ultra-low fertility in east asia: 'babymaking mchines'goin ......birth registration data...
Post on 12-Oct-2020
2 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
Ultra-low Fertility in East Asia:
“Babymaking machines” going on strike?
Yen-hsin Alice Cheng
鄭雁馨
Vienna, Austria
7 December, 2018
“Health Minister Hakuo Yanagisawa, 71, in January publicly described women as "baby-making machines" and suggested Japan had a birthrate problem because women were failing in their duty to produce children. In November, Hakubun Shimomura, 52, one of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's top aides, said the country could easily address a national shortage of public daycare if women would simply "stay at home and raise their children.“ (Washington Post, March 2007)
Finger-pointing and scapegoat?
Derogatory terms for unmarried women above age 30: “leftover women”,
“defeated dogs”, “single parasite”, “culprit of national security problems”, etc.
Rigid patriarchal family and cultural system that can’t keep pace with women’s rising status & respect their basic rights
What babymaking machines?!
East Asian Families
A few facts about East Asia
East Asia contains 1/5 of world population
Asia = 60% of the world’s population; 1/3 of this share is East Asia
Incredible rapid decline in fertility with limited signs of reversal
Unprecedented and persistent low fertility in one of the most family-oriented social contexts
Remarkably rapid economic development and yet a region with a deep-rooted Confucian culture system:
(1) women’s subordinate role;
(2) traditional family values/obligations;
(3) collectivist norm that constrain individual behaviors and options
(4) xenophobic value that lauds ethnic homogeneity;
The Scope of East Asia
The scope of East Asia (Population=1.6 billions)
Population size: China (1.4 billions), Hong Kong (7.4 millions), Japan (127 millions), South Korea (51.5 millions), and Taiwan (23.5 millions)
GDP per capita (nominal): China ($8,643), Hong Kong ($46,080), Japan ($38,448), Korea ($29,938), and Taiwan ($24,292) (IMF 2017)
Mongolia and North Korea are less studied due to data availability. Both with PTFR of ~2 children
Singapore?
Often juxtaposed with other East Asian countries due to its impressive economic development, Confucian culture, son preference, and equally fast-declining fertility over the past decades.
But strictly speaking it’s located in Southeast Asia
Overview of East Asian fertility
Rapid fertility decline since mid-20th century, dipping down to below replacement-level in mid-1980, except China
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
PTFR in East Asia, 1960-2016
Japan South Korea Taiwan Hong Kong China
Data sources: World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN/ and Department of householdregistration, Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/portal/346
PTFR in South Korea: 1.05 (2017) 0.96 (2018)
Historical records:0.89 in Taiwan, 20100.90 in Hong Kong, 2003
Overview of East Asian fertility
The emergence of son preferences since 1980
100
105
110
115
120
125
Se
xR
ati
o a
t B
irth
Japan
China
Taiwan
Korea
Hong Kong
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics in China; vital statistics of Japan and South Korea; Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong; Department of Household Registration, Taiwan
Overview of East Asian fertility
% of age 25-29 population with tertiary education
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
JP_Men
JP_Women
SK_Men
SK_Women
TW_Men
TW_Women
HK_Men
HK_Women
CH_Men
CH_Women
Data source: Barro and Lee 2018
Overview of East Asian fertility
Female Labor Force Participation, 1990-2016
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
20-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-64
LF
PR
Korea199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
LFP
R
Japan19901991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
LFP
R
Taiwan199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016
Data source:International Labor Organization
Overview of East Asian Fertility
Marriage delayed but also marriage foregone, except for China
20
22
24
26
28
30
1970 1995 2010
Mean age at marriage
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan
Hong Kong
China
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
% never married men at age 50
China
Korea
TaiwanHong Kong
Japan
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
% never married women at age 50
China
Korea
TaiwanHong Kong
Japan
Overview of East Asian Fertility
Why do we care about marriage when studying fertility in East Asia?
Marriage is still closely linked to fertility
Decomposition of fertility changes in Taiwan, 1975-2015 (PTFR: 3.11.18)
-0,0296
-0,1638-0,1335
0,0114 0,0192
-0,0004 -0,0016
-0,25
-0,20
-0,15
-0,10
-0,05
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Contribution of marital fertility rate Contribution of marriage rate
Net change in ASFR
Overview of East Asian Fertility
So, are there NO babies outside of marriage in East Asia?
