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Disarmament and International Security Committee
2016第二届
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
Topic A: Aggression, Sabotage and Espionage in Cyberspace: Drawing Red Lines
Written by George Mullens Yuji Develle
Topic B: The Kurdish Peace Process: Disarmament and Peace-Building in the relevant regions of Turkey, Syria and Iraq
This document, originally written for use in Oxford
International Model United Nations 2016, is licensed
under Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0
(CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).
Any re-use or modification must be made public and
noncommercial and give credit to the original authors.
This Study Guide is ONLY for Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS
Model United Nations Conference 2016, co-hosting by
WELAND International, Oxford Global Education
Development and Shanghai Foreign Languages School
affiliated to Shanghai International Studies University.
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
1
CONTENTS
Topic A: Aggression, Sabotage and Espionage
in Cyberspace: Drawing Red Lines
- Introduction pg 3
-Topic History pg 3
-Discussion of the Problem pg 10
-The Future pg 15
-Bloc Positions pg 18
-PRSA .....................pg 19
-Further Reading pg 19
-Bibliography pg 20
Topic B: The Kurdish Peace Process:
Disarmament and Peace-Building in the
relevant regions of Turkey, Syria and Iraq
-Introduction pg 24
-Topic History pg 26
-Discussion of the Problem pg 30
-The Future pg 36
-Bloc Positions pg 37
-PRSA pg 38
-Further Reading pg 38
-Bibliography pg 39
Written by:
George Mullens
Yuji Develle
Disarmament and International Security
Committee
Topic A: Aggression, Sabotage and Espionage
in Cyberspace: Drawing Red Lines
Topic B: The Kurdish Peace Process:
Disarmament and Peace-Building in the
relevant regions of Turkey, Syria and Iraq
Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the Disarmament and
International Security Committee! DISEC,
also known as The First Committee, is one of
the most important and powerful UN
committees.
The topics that we will debate are extremely
relevant to the maintenance of international
peace and security. With the increased usage
of technology in our lives, security in
cyberspace is an important security threat to
states. Whilst the Kurdish peace process has
been ongoing for decades without a peaceful
end in sight.
You are all expected to read through this
document carefully and to research both topics.
In your role as a delegate, you are
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
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expected to represent your country’s foreign 1
opponent to fulfil our will.’ The ‘Fifth
policy and to act like a true diplomat.
TOPIC A: AGGRESSION,
SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE IN
CYBERSPACE: DRAWING RED
LINES
The exponential pace of technological change
has shaken the very foundations of the UN
Charter. Over the past 70 years, international
conflict has morphed into a shape beyond the
San Francisco diplomats’ wildest
imaginations. Carl von Clausewitz, the father
of modern warfare, once declared: ‘War is a
mere continuation of policy by other means;
War… is an act of violence to compel our
Domain’ of warfare, cyberspace, and/or
information warfare has given states and non-
state actors new ways of achieving political
ends through other means.
It is the mandate of the DISEC to oversee
frameworks and solutions to issues that lead to
a destabilisation of peace and security to both
individuals and states alike. Cyberspace has
long been a blind-spot for the UN system,
where criminal and inter-state threats
jeopardize the trust and readiness of collective
security in both the developed and developing
world. Over the past two years, actors like
China, the USA, the E.U., and Great Britain all
shifted their view on cyberspace to include not
only a matter of information security/C4-
infrastructure but also the Fifth Domain of
Warfare.
TOPIC HISTORY
Despite the relative ‘newness’ of cyber
aggression, the past three decades have
gathered quite an extensive record of diverse
cyber-attacks. Throughout the past 25 years,
one notices the increasing complexity and
boldness of attacks, regardless of whether
those are attributed to states, state-sponsored
actors, or independent non-state actors.
Cyber-attacks involve many different types of
actors looking to use attacks in different ways
to achieve different strategic ends. Many of
1Von Clausewitz, On War (Web: Clausewitz.com,
consulted 5 August 2016)
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1c
h01.html
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the high-profile acts of cyber aggression have
involved a combination of actors, making
exclusive categorisation close to impossible.
Given the nature of the topic and the mandate
of DISEC, the ten following examples of acts
of cyber-aggression are disproportionately
state-influenced and/or have geopolitical
ramifications. However, it is important to keep
in mind that cyber-attacks disproportionately 2
to compromising the US Military’s non-
classified inner network (NIPRNET).
In March 1998, the DoD detected a
penetration of the ‘Non-Classified Internet
Protocol Router Network’ (NIPRNET). The
attackers broke into computer networks
affecting various non-classified areas of US
government, including ‘NASA, DoE, the DoD,
etc. The FBI led an investigation with the affect the private sector.
Timeline of notable attacks:
• 1998 – 2001 MOONLIGHT MAZE
• 2005 – 2011 TITAN RAIN & BYZANTINE
HADES
• 2007 Estonia DDoS Campaigns
• 2008 Russia-Georgia War
• 2010 Operation OLYMPIC GAMES
NIPC, while the newly created JTF-CND
(Joint Task Force for Computer Network 3
Defense) was to coordinate a response’ .
While previous attacks were often attributed to
non-state actors, MOONLIGHT MAZE marks
the beginning of the state-led APT threats
scares. According to Techopedia, ‘[a]n
advanced persistent threat (APT) refers to a
cyber attack launched by an attacker with
substantial means, organization and motivation
to carry out a sustained assault against a 4
• 2011 Winnti Hacks
• 2012 Saudi Aramco Attacks
• 2014 OPM Hack
• 2015 BlackEnergy3 Malware in Ukraine
• 2016 DNC Hacks
1998 – 2001 “MOONLIGHT MAZE”
target.’
As an APT, MOONLIGHT MAZE is still
shrouded in mystery because cyber-attacks
grant a much greater ability for states to
conceal their actions (they can pursue attacks
via proxy actors, proxy servers, rerouting their
connections around the world, using attack
patterns, or signatures associated with other
adversaries, etc.).
Widely known as the first major
state-attributed cyber attack in history (to
Russia), operation MOONLIGHT MAZE led 3 Healey, Jason. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in
Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Print: Washington D.C.,
2013) 2 Information is Beautiful. ‘World’s Biggest Data
Breaches” (Last updated 8 August 2016)
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/wo
rlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
4 ‘Advanced Persistent Threat APT’ (Web: Technopedia)
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28118/advanced
-persistent-threat-apt
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2005 – 2011 TITAN RAIN & BYZANTINE
HADES
The first publicly declared attacks were 5
codenamed TITAN RAIN . Over three or four
years, hackers with links to the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) compromised
hundreds of systems in US industry and
government.
They hacked an impressive portfolio of
networks including Lockheed Martin,
Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems. In
2010, Google reported that it was victim of a
“highly sophisticated and targeted attack on
our corporate infrastructure originating from
China… theft of intellectual property.” The
attackers took advantage of an Internet
Explorer vulnerability affecting hundreds of
the largest technology companies. This
culminated in the 2011 attacks on RSA
security, a computer and network security
company. The RSA breaches were used as a
Whether this was an act of espionage (because
of the theft of key US documents and
technology), deliberate aggression (an
intentional attack aimed at degrading key
American industries and infrastructure), or
sabotage (a deliberate action aimed at
weakening the influence of Google and other
industries in China), is still undetermined. This
string of attacks reveals a dire need for the UN
(along with other bureaucracies) to draw red
lines defining and labelling attacks properly.
2007 Estonia DDoS Campaigns
For several days, waves of DDoS (Distributed
Denial of Service) attacks from Russia hacked
and defaced Estonia’s banks, agencies and
governmental websites. ‘Commerce slowed
almost to a standstill for several hours as
financial institutions found their servers
overwhelmed by requests generated by the
botnets behind the attacks. Five years later, the
origin and motivation behind the cyber attacks
stepping stone for breaches on networks 7
is yet unclear.’ These attacks coincided with
associated with the development of the F-35
Fighter Jet. There have eventually been
suggestions that the fuselage of China’s
second stealth fighter jet, the J-31, resembles
that of the F-22 and F-35. This entire episode
of hacking campaigns affecting over 750
targets was codenamed by US
counterintelligence officials as BYZANTINE 6
HADES.
a series of Pro-Estonian/Anti-Russian protests
associated with the relocation of a prized
Estonian artefact to the Estonian Military 8
Cemetery . While the source of the attack is
unknown, whether it may be the Russian
government or Russian patriotic hackers,
Sergei Markov of the Russian State Duma
shed light on the issue when he blamed the 9
Nashi Youth Group for the attack . The attack
5 Nakashima,
Ellenhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/a
rticle/2010/01/15/AR2010011503917.html 6 Healey, Jason. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in
Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Print: Atlantic Council
CCSA, 2013)
7 Richards, Jason. “Denail of Service: The Estonian
Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. National
Security” (Web: International Affairs Review)
http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65 8 ibid 9 Miller, Chuck. “Russia Confirms involvement with
Estonia DDoS attacks” (Web: SC Magazine, March
2009)
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had a minimal effect on the Estonian
economy, but it did reveal the potential for
cyber attacks to completely cut a government
off from the rest of its infrastructure for a time.
“Striking an enemy’s ability to communicate
with the outside world is a very valuable use
of a weapon at the early stages of war,” Jose
Nazario, a security researcher at Arbor 10
Networks, told SC Magazine.
These attacks led to the NATO CCD-COE
creating a seminal outline on cyber-warfare,
the Tallinn Manual.
2008 Russia – Georgia War
ceasefire). Russia retaliated with an invasion
into Georgia the next day. But the cyber
campaign began much earlier. As early as 19
July, Russian hackers focused on ‘denial and
degradation of Georgian communications
systems’ as well as targeting many public-
facing Georgian websites. The website of
then-President Mikheil Saakashvili was victim
of DDoS and site defacement (pictures posted
comparing him to Hitler), taking it down for
24 hours. ‘The pages of the Parliament, the
Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry, several
news agencies, and a few banks (were also
hit).’ (Wentworth, “You’ve 12
While ‘the cyber attacks against Estonia in
2007 demonstrated the degree to which
nations might persuade patriotic hackers and
cyber professionals to exert pressure on a
hostile nation’ and set the groundwork for a
framework for cyber-war in the future (the
Tallinn Manual), the Russian cyber campaign
occurring at the same time as the military
campaign against Georgia in 2008 confirmed
many existent thoughts within military circles. 11
Cyberspace was to be an essential
component of C4I (Communications, Control,
Command, Computer and Intelligence)
infrastructure for kinetic operations.
