amraam current status and alternative aug 1986

8/3/2019 AMRAAM Current Status and Alternative AUG 1986

1/92

T H E A D V A N C E D M E D I U M - R A N G EA I R -TO-A I R M I S S I L E ( A M R A A M ) :

C U R R E N T P L A N S A N D A L T E R N A T I V E S

S t a f f W o r k i n g Paper

Augus t 1986

T he Congress of the U n i t e d StatesC o n g r e s s i o n a l B u d g e t O f f i c e


2/92


3/92

N O T E SUnles s o t h e r w i s e stated, a ll y e a r s r e f e r r e d toin th i s paper a re f iscal years.Detai ls in the text and tables of this paperm ay not add to the to ta ls because o f r o u n d i n g .A ll costs are expressed in 1987 budgeta u t h o r i t y d o l l a r s , us i ng the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' sF e b r u a r y 1 98 6 e c o n o m i c a s s u m p t i o n s , u n l es so t h e r w i s e n o t e d .


4/92


5/92

S U M M A R Y

Some 2,900 fighter ai rc ra ft in the inventori es of the U.S. Air Force andN a v y carry radar guided missiles. These planes currently carry the Sparrowm i s s i l e , w h i c h homes i n o n radar signals beamed o u t f r o m the employingaircraft toward the target air craft . The Sparrow is an old missile, i n i t i a l l ydeployed in 1956. Though Sparrow has been upgraded many times since thenit s t i l l lacks m a n y capabilities that the services feel are important. In thelate 1970s, the Department of Defense (DoD) began a j o i n t Air Force/Navyproject to develop a new missilethe Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Airm i s s i l e , o r A M R A A M . Because A M R A A M h a s i t s o w n radar transmitter,the e m p l o y i n g aircraft can break away to d e f e n d itself or attack othertargets once it has launched the missile.T h e A M R A A M is scheduled to enter low-rate production in fiscal year19S7, some two years after its original production date. Even aftera d j u s t i n g f o r i n f l a t i o n , i t i s n o w projected that A M R A A M w i l l cost about1 20 percent more than estimated in 1979. This delay in schedule a n d costgrowth led the Congress to contemplate canceling the program last year.Since then , the program has been restructured and the Secretary of Defensehas certified that costs w i l l not g r o w f u r t h e r nor w i l l capabilities bed i m i n i s h e d below current estimates. Nonetheless, ongoing concerns aboutcost increases and testing delays have prompted discussions of alternativesto the Administra tion's plan that w o u l d delay A M R A A M production. Itappears unlikely, however, that the Congress will cancel the program thisyear. T h u s , this paper considers o n l y two alternatives in d e t a i l t h eA d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s plan and a one-year delay in procurement to allow moretime for testing. Two other alternativesa reduction in procurement levelsa n d program cancelationare discussed i n general terms. These m i g h tbecome relevant in f u t u r e years if the test program goes poorly or if costsrise significantly.

A L T E R N A T I V E 1 . T H E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N ' S P L A NT h e Department o f Defense plans t o b u y 7,843 A M R A A M s f o r t h e A i r Forceand 1,250 for the Navy over the next five years, and a total of 17,123 and7 , 2 1 2 for each service, respectively, by the end of the program in 1996 (seeS u m m a r y Table). Procurement costs w i l l total $4.6 b i l l i o n for the two


6/92


7/92

S U M M A R Y T A B L E

A l t e r n a t i v e 1987

T W O A L T E R N A T I V E A M R A A M A C Q U I S I T I O NP R O G R A M S (B y f i scal years)

1988 1989 1990 1991 To Com-87-91 pleteQ U A N T I T I E S O F A M R A A M MISSILE S(I n n u m b e r s o f mi s s i les )

A l t e r n a t i v e I( A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 'P r o g r a m )A ir ForceN a v y

Total

's2600260

8330833

1, 950 2,502,000 3,

600 240000 0 3

, 2 0 0800

,0007 , 8 4 31,2509,093

9 , 2 8 05,96215, 242

A l t e r n a t i v e I I( O n e - Y e a r D e l a y )A ir ForceN a v y

Total000

26 00260

833 1,08 33 2,

COSTS(I n m i l l i o n s of 1987r o u n d e d to the n e a r e s tA l t e r n a t i v e I( A d m i n i s t r a t i o nP r o g r a m )

A ir ForceN a v yTotal

's7600760

990101 , 0 0 0

93015 01, 080 1,

950 250000 3

, 6 0 0400,000

5,64345 06,093

1 1 , 4 8 06,76218, 242

d o l l a r s10 m i l l i o n )

78022000 0

52027 07 9 0

3,9806504 , 6 3 0

1,9001 , 5 0 03 , 4 0 0

A l t e r n a t i v e I I( O n e - Y e a r D e l a y )A ir ForceN a v y

T o t a l19 0019 0

80 00800

94010 96015 09 50 1 , 1 1 0 1

820220, 040

3,71038 04 , 0 9 0

2 , 5 4 01 , 7 7 04 , 3 1 0

S O U R C E : C o n g r e s s io n a l B u d g e t O f f i c e .


8/92


9/92

se rvices over the n e x t f i v e y e a r s ( 19 87 d o l la r s) . P r o c u r e m e n t f u n d i n g o v e rthe l i fe of the p r o g r a m is to total $8.4 bi l l ion , w i t h the Ai r Force share tobe $6.2 b i l lion . These es t im ates appear co ns is ten t w i t h f u n d i n g l i m i t s i m -posed by the Congress . La s t year the Con gress req u i r ed the Secre ta ry ofD e f e n s e to c e r t i f y t h a t A ir Force costs w ould n o t exceed a "cap" o f $5.2bil l ion in 1984 d o l l a r s an d that a f i r m f i x e d - p r i c e c o n t r a c t w i t h H u g h e sA i r c r a f t C o m p a n y fo r p a r t of the d e v e l o p m e n t f u n d i n g w o u l d n o t exceed$556.6 m i l l i o n , in c u r r e n t d o l l a r s .

T he A M R A A M missi le should of f e r the mi l i ta ry services i m p o r t a n t a d -v a n t a g e s . It is expected to be m u c h m o r e capable than Spar row. A snoted above, i t has an active radar seeker that will allow th e l a u n c h i n gf ighte r to f i r e a n d then break off to engage other targets or to leave the airbattle ( t h e so-called "launch an d leave" capabil i ty) . In addi t ion , A M R A A Mis smal le r than Spar row and so can more easi ly be used by the Air Force'sF-16 f i g h t e r , w h i c h i s no t cur ren t ly equ ipped to c a r r y th e Spar row and sohas no cu r re n t m issi le w i th radar capabi li ty . This i s im po r tan t to the A i rF o r c e b e c a u s e a b o u t t w o - t h i r d s o f A i r Force f i g h t e r s w i l l be F-16s by theear ly 1990s. T he A M R A A M will also give N a v y F/A-18 a i r c r a f t a l a u n c h -a n d - l e a v e c a p a b i l i t y c u r r e n t l y f o u n d only o n F-14s that c a r r y the P h o e n i xmi s s i le and have the ex tens ive in te rnal sys tems needed to operate i t . Butthe N a v y r e q u i r m e n t fo r A M R A A M m a y b e less u r g e n t s i n c e a ll N a v yf i g h t e r s i n c l u d i n g the F / A - 1 8 c a n c u r r e n t l y c a r ry the S p a r r o w r a d a r m i s -s i le .The m i l i t a r y services, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Air Force, believe they needA M R A A M q u i c k l y because o f i m p r o v e m e n t s i n t h e capabilities of Sovietf i g h t e r s an d m issi les. These inc lude im pro vem ents in f igh te r r adars thatlead to more capabi l i ty in their radar missiles, coupled w ith Soviet quan ti -tative advantages on the central E u r o p e a n f r o n t in the event of an all-o u t c o n v e n t i o n a l w ar between N A T O forces an d those of the W a r s a w Pact.But there i s still concern that A M R A A M i s n o t mature enough to enterp r o d u c t i o n . A l t h o u g h the A M R A A M p r o g r a m has already been restruc-t u r e d an d delayed s ign i f i can t ly , evidence exists that testing ha s n o t keptp a c e w i t h th e res t ru c tu red schedule : on ly 11 of the 16 missi les that w e r esupposed to be tested b y n o w have been tested. Seventeen unsuccessfu la t t e m p t s w e r e n e e d e d to get off the 11 shots that w e r e m a d e ( t h o u g h m o s to f th e uns uc c es s f u l a t t e m p t s did no t f a i l because o f p r o b l e m s w i t h the m i s -s i l e ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , three of the last f i v e tests w e r e less t h a n f u l ly success-ful , t h o u g h the last tw o shots went well .


10/92


11/92

The missile's c u r r e n t cost estimates may still be too low. The G e n e r a lA c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e ( G A O ) r e c e n t ly e n u m e r a t e d s ev e ra l f a c t o r s that c o u l dlead to cost g r o w t h , i n c l u d i n g D o D 's a s s u m p t i o n t h a t p r o c u r e m e n t q u a n t i -ties wil l r e m a i n s t a b l e a t h i g h rates fo r a n u m b e r o f y e a r s a n d that n o m a j o rdes ign c h a n g e s wil l be ma de in the m iss i le . Co nc ern has a lso been ra i sedthat th e " p r o d u c i b i l i t y e n h a n c e m e n t " p r o g r a m ( P E P ) p l a n n e d f o r t he m i s -s i l e a series o f p r o d u c t i o n i m p r o v e m e n t s a i m e d a t h o l d i n g d o w n c o s t s i ss ev e n m o n t h s b e h i n d s c h e d u le e v en t h o u g h the n u m b e r o f miss i les expectedto b e n e f i t f r o m P E P s a v i n g s h a s a p p a r e n t l y n o t been reduced .A L T E R N A T I V E 2 . D E L A Y P R O C U R E M E N T B Y O N E Y E A RT h e C o n g r e s s c o u l d d e l a y t h e A M R A A M p r o g r a m b y a y e a r t o m i n i m i z e ther i s k s o f u n f o r e s e e n cost g r o w t h o r p r o b l e m s in the t e s t i n g p r o g r a m . Thedelay w o u l d g i v e the A i r Force t i m e to test m o r e m i s s il es b e f o r e c o m m i t -t ing i t se l f to p r o d u c t i o n . It s hould also let the service develop thep r o d u c i b i l i t y e n h a n c e m e n t p r o g r a m f u r t h e r a n d s o i n c o r p o r a t e i t s f e a t u r e sin m o r e m i s s i l e s .