Circa 2015, very low rates of non-marital births (NMB):
1.5% in South Korea
2% in Japan
4% in Taiwan
8% in Hong Kong
No statistics for China, yet likely also extremely low due to traditional family values and stigma for NMB.
However, rising % of pre-nuptial pregnancies (PNP) (or bridal pregnancy, BP) have been observed in all these countries
Overview of East Asian Fertility
% bridal pregnancies have increased substantially over the past decades
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2015
Taiwan (BirthCoh)
Taiwan (MarrCoh)
Japan (BirthCoh)
Japan (MarrCoh)
South Korea (MarrCoh)
Hong Kong (BirthCoh)
Data sources: Iwasawa, Miho and Kenji Kamata. 2014. "Marriage Preceded by Pregnancy and Women’s Employment." Japan Labor Review 11(4):21-51. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/syussyo06/syussyo2.html#02 Birth registration data and Statistical Yearbook of Taiwan Kim, Yujin and Jinwoo Lee. 2018. "Bridal Pregnancy and Women’s Educational Attainment in South Korea, 1970–2009." The History of
the Family 23(3):426-45. doi: 10.1080/1081602X.2018.1474785. Gietel-Basten, Stuart and Georgia Verropoulou. 2018. "The Changing Relationship between Marriage and Childbearing in Hong Kong."
PloS one 13(3):e0194948. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0194948.
% births within 8 months after marriage
Overview of East Asian Fertility
With pre-marital conceptions rising, what about cohabitation?
Cohabitation in East Asia has also been rising overtime, but its prevalence
seem to be much lower than in Europe.
Limited data on % of ever cohabited in most East Asian societies
Japan 2004: 10-15%
Taiwan 2004: ~20%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Cohabitation rates (%) by birth cohort
Japan Taiwan China
Data sources: Tsuya 2006; Yu & Xie (2015); KAP survey of Taiwan 1998 & 2004
Causes of Ultra-Low Fertility
What factors led to such changes in fertility and marriage in East Asia?
Economic development, educational expansion, rising female labor market
attachment delayed union formation & higher opportunity cost
Tempo effects provide partial explanations substantial quantum changes
Childcare and education High expenses on child-rearing
Delayed policy responses work-family conflict
Deteriorating labor market conditions unemployment, precarious work
Stalled gender revolution persistent patriarchal values
Lowers the likelihood of compatible couples
Exacerbates work-and-family conflict, particularly for women
Affects division of labor at home
Negative impact on policy effectiveness
Patriarchy and division of labor:
Women’s Role at Home
Male-breadwinner model: women still shoulder the bulk of domestic chores with their changing social roles and rising status
Sources: Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities, Japan; Hsu (2008);Kim (2017); Hsiao (2005); Yang (2017)
The gender gap is closing due to decreasing women’s hours and rising men’s input
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
1990 1995 2000 2010 2016
Women's Share of total housework hours
Japan South Korea Taiwan China Hong Kong
Patriarchy and family policy:
Why pronatalist policies didn’t work?
In the case of Taiwan:
Too much focus on raising fertility, but not on declining marriage rates
and potential aversion of childbearing pressure
Parental leave (2002, “a visible yet unreachable benefit”)
Repercussions for women
Men discouraged by traditional gender-role values
Only 3% of new parents take 2-year leave; 60% had a 6-month leave % men taking leave: < 5% in 2006; 17% in 2017
% new parents taking parental leave: from ~¼ in 2009 to ~1/2 in 2017
Salary gap between men and women
Men’s economic burden & persistent male-breadwinner value
Confucian Culture and Patriarchy
Confucian culture stresses the importance of structure and hierarchy in social relationships and values a patrilineal family system
Such family lineage that continued along male descendants is often associated with practices that reinforces patriarchy:
Virilocal living arrangements after marriage
Women adapting to husband’s family & shoulder the care of parents-in-law
Investment in daughters thus considered expensive and unnecessary
Son preferences
Ancestral worship, inheritance, passing down family name, old age security, etc.
creating tremendous pressure on married women
Subordinate role of women
The three obediences for a woman means women should obey her father as a daughter in the natal home, her husband as a wife in a marriage, and her sons in widowhood
Confucian Culture and Patriarchy
Subordinate role of women: the case of foreign migrant wives
Migrant wives come from neighboring less developed countries
Common anecdotes about in-law issues and maltreatments but they were expected to
endure such treatments because of the filial piety runaway migrant wives!
