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PLOTINUS AND THE GNOSTICS

BY JOSEPH KATZ

Plotinus'essay

against the Gnostics (Ennead II ix) 1 has often been

commented upon. Due acknowledgment has been made of the polemical

sharpness with which Plotinus attacked what he regarded as the arrogant

myth-making and the dialectical imprecision of the Gnostics. But a much

more important fact seems to have escaped the interpreters. For it is

amazing that almost all of the ideas that Plotinus finds objectionable in

the Gnostics have been asserted by himself too in one form or another. The

polemic against the Gnostics, consequently, turns out to reveal a vital ten-

sion in Plotinus' own system, rather than a mere external differentiation of

his doctrines from others. To see Plotinus as in some sense a Gnosticmanque is to discover an important aspect of his many-faceted philosophy.In the essay against the Gnostics Plotinus, who usually is very restrained,

permits himself a large amount of emotive invective. This too suggeststhat we are touching upon a vital nerve of Plotinus' thought.

The avowed purpose of the essay against the Gnostics is to oppose those

who assert that the world of sense or its originating source are evil. Ploti-

nus declares that whatever the deficiencies of the world of sense, it is a

copy of the intelligible world and thus exhibits the order and beauty ap-

propriate to it. It is the best possible world, given its inevitable spatialand temporal character. Plotinus even goes so far-and it is going far

for a Platonist-as to say that surely those who have had the experienceof intelligible beauty and harmony will not fail to be touched by their sensu-

ous copies. " Would any musician who had once heard the intelligible har-

monies not also be moved by those of sense? "2 Plotinus even permits

himself, something exceedingly rare in him, a moralistic censure, reproach-

ing the Gnostics with unconcern for virtue and declaring solemnly that

1 The title of the essay as givenin sections 5 and 16 of Porphyry'sLife of Ploti-nus is "Against the Gnostics." In section24 it is "Againstthose who say that themaker of the world is evil and that the world is evil." The titles are not due toPlotinus and in the body of the essay neither the names of particularthinkersnorthe genericname" Gnostics" occur. In section 10 Plotinusrefersto "friendswhohad come acrossthese doctrines[the doctrinesattacked in Enn. II ix] beforebe-

comingfriends of oursand who, I do not knowhow, still persevere n them." The

brevity of Plotinus' statement of the doctrineshe attacks and the incompletenessof our sourcesmake it very difficultto determinewhichspecificmen Plotinushad

in mind. Giventhe natureof Plotinus'problem n Enn. II ix it will be permissiblein this article to use the term "Gnostics" in a genericsense-and it may well havehad just such generic significanceor Plotinus too.

For a discussionof the problemwhichspecificmen and doctrinesPlotinusmayhave had in mind, see CarlSchmidt,Plotins Stellungzum Gnosticismusund kirch-lichen Christentum,Texte und Untersuchungen ur Geschichte der altchristlichen

Literatur,new series,vol. 5, fasc. 4 (Leipzig, 1901), especially pp. 13ff.,30ff.,48ff.,82ff.

2Enn. II ix 16. All translationsn this article are my own.

289





PLOTINUS AND THE GNOSTICS 291

literal understandingof a favorite metaphorof his, the Phaedr metaphorof the soul's loss of wings.14 Accordingto a device he frequentlyuses,the

psyche consists of hierarchicallyarranged faculties, the highest of which

never descends,so that ascent or descent becomes a matter of the shiftingawarenessof the human self.15 He suggestsin additionthat the descentofthe psyche does not springfroma flaw,but ratherfrom the powerof super-abundant perfection which, in the absence of a counter-power,exhaustsitself in all degreesof being.18 Yet these constructionsand the often tor-tuous dialectic they requirehalf imply and half defendthemselves againsta quite differentconceptionof the psyche. In somecontextsthis conceptiontoo findsexplicit statement. The fall of the soul is then derived from dis-

content and overbearing. Her fall is a withdrawalfromthe whole into anindividualisticseparateness.l7 The fall is a self-assertion. Plotinus even

goes so far as to declare on occasion that the fall stems from the soul's" arrogance."18 These passages illustrate well how close Plotinus, too, isto "acosmism,"how he is willing to violate cosmologicalorder, and dia-lectical rigor,for the sake of a drama of rebellionand redemption.

