discoursewith its own genre conventions, logic, and semanticandsymbolic structure. The initial aporiaor perplexitywas harnessedandmade the centralprincipleof this new discourse,a discourseof "mysti-cal dialectic" that was to have enormous impact on Greek, Jewish,Christian,andIslamicthought.Plotinus called his strategyfor dealingwith the referentialaporiaapo-phasis (speaking away), a term often translatedas the "negative way"(via negativa),though Plotinianapophasis s very different from simplenegation. More confusingly, the term has been applied to two verydifferent kinds of writing. Formal apophasis acknowledges theineffabilityof the transcendentbut continues to use normal, discursivereference. The formalapophaticmight placea warningat the beginningor end of the discussion to the effect that no name or predictioncan bemade correctlyof the unlimited, but duringthe discussionsuch qualmsare largelyforgotten, and the language s used with little questioningofits normal referentialstructure. Plotinian or rigorous apophasistakesthe aporiamore seriously and uses it like a magnet to transformfixedreferenceinto an open, ever changingsemantic movement.In discussingrigorous apophasisone is caughtin Plotinus'sdilemma.It was statedthat it is impossibleto refer to the unlimited, since the actof reference delimits. But in that very sentence the term "the unlim-ited" had to be used. Similarly, n the case of pronominaldelimitationone might say that "We can't even call it it," but againone has had touse reference to deny the use of reference. Like the rigorous apo-phatic, the critic is caught in a regress spiralling infinitely back awayfrom saying anything.Rigorous apophasis is obscured when treated from an ambiguousapophatic perspective, when, for example, the Plotinian One istranslatedas "God," and that term is then used in a nonapophaticway.Formal or nonapophaticlenses result in a nonapophatic picture. Aself-sustainingprocess of reversion to the normative sets in. Criticalmethods based upon nonapophatic premises render the rigorous

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HARVARDTHEOLOGICALREVIEWapophatictraditionthe more invisible. To avoid this trap, one mustbegin by adhering o the conventionsof Plotinianapophasis.Apophasis begins with apology, acknowledgementthat the termsused in reference to the unlimited are incorrect and should not betaken referentially. This discussion begins with a repetition of thatapology.The second step is the apophaticmarker. Plotinus often uses theterm hoion(as it were) to show that a name or predicateshould not betaken at face value. Though we have a wider variety of apophaticmarkers(quotationmarks,brackets),to placean apophaticmarkerafterevery problematicreferencewould dilute the impactof the markerandresult in an unreadable ext.This leads to the most important step, the apophaticpact. Unlessthe readeragrees to accept a seemingly incorrect use of names at theoutset, and to make a certainadjustment n the term (describedbelow),apophatic anguagewill seem absurd. Plotinus believed that the mindhas a language-conditionedendency to delimit, and to be unawareofthe delimitation. Not only the apophatic writer but anyone whoattempts to discuss that writer'swork without betraying t must enterwith the readerinto an engagementwith the dilemmasof delimitation.Apophasiscannot be presentedunless the presentation s in some wayapophatic. Just as in the above passagePlotinus was forced to use theterm "immense nature," so one is now forced to use terms (the One,the unlimited) that cannot perform the referentialact they proclaim.The readeris asked to bracketthem, to recognize their deficiencywiththe expectationthat their referential unctionwill be transformed.To the referential use of language that he associates with orality,with speaking,naming,and calling, Plotinus opposes theoria. Theoria sa seeing or gazing (idein, blepein, theasthai), but as opposed to normalsight, it is not the viewing of an exterior object. As an example, Plo-tinus suggests the Pythagoreanuse of the term Apollo as a "symbol"of the "not many." This is not a negation, but something more com-plex, an open, never endingprocessof apophasis:

The name "The One" is merely a denial of multiplicity. ThePythagoreans signified it symbolically (symbolikos) among oneanother through the term Apollo (a-pollon, not-many), by apo-phasisof the many. If the One is to be takenas a positing(thesis),name (onoma), and referent (deloumenon),we would express our-selves more clearly f we did not speakits name at all. We speakitso that we can begin our search with that which signifies the mostsimple, endingwith the apophasisof even that. (5.5.6.26-33)

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MICHAELSELLSApophasisis not merely a substitutionof a negative term (the non-many) for a positive term (the One). The term Apollo is used to sig-

nify the "not many," but it is followed by the "apophasis of eventhat." As in the example above, "we can't even call it it," the nega-tion must undergo apophasisin turn. The infinite regress within theinitial aporia inds itself at the center of what Plotinusrefers to as sym-bolic language. An initial, working definition of Plotinian theoriaorsymbolism would be: a discourse that transforms itself from thereferential to the nonreferential through a never-ending process ofapophasis, the withdrawalof a delimitation, the withdrawalof the de-limitation posited in making the first withdrawal,ad infinitum. Thelanguage-conditionedendency of the mind moves it inexorablytowarddelimitation, a tendency that must be continuallytransformedby newacts of apophasis as long as the contemplative gaze remains. Thedynamicof symbolic engagementtends to revert to static reference, tobeing paraphrased s a symbol "of some-thing," the reversion of thesymbol into a name. Plotinian languageavoids reversion through thecontinued "apophasisof even that."In a vivid passage,Plotinus imaginesa glowingmass in the center ofa hollow sphere. Light is wholly presentover every spot on the sphere.Then:

