military history group u3a dorking newsletter number 5
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Military History Group
U3A Dorking
Newsletter Number 5
Ready for Anything!
Contact email: mhgu3adorking@gmail.com
Phone Barrie Friend 07796 633516
Contributions for the newsletter to Robert Bartlett 938at938gmail.com
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Contents
From Group Leader Barrie Friend. Page 2
Programme 2021 Page 4
Zoom Presentations Page 4
Fascinating Tales from Balloons, Barnstormers and the Royal Flying Corps Page 5
The 1914 Christmas Truce in the Trenches Page 11
The Battles of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift: Part 1 Isandlwana Page 18
Book Reviews Page 28
From Group Leader Barrie Friend
Fellow enthusiasts: Welcome to the December edition of the Military History Group’s
Newsletter which comes with safe seasonal greetings
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Some Reflections
Farewell 2020
2020 has seen many changes in our personal lives, in the relationship we each have with the
U3A and also with our U3A special interest groups. We all have adapted to the circumstances
knowing that not to do so would be folly.
The cry ‘don’t let the group wither on the vine’ was heard loudly within the Military History
Group (MHG) in very early Spring, and we responded by maintaining relationships through
Zoom meetings supported by the introduction of this Newsletter. Thank you, Bob Bartlett, for
the initiative. From a MHG core of 15 members at that time we had enough who took the
plunge and gave Zoom talks with George Blundell-Pound and Jim Barnes flying to the fore.
By welcoming the total membership of Dorking U3A to these talks’ attendance has steadily
increased and the November meeting recorded 55 attendees. Thank you for your support. The
talks are available on Dorking U3A YouTube site. It’s most heartening to note that the core
MHG membership has increased significantly.
By distributing The Newsletter to the Dorking membership, we connect with more members
and it means that those members who don’t view Zoom can read a summary of the talk given
the previous month. Military related articles and book reviews add to readers’ interests and the
Newsletter provides an opportunity for anyone to make their own contribution. This latter
aspect is yet to be fully realised but as there are many very capable members, I know that this
will emerge.
John Sinclair has been a major support to the MHG on our Zoom learning curve and has been
proactive in emailing the talk invitations. Thank you.
Welcome 2021
The introduction of the Covid vaccine means that we can start to look forward with optimism
to the next phase of the group’s evolution. We will continue with Zoom presentations with
invitations to all the Dorking membership. We have our first Zoom guest speaker in January:
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Mike Smith from the U3A Bookham MHG will talk at 1030 on Tuesday 5th January about the
Battle of Gallipoli 1915/1916 and 6 Victoria Crosses awarded before breakfast. Cracking stuff!
You are invited to a Zoom meeting on January 5:
https://zoom.us/j/95576285916?pwd=dHZHR1pnWDdnVWtIYTFMazk0OUVZZz09
Meeting ID: 955 7628 5916 Passcode: 318495
The Newsletter will also be widely distributed.
At some stage the Zoom meetings will finish and we will recommence our face to face meetings
using The Pavilion in Brockham. Hilda Burden’s MHG garden meeting in September
demonstrated how much we needed to talk face to face. A significant number our MHG
members are in the wings waiting to enthral us with face to face talks and speakers from other
U3A MHGs will be invited. Dorking U3A membership will continue to be welcomed to these
meetings and the Newsletter will still play a significant role in our relationship within the MHG
and with the overall membership. With the group growing in size and with the help of Dorking
U3A resources we can consider a Covid safe summer visit to a local military site supported by
a previous illustrated talk.
No time for Churchillian epithets - simply to say that with your support the future looks bright.
Programme for 2021 Meetings via Zoom during Pandemic
January 5: Battle of Gallipoli 1915/1916: Mike Smith
February 2: 1914 Battle for the Falklands: George Blundell-Pound
March 3: Defending Britain from Invasion by the French and by the Germans: Barrie Friend
April 6: Jim Barnes – title to be announced
May 4
June 8
July 6
August 3
September 7
Zoom Presentations
https://www.danhillmilitaryhistorian.com/archive
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Fascinating Tales from Balloons, Barnstormers and the
Royal Flying Corps
Jim Barnes: The link to Jim’s talk on You Tube: https://youtu.be/CSKAkUONzV8
Whilst we know what a balloon is and have heard of the Royal Flying Corps, the word
Barnstormer may be new. A Barnstormer is a pilot who flies in a flying circus or shows off
with his aerobatics. When I researched the story of the RFC I found various authors had the
same idea of chronicling every flight. The story becomes boring and tedious to read so, with
a cruise ship presentation in mind, I decided to create a story of the birth of flight and air
warfare. By the end if the war in 1918 the RAF had 125 different types of aircraft so the story
cannot be about that! So, my presentation has picked out the interesting stories of British,
German and even French exploits in the air.
In 1777 the Mongolfier brothers developed the hot air balloon when Joseph saw the laundry by
the fire billow and lift. He thought perhaps impregnable Gibraltar could be attacked from the
air. Jean Coutelle took the idea further and formed La Compagnie d’Aéronautiers in 1794 and
aimed to help Napoleon in the Egyptian war of 1798 but the ship carrying his equipment caught
fire. However, it was in the American civil war that the balloon came into its own with artillery
spotters giving corrections to the Unionists who could not see the enemy.
In the late 1800s several balloon units were formed in England at Woolwich, Aldershot and
Chatham. But what about heavier than air machines? Sir George Cayley is credited with
discovering weight, lift, drag and thrust building a glider which was like a flying parachute. By
July 1909 Blériot had flown the channel winning £10,000, the Wright brothers had established
themselves with the American military but the British Army were sceptical about the use of an
aircraft. Sam Cody, an American Barnstormer offered to develop the first British aircraft and
although the Army stopped funding him he continued to experiment and take up passengers for
ten shillings and sixpence. Sadly he was killed in 1913 when his aircraft broke up in the air
with passenger W Evans – the opening bat for Kent - who then lost the match! A fine statue of
Sam Cody stands outside the Farnborough museum.
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The first British pilots’ licence was gained by Brabazon and he never let people forget it with
his car registration “FLY 1”. Pilots paid for own lessons which cost £75 and were reimbursed
by the Government if they were successful. Nobody over 40 was allowed to train to be a pilot.
In 1912 Geoffrey De Havilland (of Comet fame) set up his own factory to build the Blériot
aircraft BE1. In April 1917 the superior German aircraft – the Fokker Eindecker – out classed
the RFC’s BE aircraft. It became known as “bloody April”.
Eindecker
In 1911 Prime Minister Herbert Asquith pushed for a committee to be formed to consider a
flying corps of Army and Navy sections. The Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air
Service. On 12th April 1912 the RFC and RNAS was formed under General David Henderson
the Director of Military Training. Aircraft were not fitted with parachutes and this was
considered a lack of moral fibre and only balloon observers were permitted to have a parachute.
France had the largest Army and provided nearly all the aircraft engines – notably the Gnome
radial engine. In August 1914 2, 3 and 4 squadrons were deployed with 16 other aircraft to
France and after three weeks an Avro 504 crashed in German territory advertising that the
British had an air force. The British Expeditionary Force under General French were saved by
a French reconnaissance aircraft which spotted the advancing German army.
Germany was keener on airships but did have the Rumpler Traube which almost resembled a
kite and was given all tasks.
Aircraft were of two basic types ‘Pushers’ with the propeller behind the crew giving an
uninterrupted arc of fire and ‘Pullers’ with the prop on the front with restricted arcs of fire.
Vickers made the Gun bus which was a pusher.
Vickers Gun Bus
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The first VC in the RFC was given to William Rhodes-Moorehouse who attacked a railway
line. At Courtrai. On his return he was mortally wounded but flew 35 miles to report his action
before his death. But the first fighter pilot to gain the VC was Lt Insall.
He was patrolling in a Vickers Fighting Machine, with First Class Air Mechanic T. H. Donald
as gunner, when a German machine was sighted, pursued, and attacked near Achiet.