Plotinus strongly objects to the Gnostics' insistenceon their specially-privilegedplace in the universe, heir insistenceon beingthe children of god,better than other men and deities.19 There is a rationalistic and a socio-

logical aspect to his argument. He is irked that "men without station,"members of the "vulgar crowd,"should claim such distinction,and more

emphatically,that the way to salvation should flagrantlybypass dialecticand the sternintellectualand moraldiscipline t requires.20But these reser-vations do not imply immunity to the serpent's temptation: eritis sicutDeus. In Plotinus' system too identification with the One is the ultimate

goal of humanendeavor. The self in its upward flightdoesnot stop at thelevel of nous in a mere contemplationof the highest existence-as do theredeemed in Christianity. Plotinus too holds

somethinglike the Gnostic

notion of the divine sparkwhenhe says, in moreAristoteliananguage,thatascent to and union with the One means the reawakeningof the psyche'spotentialities,21 or when he declares that the supremepart of the psycheis forever united with the One.22

Plotinus' " acosmism" is of coursemore mitigatedthan the Gnostics'.According o Gnosticdoctrine, his world is the productof an evil demiurge,and men of the divine pneumaowe no allegianceeitherto this creator godorto his world.23Plotinusfinds it particularlyobjectionablen this doctrine

14Pato Phaedrus246c,Enn. II ix 4. ' Enn. II ix 2, IV viii 8.1 Enn. II ix 3, 8, of.Vii 1, 2, VI vii 8. 7 Enn. IV viii 4.18 Enn. V i 1. Often there is an attempt to minimizethe flawthat initially in-

heres in the psyche and also to shift at least part of the responsibilityupon theobtrudingpresenceof a body. See Enn. III ii 4. Such passagesbetray Plotinus'uneasinesswith the moreGnosticimplicationsof his thought.

19Enn. II ix 9, 16, 18. 20Enn. II ix 9.e1 Enn. VI ix 1I, IV viii 1. 22Enn. II ix 2. 2SCf. Enn. II ix 15ff.





292 JOSEPH KATZ

that it assigns to man a rank higher than to the celestial realm whose beautyand order are in such marked contrast with terrestrial life. According to

Plotinus, the sun and the stars possess not only immortality, but a wisdom

and a freedom from passion superior to those of men born only recentlyand subject to lust, pain, and the fits of temper.24 A striking vindication,even a glorification, of the world of sense occurs in Ennead III viii, which

Plotinus puts in the form of a hypothetical speech by the cosmos itself:

I was made by god and as I stem from the realm beyond, I am perfect con-

taining all living things. I am self-sufficient and independent, in want of

nothing, because in me there is everything, all plants, animals, all that is

born, the plurality of gods, the tribes of demons, excellent souls, and men

happy through the quality of their life. The earth is not alone adorned by

the whole gamut of plants and all the varieties of animals, nor does thepower of the soul extend to the sea omitting the air, ether, or heaven; butthere are found beyond the earth souls, and excellent souls only, which givelife to the stars and to the well-ordered and eternal round of heaven thatin imitation of the intelligible world wisely describes a circular path aroundthe same center forever, without the need for deviation. All things thatexist within me aspire towards the Good, but each realizes it according to its

capacity; for the whole heaven depends on it, all that I possess of soul, the

gods that exist in my parts, all animals, plants, and all that is in appearance

inanimate. The latter seem to participate in existence alone, of the otherssome participate in life alone, some also possess sensation, some even reason,and some universal life. For one must not ask that unequals be equal. Onemust not ask of a finger to see, but of the eye. Of the finger one must ask,I suppose, to fulfill its proper function of a finger.25

What Plotinus says in such contexts implies no special exaltation of man.It seems only a short step to the Stoics' submission to nature or even toAristotle's notion of mortal man reaching only a temporary immortality inthe study of the eternal patterns of nature. No notion of man's super-

natural character seems to break in to require the union of two incom-mensurable orders of existence.

