eu 2013 policy priorities banking and financial markets
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This report outlines the EU
policies in the field of
banking and financial
regulation throughout
2013.
The report offers an overview of the stand points of
the European Greens on these specific policies, and
points to the national contexts where these policies
are likely to stir most discussions.
This report is researched and drafted by Jonas
Hirschnitz.
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Overview
Relevant Commissioners: Michel Barnier (France, Single
Market, MARKT)
Relevant Committee: Economic and Monetary Affairs
(ECON)
Main Green Actors in the European Parliament: Sven
Giegold (Coordinator of Greens in ECON committee,
Germany), Jean-Paul Besset (France), Philippe Lamberts
(Belgium), Substitute Members: Bas Eickhout
(Netherlands), Eva Joly (France), Emilie Turunen
(Denmark)
During the financial crisis, bank failures and the
meltdown of financial markets led to many European
citizens losing savings, investments, and even their jobs.
Massive government bailouts of banks in trouble also
meant taxpayers took over the risks incurred by private
investors on an unprecedented scale. This put severe
pressure on the finances of several countries, large and
small. It also clearly revealed that the regulation of
financial markets and banks was insufficient.
As international standards and national legislation were
not able to provide for a stable scheme, 2013 will see
further work of European banking and financial market
regulation. Although the EU does not have direct
competence to regulate Member States’ fiscal policy and
economic governance, it can introduce financial market
and banking standards through Internal Market
Directives and Regulations.
The EU Commission had previously been mostly occupied
with harmonising European financial markets, paying
less attention to their regulation. Yet, this approach was
radically turned around after 2009. Through the cross-border character of financial flows and the involvement
of banks in European and international markets during
the crisis, the European Commission now has a strong
mandate to propose further regulation in this regard.
While the new Commissioner for the Directorate General
Internal Market, Michel Barnier, in 2010 took office with
his personal vision to properly regulate “every financial
actor, financial market, financial activity and product”,
the far-reaching measures like the European Banking
Union or the financial transaction tax were only brought
on the way when agreements were reached in the
European Council of heads of state and government.
Consequently, most regulatory initiatives have been put
forward under the Single Market provisions under Article
114 of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, TFEU). The first major advancement
was the installation of a European System of Financial
Supervisors (ESFS), comprising three specialised
European supervisory authorities and the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Among the three
supervisory authorities1, the European Banking Authority
(EBA) is the most prominent. It gained this status as it
was principally banks and not market infrastructure or
insurance companies that were responsible for the crisis.
Until now, the scope of action of those Authorities does
yet not go far beyond assisting and advising the national
authorities. But aside from this, a plethora of more than
20 separate but more or less interacting initiatives have
been initiated by the Commission, such as regulation
proposals on deposit guarantee schemes, capital
requirements for banks, bank resolution regimes, and
the financial transaction tax. Furthermore, the
Commission has started taking belated and tentative
action in the fight against tax havens and shadow
banking. Currently in the debate is also the general
structural reform of banks. All of these initiatives will be
briefly described in this paper, highlighting the Green
responses to these proposals.
1 The other two organs are the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
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EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Banking regulations and financial markets
Key Measures – Banking Union
In an ordinary economy, banks are the most important
actors in the financial markets. They administrate the
savings of millions of citizens, they lend out money to
conventional customers and businesses, and they are an
essential source for loans to businesses and enterprises.
In this regard, they are one of the most essential building
blocs of the economy. Yet, the financial crisis showed that
imprudent bank conduct can have devastating
consequences for the whole society. As a result,
European decision-makers realised that the conduct of
banks had to be put in a clear framework, avoiding
excessive risks in banks, and separating banks from
states to avoid that bank failures become a burden to
state budgets. The measures to achieve this are
summarised in the concept of the banking union.
Any future banking union has three pillars:
> a single bank supervisor, which prevents
excessive risk taking of banks
> a common deposit guarantee scheme, which
guarantees the savings of ordinary bank
customers; and
> coherent resolution system which acts as an
emergency mechanism allowing intervention in
should a systemically important bank tumble into
crisis and which allows for a structured resolution
of failed banks
All three pillars could theoretically be steered by the
same entity, and the consensus among the Eurozone
members so far is that this entity should be the European
Central Bank (ECB). Yet, as there is already a European
bank supervisory authority installed – the EBA –
competences between the ECB and the EBA would have
to be defined.
