eu 2013 policy priorities banking and financial markets

This report outlines the EU

policies in the field of

banking and financial

regulation throughout

2013.

The report offers an overview of the stand points of

the European Greens on these specific policies, and

points to the national contexts where these policies

are likely to stir most discussions.

This report is researched and drafted by Jonas

Hirschnitz.

EU 201EU 201EU 201EU 2013333 Policy PrioritiesPolicy PrioritiesPolicy PrioritiesPolicy Priorities Banking RegulationBanking RegulationBanking RegulationBanking Regulation &&&& Financial Financial Financial Financial MarketsMarketsMarketsMarkets

Overview

Relevant Commissioners: Michel Barnier (France, Single

Market, MARKT)

Relevant Committee: Economic and Monetary Affairs

(ECON)

Main Green Actors in the European Parliament: Sven

Giegold (Coordinator of Greens in ECON committee,

Germany), Jean-Paul Besset (France), Philippe Lamberts

(Belgium), Substitute Members: Bas Eickhout

(Netherlands), Eva Joly (France), Emilie Turunen

(Denmark)

During the financial crisis, bank failures and the

meltdown of financial markets led to many European

citizens losing savings, investments, and even their jobs.

Massive government bailouts of banks in trouble also

meant taxpayers took over the risks incurred by private

investors on an unprecedented scale. This put severe

pressure on the finances of several countries, large and

small. It also clearly revealed that the regulation of

financial markets and banks was insufficient.

As international standards and national legislation were

not able to provide for a stable scheme, 2013 will see

further work of European banking and financial market

regulation. Although the EU does not have direct

competence to regulate Member States’ fiscal policy and

economic governance, it can introduce financial market

and banking standards through Internal Market

Directives and Regulations.

The EU Commission had previously been mostly occupied

with harmonising European financial markets, paying

less attention to their regulation. Yet, this approach was

radically turned around after 2009. Through the cross-border character of financial flows and the involvement

of banks in European and international markets during

the crisis, the European Commission now has a strong

mandate to propose further regulation in this regard.

While the new Commissioner for the Directorate General

Internal Market, Michel Barnier, in 2010 took office with

his personal vision to properly regulate “every financial

actor, financial market, financial activity and product”,

the far-reaching measures like the European Banking

Union or the financial transaction tax were only brought

on the way when agreements were reached in the

European Council of heads of state and government.

Consequently, most regulatory initiatives have been put

forward under the Single Market provisions under Article

114 of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union, TFEU). The first major advancement

was the installation of a European System of Financial

Supervisors (ESFS), comprising three specialised

European supervisory authorities and the European

Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Among the three

supervisory authorities1, the European Banking Authority

(EBA) is the most prominent. It gained this status as it

was principally banks and not market infrastructure or

insurance companies that were responsible for the crisis.

Until now, the scope of action of those Authorities does

yet not go far beyond assisting and advising the national

authorities. But aside from this, a plethora of more than

20 separate but more or less interacting initiatives have

been initiated by the Commission, such as regulation

proposals on deposit guarantee schemes, capital

requirements for banks, bank resolution regimes, and

the financial transaction tax. Furthermore, the

Commission has started taking belated and tentative

action in the fight against tax havens and shadow

banking. Currently in the debate is also the general

structural reform of banks. All of these initiatives will be

briefly described in this paper, highlighting the Green

responses to these proposals.

1 The other two organs are the European Insurance and

Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the

European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).

2

EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Banking regulations and financial markets

Key Measures – Banking Union

In an ordinary economy, banks are the most important

actors in the financial markets. They administrate the

savings of millions of citizens, they lend out money to

conventional customers and businesses, and they are an

essential source for loans to businesses and enterprises.

In this regard, they are one of the most essential building

blocs of the economy. Yet, the financial crisis showed that

imprudent bank conduct can have devastating

consequences for the whole society. As a result,

European decision-makers realised that the conduct of

banks had to be put in a clear framework, avoiding

excessive risks in banks, and separating banks from

states to avoid that bank failures become a burden to

state budgets. The measures to achieve this are

summarised in the concept of the banking union.

Any future banking union has three pillars:

> a single bank supervisor, which prevents

excessive risk taking of banks

> a common deposit guarantee scheme, which

guarantees the savings of ordinary bank

customers; and

> coherent resolution system which acts as an

emergency mechanism allowing intervention in

should a systemically important bank tumble into

crisis and which allows for a structured resolution

of failed banks

All three pillars could theoretically be steered by the

same entity, and the consensus among the Eurozone

members so far is that this entity should be the European

Central Bank (ECB). Yet, as there is already a European

bank supervisory authority installed – the EBA –

competences between the ECB and the EBA would have

to be defined.