T he S u m m a r y T a b le s h o w s t h e q u a n t i t i e s a n d costs under th is de layeds c h e d u l e . A c c o r d i n g to Air Force estimates, a one-year delay w o u l d save$ 0 . 6 b i l l ion in 1987 f u n d i n g ; when spread over th e f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d o f 1987-1 9 9 1 , h o w e v e r , n et s a v i n g s wou ld on ly a m o u n t to $0.5 bi l l io n. Such a delayw o u l d b r e a c h t h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l l y i m p o s ed c a p o n p r o c u r e m e n t costs b yabout $0 .3 b i l l ion (in 1984 d o l l a r s the b r e a c h is the same because ofr o u n d i n g ) or 5 pe rc ent because the de lay w o u l d cause the costs o f i n i t i a t i n gp r o d u c t i o n an d other costs to increase, a l t h o u g h a delay would n o t c h a n g ed e v e l o p m e n t f u n d i n g . The delay w o u l d also m e a n that t h e m i l i t a r y wou ldn o t r e a l i z e A M R A A M ' s b e n e f i t s u n t i l a y e a r later, t h u s i n c r e a s i n g th e riskt h a t U . S . m i l i t a r y s e r v ic e s w o u l d f a c e a n i m p r o v e d S o v ie t f o r c e w i t h o u t th einc reased cap abi l i ty they be l ieve they need.A L T E R N A T I V E S W I T H M O R E E X T E N S I V E P R O G R A M C H A N G E SBecause the S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e r e c e n t l y c e r t i f i e d A M R A A M as to costan d c a p a b i l i t y , a n d because o f s t r o n g service s u p p o r t , i t s e e m s u n l i k e l y thatthe Congress w i l l m a k e drastic changes, in the p r o g r a m a g a i n this year.Should A M R A A M g o s u b s t a n t i a l l y a b o v e i ts c a p p e d costs i n f u t u r e years ,h o w e v e r , o r sh ou ld i t s capabi l i t ies appear to f a l l fa r shor t o f p romises , theC o n g r e s s m i g h t e v e n t u a l l y h a v e to c o n s i d e r m o r e e x t e n s i v e c h a n g e s to thep r o g r a m , p e r h a p s i n c l u d i n g q u a n t i t y r e d u c t i o n s o r even cancelation.


12/92


13/92

Ho w m i g h t q u a n t i t i e s b e r e d u c e d ? The A M R A A M ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s m i g h tb e l e s s i m p o r t a n t in s o m e m i s s i o n s t h a t f a c e r e l a t ive l y few attackers. TheA ir F o r c e miss ion o f d e f e n d i n g the U n i t e d States aga ins t Sovie t b o m b e r sd u r i n g a n u c l e a r a t t a c k m i g h t fa l l i n t o t h i s c a t e g o r y , a s m i g h t the Navy ' smiss ion o f d e f e n d i n g a i r c r a f t carriers aga ins t Soviet bo m bers a t tack in g atlong r a n g e s . Should c o s ts i n c r e a s e o r f i s c a l c o n s t r a in t s r e qu i r e a costr e d u c t i o n , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n or the C o n g r e s s m i g h t c o n s id e r using cheapermiss i les t h a n A M R A A M to meet these needs.

If A M R A A M were to experience serious design problems and theC o n g r e s s we r e f o r c e d to c o n s id e r c a n c e l a tio n , o t h e r m is s i le s c o u l d p r o v id eless expen s ive a l te rn a t ives . Fo r e x a m p l e , the N a v y h a s c o m p l e t e d t h ep r e l i m i n a r y design o f a m o d i f i c a t i o n to S p a r r o w t h a t c o u l d yield i m p r o v e -m e n t s over today 's capabi l i ty , a l t h o u g h not as ex tens ive as those p r o m i s e dby A M R A A M . C u r r e n t cost estimates, also p re l im in ary , suggest that such a"dual seeker" vers ion o f S p a r r o w would b e cheaper than A M R A A M , t h o u g has i t w e n t t h r o u g h t h e d e ve l o p m e n t p r o c e ss i t s costs m i g h t rise.


14/92


15/92

C H A P T E R I . I N T R O D U C T I O NIn w a r t i m e , U .S . m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t w o u l d b e used both to attack g r o u n dtargets and to p e r f o r m the "air superiority" m i s s i o n t h a t is, to clear the airo f e n e m y a i r c r a f t . In the a i r s u p e r i o r i t y role, U . S . a i r c r a f t w o u l d some-times u se i n f r a r e d m i s s i l e s , w h i c h h o m e i n on th e heat g e n e r a t e d b y e n e m ya i r c r a f t an d des t roy them. _!/ I n f r a r e d m i s s i l e s , i n c l u d i n g the S i d e w i n d e r ,w o u l d b e used at s hor t ranges. A t longer ranges , U. S . a i r c raf t would useradar missiles, such as the currently deployed Spar row and Phoenix. Thesea r e g u i d e d to the i r targets b y radars a b o a r d the l a u n c h i n g a i r c r a f t or , ins o m e cases, o n b o a r d the miss i les themselves.

T he A d v a n c e d M e d i u m - R a n g e A i r - t o - A i r M i s si l e ( A M R A A M ) i s a newrada r m i s s ile be i ng developed j o i n t l y by the N a v y a n d A i r Force a s ar e p l a c e m e n t fo r th e S p a r r o w . Th e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p l a n s t o b u y 24,335A M R A A M s , i n c l u d i n g 17,123 fo r the Ai r Force an d 7,212 fo r the N a v y . 2/T he A M R A A M has an i m p o r t a n t a d v a n t a g e o v e r th e S p a r r o w . T h e S p a r r o wm i s s i l e s h o m e i n on th e r e f l e c t e d e n e r g y f r o m the e m p l o y i n g fi g h t e r 's r a d a r ,t h u s r e q u i r i n g a f i g h t e r to c o n t i n u e to i l l u m i n a t e the e n e m y target u n t i lS p a r r o w des t roys i t . The A M R A A M , i n contrast, carries i t s o w n r a d a r ,whi c h would al low the l a u n c h i n g aircraft to t u r n a w a y after the missile hasa c q u i r e d its target; this should enable the p l a n e to attack several targetss i m u l t a n e o u s l y or to def end i t s e l f f r o m e n e m y attack. O n l y the N a v y ' sP h o e n i x m i s s i l e h a s th i s c apab i l i ty today, and th e Phoeni x mi s s i le w a sd e s i g n e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e F-14's o n - b o a r d s y s t e m s t o d e f e n d N a v yships at v ery long ranges.

The A M R A A M ' s c apabi l i t i es w o u l d b e u s e f u l in a n u m b e r o f p o t e n t i a lc o n f l i c t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those i n w h i c h N A T O f o rc es c ou ld b e h e a v i l y o u t n u m -b e r e d b y t h e W a r s a w Pact. I n t h e e a r l y d a y s o f a m a j o r w a r i n E u r o p e , f o r1. M a n y U.S. aircraft are also equipped wi th guns.2. O f the 17,123 mi s s i les bought fo r the Ai r Force, 15 are b e i n g p r o d u c e dto q u a l i f y R a y t h e o n . I n a d d i t i o n to these p r o d u c t i o n m i s s i l e s , 1 1 1dev elopment mi s s i les are be i ng bought ; 9^ of these are Air Force and

the r e m a i n i n g 17 ar e N a v y .


16/92


17/92

example , N A T O forces could be ser ious ly outnumbered b y a t tack ing a i r -c r a f t . W i t h A M R A A M , N A T O m i g h t b e able to attack these e n e m y a i r c r a f tb e f o r e the i r miss i les could come w i t h i n r a n g e o f allied forces. TheA M R A A M should also allow a N A T O a i r c r a f t to launch a missile at ana t t a c k e r a n d the n d i s e n g a g e an d p u r s u e a n o the r e n e m y p l an e . B o th o f thesechara c ter is t i c s should enhance the capab i l i t ies o f N A T O aga ins t la rgere n e m y forces. T he ability to attack m u l t i p l e targets s imul taneous ly couldalso be usefu l in o the r c o n f l i c t s . F o r e x a m p l e , in the case o f a s m a l lc o n f l i c t o u ts i d e E u r o p e that arose quick ly , a l imi ted n u m b e r of locallydeployed U.S. forces could f i n d itself pitted against the larger forces o f,say, a Thi rd W o r l d c o u n t r y .

Radar miss i les , inc luding A M R A A M , are also useful in poor weather,w h i c h is f r e q u e n t l y e n c o u n te r e d in E u r o p e . C l o u d s an d r a i n m a s k he a ts i g n a tu r e s and so p r e v e n t e f f e c t i v e use of in f ra red guidance ; rada r miss i les ,h o w e v e r , can s t i l l operate in these c o n d i t i o n s .A M R A A M ' s l o n g d e v e l o p m e n t h i s to r y started i n the m id-1970s , whenthe Air F o r c e an d N a v y needed an i m p r o v e d r a d a r m i s s i le . 3_ / Since then ,the p r o g r a m ha s e x p e r i e n c e d p r o b l e m s w i t h cost a n d s c he d u l i n g that ha v ed e l a y e d p r o c u r e m e n t .

D E S I R E D C A P A B I L I T I E S F O R A M R A A ME a r l i e r v e r s i o n s of the S p a r r o w mi s s i le ha v e e x h i b i te d d i s a p p o i n t i n g p e r fo r -m a n c e bo th in exercises a n d i n a c tu a l c o m b a t . 4/ Despite their long

3. D e v e l o p m e n t of a new system by the D e p a r t m e n t o f D e fe n s e is f r e -q u e n t l y a very long process. In A M R A A M ' s case, the need fo r a newmissile to replace Sparrow w as discussed in the mid-1970s. The re-q u i r e m e n t w as def i ned and the " S t a t e m e n t o f O p e r a t i o n a l R e q u i r e -m e n t " released in 1978. I f A M R A A M r e m a i n s on the revised schedule,it will be f ielded in 1989, more than 10 years after th e r e q u i r e m e n tw as d e f i n e d .F o r e x a m p l e , a m i d - 1 97 0s s tu d y o f a i r - to - a i r m iss i les (ca l led A I M V A L )i n d i c a te d that f i g h te r s fo r c e d to c o n t i n u e to i l l u m i n a t e th e targetw e r e e s p e c i a l l y v u l n e r a b l e to e n e m y f i r e . A l so , in the 1973I s r a e l i / A r a b w ar , hea t-seek ing m iss i les we re c redi ted w i th des t ro y in g


18/92


19/92

r a n g e , S p a r r o w s have been v u l n e r a b l e to e n e m y c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s , s u c h aselectronic "spoofing" of their guidance systems.Thus, in 1978, the Air F o r c e an d N a v y establ ished a Joint ServiceO pera t ional R equi rem ent ( JSOR ) fo r a new missi le . Desired capabilitiesincluded miss i le-bo rne radar to e l i m i n a t e the need to use the l a u n c h i n gf i gh ter ' s r a d a r t o i l l u m i n a t e t h e t a rget , , abi l i ty to engage m u l t i p l e targetss imul taneous ly , and c o m p a t i b i li t y w i t h b o t h A ir Force an d N a v y f ighters.The program was broadened in 1980 to inc lude several N A T O n a t i o n st h r o u g h a m e m o r a n d u m o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g that agreed t o t w o d e v e l o p m e n tp r o g r a m s . W i t h U . S . p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the N A T O c o u n t r i e s w ould develop theA d v a n c e d S h o r t - R a n g e Air - to-Ai r Miss i le , a successor to Sidewinder. TheUni ted States wou ld develop A . M R A A M with European participation.