Georgia moved its troops into South Ossetia
from 7 August, capturing the regional capital
and several other villages, allegedly in
response to South Ossetia bombardments (in
violation of the terms of the previous
http://www.scmagazine.com/russia-confirms-involveme
nt-with-estonia-ddos-attacks/article/128737/ 10 ibid 11 Healey, Jason (2013)
Got Malice”).
‘Hackers used sophisticated DDoS methods
against targets, incorporating SQL injections
and cross-site scripting (XSS).’ They made no
clear effort to hide the origin of such attacks,
having written the code in Russian and
embedding the ‘obvious statement
“win+love+in+Rusia” in some of the
messaging.’ (Nazario, “Georgia President’s
web site under DDoS attack from Russian
hackers”).
Was the Georgian War a cyber war? Or was it
simply a war, with cyber-support. Or,
alternatively, was it a war, and was the cyber
campaign a string of attacks disassociated
from the war entirely?
12 Ibid. p. 197
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2010 OLYMPIC GAMES
After Georgia, it was the United States’ turn.
Codenamed ‘OLYMPIC GAMES’, an
American cyber-offensive campaign aimed at
Iran’s critical national infrastructure – its
nuclear enrichment program in particular –
marked a new era of complexity and boldness
in nation-state cyber-attacks. STUXNET,
Flame, and Duqu had some degree of
commonality, with STUXNET as the
centrepiece of the operation.
The story is well-known; In the summer of
2010, a spiked USB was plugged into a
Siemens PLC (a controller with access to some
of the facilities core functions) of the Natanz
uranium enrichment facility, rendering up to
1000 of the 9000 IR-1 type gas centrifuges 13
Iranian infrastructure and international energy
infrastructure. They were caught soon enough.
Iran’s nuclear program was to be the
centrepiece of Iran’s domestic prosperity and
military defence strategy - clearly critical
national infrastructure. This set a precedent for
the deliberate degradation and destruction of
important hardware in other countries. Until
when is this sabotage an act of war? How can
the UN update its policy to comprehend such
bypassing of national sovereignty (over energy
infrastructure and nuclear disarmament)?
14
2011 Winnti Hacks
Winnti, an allegedly Chinese hacking group,
has been active for years and mostly targets
the Asian video-gaming industry. The group
steals digital certificates (online identifiers)
and uses them to sneak into the update servers
of gaming companies to prepare for man-in-
the-middle (MiTM: when hackers impersonate
other people to gain access) attacks for
intellectual property theft (IP theft).
Similar attacks occurred in 2011 on South
Korean social networks Cyworlds and Nate,
this time via a Trojan Horse impersonating
TNK, a Japanese video-gaming company.
Qualitative analysis of the incidents point unusable.
By far the most spectacular instance of cyber-
aggression, this attack did what aerial
bombardment could covertly and without
many political ramifications. Unfortunately,
US and Israeli intelligence (to whom this
towards IP theft at a grand scale, that goes
beyond company secrets but also towards the
ID-theft of users across Asia.
Additional attacks in 2013 with similar IOCs
(Indicators of Compromise) and signatures
attack is attributed) could not control the
spread of the Flame and Duqu malware across
13 Healey, Jason (2013) p. 213
14Kaspersky
Labshttps://securelist.com/analysis/internal-threats-repo
rts/37029/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/
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targeted Tibetan and Uyghur activists using
the digital signature of MGAME Corp, yet
another video-gaming company. This new
information points towards the Chinese
security services having a role in the incident.
15
2012 Saudi Aramco Attacks
The Shamoon (or Disttrack) modular computer
virus was used to conduct cyber espionage in
the oil and gas sector. The most notable attack
was one targeting Saudi Arabia’s largest oil
company, Aramco. The virus quickly
overwrites files in computers throughout a
network with JPEG files, simultaneously
compiling a list of files from specific locations
in the system and sending them back to the
attacker. It then finishes with an overwrite of
the master boot record to prevent system
reboots. Over 30,000 Saudi Aramco
workstations were destroyed.
The virus has hit companies throughout the
energy sector, and the Shia-affiliated group
Cutting Sword of Justice had the strongest
claim over the attack. Early investigations
pointed towards Iran being involved in the
attacks. Should Saudi Arabia have been a less
careful in the attack attributions, this cyber
attack could have – given the geopolitical 16
tension - triggered a war.
15http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/saudi-ara
mco-cyber-attacks-a-wake-up-call-says/ 16 Develle, Yuji. “Attribution Game: the challenges and
opportunities of cyber attribution in policy-making”
(Web: Medium/Strife, 2015)
https://medium.com/wonk-bridge/the-attribution-game-t
he-challenges-and-opportunities-of-cyber-attribution-in-
policy-making-3f99cdacd586#.2hbwd57rq
2014 – 2015 Office of Personnel 17 18
Management Breach (OPM Hack)
In June 2015, US civil service personnel had
their personal information compromised
(Identity Theft) from a hack into the US Office
for Personnel Management. ‘This also
included 19.7 million individuals who applied
for background checks…. And over 1.8
million non-applicants… predominantly 19
spouses or cohabitants of applicants.’
Usernames, passwords, names, addresses,
dates of birth, and even fingerprint and
interview data were stolen. This forced the
OPM to guarantee ID theft insurance for up to
three years to all victims, and the resignation
of the OPM’s director.
At first, the media quickly denounced China
for being behind these attacks. Some attributed
such attacks to “Deep Panda” while others,
such as FireEye (an American network
security company), blamed other Chinese 20
cyber gangs with a history in identity theft.
However, there was controversy. Cyber-
attacks are no less dangerous for their actual
damage than for their reputational damage (the
blowback). The Council on Foreign
Relations denounced the China
17https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-wors
e-you-imagine 18http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-dat
a-protection/cyber-security/the-opm-breach-timeline-of-
a-hack/ 19 “Why the OPM Hack is Far Worse than You
Imagine” (Web: Lawfare Blog, 11 March
2016)https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-
worse-you-imagine 20 Hesseldahl, Arik. “FireEye identifies Chinese Group
Behind Federal Hack” (Web: ReCode, 19 June 2015)
http://www.recode.net/2015/6/19/11563730/fireeye-ide
ntifies-chinese-group-behind-federal-hack
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attribution, saying it came from unreliable
American news sources, that the stolen
information had little value to the Chinese
government, and that the information would be 21
more valuable to criminals.
December 2015 BlackEnergy3 Malware
causing Huge Blackout in Western Ukraine. 22 23 24 25
Along with the OPM Hack, the Ukrainian
Power Grid attack of December 2015 was a
major wake up call for governments of the
(Supervisory control and data acquisition), the
hackers took 30 electricity substations offline,
damaged 2 power distribution platforms, and
removed 2 or 3 backup power supplies to
ensure maximum duration of damage. Drives
were wiped permanently with KillDisk,
passwords were changed to prevent operators
from accessing control functions, and a
Ukrainian telephone company was TDoS’d
(like DDoS) to prevent customers from
contacting the electricity company. Following
a manual restoration of power, the power came 26
Western world concerning the potential
destructiveness and strategic threat of cyber-
attacks. Over 230,000 residents in the Ivano-
Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine lost
power just before Christmas.
F-Secure Labs identified Quedagh (a Russia-
based gang known to target political
organisations) as the main user of the
BlackEnergy malware toolkit, which was
modified from a DDoS botnet kit to conduct
this latest APT. F-Secure believes a phishing
e-mail could have been opened by a Ukrainian
employee. After entering a SCADA
21 Knake, Robert. “Data Breach at the Office of
Personnel Management: China, Again… Really?”
(Blog: Council on Foreign Relations, 5 June 2015)
http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/06/05/data-breach-at-the
-office-of-personnel-management-china-again-really/ 22http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/27/ukraine_blac
kenergy_analysis/?page=2 23http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/questio
ns-remain-on-how-cyberattack-caused-ukraine-blackout
-/d/d-id/1323749 24F-Secure Labs, ‘Blackenergy & Quedagh: The
Convergence of Crimeware and APT attacks’ (Malware
Analysis Whitepaper, 2015) 25https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unpre
cedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/
back after 3 to 6 hours.
BlackEnergy was used in patterns attributable
to Russia in the past, such as when Russia
conducted a swathe of attacks on Georgia
during the 2008 Georgian War. Typical of
Russian underground operations, the greater
degree of plausible deniability proposed by the
usage of the BlackEnergy 3 kit (because it’s
used by so many criminals) allows for bolder
attacks. Toolkits and botnets are the weaponry
of cyber-conflict; their increasing availability
and ease of use make attacks all the simpler to
execute.
26 ICS CERT. “IR ALERT H-16-056-01” https://ics-
cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056- 01
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2016 #DNC Hack
A well-timed data leak is all it takes to
completely change the course of a political
campaign, and thus the course of a country’s
policy-making. In June, an attack widely
attributed to Pro-Russian hacker groups “Cozy
Bear” and “Fancy Bear”, stole opposition
research by the Democrats on Donald Trump. 27
A month later, in time for the Democratic
National Convention, the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) had the contents of its
22,000 emails leaked to the world via
WikiLeaks. It is highly likely that this earlier
compromise enabled the same hackers (under
the alias Guccifer 2.0) to access the DNC
27 Galperina, Marina. “Russian Government Hackers
Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear” (Web: Gawker, 14 June
2016)
http://gawker.com/russian-government-hackers-cozy-be
ar-and-fancy-bear-1781960847
email database (and a week later, the Clinton
Campaign database).