The German pilot led the Vickers machine over a rocket battery, but with great skill Lieutenant
Insall dived and got to close range, when Donald fired a drum of cartridges into the German
machine, stopping its engine. The German pilot then dived through a cloud, followed by
Lieutenant Insall Fire was again opened, and the German machine was brought down heavily
in a ploughed field 4 miles south-east of Arras.
Germans on the ground then commenced heavy fire, but in spite of this, Lieutenant Insall turned
again, and an incendiary bomb was dropped on the German machine, which was last seen
wreathed in smoke. Lieutenant Insall then headed west in order to get back over the German
trenches, but as he was at only 2,000 feet altitude he dived across them for greater speed,
Donald firing into the trenches as he passed over.
It was clear that aircraft needed guns and the mechanics and pilots fitted their aircraft
themselves with either the Lewis light machine gun or the heavier Vickers machine gun. There
was a high death rate. Life expectancy of pilots was 17 days.
So what about tactics? One of the early tacticians was Lanoe Hawker who had a moto “attack
everything”. He taught his pilots how to attack and survive and even how to get out of a spin.
During the second battle of Ypres Hawker was wounded in the foot but insisted on being carried
to his aircraft. He gained the VC for shooting down three aircraft in the same mission.
He met his death aged 25 when shot down by von Richthofen. Such was his
respect for him that von Richthofen put Hawker’s Lewis gun above his office
door.
Lanoe Hawker
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So what is an ‘Ace’? – 5 kills made you an Ace and von Richthofen had 80 kills.
The great tactician, who taught von Richthofen, was Oswald Boelke . Bolke wrote
the first tactics manual called Dicta Boelcke.
Oswald Boelke Max Immelmann
An equally successful German pilot was Max Immelmann who had 16 kills and
was called the Eagle of Lille. Immelmann developed the Immelmann turn which
is still taught today. It was Lt McGubbin on 18th June 1916 who shot down
Immelmann. Germany would not admit one of its great aces had been shot down
and blamed ground fire.
After a year of war a new commander of the RFC was appointed – Brigadier
Trenchard whose ideals were ‘support the ground’ ‘Know the importance of
morale’ and ‘Offensive Action’. He was the only pilot over 40 years old.
Meanwhile the French came up with the idea of a metal propeller which could
deflect shells enabling the pilot to shoot straight ahead. The aircraft was the
Morane Saulnier and Sub Lt Warneford gained the VC by knocking down a
German airship.
Morane Saulnier
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The Navy wanted aircraft on ships but Handley Page offered the first heavy
bomber to be used against ships. The Americans made 1,500 but the bombing
accuracy was so poor it soon became obvious small aircraft should be on ships.
Albert Ball enlisted in the Army in 1914 but soon transferred to the RFC. In 1916
British ace Albert Ball from Nottingham became a hero by shooting down 44
German aircraft. He was flown back to the UK to visit towns and cities lifting
public morale becoming a symbol of hope. At the age of 20 he was shot down
and lost his life. He was awarded a posthumous VC because of his 44 victories.
The most famous ace of the war was Manfred von Richthofen who served in the
trenches before becoming a pilot. He came up with an idea of selecting the best
pilots and forming teams of 11 to fly together – called Jasta Eleven. So successful
was the idea it produced bloody April 1917 when the RFC lost 80 aircraft despite
having more aircraft in the air than Germany. On 21st April in 1918 von
Richthofen was shot down by Canadiuan Lt Brown RNAS. He was buried with
full military honours at Bertangles France by the Australian Flying Corps. RFC
pilots attended.
Captain Albert Ball VC
In 1918 there were some potent aircraft. The Sopwith Camel – with the first
synchronized gun - which could out turn inside the German Albatross and the
SE5, fitted with a powerful Italian engine, which could fly high and dive with
great success.
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In England there was concern about air defence as the German Gotha bombers
had bombed Liverpool station killing 162 people. But it was Lt Leefe Robinson
who brought down a German airship witnessed by Londoners who sang the
National Anthem.
Lt Leefe Robinson VC
In 1918 Prime Minister David Lloyd George tasked General Smuts with looking
at merging the RFC and RNAS to form the RAF. Many arguments about funding
between the Navy and Army air wings were making air power rivals.
On 1st April 1918 the RAF was formed with paperwork signed by Trenchard in
his office at Farnborough.
Finally, in August 1918 the Germans faced 465 tanks and 1400 aircraft from
Britain, France and the USA. Some 3000 missions were flown. By September
the allies were unstoppable and by November the Armistice was signed. Such had
been the development of air power from the early days of the RFC and RNAS
with 143 Officers and 63 French aircraft, to 27,000 Officers and 22,000 aircraft,
that warfare would never be the same again.
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Myth or Mistletoe?
The 1914 Christmas Truce in the trenches
Barrie Friend
Christmas carols sung between enemies, gifts exchanged, and a grand football match in no
man’s land – it seems that the 1914 Christmas Truce has become almost as well known as the
First World War itself. Various books and articles, a 2005 film (‘Joyeux Noel’) and the 2014
Sainsbury’s Christmas advert have helped to popularise this event.
But what exactly was the 1914 Christmas Truce? Did it happen? Why and where? How did it
start? And who won the grand football match?
A mountain of written correspondence, some with photos, from both sides exist of experiences
along the Western Front demonstrate that the 1914 Christmas Truce occurred. These meetings,
and exchanges of gifts (such as Maconochie’s tinned stew for German cigars, sausages or
sauerkraut), occurred at various points up and down the line and were part of a larger covert
phenomenon known as ‘live and let live’ and not a one-off event.
The BBC/PBS series ‘The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century’ reports: “On
Christmas Eve, 1914… all across the German lines, lights began to appear … sounds of singing
drifted across no man’s land.” The British heard “Stille nacht! Heilige Nacht” and responded
with their own carols. On Christmas Day, men began emerging from their trenches and met
between the lines. One of those who emerged early on was Captain Charles Stockwell who
recalled “I ran out into the trench and heard the Saxons shouting, ‘Don’t shoot! We don’t want
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to fight today. We will send you some beer’.” Stockwell met his German opposite number in
no man’s land “We met, and formerly saluted. He introduced himself as Count something-or-
other and seemed a very decent fellow.”
As Malcolm Brown and Shirley Seaton explain in ‘Christmas Truce’, the ceasefire took place
over more than two-thirds of the British section of the 440-mile Western Front offering a
chance for men on both sides to bury the dead and to take a break from the hostilities.
In ‘Silent Night’, Stanley Weintraub explains that as the spontaneous truce gradually unfolded
many of the greetings between participants were polite, even a bit formal.
Weintraub talks of a Saxon smoking a pipe in no-man’s-land that one British officer took to be
an official gift from German 5 Army commander Crown Prince Wilhelm.
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But what of the grand football game, and of the way it is portrayed in the 2014 Sainsbury’s
advert?
Weintraub mentions unit histories for those in Flanders that refer to football matches between
British units within British lines, and some with the Germans in no man’s land. Although these
games couldn’t have been too elaborate given the difficult terrain, moving aside the dead did
provide some space, at one point is seems amongst turnip and cabbage fields.
Footballs were not in plentiful supply and one unit had to shove straw into a cap-comforter to
create a makeshift one – something the Saxons opposite apparently found amusing.
G Farmer of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles reported that they couldn’t convince the Germans
to participate in a football game – perhaps because their officers had forbidden it, or because
the ground was not really suitable, given the rough terrain and freezing conditions. But a scratch
match was reported “On 1 January, 1915, The Times published a letter from a major in the
Medical Corps reporting that in his sector, after the Saxons sung ‘God Save the King’ to ‘our
people’, one of his men ‘was given a bottle of wine to drink the King’s health’, following which
his regiment ‘actually had a football match with the Saxons, who beat them 3-2!’ ” This is
backed up by the war diaries of the 133 Saxon Regiment unit. Hugo Klemm, of the unit,
remembered “Everywhere you looked, the occupants of the trenches stood about talking to
each other and even playing football.”