1. Single Supervisory Mechanism
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has been the
central and most important issue in the discussions on
the banking union in 2012. The general idea is to install
an entity, which monitors the business of the banks, and
prevents them from engaging in too risky large scale
activities, which could have implications beyond the
frontiers of the bank.
The Commission has brought forward two proposals
among which the first designates the ECB to be the
European supervisory authority, and the second governs
the relations between ECB and the European Banking
Authority (EBA). Should both proposals be accepted as
such, the ECB would be the highest organ, and would be
complemented by the European Banking Authority (EBA),
which is mandated to develop a single rulebook for all
European Banks and to police the implementation of EU
supervisory rules.
The scope of the ECB’s supervisory powers is likely to be
limited to those European banks with assets worth at
least €30 billion or more than 20% of national GDP. This
was defined in the last Council of finance ministers on
12-13 December 2012. In fact this means that only circa
150 of the 6,000 European banks – at least three from
each participating state – could fall under the regime.
The ECB, being an independent institution overseeing the
monetary policy of the Eurozone since more than ten
years, is certainly an institution with vast expertise. Yet,
concerns have been raised that an unelected institution,
both overseeing monetary policy of the Euro, and
supervising national banks, could develop excessive
powers and be in a position to resolve important tensions
between monetary and supervisory policy (the latter
having important fiscal consequences). Another critical
point concerns the ECB’s governance structure. Banking
regulation becomes more effective the more countries
participate. If more powers are conferred on the ECB,
whose executive board only features members of the
states of the Eurozone, there is a danger of excluding
non-Eurozone states wanting to opt into the banking
union. Therefore, the European Council foresees a
reform of the internal structures of the ECB. This reform
proposal gives the supervisory board competence to
prepare decisions on supervisory tasks, and attributes
equal voting powers to countries opting in. Nevertheless,
the ultimate authority under the Treaties rests with the
Governing Council of the ECB – a pure Eurozone body.
The partial opening up of the ECB’s regime had been a
result of the pressure exerted by the European
Parliament’s Economic Affairs committee (ECON), which
called for a decision-making structure which would not
discriminate non-Eurozone Member States. The ECON
committee, for example, would like to see the Chair of
the ECB’s supervisory board being approved by the
European Parliament or have national parliaments and
the European Parliament entitled to hold hearings with
representatives of the ECB’s Supervisory Board.
Currently so-called “trialogue” negotiations are going on
between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament
and it will be crucial to see how many of the far-reaching
points in the position of the Parliament’s ECON
committee will find their way into a final compromise. As
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EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Banking regulations and financial markets
the two Commission proposals for regulation are to be
seen as a package, the European parliament has
considerable influence in the decision-making.
Green Response
The Greens have been very engaged in the discussions on
who should supervise and how this arrangement should
be designed. Based on a strong vision of inclusion and
democracy, any Green solution must imply non-discrimination of the countries not opting in into the new
supervision, and be bound to close democratic oversight.
This results in two demands: a reform of the ECB’s
governing board and as much European Parliament
oversight over the work of the supervisory body as
possible. The Greens have strongly advocated those
points in the ECON committee, and partly those demands
are reflected in the Committee’s position.
Yet, the original Green position set out to limit the powers
of the ECB even further as is now reflected in the ECON
position. The Greens wanted to clearly define that the
ECB cannot act as a legislator and as executive at the
same time, that is to say that it cannot issue regulations
for banks and at the same time act as supervisory
authority over those rules. The Greens were strongly in
favour of designating the EP and the Council as
‘legislator’, assisted by the expertise of the EBA, and
equipping the ECB as the executing institution. The
Greens see a democratic problem in delegating too much
power to an unelected body. While they were not able to
uphold this strong stance, they were able to introduce
several checks in the legislation, which work in this
interest. For example they stressed that the ECB’s
executive board is not totally independent in its conduct
where supervisory tasks are concerned, but is acting in
the scope defined by the European Council.
Moreover, although it was agreed that the supervisory
board inside the ECB should be open for any Member
State opting in into the SSM, the Greens criticise that the
governing board of the ECB still has the last say under
the ‘object and complain’ procedure.
Another object of criticism of the Greens is that they see
the regulation of commercial banks and the regulation
of investment banks or non-bank entities being involved
in the same kind of risk taking (shadow banks) as non-separable issues. The exposure to risk should be the
guiding principle when regulating an entity, and not its
legal character. This ‘same risk, same rule’ approach,
according to the Greens should be directly included in a
proposal on bank regulation. However, the Treaty
explicitly forbids the ECB to have a supervisory role with
regard to insurance undertakings and many financial
groups are retail bank, investment banks, and insurance
or investment management conglomerates.
