animal rights in mammals

7/29/2019 Animal Rights in Mammals

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American Society of Mammalogists

Animals, Nature, and EthicsAuthor(s): Marc Bekoff and Ned HettingerSource: Journal of Mammalogy, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 219-223Published by: American Society of MammalogistsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1382254 .

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ANIMALS, NATURE, AND ETHICSMARC BEKOFF AND NED HETIINGER

Department ofEnvironmental, Population, and Organismic Biology,University ofColorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0334 (MB)Department ofPhilosophy, College ofCharleston,Charleston, SC 29424 (NH)

Recently, Howard (1993, Journal ofMammalogy, 74:234-235) argued for the defensibilityof research on nonhuman animals (hereafter animals). Unfortunately, his essay is unnecessarily combative, lacking in detail, unbalanced, and poorly argued. Howard (1993) unfairly and mistakenly stereotypes as biologically naive anyone who rejects his position thatnature's poor treatment ofwild animals justifies animal research. Those interested in themorality of animal research deserve better guidance than what Howard ( 1993) provides.Here, we analyze Howard's (1993) claims and their implications, present relevant literatureon ethics and animals, and conclude that much work remains to be done to understandand properly appreciate the moral dimensions of animal research. The questions raisedabout uses of animals by humans in various activities, including research, are difficult anddemand careful interdisciplinary analysis. Simple answers should not be expected. Weexplore some of he issues and make them accessible to a wide audience, including practicingscientists.Key words: animal welfare, animal rights, animal research, morality, ethics

Interest is growing in the diverse andcomplex issues about how humans ought totreat nonhuman animals (hereafter animals). That many scientists who work withanimals are concerned with animal welfareis evidenced by the fact that most professional societies, including The AmericanSociety ofMammalogists (1987), have published guidelines to which researchers mustadhere ifthey are to publish in thejournal(s)sponsored by that society (Bekoff, 1993a;Rollin, 1989). Ewbank, the editor-in-chiefof Animal Welfare, has called for papersthat consider ethical issues specifically infield research (see Animal Welfare, 1993,vol. 2).Recently, Howard (1993) presented hisviews on the defensibility of animal research (and other uses of animals), echoingthe main messages in Howard ( 1990). Howard (1993) states his ideas as if they werefacts, ignoring counterarguments and failingto confront the complexityof he issues. HisJournal ofMammalogy, 75(1):219-223, 1994 219

vague platitudes do not help in understanding the variety of ethical issues that arisefrom the diverse uses of animals by mammalogists and other scientists. For example,he ignores morally relevant differences between field research and research on captiveanimals, and he lumps all animals (e.g.,mammals and amphibians, domestic andwild animals) into one category about whichhe makes sweeping generalizations. Howard's (1993) ideas are typical of those whowish to distance humans from other animals and place humans apart from, andabove, nature. His belief that animals shouldnot be mistreated because of obligations tohumanity rather than obligations to the animals themselves, establishes this absolutemoral gulf between humans and everythingelse.Our goals are to provide an analysis ofHoward's (1993) wide-ranging claims, expose their implications, suggest alternativepoints of view, and provide references so