If someoneshouldtakeout the corporealmass,but preserve hepowerof the light,wouldyou thenspeakof where he lightwas?Orwould t not be everywhere, istributedn andover the entiresphere? No longercanyou saythroughdianoiawhere t wasfirstlocated,andno longercanyou saywhenceand howit came. Youwill bebroughtntoperplexityndwonderment.6.4.7.32-38)The hand of the author reaches back into the image to pull out theglowing mass, a kind of manusex machina,as it were. This is apo-phasis: to reach into a reference and withdraw he delimited referent,to reach into the notion of contemplatingsomething and withdraw he"some-thing." What appears to happen ex machina is not reallyartificial,however. The apophaticwithdrawal s governed by the innerlogic of the aporia. In the above example, the entire image was notwithdrawn,only the central mass. An analogous situation holds forpropositions. Apophasisdoes not negate the first proposition, it with-draws from it a delimitingelement. The originalregressionthat spiralsbackawayfrom sayinganythingis transformed nto a movement spiral-ing deeper into the prereferential,or rather, transreferentialsymbol.The common, closed categories of discursive reason (dianoia) aretransformed nto a dynamic, open-ended processof theoria.

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HARVARDTHEOLOGICALREVIEWDisontology ndDoubleProposition emantics

Then there canbe no "thus." It wouldbe a delimitation nd asome-thing.One who sees (idOn),knowsthat it is possibletoassertneithera "thus"nora "not-thus."Howcanyou saythat tis a beingamongbeings, something o whicha "thus" can beapplied?It is other hanallthings hatare"thus." Butseeing heunlimited ou willsaythatall thingsarebelow t, affirminghat itis none of thembut, if you will, a powerof absoluteontologicalself-mastery. t is thatwhich t willsto be;orrather,hebeing hatit wills to be it projects ut into beings,whileit remainsgreaterthanallitswill,all willbeingbelow t. So neitherdidit willto bea"thus,"so that t wouldhave to conform to its "thus"),nor didanothermake t so. (6.8.9.38-48)

The critiqueof languagereferenceis tied into a critiqueof ontology.4Both ontology, the placing of the unlimited within the category ofbeing, and referentialdelimitation,as representedby the predications"thus" and "not-thus," are invalid. The unlimited must be free of allcategories, including the category of being. The argument can bediagrammedas follows: (a) Since the unlimited is free, no other makesit what it is. It is what it wills itself to be. (b) But it cannot even besaid to be limited to what it wills itself to be. (c) We should say that itprojects he being, the quiddity,the "what," that it wills itself to be outinto the realmof beings. It alwaysremains above its own being and itsown willing. This series of apophaticwithdrawals s an explication ofthe dense expression dynaminpasan hautPs ontOskyrian, "power ofabsolute ontological self-mastery." The One's "projection" of beingoutside of itself is the primePlotiniansymbol. Later, even the notionthat "it projects"will be transformed,since the subjectof such a predi-cation implies an actor or being, but "being" is preciselywhat is beingprojectedout.Disontology, mythicallyrepresentedby this "projection," s the tran-scendence of predicationand reference as representedby "thus" and"not-thus." To say that the One is x is to delimit it, to mark it offfrom the not-x. It is also to mark it off even from the x it is said to be.To say that it is here is to mark it off not only from "there," but also"here." There is some category,hereness, which is other than it (oth-erwise the statement "it is here" would be a tautology). A similarcase

4 For a discussionof the conceptof "being" in Greek and medieval Westernthought,see IvorLeClerc,"God and the Issueof Being," RelS20 (1984) 63-78.

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MICHAELSELLSof double delimitation would occur for the "not thus." Plotinus wasconvinced that such reifications, hidden within acts of predication,determine consciousness in a manner both subtle and profound. Wecannot even say "it is" since this would imply a category (beingness)from which it wouldbe markedoff and delimited.

