globalism, populism and security ; what role for european ... · globalism, populism and security ;...

Globalism,PopulismandSecurity;WhatRoleforEuropeanCulturalPolicy?

ICPP3SingaporeJune27-9th2017

RichardHiggoI,PhD,FRSA,FAcSS

ProfessorEmeritusofInternaMonalPoliMcalEconomyUniversityofWarwick

andDisMnguishedProfessorofDiplomacy

VesaliusCollegeandResearchProfessor,InsMtuteofEuropeanStudies

VrijeUniversiteitBrussel

“ThispanelisproducedintheframeworkoftheEL-CSIDproject,whichhasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020researchandinnovaFonprogrammeundergrantagreementNo693799.Thepaperpresentedreflectonlytheauthors’view,andtheResearch

ExecuFveAgencyisnotresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformaFonitcontains.”

TheContemporaryGlobalDistemper:andtheLimitstoInterna8onalCoopera8on

•  DefiniMon:Distemper—toxicvirus•  HowwegoverntheglobalpoliMcalandeconomicorderisinneedofdramaMcrethinking.

•  PutasfourquesMonsweneedtoask:–  HowdoweaccountforthegrowthofradicalpopulismandnaMonalism(thepopulistnaMonalistzeitgeist-PNZ)?

–  HowdisrupMveisitsinfluenceonaconsensusdriveninsMtuMonmulMlateralorder?

–  Canthesystemofrulemaking,collecMveacMonproblemsolvingandcollecMvesecuritybuiltacerWWIIbereformedandmadefitforpurposeinthefaceofthepopulistandnaMonalistonslaught?

– Whatroledoes/can"CulturalDiplomacy"play?

Part1

ExplainingtheRiseofPopulismandNaMonalismandtheChallengeto

Globalism

FromFrederickHayektoDonaldTrump:theRiseandFalloftheNeo-LiberalEra?

•  Hayek’sTheConsFtuFonofLiberty(1960)settheagendaforNeo-Liberalism•  WhydidtheAngloAmericanspherebuyintoitforthelast40+years?

–  The‘leadership’ofRonaldReaganandMargaretThatcher–  Howdoweaccountforthehegemonyofneo-classicaleconomics?

•  Whywerethe‘free’marketandtheEfficientMarketHypothesisreified?•  WhywasgovernmentandregulaMonvilifiedanddismissed?•  Whywasgrowinginequalitydismissedasanirrelevance?•  Whydidweturnablindeyetocorporateexcessandirresponsibility?

•  WhyarethelargesecMonsofthepopulaMonsoftradiMonalliberaldemocraMccountriesinrevoltagainstglobalisaMon?–  Whyis‘populism’andnaMonalismontherise?–  AreBrexitandtheelecMonofDonaldTrumptheendorjustthebeginning?

•  AreNeo-liberalism’schickens,especiallyposttheGFCof2008,finallycominghometoroost?(eventheIMFnowthinksthetheorywasflawed)

Implica8onsofPopulismforGovernance1

•  ConfidenceintheprobityandcompetenceofpoliMcal,businessandglobaladministraMveeliteshasbeenchallenged---especiallyacer2008GFCandinthe2016USPresidenMalelecMon.–  PopulismchallengesamajorassumpMonsofliberaldemocracy:namelythesocialcontractbetweentheciMzenandthestate.•  DemocracyisegalitarianinaspiraMon•  Capitalismisin-egalitarianinoutcome•  ThisisOKwhilecapitalismgeneratesbenefitsforall•  ButifcapitalismnolongergeneratesmaterialimprovementthenthesocialbondbetweentheciMzenandthestatecan,anddoes,wither

–  Unequaloutcomescanspurauthoritarianismandplutocracy–  DemocracybecomesunsustainableandcapitalismillegiMmate–  Trumpa‘pluto-populist’(Wolf)

Implica8onsofPopulismforGovernance2

•  PopulistchargeagainstglobalisaMonnotwithoutsubstance–  Itdoesgiverisetoadetachedecono-poliMcalplutocracy–  ItdoesplacelimitaMononnaMonaldemocracies–  ItdoesunderminesovereigndecisionmakingabiliMesofstates–  Theseare,orshouldbe,genuineissuesofconcernforciMzens