1. Single Supervisory Mechanism

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has been the

central and most important issue in the discussions on

the banking union in 2012. The general idea is to install

an entity, which monitors the business of the banks, and

prevents them from engaging in too risky large scale

activities, which could have implications beyond the

frontiers of the bank.

The Commission has brought forward two proposals

among which the first designates the ECB to be the

European supervisory authority, and the second governs

the relations between ECB and the European Banking

Authority (EBA). Should both proposals be accepted as

such, the ECB would be the highest organ, and would be

complemented by the European Banking Authority (EBA),

which is mandated to develop a single rulebook for all

European Banks and to police the implementation of EU

supervisory rules.

The scope of the ECB’s supervisory powers is likely to be

limited to those European banks with assets worth at

least €30 billion or more than 20% of national GDP. This

was defined in the last Council of finance ministers on

12-13 December 2012. In fact this means that only circa

150 of the 6,000 European banks – at least three from

each participating state – could fall under the regime.

The ECB, being an independent institution overseeing the

monetary policy of the Eurozone since more than ten

years, is certainly an institution with vast expertise. Yet,

concerns have been raised that an unelected institution,

both overseeing monetary policy of the Euro, and

supervising national banks, could develop excessive

powers and be in a position to resolve important tensions

between monetary and supervisory policy (the latter

having important fiscal consequences). Another critical

point concerns the ECB’s governance structure. Banking

regulation becomes more effective the more countries

participate. If more powers are conferred on the ECB,

whose executive board only features members of the

states of the Eurozone, there is a danger of excluding

non-Eurozone states wanting to opt into the banking

union. Therefore, the European Council foresees a

reform of the internal structures of the ECB. This reform

proposal gives the supervisory board competence to

prepare decisions on supervisory tasks, and attributes

equal voting powers to countries opting in. Nevertheless,

the ultimate authority under the Treaties rests with the

Governing Council of the ECB – a pure Eurozone body.

The partial opening up of the ECB’s regime had been a

result of the pressure exerted by the European

Parliament’s Economic Affairs committee (ECON), which

called for a decision-making structure which would not

discriminate non-Eurozone Member States. The ECON

committee, for example, would like to see the Chair of

the ECB’s supervisory board being approved by the

European Parliament or have national parliaments and

the European Parliament entitled to hold hearings with

representatives of the ECB’s Supervisory Board.

Currently so-called “trialogue” negotiations are going on

between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament

and it will be crucial to see how many of the far-reaching

points in the position of the Parliament’s ECON

committee will find their way into a final compromise. As

3


the two Commission proposals for regulation are to be

seen as a package, the European parliament has

considerable influence in the decision-making.

Green Response

The Greens have been very engaged in the discussions on

who should supervise and how this arrangement should

be designed. Based on a strong vision of inclusion and

democracy, any Green solution must imply non-discrimination of the countries not opting in into the new

supervision, and be bound to close democratic oversight.

This results in two demands: a reform of the ECB’s

governing board and as much European Parliament

oversight over the work of the supervisory body as

possible. The Greens have strongly advocated those

points in the ECON committee, and partly those demands

are reflected in the Committee’s position.

Yet, the original Green position set out to limit the powers

of the ECB even further as is now reflected in the ECON

position. The Greens wanted to clearly define that the

ECB cannot act as a legislator and as executive at the

same time, that is to say that it cannot issue regulations

for banks and at the same time act as supervisory

authority over those rules. The Greens were strongly in

favour of designating the EP and the Council as

‘legislator’, assisted by the expertise of the EBA, and

equipping the ECB as the executing institution. The

Greens see a democratic problem in delegating too much

power to an unelected body. While they were not able to

uphold this strong stance, they were able to introduce

several checks in the legislation, which work in this

interest. For example they stressed that the ECB’s

executive board is not totally independent in its conduct

where supervisory tasks are concerned, but is acting in

the scope defined by the European Council.

Moreover, although it was agreed that the supervisory

board inside the ECB should be open for any Member

State opting in into the SSM, the Greens criticise that the

governing board of the ECB still has the last say under

the ‘object and complain’ procedure.