D E V E L O P M E N T P R O B L E M SThe A M R A A M w as or ig inal ly scheduled to be deployed in 19S7 and wassupposed to cost less than Spar row. 5/ Both o f these pro jec t ions p rovedF o o t n o t e C o n t i n u e dabout 200 Ara b a i r c raf t com pared wi th about seven dest royed bySparro w. In th e 19S2 Israel i -Syr ian air-to-air f i g h t i n g o v e r L e b a n o n ,Sparrow m issi les destroyed only two Syr ian planes in com par ison w ithabout 50 destroyed b y i n f r a r e d missiles. The Ai r Force and the N a v ya r g u e t h a t the o p e r a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f these w ars i n p a r t i c u l a rrelat ively shor t ranges an d good weath ertend to favor in f ra red mis-

sile e m p l o y m e n t m o r e t h a n does the e n v i r o n m e n t o f a central Euro-pean conf l i c t . A ddi t io na l ly , they a rgue tha t the threat faced by theIsraelis was less capable than the Soviet threat, thus al lowing theIsraelis to get in closer and to use short-range missiles more. For adiscussion o f h i s t o r i c a l m i s s i l e p e r f o r m a n c e , s ee L o n O . N o r d e e n , Jr.,A ir W ar far e in the M issi le A ge (W ashington , D.C.: Sm i thson ian Insti-t u t i o n Press, 1985) and M icha el J . Fi tz patr i ck , "A Case S t u d y in W e a -pons A cquis i t ion : The Sidewinder A i r - to -A i r M iss ile ," Journ al o f I n te r -n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (Summer 1985), p. 175-190.5 . T e st i m o n y b e f o r e th e Senate C o m m i t t e e o n A r m e d Services o n M a r c h9 , 1977 by the Direc tor of the A M R A A M J o i n t S y s t e m s P r o g r a m

O f f i c e indicated that th e missi le would be half as costly as Spar row.


20/92


21/92

o v e r o p t i m i s t i c . B y 1984 the p r o g r a m w a s t w o years behind schedule an dcosts per miss i le had g r o w n f r o m $ 1 8 2 , 0 0 0 to near ly $438,000 (in 1987dol la rs ) . 6/ H u g h e s A i r c r a f t C o m p a n y w h i c h developed A M R A A M w a se x p e r i e n c i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l a m o u n t o f t r o u b l e in m e e t i n g the o r i g i n a lschedule. A l t h o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t w as supposed t o be v i r t u a l l y complete b y1984, only one miss i le had been tested by that time. In 1985 DoD s ubs tan-tially c hanged the p r o g r a m , d e l a y i n g the schedule by about two years anda d d i n g a series o f p r o d u c i b i l i t y i m p r o v e m e n t s a i m e d a t h o l d i n g d o w n thep r o g r a m costs. T h e D o D also p r o v i d e d f u n d s to a l lo w R a y t h e o n C o r p o r a -t i o n w h i c h lost to H u g h e s in the c o m p e t i t i o n to design A M R A A M b u t w a sdesignated as a second p r o d u c e r t o q ua l i fy for produc t i on earlier in theschedule than o r i g i nal ly p lanned , thus a l lowi ng a n y s av i ngs f r o m competitionto be a c h i ev e d m o r e q u i c k l y . The mi s s i le now is scheduled to enter l o w -rate i n i t i a l p r o d u c t i o n in f iscal year 1987, if i t receives C o n g r e s s i o n a l f u n d -i n g .

In 1984 th e Congres s began to express c o n c e r n a b o u t the cost of theA M R A A M p r o g r a m a n d t h e " c o n c u r r e n c y " i n i t s d e v e l o p m e n t s c h ed u l e.( C o n c u r r e n c y a s u s e d b y D o D m e a n s h a v i n g p r o d u c t i o n b e g i n b e f o r e d e ve lo p -m e n t is completed.) By 1985 concern over cost and schedule slippage waswi des pread th roughout committees overseeing A M R A A M . A u t h o r i z i n g l e g -i s l a t i o n i n that year req u i red that th e Secretary o f D e f e n s e c e r t i f y that th ecosts o f A M R A A M s b o u g h t f o r t he A i r Force w o u l d n o t exceed $6.2 bi l l ion($5.2 bi l l ion in co nsta n t 1984 dollars) for the p u r c h a s e o f 17,000 missiles(123 f ewer missiles than are i nc luded in the actual Air Force procurementp r o g r a m ) a n d that th e m i s s i l e w o u l d meet d e s i g n r e q u i r e m e n t s . T he Secre-t a ry i s s ued that c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 6 .

F o o t n o t e C o n t i n u e dS ee H e a r i n g s b e f o r e the C o m m i t t e e o n A r m e d S e r vi c es , U n i t e d StatesSenate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 7, pp. 4611-4638.6. C o s t s r e f e r r e d to here are " p r o g r a m u n i t " costs that i nc lude dev elop-m e n t f u n d i n g and dev elop m ent m i s s i le q uan t i t ies . Do D also uses "pro-curement u n i t " costs that exclude d e v e l o p m e n t f u n d i n g .


22/92


23/92

C H A P T E R I I . C A P A B I L I T I E S A N D R E Q U I R E M E N T ST he A M R A A M i s expected t o p r o v i d e s u b s t a n t i a l a d v a n c e s i n c a p a b i l i t yover the c u r r e n t l y d e p l o y e d S p a r r o w m i s s i l e . S o e x t e n s i v e a re thesea d v a n c e s that t h e A i r Force C h i e f o f S t a f f h a s stated that a n F-15 f i g h t e ra i r c r a f t e q u i p p e d w i t h A M R A A M w o u l d b e able to d e s t r o y twice a sm a n y e n e m y a i r c r a f t as i t could wi th Spar row, wh i le a n F-16 f i g h t e r , w h i c hc a n n o t c a r r y S p a r r o w , c o u ld d o w n s i x t i m e s a s m a n y e n e m y a i r c r a f t w i t hA M R A A M as w i t h S i d e w i n d e r . ]_/ 2] T h e s e i m p r o v e m e n t s in c a p a b i l i t yc o u l d r e d u c e total m i s s i l e r e q u i r e m e n t s fo r bo th th e services, a l t h o u g hr e q u i r e m e n t s a l s o d e p e n d o n m a n y o t h er f a c t o r s .I M P R O V E M E N T S I N C A P A B I L I T Y O F F E R E D B Y A M R A A MT h e p a r t i c u l a r i m p r o v e m e n t s o f f e r e d b y A M R A A M a n d their re levance tothe air battle are p r e s e n t e d b e l o w .

"Launch an d Leave" Capability. Since the A M R A A M carries an"active s e e k e r " t h a t is, a r a d a r that ac t ively sends out a s i g n a l a n d sodoes n o t d e p e n d o n t h e a i r c r a f t ' s r a d a r to a c q u i r e a n d h o l d a target, a n

1 . D e t a i l s o f these estimates a re c lass i f i ed . T he statement w a s m a d e int e s t i m o n y o n t h e f i s c a l y ea r 1 9 87 b u d g e t r e q u e s t b e f o r e the HouseA r m e d S e r v i c e s C o m m i t t e e .2. The F-16 i s u n a b l e to c a r r y S p a r r o w m i s s i l es f o r t w o reasons. First,the F - 1 6 l a c k s the necessary a v i o n i c s to a c c o m m o d a t e S p a r r o w ,n a m e l y the a b i l i t y to c o m m u n i c a t e target l oca t ion to the miss i le .S e c o n d , S p a r r o w is h e a v i e r t h a n S i d e w i n d e r (o r than A M R A A M w i l lbe), and the Air Force argues the extra weigh t could impa i r the F-16'sp e f o r m a n c e i n battle. N o r , t h e A i r Force argues, c o u l d S p a r r o w b eu se d as A M R A A M c o u l d t o p r o v i d e a sel f -defense capab i l i ty f o rF-16s p e r f o r m i n g a i r -t o - g r o u n d m i ss io n s , because th e w e i g h t of theS p a r r o w m i s s i l e p r e c l u d e s carriage o n w i n g t ip stations; there i s nor o o m for it u n d e r the body of the airplane, w h e n the plane carries

b o m b s .

10


24/92


25/92

a i r c r a f t f i r i n g th e missile could break a w a y w h e n th e missile w a s w i t h i nr a n g e of i t s target. This capability should increase aircraft s u r v i v a b i l i t y b ya l l o w i n g a plane to leave the battle area before it comes w i t h i n the lethalr a n g e o f enemy missiles. I f desired, however, a n A M R A A M - e q u i p p e da i r c r a f t could track an enemy target with its more capable radar andp r o v i d e A M R A A M w i t h periodic updates f o r long-range launches.

Mul t i p l e Launch Capability. This is another advantage of theA V l R A A M ' s active seeker. Since the plane does not need to continue toi l l u m i n a t e the target, it could fire other missiles at other targets.Enhanced "Electronic Counter-Countermeasures" ( E C C M ) . A M R A A Mi s expected to be more resistant than the current Sparrow to enemydeception techniques, intended to deflect attacking missiles by electronica n d other means. I n military language, A M R A A M w i l l have a n enhanceda b i l i t y to "counter" enemy "countermeasures." J 5 / T h o u g h the missiles

c u r r e n t l y being tested do not yet have enhanced E C C M , later test missilesa n d a ll production missiles w i l l have these improvements, according toH u g h e s ."All Aspect" Capability. A target airplane's radar signature varies,d e p e n d i n g on the aspect it presents to the seeking radar (head-on, side, andso forth). The A M R A A M is expected to be better than some earlier radarm i s s i l e designs at seeing targets f r o m certain aspects in certain parts of thearea it can cover."Beyond Visual Range" (BVR) Launch Capability for F-16s. T hef a r t h e r away a plane is f r o m an enemy target when it fires its missiles, thes a f e r it is. A l t h o u g h the current Sparrow missile can be f i r e d at rangesf a r t h e r than the eye can see, F-16s cannot carry Sparrows. < * l TheA M R A A M w o u l d give the F-16 the capability to f i r e beyond visu a l range.T o b e effective, B V R requires a good ability to i d e n t i f y f r i e n d a n d f o ea i r c r a f t at considerable ranges, a task that may be d i f f i c u l t to accomplish-t h o u g h the Air Force argues that it w o u l d make BVR shots in many cases

3. The N a v y i s currently p l a n n i n g a product improvement program (PIP)fo r the Sparrow that will, among other things, upgrade its counter-counter measures.V i s u a l range i s about three t o f o u r miles.

11


26/92


27/92

e v e n w i t h o u t this abi l i ty . VAil-Weather, Look-Down, Shoot-Down Capability for F-16. To pos-sess a l o o k - d o w n , s h o o t - d o w n c a p a b i li ty , a m i s s i l e m u s t b e able to f i l t e r o u t

g r o u n d clutter in order to track l o w - f l y i n g targets. All-weather capabi l i tyis i n h e r e n t in r a d a r m i s s i le s b e c a u se r a d a r can see t h r o u g h c l o u d s . T heS p a r r o w has these capabilities, but d e p l o y m e n t of the A M R A A M w o u l dp r o v i d e t h e m to the F-16.A Low-Smoke Rocket Motor. C u r r e n t m i s s i l e s h a v e highly visibleexhaust trails; these not only show that they have been f i r e d but also canr e v e a l th e l o c a t i o n of th e f i g h t e r t h a t f i re d t h e m . T h e A M R A A M ' s m o t o rhas a less visible exhaust than Sparrow's motor.