•  ButPopulism–  IsfundamentallyanM-democraMc–  GivesrisetoTrumpism,BrexiMsmandilliberaldemocraciesandplebiscitarydemocracies—paceRussiaandTurkey

–  TapstheworstracistinsMnctsofthewhiteworkingclasses–  Contagioneffecteg.LePenisminFrance,theAfDinGermany,OrbanisminHungary.WildersFreedomPartyinNetherlands

DemocracyandtheOpenEconomy:TheNeedforLiberalPluralismtoCombatthePopulists

•  LiberaldemocracyasapoliFcalvisionmustretakecontroloftheglobalisaMonnarraMvefromneo-classicaleconomics(itsintellectualhandmaidens)–  Neo-liberaleconomic’srigidadherencetopuristfreetradeorthodoxy,failing

toadmitaneedforcorrecMvesupportforworkersinsunsetindustries,hasprovidedammuniMonforadvocatesoftheworstkindsofprotecMonism

–  LackofhonestyabouttradehasgivenitabadreputaMonitdoesnotdeserve–  Tradeoffersmassiveglobalwelfaregainsbutnoteveryonebenefits.There

areunevendistribuMonaleffects,especiallyinthesunsetindustriesinthemostadvancedeconomies.

–  GoodpublicpolicycancorrectfordistribuMonaleffectsifHayekianideologyandeconomic’ssearchforscienMficpurityandtheoreMcalperfecMondoesnotimpedeameasuredliberalpoliFcalcaseforaddressingmal-distribuMon

•  IsTrumpismthelastwakeupcallforLiberaldemocracy?

Resis8ngPopulism:WhatistobeDone?•  Don’tpanic.Itsnottheapocalypse.But:

–  NaMonalsocieMesaredividedanddemocraciesweakened.–  Inequality(naMonallyandglobally)isabigissue.–  ItaIacksthesocialbondbetweenciMzensandthestate–  PoliMcalandeconomicelitesmustlearnfromtheirmistakes

•  LiberalDemocracymustfightback–  PopulismisasmuchselfindulgentpoliMcalfashionaseconomicreality–  Liberals(centerlec&centerright)mustputtheirpoliMcalhousesinorder–  Xenophobiaandonslaughtagainstglobalopennessmustberesisted–  The‘Trumpenproletariat’mustnotbelosttodemocracy.Itmustbe

reengagedbythepoliMcalcentreintheUSAandEurope,•  PoliMcianswhoignoretheselessonswillbeheldaccountable.

–  GlobalisaMondoesneedreform–  WeneedtoensurethatordinaryciMzens,notjusttheplutocracybenefit

fromglobalisaMonorareatleastprotectedfromitsworstexcesses.–  Weneedtore-writetherulesoftheglobaleconomyonceagain–  WeneedtoensureminimumlevelsofnaMonalsovereigncontrol

GlobalOrderandCooperaMon•  InsMtuMonalinfrastructureofthepostWWII—especiallythe

BreIonWoodsinsMtuMonsandtheWTO—weakenedbynaMonalismasinstrumentsofglobalpolicycoordinaMon.This:–  De-stabilisesdelicategeopoliMcalandgeo-strategicbalancesinEuropeandAsia

–  Createsnew“GreatGame”onagaininEurasia–  SeesUSasnolonger""self-bindinghegemon

•  Keyglobalpolicyareas—security,trade,finance,climateandenvironment,development—involveagreaterpluralityofboIomup/topdown,endogenous/exogenousandpublic/privateinteracMonswithlimitedworkinginsMtuMonalstructure

Resis8ngPopulismandNa8onalism:2CheersforMul8lateralIns8tu8ons

•  WhydoweneedmulMlateralinsMtuMonalism?Because:–  InsMtuMonslowertransacMonscostsbytheprovisionandsharingofinformaMon

–  InsMtuMonscanreduceuncertaintyinpolicy-making–  InsMtuMonscanhelpmakepromisescredible–  InsMtuMonscanfacilitatedeal-making–  InsMtuMonscanenhancecompliance

•  MulMlateralismdoesnotundermineindividualstatesovereignty•  Rather,mulMlateralinsMtuMonscanenhancenaMonaldemocraMc

processesinanumberofimportantways:–  ByrestricMngthepowerofspecialinterestfacMons–  ByprotecMngindividualrights–  ByimprovingthequalityofdemocraMcdeliberaMon,–  ByincreasingcapaciMestoachieveimportantpublicpolicy

Whattodointhefaceofthepopulistna8onalistzeitgeist?