This match was denied in the official history of the British brigade. Covered up perhaps for
political reasons (fraternising with the enemy) the history noted, “it would have been most
unwise to allow the Germans to know how weakly the British trenches were held”. For
Oberstleutnant Niemann, football wasn’t the most memorable aspect of the truce: “At our
soccer match we discovered that the Scots wore no underpants … (as) their behinds became
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clearly visible any time their skirts moved in the wind.” Yet, the whole affair was not the grand
get-together of the Sainsbury’s advert.
Another account, from Sergeant Bob Lovell of 3 London Rifles, said that he could “scarcely
credit what (he had) seen and done”, and that even if his side did lose, it was “indeed … a
wonderful day”. Although Weintraub notes that actual footballs were rare at this time, there
are some reports of them being used. One came from Kurt Zehmisch of 134 Saxons:
“Eventually the English brought a soccer ball from their trenches, and pretty soon a lively game
ensued.”
The kind of truces, the level of friendliness between participants, or even that truces occurred
at all, was a mixed picture up and down line. Sergeant Major Nadin of 6 Cheshire Regiment
described one match as “a rare old jollification” whilst Captain Thomas Frost of 1 Cheshires
wrote home about a football match and visits to the German lines in which plum puddings were
swapped for sausages when simultaneously “ … a desperate fight was going on about 800 yards
to our left between the French and the Germans.” Some encounters fell somewhere between
these two extremes.
Private Mullard said in his letter home that men of his unit, the Rifle Brigade, had agreed to
play a game of football with the Germans on Christmas Day and got a ball ready. But the match
was blocked by their commanding officer, and so the British played amongst themselves. In
this case Weintraub says the Germans still managed to join the British for tea and cocoa and
some singing, until they were ordered back to their line when night fell. Then, Mullard recalled
“Just after midnight you could hear, away on the right, the plonk-plonk of the bullets as they
hit the ground, and we knew the war had started again.”
Naturally, there were also those on both sides who wanted to shut the truces down. Lancashire
Fusiliers Lieutenant C Richards was ordered to fill in shell holes by his commander at battalion
HQ, that way a football pitch could be established. But he refused. And Obersleutnant
Riebensahm, of 2 Westphalians, said in his diary that he thought “The whole business is
becoming ridiculous and must come to an end. I arranged with the 55th Regiment that the truce
will end this evening.”
Phillip Maddison, who had seen behind the German lines, summed things up thus: “Both sides
were misled by half-truths. Each side was more inefficient than the other assumed. Beneath the
artificial hatred each respected the other. Victory, if it came at all, would be long delayed,
costly and worthless. Perhaps a football match, after which both sides went home, might be a
better solution.”
Although Weintraub, and Brown and Seaton, questions the credibility of some accounts, they
acknowledge credible sounding accounts of at least one match with a proper football, such as
that given by Ernie Williams of 6 Cheshire’s in a TV interview in 1983. “The ball appeared
from somewhere, I don’t know where, but it came from their side … They made up some goals
and … it was just a general kickabout. I should think there were a couple of hundred taking
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part … Everybody seemed to be enjoying themselves. There was no ill-will between us …
There was no referee, and no score, no tally at all. It was a simple melee … “
Overlooking no man’s land where the two sides met on Christmas Day
With or without football, it’s now been well established that the truce itself came out of a larger
phenomenon known as ‘live and let live’. University of Aberdeen historian Thomas Weber has
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uncovered much evidence that festive truces continued after 1914. One eye-witness account of
a later truce is of Ronald MacKinnon, a Canadian soldier at Vimy Ridge during Christmas 1916
“I had quite a good Xmas considering I was in the front line… We had a truce on Xmas Day
and our German friends were quite friendly. They came over to see us and we traded bully beef
for cigars”.
Covert peace-making during the First World War is described in ‘Trench Warfare 1914-1918
The Live and Let Live System’ by Tony Ashworth. Evidence from 98 per cent of the British
divisions on the Western Front has shown that frontline soldiers “hated the sight of staff
officers”, held generals in contempt, and how the truce system developed despite the High
Command’s edicts that they should not.
“It is no secret that the resentment of trench fighters towards high command was expressed in
derisory and colourful language, but it is less well known that such resentment was also
translated into subtle, collective action, which thwarted the high command trench war
strategy”. “Live and let live was a truce where enemies stopped fighting by agreement for a
period of time: the British let the Germans live provided the Germans let them live in return”.
The truces that developed were tacit and tit-for-tat in nature. As what he refers to as a
‘bureaucracy of violence’ meted out from the top became more elaborate, so too did the truce
systems as they evolved around official censure and measures to stop them.
At first, truces were more overt, for example the 1914 Christmas Truce, but this was the tip of
a much larger iceberg, and one that possibly emerged initially around tacit agreements not to
shell each other during mealtimes.
Ritualised violence was more elaborate. This might involve firing the exact same number of
shells at the exact same spot in the enemy line at the exact same time every day – thus enabling
the enemy to avoid it.
Of course, not all units participated in all of this, and there was a contest between those who
wanted to fight and those who didn’t. Approximately one-third of British units were aggressive
more or less all of the time, one third avoided aggressing the enemy whenever they could, and
the final third varied in their levels of aggression.
Although later it became harder to sustain this kind of open rebellion, “Live and let live was
endemic to trench warfare… one can know neither how men endured the war nor the nature of
the war experience, without also knowing how trench fighters controlled some conditions of
their existence”.
On Christmas Day 1914 there were 77 deaths of BEF servicemen in France and Belgium
(CWGC data). Did the truce slow the killing? Maybe - on the 23rd and 24th December
respectively 110 and 106 deaths occurred and the two following days (26th and 27th) the
numbers were 46 and 76. Was this decline chance, or a reflection of both sides’ desire to
achieve some form of peace on earth?
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The 1914 Christmas Truce was not a one off occurrence but part of the developing culture of
co-existence in trench warfare. Both sides willingly participated and as the war progressed the
live and let live system became more subtle but with fewer units participating.
Memorial in the town of Messines, Flanders.
A Christmas reading and viewing list:
Ashworth, Tony. ‘Trench Warfare 1914-1918. The Live and Let Live System’ (2004)
Brown, Malcolm and Seaton, Shirley. ‘Christmas Truce. The Western Front December 1914’
(2001)
Weber, Thomas. ‘Hitler’s First War’ (2010),
Weintraub, Stanley. ’Silent Night. The remarkable Christmas Truce of 1914’ (2002)
‘Joyeux Noel’ (2005)
‘The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century’ BBC/PBS series
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The Battles of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift
Part 1 Isandlwana
Robert Chase
Presentation to the Oxford and Cambridge Club Military History Group March 2017
These two battles are a textbook illustration of the enduring strengths and weaknesses of the
British Military. The defeat at Isandlwana on 22 January 1879 caused by the poor generalship
of the military establishment's General Frederic Thesinger, Lord Chelmsford contrasted with
the victory against the odds of 30 to 1, 4000 Zulus versus 130 British soldiers at Rorke’s Drift,
which attributable in the view of their superiors to two mediocre junior officers. However, they
sensibly had made full use of the local expertise and initiative of their subordinates. It was a
battle won by the guts and ingenuity of the rank and file and two junior officers earning them
11 VCs and 4 Distinguished Conduct Medals, whereas Isandlwana, where the odds were 2,200
British troops and African auxiliaries versus 24,000 Zulu warriors, only 14 to 1 was a battle
lost by senior officers, who declined to accept the advice of subordinates and local experts.