Elsewhere, insteadof sayingit is neither x nor not-x, he says that itis both x and not-x (see below). It is often maintained that suchlanguage s only a "seeming contradiction." It must be arguedthat realcontradictionsarise when the delimited, referential unction of languageencountersa rigorouslyapophaticnotion of the unlimited. But they arenot illogical. They result from a rigorouscritiqueof referentialdelimi-tation. Further, the rules of non-contradictionand of the excludedmiddle apply specificallyto delimited language reference. The coin-cidentiaoppositorums the logical result of any reference to the unlim-ited, and the means by which languagereference is transformed intotheoria. Since the term "paradox" s often defined as a "seeming con-tradiction,"the term "dialectical ogic" is preferred or the coincidentiaeoppositorumnderdiscussion here.The dialectic of immanence and transcendence is an instance ofdialectical ogic. "It is beyond all things" is a statement that delimits.If it is beyond all things, then there is a conceptual space (all things)from which it is excluded, and anotherspace (the beyond all things) inwhich it is confined. Apophatic thinking criticizes normal, one-stepstatements of transcendenceas being just anotherform of delimitation.To achieve an affirmation of transcendence of all limits, one must"transcend" the delimitationof normal affirmationsof transcendence.The solution lies in the following double proposition: It is within allthings-it is beyond all things. Neither proposition n itself is meaning-ful since each imposes a delimitation. The smallest semanticunit is notthe sentence or proposition,but the double sentence or dual proposi-tion. With the image of the glowing mass within the sphere, meaningwas generatedonly when a second imagewas superimposedupon it, thereaching n and pullingout the mass. Meaningresults from the interac-tion of the first and second propositions. Either propositiontaken byitself is delimitingand thus, in reference to the unlimited,meaningless.No single propositioncan be true or false since no single propositioncan say anythingabout the unlimited. It is to this new semantics of thedouble-sentencethat dialectical ogic applies.

Because of the tendency to treat the sentence as the semantic unit,apophasis must be continually repeated. Otherwise, the gravity oflanguage-conditionedhought pulls it towardgiving independentpropo-sitional status to the last sentence. Plotinian discourse, when the

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HARVARD THEOLOGICALREVIEWcontext is the unlimited, is made up of dual propositions,the last sen-tence of the first dual proposition forming the first sentence of thesecond dual proposition. One movement popularwith Plotinus and hissuccessors begins with the dialectic of immanenceand transcendence:It is beyondall things-it is in all things. But as the mind settles on thesecond sentence, it reifies a some-thing containedin all things as in aplace. A new apophasis pushes off this reificationby switching to astrongerform of immanence: it is not in all things but is all things, oris the very place of all things. It is througha continualmovement ofdual propositions that meaning is generated. Once the movementstops, the mind is trappedin the false significationof the last singleproposition.It is ironic that practitionersof mystical dialectic are accused ofpantheismor the denial of the transcendent. Theircritiqueof languageshowed that simple, one-propositionaffirmationsof transcendencearemisleading, pretendingto affirm what in fact they cannot. It is theattempt to find a meaningful formulationof transcendence that leadsineluctablyto statementsof radical mmanence. The chargeof panthe-ism is often countered by saying that we shouldn't take seriously themore extreme statementsof immanence. But dialectical ogic is a logicof extremes. The "absolutelytranscendent" s meaningful only if it issimultaneously the "absolutely immanent." Otherwise it is justanotherbeing, howevergreat, among beings.The existence of the apophaticcritique is often ignored. WilliamChristianstates, for example, that "in most conceptions of God hetranscends he world but is not utterlyor absolutelytranscendent,sincehe is immanent in the world also."5 This statement is based uponpresuppositionsconcerning the relationshipof language reference totranscendence hat are challengedby mysticaldialectic. Plotinus wouldcertainly wonder how an absolute transcendence could be affirmedwithoutan absoluteimmanence.Dialecticallogic as defined here can be found in Plato's Parmenideswhere the hypothesisof "the One" results in a plethoraof coincidentiaeoppositorumr6pecificpassageswill now be examined to show how Plo-tinus gives this schematizedlogic a dynamic principle,how he makes itcome alive.

5WilliamA. Christian,Sr., Meaning nd Truthn Religion Chicago:Universityof Chi-cagoPress, 1964, 1978) 190. Italicsmine.6 Parm.137c-155d. See E. R. Dodds, "The Parmenidesof Plato and the Originsofthe NeoplatonicOne," ClassicalQuarterly2 (1928) 129-43.

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MICHAELSELLSSubject-Predicateusion

For Plotinus, discursive reason reflects alienated consciousness. Itmust "run after" the objectof its contemplationthroughactivity. It iscaught in dualisms of subject-object,cause-effect, origin-goal. Nousasspirit, intuition, theoria, is the overcoming of these dualisms. Itinvolves several acts of union: (1) The union of subject,predicate,andobject. Nous is thought thinking itself, or it is the union of being(ousia) and act (energeia), at once pure being and pure act. (2) Theunion of all these activities in one act. In Nous, to think something isto make it, rather than to consider a preexistent separateobject, andboth acts are identicalwith willing, loving, living, etc. (3) The unionof the divine and human. The human stage of psyche insofar as itachieves noetic contemplationis by that fact united with Nous. AndNous is considered by Plotinus to be divine. Nous is an event, andfrom the human perspectivewe might consider it the event of unionwith the divine. (4) The union of all three unions in Nous. The threeoccursimultaneouslyand implyone another.The statement "thought thinking itself" still contains dualisms.Though subject, predicate,and object are said to be identical, they arelinguistically differentiated and thus delimited. The last stage, theunlimited, the One, lies beyond this delimitation. Nouscan be realizedonly when the contemplativegaze is focused not on Nous but on theOne. For Nousto be Nous it must look beyonditself.If Nous is thought thinking or contemplating itself, what does itmean to say that Nouscontemplatesthe One? There are two problemshere. First, the One cannot be an object of contemplation,since thatwould make it a delimitedentity, marked off logicallyfrom the subjectthat contemplatesit. Second, if Nousis self-contemplation,then to saythat it contemplatesthe One is to say that it is the One. In either case,the reference is split.The breakdownof standard reference can be seen in predicationssuch as "the One wills." As was mentioned earlier, to say "the Onewills" creates several delimitationsmarkingthe One as subjectoff fromthe activity in which it engages, markingthe activity of will off fromother activities. To say that the One is "self-willing" does not solvethe problem since it is Nous that is defined as self-reflective act. Plo-tinus suggests that the One can be intimated only when languagearrives "where there is not two as one, but One-either because thereis Act only, or becausethere is no act at all" (6.8.12.35-37).As opposed to the noetic identity of being and act, or subject andpredicate, the identity spoken of here can be called fusion identity.Again, such a notion can only be conceived of in a dual proposition.