N U M E R I C A L R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R A I R - T O - A I R M I S S I L E SA M R A A M ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s s h o u l d i m p r o v e th e c h a n c e s that i t w o u l d b e able tod e s t r o y a n e n e m y target, t h u s c u t t i n g d own o n n u m e r i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . B u tr e q u i r e m e n t s fo r miss i les a lso depend on th e n u m b e r o f a i r c r a f t t h a t c anc a r r y t h e m , t h e n u m b e r a n d t y p e s o f targets tha t the p lanes a re expected tod e s t r o y w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f m i s s i l e , and a host o f o t h e r o p e r a t i o n a lf a c t o r s . 6/ R a d a r m i s s i l e r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e d e p e n d e n t f u r t h e r o n a s s u m p -

5. The abi l i ty to i d e n t i f y f r i e n d l y and u n f r i e n d l y a i r c raf t c lear ly en-h a n c e s the u t i l i t y o f a BV R c a p a b i l i t y . S y s t e m s w h i c h i d e n t i f y f r i e n do r foe ( I F F ) can be divided into cooperative and noncoopera t ive sys-tems. W i t h c o o p e r a t i v e s y s t e m s , the a t t a c k e r i n t e r r o g a t e s the t a r g e tw i t h a s ignal ; if it is f r i e n d l y and has an operational t r ansponder , thet a r g e t r e s p o n d s w i t h a s ignal . T h e c u r r e n t I F F s y s t e m , the M a r k X I I ,h a s o p e r a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s and is subject to s p o o f i n g , and is to be re-placed in the 1990s wi th th e M a r k X V . T h e D o D i s also p u r s u i n gn o n c o o p e r a t i v e m e t h o d s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . N o n c o o p e r a t iv e s y s te m si d e n t i f y s o m e s i g n a t u r e of the h o s t i l e target w i t h o u t the ass is tance o fthe target i t se l f . The Air Force m a i n t a i n s that a c o m b i n a t i o n of sys-t e m s w i l l e n a b l e i t t o e s t a b li s h a B V R c a p a b i l i t y , e v en t h o u g h criticsst i l l aver that the IFF p r o b l e m has not been solved.

6 . O t h er f a c t o r s i n c l u d e the n u m b e r of m iss i les a p lane can c ar ry , ex-p e n d i t u r e s f o r t e st i n g p u r p o s es , w a r t i m e a i r c r a f t attrition, a n d a f a c -

12


28/92


29/92

tions about th e availabil i ty o f infrared missiles ; the Ai r Force assumes th a tsome o f the t a r g e t s i t faces wi l l be des t royed by them, a l though thesemiss i les are not discussed in deta il in this s tudy.A ir F o r c e R e q u i r e m e n t sBased on the factors discussed above, the Air Force believes i t needs about17,000 A M R A A M missiles. I t c u r r e n t l y has about 2 ,000 a i rc ra f t capable o fc a r r y i n g S p a r r o w r a d a r m i ss i le s, i n c l u d i n g a b o u t 730 F-15s an d about 1220F - 4 s (see Table 1). The F-15s w o u l d be candida tes fo r A M R A A M , but theA ir F o r c e c u r r e n t l y ha s n o p l a n s t o m o d i f y F-^s to ca r ry the miss i le s incethey wil l r e t i r e soon . The rem ain der o f the A i r Force planes in tended fo raerial c o m b a t , about 9 10 F-16s, a r e no t cur ren t ly capable o f c a r r y i n g th eS p a r r o w . (The se r v i ce has prev ious ly cons idered m o d i f y i n g a t least s o m ep o r t i o n of the F-16 i n v e n t o r y to a l low them to c a r r y S p a r r o w . ) The F-16a i r c r a f t w o u l d , ho w e v e r, b e able to c a r r y A M R A A M , thus g iv ing the c u r r e n tm o d e l F - 1 6 s a rada r miss i le capab i l i ty .

The Ai r F o r c e expec ts to m a k e he a v y use of A M R A A M in the ai rs u p e r i o r i t y m i s s i o n o f c l e a r i n g the skies o f e n e m y f i g h t e r s an d b o m b e r s .The numer ica l super io r i ty of the W a r s a w Pact air fo r c es is of c o n c er n to theservice, as is the i n c r e a s i n g l e tha l i ty o f S o v i e t a i r c r a f t an d miss i le inven to -ries. T j F o r e x a m p l e , w i th the d e p l o y m e n t o f the F l a n k e r , the F u l c r u m , a n dthe F o x h o u n d t h r e e n ew Soviet f igh te rsthe Soviet Union will have muchi m p r o v e d air-to-air r a d a r s tha t will increase the capab i l i t ies o f Sovietm iss i les . The A i r F o r c e bel ieves tha t the com bin a t io n o f these q u a l i t a t i v ei m p r o v e m e n t s a n d l o n g - s ta n d i n g S o v ie t q u a n t i t a t i v e a d v a n ta g e s p r e s e n t s ag r e a t th r e a t to N A T O fo rces .Radar miss i les , i n c l u d i n g A M R A A M , would also b e used for the missionof d e f e n d i n g the U n i te d States a g a i n s t attack b y S o v i e t b o m b e r s d u r i n g anuc lea r w ar (the air defense mission). The k i n d o f a i r c r a f t that the Air

F o o t n o t e C o n t i n u e dto r fo r misa l loca t ion o f miss i les to bases.7 . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the A i r F o r c e i s conc erned tha t Soviet f ig hte rs nowb e i n g f ielded c a r r y m e d i u m - r a n g e a i r r t o - a i r miss i les that have a look-d o w n , s ho o t - d o w n c a p a b i l i ty , thu s r e m o v i n g the s a n c t u a r y o f low-levelf l i gh t .

13


30/92


31/92

T A B L E 1 . R A D A R MISSILE D E P L O Y M E N T

S e r v ic e /C o u n t r y /A i r c r a f t TypeU.S. A ir F o r c e a/

F-15F-16

F-4 b /U.S. Navy a/

F / A - 1 8F - f b /

N A T O All ies e/U n i t e d K i n g d o mT o r n a d oS ea H a r r i e rG e r m a n y

F - ^ F

A I R C R A F TMiss i le !( N u m b e r pC u r r e n t

S p a r r o wN o n e( I n f r a r e dOnly)

S p a r r o w

S p a r r o w(6 )orP h o e n i x(6 )S p a r r o wS p a r r o w

Sky Flash f /(0)

N o n e ( I n f r a r e dOnlyJ

System C u r r e n ter p l a n e ) A i r c r a f tP l a n n e d I n v e n t o r y

A M R A A M 730(8 )A M R A A M 910(6 )

None 1,220

A M R A A M c / 46 0(6 ) ~orPhoenix(6 )A M R A A M d/ 320(6 )

N o n e 19 5

A M R A A M(2) 30 g/

A M R A A M 120( f t ) (Cont inued)S O U R C E S : A ll d a t a o n U.S. ships an d a i r c r a f t f r o m U .S . A ir F o r c e an dN a v y . U K a i r c r a f t data f r o m Br i t i sh Defense St af f . G erm an

a i r c r a f t d a t a f r o m A M R A A M P r o g r a m O f f i c e . A ll ship d a taf r o m N A T O S e a sp a r ro w P r o g r a m O f f i c e .a . L i s t s m a x i m u m c a r r i a g e ; typ ica l tactical carriage m ay be l ow e r .b . U.S. A ir F o r c e an d N a v y F-4s are to be r e t i r e d .


32/92


33/92

T A B L E 1. ( C o n t i n u e d )SHIPS

S e r v ic e / N u m b e r o f Seaspar row N u m b e r o fC o u n t r y / L a u n c h e r s p er ship (A ll Ships withShip T y p e l a u n c h e r s h a v e 8 m i s s il e s) L a u n c h e r sU.S. N a v y

CV ( A i r c r a f t C a r r i er ) 2-3 h/ 13A O E (Fas t R e p l e n i s h -m e n t Ship) 1 4A O R (Fleet Oiler) 1 5DD 963 (D est ro yer ) 1 31N A T O All ies( A l l F r i g a t e s )

Greece 1 2I t a ly 1 4Spai n 1 4Be lg iu m 1 4N e t h e r l a n d s 1 14D e n m a r k 1 5N o r w a y 1 5West G e r m a n y 1 6C a n a d a 1 i fT u r k e y 1 i/Por tugal 1 i fNon-NATO Ally

Japan 1 5c. The F-14 wil l be able to c a r r y 6 A M R A A M s under f u n d i n g in the FY1987 F i v e - Y e a r Defense P lan . Should the N a v y decide to f u n d f u r t h e rm o d i f i c a t i o n s to the F-14 , i ts A M R A A M car r iage could b e i nc reased to8-10 missiles.d. The A M R A A M i s cu r ren t ly scheduled to be deployed only on C and Dmodels of the F/A-18. Should th e N a v y decide to deploy i t o n A / Bm o d e l s , m o d i f i c a t i o n f u n d i n g would be r e q u i r e d .e. M a n y o t h e r c o u n t r i e s m i g h t p a r t i c i p a t e in the A M R A A M p r o g r a mwhen the miss i le ha s c o m p l e t e d d e v e l o p m e n t .f. The Sky Flash is a Br i t ish var iant of the A I M - 7 E .g. The UK plans eventual ly to have about 160 Tornados an d 40 Har r i e r s ,h. Six of the t h i r t e e n c a r r i e r s w i t h l a u n c h e r s h a v e t h r e e miss i le launch-ers, the rest have two.i . These count r ies a lso p lan to equip several ships w ith Seasparrow .

15


34/92


35/92

Force will choose fo r th is miss ion has as yet to be d e t e r m i n e d . The serviceis eva lua t ing candida tes fo r this miss ion inc luding the F-16 now in the in -v e n t o r y a n d N o r t h r o p C o r p o r a t io n ' s n ew F - 20 . A dec is ion is expected in thefall .M i s s i l e r e q u i r e m e n t s d e p e n d on the types o f m i s s i o n s an d n u m b e r s o fa i r c r a f t c a r r y i n g the m in addi t ion to the e n e m y threat a n d o ther fac to rsdiscussed above. Wh ile the detai l s o f the r e q u i r e m e n t c a l c u l a t i o n s a r e n o tpubl i c ly ava i lab le , the Ai r Force es t imates i t will need about 17,000A M R A A Ms by the 1990s. In a d d i t i o n , the Air Force now has 10,824 Spar-r o w s , w h i c h i s f e w e r tha n e s t i m a te d r e q u i r e m e n ts . 8/ Spar row miss i leshave 15- to 20-year service l ives and will con t inue to be used on F - 4 a i r -c r a f t u n t i l the F-4s are replaced in the 1990s.

Navy R e q u i r e m e n t sThe D e p a r t m e n t of the Nav y (whi c h a lso p rov ides miss i les for the M a r i n eCorps) states that i t will need about 7,000 A M R A A M s . Curren t Navyf i g h t e r i n v e n t o r i e s total 975, made u p o f F-4s, F-l^s, an d F / A - 1 8 s . F-l^san d F / A - 1 8 s would u se A M R A A M p r i m a r i l y to defend themselves o r N a v yshort-range b o m b e r s against e n e m y f i g h te r s o n their w ay t o attack landtargets. (The N a v y does n o t p lan to equip F-^s w i t h A M R A A M , as they ar eto be ret i re d soon.) N avy needs for A M R A A M m a y be less urgen t than thoseof the Air Force, since all Nav y a i r c r a f t c u r r e n t l y c an carry Spar row radarmiss i les , a l t h o u g h the A M R A A M m i s s i l e would p r o v i d e l a u n c h an d leave a n dm u l t i - t a r g e t attack capabil i t ies fo r F / A - 1 8 a i r c r a f t . 9/ Also , Navy F-14sc a r r y th e long-range Phoen ix miss i le that is designed to defend ships againsta t t a c k s b y long-range Sovie t b o m b e r s t h e c o m b a t a i r p a t r o l ( C A P ) m i s si o n .In the CAP m i s s i o n the N a v y is p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d a b o u t attacks b ySovie t B a c k f i r e a n d B a d g e r b o m b e r s c a r r y i n g K i t c h e n a n d K i n g f i s h c r u i s emiss i les . The N a v y would p refer to shoot down these a i rc ra f t befo re theyc o u l d laun ch the i r c ru ise m iss iles, w h i c h have ranges o f several h u n d r e dmiles . Hence , the Nav y wi l l c o n t i n u e to f ie ld the l o n g - r a n g e P ho e n i x m i s si l e8 . D e ta i l e d c o m p a r i s o n s o f m i s s i l e r e q u i r e m e n t s an d i n v e n t o r i e s areclassif ied.