Lord Chelmsford
The Zulu Nation “People of the Clouds” began as a small sub-tribe numbering just 3000
occupying only 10 square miles, but which at its zenith encompassed Natal, Swaziland and
Mozambique, some11,500 square miles. Its founder Shaka “intestinal beetle” was the exiled
son of the troublesome Nandi the third wife of a minor Zulu sub chief. Shaka changed the
nature of warfare in Southern Africa, which up to then had been limited to a ritual display of
force with few casualties. This left a defeated tribe largely intact and capable of renewing
hostilities. Shaka initiated wars of annihilation; any survivors were either slaughtered or
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incorporated into Shaka's army. He replaced fighting at a distance with light throwing spears
for close combat using broad bladed short stabbing assegais.
Chelmsford
The Zulus' classic attack formation was “the horns of the charging bull, the mature married
men formed the chest for the frontal assault, while the younger warriors formed the flanking
parties the right and left horns and the senior warriors provided the reserve or loins, which were
positioned behind the chest. The warriors of the Chest would hold the enemy in place, while
the horns moved round to attack the flanks and rear, supported as necessary by the reserve.
They would discharge their firearms before the final charge, then throw them down and charge
in with their stabbing spears. In the Anglo Zulu War, which would ultimately be decided by
firepower, this would prove to be a fatal weakness. The 40,000 strong Zulu army was a part-
time body, which required a period of service for a few months a year for all the young men.
At the age of 18 or 19, they were called together to form an amabutho guild or regiment in
which they would serve with the rest of their age group for all their lives. The men were not
allowed to get married or to have full sex, until they had proved themselves as warriors. Once
the members of an amabutho had proved themselves in battle, the King would reward them by
giving permission to marry and wear their hair in a round topknot. The King would then provide
brides for the entire regiment.
Shaka granted Port Natal (Durban) with 3,500 miles of territory, which became Natal to the
English freebooter Henry Flynn, who nursed him back to health after an assassination attempt.
Meanwhile to escape British colonial rule after the British takeover of the Transvaal, the Dutch
vortrekkers in their search for new farming land started to move into Natal and Zululand. This
led to endless friction with the Zulus and the defeat of King Mpande's Zulu army by the Boers'
defensive laager of wagons at Blood River. Mpande's successor King Cetshwayo sought to
coexist with the British. However, the British Government feared that the troublesome Boers
would plot with foreign powers to secure independence from Britain. The British Governments
High Commissioners Bartle Frere and Shepstone therefore argued that despite 40 years of
peaceful coexistence with the Zulu Nation, the Zulu Kingdom should be conquered and
incorporated as part of a South African Confederation in order to promote political stability
and economic development. This would eliminate any potential threat of a Zulu invasion of
Natal, remove a cause of friction with the Boers and free up the young men in the Zulu army
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to be exploited as agricultural labourers and miners by the entrepreneurs needing more labour
to develop the vast economic potential of South Africa. However, the British Government was
already fully occupied in Afghanistan confronting the Russian threat to British India. They did
not want to get involved in yet another colonial war in Southern Africa.
Bartle Frere therefore decided to provoke a war with the Zulus, the “celibate man slaying
gladiators” and present London with a fait accompli. He found a willing accomplice in General
Frederick Thesinger. Lord Chelmsford, who had just successfully put down a rebellion in the
Cape using the men of the 24th
Regiment with their Martini-Henri rifles. Lord Chelmsford's
experience in campaigning in the Cape against the Xhosa had convinced him and Frere of the
superiority of white troops and of the power of the Martini Henry rifle. Lord Chelmsford, “I
am inclined to think that the first experience of the power of the Martini Henry will be such a
surprise to the Zulus that they will not be formidable after the first effort”. His experience with
fighting the Xhosa, who sought to avoid pitch battles made him misjudge the aggressive
fighting capacity of a Zulu impi. A disciplined, well led force of strong athletic warriors, trained
in field craft, who on average were three inches taller than their redcoat opponents, moved with
the speed of cavalry and carefully prepared to be fearless in battle by their medicine-men with
doses of cannabis and powdered red mushroom snuff. Lord Chelmsford was convinced that the
existing forces at his disposal, some 17,000 men and 20 guns would be more than sufficient to
quell the Zulus and there was no need to ask London for reinforcements.
Frere then set out to provoke a war. First, he tried to use the incident when a party of Zulus
crossed the border to seize two errant wives of Chief Sitiwayo, a favourite of King Cetswayo
and their lovers, who were executed on their return to Zululand as a justification for declaring
wars on the Zulus. However, London did not consider this a justification for war and Cetswayo
agreed to pay a fine. Then without consulting London Frere issued an ultimatum, whose terms
he knew no Zulu King could possibly accept as it would be tantamount to abolishing the
monarchy. The ultimatum required Cetswayo to dissolve the army within 30 days, handover
Sitwayo and his sons, dismantle the anbutho system and accept a British Resident, who would
oversee the administration and judicial system. The ultimatum deadline was 31 December 1878
and Cetswayo asked for more time, but on 4 January 1879 a military column under Col. Wood
crossed the Blood River into Zululand. Lord Chelmsford's invasion plan involved five columns.
Columns 1, 2 and 3 were each big enough to defend themselves against the Zulu army and
were to converge on the royal kraal at Ulindi. Each column was composed of a mixed force of
British infantry, artillery and in the absence of regular cavalry, mounted infantry and colonial
volunteers supported by a large force of African auxiliaries. The smaller Columns 2 and 5 were
to defend Natal. He had opted to divide his forces rather than advancing with one large strong
column, because he did not wish to deter the Zulus from engaging in a pitched battle. Also, the
multiple columns approaching from different directions made it more difficult for the Zulus to
bypass them and invade Natal.
Lord Chelmsford joined the Central 3rd
Column, nominally commanded by Col. Glyn, but in
reality, led by Lord Chelmsford. This column crossed the Buffalo at Rorke’s Drift on 11th
January 1878 heading for Ulindi. Its purpose was to hunt down and defeat the main Zulu army.
21
The Column of 4,700 men was made up of 1,891 European and 2,400 African troops. Its
comprised two battalions of 24th
Regiment of Foot (2nd
Warwickshire), a battery of six 7pdr
guns of the Royal Artillery, a unit of mounted police and various units of volunteer European
irregular horse. 60% of the force was composed of newly raised half trained and poorly armed
black African troops, (only 1 in 10 had a firearm mostly muzzle loaders with only 4 rounds of
ammunition because distrusted by the whites, whereas in contrast 1 in 4 of the Zulu warriors
had rifles) of the 1st
and 2nd
battalions of the Natal Native Contingent (NNC) and 300 African
Natal Native Pioneers. The cumbersome column required 2000 oxen and 68 mules to haul the
guns, 220 wagons and 82 carts over rough territory with no roads. It took 10 days to reach
Isandlwana, while in contrast the Zulu impi covered 70 miles in 5 days. The major weakness
of the column was the lack of regular cavalry to help with scouting and intelligence gathering.
Chelmsford had considerable staff officer experience but was not used to battlefield command.
He could not delegate and was old school British army, preferring to have friends on his staff
rather than properly trained staff officers, which was to cause confusion. He neglected the need
for reconnaissance and did not bother to appoint trained intelligence officers. He
underestimated Cetswayo, who realised that in the longer term, he could not defeat the
resources of the British Empire. Therefore, his plan was to crush the individual columns
separately, before they could unite before Ulindi and drive them out of Zululand. His Impis
would then halt on the frontier, while he sought to negotiate peace, before the British could
send out reinforcements.
After crossing the Buffalo, the Central Column destroyed the kraal of Cetswayo's close ally
Chief Sikayo, despite a resolute defence by two or three hundred warriors. Lord Chelmsford
and his troops' over confidence and contempt for the Zulu enemy was increased by this easy
victory. A private of the 24th
wrote “I can tell although large and powerful they have not the
pluck and martial aspect of Englishmen”. On arriving at Isandlwana on the morning of 20th
January many noted the Sphinx-like shape of the hill, which recalled the 24th
regimental badge
awarded after the Battle of the Nile and they called it “the little sphinx”. In Zulu it was “the
little hand”. The site for the camp was chosen by Major Clery who laid out a sprawling camp
with an extensive perimeter, which needed the full column to defend it. Lord Chelmsford took
no interest in the camp and left all the arrangements to his staff, as he expected the camp to be
very temporary.