But such subordination of the psyche holds for Plotinus only when heviews it in its state of association with the body, or in its cosmological func-tion as a hypostasis mediating between the intelligible and the sensibleworlds. Ultimately, for Plotinus too, the psyche transcends both the sensi-ble and the intelligible worlds.26 It leaves behind sun, stars, and the otherdivinities.27 Plotinus' conception of man never reaches the boldness of theGnostic

conceptionof man the redeemer, but neither does it rest

content toassign man the function of a " part " in a universal whole. Union with theOne is as all-devouring ontologically as solipsism is epistemologically. Beit noted, moreover, that ascent is accomplished neither by grace nor prayer,but through the adoption of Plotinian philosophy.

24Enn. II ix 5, 13. 25Enn. III ii 3; cf. II ix 8.26Enn. VI ix 11, IV viii 1. Whenunited with the One, the psyche "is raised

above all the other intelligiblebeings." 27Plotinus maintains the existenceofdeities,but they are to him of inferiorrank than the One. The pluralityof godsexhibitsthe abundantpowerof the One (Enn. II ix 9).






There seems to be one respect in which Plotinus is profoundly different

from the Gnostics, and that is in his painstakingly rationalistic way of

arguing. At the very beginning of his essay against the Gnostics28 he

charges the Gnostics with needlessly multiplying the number of hypostases.What he has in mind is the multiplicity of entities, half-conceptual and half-

mythical, that spring from the fertile Gnostic imagination. To Plotinus the

dramatic evolution of the Gnostic world destroys the perfection of the One

by introducing potentiality into it.29 Similarly, to Plotinus the Gnostic

division of nous into an intelligence at rest and an intelligence in motion,or into thought and awareness of thought, seems to ignore the capacity for

interpenetration and unification that immaterial existence possesses and to

lead to an infinite regress (awareness of awareness of thought becomes a

superior hypostasis and so forth).30 These arguments are representative of

Plotinus' approach in general. A disciplined logic underlies Plotinus'

method. He himself is quite aware of this when he charges the Gnostic

constructions with not being " Greek." 31

Nevertheless, Plotinus cannot be called a rationalist without major reser-

vations. For Plotinus' system too rests on myth. He is, of course, unaware

of this, and on the surface pushes rationalism so far that he will usually

accept the traditional Greek myths only on the assumption that they are

metaphorical, and in particular always translates their temporal form intohis eternalistic concepts. The break in Plotinus between a rationalist

method and a mythical background is discernible at a juncture in his system

that, on the surface, seems to furnish a model of consistency: the relation-

ship of the One to nous. In Plotinus' system, nous generated by the One is

the first reflection of ultimate simplicity. On the level of nous the One's

richness splits up into manifoldness, but as the realm of nous is immaterial,its multiplicity is compatible with togetherness and eternity. Nevertheless,the apparent smoothness of the transition from the One to nous is one of the

triumphs of Plotinian dialectic. It hides the conflict between the rationalistmethod and the mythical background. As one might expect, discussions of

nous imply the former, discussions of the One imply the latter; but the

division is not really clear-cut, since the conception of nous is not without

a rather full share of myth (as, for instance, in the identification of nous

and Being), and since much logic enters into the definition of the One (as,for instance, in deriving some of the logical implications of unity).

Plotinus' discussions of nous are often a more or less hypostatized de-

scriptionof the rationalist

approach.Most

characteristicallythis is asserted

28 Enn. II ix 1. 29Enn. II ix 1, 6. 30Enn. II ix 1.31 Enn. II ix 6. Plotinus is nevertheless ed to remark that the Gnosticswith

an appearance f justicederivesomeof their doctrines romPlato (Enn.II ix 6, 17).He might have added other Greek sources, particularlythe Pythagoreans. But

rather than admit the "impurity" of the Greek tradition, Plotinus prefers to

chargethe Gnosticswith an impure interpretation. Whenhe chargesthe Gnostics

with unfitting elaborationsof the ancient doctrinesand when he speaks of the

"deceit" capturingmankind,one gets a good idea of the bitternesswith which

Plotinusfaced not only the Gnostics,but also, in all likelihood,Christianity.