•  DemocraMcstatesmustgoontheoffensive.Theyneedto:–  Re-bootthesocialcontractbetweenstateandsociety–  Supportthemarketeconomybutresistmarketfundamentalism–  Rebuildthe‘embeddedliberalcompromise’(Ruggie)–  PracMcewelfareKeynesianismathome,Smithianliberalismabroad–  Buildsystems,compromisesandincenMvesthatreconcilecapitalismwithmassdemocracy,notelitedemocracy.

–  Re-affirmlegiMmacyofinternaMonal,rulesbased,normsandregulatoryregimesinthefaceofpressurefromthepowerfulandanM-democraMclobbies—especiallyfromthefinancialsector.

–  Re-affirmtheprinciplesofcollecMveacMonproblemsolvingembodiedinthemulMlateralinsMtuMons•  EspeciallytheUNIMF,WorldBank,WTOandthenewerinsMtuMonssuchastheAIIBandtheBRICSNDB

WhattoDoAbouttheUSAunderTrump?

•  Notalottobedonebuthopeforthebestandplanfortheworst•  Ifthelong20thcenturyiscomingtoanenditcouldbevery

disrupMve—economicallyandpoliMcally—theUScouldsititout–  NolawforcestheUStoacceptglobalresponsibility.Itsatoutthe1920sand1930swhiletherestoftheworldcollapsed.

•  Itcouldtrytodothesameagain.–  Butunlikethe1920s-30s,USgeographyandwealthnolongerinsulateitfromexigenciesofglobaleconomicandpoliMcalcalamity.

–  Itspowerthenwasabsolute.Nowitisnot.–  TherewasnoresurgentRussia,norisingChinaandIndiaandnoothermajoreconomicandnuclearplayers

–  ThereisnolongertermexitopMonthisMme–  ButwhiletheUSremains,the‘indispensiblenaMon’muchdamagecouldbedoneintheshortterm

PART2:AEUROPEANCONTEXT

ThatWasThen,Thisisnow

FromtheEuropeanSecurityStrategy(2004)toShared

Vision,CommonAc:on:AStrongerEurope(2016)

WayBackWhen:TheIni8alproposi8on•  Thinkbacktothe2003EUSecurityStrategyPaper.Itwas:–  OpMmisMcandupbeataboutEuropeasasecurityactor–  Aself-congratulatory,smugeven,viewof‘normaMvepowerEurope’inagrowingmulM/tri-polarworldinwhichtheEUwouldbeoneof3majorplayers

•  ‘Socpower’seenasmajortoolinthepursuitofexternalrelaMons–  TheEU,assumingitwasalreadyadept,wouldbecomeevenbeIeratpracMcingsocpower

–  EUsocio-economic-culturalstrengths(democraMcvalues,superioreconomicintegraMonmodel,enlightenmentculture,commitmenttorulesbasedinternaMonalorder)wereonaroll.

–  AllwerevaluesforexporttomaketheworldabeIerplaceandwouldprojectaposiMveexternalimagefortheEU

Butthisnow.Howtheworldchanges•  2ndsentenceofEUGS(8)‘weliveinMmesofexistenMalcrisis’.•  InteraliatheEUfaces:

–  ConMnuinglegacyproblemsofglobalfinancialcrisis,–  UnresolvedEurozoneproblems–  AcermathoffailedArabrevoluMons,terrorismonitsonsoil–  RefugeesandmigraMonproblemstheMediterranean–  IncreasinglynaMonalistandaggressiveRussia–  Growthofpopulism,naMonalismand‘ilIiberaldemocracy’beyond(but

alsowithin)itsborders–  UnpredictableUSA,nolongera(self-binding)hegemonbutrather

threateningthe70yearpostWWIIliberalinternaMonalorder–  BrexitandallitsimplicaMons(knownandunknown)–  BrusselsonthedefensiveoverissuesoflegiMmacyandaccountability

•  EU’smemberstatessMllfindithard,atMmesevenundesirable,tooperateacommonpolicyintheinternaMonaldomain.–  IniMaMvesinvolvingrecoursetotradiMonalinstrumentsofforeignpolicy

includingforcefulandcoordinateddiplomacy,ocenreflectdivisionsbetweenmemberstatesleadingtosub-opMmalpolicyoutcomes.