9. The N a v y also plans to p r o c u r e a m o d i f i e d A -6 attack a i r c r a f t , th eA - 6 F , t h a t m i g h t c a r r y A M R A A M fo r a sel f -defense capab i l i ty .

16


36/92


37/92

as i t s p r i m a r y a r m a m e n t a g a i n st b o m b e r s . S p a r r o w s a r e c u r r e n t l y s e c o n d a r ym u n i t i o n s fo r th i s role, a n d A M R A A M w o u l d also f u n c t i o n as a secondaryw e a p o n i n t h e C A P m i s si o n . 10/A l t h o u g h s h i p b o a r d r e q u i r e m e n t s d o n o t c u r r e n t l y i n f lu e n c e A M R A A Mr e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e y c o u l d e v e n t u a l l y . T h e N a v y h a s a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r r a d a rmiss i les on sh ips that m u s t d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t e n e m y a i r c r a f t a n dm i s si l es . T h is r e q u i r e m e n t is c u r r e n t l y m e t b y a v a r i a n t of the S p a r r o w , theN A T O Seaspar row . A f ter com plet ion o f th e p ro g r am in 1992, about 110Seaspar row laun ch er s wi l l be located on 63 U.S . sh ips o f va r ious types,i n c l u d i n g a ll large-deck a i r c r a f t carriers. T h e a i r - l a u n c h e d S p a r r o w a n ds h i p b o a r d Seaspar row a r e s i m i l a r , a n d A M R A A M c o u l d p r o b a b l y b e a d a p t e dfo r ship use. T he N a v y , h o w e v e r , c u r r e n t l y has no p l a n s to replace theS e a s p a r r o w a n d is c o n s i d e r i n g a p o ss ib le m o d i f i c a t i o n o f S e a sp a r r o w f o rf u t u r e sh ips , th ough the service i s r e v i e w i n g a p p l i c a t i o n s o f active seekermiss i les i n t h e sh ip se l f -defense m i s s i o n , l l /

N A T O R e q u i r e m e n t sSevera l N A TO co un t r ies h ave a lso expressed an i n te n t to use A M R A A M o nt h e ir a i r c r a f t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t he U n i t e d K i n g d o m p l an s d e p l o y m e n t o n i ts1 0 . C o n s i d e r a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y s u r r o u n d s t h e c a p a b i l i t y a n d d e p l o y m e n t o fthe S o v i e t b o m b e r s and th e i r air-to-surface missi les . For a discuss ionof the v a r i a t i o n s i n data ava i lab le in the p u b l i c d o m a i n , see B e r t o nW r i g h t , Soviet M issi les ; Data f r o m 1 00 Unclass i f i ed Sources ( B r o o k -l ine , M ass. : In s t i tu te fo r Defen se and D isa r m am en t S tudies , 1985) .

F o r tw o carriers, the C o r a l Sea and the M i d w a y , F/A-18s equippedw i t h Sparrow miss i les (and even tua l ly wi th A M R A A M ) are th e on lya i r c r a f t a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e C A P m i s s i o n , a s these tw o smal l -deckcarriers cannot accommodate F-l^s.11 . A s t h e S e a s p a r r o w p r o g r a m is a N A T O p r o g r a m , t r a n s i t i o n to a seaA M R A A M w o u l d a f f e c t other c o u n t r i e s a s wel l as the U.S. Seasparrowis used on the ships of 10 countries. The r a p i d l y d i m i n i s h i n g S p a r r o wp u r c h a s e s u n d e r t h e c u r r e n t p r o g r a m c o u l d m a k e a b u y o u t b y N A T Oan d the U.S. N a v y advisab le as a m e a n s o f a v o i d i n g the h i g h u n i t costi n c r e a s e s that w o u l d c o m e w i t h r e d u c e d p r o d u c t i o n . S u c h a b u y o u tc o u l d b e d i f f i c u l t u n d e r b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t s .

17


38/92


39/92

A V - 8 a n d T o r n a d o a i r c r a f t , a n d G e r m a n y p l a n s m o d i f i c a t i o n of i t s F - ' f s toc a r r y the missile (see Table 1 ). D e p l o y m e n t of the A M R A A M on the A V - 8an d the G e r m a n F-4s w o u l d b e p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t as neither o f thesea i r c r a f t c a n c u r r e n t l y c a r r y r a d a r m i s s i l e s that c a n b e f i red beyond v i s ualrange . Sev eral other N A T O n a t i o n s p a r t i c u l a r l y those w i t h F - l 6 s m i g h talso use A M R A A M once i t is a v a i l a b l e .

18


40/92


41/92

C H A P T E R I I I . K E Y P R O B L E M S W I T H TH E A M R A A M P R O G R A MA s discussed i n the last chapter, A M R A A M o f f e r s the p o t e n t i a l f o rs u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e as e s i n c a p a b i l i t y , a n d t h e N a v y a n d A i r Force t o g e t h e rbel ieve th ey need about 24 ,000 o f th e m issi les . But th e p rog ram h as h adp r o b l e m s . A l t h o u g h the m i s s i l e w as i n i t i a l ly supposed t o b e less e x p e n s i v eth an Spar row, it wil l cost about twice as m u c h per u n i t according to c u r r e n te s t i m a t e s , and t h o s e e s t i m a t e d costs c o u l d increase. J7 M o r e o v e r , the testp r o g r a m for A M R A A M is beh ind its or ig ina l ly p lanned schedule.COST G R O W T HW h e n d e v e l o p m e n t o f A M R A A M began in late 1979, th e average p r o g r a mu n i t cost p er miss i le d e f ine d as the total cost to develop and buy a l l themissi les div ided by the n u m b e r b o u g h t w a s expected to be $182,000 (inf i s c a l ye ar 1987 do l lars) . The total e s t i m a t e d cost fo r 20 ,000 mi s s i les the

This i s b a se d o n a c o m p a r i s o n o f t he total p r o g r a m u n i t cost o fA M R A A M , $396,000, to the total p r o g r a m u n i t cost o f S p a r r o w ,$ 2 2 1 , 0 0 0 m a k i n g A M R A A M a b o u t 8 0 percent more expens ive th anS p a r r o w . T h e A i r Force p r e f e r s t o c o m p a r e p r o c u r e m e n t u n i t costs o fA M R A A M to those of S p a r r o w , w h i c h are about $344,000 and $214,000respec t ively , a 60 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e in cost. The service feels thatthese costs are m o r e comparable as the A I M - 7 M a m o d i f i c a t i o n ofe a r l i e r S p a r r o w miss i le sh as s u b s t a n t i a l l y l o w e r d e v e l o p m e n t coststhat a r e n o t i n c l u d e d i n p r o c u r e m e n t f u n d i n g . T h e service f u r t h e ra r g u e s that d e v e l o p m e n t f u n d i n g f o r A M R A A M i s essent ial ly a sunkcost a n d h a s less r e l e v a n c e to f u t u r e d e c i s i o n s t h a n d o e s p r o c u r e m e n tf u n d i n g . Th is meth od of cos t ing may , h owever , place the S p a r r o w at ad i s a d v a n t a g e , s i n c e i t i n c l u d e s f u t u r e y e a r s o f S p ar r o w p r o c u r e m e n twhen the missi le is being p roduced at greatly l owered p roduc t ion ratesa n d r a i s e d p r o c u r e m e n t costs. C o m p a r i n g A M R A A M ' s total p r o c u r e -m e n t costs to those of S p a r r o w In 1987bef ore the t r a n s i t i o n toA M R A A M l o w e r s th e S p a r r o w p r o d u c t i o n r a t e y i e l d s a 108 p e r c e n th igh e r cost fo r A M R A A M o v e r that o f S p a r r o w ( $ 3 4 4 ,0 0 0 to $165,000) .A 1 J cos ts d i scussed h ere are in 1 9 8 7 b u d g e t a u t h o r i t y d o l l a r s .

19


42/92


43/92

q u a n t i t y desired by the services a t t h a t t i m e a m o u n t e d to about $3.6b i l l ion . In 1981, at the t i m e of the decision to go ahead with ful l -scaled e ve l o p m e n t , the u n i t cost ha d risen to nearly $331,000; three y ea r s latercost estimates had g r o w n f u r t h e r to about $438,000 p er missile. A t thisprice, the Air Force p o r t io n o f t h e p r o g r a m a l o n e would have cost $8.0bi l l ion . 2 J The increases a p p a r e n t l y s t e m m e d p r i m a r i l y f r o m over lyo p t im is t i c estimates i n the p r o g r a m ' s e a r l y years.

In early 1985, th e Secre ta ry o f Defense , concerned by cost i n c r ea s esan d schedule sl ippage, inst ructed the Ai r Force to s t u d y cost r e d u c t i o nm e a s u r e s f o r t h e A M R A A M p r o g r a m . L a t e r that y ea r , the Armed ServicesC o m m i t t e e s l i m i t e d f u n d s f o r t h e A M R A A M d e ve l o p m e n t c o n t r a c t w i t hHughes A ir c r a f t C o m p a n y to $5 56 .6 m i l l i o n ( i n c u r r e n t d o l l ar s ) 3/ and setthe a m o u n t a v a i l a b l e to p r o c u r e t he A i r Force's r o u g h l y 17,000 missiles a tno m o r e t h a n $5 .2 b i l l i o n , a u n i t p r o c u r e m e n t cost o f about $305,000 in 198^dol la rs , ( t h e e qu iva l e n t of $6.2 bil l ion in 1987 dollars). * j ] The Secre ta ry ofDefense had to c e r t i f y that these cost caps wo u l d no t be breached. T heC o n g r e s s i o n a l l anguage a l so required the Secre ta ry to c e r t i f y that thedesign wa s c o m p l e te a n d t h a t the m issile 's cap abil i ty wo uld no t be degradedto m e e t cost goals .

In response to D oD and Congress ional c o n c e r n s , the Air Force i n i t i a t e da n u m b e r of measures , i n c l u d i n g ear l ier c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n m a n u f a c t u r e r s2 . A i r Force u n i t costs under th is estimate are h ig h e r a t about $^66,000p er missile because A ir Force f u n d i n g inc ludes ear ly more costlyp r o c u r e m e n t an d c o n t a in s m o r e d e ve l o p m e n t costs.3 . F u n d in g f o r research, development , testing, and evaluat ion ( R D T & E ) inc u r r e n t d o l l a r s i n c l u d i n g i n f l a t i o n e s t i m a t e s t o t a l s $1.1 bil l ion,higher than the f u n d i n g cap. Air Force R D T & E f u n d i n g is $971.6mil l ion an d N a v y f u n d i n g is $176.6 m il l io n . W h i l e Congress ionallanguage does n o t expressly state curren t dol la rs , C B O assumes t h a tthe l a n g u a g e i s i n t e n d e d to r e f e r to a c u r r e n t d o l l a r d e ve l o p m e n tcontract that the Air Force has s igned wi th Hughes fo r $556.6 mil l ion .