There is a growing consensus amongst the
cybersecurity and intelligence community that
Russia is behind the hacks (or at least 28
condoning them). The attack sets a new
precedent in how bold Russian actors have
become in intervening in the politics of other
states, this time striking across the Atlantic. It
is no wonder however, as this specific
electoral campaign is set to deeply affect
Russia’s economic sanctions and its future
influence in the region. The United States has
28 Rid, Thomas. “All Signs Point to Russia Being
Behind the DNC Hack” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, 25
July 2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/all-signs-point-to-russ
ia-being-behind-the-dnc-hack
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of course had a long history of intervening in
the electoral process of Eastern European
states.
While much of the security community called
for a more forceful condemnation of the
attacks, no such statement was made in
Washington (USA), New York (UN) nor
Moscow (Russian Fed). White House
Directive #41 created a scheme that color-
coded various degrees of cyber-attack severity,
at least removing some of the confusion
surrounding the kinetic comparability of cyber
attacks from the White 29
speaking, this lack of clarity would make
majority votes for resolution close to
impossible.
After MOONLIGHT MAZE, Russian
attribution was made due to knowledge of 30
several geopolitical realities :
- Since the End of the Cold War, espionage
‘has largely continued unabated’
- Russian Military Doctrine since the
Chechnya War recognizes the importance of
‘command, control, intelligence and
computers’ (C4I).
House’s point of view.
DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM
The Attribution Problem
As you may have noticed in the ten examples,
it is incredibly difficult to catch the perpetrator
of cyber attacks. The technical process of
properly finding the culprit takes weeks if not
months. By then, the reputational damage of
the attacks is tremendous. Politically speaking,
it is necessary for governments to be able to
attribute responsibility to countries,
governments, or organizations. This is done
via initial forensic findings and geopolitical
estimations. This is a major obstacle in the
UN, as a Security Council resolution
penalizing a damaging cyber attack would
theoretically need a referent object. Practically
29 Koebler, Jason. “Obama Created a Color-Coded
Cyber Threat ‘Schema’ After the DNC Hack” (Web:
VICE/Motherboard, 26 July 2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/obama-created-a-colo
- Russia vigorously denied these allegations.
This also raised issues concerning the degree
to which the state and informal hacker groups
have a relationship (or not).
Attribution became a major obstacle in
coordinating a response as the degree of state
involvement was unknown. The image to the
left shows the complexity of classifying state
involvement for only
one group of hackers, now imagine if multiple 31
groups were to be involved.
‘An undisclosed government source noted that
the attack had been traced to Internet servers
located 20 miles from Moscow…. The pattern
of the intrusions suggested that the attackers
had a regular office-like schedule from 8am to 32
5pm and never on Russian holidays.’ A
senior Energy Department official suggested
30 Healey, Jason (2013) 31 Image Source: J. Healey, ‘Beyond Attribution:
Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber-attacks’,
2011
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that it could be a “sponsored” intelligence
activity due to how organized the attack was.
Is this Cyber War?
What is war? If we use Carl von Clausewitz’
definition, then a war must comprehend
several key identifiers: violence, a clear
political objective, two or more clearly
identified “combatants” and a clear link
between the subject, object, and means of the
employed violence. This raises a number of
difficult questions (that your respective
countries have sometimes answered with
definitions, please follow this website
https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-definitions.html):
● What is violence? Does violence always
involve death or destruction of property? If
so, is information property? How much
violence is needed to move into “act of
war” territory?
● How do we identify political objectives?
As many contemporary wars are
undertaken without a specific declaration
of war, how do we know when we are in a
situation of cyber-peace or cyber-war? Are
we constantly in a state of war or peace?
● If the objective is to steal information,
does this make it any less damaging than
the objective to weaken or destroy
infrastructure?
●
With the use of various geographic and
instrumental intermediaries, what criteria
is needed to attribute attacks to
governments and states? Are the
intermediaries to blame? Should states be
compelled to crack-down on malicious
third-parties?
Extended scholarship has been dedicated to
this subject, we would highly recommend you
read at least two of these publications:
● Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take
Place” (King’s College London, UK:
Journal of Strategic Studies, 5 October
2011) You can find it on tandofonline.
● Stone, John. “Cyber War Will Take Place”
(King’s College London, UK: Journal of
Strategic Studies, 29 November 2012) You
can also find this on tandofonline.
● Masters, Jonathan (Deputy Editor).
“Confronting the Cyber Threat” (Web:
Council on Foreign Relations, May 23
2011)
http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign
-policy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577htt
p://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-p
olicy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577
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● Sauter, Molly. “When Is a Hack an Act of
War?” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, July 28
2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/policy-di
rective-41-cyber-incidentshttp://motherboa
rd.vice.com/read/policy-directive-41-cyber
-incidents
● Ranger, Steve. “Inside the secret digital
arms race: Facing the threat of a global
cyberwar” (Web: Tech Republic/Cover
Story)
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside
-the-secret-digital-arms-race/http://www.te
chrepublic.com/article/inside-the-secret-di
gital-arms-race/
● Ranger, Steve. “Cyberwar: The Smart
Person’s guide” (Web: Tech
Republic/Security, 19 May 2016)
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyber
war-the-smart-persons-guide/http://www.te
chrepublic.com/article/cyberwar-the-smart
-persons-guide/
The Question of Critical National
Infrastructure
Inevitably, the cyberwar debate ventures into
the territory of Critical National Infrastructure
(CNI). Information security and the integrity
of certain pieces of infrastructure are essential
to the economic development and political
stability of many UN states. At the 69th
UNGA meeting, representatives from a
number of political bodies including the ‘Non-
Aligned Movement’ expressed the need to
regulate and secure this space. ‘The
representative of Pakistan said that
technological innovations had been used in
recent years for indiscriminate surveillance
and as a means of waging cyber-attacks. In
view of those dangerous developments, it was
essential to regulate their production and use
“sooner rather than later”.... The representative
of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the Non-
Aligned Movement, agreed that information
and communications technology could be used
for purposes that were inconsistent with
maintaining international stability and security.
The prevention of political and military
confrontation in that field was particularly
urgent, said the 33
representative of the Russian Federation.’
One particularly promising avenue for
regulation (by DISEC) is linking the idea of
CNI with that of committing an act of cyber-
war. There are various definitions of CNI:
‘systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters (Sec. 1016(e)).’ – US 34
Department of Homeland Security
33UNGA Press Release. “Cyber Warfare, Unchecked,
Could Topple Entire Edifice of International Security,
Says Speaker in First Committee at Conclusion of
Thematic Debate Segment” (UN PR: GA/DIS/3512, 28
October 2014)
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gadis3512.doc.htm 34 Moteff, John & Parfomak, Paul. “Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets: Definition and
Identification” (CRS Web: Congressional Research
Service, 1 October 2004)
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32631.pdf
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Or the European Commission’s term,
“operators of essential services”:
‘as a public or private entity in the following
sectors: …. Energy, including subsectors…
Transport, including subsectors… Banking,
including credit institutions… Financial
market infrastructures… Health sector,
including hospitals and private clinics….
Drinking water supply and distribution,
including suppliers and distributors of water
intended for human consumption… Digital
Infrastructure, including Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs), Domain Name System service
providers (DNS), and Top Level Domain
(TLD) name registries’ –2016 EP NIS 35
Directive
Both definitions provide different ways to
incriminate and politicize certain cyber-
attacks. The American definition, a product of
a long development process since 1983 has in
its latest iteration (the 2001 Patriot 36
Act), included virtual and real-life
constructions and “events” within the
definition. This means that the DNC Hack of
last July, could have, in fact, been denounced
as an attack on CNI (the DNC being a key part
of an existential event in the American
political calendar, the US Presidential
35 NATO CCDCOE, “EU Adopts Network and
Information Security Directive that sets Security Rules
on National Critical Infrastructure” (Web: CCDCOE
INCYDER Database, 29 July 2016)
https://ccdcoe.org/eu-adopts-network-and-information-s
ecurity-directive-sets-security-rules-national-critical.ht
ml 36 U.S. Patriot Act.
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/
PLAW-107publ56.pdf
Campaign). This broad definition allows for
flexibility of response.
The EU definition goes into more detail, not
only outlining the specific sectors concerned
by CNI, but adjusting its potential response to
the geographic spread, market share, role of
CNI actors affected by a potential attack. This
specific enumeration clarifies the type of
responses attackers would receive.
The UN should find a coherent way to define
CNI, and include this within a broader strategy
for cyber international security.
Why do states attack in cyberspace?
Rather than simply addressing the question,
“Why do states attack other states?”, this
question looks at why cyberspace is an
attractive or justified space in which states
employ force and violence.
Of course, cyberspace is the “location” where
an increasing share of the world economy and
information flows. An increasing number of
CNI and state defences are connected in terms
of C4I and IoT (Internet of Things).
In accordance with the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) thesis, that developments in
military doctrine and technological change
have irreversibly rendered previous theoretical
understandings obsolete, states and their
security apparatuses have observed a rapid
militarization of cyberspace. Be it the United
States, Russia, or China, it has become
increasingly clear that interstate power
struggles are fought primarily at the ideational
level: wars of ideas vs. wars of territory. China
and Russia have been aware of this change
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since the Cold War, when there was bitterly
aware of ideational weakness versus NATO
nations. More relevantly, the Colour
Revolutions, which saw the democratic
plebiscite of various Eastern European and
Eurasian nations, coincided with the
development of corresponding military
doctrine centred around the combined use of
information and military aggression.
China’s 2015 military strategy focused largely
on updating its capabilities to this new reality,
calling cyberspace a ‘form of war…
accelerating its evolution to
informationalization’ having ‘become new
commanding heights in strategic competition.’
data centres (storage) and certificate
authorities (digital identity providers). No
Root servers, or servers that maintain the
underlying domains that make up the Internet, 41
are located in China.
42
The Internet Map, check it out.
The Internet Map below shows how most
domains are located disproportionately across
the globe: Light blue indicates the USA,
Purple is Japan, Yellow is China, Red is
Russia, Blue Germany, etc.
