reasoning about concrete security in protocol proofs

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Reasoning about Concrete Security in Protocol Proofs

A. Datta, J.Y. Halpern, J.C. Mitchell, R. Pucella, A. Roy

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Motivation We want to answer questions like:

Given a cryptographic protocol and a security property How frequently should we refresh the keys? How does any advance in breaking the specific cryptographic

primitives used quantitatively affect security?

We base the analysis on the known security properties of the crypto primitives used A protocol may use a number of different crypto primitives

How do we translate the quantitative guarantees? How do we handle composition?

Precursor: Computational PCL [DDMST05,DDMW06,RDDM07,RDM07]

Used to reason about asymptotic security

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Security of signatures

AdversaryChallenger

kmi

sigk (mi)

m’, sigk (m’) : m’ mi

Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack

Advantage(Adversary,) = Prob[Adversary succeeds for sec. param. ]

A signature scheme is CMA secure if Prob-Polytime A.

Advantage (A, ) is a negligible function of

Cryptographic Security Complexity

Theoretic Concrete

vk

vk : public verification keyk : private signing key

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Security of signatures

AdversaryChallenger

kmi

sigk (mi)

m’, sigk (m’) : m’ mi

Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack

Advantage(Adversary,) = Prob[Adversary succeeds for sec. param. ]

A signature scheme is (t, q, e) - CMA secure if t time bounded A making at most q sig queries.

Advantage (A, ) is less than e

Cryptographic Security Complexity

Theoretic Concrete

vk

vk : public verification keyk : private signing key

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A Challenge-Response Protocol

A B

m, A

n, sigB {m, n, A}

sigA {m, n, B}

Alice reasons: if Bob is honest, then: only Bob can generate his signature if Bob generates a signature of the form sigB{m, n, A},

he sends it as part of msg2 of the protocol, and he must have received msg1 from Alice

Alice deduces: Received (B, msg1) Λ Sent (B, msg2)

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Computational PCL

Proof system for direct reasoning Verify (X, sigY(m), Y) Honest (Y) Sign (Y, m) No explicit use of probabilities and computational complexity No explicit arguments about actions of attackers

Semantics capture idea that properties hold with high probability against PPT attackers Explicit use of probabilities and computational complexity Probabilistic polynomial time attackers Soundness proofs one time

Soundness implies result equivalent to security proof by cryptographic reductions

Formal Proofs Syntax, Semantics,

Proof System

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Axiomatizing Security of signatures

AdversaryChallenger

kmi

sigk (mi)

m’, sigk (m’) : m’ mi

Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack

vk

vk : public verification keyk : private signing key

Formal Proofs Syntax, Semantics,

Proof System

Computational PCL: Verify (X, sigY(m), Y) Honest (Y) Sign (Y, m)

Quantitative PCL: T esig(t,q,) (Verify (X, sigY(m), Y) Honest (Y) Sign (Y, m))

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Axioms and Proof Rules

where, = esig(t,q,)

where, ’ = l()(l()+1)/2

where, Bi are basic steps of the protocol

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X Y

m, X

n, sigY {m, n, X}

sigX {m, n, Y}

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Previous CPCL Results Core logic [ICALP05]

Key exchange [CSFW06] New security definition: key usability Used by Blanchet et al in CryptoVerif Kerberos proof

Reasoning about computational secrecy [ESORICS07] Application to Kerberos

Reasoning about Diffie-Hellman [TGC07] Applications to IKEv2 (standard model) and DH Kerberos

(random oracle model)

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Logic and Cryptography: Big Picture

Complexity-theoretic crypto definitions (e.g., IND-CCA2 secure

encryption)

Crypto constructions satisfying definitions (e.g., Cramer-Shoup

encryption scheme)

Axiom in proof system

Protocol security proofs using proof system

Semantics and soundness theorem

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Thanks !

Questions?

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Example Property

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PCL: Big Picture

Symbolic Model•PCL Semantics (Meaning of formulas)

Unbounded # concurrent sessions

PCL •Syntax (Properties)•Proof System (Proofs)

Soundness Theorem

(Induction)

High-level proof principles

Cryptographic Model•PCL Semantics (Meaning of formulas)

Polynomial # concurrent sessions

Computational PCL •Syntax ± •Proof System±

Soundness Theorem

(Reduction)

[BPW, MW,…]

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Fundamental Question

PCL CPCL

Axioms and rules for reasoning about cryptographic protocols (Soundness)

Axioms and rules for reasoning about cryptographic protocols (Computational soundness)

First-order logic (Soundness and completeness) ???

Conditional first-order logic (Soundness and completeness) [?]

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Towards QPCL

PCL QPCL

Axioms and rules for reasoning about cryptographic protocols (Soundness)

Axioms and rules for quantitative reasoning about cryptographic protocols (Computational soundness)

First-order logic (Soundness and completeness)

Conditional first-order logic (Soundness and completeness)

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Protocol language

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Conditional implication (OLD)

Implication uses conditional probability

[[1 2]] (T,D,) = [[1]] (T,D,)

[[2]] (T’,D,)

where T’ = [[1]] (T,D,)