Migrant brides who married native Taiwanese, Japanese, and Korea men have lower fertility than their native counterparts (Yang et al. 2012; Yamauchi 2010; Korekawa
2017; Kim 2018)
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1976
Ages 40+ Marital Fertility Rates, Taiwan
Native Migrant
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
1967-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1995
Ages <40 Marital Fertility Rates, Taiwan
Native Migrantbirth cohort
Data source: stacked 1979-2016 WMFE surveys, married women (N=449,322)
Why lower fertility among migrants than native women?
The fertility of migrant women is generally higher than native women in many developed society, but not in East Asia. WHY?
Prejudice and discrimination exacerbate women’s subordinate role in lower-SES marital families
Maltreatments in martial families and complaints about being viewed as “childbearing machine” abound
Lower fertility among migrants persist even when spousal age gap is controlled for
The Paradox: Why do migrant women who often did not have a high school degree and have limited career prospect have lower fertility than native women in East Asia?
Confucian Culture and Patriarchy
A stalled gender revolution under
the Confucian doctrines?
Are there changes in attitudes and values?
54,32
59,32
49,09
24,6428,08
20,85
15
25
35
45
55
65
Total Men Women
Newlyweds should live at the man’s family
1995
2015
(percentage of people choosing this option)%
27,9424,41
31,63
49,9246,03
54,21
15
25
35
45
55
65
Total Men Women
Newlywed should have their own residence
1995
2015
(percentage of people choosing this option)%
Data source: Taiwan Social Change Survey
A stalled gender revolution under
the Confucian doctrines?
2,16 2,122,20
3,573,49
3,65
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
Total Men Women
It is fine to have a quarrel with the mother-in-law when there is disagreements
1985
2015
(1 very wrong- 5 not wrong at all )
Mean score
2,48 2,46 2,50
4,20 4,07
4,34
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
Total Men Women
It is fine to get a divorce when couples have compatibility problems
1985
2015
(1 very wrong- 5 not wrong at all )
Mean score
Are there changes in attitudes and values?
Data source: Taiwan Social Change Survey
A stalled gender revolution under
the Confucian doctrines?
Son preferences worsen under the “fertility squeeze" caused by ultra-low fertility?
Data source: Taiwan Social Change Survey
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
Women Men Total
To Continue the family lineage, one ought to have at least a son
TSCS_1994 TSCS_2011 TSCS_2016
(1 not important— 6 absolutely important)
Son preference slows down
progress in gender equality
and fertility would likely
remain very low
The Future of Marriage (and Fertility)?
Why do fewer people marry (and have children) in East Asia?
The common cited reason of “haven’t met a suitable partner” among singles
What factors interfere with compatibility of single men and women?
Persistent hypergamy norm and resistant male pride?
The unexplained “mate-searching” and “couple dynamics” in low-fertility
East Asian contexts need more qualitative research
Virilocal marriage practice, son preference, and persisting gender
discrimination at workplaces could have prompted women to invest more
time at work that is at odds with forming unions and childbearing
Lack of ideal marriage role-models in parental generations
The Future of Marriage (and Fertility)?
Proportion never in union at age 45-49, 2010-2050 holding contemporary forces of
attraction by age-only (solid line) and by age and education (dashed line)
Data source: Albert Esteve, Joan Garcia Roman, Ridhi Kashyap, Fukuda Setsuya, Yen-hsin Alice Cheng, Wanli Nie, and Hyun Ok Lee, 2017, “The Implications of Demographic Change for Asian Marriage Markets, 2000–2050”, paper presented at 2017 AnnualMeeting of the Population Association of America, Chicago, IL: Population Association of America, 2017-04-27 ~ 2017-04-29
The Future of Marriage (and Fertility)?
Fertility will likely stay low if (1) NMB remains rare, aand (2) society-at-large is slow in making traditional family practices adaptive to women’s new roles
Unlike in Europe, “replacement migration” is rarely considered as a policy option What else can be done?
In addition to pro-natalist policies, what governments should do to improve the welfare of individuals in ultra-low feritlity societies?
Social infrastructure needed for rising share of lone-person households?
Potential social consequences of excessive unmarried low-SES bachlors?
The implications of thinning kinship?
If the best-educated women have higher risk of childlessness, does it mean that there will be an evolutionary selection of genes from mothers with lower education?
* Special thanks goes to Mr. Chen-Hao Hsu for excellent research assistance! *
Thank you for your attention!
top related