37
It implies that cyberspace has given
‘anti-China forces’ capabilities in attempting
to ‘instigate a colour revolution’ in its Tibetan 38
and East Turkestan regions. Russian “Hybrid
Warfare” has been an early attempt at
controlling the informational discourse, both at
a strategic (general) and tactical (local) level,
so as to justify its military actions and make 39 40
them more effective.
China, Russia and a swathe of other nations
have all observed how power in cyberspace
disproportionately favours the West. A grand
majority of international data flows through
the United States at any given time through
37 Xinhua. “Full text: China’s Military Strategy” (Web:
China Daily, 26 May 2015)
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/conten
t_20820628.htm 38 ibid. 39 On Hybrid Warfare:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29903395 40 Adamsky, Dmitry. “Cross Domain Coercion: The
Current Russian Art of Strategy” (Ifri Security Studies
Centre: Proliferation Papers 54, November 2015)
Huawei Marine’s ‘Submarine Cable Map’, 43
check it out.
41 Interesting article on Root Servers:
http://www.public-root.com/root-server-locations.htm 42 The Internet Map, available from:
http://internet-map.net 43 On Submarine Cable Map:
http://www.submarinecablemap.com
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The approximate locations of US Naval Fleets 44
across the globe.
These three maps serve to illustrate a more
kinetic view of control. The Submarine Cable
Map shows the worldwide distribution of
Internet around the world (covering close to
98% of worldwide Internet traffic, rest are
relayed to satellites). The United States
controls the only navy in the world that can be
present in all five oceans. Due to the
international nature of the Internet however,
control of so many access points (where the
cables reach data centres) is distressing to
countries like China who seek to control or
regulate their informational services. This
Strife article provides one example of how this
may contribute to China’s strategic objectives 45
for the South China Sea issue.
Concerned by the growing imbalance of
control in cyberspace, states like Russia,
China, DPRK, France, UK, Germany, Israel,
Iran, and Malaysia among others have all
developed specific departments in the military
and intelligence community to conduct a
combination of cyber offensive and defensive
operations. Short of having effective ways to
prevent, defend, detect, and attribute attacks,
they resort to playing this dangerous game.
In doing so, states have associated themselves
with proxy actors with dubious
44 US Fleets location:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5a/
USN_Fleets_%282009%29.png 45 Lai Ki, Cheng. “Somewhere, Under the Sea: maritime
claims and territorial disputes in South China Sea”
(Web: Strife Blog, 12 January 2016)
http://www.strifeblog.org/2016/01/12/somewhere-under
-the-sea/
intentions/methods. While the USA and Israel
(sometimes) have the normative liberty to
conduct cyber-attacks and surveillance via
Spyware (and Encryption Backdoors), most
countries have allied with the criminal
underworld to add layers of separation
between themselves and their targets. Iran is
notoriously famous for aiding proxy hacker
groups (such as Cutting Sword of Justice in 46
the Saudi Aramco attacks). Russia’s unique
economic and social climate cultivates a
thriving criminal hacker community. I once
asked a self-declared F-Secure “cyber-warrior”
why so many hackers came from Russia? He
answered that talented coders and
programmers in Russia were often threatened
into employment by existing hacker
collectives or encouraged by the Kremlin to
have a contractual relationship.
THE FUTURE
States and international bodies have recently
made critical overtures towards reversing the
status quo.
Tallinn Manual
After the 2007 Estonian Cyber-Campaigns, the
newly created NATO CCD-COE (a panel of
cybersecurity and information warfare experts)
got together to write this foundational
document for the ‘rules of cyber-war’. Which
can be found in the bibliography.
46Tucker, Patrick. “Why the military can’t go after Iran
Hacking Your Dam” (Web: Defense One, 24 March
2016)
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/03/why-
military-cant-go-after-iran-hacking-your-dam/126945/
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47 The Tallin Manual:
http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/tallinn-manual-interna
tional-law-applicable-cyber-warfare/p30415 48 ibid.
The Tallinn Manual explains that ‘[s]tates may
not knowingly allow cyber infrastructure
located in their territory to be used for acts that
adversely affect other states.’ States may be
responsible for attacks happening, without
their prior knowledge, as ‘the State itself is
Source: White House
Although this schema is limited to the USA,
the UN could adapt the schematic to better suit 49
its objectives. Of course, such schemas are
useless if not supported nationally by 50
responsible under international law for any
actions of individuals or groups placed under 47
its direction.’ This is very similar to the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine and coherent
with the UN Charter’s obligations towards
instilling international peace and security. To
corresponding cybersecurity strategies.
Bilateral Agreements
In 2015, the United States and China had a
summit to discuss security issues between the
two powers. One important feature was 51
what extent States must enforce this principle
is yet to be decided upon however.
The Manual also states that the ‘International
Group of Experts agreed that, at minimum,
any cyber operation that caused harm to
individuals or damage to objects qualified as a
use of force... [but that] cyber operations that
merely cause inconvenience or irritation do
something many called a ‘cyber-truce’.
Although both countries officially denied
having taken part in economic cyber-
espionage and cyber-crime, they have
nevertheless engaged in high-level agreements.
They agreed to provide timely responses to
each other's requests for information and
assistance concerning 48
not qualify as use of force.’ What is malicious cyber activities. They also
damaging? Until when is an attack merely an
inconvenience?
White House Directive #41
This directive, signed and proposed in the
committed themselves to holding
cyber-criminals accountable to their own legal
systems, to provide updates to each other
regarding the status and results of
aftermath of the DNC Hack, gives the
responsibility of evaluating cyber-attacks on
CNI to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). Almost a picture-perfect copy of
George W. Bush’s Terror alert schema, Barack
Obama’s ‘Cyber Incident Severity Schema’
looks as follows:
49 Koebler, Jason. “Obama Created a Color-Coded
Cyber Threat ‘Schema’ After the DNC Hack” (Web:
VICE/Motherboard, 26 July 2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/obama-created-a-colo
r-coded-cyber-threat-schema-after-the-dnc-hack 50 White House Directive #41: The Color Coded Cyber
Threat Schema
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/0
9/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan 51 Duggal, Pavan. “Cybersecurity Law finds a cradle in
US-China cybercrime truce” (Web: First Post, 1
October 2015)
http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/cybersecurity-la
w-finds-a-cradle-in-us-china-cybercrime-truce-283295.
html
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investigations, to create a summit level Group 52
of Experts from both countries, and more.
As reported by FireEye, this set of agreements
lead to a dramatic decrease in the quantity of 53
cybercrime between the two countries. The
report concludes that the agreement probably
forced both parties to adopt more covert attack
tactics and to focus on strategically relevant
targets. Such dialogue can only be part of a
solution.
United Nations Group of Governmental
Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in the
Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security
In July 2015, the twenty UN GGE countries
(Belarus, Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt,
Estonia, France, Germany, Ghana, Israel,
Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan,
Russian Federation, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, and the United States of America)
geographical distribution’ (cyber sovereignty)
and including key ‘cyber powers’. In 2013, the
only remarkable declaration produced was an
affirmation that ‘international law applied 54
(without exception) to cyberspace’.
‘The 2015 report focusses on (1) existing and
emerging threats; (2) norms, rules, and
principles for the responsible behaviour of
states; (3) confidence-building measures
(CBMs); (4) international cooperation and
capacity-building; (5) the applicability of
international law, and (6) recommendations
for future work. Unsurprisingly, as the report
represents a diplomatic consensus, it remains
rather general.’ – NATO CCD-COE 55
INCYDER Brief
The following limiting norms, good practices,
and positive duties were suggested
(summarized by the NATO CCD-COE):
“Limiting Norms:
- states should not knowingly allow their
territory to be used for internationally
wrongful acts using ICTs;
- states should not conduct or knowingly
support ICT activity that intentionally
damages critical infrastructure;
- states should take steps to ensure supply
chain security, and should seek to prevent
the proliferation of malicious ICT and the
use of harmful hidden functions; redacted a report based on ‘equitable
54NATO CCDCOE. “2015 UN GGE Report: Major
Players Recommending Norms of Behaviour, 52 ibid. 53 FireEye iSight Intelligence. “Redline Drawn: China
Recalculates its Use of Cyber Espionage” (Special
Report, June 2016)
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/curr
ent-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-espionage.pdf
Highlighting Aspects of International Law” (Web:
CCDCOE INCYDER, 31 August 2015)
https://ccdcoe.org/2015-un-gge-report-major-players-re
commending-norms-behaviour-highlighting-aspects-int
ernational-l-0.html 55 ibid.
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- states should not conduct or knowingly 57
of cyber-defence best practice. Operational
support activity to harm the information
systems of another state’s emergency
response teams (CERT/CSIRTS) and
should not use their own teams for
malicious international activity;
- states should respect the UN resolutions
that are linked to human rights on the
internet and to the right to privacy in the
digital age.
Good practices and positive duties:
- states should cooperate to increase stability
and security in the use of ICTs and to
prevent harmful practices;
- states should consider all relevant
information in case of ICT incidents;
- states should consider how best to
cooperate to exchange information, to
assist each other, and to prosecute terrorist
and criminal use of ICTs;
- states should take appropriate measures to
protect their critical infrastructure;
- states should respond to appropriate
requests for assistance by other states
whose critical infrastructure is subject to 56
malicious ICT acts;”
Collective Security Assurances
International security organizations like
NATO could apply deterrence theory in
cyberspace, enabling the creation of “cyber
framework nations”, or case-countries which
would serve as examples to the rest of alliance
56 ibid.
partnerships with the private sector (PPPs) and
other international organizations (the EU, UN,
or even other states like Russia) would be in
order. Such regional approaches are attracting
attention around the world, such as this
document’s call for ASEAN leadership in 58
regional strategic cyber defence.
Regulating Attack Toolkits
Malware or virus toolkits and botnet operators
have often acted as intermediaries for
malicious attacks in cyberspace. A possible
way to disarm cyber-criminals and states in
this space would be to work towards
regulating (or cracking down on) these
intermediaries.
Often found on the Darknet, these middlemen
are difficult to track but easy to find. Despite
strong encryption like that of the most popular
rerouter “The Onion Router” (Tor),
intelligence and law enforcement have caught
such actors with “honeypots” (they lured
criminals into revealing their identities).