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HARVARD THEOLOGICALREVIEWThe first step posits a predication("the One wills") and the secondstep reaches in to withdraw he glowing mass, this time in the form ofeither the subjector the predicate. We are asked to think of an act sototal that the subject has been utterly fused into the act, a willingwithout a willer; or alternatively,to think of a pure subject, a subjectthat does not act, but serves as the bottomlessground (or depth) out ofwhich the divine willingand divine consciousness (as Nous) well up oremanate. Because thought gravitates toward the subject-predicate,being-act dichotomy, a willing-without-willeror willer-without-willingcan only be glimpsedmomentarily n the intersticesof the dual proposi-tion. Apophasismust keep the mind from settling into delimitationbyever new dual propositions. This being-without-actor act-without-being attemptsa momentarytranscendenceof predication. The follow-ing passage begins with an apophaticapology, only to shift into themost intensely apophaticlanguage. The crucialmoments are signaledby the use of the apophaticmarker(hoion,as it were):

But given that we must incorrectly mploy predicationsor the sakeof the inquiry,then let it be said once againthat they are not beingspoken correctly,since a dualitymust never be posited, not evenfor the sake of obtaininga notion (epinoia). We use these namesnow for the sake of persuasionand in doing so we departfromstrictaccuracy. If we give it activities,and imply that its activitiesare throughits will (for it would not act will-lessly), the acts mustbeas it were its being;its will and its beingwill be thesame. If thisis so, it is as it willedto be. (6.8.13.1-9)

The statementthat its will and being are the same containsa tensionbetween the fusion identity evoked, and the noetic, linguistic identitywhich is the most thatany one-step proposition akenby itself can actu-ally say, a tension which is here highlightedthroughitalics. The mindglimpses an identity of fusion beyond the delimitations of languagebefore it settles into normal habitsof reference. In other passages,theauthor attempts to prolongsuch a glimpse by an apophaticwithdrawalof the subject from the proposition, by speaking of an awakeningwithout an awakener, for example. In the following quotation theOne-Nous is said to cause itself, to be its own very act of self-causing,to be its act of contemplating tself. This turninginward,this motiontowards tself, is the "powerof absoluteontologicalself-mastery"men-tioned above. The deontology consists of a continual fusing of thesubject-predicatedualism. The apophaticmarker hoion appears withsuch frequencythat to translate t each time as "as it were" would becumbersome. It will here be marked with the sign: (. Despite

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MICHAELSELLSPlotinus's intense use of the marker, this passage and others like ithave been readas if there were an entity engagingin activities.7

He is everywhere and nowhere. ... if nowhere, nowhere has hehappenedto be, and if everywhere,then, just as he is, he is every-where so that he is the everywhereand the everyway.... If thenhe exists in view of holding fast toward himself and gazing 0towardhimself, and the being 0 is for him thatvery gazingtowardhimself, he would then make him(self) 0, and then he is not as hehappenedto be but as he wished to be. ... The being that he is isthatvery act towardhimself. ... If then his act did not come to be,but always was, an awakening0 without an awakeneras other 0,an eternalawakeningand a supra-intellection, hen as he awoke tobe he is: awakeningbeyond being, and Nous, and rational ife 0,thoughhe is these 0, act beyondNous and understanding nd life,which are from him and from no other. By himself, in himself,and from himself is his being. He is, therefore, not as he hap-pened to be, but as he wished to be. (6.8.16.1-39)

Predications mply that a subjectengages in an activity, that there isa "remainder"within the subject that is not that activity itself. Plo-tinus evokes an act without subject to overcome such remainders,toovercome the delimitationshidden within predication. He evokes anact so utterly complete and instantaneousthat the subjectis fused intothe act to the point of no longer existing. In terms like "awakeningwithout an awakener,"the fusion of normalsyntacticalunits results inextraordinaryemanticintensity.SplitorShiftingReference

