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The US Navy’s Submarine Safety Standards
Presentation to International and Domestic Standards Conference
May 8, 2015
Roger W. Schaffer, P.E.
Deputy Director, Submarine Safety and Quality Assurance
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The US Navy’s Submarine Safety Standards
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Standards
While e ngaged in a deep test dive a pproximately 200 mi les o ff the northeast coast of the United S tates,
USS THRESHER was lost at sea with all aboard 112 Officers and Enlisted; 17 civilians
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Standards
Inception of the SUBSAFE and DSS Programs
Loss of THRESHER
SUBSAFE DSS Program Program
June 1963 February 1964
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Standards
The purpose of the SUBSAFE Program is to provide “maximum reasonable assurance” of:
Hull integrity to preclude flooding Operability and integrity of critical systems and components to
control and recover from a flooding casualty
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Standards
The purpose of the Deep Submergence Systems Program is to provide “maximum reasonable assurance” that a material or procedural failure that imperils the o perators or occupants will not occur. Focused on operability and integrity of critical systems and
components and the associated maintenance and operational procedures required to prevent injury to personnel
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Standards
Fly-By-Wire Ship Control System (FBW SCS) Certification Program
With the advent of “Fly-By-Wire” ship control designs in submarines, NAVSEA recognized the need for a certification program for this “new” t echnology.
FBW SCS Requirements Manual was promulgated in 2004.
Similar to SUBSAFE, the F BW SCS Program objective is to provide “maximum reasonable assurance” that the F BW SCS will not cause a casualty or prevent ship recovery from a flooding or control surface jam casualty
Focused on Submarine Flight Critical Components (SFCCs) Electronic Hardware and Software that process safety critical functions and data elements
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High Reliability Organizations
Performance: Manage complex, demanding technologies so as to
avoid major failures
Perform exacting tasks under considerable time pressure
Perform work with no catastrophic failures over long periods of time
Their success can be attributed to their culture: Collective preoccupation with the possibility of failure
Robust p rocesses
Passion about excellence in e xecution
Well trained workforce
Compliance V erification
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High Reliability Organizations
A Strong Culture Combats: Inadequate process definition
Inadequate process control and change control
Failure to follow procedures
Failure to stop work when unusual conditions encountered
Inattention to detail
Lack of discipline
Lack of technical oversight
Lack of management involvement
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Responsibility A duty, obligation, or burden
Accountability The state of being answerable
for one’s a ctions ( implies consequences)
Integrity Rigid adherence to a code of
behavior
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Foundational Elements
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture The Fundamentals
Work Discipline Knowledge of and Compliance W ith Requirements
Material Control Correct Material Installed Correctly
Documentation Design Products (Specs, Drawings, Maintenance
Standards, etc.) Objective Quality Evidence (OQE)
Compliance Verification Inspections, Surveillance, Technical Reviews, Audits
Separation of Powers Continual Training
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Multi-faceted approach Ship/System Certification Audits Facility Functional Audits
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Compliance Verification
Multi-layered approach Contractor/Shipyard/Activity responsibilities Inspections, Surveillances, Document Reviews, Audits
Local government oversight authority responsibilities Inspections, Surveillances, Document Reviews, Audits
Headquarters responsibilities Document Reviews, Audits
NAVSEA Headquarters
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Compliance Verification
Certification Audits:
Ship/System Specific A critical element for
certification for sea trials and unrestricted operations
Functional Audits:
Facility specific re view Policies Procedures Practices
Verifies organizational compliance w ith SUBSAFE/DSS Program requirements
USS TUCSON
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
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Controlling Work Aboard US Navy Submarines and Deep Submergence Systems
Only Qualified and Authorized Firms work on submarines and DSS systems
In 1996 heavy workloads created a capacity shortage among submarine yards
NAVSEA established instructions to qualify a firm to do submarine work
Focus of controls is on repair and maintenance work performed onboard the submarine, rather than components worked at suppliers facilities
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Compliance Verification
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Compliance Verification
Controlling Work Aboard US Navy Submarines and Deep Submergence Systems
Suppliers of new material and Original Equipment Manufacturers are exempt
Procurement process for these organizations ensures compliance
Navy wide notice is issued annually listing authorized firms and yards
A functional audit of each authorized activity is conducted every two years
Firm remains on the list provided the audit results are satisfactory
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Compliance Verification Internal Audits
Prior to any NAVSEA Functional or Certification Audit, each activity conducts an internal audit to self identify and correct any problems
Allows them to gage their own knowledge, awareness, and compliance against future NAVSEA results
Self Assessments
Each activity prepares a self assessment annually to report how the activity grades itself on compliance w ith the program requirements.