In general, the Greens thus evaluate the outcome of the
negotiations so far as ‘quick, but dirty’ fix. This expresses
the dissatisfaction that the ‘same risk, same rule’
necessity was not implemented in the final text, and that
delegating more supervisory powers to the ECB is an
easy and quick solution, but that a more thorough policy
package had been desirable, especially from a
democratic point of view.
2. Deposit guarantee scheme (DGS)
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) reimburse a limited
amount of deposits to depositors whose bank has failed.
From the depositors' point of view, this protects a part of
their wealth from bank failures. From a financial stability
perspective, this promise prevents depositors from
making panic withdrawals from their bank, thereby
preventing severe economic consequences. Under the
1994 Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive, it was already
agreed that every EU Member State has to have such a
scheme in place.
However, the crisis in 2008 showed that the fragmented
regulations throughout the member states pose
substantial risks to the stability of the system. Therefore,
harmonisation under one scheme with common rules
seemed inevitable. The proposed Reform of the Deposit
Guarantee Scheme (2010), is currently still frozen in the
co-decision procedure awaiting the first debate in the
Council of Ministers. Yet, it is likely to be warmed up in
the upcoming year. The most important points the
proposal is supposed to amend are 1) the move towards a
harmonised European Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS),
including a time-table for a pan-European DGS, 2) a
confirmation of the coverage level of up to €100,000, 3)
better information for consumers on their rights, and 4)
an enhancement of the financing of such schemes by
bank contributions to ensure their workability.
Especially the time-table for a European DGS has raised
most controversy in the Council and has led to a
standstill of the process. Member States are still not able
to achieve consensus on European solidarity for deposit
guarantee schemes between the different countries.
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EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Banking regulations and financial markets
Green Response
The Greens original position is to favour a European
Deposit Guarantee Scheme. In the early stages of the
negotiations, this position was taken up by the European
Parliament’s ECON committee. During the negotiations
with the Council, however, it became clear that this
position was irreconcilable with the Council’s. Thus, the
ECON committee watered down its position on 24 May
2012, proposing that the deposit guarantee schemes
should remain national, but should be subject to common
European standards. Those standards are for example
the deposit guarantee up to €100,000, the obligation for
banks to have ex-ante capital financing for 1.5% of the
guaranteed deposits, and risk-adequate contributions
towards the guarantee system by financial institutions.
As this still represents a strong defence of the consumer,
in this case ordinary depositors, this position can be seen
as strongly reflecting Green preferences and the Greens
will continue to push into this direction in 2013.
3. Bank Resolution & (Common) Resolution Fund
When banks tumbled through the shocks of the financial
crisis, their situation was often aggravated through
panic-stricken bank runs, meaning that investors and in
some cases depositors in fear of losing their money
withdrew it as fast as they could. This suddenly removed
liquidity from the ailing institutions, depriving them of any
opportunity to lift themselves out of their dilemma. In the
case of systemically relevant institutes, the nation states
had to intervene through large scale bail-outs in an
attempt to keep banks in “intensive care” while
confidence was restored, thus transforming private
(bank) debt into public (taxpayer) debt. Had a structured
bank resolution mechanism existed, accompanied by a
resolution fund, this situation could have been averted by
early, decisive action and there is a good chance that a
credit crunch would not have developed into such a large
scale shock.
Therefore, the Commission’s proposal for a Recovery and
Resolution Directive (June 2012) set out to clearly define
a European-wide three step mechanism for dealing with
ailing banks. First, banks’ risk taking should be
controlled in order to limit their likelihood of bankruptcy
in case of market disruptions. Secondly, non-specified
authorities, likely to be national, are mandated to
intervene into bank affairs, should they detect grave
problems. Thirdly, in case those steps still cannot
prevent that a bank is on the verge of bankruptcy, a
coherent mechanism for bank resolution is defined.
A resolution can include measures such as the
recapitalisation of banks via bail-ins2, the restructuring of
banks implying a separation into good banks and bad
banks, and the sale of part of the business.