The One is Nous, but beyond Nous. Or the One-Nous s the being itmakes itself to be and then, in disontology, is said to projectoutside ofitself. This disontologyis reflected in language by a splittingof normalreference, and by a subversionof normaldistinctionsbetween reflexiveand nonreflexive. When Plotinus says in the above passage that "he7 A. H. Armstrong n his influentialbook TheArchitecturef theIntelligibleUniversenthePhilosophy f Plotinus Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1940) took these pas-sages as positing a positive One, a being with attributesof freedom, will, knowledge,love, and goodness, that is in contradictionwith a negativeOne mentioned in other Plo-

tinian passages. For anothernonapophatic eadingof Plotinus, see J. M. Rist, Plotinus:TheRoad to Reality Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1967). In the recentworkof Armstrong,the centralityof apophasisn Plotinus s stressed: A. M. Armstrong,"TheEscapefrom the One: An Investigationof Some Possibilities mperfectlyRealized in theWest," StPatr13 (1979); idem, "NegativeTheology," DownsideReview 5 (1977).

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HARVARDTHEOLOGICALREVIEWwould then make himself," or in another passagethat "logic leads usto the discoverythat it made itself," the reflexivepronounis subvertedby the infinite regress lying within the notion of self-causality. Thesimultaneous use and subversion of the reflexive is a deliberateverbalstrategy.This is a criticalmoment. The infinite regress that constituted theoriginal aporiareturns as the interior principle of mystical dialectic,splittingapartnormalreferencestructures rom within:

And if someone should say: "What! doesn't it follow that hewould have had to come into being beforecominginto being? Forif he makes himself, then, insofar as he is made, he is not yet inbeing, but from the perspectiveof the act of makinghe is beforethe self as made, which he is said to be?!" To whom it must berepliedthat he cannot be taken as made, but only as maker. Theact of making himself must be freed (apoluteon)from all else.(6.8.20.1-6)

The dual proposition now takes the following form. The Onemakes/wills/thinks itself to be (self-causality)-the One cannot betaken as the object, it transcendsthe self which it makes itself to be(self-transcendence). Parenthesesare used here to indicate the splittingof reference: It is as it makes it(self) to be. Splitreferenceoccurs notonly in the object [it makes it(self)] but throughoutthe proposition.What is it that makes itself? It must be Noussince Nous is defined asreflexive act. But then it would have had to make itself in order toexist in order to make itself. Nous as self-making devolves into aninfiniteregress. On the other hand, if we say that the One makes itself,then we must withdrawnot only the "itself," but also the divisionbetween maker and makingby posing a makingwithout a maker or amakerwithout a making. Insofar as "it makes," it cannot be the One,since the One cannot be referredto in a subject-predicate elimitation.Nousboth is and is not the One. The double dialectic of self-causalityand self-transcendencebrings to life the underlying dialectical logic.This analysis accounts for the disagreementamong editors in manycases over whether the antecedentof the pronounis Nousor the One.88 See Henry and Schwyzer'sapparatus or 6.7.16.15-16, 6.7.8.16.37, 6.8.13.54-55,

5.2.1.12-15, 5.1.7.10for a few examplesof the controversyover whetherthe reflexiveornonreflexive is meant. For a more extended view of the controversyin a particularinstance,see V. Cilento, Enneadi,vol. 3, part 2, p. 32. In a separateessay (in prepara-tion) I applythe principlesof interpretation utlinedhere to a detaileddiscussionof theabove texts.

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MICHAELSELLSIt is neither and both. As with other writersof mysticaldialectic,Plo-tinus splits the normal reference so that the reflexive/non-reflexive,self/other division is no longeroperative.9The referentcontinuallyslipsbeyondthe proposition.Below, Plotinus speaks of the beyond-being projectingbeing outsideitself. As indicatedin reference to the "power of absolute ontologicalself-mastery," the predication "it projects" cannot stand. To theextent that it is projectingoutside of itself its being, it has no being thatit might be thoughtof as a being that projects. The proposition urns inupon itself in apophasis, transforming tself on ever deeper levels ofdeontologyinto a transreferentialheoria.

So we should intuit the beyond-beingspoken as a riddle by theancients. Not only did he beget being, but he is subjectneither tobeing nor to himself, nor is his beinga principleof himself, but he,being the principleof being, did not make being for himself, buthaving made it, he projected t outside himself-he who is in noneed of beingness, who made it. Thus he did not make in accor-dancewith his being. (6.8.19.12-20)Self-makingrefers then to Nous (noetic self-reflexivity) and to theOne (fusion-identity) at the same time. The propositions"it is as itwilled/made/thought it(self) to be" not only split the reference, butthe infinite regress implied in them continues to split the reference aslong as the gaze (theoria) is maintained. The split reference of self-causality, the "projection" of being outside the self, the process ofdeontology, the breakdownof the self/other dichotomy, are all aspectsof emanation (literally "outflowing," though the term also refers tooverflowing). Emanation s reified when presentednon-apophatically sif there were some place or thing from which things "flow out." In9For similarshifts in Erigena,Eckhart,and Ibn cArabi, ee MichaelSells, "The Meta-phor and Dialectic of Emanation n Plotinus, John the Scot, MeisterEckhart,and Ibn(Arabi" (Ph.D. diss., Universityof Chicago, 1982); idem, "Ibn cArabi'sGardenamongthe Flames:A Reevaluation,"HR 23 (1984) 287-315; and idem, "Ibn cArabi'sPolishedMirror:PerspectiveShift and MeaningEvent," Studia slamica forthcoming). Ibn (Arabirefers to the doctrineof fana,, the passing awayof the ego self in the contemplationofthe divine beloved, through the image of the polished mirror. When the Sufi passesaway, his heart becomes a polishedmirror. The mirror is no longer "seen," only thedivine image reflectedin the mirror. The question "Who sees whom in whom" theninvolves an infinite regress of shifting referents, which I attempt to translate as "It(divine subject,human subject)sees it(self) throughit(self) in it(self)." Again, normallinguisticdistinctions between reflexive and nonreflexive, between self and other, aresplitor fused.