Another object of criticism of the Greens is that they see

the regulation of commercial banks and the regulation

of investment banks or non-bank entities being involved

in the same kind of risk taking (shadow banks) as non-separable issues. The exposure to risk should be the

guiding principle when regulating an entity, and not its

legal character. This ‘same risk, same rule’ approach,

according to the Greens should be directly included in a

proposal on bank regulation. However, the Treaty

explicitly forbids the ECB to have a supervisory role with

regard to insurance undertakings and many financial

groups are retail bank, investment banks, and insurance

or investment management conglomerates.

In general, the Greens thus evaluate the outcome of the

negotiations so far as ‘quick, but dirty’ fix. This expresses

the dissatisfaction that the ‘same risk, same rule’

necessity was not implemented in the final text, and that

delegating more supervisory powers to the ECB is an

easy and quick solution, but that a more thorough policy

package had been desirable, especially from a

democratic point of view.

2. Deposit guarantee scheme (DGS)

Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) reimburse a limited

amount of deposits to depositors whose bank has failed.

From the depositors' point of view, this protects a part of

their wealth from bank failures. From a financial stability

perspective, this promise prevents depositors from

making panic withdrawals from their bank, thereby

preventing severe economic consequences. Under the

1994 Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive, it was already

agreed that every EU Member State has to have such a

scheme in place.

However, the crisis in 2008 showed that the fragmented

regulations throughout the member states pose

substantial risks to the stability of the system. Therefore,

harmonisation under one scheme with common rules

seemed inevitable. The proposed Reform of the Deposit

Guarantee Scheme (2010), is currently still frozen in the

co-decision procedure awaiting the first debate in the

Council of Ministers. Yet, it is likely to be warmed up in

the upcoming year. The most important points the

proposal is supposed to amend are 1) the move towards a

harmonised European Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS),

including a time-table for a pan-European DGS, 2) a

confirmation of the coverage level of up to €100,000, 3)

better information for consumers on their rights, and 4)

an enhancement of the financing of such schemes by

bank contributions to ensure their workability.

Especially the time-table for a European DGS has raised

most controversy in the Council and has led to a

standstill of the process. Member States are still not able

to achieve consensus on European solidarity for deposit

guarantee schemes between the different countries.

4


Green Response

The Greens original position is to favour a European

Deposit Guarantee Scheme. In the early stages of the

negotiations, this position was taken up by the European

Parliament’s ECON committee. During the negotiations

with the Council, however, it became clear that this

position was irreconcilable with the Council’s. Thus, the

ECON committee watered down its position on 24 May

2012, proposing that the deposit guarantee schemes

should remain national, but should be subject to common

European standards. Those standards are for example

the deposit guarantee up to €100,000, the obligation for

banks to have ex-ante capital financing for 1.5% of the

guaranteed deposits, and risk-adequate contributions

towards the guarantee system by financial institutions.

As this still represents a strong defence of the consumer,

in this case ordinary depositors, this position can be seen

as strongly reflecting Green preferences and the Greens

will continue to push into this direction in 2013.

3. Bank Resolution & (Common) Resolution Fund

When banks tumbled through the shocks of the financial

crisis, their situation was often aggravated through

panic-stricken bank runs, meaning that investors and in

some cases depositors in fear of losing their money

withdrew it as fast as they could. This suddenly removed

liquidity from the ailing institutions, depriving them of any

opportunity to lift themselves out of their dilemma. In the

case of systemically relevant institutes, the nation states

had to intervene through large scale bail-outs in an

attempt to keep banks in “intensive care” while

confidence was restored, thus transforming private

(bank) debt into public (taxpayer) debt. Had a structured

bank resolution mechanism existed, accompanied by a

resolution fund, this situation could have been averted by

early, decisive action and there is a good chance that a

credit crunch would not have developed into such a large

scale shock.

Therefore, the Commission’s proposal for a Recovery and

Resolution Directive (June 2012) set out to clearly define

a European-wide three step mechanism for dealing with

ailing banks. First, banks’ risk taking should be

controlled in order to limit their likelihood of bankruptcy

in case of market disruptions. Secondly, non-specified

authorities, likely to be national, are mandated to

intervene into bank affairs, should they detect grave

problems. Thirdly, in case those steps still cannot

prevent that a bank is on the verge of bankruptcy, a

coherent mechanism for bank resolution is defined.

A resolution can include measures such as the

recapitalisation of banks via bail-ins2, the restructuring of

banks implying a separation into good banks and bad

banks, and the sale of part of the business.