294 JOSEPH KATZ

in Ennead III viii, where he declaresthat not just rationalbeings,but all

natureaspirestowardscontemplation. "Begetting means to producesome

form; and this means to spread contemplationeverywhere."32 Practical

activity, the mechanicalarts are attemptsto get hold of ideas and expressthem in actionsor artefacts characteristicof men who cannot morepurelyholdthem in mind.33 "All life is some sort of thought ... The highestlifeand perfectthoughtare one and the samething."34 In otherwords,it is in

beingunderstoodhat thingsreachtheir fulfilment. For this Plotinusquite

properly might claim the "Greek" tradition-with reservations,for howshould one term his reification of the intellectual function? Moreover,Plotinus'havingall naturesubserve he designof contemplative ulfilment-

how like the Gnosticsit is in its anthropocentric gotism35

It is a quite differentmanner of being and a quite differentexperiencethat Plotinus understandsunderthe name of the One. It is so little intel-lectual that Plotinus denies even self-awareness o the One.36 In the de-

scriptionof the One the terms of his system forsakehim, and occasionallyhe even says that the Oneis not to be called the One37or that the Goodisnot to be calledgood.38 Thereare dialecticalreasonsfor this via negativa,giventhe conceptionof levels of realityandthe view that the properreferentof discursive anguage s sense existence. But Plotinushas a moredefinite

notionof the One,and forgettinghis negativestrictureshe refersto it in themetaphorsof joy,39of love,40of light,41even of intoxication.42

The soul is in such a state then [when unifiedwith the One] that it hascontempt even for thought, which before has given it much joy.... Nousmust have (1) the powerof intelligencewhichgives it the vision of what iscontained n itself and (2) the powerof grasping hat whichis beyonditselfby a directapprehension.... The firstvision is that of intellectualnous,the

32Enn. III viii 7. In Plotinus the Trational rinciples (logoi) of nature are

understoodat once in an ontic and an epistemicsense.33Enn. III viii 4; see also Enn. IV iv 44 wherePlotinusasserts that only con-

templation s free from the magical nfluences o whichactionis necessarily ubject.34Enn. III viii 8.S5Nevertheless,Plotinus' identificationof nous with Being creates strong am-

biguities,even to the point of an anti-intellectualistconceptionof the intelligibleworld. Plotinus'usual objectionto the notion of providence s that it ascribes de-liberationto the intelligibleworld, which in his view creates rather by its beingwhat it is (Enn. III ii 3, VI vii 1, II ix 8). In Enn. II ix 2 Plotinusasserts thatthe world soul governsnot "by

deliberation,"but

"byits

contemplationof theworld above it." The contrastof "deliberation" with "contemplation"mirrorsthe ambiguityof the identificationof nous with Being. OccasionallyPlotinus goesso far as to assertthe quitemodern-soundingdea that knowing,even the knowingof nous,springsfrom want (for instance,Enn. III viii 11). Plotinusalso tends toa conceptionof consciousnesswhich makes it a productof incompleteabsorptionin activity (for instance,Enn. I iv 10).

36Enn. VI ix 6. 37Enn. V v 6, 13. 38 Enn. VI ix 6.39Enn. VI vii 34. 40Enn. VI viii 15,VI ix 9. 41Enn. VI ix 9. 42Enn. VI vii 35.






other that of nouswhich loves. For whennous ceasesto be rationaland isdrunk with nectar, it becomes nous which loves and achieves the unitywhichgives happinessthroughits fullness. Such drunkenness s better for

it than a sobrietythat is above suchdrunkenness.43Salvationin the One is very much more than intellectual fulfilment. The

metaphorsdescribing he One,the metaphorsof the ascent to the Alone,ofthe fall, of the arroganceand self-assertionof the psyche,of the treacherousblackmagic of matter,44 ll describe a reality that is rich and imaginative.One need only expandwhat Plotinus says, let the imaginationrun more

freely,give it appropriate xpressionn rite and acts, and one has full blownGnosticism.