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220 JOURNAL OF MAMMALOGY Vol. 75, No. 1that future discussions can be more informed. We show that the issues are not ascut and dry as Howard (1993) and others(e.g., Nicoll and Russell, 1991) make themout to be (Bekoff and Jamieson, 1991, inpress; Bekoff et al., 1992; Broom, 1991;Cavalieri and Singer, 1993; Cuthill, 1991;Driscoll and Bateson, 1988; Gavaghan,1992; Gruen, 1991; Hettinger, 1989, inpress; Lockwood, 1987; Lynch, 1988;Mendl, 1991; Regan, 1983; Rollin, 1989;Rolston, 1988; Sapontzis, 1987; Singer,1990, 1993; Taylor 1986; United States Department of Agriculture, 1991; Verhoog,1991; Zimmerman ei al., 1993; the journalEnvironmental Ethics).Early in his essay, Howard (1993) claimsthat animals do not have legal rights, buthe later points out that extensive reviewprocesses exist for animal research. Theseregulations are legally enforceable, and inthis sense, animals do have legal rights (i.e.,humans have legally enforceable duties concerning animals; for further discussion, seeFinsen, 1990). Indeed, the Animal WelfareInstitute (1990) summarizes the legal rightsofanimalsinAmericafrom 1641-1990. "Aright," Howard (1993) tells us, "impliesconcomitant responsibilities, which certainly are not displayed by animals." If thiswere true, human infants, mentally disabledhumans, and those who suffer from differentforms of dementia, including Alzheimer'sdisease (Binstock et al., 1992), also wouldlack rights because they too have no responsibilities. Ethicists, caregivers, andmany others who are concerned with therights of young (prelinguistic) humans orthose humans who are mentally impairedfind this conclusion to be extremely disturbing (Dresser, 1992; Moody, 1992).Perhaps Howard (1993) denies that animals have legal rights because he thinks thatobligations the regulations impose on humans are ''obligation(s) made to humanityand not to non-human animals." Apparently, he believes regulations that prohibitcausing unnecessary suffering to researchanimals are aimed at protecting humans who

might be upset about such suffering and notat protecting animals that are the victimsof such suffering. For Howard (1993) theethical question is "how animal resourcesshould be exploited." Not only do animalslack rights, they are, in his view, mere resources or tools that exist for the purposeof being exploited. This fits with his insensitivity to the moral significance of takinganimal life. At one point, he even speaks ofthe killing of laboratory and wild animalsas a "sacred act." One of Howard's (1993)justifications for killing wild animals in research is that they usually will be replacedby others of the same species who wouldnot have existed if humans had not killedthose they are replacing. On his view, anindividual animal's life is a totally replaceable commodity.The ethical guidance that Howard (1993)provides concerning animal pain is that weshould not inflict "unnecessary pain and suffering" on animals and that we should not"mistreat them." But he does not tell uswhat constitutes mistreatment or unnecessary pain and suffering. By failing to developthese notions, he gives no guidance whatsoever. Mammalogists and others deservea more careful, accurate, and helpful analysis about the conditions under which it ismorally justified to kill animals or to causethem pain and suffering.Howard's (1993) characterization of theanimal-rights movement is misinformedalso. His foes belong to "the biologicallyunsound animal rights movement (ARM)which wants to bring all new knowledgeabout mammals to a screeching halt." However, it is just not true that those in theanimal-rights movement "think it morallywrong to acquire knowledge by studyingmammals" or think it unjustified "to protect endangered species." These sorts of alseattributions commonly are found in the arguments of those who want to demean theanimal-rights movement as a whole. We alsoare told that members of the animal-rightsmovement are "anti-establishment types,"and "generally they are very uncompro-


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mising. . . . However, the animal-rightsmovement actually is a heterogeneous organization composed of different factionswhose members often try to distance themselves from one another (Bekoff et al., 1992).Based on a study of ndividuals who identifythemselves with animal rights, Holden( 1991 :264) concluded that so-called animalrights activists are "by no means monolithicin their views" (see McAdam, 1992, andPious, 1991 ).Howard (1993) writes that "the ARM always ignores nature when they try to defendtheir views," and he informs us that we needto educate the public about nature to counteract their biologically unsound claims. Theeducation about nature that he provides isthat nature "requires much cruelty" and has"a death ethic." Howard (1993) notes the"brutality of natural predation" and "na-ture's brutal deaths" and "cruel diseases."In defense ofmammalogists and others who"should and usually do demonstrate compassion and pity toward the animals theyutilize," he seems to berate wild animals forfailing to manifest these virtues. However,nature has no ethic, nor can nature haveone. Neither nature nor animals can be heldmorally responsible for the suffering andpain they cause or for failing to show pityor compassion. It only makes sense to holdmoral agents accountable, and neither nature as a whole, nor individual animals, aremoral agents.