Long-term visions, such as the latest van Rompuy paper

of 5 December 2012, project the creation of a European

Resolution Fund, but this will have to be debated between

the heads of state in the upcoming year. The Recovery

and Resolution Directive is supposed to receive a first

reading by the EP’s ECON committee in March 2013

where discussions are currently based on the draft

report by Gunnar Hoekmark (EPP).

Green Response

The Greens have clear priorities for an outcome of the

negotiations: the principle that the taxpayer should not

pay the bill should a bank fail is paramount.

In this regard, it is likely that the Greens will support that

resolution funds will be financed by the banks, that

investors who knowingly invested in risky products

should accepts losses (bail-ins) and that deposits of

clients of retail banking should be guaranteed.

To make the system more transparent, the Greens are

currently working towards a separation of debt into debt

that is explicitly earmarked for bail-in, and debt which

even in a crisis, should have a much lower probability of

being endangered if the cushion of capital and explicit

bail-in debt is adequately sized. This would give investors

more information on the risk they potentially take.

National Considerations on Banking Union:

Countries outside the European Banking Union have

raised several concerns as its structures are putting non-members in a dilemma. On the one hand, banks under

the new European regime are upgraded, and become

2 A bail in usually imposes losses on bondholders,

meaning that they those who knowingly invested in risky

business contribute first to the recapitalisation of banks.

5


more interesting for ordinary bank customers. This is a

particular problem for Eastern European countries,

where Austrian, German and Italian banks own large

shares of the banking sector.

This problem is connected to the provisions in the

legislative proposal, which make opt-ins unattractive.

Non-euro countries can opt into the banking union, but

would have no say in the governing council of the ECB

which is made up of Eurozone members only and

basically has the last word on all decisions. Therefore,

states prefer to maintain sovereignty over their banks

rather than surrendering it to an unaccountable

authority.

The UK is traditionally against any regulatory measure,

which could potentially reduce the attractiveness of the

City of London as a financial marketplace. A strict control

of its bank practices could be such a measure. Lastly,

also the UK has concerns on a lack of influence in the

ECB’s Governing Council. However, there is also a

compelling argument of the Banking Union states to keep

the Brits out of the regime: its aggregate bank assets are

simply too large, currently standing at €10.2 trillion –

four times the size of the German economy. Although

almost certainly not forming part of the Banking Union in

the near future, the UK is expected to consent to the new

enhanced cooperation.

A particularly interesting case is Estonia, member of the

Banking Union. Its whole banking sector is under

Swedish control, yet Sweden is not part of the Banking

Union, which in turn means that Estonian banks will not

be subject to the Banking Union controls.

SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES

4. Capital Requirements for Banks

One central activity of banks is to lend money and to

invest money; money which it has received as deposit

from ordinary retail bank customers or in the form of

long term debt issues to investors or, increasingly in the

years leading up to the crisis as short term loans from

other banks or financial institutions. In order to maximise

gains, a bank will always lend and invest the maximum

amount of money. In a prudent bank, though, investment

and lending follow certain rules such as careful selection

of the borrower and the financial product, careful

matching of the profile of liabilities and assets, and

diversification of the investments. Therefore, risks are

supposedly low and the diversity of investments prevents

that failure of certain investments results in large scale

shocks on banks.

Yet, the financial crisis has shown that bank’s conduct is

not always prudent, and that financial risk at times is

hard to assess and easy to spread. As shocks can not be

ruled out entirely, a possible remedy is to increase the

obligation of the capital banks have to hold. This capital

acts as a buffer for banks to still be able to meet

liabilities when investments fail.

To upgrade the European capital requirements for banks,

the Commission adopted an updated legislative package

(CRD IV package, July 2011, including a Directive and a

Regulation). These two legislative measures are the

European implementing acts of the international Basel III

recommendations. This legislative package also

increases the EU’s supervisory power by equipping EU

supervisors with the competence to fine institutions

which breach EU requirements.

Implementing the Basel III requirements, lenders are

supposed to hold significantly more capital of a much

better quality than they were obliged to hold under the

old scheme. Together with the new capital buffers, this is

supposed to create a strong emergency mechanism in

case of large bank losses.

Yet, the Commission proposal falls short in proposing

concrete indebtedness limits for banks, so-called

leverage ratios.