22
Cetswayo
A number of his officers and advisers were unhappy with the siting of the camp, because it was
overlooked by hills, which could provide cover for enemy forces approaching the camp. They
argued for camping further out in the open plain. Captain Duncombe complained, “Do the staff
think we are going to meet an army of schoolgirls. Why in the name of all that is holy do we
not laager”. However Lord Chelmsford dismissed such criticism retorting to a comment from
Sub Inspector Phillips of the Natal Mounted Police “Tell the police officer my troops will do
all the attacking, but even if the enemy does venture to attack, the hill he complains about will
serve to protect our rear”. Lord Chelmsford did not consider precautions necessary; he was
convinced by reports that the Zulus were gathering around Mangani and that the Zulus would
not dare to attack the camp. So, the camp was neither entrenched nor laagered in contravention
of Lord Chelmsford's own field regulations. Like Custer with the Sioux, he was totally
preoccupied with locating and attacking the Zulus, before they could melt away. So
immediately on arriving at Isandlwana, he galloped off on a reconnaissance with his staff
leaving the column to make camp. He rode out to the Mangeni Hills, where the Zulus were
supposedly gathering.
They spotted small groups of Zulus, but no sign of an Impi. In fact, the Zulus were using their
scouts to draw the British away from their camp at Isandlwana and away from the line of march
of the advancing Zulu Impi. On his return Lord Chelmsford ordered Major Dartnell with most
of the mounted troops to conduct at dawn on 21st
January a reconnaissance of the Hlazkazi
Ridge. At the same time the thousand strong 3rd
Regiment of the Natal Native Contingent under
Commandant Rupert Lonsdale were ordered to reconnoitre the area around Malakatha, which
they did without spotting any Zulu. The use of such a large force for reconnaissance, a quarter
of the column's strength was a strange decision, as such numbers were very conspicuous and
being foot soldiers, they would not be able like cavalrymen to withdraw quickly if attacked.
Also, they lacked firepower, as most were only armed with spears, so they would be no match
for the
Zulus. Lord Chelmsford was playing into the Zulu commanders’ hands by dividing his forces,
over a quarter of which were now operating well away from the camp. In the late afternoon a
23
force of several hundred Zulus appeared, but retired out of sight. Thinking he had found the
advance guard of the Impi Dartnell sent a report to Lord Chelmsford, but he did not realise that
these warriors were only those of the local chief. In fact, the main Zulu army numbering some
23,000 warriors was camped on the night of 20/21 January on the eastern slopes of Siphezi
Mountain. On the morning of 21st
January moved undetected northwest into the Ngewebeni
Valley to camp overnight just 4 miles from the Isandlwana Camp.
At 2 am on receiving Dartnell's report requesting reinforcements, Lord Chelmsford decided to
march out with a flying column to surprise the Zulus, before they could disperse into the hills.
He ordered Col. Glyn with 5 companies of the 2nd
Battalion and Major Harness with 4 of the
guns from his six-gun battery to be ready to depart at dawn on 22nd
January. For maximum
speed and mobility, they would like Custer take no spare ammunition or food, they would only
have their marching allocation of 70 rounds (first extensive use of the Martini Henry rifle in
combat with a rate of fire of 12 rounds a minute made approved Horseguards marching
allocation inadequate. Lord Chelmsford's had casually now like Custer two years previously,
fragmented Number 3 Column into three widely separated components; Durtnall and
Lonsdale's reconnaissance force, the flying column and Col Pulleine's Isandlwana camp guard.
The Central No 3 Column was being subdivided across a distance of 20 miles. Nowhere was
there a sufficient concentration of troops to repel a determined mass attack by the Zulu army
and nowhere did any of the forces have ready access to supplies of reserve ammunition
necessary for a prolonged engagement. (Custer)
Meanwhile Lord Chelmsford sent instructions to Col. Dunford to bring up the 2nd
Column to
reinforce the camp. Lord Chelmsford chose to ignore snippets of information gleaned from
captured Zulus regarding the direction of the Zulus advance towards Isandlwana from the North
East, because it contradicted his own evaluation that the Zulus would be gathering to the South
East of Isandlwana around Mangeni. He led out the 24th
and the guns, riding ahead with his
staff to join Lonsdale's battalion of NNC, which attacked the Zulus on the nearby hills.
However, these Zulus were just a decoy; they fell back and then dispersed. All the time Lord
Chelmsford was being drawn further from the Isandlwana Camp. Chief Ntshingwayo, the
commander of the Zulu army, had not intended to fight on the 22nd
January 1879, as it was a
day of the dead moon. However, Lord Chelmsford had now presented the Zulu commander
with too good an opportunity, having split his forces not just once, but twice. The Zulus would
never get a better chance of destroying the British column. His young warriors were eager for
the fight and his scouts reported that, “The white people were scattered about on the hills
around the camp like a lot of goats out grazing”.
Lord Chelmsford had been so preoccupied with organising the flying column that he neglected
to give orders for the command and security of the camp. Major Clery stepped in and appointed
Henry Pulleine a 40-year-old Major just made Brevet Lt. Col and CO of the 1st
Battalion 24th
in charge of the camp. Pulleine was a socially accomplished staff officer, well regarded by
Horseguards, a good administrator with 24-year’s service, but with no combat experience. He
had had only one week as CO to get to know his fellow officers and men of the 24 . Pulleine
24
received messages from the cavalry outposts located three miles out from the camp reporting
that thousands of Zulus were advancing towards the camp. Pulleine assembled the men of the
1st
24th
then left them on the parade ground for an hour without orders. Then he sent them back
to their tents for lunch for three quarters of an hour after receiving reports from lookouts that
the Zulus appeared to be retreating. At 9.30 am Lord Chelmsford received a message from
Pulleine that the Zulus were advancing on the camp. Lord Chelmsford commented, “There is
nothing to be done”. He sent Milne RN up to the summit of the hill with a naval telescope to
observe the camp, while he enjoyed breakfast with his staff. Milne reported the tents still
standing and all seemed to be quiet. Lord Chelmsford then set off after breakfast with his staff
to find the site for a new camp in the Mangeni Valley, which put him out of contact with the
camp at Isandlwana for an hour.
Meanwhile Lt Col Durnford arrived at Isandlwana at 10.30 am with his 250 troopers of the
Sikhali native horse, a rocket battery and 200 native infantry from the 1st
battalion 1st
Regiment
of the NNC, a total of 526 men, which brought the garrison up to 2,200 men. Durnford did not
take command of the camp, but he did take command of all the mounted troops in the camp.
When the lookouts on the top of Isandlwana reported that the Zulus were retreating, Durnford
decided to ignore his orders from Lord Chelmsford to defend the camp and instead to ride out
towards the Mangeni Hills with the objective of preventing the retreating Zulus joining those
supposedly already facing Lord Chelmsford. Over breakfast he asked Pulleine for two
companies of 1st
24th
(slow moving infantry) to support his cavalry column. At first Pulleine
objected pointing out that his orders were to use the 1st
24th
for the defence of the camp' but
then in deference to a senior officer he gave in. However, Adjutant Melville intervened and
Dunford withdrew his request. Dunford, a Custer look alike with drooping moustaches and a
slouch hat hooked up on one side, rode off at 11.30am on his stallion Chieftain at the head of
his Second Column hoping to take a leading role in the expected battle at Mangeni. He made a
parting request to Pulleine “If you see us in difficulty you must send and support us” to which
Pulleine agreed.