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HARVARDTHEOLOGICALREVIEWPlotinus there is always that second step, the reachingto pull out theglowingmass.Emanation s Overflow f Meaning

The One is all things but no one thing. The principleof all thingsis not all things, but is all things in "that" way. For there allthings run within, as it were. Or they are not, but will be. Howthen from the absolute One, in which no multiplicityappearsnorany duality whatsoever, [can there be a many]? Rather, it isbecauseheres nothingn it thatall things re rom t In order hatBeing be, That must not be Being, but rather Being's begetter.This is, as it were, the primalgenesis. Perfect, seeking nothing,having nothing, needing nothing, it overflowed,as it were, and itsoverflowing made its other. This begotten turned back towardit(self) and was filled and became the contemplatorof it(self) andbecame Nous. Its standingbefore it made Being, and the contem-plationtoward t made it Nous. When it standsbefore it, so that itsees, at one time it is engenderedas Nousand Being. Thus, sinceit is, as it were,That,it bringsabout ikenesses-pouringorthavast power,and that is its image. (5.2.1.1-16)

"Because there is nothingin it, all thingsare from it." Here emana-tion is tied in directly to "ontological self-mastery," or disontology.The passagecontains coiled within it the entire mystical dialectic, andby unraveling ts dilemmaswe can see the workingsof this genre. Forexample, the primal act of generation (prote gennOsis) s called anoverflowing. The overflowing producedan other, which turned back(epestrapho),was filled, and became a contemplatorand Nous. How-ever, if the One producedthe other by overflowing, if that other iswhat flows from it, then to state that the other is filledby the same per-petual overflowing is to fuse together the vessel-content dualism onwhich the metaphor is based, or to first pose the dualism and thenwithdrawone element. This is the dilemmathat the vessel is the con-tent.A similardilemmais intimatedby the meaningsof the Englishtermemanation: the act of flowing out or of causing to flow out, or thatwhich flows out. What flows out is identical to the act of flowingout,the result of the processis the process. In regard o the One and Nous,it [split reference] is the motion of processionand return (or turningback), the motion of which it is at other times calledthe result.

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MICHAELSELLSAnother dilemma concerns the fact that what flows out, or theflowing out, cannot really be or happen until the turning back to the

source. Only after the return can it really be said to have proceded.SimilarlyNous (as intellective act) is said to beBeing. Sometimes Nousis said to proceedand become being when it turnsback. At other timesBeing proceeds and becomes Nous when it turns back. Plotiniandiscourse is filled with related double paradigms(Beauty-Life, Unity-Multiplicity,Rest-Motion). These double paradigms,which elsewhereare referredto as reciprocal ausality,are latent in the split reference [itturns back towardit{self)]. In the semantics of the double paradigm,no single, staticparadigm s meaningful. "A then B" leads ineluctablyto "B then A." Again, textual difficultiesthat occur in deciding theantecedent (Nous or the One) for the pronounsin this passagecan beseen as a resultof Plotiniansplit reference.Split reference involves a double gaze. Nous looks toward itssource/self. Plotinus accepted Aristotle's Nous as thought thinkingitself, but criticizedmaking it the ultimate principle.10Nous becomesitself by gazingbeyond itself. The enigma of the doublegaze relatestothe problemof predication. If Nous is reified as a principle,as subjectof predication, hen the thought-thinking-itselfreezes into a static con-cept. In the simultaneouscontemplationof source/self, contemplativemind is led by the aporiainto reenactingthe very unions mentionedabove as being part of Nous: union of subject and predicate, of allactivityin one act, etc. The unlimited, like a magnet, keeps Nous in astate of constantactivity.One could go on explicatingthe dilemmasof emanation. Later Neo-platonistsdid so systematically. What is most important s the aporeticfunction these dilemmas represent. The aporia keeps the mind inincessant activity, never allowing it a fixed referent. One is led fromone facet of aporia to another. The logical regress within the aporiacontinuallyforces the readerto reachin and pull out the glowing mass.Whenever a source of emanation is delimited a second step removesthe delimitation.

