Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?

Jean Tirole

Econometrica, Vol. 67, No. 4. (Jul., 1999), pp. 741-781.

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Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?Jean TiroleEconometrica, Vol. 67, No. 4. (Jul., 1999), pp. 741-781.Stable URL:

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[Footnotes]

3 An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the FirmOliver HartColumbia Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 7, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law. (Nov., 1989), pp.1757-1774.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010-1958%28198911%2989%3A7%3C1757%3AAEPOTT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

6 An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial ContractingPhilippe Aghion; Patrick BoltonThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3. (Jul., 1992), pp. 473-494.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199207%2959%3A3%3C473%3AAICATF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

6 A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder CongruenceMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1027-1054.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1027%3AATODAE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 1 of 13 -

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8 An Economist's View of Fiduciary DutyOliver HartThe University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, Special Issue on Corporate StakeholderDebate: The Classical Theory and Its Critics. (Summer, 1993), pp. 299-313.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0042-0220%28199322%2943%3A3%3C299%3AAEVOFD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

13 Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property RightsJames J. Anton; Dennis A. YaoThe American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1. (Mar., 1994), pp. 190-209.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199403%2984%3A1%3C190%3AEAIARI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

14 The Management of InnovationPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1185-1209.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1185%3ATMOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

20 Two Remarks on the Property-Rights LiteratureEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 139-149.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199901%2966%3A1%3C139%3ATROTPL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

21 The Management of InnovationPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1185-1209.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1185%3ATMOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

26 Contracts as a Barrier to EntryPhilippe Aghion; Patrick BoltonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Jun., 1987), pp. 388-401.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198706%2977%3A3%3C388%3ACAABTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7

http://www.jstor.org

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26 Incomplete Contracts and SignallingKathryn E. SpierThe RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 432-443.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199223%2923%3A3%3C432%3AICAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

28 The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common ValuesEric Maskin; Jean TiroleEconometrica, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Jan., 1992), pp. 1-42.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199201%2960%3A1%3C1%3ATPRWAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

29 Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in AgencyBenjamin E. Hermalin; Michael L. KatzEconometrica, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1735-1753.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199111%2959%3A6%3C1735%3AMHAVTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

32 Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the FirmMike Burkart; Denis Gromb; Fausto PanunziThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 3. (Aug., 1997), pp. 693-728.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199708%29112%3A3%3C693%3ALSMATV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

38 Formal and Real Authority in OrganizationsPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 1. (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-29.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199702%29105%3A1%3C1%3AFARAIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

39 Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal IncentivesBengt Holmstrom; Paul MilgromEconometrica, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Mar., 1987), pp. 303-328.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198703%2955%3A2%3C303%3AAALITP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 3 of 13 -

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40 The Management of InnovationPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1185-1209.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1185%3ATMOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

40 Formal and Real Authority in OrganizationsPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 1. (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-29.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199702%29105%3A1%3C1%3AFARAIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

40 A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder CongruenceMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1027-1054.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1027%3AATODAE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S

40 AdvocatesMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 1. (Feb., 1999), pp. 1-39.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199902%29107%3A1%3C1%3AA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8

43 Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of NatureLuca Anderlini; Leonardo FelliThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1085-1124.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1085%3AIWCUSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

47 Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable InformationPhilippe Aghion; Mathias Dewatripont; Patrick ReyEconometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar., 1994), pp. 257-282.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 4 of 13 -

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47 Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk SharingTai-Yeong ChungThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 5. (Oct., 1991), pp. 1031-1042.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199110%2958%3A5%3C1031%3AICSIAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

47 Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal InvestmentAaron S. Edlin; Stefan ReichelsteinThe American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. (Jun., 1996), pp. 478-501.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199606%2986%3A3%3C478%3AHSBRAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

47 Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market ContractsW. Bentley MacLeod; James M. MalcomsonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 4. (Sep., 1993), pp. 811-837.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199309%2983%3A4%3C811%3AIHATFO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

References

Contracts as a Barrier to EntryPhilippe Aghion; Patrick BoltonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 3. (Jun., 1987), pp. 388-401.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198706%2977%3A3%3C388%3ACAABTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7