Includes metrics de rived from internal and external audit results, problem reports and root cause analyses, and submarine test report deficiencies
Trouble Reporting
Each activity is required to report significant problems to alert the community so that they can establish preventive actions before those problems might occur elsewhere
Underlying document is called a “critique” and includes a full analysis of the causes and corrective/preventive actions taken to resolve them.
Pr
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Compliance Verification
Why does the submarine Navy invest s o much in compliance verification?
Because the consequences of failure are unacceptable.
Because the pressures of cost and schedule are great.
Because an honest mistake can kill you just as dead as malpractice.
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Separation of Powers
Platform Program Manager
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY
Independent Independent Technical Safety & QA Authority Authority
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SUBSAFE, DSS, & FBW Awareness Training is required for all personnel, from entry level workers to 3-star Admiral
Annual Requirement
Must achieve passing score on associ ated exam
Training provides: Overview of the program and importance of program fundamentals Reinforcement of compliance with requirements Emphasis o n proactively correcting and preventing problems Recent lessons learned and a reminder of consequences of
complacency
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Continual Training
Present
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Continual Training
THRESHER Anniversary 2008 – Gene Kranz NASA Flight Director for Apollo Missions
“Failure Is Not An Option” – Apollo 13
2009 – VADM Bruce Demars (Ret) Former Director of N aval Nuclear Propulsion
Spoke about importance of oversight and acceptance of r esponsibility
2010 – CDR John Dyer (Ret) Lead Engineer for NAVSEA Submarine Type Desk
SUBSAFE support contract
Spoke about the beginnings and formulations of the SUBSAFE program in the 1960’s
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Continual Training
THRESHER Anniversary
2011 – Lori Arsenault Daughter of a USS THRESHER crewmember
Gave a personal perspective on the tragedy
2012 – CAPT Joseph F. Yurso (Ret) Former Commanding Officer of SOSG and
PNS
Spoke about being a Shipyard Watch O fficer when message came in that the USS THRESHER was lost
Discussed change in “quality control” after the tragedy and the importance of oversight
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Continual Training
50th USS THRESHER Anniversary Commemoration 10 April 2013
The Honorable Donald C. Winter, Tolling of the Bells ceremony 74th Secretary o f the Navy and reading of the names of those
lost on USS THRESHER Lessons (Sometimes) Learned and Often Forgotten
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RAYBACK Anniversary 2009 - CDR David Kelly Served aboard USS GRAYBACK
Provided retrospective on D iving Accident
2010 - CW04 Patrick Broderick (Ret) Former U nderwater D emolition Team member
who conducted Swimmer Delivery Ve hicle operations from USS GRAYBACK
Gave the perspective as a teammate of the men lost onboard
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Continual Training
G
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GRAYBACK Anniversary
2011 - CAPT Keenan U.S. Navy’s Director of Ocean Engineering,
Supervisor of Salvage and Diving
Spoke about the chain of events before and after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
2012 - Bryan Hughitt Manager of Quality Assurance at NASA’s
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
Spoke about engineering failures w ith the Big Dig and Turkish Airlines Flight 981
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Continual Training
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Continual Training
NAVSEA’s Senior Manager’s Workshop
NAVSEA’s School Of The Boat
MIT’s Submarine Concept Design Course
Audit Outbriefs include Senior Level Representatives
Training materials available to Field Activities upon request
Open offer to Field Activities to provide trainings and briefs
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The U.S. Navy’s Safety Program has a very successful history; however we must be aware of the program’s greatest threats.