A breakthrough deal in the trialogue negotiations

between the Parliament, Council and Commission was

obtained at the end of February 2013, after months of

stagnation. The deal will provide for an EU cap on bank

bonuses, for provisions to ensure greater transparency

for banks' accounts, on top of key provisions ensuring

banks are properly capitalised. Commenting on the

outcome, Green negotiator and finance spokesperson

Philippe Lamberts (MEP, Belgium) said: "MEPs were

able, in the final round of negotiations, to obtain three

crucial points from the Council, namely a cap on

bonuses, on transparency of banking activities and on

capital surcharge for systemic banks. These concessions

from the Council were almost unimaginable when we

started negotiations over seven months ago."

This agreement still needs formal approval by the

European Parliament and the Council. Most member

6


states of the EU are firmly behind the proposals, with the

notable exception of the UK that points to fears from the

City of London that these rules would drive away talent

and restrict growth.

Green Response

The Greens, also in this initiative follow their core

conviction that all has to be done to protect the citizens

from excessive risks imposed by the financial sector and

the banks. Therefore, they support the position formed in

the EP’s ECON committee on 14 May 2012, which

followed exactly this line and which is the result of

intensive Green involvement. The position called for an

extension of the Basel III rules in implementing even

higher capital levels and setting concrete leverage limits

and liquidity standards, whereas a particular focus

should lie on systemically important banks. To make this

possible, besides minimum standards, the committee

position foresees a greater leeway for member states in

imposing higher requirements for bank capital.

The ECON position reflects the general approach of the

Greens to set binding requirements which cannot be

circumvented easily. Last but not least the Greens were

responsible for the ECON position having strong

provisions on the benchmarking of the internal models

banks use to asses capital requirements for credit and

market risk and country-by-country reporting of financial

information to improve transparency around the nature

of banks profit generating activities.

Going beyond the ECON position, the Greens criticise that

a long term stable funding requirement designed to stop

banks relying too much on volatile short term funding

has been absent from the legislative proposal, and could

not be introduced in the ECON text.

Although a short term liquidity buffer "LCR" - another key

Basel III proposal - did feature in the Commission’s

proposal, it has already been watered down during

negotiations, much to the regret of the Greens.

5. Structural Reform: separation of investment and retail banking

On October 2, 2012 the Liikanen group presented its

report to the European Commission. It had been

mandated to assess whether investment banking and

retail banking had to be separated to protect the

European taxpayers from further bail-outs, and retail

banking customers from the risks of losing their bank

deposits. The result was a recommendation to legally

separate the different types of banking and to limit the

extent of risk taking by the parts involved in investment

banking. For example, bank bonus payments should be

paid out in debt shares which can be bailed-in in case of

the bank getting into trouble, which is supposed to limit

bank managers’ willingness to take risks as own assets

would be concerned.

Whereas the report as a whole will most likely not be

transposed into a legislative proposal, it proposes some

interesting ideas on how to shield European retail bank

customers from risks they are not aware of. Moreover,

whereas some proposals such as the higher capital

requirements for banks have already been picked up in

individual proposals, the debate on how to separate risky

investment banking from commercial banking will

certainly continue in 2013.

Green Response

For the Greens the protection of the ordinary bank clients

through a clear separation between risky investment

banking and commercial or retail banking is a priority.

Therefore, they applaud the recommendations of the

Liikanen group to clearly separate those activities, but –

as the Greens’ finance spokesperson Philippe Lamberts

expressed-deplored that the group had not considered

the option of a clear physical separation of investment

banks and retail banks – a more radical, but equally

easier to enforce policy measure.

Another problem which had been central in the crisis had

also not been addressed sufficiently, namely the problem

that some banks were simply ‘too big too fail’, which

resulted in the large scale bail-outs financed by the

European taxpayers. To resolve this problem once and

for all, the European Greens defend “cap limits on the

size of assets that a bank can hold […] to reduce the

systemic footprint of the banking industry”. Besides

those large scale reforms, Lamberts also pointed out

that all loopholes created by exceptions would have to be

closed to make the proposal workable.

The Greens also maintain that strict bans on bonuses

that exceed fixed remuneration are absolutely necessary

to limit bank risk taking.

7


6. Shadow banking regulation

The past has shown that stronger regulation of banks

often leads to increased efforts to circumvent the

regulatory regime. Shadow banking refers to a variety of

less regulated financial activities that perform similar

activities to deposit taking and lending without the same

safeguards. Through shadow banking many banks have

effectively outsourced excessive risk taking to related off-balance sheet vehicles and via these to investment funds

and other money and capital market actors.