As a result, he in advisedly sent Lt. Cavaye's E Company of 1st
24th
to Tahelane Spur about a
mile from the camp, so as to be in a position to support the two troops of Zikhali Horse. Cavaye
deployed his men along the rocky crest line at five-yard interval and posted Lt. Dyson's
detachment 500 yards to the left. Cavaye's men fired volleys at the Zulus of the right horn as
they moved round the back of the Isandlwana Hill to get into position to attack the camp from
the rear. Pulleine also ordered Major Smith and his 70 artillerymen to deploy the two 7 pdr
guns on a rocky ridge 800 yards on the far left in front of the camp with a good field of fire
over the plain to assist Durnford's retreat if required.
Degacher's A Company was sent to the ridge to protect the guns and Wardell with H Company
was deployed to his right. Mostyn with F Company was sent to support Cavaye on the spur.
The soldiers lay down in skirmishing order with a gap of 10 yards between each man.
Younghusband with C Company anchored themselves against the hillside to facilitate the
withdrawal of Cavaye and Mostyn should this prove necessary. Pulleine had ineptly established
25
a very extended firing line almost a mile out from the camp and the ammunition reserves, which
faced onto a depression. This dead ground provided cover for the advancing Zulus to close
within 200 yards of the firing line unseen or 35 seconds away at charging speed. The firing line
from Cavaye posted on the far left of the camp to Pope on the right extended for 2000 yards or
over a mile, although he had only deployed 400 infantrymen to man it. He initially mobilised
only half of his force of 891 Europeans and 350 natives to man the firing line. All the cooks,
orderlies, clerks, bandsmen and wagon drivers were left to carry on with their normal duties
rather than help with the defence of the camp. He did not strike the tents or laager the wagons
as he was expecting orders to move camp.
Such was the confidence of his fellow career officers in the British superiority over the Zulu
that many officers were hoping for the glory of defeating a Zulu attack before the General got
back. Pulleine may not therefore have wished to take measures, which might have served to
deter a Zulu attack. If, however, on the first sighting of the Zulus Pulleine had struck the tents
and concentrated all his troops in a tight defensive formation with adequate ammunition
supplies close to hand and with their rear protected by Isandlwana Hill, the camp might have
been saved. Dunford sent out reconnaissance patrols to follow up a reported sighting of 600
Zulus. A patrol led by Lt Raw discovered the Zulu Impi concealed in the Ngwebeni Valley just
4 miles from the camp. Raw's troop of irregular native horse fired on the Zulus, who rushed to
the attack around 11.30am and the battle of Isandlwana began. Raw's Zikhali Horse retreated
to join Cavaye on the Tahelane Spur.
Meanwhile Dunford ordered Major Russell and the rocket team together with their NNC escort
to advance towards the right flank in order to outflank the Zulus. Durnford and his mounted
men outstripped the rocket battery and its NNC infantry escort leaving them to fend for
themselves. Having fired just one rocket they were attacked by Zulus at 12.05pm. Major
Russell and several of his team were killed. At midday, four miles from the camp, Durnford
was overtaken by a Caribineer scout who reported seeing a Zulu impi advancing towards the
camp. Durnford realising that he had been duped organised a fighting withdrawal with his
troopers stopping to dismount and fire volleys at the pursuing Zulus until they reached the
Nyokana Donga. Meanwhile staff officer Captain Gardner was sent by Lord Chelmsford with
orders to Pulleine to strike part of the camp and send up supplies for his flying column, so he
could camp in comfort at the Mangeni Falls.
Pulleine on receipt of the orders around 11.30am hesitated over the reply. While he wished to
obey Lord Chelmsford 's instructions he realised that it was rather late in the day to be packing
up a portion of the camp and moving it over 15 miles, at a time when large numbers of Zulus
appeared to be advancing on the camp. Shepstone of the NNC, the Commissioner's son, advised
him to disobey Lord Chelmsford 's orders in the face of the Zulu threat and so he drafted a
reply explaining that “there is heavy firing on the left and we cannot move camp at present”.
Unfortunately, Pulleine did not make it clear that an attack was being launched by thousands
of Zulus, which might have brought home to Lord Chelmsford that the main Zulu Impi had
succeeded in bypassing his flying column. Gardner added an unhelpful message of his own to
the effect that there was fighting about a mile from camp and it is reported that the Zulus are
26
retreating. Once again Lord Chelmsford on receipt of Pulleine's report on the camp being under
attack ignored it to concentrate on his Mangeni campaign.
Major Harness with his guns and infantry escort following several miles behind Lord
Chelmsford heard the field guns firing and could see the flashes of the explosions coming from
Isandlwana. Hamilton Brown's NNC battalion were returning to Isandlwana, but their way was
blocked by the Zulu impi six miles from the camp and had to withdraw. Brown sent a request
to Major Harness RA for help, who turned back with his guns to march towards Isandlwana.
However, Lord Chelmsford's staff officer Major Gossett loudly decrying Brown's reports as
“what bosh” intervened to stop Harness. Lord Chelmsford then confirmed that Harness should
continue the march to Mangeni. The last chance of saving at least some of the camp garrison
had been lost. Lt. Pope's G Company of the 2nd
24th
was posted 800 yards to the right of the rest
of the 24th's firing line to protect the front of the camp and to support Dunford, who had
positioned himself at 12.30pm with his dismounted Edendale, Basutos troopers and military
police in the Nyokana Donga a mile to the far right of the camp. The intensity of Dunford's
troopers' fire initially stalled the advance of the Zulu Left Horn, until they began to run low on
ammunition. Durnford sent Harry Davies to ride over a mile get more ammunition for their
carbines, but he could not find the Second Column ammunition wagon. Durnford could no
longer hold back the Zulu left horn from outflanking his position and as Davies had not yet
returned with the ammunition, Durnford ordered his men at 1.15pm to abandon the Donga and
ride back to the camp in search of ammunition. Durnford had failed to note the location of their
carbine ammunition wagon before riding out for Mangeni, so time was wasted locating it.
Durnford's withdrawal had left Pope dangerously isolated and with his flank exposed. Pulleine
ordered Cavaye's and Mostyn's two companies to withdraw from the spur and reinforce the
firing line. By 12.20pm all six companies of 1/24 with their 440 Martini Henry rifles were now
dispersed along a firing line now reduced in length from 2000 to 700 yards. One soldier every
3 yards to the left of the guns and one every 6 yards to the right.
The Zulus were advancing in skirmish order skilfully using the dead ground in front of the
firing line to conceal their movements, sometimes running and sometimes crawling. The
warriors bobbing up and down in the tall grass to fire their weapons obscured by gun smoke
and the fading light, with the coming eclipse of the sun, were difficult targets. One in four Zulus
had a firearm, so they heavily outgunned the 24th. However, for most part they were poor
marksmen and so their fire only became effective at close range. The casualties amongst the
24th
rank and file were light at this stage, as they used cover to reload. The Zulu fire was
however taking its toll amongst the officers and the gunners, who remained standing. Much of
the Zulu fire overshot the 24th's firing line and fell amongst the NNC standing well back behind
the 24th, who began to desert in large numbers.
The companies on the firing line were managing to stall the advance of the Zulu chest, but then
they began to run low on ammunition and being so distant from the camp, the rate of resupply
was inadequate. Also, after two-dozen shots the Martini Henri rifle barrels heats up to 46
degrees baking the black powder residue into a hard coating and the soft brass casings were
easily damaged, which led to some rifles jamming. A few guns jamming would not pose a
27
problem for troops in close formation, but in skirmish order with troops strung out with six-
yard gaps, it caused significant gaps in the fire wall. At that moment the Induna of the Meijo
Chief Mkhouza raced down from the command post on the Nyoni Ridge to relaunch the
advance shouting, “Your King sent you to kill red soldiers, not to hide in the grass”. He was
killed in the renewed advance.
At 1.15pm Pulleine finally realising the danger ordered the firing line of the 24th
to withdraw
closer to the camp and nearer to the ammunition supplies. There were 400,000 rounds stored
in the camp and the ammunition boxes were not difficult to open even without a screwdriver.