10Enneads .7.41.8-17, 6.7.40.22-30. ThoughPlotinusconsideredhimselfa discipleofPlato and a critic of Aristotle, it may have been in his unravelingthe hidden dynamicwithin Aristotelian formulations of Nous (Metaphysics1074b 33-1075a; De anima3.4.429b-430a) that the Plotinian nfinitelyrecedingreferent evolved. The term "Neo-platonism"may granttoo much to Plotinus's rhetorical elf-positioning,and may neglectthe profound mpactupon him of certainAristotelian exts. (Ofcourse that is in additionto the deeper problemwith the term "Neoplatonism"with its implication hat what isinterestingabout Plotinus lies in his doctrineratherthan, as suggestedhere, in his modeof discourse.)

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HARVARDTHEOLOGICALREVIEWThe aporiagoverns a discourse that combines the metaphorof ema-nation, or the mythic languageof "projectionof being out of it/self,"

with an inner dialectic that transformsthe dualistic structures uponwhich images are based, forminga symbolicprocessof mythic dialecticor metaphoricdialectic.Emanation s often seen as causalexplanation,and genesis as simplythe One's engendering of Nous, and the succeeding creation of thelower realms. But the inner apophatic ogic subverts the dualisms anddelimitationsupon which such narrative,explanatory anguage s based.Explanatory anguageis transformed nto a languageof theoria. Untilnow theoriahas not been translatedhere as contemplationsince con-templation s most often seen as contemplationof some-thing, and thatreification of a "something" is preciselywhat Plotinus was attemptingto avoid. Nousis contemplation,but the "object" of its contemplationis constantly being pulled away through the techniques of linguisticfusion and split reference.From the fusion or fission of small particlesresults an enormousenergy. Though such analogiesmay only be suggestive, Plotinus doesobtain an extraordinary ymbolic intensity through splitting reference,and fusing subjectand predicate. This is the "pouringforth of a vastpower" that results from the Plotinian epistrophe,he turning back tothe self/source.Ingress ntoSymbol

Plotinus calledhis apophasisa "symbolic"use of language. This useof "symbol" should not however be confused with pre-referentialsignification. Mysticaldialectic uses languageand languagereference.It "proceeds" out into delimited languagereference, only to "return"to the non-delimited source. Both steps are necessaryfor the genera-tion of meaning. The first or "kataphatic"step sets the context. Thecultural and linguistic context of a given tradition, in this case thephilosophical raditionof late antiquity,is affirmed. The second or apo-phatic step removes the delimitation through the negativity,representedby withdrawinghe glowingmass.The second or negative stage can take on meaning only within itscontext. This negativity can never be propositionally distinguishedfrom mere negativityor nothingness. From the standpointof the apo-phatic moment, the question "does it exist or not" cannot beanswered. On what groundscould one affirmor deny the existence ofwhat (!) lies beyond the delimitationsof predication,of "it exists" or"it does not exist." When the apophaticmovement is taken out ofcontext it sounds nihilistic. But a greaterdanger s posed by those who

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MICHAELSELLSattempt to show that the apophaticmoment actuallyaffirmsa "some-thing" and thus delimits it. Apophasis demands a moment of realnegation. After speakingof absoluteunity as thatwhich is most power-ful (dynatotaton) n an animal,a soul, or in the all, Plotinussays:

But shouldwe grasp he One of authenticbeings,theirprinciple,wellspring, nd dynamis-willwe then lose faith and consider tnothing?It is certainly othingof the thingsof which t is theori-gin,beingsuch,as it were,thatnothing an beattributedo it, nei-ther being,nor beings,nor life. It is beyondthose. If then bywithdrawingeing you shouldgrasp t, you will be brought ntowonder thauma).3.8.10.26-32)After contemplatingthe worldviewof his tradition,the mystic thenwithdrawsbeing from the source. At this moment the soul "fears thatthere be nothing" (6.9.3.6). A moment of pure receptivity isdemanded, a letting go, a leap beyond the security of delimited con-sciousness. At this point one is asked not to lose faith. The faithdemanded is not a faith in any-thing, but a willingness to let go ofbeing. Such a letting go results in wonderment (thauma), and emana-tion, an overflow of meaning. But wonderment and the overflow thatresult from liberationfrom deliberationconstitute an event. They can-not be held onto. The processmust be continuallyrepeated.Apophasistransformsa semantics of predication nto a semanticsofrealization. Nothing can be affirmedobjectively about the One/Nouswithoutdelimitingthe unlimitedand freezingthe dynamic. Noetic con-templation must be realized (in the double sense of understood andactualizedor reenacted)at the moment of apophaticwithdrawal.The appeal of apophaticmystics lies not in a universal doctrine orcreed. One need not share Plotinus's opinions on astrology or thematerialworld, for example, in order to appreciate he apophaticpas-sages. The "what" that is posed in the first kataphatic tage is condi-tioned and delimited, but the act of withdrawing t is not. ThoughPlotinus insists that it is necessaryto follow the virtuouslife, accordingto his own rigorousnotions of virtue, to achieve a complete experience,his ultimate (and hardwon) decision to write implies that readingcanitself enact the epistropho, esthetically and noetically, as a meaningevent. Plotinus's agony for expression led to the birth of mysticaldialecticas a genre, a genre that was to have a long history in Greek,Christian,Jewish, and Islamic traditions.This account of mysticaldialectic suggests a change in the focus ofcontemporarydiscussion of mysticism. One group has claimed that"what" the mystic experiences is the same in different traditions. In