In this way the regulated banks offload risky investments

to non-banks in return for cheap short term cash that

they can reinvest in even more precarious products. The

prevailing danger is that in case the risky investments

blow up this does not only affect the shadow bank directly

taking the risk, but also its related bank. This sudden risk

puts the deposits of bank clients in danger. In addition, as

the practice can occur at such a large scale the failure of

the shadow banking market can constitute a systemic

risk. In the context of the financial crisis, bank regulation

can thus not function without a regulation of the shadow

banking sector as well.

On this note, the parliament’s ECON committee on 22

October 2012 adopted an initiative report on the matter,

which could lead to a motion for a resolution by the EP

plenary. The report calls for centralised information

sharing and data collection to better map the risks and

liquidities of banks throughout Europe. This should be

underpinned by common accounting standards

throughout Europe. Furthermore, the report also calls

for rules for banks, which prevent them from passing on

securities they received to a third party. In this way, the

relation between lender and borrower would remain

direct and easier to oversee and control - a situation

which totally went out of hand throughout the crisis. A

novel and far-reaching proposal is that rules for

‘exchange traded funds’ should be introduced, which

could work towards containing speculation on resources.

Green Response

The Greens have been calling for a regulation of shadow

banks for many years, as they undermine the effective

regulation of risky financial activities putting to risk the

savings of conventional bank customers. Many points in

the own initiative report have been defended by the

Greens in the ECON committee, such as the transparency

requirements, common standards, and stronger control

of opaque funds.

Yet, the Greens also defended a strengthening of the

European supervisory bodies such as the European

Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the

Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) to monitor risky

investment vehicles and markets. Besides increased

analytical capacities, the Greens even envisaged the

delegation of the competence to take products

constituting high and destabilising risks from the market

to those authorities. However, this position could not be

defended in the committee. Nevertheless, as the

Commission is now urged to present a legislative

proposal, the debates will continue once this proposal is

tabled.

What is missing?

Direct Recapitalisation of banks through the ESM

Direct Recapitalisation of banks through the ESM has

been circulating as an idea since the banking union

entered the agenda. The prevalent argument (not least

defended by Germany) is that direct recapitalisation of

banks on the verge of failure through the ESM will

require a preceding introduction of a clear supervisory

scheme for banks. This follows the principle of carrot-and-stick. If banks apply for recapitalisation by the ESM,

they will have to accept that a supervisor is imposed on

them. As outlined above, currently the discussions on

banking union are defining this supervisory mechanism,

the SSM. Yet, apart from the political discourse, there is

no link between the SSM and recapitalisation of banks

through the ESM.

For the Greens, the recapitalisation of banks is a very

inevitable obligation to bring the economy back on track

in the current context. After all, key policies such as the

Green New Deal rely on investments to bring about

change in the economy and banks cannot act as lender if

they are lot liquid. Supervision does not change this

situation. Currently, banks are recapitalised by

taxpayers’ money. Establishing clear-cut mechanisms

with earmarked fund under the ESM would alleviate this

pressure from the ordinary clients. Therefore, the

Greens call for a sunset clause to define a legal link

between the SSM and the ESM.

Additional Information:

> The Greens/EFA group in the European

Parliament has a section on its website dedicated

8


to Economic and Social policies, where press

releases, documents, and events can be found

> Green MEP Sven Giegold currently runs a

competition for the most dangerous financial

product and an article in The Telegraph has been

published on this.

> The Green New Deal website, developed and

promoted by GEF for the Greens/EFA group, and

uniting materials from GEF, the Greens/EFA and

the EGP, has a particular section on the Green

Economy

> Green MEP Philippe Lamberts runs a website on

the 7 sins of banks (in French)

> The website of the Tax Justice Network has a lot

of coverage on tax havens and tax avoidance

This text is the result of an original research carried out by Jonas Hirschnitz for the Green European Foundation.

Warm thanks to Greens/EFA advisors David Kemp and Michael Schmidt for their advice on the issues at stake.

© Green European Foundation

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors’ alone.

They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Green European Foundation.

With support of the European Parliament.

Green European Foundation asbl

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1463 Luxembourg

Brussels Office:

15 rue d’Arlon, 1050 Brussels, Belgium

Phone: +32 2 234 65 70 - Fax: +32 2 234 65 79

E - mail: [email protected] - Web: www.gef.eu

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