Howard's (1993) main argument in defense ofanimal research is that because whatnature does to animals is so horrible, whathumans do to them must be permissible, aswe treat them less badly. He appeals to thefact that individual animals bred for research purposes would not have existed ifhumans had not created them. He claimsthat these animals live longer, have a higherquality of life, and die less painfully thando their wild counterparts. Howard (1993)does not dispute the claim and is undauntedby the fact that millions ofanimals are killedeach year in high school and college classes.He justifies this practice by noting that

"None of these animals would be born ifnot wanted, and they have a quality life anddie humanely rather than live nature's tortuous life."Do we really want an ethic that sanctionstreatment of animals by humans as long asit is better than what nature typically has instore for similar animals? For example,would we allow mammalogists who are accused of animal cruelty to justify their behavior with the argument that they caused

them less suffering than their wild predatorswould have caused them? Although the sortsof lives animals lead in the wild is an important consideration for insuring appropriate care and management ofanimals (e.g.,animals in zoos and wildlife parks), an ethicthat permits any use of animals by humansthat causes them less suffering or allows thema longer life than is typical for wild animalsis far too weak (Hettinger, in press; Rolston,1988).We also should not accept Howard's(1993) claim that the quality ofanimal livesis superior in human culture than in wildnature. For example, with rare exceptionsthe life ofa tiger is not improved by puttingit in a zoo. Although its food will be provided, hunting has played a large role in theevolution of igers and is essential to a tiger'sway oflife. Movement also will be severelyrestricted, and for animals that typicallyroam in search offood and shelter, captivityproduces an impoverished existence. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that captiveanimals live longer than their wild counterparts. Further discussion is needed concerning if and how appeals to the "ways ofnature" bear on the morality of treatmentof other animals by humans (Bekoff andJamieson, in press; Hettinger, in press). Superficial appeals to nature's brutality to justify the treatment of nonhumans (e.g.,Grandin, 1992; Greenough, 1992; Lansdell,1988) will not do (for a field biologist's perspective on death in nature, see Lack, 1957:72-79).Two other points deserve mention. First,without corroborative data, Howard (1993)


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claims that abuses of animals in researchare rare and that the benefits of animal research to people and animal welfare areenormous. Both of these claims need to bebolstered by a deeper appreciation of theproblems involved in making judgementsabout what constitutes abuse and what sortsof knowledge are appropriately valued asbeneficial (see the exchange between Bekoff,1993a and Emlen, 1993, concerning thestudy of nfanticide). Second, Howard (1993)glosses over the issue of alternatives to animal research. He merely states that "alternatives will never be able to replace all needsof laboratory and field research with liveanimals." Howard (1993) does not mentionthat there is much interest among diversescientists in developing alternatives to certain animal research practices (Langley,1991; National Library of Medicine, 1993;Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals, 1992). Indeed, The Johns Hopkins University supports a Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing, and a similargroup exists at the University of Californiaat Davis.Howard's ( 1993) treatment of these important issues is superficial and narrow. Although some animal research is defensible,some is not (Bekoff, 1993b; Bekoff and Jamieson, 1991, in press; Singer, 1990), buteven the first conclusion does not directlyfollow from Howard's (1993) essay. The interests ofmembers ofThe American Societyof Mammalogists and of other professionalsocieties would be better served by readingsome of the mentioned references for morediverse and informed opinions about theethics of animal use. It also is important toassess available empirical information concerning the behavior and cognitive abilitiesof diverse animals (Bekoff and Allen, inpress; Jamieson and Bekoff, in press) andhow these data can be used to inform welfare decisions (Bekoff and Jamieson, 1991 ).Questions about the ethics of animal usemust not be trivialized or reduced to hurdlesin the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Critical discussions about how scientists ought

to treat animals should not be taken as beingantiscience. Instead, inquiries concerningscientific conduct ultimately will make thepractice of science more challenging andsatisfying to scientists (Bekoff, 1993b), andit will allow scientists to explain better whatthey do to nonscientists interested in theenterprise of science.