The Congress did no t m e n t i o n N a v y f u n d i n g in i ts c e r t i f i c a t i o nlanguage , pe rhaps because of the N a vy ' s s m a l l e r d e ve l o p m e n t f u n d i n gan d m i s si l e p r o c u r e m e n t .

20


44/92


45/92

a n d t h e p r o d u c i b i l i t y e n h a n c e m e n t p r o g r a m (P E P ) . S p e c i f i c a ll y , t h e A i rForce p r o v id e d f u n d s to al low the R a y t h e o n C o r p o r a t i o n w hi c h lost theo r i g i n a l c o m p e t i t i o n to develop the miss i le but w as always in tended top r o d u c e i t a l o n g wi t h th e missile 's developer, Hugh esto be able to p r o d u c ethe miss i le o n e year ear l ie r in the p r o d u c t io n p r o g r a m t h a n pl a n n ed . T h u s ,an y s a v in g s f r o m c o m p e t i t i o n would be real ized soon er. The A ir Force alsostarted P E P , w h i c h id e n t i f i e d a n u m b e r o f c h a n g e s in p r o d u c t io n t e c h n iqu e sa i m e d a t r e d u c i n g costs. These i n c l u d e d replac ing h ybr id c i rcu i t ry that iscost ly to m a n u f a c t u r e w i th large-scale i n t e g r a t e d c i r c u i t s that a r e cheaperto p r o d u c e .C o s t E s t im a t e sIn February 1986, af ter reviewing the Ai r Force in i t ia t ives , th e Secretary o fD e fe n s e c e r t i f i e d that the cost c a p s im p o s e d by the Congress could be me tw i t h o u t d e g r a d a t io n i n m is s i le c a p a b i l i t y . T h e l im i t s i m p l y that the averageA M R A A M p r o g r a m u n i t cost will be abo ut $396,000. This is less than thee s t im a t e of $438,000 cited above , re f lec t in g assumed savings und er the PEPp r o g r a m . But the p r o g r a m u n i t cost o f A M R A A M will still b e n e a r l y t w ic eth e p r o g r a m u n i t cost of the m o s t recent vers ion o f Sparrow ( the A I M - 7 M ) ,w hi c h is about $221,000.

The estimates in the December 1985 Selected A c q u i s i t i o n R e p o r t( S A R ) suggest that p r o c u r e m e n t f u n d i n g fo r the Air Force will m e e t theCongress ional cap . 5 j Also , the Air Force has signed a f i r m f ixed-pr icecontract w i t h H u g h e s A i r c r a f t C o m p a n y that meets the Congress ional lyimposed development cap. T he A M R A A M p r o g r a m m a n a g e r has indicated,h o we ve r , that a n a d d i t i o n a l $16.5 m il l ion ( in cur ren t dol la rs ) in developm entf u n d i n g above the cap may be needed in the near term. The f u n d s areneeded to open a t h i r d test site at Egl in A ir Force Base, to pay addi t ionalHughes p e r s o n n e l to i n t e r p r e t test resul ts , and t o buy a t h i r d A M R A A MC a p ti v e E q u i p m e n t ( A C E ) p o d that s imula tes miss i le behavior . 6/ If5. The Selected A c q u i s i t i o n R e p o r t s (S A R ) a r e p u b l i sh e d a n n u a l l y b yD o D . They describe the costs, procurement , development schedules ,an d c a p a b i l i t i e s o f m a j o r weapon sys tems.6 . The A CE pod , co n ta i n in g m iss i le gu id an ce equipm ent and recorders , i s

c a r r i e d o n a n a i r c r a f t that s i m u l a t e s the p a t h the miss i le wil l takewhen it is f i r e d . M a n y s u c h s im u l a t io n s a re car r ied o u t b e f o r e an

21


46/92


47/92

approved, this addi t iona l f u n d i n g could jeopardize the development cap. 7 JI t will b e d i f f i c u l t to asce r t a i n whether th e p r o d u c t i o n cost c ap wil l b e

m e t , ho w e v e r , u n t i l w e l l i n to the 1990s when many A M R A A M missiles havebeen p rod uced. Thus , it is worth assessing th e p r o b a b i l i ty that the cost capswi l l b e m e t befo re proceeding w i th th e p r o g r a m . M a n y observers haveques t ioned the assum pt io ns un der ly ing the Sec re ta ry o f Defense 'sc e r t i f i c a t i o n s an d have suggested that costs could be higher. In par t icula r ,t h e G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e ( G A O ) ha s r e c e n t ly p u b l is hed three r e p o r t son the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . J 5 /A r e a s o f u n c e r t a i n t y a b o ut th e c u r r e n t cost e s t i m a t e s are discussed inthe fo l l o w i n g sections.Savings f rom Producibility Enhancements. When th e A M R A A Mp r o g r a m w as r e s t r u c t u r e d in 1985, D o D sought p roposa ls f r o m the

m a n u f a c t u r e r s to reduce miss i le p roduc t ion costs. B o th H u g he s an dR a y t h e o n s u b m i t te d lists o f potential m o d i f i c a t i o n s f r o m w hi c h D o Dselected 27. A c o m p e t i t i o n fo r design o f these m o d i f i c a t i o n s w as then held ,an d the Air Force planned to a w a r d th e contracts by December 1985. Ato ta l o f $2.0 b i l l io n , o r abou t 24 percent of the total p r o c u r e m e n t cost o fF o o t n o t e C o n t i n u e da c tu a l test f i r i n g o c c u r s .7 . T he G A O has i nd i ca t e d that, pr io r to the enactment of the Congres-s iona l leg is la tion , $200,000 (cu r ren t do l la rs) above the cap had a l readybeen oblig ated. These f u n d s were subsequently deobligated to m e e t

the c ap . S e e " A d v a n c e d M e d i u m - R a n g e A i r - to - A i r M i s si le ( A M R A A M )C e r t i f i c a t i o n Issues," B r i e f i n g R e p o r t t o the C ha i r m a n , C o m m i t te e o nA r m e d Services, House o f Representatives, Ju ly 1986.8. G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e , " M i s s i le D e v e l o p m e n t , S ta tu s o f A d v a n c e dM e d i u m - R a n g e A i r - t o - A i r Missi le ( A M R A A M ) C e r t i f i c a t i o n , "G A O / N S I A D ( F e b r u a r y 1 9 86 ); " M i ss il e D e ve l o p m e n t , A d v a n c e d M e d i -u m - R a n g e A i r - t o - A i r Mi s s i le L e g a l V i e w s a n d P r o g r a m S ta tu s " ( M a r c h1986); an d "M issi le Developm ent , A dvanced M edium -R ange Ai r - to -Ai rMissi le ( A M R A A M ) Cer t i f ica t ion I ssues ," Bri ef i ng R e p o r t to the C ha i r -m a n , C o m m i t t e e o n A r m e d Services, House o f Represen ta t ives , D u l y1986.

22


48/92


49/92

$8.4 b i l l i o n , w as r e m o v e d f r o m the e s t im a t e d cost of the A M R A A Mp r o g r a m , based on the assum pt io n that t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n s would b ei n c o r p o r a t e d p a r t i a l l y in miss i les bought in 1989 (Lot 3 of the i n i t i a lcont rac t ) and comple te ly by 1990 (Lot 4) .These contracts we r e n o t a wa r d e d u n t i l J u l y 1986, how ever. Som ea n a l y s t s are concerned that more miss i les than p lanned could be producedw i t h o u t the d e s i g n m o d i f i c a t i o n s , w h i c h would push up costs. The Ai r F o r c em a i n t a i n s t h a t c o s t - s a v in g m o d i f i c a t io n s wil l not be held up, despite theseven-m on th de lay in the aw ard in g of the c o n t r a c t s .Savings f rom Competition. T h e Ai r Force assumed that base l ine costes t imates were reduced by $0.9 bil l ion because o f savings associated w i t hco m pet i t io n be tween Hughes and R aytheon . These savings a re in evi t abl yhighly u n c e r t a in . E s t im a t e s o f compet i t ive "savings" in an Ai r Forcei n d e p e n d e n t cost ana lys isassoc ia ted w i t h e a r li e r p r o g r a m cost estimates-

r a n g e d f r o m a cost increase o f 9 p e r c e n t to savings of 6 percent. Increasescould occur i f savings f r o m l o w e r r e c u r r i n g costs we r e i n s u f f i c i e n t to recoupt he a d d i t i o n a l o n e - t im e cost o f q u a l i f y i n g a second p ro ducer , or ifc o m p e t i t i o n w as less aggressive than expected. T h u s , c o m p e t i t i o n c o u l dg e n e r a t e l ower savings than expected.The O ff i ce of the Secretary of Defen se (OS D) raised an other con cerna b o u t c o m p e t i ti o n . F r e qu e n t l y " c o m p e t i t i v e " savings are the resul t ofincreased e f f ic iency on t he p a r t of the contractor. To the extent thate f f i c i e n c y improvements have a l ready been captured under the produc ib i l i tye n h a n c e m e n t p r o g r a m , t h e y s h o u l d no t be credited to c o m p e t i t i o n .Program Stability. T h e G A O expressed concern about the a s s u m p t i o n ,

m a d e b y both the N a v y and the Air Force, that l a r g e qu a n t i t i e s o f missileswould be produced thro ug hou t the pro gr am . In an a u s te r e budgete n v i r o n m e n t , reduced purchases co uld occur that would inc rease the averagecost of the miss i les p rocured .G A O quest ioned the a s s u m p t i o n that n o design changes (except thep r o d u c i b i l i t y changes discussed above) would o c c u r d u r i n g the p r o d u c t i o nphase of the pro gra m . A s evidence that th is a s s u m p t io n m ig h t n o t h o l d ,G A O ment ioned severa l changes that s o m e in the Air Force al ready in tendt o m a k e in t h e m is s i le . T h e Do D m a in t a in s , h o we ve r , that the design of themiss i le i s essent ial ly c o m p l e t e , a n d that . the A ir Force envis ions r e q u i r i n ghigh- level approval fo r any eng ineer ing change orders , s imi la r to thecont ro l s appl ied to the B-l b o m b e r p r o g r a m . I f t h e m is s i le s h o u ld p r o ve lessm a t u r e than the Air Force bel ieves, how ever, or if the service sho uld be less

23


50/92


51/92


52/92


53/92

The A ir Force has also abor ted o r canceled f i r i n g a t t e m p t s o n 1 7occasions. Ten of these i nvo lved p r o b l e m s u n r e l a t e d to t h e m is si l e ( f i r i n grange , weather , target, o r l a u n c h i n g a i r c r a f t ) b ut seven appear to h a ver e f l ec t e d p r o b l e m s w i t h the miss i le . O f the last f ive f i r i ngs , m o r e o v e r , tw ow e r e only p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l and in a n o t h e r the miss i le ' s r o c k e t m o t o r d idn o t i g n i t e so t h a t th e test objec t ives were n o t accompl ished . 2/ The tw om o s t r e c e n t f i r i n g s we r e , h o we ve r , ful ly successfu l .