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HARVARDTHEOLOGICALREVIEWresponse, in a discussion of the experienceof "nothingness," StephenKatzanswersthat "the differencebetween cases is a differencebetweenwhatis experienced, not just how somethings experienced"11Noticehow "nothing" has been made into "something"! Mystical dialecticcriticizes such a use of "what." The proposition "experiences what"delimits. A "what" implies a quiddity, a definable essence, a some-thing. While we might arguethat the experienceis contextuallycondi-tioned, or that it is common to mystics in differing traditions,at theapophatic evel we must withdraw he "what." Such withdrawal llowsan alternativeeither to delimitinga common essence of religious tradi-tions or denyingthe possibilityof comparativeunderstanding.

In this interpretation, he focus has been upon linguistic elements,subject-predicate ualisms, for example. It might be objectedthat Plo-tinus does not usually use grammatical erminology. It is true that hespeaksontologically,of the "other" proceeding rom the One and thenrealizing itself as it turns back toward it(self). Yet, there are cluesthroughoutthat these passagesare to be read symbolicallyas disontol-ogy. When Plotinus speaks of an awakeningwithout an "awakenerasan other," in the context of act-without-being,his text is self-reflective.What "proceeds" is the subject-predicatedualism that is languagereference. That reference is not what it is until it returns to itself (wecan't speak of the proceeding until the result, the subject-predicate,allows us to say "it proceeds"). But the languagereferenceis not fullyitself until it turns towardsits source in intuition (gazing inward), ininsight into the pre-predication, he un-delimited. This transreferentialsecond step is markedby fusion identities and split reference. There ismovement (processionand return) but the movement is also a rest orremaining: the event of epistrophe,of apophasis, be continuallyrepeatedin orderfor the gaze to rest fixed. No single propositioncanbe more than momentarilymeaningful.The original aporia that spirals back away from reference istransformed nto a new spiral, the dynamis f disontology. The linear,dualistic thrust of intention (origin-goal), causality (cause-effect),hierarchy(high-low), time, space, and languagereference is combinedwith an equal circularmovement of dialectic and coincidentia ppositorum.In emanation,what flows out is identicalwith the act of flowingout. In mystical dialectic,what is meant is identicalwith the process,or the movement, of signification. One can never say propositionally

11Stephen Katz, "Language,Epistemology,and Mysticism,"in idem, ed., Mysticismand PhilosophicalAnalysis(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) 52. Emphasismine.

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MICHAELSELLSwhat is meant, since the meaning cannot be delimited in a "what," asomething. The dynamisof absolute ontological self-mastery is themeaningevent thatcomes about throughapophasis.Plotinus's attitude towardwriting is portrayedas ambivalent, eventortured, by Porphyry,his editor, biographer,and disciple. For yearshe refused to write, and when he finallydid, he would write an entiretreatise at a time, in a kind of contemplativewhite heat, not movinguntil it was finished. Afterwards,he would not look at it, even to makespelling and grammatical corrections. His ambivalence is in partjustified by the fate of his method in much subsequentinterpretation.The tendency to reify the One as some kind of entity is in direct pro-portion to Plotinus's pleas, and his apophatic mechanisms, meant toprevent such reification. The quotation with which this essay beganexemplifies this tendency. The One is first reified as an entity, andthen that entity is attacked or its "staticfelicity." But the One is not astatic entity, felicitous or otherwise. It is what 0 continually slipsbeyond delimiting language reference, leading a contemplative move-ment ever deeper into meaning. The movement never stops at a finalentity. This movement can take place within any religious or culturaltradition. It does not attempt to deny the religious language of thetradition,but transforms t from the doctrinal o the contemplative,to alanguageof theoria. In doing so it breaksapartnormalcategoriesandboundaries,mergingtheology, philosophy,and poetryin a uniquegenreof discourse. It challengesstandard tereotypesof Easternand Westernthought,12as well as stereotypesof modern and classicalviews of refer-ence and language.13t challenges the marginalization nd dismissal as"uncommunicative"of mysticallanguage. Finally, it challenges schol-arshipand criticismto develop a contemporarydiscourse that will notfreeze and reify the apophaticmotion.

12There are strong similarities between Plotinian apophasis and non-dual Indianthought, for example. The Sunyatanotion that all constructs are empty includingtheconstructthat all constructsare empty, including he conceptthat the conceptthat ... isan infinite regress functionally identical to Plotinus's aporia, and used (as in theVimalakirtiutra)in similarways.13There is a tendency among followersof deconstructionisthoughtto overlook prec-edents among apophatic hinkers. This is often due to a reified view of the apophaticthinkersthemselves, or a dismissal of them, founded upon an inaccurateview of mysti-cism as irrational.

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apophasis in plotinus - a critical approach, sells

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