One example of toolkit regulation is the
regulation of dual-use technologies, tech that
could be used for good or for evil.
‘Embarrassed by evidence suggesting
surveillance technologies FinFisher GmbH
57 The Atlantic Council on Extended Deterrence:
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/cyber-e
xtended-deterrence-and-nato 58 Noor, Elina. “Strategic Governance of Cyber
Security: Implications for East Asia”, Navigating
Change: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in East
Asia and in Global Governance (Tokyo: Japan Centre
for International Exchange, 2015)
http://jcie.org/researchpdfs/ASEAN-Japan/NavChange/
9.pdf
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and Hacking Team have been used by
repressive regimes to target activists and
journalists’, the EU ‘is expected to propose
tighter regulations on the export of dual-use 59
goods.’
BLOC POSITIONS
This debate is difficult to split along a
dichotomy. A whole swathe of issues are
addressed in the debate and it is much better to
approach the topic with one’s national interest
close at heart, rather than rely on this list to
orient you in debate. However, the following
countries are likely to work closely together.
Assertive in Cyberspace: USA, UK,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Israel and
most of NATO
Often seen repeating the same refrain on many
DISEC committees, these countries believe in
enhancing the current status quo in
cyberspace. It ensures information freedom of
movement and gives unprecedented access to
US-linked intelligence. It condemns the use
cyber-attacks to further political ends
asymmetrically, while maintaining that if
those ends are justified, cyber-defence does
also involve a certain measure of offensive
capabilities.
Cyber-Sovereignty: Russia, China, Brazil,
Germany, India, Turkey and many more who
typically place a premium on national
sovereignty
59 Towsend, Kevin. “Leaked EU Proposal Pushes
Tighter Rules on Dual-Use Technologies” (Web:
Security Weekly, 28 July 2016)
This bloc will be found defending the
‘regionalisation’ (Russia) or ‘localisation’
(China) of cyberspace, into component parts
subject to the laws and regulations of those
spaces. According to this theory, this enables
countries to better detect and prevent cyber-
crime, and defend themselves from externally
based cyber-attacks. Its proponents also
typically advocate for equality of actions
amongst all states: “Why am I not allowed to
spy on you, if you’re spying on me?”
Cyber-War Veterans: Estonia, Georgia,
Ukraine, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, etc.
These countries discuss cyber-aggression in
the context of cyber warfare. To these states,
the question of cyber-defence is an urgent
matter, to be articulated through the language
of collective defence and updated relevant UN
texts.
Regional Regulation: Relevant members of
the EU and Relevant members of ASEAN
(mainly Japan, the Philippines and Malaysia)
These countries have made inroads in
discussing cyber defence on the regional level.
They argue for the transnational nature of
cyber-threats mandates and multi-stakeholder
and regional approach to defence. The EU has,
with its ground-breaking Human Rights
policy, made progress towards the ethical use
of cyberspace.
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POINTS A RESOLUTION MUST
ANSWER – QUESTIONS A
RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER
● What does war look like in cyberspace?
● What is violence or the use of force in
cyberspace?
● How can the UN update its current efforts
to deal with this new threat?
● What is the role of the UN in this space?
● Is the UN Charter inappropriate?
● What is Critical National Infrastructure on
the global level?
● How can we update and enforce the UN
GGE recommendations?
● Are bilateral agreements or regional
regulations a more favourable way to deal
with the issue?
● What kind of action can DISEC do
towards satisfying demands for cyber
sovereignty?
● How can DISEC make the Tallinn
Manual’s recommendations a reality?
● How can the UN ensure that states enforce
their laws against cybercriminals?
● What measures or missions can DISEC
establish to disrupt the underground toolkit
and botnet economy?
● What is the UN to do with the Darknet?
● How does the UN ensure a justified
balance between security and human rights
in cyberspace (in this context)?
● Can the UN recommend deterrence
schemes in cyberspace, or must it
recommend another theoretical model for
security?
● What set of criteria or schematics can the
UN implement to measure the gravity of
different cyber incidents?
● What is the role of the International
Telecommunication Union in this matter?
● Can stakeholders be brought together to
cooperate on this matter? If so, how?
FURTHER READING
Taddeo, Mariarosaria. “Information Warfare: a
Philosophical Perspective” (Hertfordshire,
Oxford: Academia.edu)
https://www.academia.edu/1505528/Informati
on_Warfare_a_Philosophical_Perspective
Tallinn Manual
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/
356296245.pdf
Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take
Place” (King’s College London, UK: Journal
of Strategic Studies, 5 October 2011)
You can find it on tandofonline.
Stone, John. “Cyber War Will Take Place”
(King’s College London, UK: Journal of
Strategic Studies, 29 November 2012)
You can also find this on tandofonline.
Healey, Jason. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in
Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012
Masters, Jonathan (Deputy Editor).
“Confronting the Cyber Threat” (Web:
Council on Foreign Relations, May 23 2011)
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21
http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-pol
icy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577
ICS-CERT. “Cyber Threat Source
Descriptions” (Web: ICS-CERT)
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/cyber-threat
-source-descriptions#gao
Sauter, Molly. “When Is a Hack an Act of
War?” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, July 28
2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/policy-direct
ive-41-cyber-incidents
Segal, Adam. The Hacked World Order: How
Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver and
Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 2016)
https://www.amazon.com/Hacked-World-Orde r-
Maneuver-Manipulate/dp/1610394151?ie=U
TF8&*Version*=1&*entries*=0
Segal, Adam. “What’s the Future of Chinese
Hacking?” (VICE/Motherboard, 30 July 2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/future-of-chi
nese-hacking?trk_source=recommended
Important for definitions/country distinctions
(see US attack/Defense similarity)
NATO CCDCOE, “Cyber Definitions”
(Tallinn: NATO CCDCOE Resources, up to
date)
https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-definitions.html
Ranger, Steve. “Inside the secret digital arms
race: Facing the threat of a global cyberwar”
(Web: Tech Republic/Cover Story)
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside-the
-secret-digital-arms-race/
Ranger, Steve. “Cyberwar: The Smart
Person’s guide” (Web: Tech
Republic/Security, 19 May 2016)
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberwar-
the-smart-persons-guide/
Develle, Yuji. “The Attribution Game: The
Challenges and Opportunities of cyber
attribution in policy-making” (Web:
Medium/Strife Blog, August 28 2015)
https://medium.com/@YDevelle/the-attributio
n-game-the-challenges-and-opportunities-of-c
yber-attribution-in-policy-making-3f99cdacd5
86#.h586rmt6o
Develle, Yuji. “Dear DNC, Here are 7 Ways to
Protect Yourself from the Russians” (Web:
Medium, July 2016)
https://medium.com/@YDevelle/dear-dnc-7-w
ays-to-protect-yourself-from-the-russians-ed53
ff46a746#.4yxxa4mx0
Healey, Jason. “Beyond Attribution: Seeking
National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks”
(Paper: Atlantic Council/Cyber Statecraft
Initiative, 2011)
Veenendaal, Matthijs. Kaska, Kadri &
Brangetto, Pascal. “Is NATO ready to cross
the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?” (Tallinn:
NATO CCDCOE Policy Brief, June 2016)
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedi
a/pdf/NATO%20CCD%20COE%20policy%2
0paper.pdf
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
On Cyber Sovereignty
Huaxia. “President Xi says China faces major
science, technology “bottleneck”” (Web:
Xinhua English, May 1 2016)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/01
/c_135402671.htm
Franchesi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “Hackers
Target Tibetans with Malicious Google Drive
Files” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, June 16
2015)
https://motherboard.vice.com/read/hackers-tar
get-tibetans-with-malicious-google-drive-files
Peterson, Andrea. “Chinese cyberspies have
hacked Middle East experts at major U.S.
think tanks” (The Washington Post: The
Switch, July 7 2014)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-sw
itch/wp/2014/07/07/chinese-cyberspies-have-h
acked-middle-east-experts-at-major-u-s-think-t
anks;
Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “The Massive
Hack on US Personnel Agency is Worse Than
Everyone Thought” (Web:
VICE/Motherboard, June 11 2015)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-massive-
hack-on-us-personnel-agency-is-worse-than-e
veryone-thought
Nakashima, Ellen & Ryan, Missy. “Pentagon
Publicly Acknowledges its First Major
Offensive Cyber Campaign” (Washington
Post: Atlantic Council/NATOSource, 15 July
2016)
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosour
ce/pentagon-publicly-acknowledges-its-first-m
ajor-offensive-cyber-campaign
Bisson, David. “The OPM Breach: Timeline
of a Hack” (Web: Tripwire/The State of
Security, June 29 2015)
http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/secu
rity-data-protection/cyber-security/the-opm-br
each-timeline-of-a-hack/
Xinhua. “Full text: China’s Military Strategy”
(Web: China Daily.com.cn, 26 May 2015)
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/
26/content_20820628.htm
Krasny, Ros. “Chinese Hacked U.S. military
contractors, Senate Panel finds” (Washington:
Reuters, 17 September 2014)
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military
-cyberspying-idUSKBN0HC1TA20140917
Rid, Thomas. “All Signs Point to Russia Being
Behind the DNC Hack” (VICE/Motherboard,
25 July 2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/all-signs-poi
nt-to-russia-being-behind-the-dnc-hack
Adamsky, Dmitry. “Cross Domain Coercion:
The Current Russian Art of Strategy” (Ifri
Security Studies Centre: Proliferation Papers
54, November 2015)
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
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Hodge, Nathan & Entous, Adam. “Oil Firms
Hit by Hackers From China, Report Says”
(Web: Wall Street Journal, February 10 2011)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527
48703716904576134661111518864
Waterman, Shane (UPI Homeland and
National Security Editor). “Analysis: Who
cyber smacked Estonia?” (Web: UPI, June 11
2007)
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-
Industry/2007/06/11/Analysis-Who-cyber-sma
cked-Estonia/UPI-26831181580439/
Cyber-crime
Acohido, Byron & Swartz, Jon. “Botnet Scams
are exploding” (Web: USA Today, March 16
2008)
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/co
mputersecurity/2008-03-16-computer-botnets_
N.htm
Barret, Larry. “DIY Malware Kits Growing in
number, toxicity” (Web: eSecurity Planet,
April 28 2010)
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/article.