Long-term visions, such as the latest van Rompuy paper
of 5 December 2012, project the creation of a European
Resolution Fund, but this will have to be debated between
the heads of state in the upcoming year. The Recovery
and Resolution Directive is supposed to receive a first
reading by the EP’s ECON committee in March 2013
where discussions are currently based on the draft
report by Gunnar Hoekmark (EPP).
Green Response
The Greens have clear priorities for an outcome of the
negotiations: the principle that the taxpayer should not
pay the bill should a bank fail is paramount.
In this regard, it is likely that the Greens will support that
resolution funds will be financed by the banks, that
investors who knowingly invested in risky products
should accepts losses (bail-ins) and that deposits of
clients of retail banking should be guaranteed.
To make the system more transparent, the Greens are
currently working towards a separation of debt into debt
that is explicitly earmarked for bail-in, and debt which
even in a crisis, should have a much lower probability of
being endangered if the cushion of capital and explicit
bail-in debt is adequately sized. This would give investors
more information on the risk they potentially take.
National Considerations on Banking Union:
Countries outside the European Banking Union have
raised several concerns as its structures are putting non-members in a dilemma. On the one hand, banks under
the new European regime are upgraded, and become
2 A bail in usually imposes losses on bondholders,
meaning that they those who knowingly invested in risky
business contribute first to the recapitalisation of banks.
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EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Banking regulations and financial markets
more interesting for ordinary bank customers. This is a
particular problem for Eastern European countries,
where Austrian, German and Italian banks own large
shares of the banking sector.
This problem is connected to the provisions in the
legislative proposal, which make opt-ins unattractive.
Non-euro countries can opt into the banking union, but
would have no say in the governing council of the ECB
which is made up of Eurozone members only and
basically has the last word on all decisions. Therefore,
states prefer to maintain sovereignty over their banks
rather than surrendering it to an unaccountable
authority.
The UK is traditionally against any regulatory measure,
which could potentially reduce the attractiveness of the
City of London as a financial marketplace. A strict control
of its bank practices could be such a measure. Lastly,
also the UK has concerns on a lack of influence in the
ECB’s Governing Council. However, there is also a
compelling argument of the Banking Union states to keep
the Brits out of the regime: its aggregate bank assets are
simply too large, currently standing at €10.2 trillion –
four times the size of the German economy. Although
almost certainly not forming part of the Banking Union in
the near future, the UK is expected to consent to the new
enhanced cooperation.
A particularly interesting case is Estonia, member of the
Banking Union. Its whole banking sector is under
Swedish control, yet Sweden is not part of the Banking
Union, which in turn means that Estonian banks will not
be subject to the Banking Union controls.
SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES
4. Capital Requirements for Banks
One central activity of banks is to lend money and to
invest money; money which it has received as deposit
from ordinary retail bank customers or in the form of
long term debt issues to investors or, increasingly in the
years leading up to the crisis as short term loans from
other banks or financial institutions. In order to maximise
gains, a bank will always lend and invest the maximum
amount of money. In a prudent bank, though, investment
and lending follow certain rules such as careful selection
of the borrower and the financial product, careful
matching of the profile of liabilities and assets, and
diversification of the investments. Therefore, risks are
supposedly low and the diversity of investments prevents
that failure of certain investments results in large scale
shocks on banks.
Yet, the financial crisis has shown that bank’s conduct is
not always prudent, and that financial risk at times is
hard to assess and easy to spread. As shocks can not be
ruled out entirely, a possible remedy is to increase the
obligation of the capital banks have to hold. This capital
acts as a buffer for banks to still be able to meet
liabilities when investments fail.
To upgrade the European capital requirements for banks,
the Commission adopted an updated legislative package
(CRD IV package, July 2011, including a Directive and a
Regulation). These two legislative measures are the
European implementing acts of the international Basel III
recommendations. This legislative package also
increases the EU’s supervisory power by equipping EU
supervisors with the competence to fine institutions
which breach EU requirements.
Implementing the Basel III requirements, lenders are
supposed to hold significantly more capital of a much
better quality than they were obliged to hold under the
old scheme. Together with the new capital buffers, this is
supposed to create a strong emergency mechanism in
case of large bank losses.
Yet, the Commission proposal falls short in proposing
concrete indebtedness limits for banks, so-called
leverage ratios.
