incomplete contracts: where do we stand? jean tirole...

Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?

Jean Tirole

Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 4. (Jul., 1999), pp. 741-781.

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http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199907%2967%3A4%3C741%3AICWDWS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

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Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?Jean TiroleEconometrica, Vol. 67, No. 4. (Jul., 1999), pp. 741-781.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199907%2967%3A4%3C741%3AICWDWS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

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[Footnotes]

3 An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the FirmOliver HartColumbia Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 7, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law. (Nov., 1989), pp.1757-1774.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-1958%28198911%2989%3A7%3C1757%3AAEPOTT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

6 An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial ContractingPhilippe Aghion; Patrick BoltonThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3. (Jul., 1992), pp. 473-494.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199207%2959%3A3%3C473%3AAICATF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

6 A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder CongruenceMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1027-1054.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1027%3AATODAE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 1 of 13 -

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.

8 An Economist's View of Fiduciary DutyOliver HartThe University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, Special Issue on Corporate StakeholderDebate: The Classical Theory and Its Critics. (Summer, 1993), pp. 299-313.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0042-0220%28199322%2943%3A3%3C299%3AAEVOFD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

13 Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property RightsJames J. Anton; Dennis A. YaoThe American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1. (Mar., 1994), pp. 190-209.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199403%2984%3A1%3C190%3AEAIARI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

14 The Management of InnovationPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1185-1209.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1185%3ATMOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

20 Two Remarks on the Property-Rights LiteratureEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 139-149.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C139%3ATROTPL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

26 Contracts as a Barrier to EntryPhilippe Aghion; Patrick BoltonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Jun., 1987), pp. 388-401.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198706%2977%3A3%3C388%3ACAABTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7

26 Incomplete Contracts and SignallingKathryn E. SpierThe RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 432-443.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199223%2923%3A3%3C432%3AICAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

28 The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common ValuesEric Maskin; Jean TiroleEconometrica, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Jan., 1992), pp. 1-42.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199201%2960%3A1%3C1%3ATPRWAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

29 Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in AgencyBenjamin E. Hermalin; Michael L. KatzEconometrica, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1735-1753.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199111%2959%3A6%3C1735%3AMHAVTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

32 Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the FirmMike Burkart; Denis Gromb; Fausto PanunziThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 3. (Aug., 1997), pp. 693-728.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199708%29112%3A3%3C693%3ALSMATV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

38 Formal and Real Authority in OrganizationsPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 1. (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-29.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199702%29105%3A1%3C1%3AFARAIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

39 Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal IncentivesBengt Holmstrom; Paul MilgromEconometrica, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Mar., 1987), pp. 303-328.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198703%2955%3A2%3C303%3AAALITP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

40 Formal and Real Authority in OrganizationsPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 1. (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-29.Stable URL:

40 A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder CongruenceMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1027-1054.Stable URL:

40 AdvocatesMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 1. (Feb., 1999), pp. 1-39.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199902%29107%3A1%3C1%3AA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8

43 Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of NatureLuca Anderlini; Leonardo FelliThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1085-1124.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1085%3AIWCUSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

47 Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable InformationPhilippe Aghion; Mathias Dewatripont; Patrick ReyEconometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar., 1994), pp. 257-282.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

47 Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk SharingTai-Yeong ChungThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 5. (Oct., 1991), pp. 1031-1042.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199110%2958%3A5%3C1031%3AICSIAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

47 Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal InvestmentAaron S. Edlin; Stefan ReichelsteinThe American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. (Jun., 1996), pp. 478-501.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199606%2986%3A3%3C478%3AHSBRAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

47 Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market ContractsW. Bentley MacLeod; James M. MalcomsonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 4. (Sep., 1993), pp. 811-837.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199309%2983%3A4%3C811%3AIHATFO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

References

Contracts as a Barrier to EntryPhilippe Aghion; Patrick BoltonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Jun., 1987), pp. 388-401.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198706%2977%3A3%3C388%3ACAABTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7

An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial ContractingPhilippe Aghion; Patrick BoltonThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3. (Jul., 1992), pp. 473-494.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199207%2959%3A3%3C473%3AAICATF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable InformationPhilippe Aghion; Mathias Dewatripont; Patrick ReyEconometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar., 1994), pp. 257-282.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

The Management of InnovationPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1185-1209.Stable URL:

Formal and Real Authority in OrganizationsPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 1. (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-29.Stable URL:

Production, Information Costs, and Economic OrganizationArmen A. Alchian; Harold DemsetzThe American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec., 1972), pp. 777-795.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197212%2962%3A5%3C777%3APICAEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of NatureLuca Anderlini; Leonardo FelliThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1085-1124.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1085%3AIWCUSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property RightsJames J. Anton; Dennis A. YaoThe American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1. (Mar., 1994), pp. 190-209.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199403%2984%3A1%3C190%3AEAIARI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive ContractsGeorge Baker; Robert Gibbons; Kevin J. MurphyThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1125-1156.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1125%3ASPMIOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L

Incomplete Contracts and Strategic AmbiguityB. Douglas Bernheim; Michael D. WhinstonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4. (Sep., 1998), pp. 902-932.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199809%2988%3A4%3C902%3AICASA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4

The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic ModellingKen Binmore; Ariel Rubinstein; Asher WolinskyThe RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Summer, 1986), pp. 176-188.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28198622%2917%3A2%3C176%3ATNBSIE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit ContractsClive BullThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, No. 1. (Feb., 1987), pp. 147-160.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28198702%29102%3A1%3C147%3ATEOSIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I

Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the FirmMike Burkart; Denis Gromb; Fausto PanunziThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 3. (Aug., 1997), pp. 693-728.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199708%29112%3A3%3C693%3ALSMATV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

Cooperative Investments and the Value of ContractingYeon-Koo Che; Donald B. HauschThe American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1. (Mar., 1999), pp. 125-147.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199903%2989%3A1%3C125%3ACIATVO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U

Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk SharingTai-Yeong ChungThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 5. (Oct., 1991), pp. 1031-1042.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199110%2958%3A5%3C1031%3AICSIAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

The Nature of the FirmR. H. CoaseEconomica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16. (Nov., 1937), pp. 386-405.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427%28193711%292%3A4%3A16%3C386%3ATNOTF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout AgreementsJoel S. Demski; David E. M. SappingtonThe RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Summer, 1991), pp. 232-240.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199122%2922%3A2%3C232%3ARDMHPW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder CongruenceMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1027-1054.Stable URL:

AdvocatesMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 1. (Feb., 1999), pp. 1-39.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199902%29107%3A1%3C1%3AA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8

Costly Contract ContingenciesRonald A. DyeInternational Economic Review, Vol. 26, No. 1. (Feb., 1985), pp. 233-250.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%28198502%2926%3A1%3C233%3ACCC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal InvestmentAaron S. Edlin; Stefan ReichelsteinThe American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. (Jun., 1996), pp. 478-501.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199606%2986%3A3%3C478%3AHSBRAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

Agency Problems and the Theory of the FirmEugene F. FamaThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 2. (Apr., 1980), pp. 288-307.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198004%2988%3A2%3C288%3AAPATTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4

Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and EvidenceRobert Gibbons; Kevin J. MurphyThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 3. (Jun., 1992), pp. 468-505.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199206%29100%3A3%3C468%3AOICITP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

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An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the FirmOliver HartColumbia Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 7, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law. (Nov., 1989), pp.1757-1774.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-1958%28198911%2989%3A7%3C1757%3AAEPOTT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

An Economist's View of Fiduciary DutyOliver HartThe University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, Special Issue on Corporate StakeholderDebate: The Classical Theory and Its Critics. (Summer, 1993), pp. 299-313.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0042-0220%28199322%2943%3A3%3C299%3AAEVOFD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

Incomplete Contracts and RenegotiationOliver Hart; John MooreEconometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul., 1988), pp. 755-785.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I

Property Rights and the Nature of the FirmOliver Hart; John MooreThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6. (Dec., 1990), pp. 1119-1158.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199012%2998%3A6%3C1119%3APRATNO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3

A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human CapitalOliver Hart; John MooreThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 841-879.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C841%3AATODBO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

Foundations of Incomplete ContractsOliver Hart; John MooreThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 115-138.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C115%3AFOIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W

Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in AgencyBenjamin E. Hermalin; Michael L. KatzEconometrica, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1735-1753.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199111%2959%3A6%3C1735%3AMHAVTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal IncentivesBengt Holmstrom; Paul MilgromEconometrica, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Mar., 1987), pp. 303-328.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198703%2955%3A2%3C303%3AAALITP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

The Firm as an Incentive SystemBengt Holmstrom; Paul MilgromThe American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. (Sep., 1994), pp. 972-991.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199409%2984%3A4%3C972%3ATFAAIS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M

Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary StudyStewart MacaulayAmerican Sociological Review, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Feb., 1963), pp. 55-67.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28196302%2928%3A1%3C55%3ANRIBAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary UnemploymentW. Bentley MacLeod; James M. MalcomsonEconometrica, Vol. 57, No. 2. (Mar., 1989), pp. 447-480.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198903%2957%3A2%3C447%3AICICAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5

Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market ContractsW. Bentley MacLeod; James M. MalcomsonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 4. (Sep., 1993), pp. 811-837.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199309%2983%3A4%3C811%3AIHATFO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

Nash Equilibrium and Welfare OptimalityEric MaskinThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 23-38.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C23%3ANEAWO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

Implementation and RenegotiationEric Maskin; John MooreThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 39-56.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C39%3AIAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5

The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common ValuesEric Maskin; Jean TiroleEconometrica, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Jan., 1992), pp. 1-42.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199201%2960%3A1%3C1%3ATPRWAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete ContractsEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 83-114.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C83%3AUCAIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

Two Remarks on the Property-Rights LiteratureEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 139-149.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C139%3ATROTPL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization DesignPaul R. MilgromThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 1. (Feb., 1988), pp. 42-60.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198802%2996%3A1%3C42%3AECIAAE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O

Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present, and FuturePaul Milgrom; John RobertsThe Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol. 21, No. 3. (Aug.,1988), pp. 444-458.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28198808%2921%3A3%3C444%3AETOTFP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part IJ. A. MirrleesThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 3-21.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C3%3ATTOMHA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0

Subgame Perfect ImplementationJohn Moore; Rafael RepulloEconometrica, Vol. 56, No. 5. (Sep., 1988), pp. 1191-1220.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198809%2956%3A5%3C1191%3ASPI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

A Formal Theory of the Employment RelationshipHerbert A. SimonEconometrica, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Jul., 1951), pp. 293-305.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28195107%2919%3A3%3C293%3AAFTOTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

Incomplete Contracts and SignallingKathryn E. SpierThe RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 432-443.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199223%2923%3A3%3C432%3AICAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

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