ImplicaMonsofachangingglobalorder•  Letsnotpanic.Itsnottheapocalypse(justyet)•  ChangesinglobaldistribuMonofpowerarereal,including

–  Prospectofanunravelingofbothsecurityandeconomicarchitectures–  SkepMcismtowardtheEuropeanprojectunabatedandgrowing–  Contradictorydemandsonthosewhowouldmake/implementEUFP

•  DifficultroleforEEASconfrontedby(increasing)naMonaldesirestoretainorclawbacknaMonalcontrolsonpolicy.

•  EnhancingEU‘hardpower’ineconomicsandsecuritylikelytotakeprecedenceover,oratleast‘crowdout’,policydomainsof‘socpower’suchasculturaldiplomacy(resourceconstraints)

•  OpportuniMesofenhancedcoordinaMonincultural(andscience)diplomacy,betweentheEU,theMSandtheirextra-Europeanpartnersbecomemoredifficultastheybecomemoreimportant–  Infacttheytakesonaforeignpolicysignificancenotnormally

aIributedtoeithercultureorscienceingeneralorCSDinparMcular.

PART3:BUTLIFEGOESON

SOFTPOWERANDSECURITY:WHAT’SCULTUREGOTTODO

WITHIT?

ABitofEuropeanHistory•  Abitofhistory--withapologiestohistoriansintheroom•  EuropeanAvtudestoNonEuropeanCulture

–  Pre18thCentury:Europeanculturalborrowings,followedby‘expropriaMon’,fromnon-Europeancultures(especiallyOIomanEmpire)notuncommon

–  18thand19thCentury:emergenceofacivilisaMonalandteleologicaldiscourseofEuropeanculturalsuperiorityemerged•  Corroboratedandbolsteredbymaterialandtechnologicaladvances

–  CulturalsuperiorityimposedbyEuropeancolonialism.•  PosedasachoicebetweenaccepMngandrejecMng‘progress’•  EuropehasatradiMonoftellingotherswhentheyarenotmodernenough,notdemocraMcenoughornotChrisManorsecularenough

•  20thCentury,postcolonialere:posiMveandnegaMveresidueofenforced‘expropriaMon’fromEuropeanculturewithmoderndayimplicaMons–  ItisnotunusualforEuropeancultureandideastobenegaMvelyreceived

simplyontheirsourceoforiginratherthantheiruMlity

LinkingCulture,SecurityandDiplomacy•  LimitedandambiguousuMlitytothenoMonof‘socpower’—conceptualstretch

–  Someseeitasaeuphemismfor‘nopower’intheareaof‘hardpower’–  EvenJoeNyehaslargelyditchedtheterm.Henowfavours‘smartpower’

•  ‘Societalsecurity’anequallyambiguousexerciseinconceptualstretching•  Butsocietalandculturaldialogueandexchangeareseriouselementsofthe

transnaMonalandtrans-conMnentaldiplomaMcconversaMon,albeitnotasubsMtuteforhardpower–  InternaMonalculturalinteracMonandorganisaMonlongagoescapedthe

boundariesofthestate.•  SuccessfulCulturediplomacyisintheeyeofthebeholderwhere:

–  Influenceandreciprocalknowledgesharinginculturaldiplomacyisnotassured–  Culturaldiplomacyinconstantneedofre-mapping&checkingwithrecipients.

•  Re-mappingimpliesnotonlyunderstandingwhatwemeanbyculture,butalsothelanguageandothermediumsweusetopromoteit

–  Withoutre-mappingoldlegaciesofresentmentwillremainandnewresentmentswilldevelop.

•  Evenif‘socpower’reallyexists,badpolicychoicescanquicklydissipateit

PART4WHATCANBEDONE

THEJOINTCOMMUNIQUÉASA

ROADMAP

TheEUandCulturalDiplomacy•  Tworecentmid2016documents,

(i)JointCommuniquétoEuropeanParliamentandCommission,TowardsanEUStrategyofinternaFonalculturalrelaFons(ii)EuropeanUnionGlobalStrategy(EUGS).