Missi les a r e expected to f a i l s o m e t i m e s in t e s t i n g ; o t h e r wis e t h e r ew o u l d be no need to h a ve tests. M o r e o ve r , s o m e t y p e s o f test r e q u i r e k i n d so f i n f o r m a t i o n that v i r t u a l l y g u a r a n t e e f a i l u r es . The A M R A A M testp r o g r a m encompasses tw o k i n d s o f testing that occur a l m o s t s imul taneously D e v e l o p m e n t Test ing an d E v a l u a t i o n ( D T & E ) an d I n i t i a l Op e r a t io n a lTest ing an d E v a l u a t i o n (1OT&E). A ll shots so far have been part o f D T & E .The D T & E dete r m in es w hether the des ign of the m iss i le meets thes p e c i f i c a t io n s i n the c o n t r a c t an d whether the s p e c i f i c a t io n s a re reasonable ;D T - 5 c E also tests the p h y s ic a l i n t e r f a c e b e t we e n the a i r c r a f t and themissile. 10/ The I O T & E e v a lua te s m is s i l e s u i t a b i l i t y t o p e r f o r m in c o m b a t .Because the goals of each type of test d i f f e r , the c r i te r ia fo r success an dthe k i n d s o f f i r i n g s needed to evaluate these critieria also d i f f e r . D i f f i c u l tshots that a r e q u i t e r e l e v a n t to I O T & E a t a r a p i d l y m a n u e v e r i n g target, fo re x a m p l e m a y no t wo rk , caus ing f a i lu r es tha t resul t in fewer shots as thedevelopers slow the p r o g r a m to d e t e r m in e wh a t we n t wr o n g . T h is c an delayD T & E .

A test p r o g r a m e n c o m p a s si n g these va r io u s k in d s o f t e s t i ng would beexpected to exper ienc e som e fa i lu r es and even , dependin g on the sever i ty ofthe tes t ing , to be de layed . Perhap s of m ore con cern is that on ly 11 o fA M R A A M ' s 9 0 p l a n n e d test shots have oc curred . Despi te that f a c t that 8 o f9. The two tests that were par t ia l ly successfu l acco m pl ished some of thetest objec t ives but the m iss i le d id no t come w ith i n le thal rad ius of thetarget.1 0. F o r e x a m p l e , the Ai r Force bel ieves that a recent f i r i n g f r o m the F / A -18 i n d i c a t e d that the s p e c i f i c a t io n for the missi le 's "g" f o r c e s e xpe r i -enced d u r i n g separa t ion f r o m th e a i r c r a f t , wh ic h is set at 15 g's, ishigher than is l ikely to occur. (A g i s a un i t o f measure fo r the f o r c eof acce le ra t ion o n a body, where o n e e qu a l s E a r t h ' s g r a v i t a t i o n a l p u l l. )H e n c e t h a t s p e c i f i c a t io n has been changed.

25


54/92


55/92

the 11, or 70 percent, have been successfulan u n p r e c e d e n te d n u m b e ra c c o r d i n g to the Air Forcethis might sugges t that the t i m e allocated tothe test p r o g r a m should b e l e n g the n e d b e fo r e p r o d u c t i o n i s started. U/Y e t , u n d e r t he A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p l a n , lo w - r a t e p r o d u c t i o n of the miss i lewould begin in 1987.

11. The Air Force says that th e success rate of the test p r o g r a m is 80percen t s ince i t has f i r e d 13 s hot s i nc lud i ng 2 ungui ded "separa-tion/control" shots in tended to see whether the missile would separatec l e a n l y f r o m the a i r c r a f t o f w h i c h 10 have been successful. CBO hasused guided test f i r i n g s throughout th is paper to be c o n s i s te n t w i t hlast year's test schedule that included 90 guided missile f i r i n g s an dexcluded s e p a r a t i o n / c o n t r o l tests. T he success ra te fo r the p r o g r a mwou ld be a b o u t 70 percent based o n g u i d e d tests a lone .

26


56/92


57/92

C H A P T E R I V . A L T E R N A T I V E S F O R A M R A A M P R O C U R E M E N TC o n c e r n o v e r p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e A M R A A M m i s s i l e s n a m e l y , cost g r o w t han d testing d e l a y s h a s p r o m p t e d s o m e i n the Congress to sugges t a l te r ingth e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p r o c u r e m e n t p l an . T hi s c h a p t er f i r s t d e sc r ib e s th eA d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p l a n f o r p r o c u r i n g A M R A A M a n d o t h e r air-to-air miss i les ,w h i c h is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a dec i s ion to place A M R A A M o n U.S. a i r c r a f t a ssoon as possible to o f f s e t i m p r o v e m e n t s in Soviet forces. Then the chapterdesc r ibes th e ef fec ts o f delay ing A M R A A M p r o c u r e m e n t b y o n e year. Th isa p p r o a c h w o u l d b e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a decis ion to p u r c h a s e A M R A A M , b u to n l y a f t e r m o r e t i m e h a d elapsed to c o m p l e t e testing a n d assess the e f f e c t sof p r o d u c i b i l i t y changes a i m e d at h o l d i n g d o w n costs. It is possible, ofc o u r s e , that over th e nex t few years A M R A A M c o u l d s u f f e r f u r t h e rp r o b l e m s o f cost o r capab i l i ty , w h ich could necessitate c o n s i d e r i n g alterna-t ive missi les to meet f u t u r e air-to-air miss i le needs. The chapter c o n c l u d e sw i t h a discuss ion o f such a l te rna t ives .A L T E R N A T I V E I-THE A D M I N I S T R A T I O N ' S P L A NT h e c u r r e n t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p r o g r a m w o u ld p r o c u r e o v er 24,000 A M R A A M s 17 ,123 fo r th e A i r Force a n d 7 , 2 1 2 f o r t h e N a v y . I/A ir Force P r o c u r e m e n tO f the 12,022 air-to-air missi les that the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p la n s t o b u y f o r t h eA ir Force i n f i sca l yea rs 1987 t h r o u g h 1991, 7,843 w o u l d b e A M R A A M s . B y1991 the e n t i r e a n n u a l p r o c u r e m e n t c u r r e n t l y d i v i d e d a m o n g S p a r r o w ,S i d e w i n d e r , a n d A M R A A M w o u l d be made up o f A M R A A M missiles (seeTable 2).

W h i l e a n n u a l p r o c u r e m e n t q u a n t i t i es f o r a l l types o f m i s s i le s w o u l d n o tchange appreciably d u r i n g this time period, the cost of p r o c u r i n g themw o u l d be subs tan t i a l ly h igh er i n th e f i rs t f o u r years o f th e f ive-year p lant h a n in 1986 (see Table 3). T h i s g r o w t h w o u l d b e caused, in part, by the

1 . O n e h u n d r e d an d e l e v e n d e v e l o p m e n t m i s s i l e s w i l l also be b o u g h t .

27


58/92


59/92

T A B L E 2. Q U A N T I T I E S O F A I R - T O - A I R M I S S I L E P R O C U R E M E N T F O RTH E A IR F O R C E A N D N A V Y (B y f iscal year, in n u m b e r s )

T o t a lM issiles 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1987-1991A ir Force

S p a r r o w 497 3 7 9 5 2 3 0 0 0 9 0 2S i d e w i n d e r 1,650 1 ,710 9 56 437 174 0 3 , 2 7 7A M R A A M 0 260 833 1 , 9 5 0 2,600 2 , 2 0 0 7 , 8 4 3S u b t o t a lA ir F o r c e 2 , 1 4 7 2 , 3 4 9 2 , 3 1 2 2 , 3 8 7 2 , 7 7 4 2 , 2 0 0 1 2 , 0 2 2

N a v yS p a r r o w 1 , 9 4 8 1 , 7 1 6 1 , 5 9 4 900 400 500 5 , 1 1 0S i d e w i n d e r 2 , 1 2 0 627 488 565 560 560 2 , 8 0 0A M R A A M 0 0 0 50 400 800 1 , 2 5 0P h o e n i x 265 205 430 560 560 560 2 ,3 15

S u b t o t a lN a v y 4 , 3 3 3 2 , 5 4 8 2 , 5 1 2 2 , 0 7 5 1 , 9 2 0 2 , 4 2 0 1 1 , 4 7 5T o t a l 6 , 4 8 0 4 , 8 9 7 4 , 8 2 4 4 , 4 6 2 4 , 6 9 4 4 , 6 2 0 2 3 , 4 9 7S O U R C E : C o n g r e s s i o n a l B u d g e t O f f i c e f r o m The B u d g e t of the U.S.G o v e r n m e n t fo r Fisca l Year 1987 .

28


60/92


61/92

T A B L E 3. C O S T O F A I R - T O - A I R M I S S I L E P R O C U R E M E N T F O R T H EA I R F O R C E A N D N A V Y (B y f i s c a l y e a r , i n m i l l i o n s o f1987 d o l l a r s r o u n d e d t o t h e n e a r e s t $ 1 0 m i l l i o n )

T o t a lM i s s i l e s 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1987-1991A ir F o r c e

S p a r r o wS i d e w i n d e rA M R A A MS u b t o t a lA ir F o r c e

N a v yS p a r r o wS i d e w i n d e rA M R A A MP h o e n i x

S u b t o t a lN a v yT o t a l

80802 2 0380

35 011003708301 ,210 1

S O U R C E : C o n g r e s s i o n a l

60100760920

28070032 0670, 5 9 0

B u d g e t

10 0509901 , 1 4 0

27 0501043 07601 , 9 0 0

O f f i c e

030930960

17 06015 045 08301,790

f r o m

030780810

110602204308201 , 6 3 0 1,

The B u d g e t

00520520

16050270400880400

of

16 021 03,980

4 , 3 5 0

99029 065 02 , 0 3 03 , 9 6 08 , 3 1 0

the U.S.G o v e r n m e n t for Fiscal Year 1987.

29


62/92


63/92

h i g h e r expense o f A M R A A M r e l a t i v e t o S p a r r o w , b u t e v en m o r e b y t h ec o m p l e t i o n o f t h e S i d e w i n d e r p r o c u r e m e n t a n d i ts r e p la c e m e n t w i t hA M R A A M i n t h e A i r Force m i s s i l e p r o c u r e m e n t account. BecauseA M R A A M costs a b o u t f iv e t i m e s a s m u c h a s S i d e w i n d e r , th e s h i f t i n m i xf r o m S i d e w i n d e r t o A M R A A M w o u l d g r e a t l y alter total costs. 2/ W h i l e t h i ss h a r p g r o w t h i n m i s s i l e costs could be a p ro b lem in an era o f t i gh t budg ets ,air-to-air m i s s i l e p r o c u r e m e n t in the 1987 budget request is o n l y 1 0 p e r c e n tof the total A ir Force m i s s i l e account, w h i c h is i tself only 9 p e r c e n t of theentire A ir Force budget . Th us , the g r o w t h m i g h t w e l l b e a c c o m m o d a t e d .W h i l e t h e A i r Force w o u l d b u y 7,843 A M R A A M s over the n e x t f i v eyears, i t w o u l d p r o c u r e n e a r l y 1 0 , 0 0 0 m o r e i n the y e a r s b e y o n d . T he totale s t i m a t e d cost fo r the rough ly 17 ,000 miss i les the service i n t e n d s t o b u yw o u l d a m o u n t t o a b o u t $ 6 . 2 b i l l i o n ( th e equ iva len t o f $5 .2 b i l l i o n i n 1984dol la rs ) .

N a v y P r o c u r e m e n tA s Table 2 shows, the N a v y plan s to p ro cu re 11 ,475 air-to-air miss i les overthe f i v e y e a r s a l m o s t a s m a n y a s t h e A i r F o r c e i n c l u d i n g b o t h S p a r r o w an dS i d e w i n d e r , a s w e l l a s l ong- range Ph oen ix miss i les .