An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial ContractingPhilippe Aghion; Patrick BoltonThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3. (Jul., 1992), pp. 473-494.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199207%2959%3A3%3C473%3AAICATF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

http://www.jstor.org

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Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable InformationPhilippe Aghion; Mathias Dewatripont; Patrick ReyEconometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar., 1994), pp. 257-282.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

The Management of InnovationPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1185-1209.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1185%3ATMOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

Formal and Real Authority in OrganizationsPhilippe Aghion; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No. 1. (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-29.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199702%29105%3A1%3C1%3AFARAIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

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Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of NatureLuca Anderlini; Leonardo FelliThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1085-1124.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1085%3AIWCUSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property RightsJames J. Anton; Dennis A. YaoThe American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1. (Mar., 1994), pp. 190-209.Stable URL:

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Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk SharingTai-Yeong ChungThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 5. (Oct., 1991), pp. 1031-1042.Stable URL:

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A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder CongruenceMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4. (Nov., 1994), pp. 1027-1054.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199411%29109%3A4%3C1027%3AATODAE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S

AdvocatesMathias Dewatripont; Jean TiroleThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 1. (Feb., 1999), pp. 1-39.Stable URL:

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Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal InvestmentAaron S. Edlin; Stefan ReichelsteinThe American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. (Jun., 1996), pp. 478-501.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199606%2986%3A3%3C478%3AHSBRAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

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An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the FirmOliver HartColumbia Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 7, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law. (Nov., 1989), pp.1757-1774.Stable URL:

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An Economist's View of Fiduciary DutyOliver HartThe University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, Special Issue on Corporate StakeholderDebate: The Classical Theory and Its Critics. (Summer, 1993), pp. 299-313.Stable URL:

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Incomplete Contracts and RenegotiationOliver Hart; John MooreEconometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul., 1988), pp. 755-785.Stable URL:

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Foundations of Incomplete ContractsOliver Hart; John MooreThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 115-138.Stable URL:

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Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in AgencyBenjamin E. Hermalin; Michael L. KatzEconometrica, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Nov., 1991), pp. 1735-1753.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199111%2959%3A6%3C1735%3AMHAVTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal IncentivesBengt Holmstrom; Paul MilgromEconometrica, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Mar., 1987), pp. 303-328.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198703%2955%3A2%3C303%3AAALITP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

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The Firm as an Incentive SystemBengt Holmstrom; Paul MilgromThe American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. (Sep., 1994), pp. 972-991.Stable URL:

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Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market ContractsW. Bentley MacLeod; James M. MalcomsonThe American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 4. (Sep., 1993), pp. 811-837.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199309%2983%3A4%3C811%3AIHATFO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9

Nash Equilibrium and Welfare OptimalityEric MaskinThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 23-38.Stable URL:

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Implementation and RenegotiationEric Maskin; John MooreThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 39-56.Stable URL:

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The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common ValuesEric Maskin; Jean TiroleEconometrica, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Jan., 1992), pp. 1-42.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199201%2960%3A1%3C1%3ATPRWAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D

Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete ContractsEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 83-114.Stable URL:

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Two Remarks on the Property-Rights LiteratureEric Maskin; Jean TiroleThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 139-149.Stable URL:

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Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization DesignPaul R. MilgromThe Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 1. (Feb., 1988), pp. 42-60.Stable URL:

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Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present, and FuturePaul Milgrom; John RobertsThe Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol. 21, No. 3. (Aug.,1988), pp. 444-458.Stable URL:

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The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part IJ. A. MirrleesThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66, No. 1, Special Issue: Contracts. (Jan., 1999), pp. 3-21.Stable URL:

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Subgame Perfect ImplementationJohn Moore; Rafael RepulloEconometrica, Vol. 56, No. 5. (Sep., 1988), pp. 1191-1220.Stable URL:

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A Formal Theory of the Employment RelationshipHerbert A. SimonEconometrica, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Jul., 1951), pp. 293-305.Stable URL:

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Incomplete Contracts and SignallingKathryn E. SpierThe RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3. (Autumn, 1992), pp. 432-443.Stable URL:

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