•  JCprefers“internaFonalculturalrelaFons”toculturaldiplomacy.–  CandidlythisissemanMcobfuscaMonhidingrealagenda—arosebyany

othernameissMllaroseandthoseonthereceivingwillnotbefooled•  OnlyreferencetoculturaldiplomacyinEUGScomesatpage49

“Newfieldsofourjoined-upexternalacMonincludeenergy diplomacy,culturaldiplomacyandeconomicdiplomacy”

•  EUGSsaysitwillnurture “societalresiliencealsobydeepeningworkoneducaMon,cultureand youthtofosterpluralism,coexistenceandrespect”

•  ButmorerealisMcallysays “PuvngourdiversenaMonalculturesattheserviceofourshared interestsisachallenge”Indeeditis!!

•  YetevenifdifferencesinnaMonalculturescouldbecontrolledtherewillalwaysbeacoordinaMonproblems(Seeslide16)

TowardsanEUstrategyforinterna8onalCulturalRela8ons

•  2015,CouncilcalledonCommissiontopreparea‘strategicapproachtocultureintheEU’sexternalrelaMons’

•  TheJointCommuniquéistheresponse.Sothegoodnews:EUhasavisionforculturaldiplomacyexplicitlyframedincontextofitsaspiraMontobeglobalactor.NotwithstandingknownobjecMons,andmyowncriMque,Ijudgeitapowerful/persuasivedocument.

•  Drivenbyadesireto:–  FirstandforemostenhanceEurope’sexternalimageandinfluence.–  EnhanceculturaldialoguebetweentheEUandtherestoftheworld–  EnhanceEuropeaneconomiccompeMMvenessinanincreasingimportant

areaofinternaMonaltransacMon•  But—relevantforthisconference—notewhatitisnot:

–  TheJCisnotdrivenbyconcernsof‘societalsecuriMsaMon’althoughimprovedsocietalrelaMonswithinEUmightbeaposiMveexternality.

–  WhilereferencetointernaMonalculturalrelaMonsarepresentinEUGS,theyarenot(norshouldtheybe)atthecentreofthenewstrategy.

–  TheEUGStalksaboutsocietal‘resilience’andtheroleofcultureinsecuringit.Butitdoessoina‘catchall’non-specificandnon-policytargetedmanner.

CulturalDiplomacy:‘abeau8fulbutetherealproject’

•  InvariousspeechesHRMogherinihasreferredtoEuropeas–  A‘culturalsuperpower’–  Andculturaldiplomacyasanimportantforeignpolicytool

•  BothsuggesMonsmayindeedbeempiricallyaccurate.BUT:–  ThefirststatementissomethingofadiplomaMcfolly–  ThesecondstatementignorestheinauspiciousMmingoflaunchofthecommuniqué:2weeksbeforeBrexitand3weeksbeforeEUGS

•  EUisaglobalactorcurrentlybesetbycrisesofconfidenceandidenMtythatengulfitataMmeofunprecedentedanddiminishedglobalexpectaMoncomparedwithjustadecadeago.

•  EUinterestinculturaldiplomacyseemstobeanaIempttooffsetalossofidenMtyandglobalaspiraMon.

•  ButthingshavemovedsincetheopMmisMcdaysoftheearlytheC21st.•  EndeavoringtomakethebestofassetssuchasEurope’sculture

becomesacrucialinstrumentofpolicyandisindeedraMonal.•  ButassumpMonsthatEUculturaldiplomacycanmiMgateitsdeclining

influencevis-a-visthetradiMonalhegemon,theUSA,andtherisingglobalforceofEastAsiaispieMsMcratherthananalyMc.

TheDifficul8esofCulturalDiplomacy

•  Culturaldiplomacy,EUledorMSled,willalwaysbedifficult.–  Targetaudiences,especiallytheMiddleEastanddevelopingcountrieswill

alwaystreatculturaldiplomacywithsuspicion.•  Problemislessthesubstance,virtueandpromulgaMonofwestern

culturalvaluesperseratherthanthe‘norms-as-pracMces’thatwouldbenecessaryfortheirtrans-naMonaldelivery

•  Sharedculturalvaluesdonotnecessarilyamounttoacommon‘Europeanculturalpersona’thatcanbeabasisforculturaldiplomacy

•  Tosuggesttheycan,assomeofthemoreasserMvebrandsofEuropeannormaMvepowerdo,isatbestfoolhardy,atworstethnocentricallyarrogant.–  HencetheasserMonthatEuropeisa‘culturalsuperpower’isinept.Inmyjudgment.Itisastatementthatshouldnotberepeated.