Even as it is, Plotinus'system may be taken as one vast hymn to inex-haustible seminal fertility.45 In his world everything emanates from the

highestpowerby cosmologicalnecessity,andyet this necessityinvolvesit in

pain and longing.4" The whole universe is endowedwith the qualities of

psyche. Not only man but everythinglongs to returnto, even to be ex-

tinguishedin the One.4T All being constitutesthe vast spectacleof bitter

necessityand sweetsalvation. Moder readershave beenpuzzledabouttheexistentialreferenceof Plotinus' system. But his system is at least exis-tential in its reference o psychic reality-of coursefrequentlyin symbolicratherthan literal terms. But Plotinus shrinksfrom the full implicationsof his own thought. Somethinglike Gnosticismis implied by half of his

thought,andyet he is blindto it to the extent of ignoring hat almost all ofthe ideas he finds objectionable n the Gnostics can nearly be matchedbyideasof his own. But he knewthe Gnostictemptationfromthe inside. The

very vehemenceof his essay againstthem is one moretestimonyto the factthat the bitterest battles are always against one's own unacknowledgedimpulses.

It mightperhapsbe said that Plotinus could have integratedhis thoughtbetter,had he had at his disposal the Christian distinction betweenfaithandreason or the distinctionbetweennon-discursiveand discursivesymbol-ism. But no mereconceptualdistinctionwould have helpedPlotinus48 (asit helped little many Christianthinkers who soon involved their revealedGod in the mostintricatedialecticalcontextsor askedpseudo-physicalques-tions about him). Plotinus' integrationof the discordantelements in his

systemwas dialectical,and he succeededat it so well that he mightbe called

48Enn. VI vii 35.

44Enn. IV iv 43, 44.45 For the extremes o whichthe Gnosticscarried he seminalcult see Epiphanius

Panarion26. Thereis muchof the libidinous n the Gnosticimaginationn general.46Enn. IV viii 5, VI ix 9. 4TEnn.VI viii 13.48Phrases like Porphyry's"the unreasonedand unreasonable aith" (alogos

pistis) of the Christians ndicate how muchsuch a distinction ay outsidethe Neo-platonists'orbit in their insistenceon at least the form of rationaldemonstration.They arehencegenuinelypuzzledby certaincharacteristicNew Testamentpassageswhichpromisesalvationthroughothermear, than philosophicknowledge.





296 JOSEPH KATZ

the masterof thosewho aim at consistency. The often-praisedarchitecture

of Plotinus' system is really analogousto a Gothic facade over a modern

structureof steel and concrete. The emanationof the One into nous hides

a major discrepancy. Again, the third hypostasis,the psyche, comes closeto beinga superfluous eduplication,and the reconciliationof its cosmologi-cal with its ethical function is hardly possible.4 On the level of sensePlotinus never fully overcomes he discrepancybetween a substantial and

a privative conception of matter and evil50 (just as St. Augustine never

fully shed his Manicheanism). Plotinus' chain of being, on the surface an

unbroken continuum of all degrees of power, hides a mass of conflictingtendencies and assumptions. Yet such was Plotinus' dialectical power that

even if thepost-Enlightenment

reader hasdifficulty finding

the existential

referents of his thought, some variant of his system has up to the nineteenth

century served as the best rational yardstick of reality.51The preceding discussion also throws some light on the problem of Ploti-

nus' mystical experience. Plotinus himself in a few passages seems to layclaim to such an experience.52 Still, he hardly dwells on the experience

49To Plotinusnous is not only "vision " but also true Being and Life. Hence

once nous is endowedwith Life, the psyche seemsto lose its most specificfunction

and the world of senses could have been derived immediatelyfrom nous. There

is indeed in Plotinus'system an isomorphismbetweennous and the sense world.Both contain in their differingways-the one in immutableand nonmaterial ame-

ness, the other in space and time-the totality of things. The psyche, if Plotinus

were fully consistent, should follow the same pattern of "horizontal" plenitude.Insteadthe psyche, in one sort of context,has a "vertical" plenitude,being asso-

ciated with the various levels of reality. In other contexts it shrinks from this