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
Ignorance
The state of not knowing Arrogance
The habit of behaving based on pride, self-importance, conceit, or the assumption of intellectual superiority and the presumption of knowledge that is not supported by facts
Complacency
Satisfaction with one’s accomplishments accompanied by a lack of awareness of actual dangers or deficiencies
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Declining B udgets
Workforce Changes
Fraud
Short Memories
Changing mindset of community without “Pinnacle Event”
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
Case 1: Pipe without all required testing was installed in critical submarine applications.
Summary: A military specification issued in 1987 contains requirements for pipe used in
military applications. The specification requires purchasing of commercial grade material in accordance with ASTM requirements with additional testing requirements. When the military specification was first issued, the ASTM requirements closely mirrored those of the military specification.
Over the years, the ASTM specification was revised, making some tests optional or eliminating some tests completely; however, the intent was for these tests still to be performed per the military specification.
Piping distributors interpreted that the removal of the requirements from the ASTM specification meant they did not have to perform the testing. They discontinued some testing and began performing optional testing in lieu of other required testing.
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
Summary (Continued): Navy receipt inspection personnel also misinterpreted the changes in the ASTM
specification and did not recognize that the tests specified by the military specification were still required.
Numerous shipments of material without all required testing were delivered to the Navy, accepted at receipt inspection, and installed in critical applications on submarines.
The Navy has had to determine the technical acceptability and process a departure from specifications for each instance where this pipe installed.
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Case 2: Nickel Copper Aluminum (NiCuAL) material low in aluminum content was installed in critical submarine applications.
Summary: NiCuAL is a strong, corrosion resistant alloy which derives most of its strength
from a precipitation hardening heat treatment, where the aluminum is the strengthening element. During the initial melting of the material, a certain amount of aluminum is burned off when the process is started.
To counteract this, a major supplier of NiCuAL was using a practice where a small amount of aluminum was added to the bottom of the consumable electrode.
At some point in time, the supplier determined that since the end of the ingot is cropped in order to square it up, the low aluminum product resulting from this process was getting removed. Rather than expending the cost to buy the aluminum and add it to the heating process only to have it removed later, the supplier determined that they would no longer add the aluminum to the heating process anymore.
U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
Summary (Continued): However, without the added aluminum in the heating process, more material
at the end of the ingot is low in aluminum and needs to be removed.
The operator that was performing the cropping was not retrained to crop a sufficient weight of material to remove the low aluminum product, and they continued to crop the material for dimensional purposes only. This resulted in a portion of the material being delivered that was low in aluminum.
The low aluminum condition was not identified because the sample of material taken for chemical testing was taken far enough from the cropped end such that the low aluminum portion was not getting tested.
The low aluminum condition was further masked as the original manufacturer performs solution annealing and precipitation hardening heat treatment using ideal times and temperatures which maximized the strengthening effects of the remaining aluminum. Subsequent heat treatments performed by product manufacturers, such as fastener manufacturers, used the minimum required/recommended heat treatment parameters, which resulted in the material not meeting the specification required tensile or yield strengths.
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
Summary (Continued): The Navy conducted numerous hardness tests and statistical studies to provide
maximum reasonable assurance that all of the suspect low aluminum heats of material were not installed in critical applications. The Navy continues to monitor all incoming critical material for the suspect heats.
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
Case 3: A distributor of material installed in critical submarine ications falsified material records.
mmary: n the process of determining the acceptability of a part to be installed, a pecific material record was requested from both from the material distributor, ristol Alloys, and the original mill.
When the records were received, it was noticed that the records did not match.
ubsequent investigation found wide spread falsification of records where ristol Alloys modified existing objective quality evidence to show different zes or lengths to cover later purchase orders.
his investigation resulted in the debarment of the company and its principles s well as jail time for the owner.
he Navy submarine shipbuilder performed physical inspection of previously rovided material and found numerous material substitutions. Material was ther replaced or accepted as-is based on extensive engineering evaluations of
he substitutions.
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture Challenges
Recent l essons l earned:
Humans are still in the loop ( both Design and Operations) Hazard Analysis Computer Behavior drives Human
Response
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture A Final Thought
"Good ideas are not adopted automatically. They must be driven into practice with courageous patience.”
“Once implemented they can be easily overturned or subverted through apathy or lack of followup…a continuous effort is required.”
- Hyman G. Rickover
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture
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U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Culture
QUESTIONS ?
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