–  Self-idenMficaMonasa‘superpower’isnotanoMonthatlendsitselftotheimprovementofinternaMonalculturalrelaMons.

CONCLUSIONS

1:TheLimitsofculturaldiplomacy•  IftheEU’smessagetootherpeoplesisthatEuropeanculturalvaluesarepivotal

tothepeacefulfuncMoningofinternaMonalsocietyitisamessagethatisprobablydesMnedtofallondeafearsinthecontemporaryera.

•  ItisaskingtoomuchofthoseEuropeansocio-culturalvaluesdevelopedsincetheEnlightenment—andespeciallyadesireonthepartofsometoexportliberaleconomicvalues,poliMcaldemocraMcvaluesandtheprogressivegrowthofhumanrights—toexpectthattheyshouldbeuniversalisableintheC21st.

•  Indeed,theyarenolongeraxiomaMcallyuniversalisableacrosstheAtlanMceven.ThedominanttrendisintheoppositedirecMon—populism,naMonalismandilliberaldemocracy(bothinsideandoutsidetheUnion).

•  ThisisnotanargumentforculturalrelaMvism.NoracriMqueofEuropeanvalues•  WhileEUstrategy’sstatedculturalaimistopromotediversity,themostlikely

readingtobetakenbeyondtheborderoftheEU,isthatitsrealaimistopromotetheEUinthecontemporaryglobalsearchforinfluence—especiallyvisavistheUSAandChina.

•  Thereisnothingwrongwithsuchastrategy.ButtheEUneedstotreadverysoclywiththirdcountriesifitisnottogenerateabacklash

2:IntotheUnkown•  ThereisacrisisofinternaMonalcollecMveacMonproblemsolving.–  EspeciallyinSecurity,EconomyandtheEnvironment

•  InsMtuMonalcooperaMon(globalgovernance)isatradeoffbetween:(i)theeffecMveandefficientprovisionofpublicgoodsand(ii)representaMon,accountability,legiMmacyandsovereignty.

•  GevngthebalancesrightremainsachargedpoliMcalquesMon.–  ItisaquesMonwemustaddressifwearetosecurethesemblanceofaposiMveglobalcooperaMveorder.

–  Aclichébut:theeconomyisglobalbutpoliMcsremainslocal–  Globalelitesmustlearnfromtheirmistakes–  PopulismandNaMonalismneedstobeconfrontedifneo-liberalism'snottobereplacedbyneo-naMonalism?

3:OpportunityCosts,CrowdingOutandResources

•  WhilerhetoriconenhancingEUculturalrelaMonsisstrong(atleastinBrussels)thelikelihoodofconcreteoutcomes—especiallyinMSwithstrongtradiMonsofculturaldiplomacy—shouldnotbeoveresMmated.–  EUhasonly‘supporMngcompetence’inculturaldiplomacy(Art6,TFEU).A

coordinaMonproblemisomni-presentinBrusselsacrossthepolicyspectrum–  ItisreflectedinculturaldiplomacyintheambiguityexpressedintheJointCommuniqué

toEUacMonsviatheEEASandtheseparatestrategiesoftheMS.•  ‘Crowdingout’isalwaysapossibilityinapackedexternalrelaMonsagenda.

Culturaldiplomacy,alongwitheconomicdiplomacyandenergydiplomacyare‘newfieldsofjoined-upexternalacMon’(2016:49)inEUGS.Butitisverypossiblethatolder,moretradiMonalprioriMeswillremain,andgrow,elsewhere.

•  InaTrumpianworldwecanexpectsecuritywillbecomethepriorityandresourcepressurestomeetmilitaryobligaMonswillbecomeacute.

•  ItwillbeinteresMngtoobserveoverthenextfewyearsthedegreetowhichculturaldiplomacycanreallybe,inMogherini’sownwords,‘…atthecoreofourforeignpolicy’.Youcouldsay,fautdemieux,ithastobe.

•  Youmightnotthinkit,butIamafan.Iwishherwell.ButIamnotopMmisMc.