php/3879226/DIY-Malware-Kits-Growing-in-
Number-Toxicity.htm
ICS-CERT. “Cyber Threat Source
Descriptions” (Web: ICS-CERT)
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/cyber-threat
-source-descriptions#gao
Key Policy
European Commission, “Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council:
concerning measures to ensure a high common
level of network and information security
across the Union” (Brussels: SWD(2013)/31 &
SWD(2013)/32 final, 7 February 2013)
Koebler, Jason. “Obama Created a Colour-
Coded Cyber Threat ‘Schema’ After the DNC
Hack” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, July 26
2016)
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/obama-creat
ed-a-color-coded-cyber-threat-schema-after-th
e-dnc-hack
BBC News. “US and China agree on
cybercrime truce” (Web: BBC News, 25
September 2015)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-3
4360934
Duggal, Paven. “Cybersecurity law finds a
cradle in US-China cybercrime truce” (Web:
Tech2, 1 October 2015)
http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/cyberse
curity-law-finds-a-cradle-in-us-china-cybercri
me-truce-283295.html
FireEye. “Redline Drawn: China Recalculates
its Use of Cyber Espionage” (FireEye iSight
Intelligence, Special Report June 2016)
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-
www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-espionage.
NATO CCDCOE, “2015 UN GGE Report:
Major Players Recommending Norms of
Behaviour, Highlighting Aspects of
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24
International Law” (NATO CCDCOE:
INCYDER Database, 31 August 2015)
https://ccdcoe.org/2015-un-gge-report-major-p
layers-recommending-norms-behaviour-highli
ghting-aspects-international-l-0.html
Council on Foreign Relations, “UN Group of
Governmental Experts: Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications
in the Context of International Security”
(CoFR, 22 July 2015)
http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/un-group-g
overnmental-experts-developments-field-infor
mation-telecommunications-context-internatio
nal-security/p36949
Maurer, Tim. “Cyber Norm Emergence at the
United Nations” (Paper: Harvard Kennedy
School Belfer Center, September 2011)
A/70/174, 22 July 2015
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sy
mbol=A/70/174
HT, Jason. “The UN Calls On Governments to
Stop Shutting Down the Internet” (Web: F-
Secure Safe and Savvy, 8 July 2016)
http://safeandsavvy.f-secure.com/2016/07/08/t
he-un-calls-on-governments-to-stop-shutting-d
own-the-internet/
NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué (Press
Release: NATO.int, 9 July 2016)
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_text
s_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en
Paganini, Pierluigi. “NATO officially
recognizes cyberspace a warfare domain”
(Web: Security Affairs, 18 June 2016)
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/48484/cybe
r-warfare-2/nato-cyberspace-warfare-domain.h
tml
Noor, Elina. “Securing ASEAN’s Cyber
Domain: Need for Partnership in Strategic
Cybersecurity” (Nanyang Technological
University: RSIS Commentary No.236, 26
November 2014)
Cyber Deterrence
Kramer, Franklin. Butler, Robert J. &
Lotriente, Catherine. “Cyber, Extended
Deterrence, and NATO” (Washington D.C.:
Atlantic Council, 26 May 2016)
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosour
ce/cyber-extended-deterrence-and-nato
Incorporation of Cyber under UNC/1/4(2)?
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chap
ter-i/index.html
Resilience
Goodin, Dan. “New Attack bypasses HTTPS
protection on Macs, Windows, and Linux”
(Web: ArsTechnica, July 26 2016)
http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/new-at
tack-that-cripples-https-crypto-works-on-macs
-windows-and-linux/
Develle, Yuji. “Authentication – Crypto-Wars’
New Frontline” (Web: Strife Blog, August 1
2016)
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
25
http://www.strifeblog.org/2016/08/01/authenti
cation-crypto-wars-new-frontline-strife-blog-s
ubmission/
Peterson, Andrea. “Are squirrels a bigger
threat to the power grid than hackers?”
(Washington Post: The Switch, January 12
2016)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-sw
itch/wp/2016/01/12/are-squirrels-a-bigger-thre
at-to-the-power-grid-than-hackers/
Cox, Joseph. “Are Data Breaches Becoming
More Common?” (VICE/Motherboard, 28 July
2016)
https://motherboard.vice.com/read/data-breach
es-vigilante-pw
Townsend, Kevin. “Leaked EU Proposal
Pushes Tighter Rules on Dual-Use
Technologies” (Web: Security Week, 28 July
2016)
Houck, Caroline. “Until We Reduce
Cybercrime, Expect More Russian Meddling”
(Web: Defense One Daily, 29 July 2016)
GReAT, “The Epic Turla Operation” (Web:
Securelist, 7 August 2014)
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TOPIC B: THE KURDISH PEACE
PROCESS: DISARMAMENT AND
PEACE-BUILDING IN THE
RELEVANT REGIONS OF TURKEY,
SYRIA AND IRAQ
The question of Kurdish sovereignty,
statehood and disarmament has been a
significant issue for the international
community for decades. With violence and
instability brought about by conflicts in Syria,
Iraq and most recently, Turkey, the question of
disarmament and peacebuilding in the region
is vital for the maintenance of international
peace and security in the Middle East.
Kurds are currently the largest stateless
minority in the world. There is presently an
estimated 30 million Kurdish people in only
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia. Kurds
form around 18-25% of the total population of
Turkey and around 15-20% of the total 60
population of Iraq . Whilst these groups are
identifiable as Kurds, there are lots of
differences between the Kurdish groups in
these countries: from language and culture to
religious beliefs. Disarmament and peace-
building in the region is essential not only for
the Kurds, but all groups.
Violence in recent decades brought about by
Kurdish political groups like the Kurdish
Workers’ Party (PKK) has led to this group
60 Roy, S. (2011) “The Kurdish Issue”, Available from
the Foreign Policy Journal at:
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/22/the-k
urdish-issue/ [Accessed on 19/07/16]
being categorised as a terrorist group by the 61
United States of America , the European
Union and Turkey. This has led to a policy
discrepancy due to the fight against the Daesh,
otherwise known as ISIL. The USA and
Western member states are providing funds
and armaments to Kurdish Peshmerga forces 62
in the fight against Daesh . These efforts have
been successful, but there is no guarantee that
the region will return to peace once Daesh is
defeated, due in part to the presence of
weapons and armed groups in the region.
The current instability in the region was
caused by the Treaty of Sévres of 1920. This
treaty created the modern states of Iraq, Syria
and Kuwait and included the possibility of the
creation of a Kurdish state in the region.
61 U.S. Department of State (2016) “Foreign Terrorist
Organisations”, Available from the U.S. Department of
State at:
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
[Accessed on 22/07/16] 62 Shinkman, P. (2014) “Who are the Kurds, and why
should we help them?” Available from USA News at:
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/26/the-d
angers-of-helping-the-kurds-fight-the-islamic-state-grou
p-in-iraq [Accessed on 22/07/16]
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63
However this never implemented due to the
Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.
After the Treaty of Sévres, Turkey, Iran and
Iraq agreed to not recognise a possible Kurdish
state. This led to a particularly harsh treatment
at the hands of the Turkish government
following the overthrow of the Turkish
monarchy by Kemal Ataturk. The Turkish
government of the time discriminated Kurds
by also naming them “Mountain Turks”,
outlawed their language and forbade them
from wearing traditional clothes in cities.
These laws resulted in political movements
like the PKK whose main aim is stop the 64
repression of Kurds . Violence between
Kurdish groups and the countries in the region 65
has led to the deaths of around 40,000 people
. Other member states have repressed Kurds.
In Iraq and Syria, Kurds have been persecuted
for decades.
Peacebuilding and disarmament in the region
is linked to the Syrian Civil War and the
actions of Daesh. For Kurds to live in peace
and without violence, these two issues will
have to be solved. At the time of writing, the
failed coup in Turkey against the government
of Recep Erdogan has resulted in uncertainty 66
towards Kurdish politics in Turkey .
63 OpCit, n.61 64 BBC (2015) “Profile: Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK)”, Available from the BBC at:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100,
[Accessed on 22/07/16] 65 ibid 66 Tash, Y. (2016) “Where does the attempted coup
leave Turkey’s Kurds?”, Available from The New Arab
at:
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/7/19/
History of the Committee
With the creation of the United Nations, it
became apparent that there was a need to have
multiple committees to deal with numerous
issues after the fallout of WW2. The First
Committee of the General Assembly,
otherwise known as the Disarmament and
International Security Committee (DISEC) 67
was formed .
DISEC has strong connections to other
disarmament bodies such as the Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament and the United
Nations Disarmament Commission. DISEC
also has to work within the scope of the UN
Charter, with article 11 setting out its mandate:
“The General Assembly may consider the
general principles of cooperation in the
maintenance of international peace and
security, including governing
disarmament and the regulation of
armaments and may make
recommendations with regard to such
principles to the Members or to the 68
Security Council or to both" .
Naturally, DISEC is concerned with the
instability in Syria, Iraq and Turkey and as
such, new measures need to be drafted to bring
where-does-the-attempted-coup-leave-turkeys-kurds-
[Accessed on 22/07/16] 67 UN (2016) “Disarmament and International Security”,
Available from the United Nations at:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/ [Accessed on 22/07/16] 68 UN (1945) “Charter of the United Nations and the
Statute of the International Court of Justice”, Available
from the United Nations at:
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pd
f [Accessed on 22/07/16]
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stability to the region. Since the establishment
of these states, Kurds have struggled to secure 69
equal rights of citizenship and expression , a
clear concern for the United Nations.
TOPIC HISTORY
The Origins of the Kurdish Issue
The origins of the Kurdish problem are very
much intertwined with local and regional
struggles. Over millennia, numerous
ethnicities have settled and migrated in the
area which we now call Turkey, Syria, Iraq
and Iran. Throughout Kurdish history, the
mountains in the region have brought
protection but also political and literal 70
isolation .