T h e N a v y ' s costs w o u l d total $4.0 b i l l i o n fo r i t s s l i gh t ly smal ler miss i lep u r c h a se . C o n t i n u e d p r o c u r e m e n t of the Ph oen ix miss i le , wh ich a t $1.6m i l l i o n each ( i n f i s c a l y e a r 1 9 8 7 p r o c u r e m e n t u n i t costs) a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l ym o r e e x p e n s i v e t h a n either th e A M R A A M o r t h e S p a r r o w , c o u p l e d w i t hs i z a b l e i n c r e a s e s i n S p a r r o w ' s u n i t costs because o f reduced p r o c u r e m e n tquantities, w o u l d cause the N a v y ' s p r o g r a m costs to a p p r o a c h those of theA ir Force. N a v y air-to-air miss i le f u n d i n g w o u l d be lower i n th e f i rs t twoyears than in 1986, a l though costs w o u l d rise by th e end o f the f iv e-y earp e r i o d . N a v y air-to-air m i s s i l e f u n d i n g w a s s u b s t a n t i a l l y h i g h er i n 1986 thanit had been for at least the preceding decade.

A s w i t h the Ai r Force, N a v y p r o c u r e m e n t of the A M R A A M w o u l dc o n t i n u e b e y o n d t h e n e x t f i v e years. I n a l l , t h e N a v y w o u l d p u r c h a s e a b o u t7 , 2 1 2 of th e m i s s i l e s a t a total p r o c u r e m e n t cost o f a b o u t $ 2 .2 b i l l i o n .2 . B a s ed o n a c o m p a r i s o n o f average p r o c u r e m e n t u n i t cost fo r th e totalA M R A A M p r o g r a m w i t h S i d e w i n d e r f i s c a l y e ar 1 98 7 p r o c u r e m e n tf u n d i n g ( b o t h i n 1987 dol lars) .

30


64/92


65/92

A d v a n t a g e s a n d r v ^ - ^ - z n t a g e s o f t he A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s P l anT h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a p p r o a c h to b u y i n g A M R A A M h a s i m p o r t a n t a d v a n -tages. A l t h o u g h th e p r o c u r e m e n t s c h e d u l e ha s been delayed, th is plan w o u l ds t i l l d e l i v e r a s u b s t a n t i a l n u m b e r o f A M R A A M missi les by the early 1990s.I f A M R A A M p e r f o r m s a s expected, i t s d e l i v e r y w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e A i rForce's F-15 the p r e m i e r f i g h t e r i n the c o u n t e r a i r m i s s i o n w i t h the a b i l i t yto l a u n c h a m i s s i l e at a target and leave and to e n g a g e m u l t i p l e targetss i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I n t h e A i r Force's v i e w , these capab i l i t i es a r e critical b e-cause of the Sovie t Un ion ' s l a rger nu m be r o f a i r c r a f t an d because o f Sovie ti m p r o v e m e n t s i n f i g h t e r a n d air-to-air miss i le c a p a b i l i t i e s . In addi t i on , del i -v e r i e s o f A M R A A M w o u l d g i v e t he A i r Force's F-16 f i g h t e r a r a d a r m i s s i l ecapab i l i ty and, thus, the ab i l i ty to attack e n e m y aircraft at greater rangest h a n i s p o s s ib l e w i t h th e i n f r a r e d S i d e w i n d e r . T h is c o u l d b e v e r y i m p o r t a n tsince, by the e a r l y 1990s, the F-16 wi l l m ake u p more t h a n t w o - t h i r d s of a l lA ir Force f i g h t e r s . I n a d d i t i o n , A M R A A M w o u l d i m p r o v e N a v y c a p a b i l i t i e sb y p r o v i d i n g i t s F / A - 1 S f i g h t e r s w i t h a m u l t i t a r g e t c a p a b i l it y , t h u s i m p r o v -i n g t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e i n the c o m b a t a i r pa t ro l m iss ion . Th is i s p a r t i c u l a r l yi m p o r t a n t f o r t h e t w o s m a l l - d e c k carriers that operate w i t h o u t F - l < f s a n dth ei r Ph oen ix miss i les .

O n th e o t h e r h a n d , th e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p r o g r a m presents s u b s t a n t i a lr i sk o f i nc reased costs. A s t h e latest chapter suggested, costs c o u l d g r o wb e y o n d l e v e ls n o w e s t i m a t e d , w h i c h a r e a l r e a d y m u c h hi g h e r t h a n o r i g i n a l l yp l a n n e d . A l s o , because o f delays i n testing, there is the poss ib i l i ty thatp r o d u c t i o n m i g h t proceed befo re a l l des ign p rob lem s h ad been unc overed.A L T E R N A T I V E I I D E L A Y P R O C U R E M E N T F O R O N E Y E A RIn l i g h t of the r isks in the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s plan , th e Congress could chooseto d e f e r A M R A A M p r o d u c t i o n f o r o n e year. 3 _ / Th is would y ie ld the

3. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the C o n g r e s s c o u l d elect a lesser delay. T he G e n e r a lA c c o u n t i n g O f f i c e ( G A O ) h a s p r e p a r e d a b r i e f i n g that e x a m i n e s th epos s i b i l i t y o f r e d u c i n g p r o c u r e m e n t i n the f i r s t year of the p r o g r a m .G A O c o n s i d e r e d a l t e r n a t i v e s that i n c l u d e r e d u c i n g p r o c u r e m e n t i n1987 f r o m 260 to 240, 180, or 135 missiles. " A M R A A M B u d g e t A l t e r -na t ives , " G A O / N S I A D , A p r i l 1986, is an u n p u b l i s h e d b r i e f i n g p r e p a r e db y G A O ' s N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s D i v i s i o n .

31


66/92


67/92

p r o c u r e m e n t p ro f i le sh own in Table < f . U n d e r such a p r o f i l e 3,000 f e w e rmiss i les w o u l d b e b o u g h t d u r i n g the f ive-year pe r iod than under theA d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p l a n , a n d d e l i v e r i e s by the ear ly 1990s w o u l d b e s i m i l a r l yr e d u c e d .A d v a n t a g e s o f a P r o c u r e m e n t D e l a yI f p r o d u c t i o n w as d e l a y e d a y e a r , m o r e m i s s i l e s c o u l d b e tested b e f o r e ap r o d u c t i o n decis ion would need to be m a d e, t h u s s u p p l y i n g m o r e data for ap r o d u c t i o n r e v i e w . A s C h a p t e r I I I i n d i c a t e d , f e w e r A M R A A M test shotsh ave b e e n c o m p l e t e d t h a n w e r e e x p e c t e d u n d e r the schedule i ssued i nA u g u s t 1985 (see Table 5). U n d e r tha t schedule , I' f shots sh ou ld have beenf i red by Jun e 1986, bu t on ly 8 wer e com ple ted . M oreo ver , in add i t io n to the8 that had been co m ple ted , 16 had been e i the r abo r ted o r can ce led becau seof s o m e p r o b l e m (see A p p e n d i x ) . T he s h o r t f a l l in t e s t i n g m a y i n d i c a t ed i f f i c u l t i e s that w il l r e q u i r e ti m e t o r e s o l v e , t h o u g h m u c h of th e d e l a y m a yhave ar isen f r o m p r o b l e m s u n r e l a t e d to the missi le . F o r e x a m p l e , s o m e o ft h e c a n c e l a t io n s w e r e a p p a r e n t l y d u e t o d i f f i c u l t y s c h e d u l i n g t i m e o n t h ef i r i n g r a n g e .

D e l a y i n g p r o d u c t i o n for a year w o u l d enable extra tests that m i g h tp r o v i d e i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t p r o g r a m risks. P r o b l e m s a r e n o tu n u s u a l i n a m i s s i l e test p r o g r a m , but the h i s t o r y o f A M R A A M ' s predecessors u g g e s t s s o m e r e a s o n fo r c o n c e r n . The A 1 M - 7 M v e r s i o n o f S p a r r o w a l s oe x p e r ie n c e d e x t e n s i v e p r o b l e m s w i t h its g u i d a n c e s o f t w a r e w h e n it reachedth e n e x t s t a g e o f e v a l u a t i o n o p e r a t i o n a l t e s t i n g a n d three c h a n g e s i n i t ss o f t w a r e p r o v e d n e c e s s a ry . T h e se c h a n g e s , a n d p e r h a p s o t h e r p r o b l e m s ,d e l a y e d p r o d u c t i o n b y t w o y e a r s .A c c o r d i n g t o A i r Force est imates , a de lay of one year w o u l d r e d u c ef i s c a l year 1987 f u n d i n g b y about $0 .6 b i l l ion . W h i l e h i g h e r costs in thel a t e r y e a r s w o u l d l o w e r t h e f i v e - y e a r s a v i n g s , t h e y w o u l d s t i l l a m o u n t t oabo ut $0.5 billion . These and other costs noted below are based on AirF o r c e e s t i m a t e s .T h e costs p r o v i d e d b y t h e A i r F o r c e f o r t h i s o p t i o n a s s u m e t h a t t h ep r o d u c i b i l i t y e n h a n c e m e n t p r o g r a m ( PE P ) w o u l d also b e delayed f o r o n ey e a r . The s e r v i c e has i n d i c a t e d t h a t p r o d u c t i o n of 10 m i s s i l e s in 1987 w o u l db e n e c e s s a r y t o k e e p that p r o g r a m o n s c h e d u l e . W h i l e p r o c u r i n g t he 1 0m i s s i l e s w o u l d i n c r e a s e 1 9 8 7 f u n d i n g , i t c o u l d decrease s u b s e q u e n t f u n d i n gas m o r e m i s s i l e s w o u l d b e p r o d u c e d u n d e r the p r o g r a m and so w o u l d b e n e f i t

f r o m t h e l o w e r costs t h a t P E P i s d e s i g n e d t o p r o d u c e .

32


68/92


69/92

T A B L E 4 . T W O A L T E R N A T I V E A M R A A M A C Q U I S I T I O N P R O G R A M S(By f i sca l yea rs )

A l t e r n a t i v e 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 87-91 To C o m -pleteQ U A N T I T I E S O F A M R A A M M I S S I L E S(I n n u m b e r s o f miss i les )

A l t e r n a t i v e I( A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s P r o g r a m )A ir Force 26 0N a v y 0Tota l 26 0

A l t e r n a t i v e I I( O n e - Y e a r D e l a y )A ir Force 0N a v y 0Total 0

8330833

2600260

1 , 9 5 0 2,502 , 0 0 0 3,

833 1 ,0833 2,COSTS(I n m i l l i o n s o f 1987r o u n d e d to the nearest

A l t e r n a t i v e I( A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s P r o g r a m )A ir Force 760 990N a v y 0 10T o t a l 7 6 0

A l t e r n a t i v e I I( O n e - Y e a r D e l a y )A ir Force 190N a v y 0T o t a l 190

1 , 0 0 0

8000800

9301501 , 0 8 0 1,

94010950 1,

600 240000 0 3

950 25 0 -000 3

,20080 0,000

,600400,000

7 , 8 4 31 ,2509,093

5,6434506,093

9 , 2 8 05,9621 5 , 2 4 2

11 ,4806,7621 8 , 2 4 2dol la rs10 m i l l l i on)

78022 0000

960150, 1 1 0 1

5202707 90

820220,040

3,9806504 , 6 3 0

amraam current status and alternative aug 1986

Documents