A breakthrough deal in the trialogue negotiations
between the Parliament, Council and Commission was
obtained at the end of February 2013, after months of
stagnation. The deal will provide for an EU cap on bank
bonuses, for provisions to ensure greater transparency
for banks' accounts, on top of key provisions ensuring
banks are properly capitalised. Commenting on the
outcome, Green negotiator and finance spokesperson
Philippe Lamberts (MEP, Belgium) said: "MEPs were
able, in the final round of negotiations, to obtain three
crucial points from the Council, namely a cap on
bonuses, on transparency of banking activities and on
capital surcharge for systemic banks. These concessions
from the Council were almost unimaginable when we
started negotiations over seven months ago."
This agreement still needs formal approval by the
European Parliament and the Council. Most member
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EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Banking regulations and financial markets
states of the EU are firmly behind the proposals, with the
notable exception of the UK that points to fears from the
City of London that these rules would drive away talent
and restrict growth.
Green Response
The Greens, also in this initiative follow their core
conviction that all has to be done to protect the citizens
from excessive risks imposed by the financial sector and
the banks. Therefore, they support the position formed in
the EP’s ECON committee on 14 May 2012, which
followed exactly this line and which is the result of
intensive Green involvement. The position called for an
extension of the Basel III rules in implementing even
higher capital levels and setting concrete leverage limits
and liquidity standards, whereas a particular focus
should lie on systemically important banks. To make this
possible, besides minimum standards, the committee
position foresees a greater leeway for member states in
imposing higher requirements for bank capital.
The ECON position reflects the general approach of the
Greens to set binding requirements which cannot be
circumvented easily. Last but not least the Greens were
responsible for the ECON position having strong
provisions on the benchmarking of the internal models
banks use to asses capital requirements for credit and
market risk and country-by-country reporting of financial
information to improve transparency around the nature
of banks profit generating activities.
Going beyond the ECON position, the Greens criticise that
a long term stable funding requirement designed to stop
banks relying too much on volatile short term funding
has been absent from the legislative proposal, and could
not be introduced in the ECON text.
Although a short term liquidity buffer "LCR" - another key
Basel III proposal - did feature in the Commission’s
proposal, it has already been watered down during
negotiations, much to the regret of the Greens.
5. Structural Reform: separation of investment and retail banking
On October 2, 2012 the Liikanen group presented its
report to the European Commission. It had been
mandated to assess whether investment banking and
retail banking had to be separated to protect the
European taxpayers from further bail-outs, and retail
banking customers from the risks of losing their bank
deposits. The result was a recommendation to legally
separate the different types of banking and to limit the
extent of risk taking by the parts involved in investment
banking. For example, bank bonus payments should be
paid out in debt shares which can be bailed-in in case of
the bank getting into trouble, which is supposed to limit
bank managers’ willingness to take risks as own assets
would be concerned.
Whereas the report as a whole will most likely not be
transposed into a legislative proposal, it proposes some
interesting ideas on how to shield European retail bank
customers from risks they are not aware of. Moreover,
whereas some proposals such as the higher capital
requirements for banks have already been picked up in
individual proposals, the debate on how to separate risky
investment banking from commercial banking will
certainly continue in 2013.
Green Response
For the Greens the protection of the ordinary bank clients
through a clear separation between risky investment
banking and commercial or retail banking is a priority.
Therefore, they applaud the recommendations of the
Liikanen group to clearly separate those activities, but –
as the Greens’ finance spokesperson Philippe Lamberts
expressed-deplored that the group had not considered
the option of a clear physical separation of investment
banks and retail banks – a more radical, but equally
easier to enforce policy measure.
Another problem which had been central in the crisis had
also not been addressed sufficiently, namely the problem
that some banks were simply ‘too big too fail’, which
resulted in the large scale bail-outs financed by the
European taxpayers. To resolve this problem once and
for all, the European Greens defend “cap limits on the
size of assets that a bank can hold […] to reduce the
systemic footprint of the banking industry”. Besides
those large scale reforms, Lamberts also pointed out
that all loopholes created by exceptions would have to be
closed to make the proposal workable.
The Greens also maintain that strict bans on bonuses
that exceed fixed remuneration are absolutely necessary
to limit bank risk taking.
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EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Banking regulations and financial markets
6. Shadow banking regulation
The past has shown that stronger regulation of banks
often leads to increased efforts to circumvent the
regulatory regime. Shadow banking refers to a variety of
less regulated financial activities that perform similar
activities to deposit taking and lending without the same
safeguards. Through shadow banking many banks have
effectively outsourced excessive risk taking to related off-balance sheet vehicles and via these to investment funds
and other money and capital market actors.