In the early 20th century, with the First World
War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,
the victorious Western powers made
provisions for a Kurdish state in the Treaty of 71
Sévres . However, the hope brought by the
Treaty was dashed by the Treaty of Lausanne
of 1923 which established the borders of the
modern-day Turkey and made no provisions 72
for a Kurdish state . This left millions of
69 Gunes, C. & Lowe, R. (2015) “The Impact of the
Syrian War on Kurdish Politics Across the Middle East”,
Available from Chatham House at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse
/field/field_document/20150723SyriaKurdsGunesLowe.
pdf, [Accessed on 22/07/16] 70 The Kurdish Project (2015) “Kurdish History”,
Available from:
http://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-
history/, [Accessed on 22/07/16] 71 OpCit, n.61 72 Brunner, B. (2015) “Kurdish History Timeline”,
Available from:
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kurds3.html, [Accessed
on 22/07/16]
Kurds with a minority status in the region and
has resulted in the use of violence through
political groups like the Kurdish Worker’s
Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP)
in Iraq and as Kurdish Peshmerga forces
(freedom fighters).
The current situation which the Kurdish
people find themselves in is not only due to
violence brought by the Turkish, Syrian and
Iraqi governments, but also due to the
mistakes of Western powers after WW1.
Since WW1, the Kurdish Issue has been
characterised by guerrilla violence as a way to
achieve political goals, fuelled mostly by the
discrimination against Kurds and nationalism.
Kurdish groups in Iraq
After the Kurds supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq
war of 1980-88, Saddam Hussein destroyed
villages and attacked peasants with chemical 73
weapons . This violence resulted in the
73 OpCit, n.61
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displacement of over 1.5 million people, many 74
of whom fled to Turkey . After the Gulf War
in which Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait,
encouraged by the United States and Coalition
forces, the Kurds in Northern Iraq rose up and
fought against Saddam’s forces. However
Saddam Hussein quashed this rebellion, killing 75
an estimated 180,000 people in the process ,
in Northern Iraq which became the Kurdistan 79
Regional Government in 1992 . This
government is democratically elected and
governed by two parties, the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Prior to the attacks on the World Trade Centre th
in what is referred to as the Kurdish Genocide. on September the 11 2001 and the invasion of
Although the UN and other member states
failed to aid the Kurds in Northern Iraq (also
known as Iraqi Kurdistan), the Security
Council acted decisively and successfully by 76
passing Resolution 688 against Iraqi actions .
Although it was not permitted, the United
Kingdom, the United States and France
imposed no-fly zones over northern Iraq to
allow humanitarian workers to provide aid to 77
those in need .
The Secretary-General of the time, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali said that the no fly-zone was 78
illegal . However, it allowed the Kurds in the
region to control a 15,000 square mile region
74 OpCit, n.72 75 Sinan, O. (2007) “Iraq to hang ‘Chemical Ali’:
Saddam Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan Majid, faces
death for his role in gassing Kurds”, Available from
Tampa Bay Times at:
http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/25/Worldandnation/Ir
aq_to_hang Chemica.shtml, [Accessed on 23/07/16] 76 UN (1991) “Resolution 688”, Available from the
United Nations at:
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/G
EN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement
[Accessed on 23/07/16] 77 OpCit, n.72 78 Pilger, J. (2000) “Labour claims its actions are lawful
while it bombs Iraq, starves its people and sells arms to
corrupt states”, Available from:
http://johnpilger.com/articles/labour-claims-its-actions-a
re-lawful-while-it-bombs-iraq-strarves-its-people-and-se
lls-arms-to-corrupt-states, [Accessed on 23/07/16]
Iraq in 2003, by the United States, the United
Kingdom and other member states, Turkey
refused to allow the U.S. to use military bases
in Turkey to launch an offensive into Northern
Iraq. This refusal empowered the Kurds in
Iraqi Kurdistan who became a powerful ally to 80
the United States . With Kurdish aid, the
United States seized valuable oil fields and
opened a northern front against Saddam
Hussein.
With the formation of a new Iraqi government,
the rights of the Kurdish people gained
traction and resulted in both Arabic and
Kurdish being recognised as the official
languages of Iraq, an entirely unprecedented
gain for Kurds in Iraq. Irrespective of the rise
of Daesh, recent changes suggest a gradual
improvement in the lives of Kurds in Iraq.
Another important development is that a
referendum on Kurdish independence is due to 81
take place in October 2016 in Iraqi Kurdistan
79 Kurdistan Regional Government (2016) “Fact sheet:
About the Kurdistan Regional government”, Available
from http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=180,
[Accessed on 23/07/16] 80 OpCit, n.61 81 Kurdistan 24 (2016) “Barzani: Kurdistan will hold
referendum before October”, Available from Kurdistan
24 at:
http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/05609d37-3569-4a
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30
. Delegates should keep this in mind whilst
researching this topic.
Kurdish groups in Syria
The 2011 uprising in Syria and eventual civil
war created a massive change in conditions for
Kurdish politics and societies within Syria.
Most present-day Kurdish political parties can
trace their roots to the Kurdistan Democratic
Party of Syria, the first Kurdish nationalist 82
party, founded in 1957 . These parties have
remained illegal under the totalitarian regime
in Syria.
During the 1990s, Syria served as a safe space
for the PKK which was consistently attacked
in Turkey, however it was expelled from the
Syria in 1998 with former members
establishing the PYD in 2003. The PYD has
since acted as one of the main Kurdish groups
during the Syrian civil war, gaining territory in
areas with majority Kurdish populations in the
north of Syria, particularly: Jazira, Kobane and 83
Afrin . This has led to the PYD joining these
administrations into an area called Rojava
(“West”) to represent Western Kurdistan.
8f-a39e-98b97c732503/Barzani--Kurdistan-will-hold-re
ferendum-before-October [Accessed on 26/07/16] 82 OpCit, n.70 83 ibid
The administration of Rojava is widely
different to most political systems in the
region. It is organised on a political theory of
democratic confederalism, advocated by
Abdullah Öcalan (the imprisoned leader of the
PKK). In democratic confederalism, there is
complete equality for women and minorities
and a separation of state and religion. The
approach has brought Rojava international 84
attention .
However, in addition to the conflict between
the Free-Syrian Army (FSA) and the Assad
Regime, there has been an added dimension of
violence brought by Daesh. Kurdish groups
have fought Daesh in order to defend Kurdish
towns and villages from violence, most
notably the People’s Protection Unit (the PYG,
the militia associated with the PYD). The
Free-Syrian Army and the PYG have
collaborated in fighting Daesh, but also remain 85
suspicious of each other . These two groups
have both collaborated and fought militarily
against each other, depending on local
84 ibid 85 ibid
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31
circumstances along with the wider aspects of
the war.
Current estimates of PYG fighters put them at
around 50,000 fighters strong, gaining the
confidence of Turkey’s allies in the fight
against Daesh. The instability in the region has
also been fuelled by the presence of Russian,
Chinese, Iranian and Eastern European 86
weapons .
While the PYG has been gaining legitimacy by
defending and gaining territory against Daesh,
it is a target of the Turkish military who view
them as an extension of the PKK. The US
Department of State and the EU has told
Turkey to stop bombing Kurdish groups in the
region, who they see as a vital force to stop 87
Daesh .
The military and political position of Syrian
Kurds is of vital importance to Turkey.
President Erdogan is opposed to Kurdish self-
rule as this could lead to the break up of 88
Syria . Turkey has stated it will not tolerate an 89
independent Kurdish authority on its border .
Similarly to Iraqi Kurds, for Syrian Kurds,
irrespective of whoever is going to be in
86 Bender, J. (2015) “Syria and Iraq are awash with
Russian, Iranian and Chinese weapons”, Available at:
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/syria-and-iraq-full-o
f-russian-iranian-and-chinese-weapons-2015-4
[Accessed on 26/07/16] 87 BBC (2016) “Turkey v Syria’s Kurds v Islamic
State”, Available from the BBC at:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33690060
[Accessed on 25/07/16] 88 ibid 89 ibid
charge of Syria, a recognition of Kurdish 90
rights essential to stop future hostilities .
Kurdish groups in Turkey
As the country with the most amount of Kurds
in the region, Turkey has had a long,
complicated and violent history with Kurdish
politics. Both sides of this conflict have used
violence
to establish political control. Turkey’s current
policies against Daesh in the region have been
influenced by the rise of Kurdish groups.
Founded in 1978, the PKK has been a thorn in
the side of the Turkish government. Originally
founded as a Marxist political group, the PKK
as evolved a political ideology called
democratic confederalism in which the
decision making powers of the state come
from a local level.
Despite the imprisoned leader of the PKK
Abdullah Öcalan calling for a ceasefire and
peace negotiations between the Kurdish and
90 International Crisis Group (2013) “Syria’s Kurds: A
Struggle Within a Struggle”, Available from the
International Crisis Group at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20Ea
st%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syri
a/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf,
[Accessed on 25/07/16]
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32
91
Turkish forces in March 2013 , violence has
always been a pressing concern in the region.
The ceasefire didn’t last long before violence
re-erupted. The PKK was the first to break the
ceasefire when they killed four policemen, the
Turkish government responded by bombing 92
PKK camps in Iraq .
Picture: PKK fighters
Current Turkish policies are based on
domestic political motivations. The ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) has
similarly faced a constitutional crisis at home
due to the recent failed coup. The coup has
caused fear as many believe that President
Erdogan would use the coup to change the 93
constitution by giving a executive presidency
. With 200 people killed and thousands
wounded, the Turkish government declared a
state of emergency and withdrew from the
European Convention on Human Rights whilst
purging military, police, academic and 94
bureaucratic institutions .