The real problem had been getting the ammunition delivered in sufficient quantities out to the
distant fighting units. As soon as H and A Companies, who were flanking the guns started to
retire, the Zulu chest rushed forward and became interspersed with the withdrawing
artillerymen, who were cut down. The men of Pope's company were now isolated with no hope
of re-joining their comrades and they were brought to bay on the nek/pass. Pope shot and
wounded an Induna, who then stabbed him to death with his Iklwa. Pulleine now finally
realised that the right horn having passed behind Isandlewana were now advancing unopposed
to attack the camp from the undefended rear.
It was 1.30pm and he had no reserves and all the 24th
together with the European officers of the
NNC and the volunteers were already engaged in trying to keep the frontal attack by the Zulu
chest at bay. Belatedly Pulleine sent staff officers to round up the cooks, bandsmen and
orderlies in order to bolster the firing line. However, as Pulleine had less than 2000 to defend
a sprawling camp designed for 4,000, his only viable option would be to contract the perimeter
and form a fighting square. The 24th managed to retreat again halting to fire volleys to keep
the Zulus at a distance. However, some of the units became disorganised amongst the tents and
were cut off from their ammunition supplies by the surrounding Zulus as they retreated to the
Saddle. Around 2pm there was an eclipse and all went dark. The remaining men of the 24th
succeeded in forming a two-rank battle line, but they were now standing close together, which
made them easier targets for the Zulus, who had 5,000 rifles to the 24th's 300. Meanwhile the
retreating guns and limbers had overturned and the artillerymen slaughtered. Durnford's
volunteer cavalrymen and Pope's regulars gallant final stand helped for a time to cover the
retreat. This allowed some of the fugitives to escape mostly on horseback making their way
over the rocks the six miles to the Buffalo River, before the left and right horns closed trapping
the remaining camp defenders.
Amongst the fugitives were Coghill and Melvill with the Queen's Colour, which Pulleine had
asked Melvill to save. They were both killed on the banks of the Buffalo. Captain
Younghusband and his Company held out on the slopes of Isandlwana until they exhausted
their ammunition, when he led a final downhill charge to join the last of the soldiers still
fighting. Col Pulleine was killed in the square, as the ammunition failed and the survivors were
left facing Zulu bullets and throwing assegais with only their much feared lunger bayonets for
defence. The last soldier died defending a hillside cave above where Younghusband had made
his stand. At 2.30 pm the fighting had ceased. Out of the garrison of 1,762, only 55 Europeans
and 350 Africans survived. The surviving Europeans included just five British regular officers,
28
of which four were staff officers. Only one, Lt. Curling RA, had been on the firing line. Many
of the bodies suffered ritual disembowelment to release the spirit and protect the killer from
harm. The Zulus captured the two 7pdr guns, 1000 Martini Henry rifles and 250,000 rounds.
An estimated thousand Zulus were killed and many of the wounded later died.
NNC Commandant Brown informed Lord Chelmsford that the Zulus had taken the camp. Lord
Chelmsford retorted, “How dare you tell me such a falsehood. On your honour tell me is it
true”. Brown responded, “The camp was taken at 1.30pm, the Zulus are burning the tents”.
Lord Chelmsford replied, “That may be a quartermaster's fatigue burning the tents”. Brown
riposted “Quartermasters' fatigues do not burn tents”. Meanwhile Lonsdale had ridden back
towards the camp. He was shocked to discover that the scarlet jacketed figures were not the
24th , but Zulus, so he withdrew to report to Lord Chelmsford. On hearing the news Lord
Chelmsford expostulated “But I left 1,000 men to guard the camp”.
To be continued in Newsletter 6
Book Reviews
Johnnie Johnson's Great Adventure
The Spitfire Ace of Ace's Last Look Back
By Dilip Sarkar MBE
Imprint: Pen & Sword Aviation
Pages: 288
Illustrations: 16 black and white illustrations
29
ISBN: 9781526791740
Published: 29th October 2020
Author Dilip Sarkar MBE
Driven by his passion to research and share the stories of casualties and record the human
experience of war, DILIP SARKAR is a best-selling author whose work is highly regarded
globally. A noted expert on the Battle of Britain period, who enjoyed a long and very personal
relationship with the Few, Dilip was made an MBE in 2003 for ‘services to aviation history’,
and, in 2006, elected to the Fellowship of the Royal Historical Society. A sought-after, dynamic
speaker, Dilip's work has been exhibited internationally and he continues to work on TV
documentaries, on and off camera.
Synopsis
Air Vice-Marshal Johnnie Johnson – a policeman’s son from Leicestershire – ended the Second
World War as the RAF’s top-scoring fighter pilot. Fearless, and an exceptional pilot and
marksman, Johnnie was also highly intelligent and a gifted writer.
Having published two of his own books, Wing Leader and The Circle of Air Fighting, during
the 1980s and 1990s, Johnnie co-authored several more with another fighter ace, namely Wing
Commander P.B. ‘Laddie’ Lucas. In 1997, the ‘AVM’ suggested to his friend, the prolific
author Dilip Sarkar, that the pair should collaborate on The Great Adventure – a book that
would, in effect, be Johnnie’s account of the ‘Long Trek’ from Normandy across Northern
Europe into the heart of the Third Reich itself. ‘Greycap Leader’ was to produce a draft, after
which Dilip would add the historical detail and comment. Sadly, the project was unfulfilled,
because Johnnie became ill and passed away, aged eighty-five, in 2001. Years later, Johnnie’s
eldest son, Chris, discovered the manuscript among his august father’s papers. In order to keep
Johnnie’s memory evergreen, Chris turned to Dilip to finally see the project through to its
conclusion.
In this book Johnnie re-visits certain aspects of his wartime service, including the development
of tactical air cooperation with ground forces; his time as a Canadian wing leader in 1943,
when the Spitfire Mk.IX at last outclassed the Fw 190; and details his involvement in some of
the most important battles of the defeat of Nazi Germany, including Operation Overlord and
the D-Day landings in 1944, Operation Market Garden and the airborne assault at Arnhem, and
the Rhine Crossings, throughout all of which Johnnie also commanded Canadian wings. Here,
then, we have The Great Adventure – ‘Greycap Leader’s’ previously unpublished last look
back.
Review
Boys growing up in the 1950s had the choice of many heroes. Johnny Johnson was one of mine
along with Ginger Lacy, Al Deere, Bob Tuck and Adolph Gysbert Malan, we knew as Sailor
Malan, a South African fighter pilot. Top of the list was of course Johnny Johnson who
published an autobiography “Wing Leader” in June 1956. A cracking book of courage and
30
adventure for naïve young people unable to contemplate the horrors involved. These brave and
resourceful men began to fade from the public consciousness but then came Dilip Sarkar whose
work post police force, has been to ensure the names and brave actions of the Second World
War fighter pilot have been recorded forever. It is fitting that the son of a policeman has as his
biographer a former police officer from West Mercia!
This is believed to be the third book by Dilip concentrating on Johnson and his war. The first
published in 2011 was “Spitfire Ace of Aces, the Wartime Story of Johnnie Johnson.” Then
came “Johnnie Johnson – the Wartime Diary of a Spitfire Ace” which is to be re-published
soon and the 2020 “Johnnie Johnson’s Great Adventure”.
Johnnie was a nickname, they all seemed to have nicknames, he was christened James Edgar
Johnson and who was to achieve the high rank of Air Vice Marshall and a career officer after
being the RAF’s top-scoring fighter ace during the Second World War.
So why another book? Has the ground not already been covered? Yes and No! “Johnnie
Johnson’s 1942 Diary – the Wartime Diary of the Spitfire Ace of Aces” is Johnnie’s 1942 diary
is, according to Sarkar, “what it says on the tin”. “Spitfire Ace of Aces, the Wartime Story of
Johnnie Johnson” was written by Sarkar in 2011 and covers the full wartime career, proliferated
with first-hand accounts from his pilots and includes the last interviews he ever gave
“Johnnie Johnson’s Great Adventure” published in 2020 was supposed to have been a
collaborative effort but at the age of 85 the Ace of Aces died (2001). Almost twenty years later
this final part of the story a book starting after Johnnie is posted away from Kenley Canadian
Wing in 1943. Much of this work is extracted from “Spitfire Ace of Aces” which remains the
only biography of this fighter ace.