AcKNOWLEDGMENTSWe thank D. Jamieson, L. Gruen, S. Townsend, and T. Daniels for discussing some of heseissues and also an anonymous reviewer for comments on this paper.

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--. 1993b. Common sense, cognitive ethologyand evolution. Pp. I 02-108, in The great ape project:equality beyond humanity (P. Cavalieri and P. Singer, eds.). Fourth Estate, London, United Kingdom,312 pp.BEKOFF, M., AND C. ALLEN. In press. Cognitive ethology: slayers, skeptics, and proponents. ln Anthropomorphism, anecdotes, and animals: the emperor 'snew clothes? (R. W. Mitchell, N. Thompson, and L.Miles, eds.). University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln.BEKOFF, M., AND D. JAMIESON. 1991. Reflectiveethology, applied philosophy, and the moral statusof animals. Perspectives in Ethology, 9:1-47.--. In press. The ethics of studying carnivores.ln Carnivore behavior, ecology, and evolution (J. L.Gittleman, ed.). Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NewYork.BEKOFF, M., L. GRUEN, S. E. TOWNSEND, AND B. E.RoLLIN. 1992. Animals in science: some areas revisited. Animal Behaviour, 44:473-484.BINSTOCK, R. H., S. G. PosT, AND P. J. WHITEHousE(Eos.). 1992. Dementia and aging: ethics, values,and policy choices. The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore, Maryland, 184 pp.BRooM, D. 1991. Animal welfare: concepts and measurement. Journal of Animal Science, 69:4167-4175.CAvALIERI, P., AND P. SINGER (EDS.). 1993. The greatape project: equality beyond humanity. Fourth Estate, London, United Kingdom, 312 pp.CuTHILL, I. 1991. Field experiments in animal behaviour: methods and ethics. Animal Behaviour, 42:1007-1014.DRESSER, R. S. 1992. Autonomy revisited: the limits


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LYNCH, M. E. 1988. Sacrifice and the transformationof he animal body into a scientific object: laboratoryculture and ritual in the neurosciences. Social Studiesof Science, 18:265-289.McADAM, D. 1992. Radicals and others. Science,255:1448-1449.

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NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE. 1993. Alternativesto the use oflive vertebrates in biomedical researchand testing: an annotated bibliography. Bethesda,Maryland, 26 pp.NicoLL, C. S., AND S. M. RuSSELL. 1991. Mozart,Alexander the Great, and the animal rights/liberation philosophy. FASEB Journal, 5:2888-2892.Pwus, S. 1991. An attitude survey of animal rightsactivists. Psychological Science, 2:194-196.PSYCHOLOGISTS FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OFANIMALS. 1992. Humane innovations and alternatives. Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals, Washington Grove, Maryland, 105 pp.

REGAN, T. 1983. The case for animal rights, University of California Press, Berkeley, 425 pp.RoLuN, B. E. 1989. The unheeded cry: animal consciousness, animal pain and science. Oxford University Press, New York, 308 pp.RoLSTON, H., III. 1988. Environmental ethics: duties

to and values in the natural world. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 391 pp.SAPONTZIS, S. F. 1987. Morals, reason, and animals.Temple University Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 302 pp.SINGER, P. 1990. Animal liberation. New York Review of Books, New York, 320 pp.--. 1993. Practical ethics. Seconded. CambridgeUniversity Press, New York, 395 pp.TAYLOR, P. W. 1986. Respect for nature:.a theory ofenvironmental ethics. Princeton University Press,Princeton, New Jersey, 329 pp.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.1991. Welfare of experimental animals: January1985-March 1991. National Agricultural Library,Beltsville, Maryland, 48 pp.VERHOOG, H. 1991. The scientific perception of animals as objects. Between The Species, 7:208-212.ZIMMERMAN, M. E., J. B. CALUCOTT, G. SESSIONS, K.J. WARREN, AND J. CLARK (Eos.). 1993. Environmental philosophy: from animal rights to radicalecology. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 437 pp.Submit ted 25 March 1993. Accepted 17 August 1993.Associate Editor was Michael R. Willig.

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