In this way the regulated banks offload risky investments
to non-banks in return for cheap short term cash that
they can reinvest in even more precarious products. The
prevailing danger is that in case the risky investments
blow up this does not only affect the shadow bank directly
taking the risk, but also its related bank. This sudden risk
puts the deposits of bank clients in danger. In addition, as
the practice can occur at such a large scale the failure of
the shadow banking market can constitute a systemic
risk. In the context of the financial crisis, bank regulation
can thus not function without a regulation of the shadow
banking sector as well.
On this note, the parliament’s ECON committee on 22
October 2012 adopted an initiative report on the matter,
which could lead to a motion for a resolution by the EP
plenary. The report calls for centralised information
sharing and data collection to better map the risks and
liquidities of banks throughout Europe. This should be
underpinned by common accounting standards
throughout Europe. Furthermore, the report also calls
for rules for banks, which prevent them from passing on
securities they received to a third party. In this way, the
relation between lender and borrower would remain
direct and easier to oversee and control - a situation
which totally went out of hand throughout the crisis. A
novel and far-reaching proposal is that rules for
‘exchange traded funds’ should be introduced, which
could work towards containing speculation on resources.
Green Response
The Greens have been calling for a regulation of shadow
banks for many years, as they undermine the effective
regulation of risky financial activities putting to risk the
savings of conventional bank customers. Many points in
the own initiative report have been defended by the
Greens in the ECON committee, such as the transparency
requirements, common standards, and stronger control
of opaque funds.
Yet, the Greens also defended a strengthening of the
European supervisory bodies such as the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) to monitor risky
investment vehicles and markets. Besides increased
analytical capacities, the Greens even envisaged the
delegation of the competence to take products
constituting high and destabilising risks from the market
to those authorities. However, this position could not be
defended in the committee. Nevertheless, as the
Commission is now urged to present a legislative
proposal, the debates will continue once this proposal is
tabled.
What is missing?
Direct Recapitalisation of banks through the ESM
Direct Recapitalisation of banks through the ESM has
been circulating as an idea since the banking union
entered the agenda. The prevalent argument (not least
defended by Germany) is that direct recapitalisation of
banks on the verge of failure through the ESM will
require a preceding introduction of a clear supervisory
scheme for banks. This follows the principle of carrot-and-stick. If banks apply for recapitalisation by the ESM,
they will have to accept that a supervisor is imposed on
them. As outlined above, currently the discussions on
banking union are defining this supervisory mechanism,
the SSM. Yet, apart from the political discourse, there is
no link between the SSM and recapitalisation of banks
through the ESM.
For the Greens, the recapitalisation of banks is a very
inevitable obligation to bring the economy back on track
in the current context. After all, key policies such as the
Green New Deal rely on investments to bring about
change in the economy and banks cannot act as lender if
they are lot liquid. Supervision does not change this
situation. Currently, banks are recapitalised by
taxpayers’ money. Establishing clear-cut mechanisms
with earmarked fund under the ESM would alleviate this
pressure from the ordinary clients. Therefore, the
Greens call for a sunset clause to define a legal link
between the SSM and the ESM.
Additional Information:
> The Greens/EFA group in the European
Parliament has a section on its website dedicated
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EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Banking regulations and financial markets
to Economic and Social policies, where press
releases, documents, and events can be found
> Green MEP Sven Giegold currently runs a
competition for the most dangerous financial
product and an article in The Telegraph has been
published on this.
> The Green New Deal website, developed and
promoted by GEF for the Greens/EFA group, and
uniting materials from GEF, the Greens/EFA and
the EGP, has a particular section on the Green
Economy
> Green MEP Philippe Lamberts runs a website on
the 7 sins of banks (in French)
> The website of the Tax Justice Network has a lot
of coverage on tax havens and tax avoidance
This text is the result of an original research carried out by Jonas Hirschnitz for the Green European Foundation.
Warm thanks to Greens/EFA advisors David Kemp and Michael Schmidt for their advice on the issues at stake.
© Green European Foundation
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors’ alone.
They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Green European Foundation.
With support of the European Parliament.
Green European Foundation asbl
1, rue du Fort Elisabeth
1463 Luxembourg
Brussels Office:
15 rue d’Arlon, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
Phone: +32 2 234 65 70 - Fax: +32 2 234 65 79
E - mail: info@gef.eu - Web: www.gef.eu
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