Sarkar knows his subject well and unusually for a biographer had the privilege of knowing his
subject well, albeit in the twilight of Johnson’s long and active life. The book has a great deal
of detail and description of the life of an operational pilot during the Second World War. What
the reviewer found difficult and at time frustrating, was the jump from quotations to narrative
and back and recognising that such a switch had occurred! There are no references, no dates or
sources. Was it in conversation, was it in a previous Sarkar book or from one of Johnny
Johnson’s published works? The final chapters appear to be totally Johnson but it is unclear
if this is fully the case.
Do not let these niggles stop you buying the book. If you are a Johnson follower you will buy
it as that is what you do! If you are an enthusiast of wartime RAF operations, particularly
fighter command this is a must.
There are a number of black and white photographs, an outline of Johnson’s service record
with postings and squadrons, an extraordinary list of combat claims and an impressive list of
decorations and awards.
31
Beating the Nazi Invader
Hitler’s Spies, Saboteurs and Secrets in Britain 1940
Neil R Storey
Imprint: Pen & Sword Military
Pages: 310
Illustrations: 150-200 black and white illustrations
ISBN: 9781526772947
Published: 15th October 2020
Neil R Storey is an award-winning historian and author. A graduate of the University of East
Anglia, he lectures widely on 20th Century history and has assembled a fine collection of
original First and Second World War images.
His published works include The British Soldier of the Second World War, Women in the
Second World War and The Home Front in World War Two. The King’s Men: The
Sandringham Company and Norfolk Regiment Territorial Battalions 1914 – 1918 is published
by Pen and Sword Books Ltd.
Synopsis
Beating the Nazi Invader is a revealing and disturbing exploration of the darker history of
Nazis, spies and ‘Fifth Columnist’ saboteurs in Britain and the extensive top-secret
countermeasures taken before and during the real threat of invasion in 1940.
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The author’s research describes the Nazi Party organisation in Britain and reveals the existence
of the Gestapo headquarters in central London. The reader gains vivid insights into Nazi agents
and terrorist cells, the Special Branch and MI5 teams who hunted them and investigated
murders believed to have been committed by Third Reich agents on British soil.
Accessing a host of recently de-classified files the book explores the highly classified measures
taken for the protection of the Royal Family, national treasures and gold reserves. The British
government made extensive plans for the continuation of government in the event of invasion
including the creation of all-powerful Regional Commissioners, ‘Blacklists’ of suspected
collaborators and a British resistance organisation. We also learn of the Nazis’ own occupation
measures for suborning the population and the infamous Sonderfahndungsliste G.B, the Nazi
‘Special Wanted List’.
The result is a fascinating insight into the measures and actions taken to ensure that Great
Britain did not succumb to the gravest threat of enemy invasion and occupation for centuries.
Review
Storey has gone back to primary sources, best evidence, for a great deal of this work and that
is obvious from the accounts and elucidations given to a comprehensive explanation of the
German intelligence operations in the UK during the build-up to war and the early years. He
is to be congratulated as so many so-called historians use little more than secondary sources
including the Internet for their research. The reader is soon disabused about German efficiency
as the Abwehr sent men, and it was mostly men, on missions to the UK under trained and
poorly prepared. Capture or death of these luckless yet extremely brave agents, gave
opportunities for the British to establish Double Cross, using turned agents to supply
misleading “intelligence” to the Abwehr. It is believed that almost every agent dropped into
the UK was soon found, turned or executed. The iron fist of the British state usually very well
hidden appears above the parapet. There are chapters on Nazi supporters in Britain in the build-
up to war, murder cases where German intelligence may well have been involved with the
author using Metropolitan Police archive material to ensure exactness of his interpretation. The
role of MI5 and Special Branch are crucial to this story and there is accurate reference to their
activities, investigations and methods of working.
This is a really good book. Highly readable, always interesting with new material accurately
established by an historian’s reliance on primary sources. High production values with
numerous photographs. There are three appendices giving additional details of MI5 activities.
Notes on sources, chapter by chapter, which are critical in a book such as this. There is also an
extensive biography, again essential for other than the casual reader to see the source of detailed
material. Highly recommended.
Hitler's Spies
Lena and the Prelude to Operation Sealion
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By Mel Kavanagh
Imprint: Pen & Sword Military
Pages: 320
Illustrations: 16 black and white illustrations
ISBN: 9781526768728
Published: 29th October 2020
Mel Kavanagh
Born in Hampshire, Mel Kavanagh spent his childhood in Surrey before joining the RAF in
1972. He comes from a family steeped with military history. His father served with the army
during WWII, serving overseas. Other relations served in the Royal Navy and RAF. His
grandfather was at the Battle of Jutland during WWI aged just 16.
He spent many years in IT as a computer programmer and systems analyst before retraining as
a teacher in 2003 Hitler’s Spies: Lena, The Prelude to Operation Sealion is his first work in
non-fiction.
Synopsis
September 1940: Britain stands alone against the might of the advancing German Army and
the spectre of invasion looms. Using a wealth of primary material including sources previously
designated secret, this is the first book, written in English, dedicated to the story of the first
four German spies who successfully arrived in the south of England. Using the codename
Operation Lena, it was the initial undertaking to necessitate Hitler’s invasion of England, itself
codenamed Operation Sealion. These men were to be the pathfinders, the scouts, the eyes and
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ears that would help the first invasion of England for several hundred years.
This extraordinary story stands as evidence of the only part of the invasion actually to arrive,
of the abysmal quality of their selection and training, of the extraordinary fair-mindedness of a
British jury, especially when Britain was gripped by spy paranoia. This is possibly one of the
most audacious and least known episodes of the Second World War.
Review
This is the story of four men who were sent as pathfinders for Operation Sealion, in preparation
for the proposed invasion of England. To write this detailed and readable account of Operation
Lena and the response of the UK defence forces, a significant amount of research has been
undertaken by Kavanagh for this his first work of non-fiction. There is a comprehensive
catalogue of documents from the National Archives particularly Security Services and Cabinet
Office material. Also, extensive bibliography of associated books with a significant list of
Internet links to a broad range of related sites. A good deal of the latter is associated with
providing the timeline which is imbedded across the book.
There is no index (why?) which is always frustrating but there are extensive notes, sources, a
list of key players and a glossary of terms. However, it is difficult to look for specifics including
individuals and locations, without the help of an index. There is an unusual mix of narrative
and timeline of Second World War events happening that day, which can be distracting and it
is not clear why the author chooses to use this device. There is a mix therefore of “big picture”
material with detail of Op Lena and its unravelling by British security personnel.
By concentrating on what Kavanagh refers to as The Brussels Four, luckless Abwehr agents
sent on what for some appeared suicide missions, significant knowledge is added to the history
of these dangerous times. There were about 12 agents sent to the country in September 1940
under Op Lena to supply information on British preparations to counter an invasion. All were
detained before they could do any harm. The book clearly establishes the detention,
interrogation along with detail of time in custody of the Brussels Four, their exposure to British
judicial process and outcome. There is considerable detail of the activities of MI5 and what
took place at the MI5 camp, Latchmere House at Kew where almost 500 prisoners were
detained from which fifteen were executed at the Tower of London. About a dozen became
highly valued double agents.
The questions remain. Was Op Lena a poorly planned and executed operation or did they come
up against a country ready to discover a spy at every turn? Vigilance and super-awareness of
the invasion threat particularly on the Kent coast. It is even written that it was a devious plot
by Abwehr leadership to destroy any likelihood of the invasion taking place. Maybe there was
some of that but the conspiracy would have to involve many and it never leaked!
A worthwhile book very well researched and which breaks new ground.
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