sort of plenitudeto a more univocalagent whose functionis mediationand which

is a mobilebeing capableof ascent and descent. Either "vertical" plenitudeor

mobility bringthe One within reachof man,that is, of man who has undergonehe

philosophicdiscipline.Thereare otherpossible mplicationso the distinctionbetweennousand psyche,

such as its standingfor the male and femaleprinciple respectively,as is suggested,for instance,by the fact that in Plotinusthe male deities of traditionalmyths tendto be identifiedwith nous,the female ones with psyche. Cf. Rene Arnou,Le Desir

de Dieu dans la philosophicde Plotin (Paris,1921),appendixA, 296ff. The absence

of an explicitlyfemalepersonfrom the Christian rinityshould be noted,whilewith

the Gnosticdivinitiesthe feminine s usuallywell represented. (Note also the quite

positive evaluation of the BiblicalEve and women in generalwith the Gnostics.)50Enn. II v 4, 5, II viii 1lff.51 It mightbe noted that it has beena recurrentmethod in philosophy o bridge

by dialecticor metaphoror both the gap betweenincommensurablehought sys-temsor between houghtandexperience. Onefindsthis, for instance, n the Monad-

ology, where Leibniz attempts to reunitegeometrywith physical reality. Or one

finds it in the many attempts to solve the mind-body"problem,"a problemdue

in manyof its formulations o the improperoppositionof two sets of abstractions.

More recentlythis methodhas been exemplifiedn the dialecticalexercisesof those

who have put values beyondthe reach of scientificmethod and yet wish somehow

to relatevaluesto this world. 52 Enn. IV viii 1, VI ix 9.






itself. The experience is the indicated goal, but Plotinus describes the struc-

ture of the One, as well as that of nous, in logical rather than experientialterms. The present discussion, nevertheless, has uncovered some strong

mythical undercurrents in Plotinus. The answer suggests itself thereforethat Plotinus' thought in its non-logical aspects was not so much oriented

on a single or rare mystical experience, but rather on those unconscious or

half-conscious impulses that find expression in myth. If Plotinus is to be

given a name, he should be called a " mythic " rather than a mystic.53Plotinus is to be regarded as in a sense a Gnostic manque, and to see

him as such is a major clue to his thought.64 Plotinus seems to be launched

53 The distinctionbetween the two is sometimesa fine one, but in mystical ex-

perience,one might say, the symbolicis given active sensoryexpression, n mythit is moreintellectualized whichfits in well with Plotinus'rationalism). Myth canbe so attenuated hat, as in sometheologians,or instance," God" is not much morethan a logicalterm. Thereis, as somescholarshave noted (for instance,R. Arnou,op. cit., 276-278), muchparallelismbetweenthe ritual of the mysteryreligionsandthe metaphorsdescribing he mystic experience, ncludingfor instance the centralsignificanceof light. (In the ceremonythe climax is reachedwhen the statue ofthe god is revealed in a blaze of light.) Plotinus seems to have been acquaintedwith the ritual of the mystery religions(see Ennead VI ix 11) and this has to betaken into accountwhen one looks for the referentsof Plotinus' statementscon-

cerningsupersensibleexperience. Myth, mystery ritual, mystic experienceare ofcourserelatedexpressions f psychic striving. E. Brehier n his book La Philosophiede Plotin (Paris, 1928), chapter 7, has arguedthat the idea, often prominentin

Plotinus,of the self's absorption n a largernon-conscious xistence s not Greekin

origin,and attempts to deduce t from Indiansources. Whatever the possiblerela-tions of historical nfluence, he emotionalroots of the idea of the absorptionof theindividual n a largerwhole should be given full consideration. It is interestingtonote that the "Western" (Plotinus'"Greek") mind,in the face of certainpsychicprojections, readily resorts to the epithet "Eastern" or some equivalent. Thus

the tendencyof the essay againstthe Gnostics to separate intellectually rom one'sself certain of one'spsychic strivingsis rather general. It is one of the forms ofself-alienation.

54HazelE. Barnes, n an articleon "Neo-PlatonismandAnalyticalPsychology,"The PhilosophicalReview, LIV (1945), 558-577, states on the first page thatPlotinus "to a large extent presented in religiousmetaphysicswhat they [theGnostics]were saying by means of elaborate religioussymbolisms." The body ofthe articleis devotedto anothertopic than the direct substantiationof this asser-tion. It shouldbe noted that it is the claim of the presentarticle that Plotinus,rather than presentinga philosophicalversion of Gnosticism,presentsa much re-stricted view whencomparedwith Gnosticism. E. Brehier,op. cit., has calledatten-tion to the dual orientation of Plotinus' thought. He says (35), "We find inPlotinusa doublepresentationof reality: on the one hand a presentationakin tothe myth of the soul. . . . On the other hand, the universe . . . can be the objectof rationalthought." On p. 8 Brehierdeclares hat for all of Plotinus'attachmentto the rationalmethodof Greekphilosophy,"the problemswhich he puts himselfare problemswhichGreekphilosophynever envisaged. They are problems hat are

properly religious." It seems to the present writer that "religious" may be too

specifica term to denotethe psychicfactorsimpliedin Plotinus'thought. On the

resemblanceof Plotinian and Gnostic ideas concerningthe highest existence,see





298 JOSEPH KATZ

on a path that he does not dare to pursue to its end. His use of reason does

not lead back to " Greek " science, and yet it bars a frank acknowledgmentof its mythical motivations. As compared with contemporary Gnostics and

Christians, there is something peculiarly unfinished and thwarted aboutPlotinus' philosophy. The ascent to the One is a more jungle-like journey,

stirring more monsters in the soul and awakening more longings than Ploti-

nus allowed. Both Gnostics and Christians saw this much better. In the

case of Plotinus too, Dionysos is playing his tricks on another sober son of

Apollo.It should finally be said that Plotinus' philosophy is properly compared

with Gnosticism, rather than Christianity. The development of what was

to become Christianity was controlled by the limitations, both positive and

negative, of a mass movement and an eventual state religion. Both Ploti-nus' and the Gnostics' are essentially minority creeds with no hope of mass

following and without the penalty of dilution. Both separate mankind into

classes, considering only a small group with special attainments as the

redeemed: Their minority status is not due to accident, but to the fullness

of their expression of certain special impulses which society at large con-

siders dangerous or impractical and from which it shrinks into conformism.

Plotinus, had he known of it, would have been sympathetic to the rebellious

interpretationthe Gnostics

gaveof the

serpent'sadvice in Eden. To

acquireknowledge of good and evil is an inspiration from the highest God, prohibi-tion of it the work of a fallen deity. In the way they interpreted the

serpent's advice Plotinus and the Gnostics differed. The gnosis of Plotinus

tends to be knowledge by discursive symbol, that of the Gnostics knowledge

by myth and even acquaintance; in Ennead IV viii 7 (cf. Enn. IV viii 5)Plotinus goes as far as to say that experience of evil may have the value of

enhancing the psyche's appreciation of good, but, he adds characteristically,

only for those who need to learn by experience rather than by science.

Neither Neoplatonism nor Gnosticism ever became genuine alternativesto Christianity, because they were both more partial and in some respectsmore perfect. Both of them continued their careers as tacit or open heresies

under Christianity (Gnosticism, for instance, in the guise of alchemy). The

temptation of intellect and the temptation of myth are as omnipresent as

Plotinus held his One to be. They lurk furtively in the very soul of the

conformist whose vaunted realism is often not much more than a defense

against such divine madness.

Vassar College.

E. Br6hier'sintroduction to Ennead VI viii in his edition of Plotinus (Plotin,EnneadesVI2 [Paris, 1938], 121). See also Hans Jonas, Gnosisund spdtantiker

Geist, Forschungenzur Religionund Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments,new series, fasc. 33 (Gottingen, 1934), 251. Jonas' entire discussion of Gnostic

acosmismand its relationto "Greek" thoughtis relevantto the problemshere dis-

cussed. Some of the problems oucheduponin the presentarticlehave found more

explicittreatment n my Plotinus'Searchfor the Good (New York, 1950). But the

body of the article is an additionto and in some respectsa revisionof what I say

in chapter 2, entitled"The nature of Plotinus'' mysticism."

katz plotinus

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