The situation of Kurdish politics in Turkey is
completely uncertain as the PKK and the
91 Ekurd Daily (2015) “U.S. welcomes Kurdish leader’s
call for disarmament of PKK”, Available at:
http://ekurd.net/u-s-welcomes-kurdish-leaders-call-for-d
isarmament-of-pkk-2015-03-03 [Accessed on 26/07/16] 92 The Economist (2015) “The truce between Turkey
and Kurdish militants is over”, Available at The
Economist at:
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa
/21659870-truce-between-turkey-and-kurdish-militants-
over-turkey-and-kurds [Accessed on 26/07/16] 93 ibid 94 Shaheen, K. (2016) “Turkish PM: coup suspects’
testimony points to Gülen’s involvement”, Available
from The Guardian at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/turkish
-pm-coup-suspects-testimony-points-to-gulens-involve
ment [Accessed on 26/07/16]
Peoples’ Democratic Party (the HDP, a Social-
Democratic Party mainly led by Kurds)
condemned the coup. However, reports note
that AKP supporters carried out attacks on 95
numerous HDP offices .
The largest fear within Turkey is that the
government could become authoritarian. With
the bombing of the Turkish parliament by pro-
coup airforce jets, peace and democratic
institutions need to be reassured in order to
prevent further conflicts. Those accused of
orchestrating the coup must face a free and fair 96
trial to ensure peace in the region .
DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM
Disarmament in Turkey, Iraq and Syria
The proliferation of weapons in the region has
led to an excess of violence due to the
prevalence of foreign imported weapons over
decades of conflict. Many member states have
used the conflict to profit through arms sales.
According to reports from the Balkan
Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and
the Organised Crime and Corruption
Reporting Project (OCCRP), Eastern European
countries have approved of the sale of more
than €1.2bn of weapons during the past four
years to Middle Eastern Countries. Thousands
of light and heavy armaments from AK-47s,
rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons have
95 Tashjian, Y. (2016) “Where does the attempted coup
leave Turkey’s Kurds?”, Available from The New Arab
at:
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/7/19/
where-does-the-attempted-coup-leave-turkeys-kurds-
[Accessed on 26/07/16] 96 ibid
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made their way from the Balkans to the
Arabian peninsula to countries which border 97
Syria .
Eight countries have approved of over €1.2bn
of weapons and ammunition exports to Jordan,
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey – key arms markets for Syria and
Yemen. Arms export licenses were granted
despite fears from governments and experts
that the weapons could end up in Syria, in
opposition to national, EU and international 98
law .
While the Free Syrian Army has received
these weapons, they have also fallen in the
hands of extremist groups like the al Qaeda
affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, Daesh and factions
fighting on behalf of Bashar al-Assad. This
development has been confirmed by markings
on ammunition cases identifying the origin
and date of manufacture. Many of the weapons
provided were produced as recently as 2015.
In response to the findings of the investigation,
Patrick Wilckens on behalf of Amnesty
International stated the following:
“The evidence points towards systemic
Since 2012, BIRN and OCCRP state that
around €806m worth of weapons and
ammunition were approved by Eastern
European countries to Saudi Arabia. Jordan
secured €155m worth of export licenses,
whilst UAE acquired €135m and Turkey
€87m. It is not difficult to imagine that these
arms could easily reach groups which are
supported by these member states, thus
bringing even more violence into the region as
Soviet-style weapons are sent to insurgent 100
groups .
Jeremy Binnie, an arms expert specialised in
the Middle East, stated that: “the militaries of
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE and
Turkey use western infantry weapons and
ammunition, rather than Soviet-designed
counterparts. It consequently seems likely that
large shipments of such materiel being
acquired by – or sent to – those countries
destined for their allies in Syria, Yemen and 101
Libya.” US government documents provide
an indication of the types of weapons given to 102
Syrian rebel groups .
Currently the lack of sanctions mechanisms
under the Arms Trade Treaty to punish diversion of weapons to armed groups accused 103
member states has allowed violence to of committing serious Human Rights
Violations, if this is the case, the transfers are
illegal under […] international law and should 99
cease immediately” .
97 Angelovski, I., Patrucic, M. & Marzouk, L. (2016)
“Revealed: the £1bn of weapons flowing from Europe
to Middle East”, Available from The Guardian at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/weapo
ns-flowing-eastern-europe-middle-east-revealed-arms-tr
ade-syria, [Accessed on 27/07/16] 98 ibid 99 ibid
continue in Syria, Iraq and Turkey. As such,
“all these states do have clear, legally binding
responsibilities to stop the transfer of arms
where there is a risk that they will be used for
100 ibid 101 ibid 102 Binnie, J. (2016) “US arms shipment to Syrian rebels
detailed”, Available from Jane’s 360 at:
http://www.janes.com/article/59374/us-arms-shipment-t
o-syrian-rebels-detailed [Accessed on 27/07/16] 103 OpCit, n.97
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
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serious violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law, and to take
mitigating measures to prevent diversion to 104
unauthorised end users” .
Delegates should consider the importance of
arms agreements, how these can be improved
in order to stop member states from profiting
from the trade of weapons to a region
devastated by violence.
Political Obstacles
What has become clear is that there are
numerous obstacles which will determine
whether any peacebuilding operations will be
successful. The determinant factor in whether
peace and disarmament will succeed in the
region will depend on the political obstacles
which Iraq, Turkey and Syria face.
With the UN special envoy for Syria
estimating that over 400,000 people have been
killed during the war. Peace and disarmament 105
in the region is a difficult future to imagine .
The political obstacles in Syria are
complicated by the fact that the Syrian civil
war is similar to the proxy wars of the Cold
War. Different international actors have been
adjusting their support for groups to ensure
that they aren’t eliminated, with the US
funding groups like the Kurds and Free Syrian
104 ibid 105 Al Jazeera (2016) “Syria death toll: UN envoy
estimates 400,000 killed”, Available from Al Jazeera at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffan-de-mist
ura-400000-killed-syria-civil-war-160423055735629.ht
ml [Accessed on 28/07/16]
Army and on the other hand Russia and Iran 106
aiding the Assad regime .
Although we will not focus on numerous UN
resolutions that have been adopted by the 107
Security Council , most international
proposals approved by the UN for ending the
war in Syria have focused on a negotiated
settlement between the various warring 108
factions in Syria . This has meant that there
has been a lack of international negotiations
regarding groups like the Kurds. There are
widespread concerns to countries like Turkey,
Iraq and Iran that the Kurds in the region will
be able to establish their own independent
country by regaining land from Daesh and the
Assad regime.
All the negotiations have been fruitless due to
a lack of trust on both sides. There are no
guarantees that if a peaceful negotiation is
reached with Assad, that he would follow all
of the terms. The government could easily
wait for the groups to disarm then simply jail
and kill all opposition leaders, a concern for all
countries which face civil wars against 109
totalitarian regimes . The objective for rebel
groups is to gain control of the central
106 Bozorgmehr, N. (2015) “Iran and Russia reiterate
support for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad”, Available from
the Financial Times at:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/acd77496-91fc-11e5-bd82-c
1fb87bef7af.html#axzz4FnxJG9MK, [Accessed on
29/07/16] 107 Security Council Reports (2016) “UN Documents for
Syria”, Available at:
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/syri
a/, [Accessed on 29/07/16] 108 Fearon, J. (2013) “Obstacles to Ending Syria’s Civil
War”, Available from Foreign Policy at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/10/obstacles-to-endin
g-syrias-civil-war/, [Accessed on 29/07/16] 109 ibid
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
35
government to not only ensure their power, but
to save themselves from possible retaliation.
Current negotiations have focused on the idea
of having a transitional government, followed
by free and fair elections supervised by the
United Nations. These plans have received
support, however the priorities for the United
States, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia
have diverged; specifically on the future of
President Assad. For the U.S. led bloc, the 110
removal of Assad is essential .
On the other hand, Russia and Iran want to
eradicate “terrorist organisations” that have
occupied parts of the country, even though
their definition of what constitutes a terrorist
group has been uncertain. Reports have stated
that the Free Syrian Army has been attacked
by Russian
forces, therefore it is clear that Russia has been
111
aiding Assad . Iran has maintained that it
110 Mousavain, S. (2015) “To Solve the Syria Crisis, We
Need to Overcome These Three Obstacles”, Available
from The Huffington Post at:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/seyed-hossein-mousavi
an/syria-crisis-obstacles_b_8740514.html, [Accessed on
29/07/16] 111 Shaheen, K. (2016) “Syrian rebels launch operation
to break Aleppo siege”, Available from The Guardian
at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/01/syrian
should be the Syrians who decide whether
Assad should continue to be their President or 112
not .
This has led to mistrust between these two
groups. Russia and Iran believe that the main
objective for the U.S. led bloc is regime
change and the U.S. led bloc believes that Iran
and Russia solely aim to remove any groups
which threaten the stability of the Assad
regime.
The mistrust between the groups has
complicated peace and disarmament processes
regarding the Kurdish peace process. Kurdish
groups have largely been the most effective
ground forces in Syria in fighting Daesh.
However, the political consequences of a
possible Kurdish nation within Syria has been
a serious threat to Turkey as the member with
the most amount of Kurds. If an independent
Kurdish state was to be formed, the territorial
integrity of Turkey would be threatened
causing further instability.
Delegates should consider the political
considerations of each actor if future
peacebuilding and disarmament aims are to be
effective in bringing peace to the region.
-rebels-launch-operation-to-break-aleppo-siege
[Accessed on 01/08/16] 112 OpCit, n.110
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36
The Presence of Daesh
The presence of Daesh is clearly a threat to
peace in the region with Western powers
attacking Daesh positions in Iraq and Syria.
Presently, American airstrikes have killed
around 25,000 Daesh fighters in both Iraq and
Syria. The New York Times has estimated that
Iraqi and Kurdish forces have taken back
around 40% of the land seized by Daesh in
Iraq. In the meantime, forces backed by the
West have seized a sizable amount of territory 113
in Syria .
However, despite the successes in regaining
territory and funds from Daesh, it has not
stopped the recruitment, radicalization of
people from all regions of the world. Bringing 114
an increase in lone terror attacks in the West
.
Military officials worldwide recognise the fact
that Daesh is one of the richest terrorist
organisation of all time by looting an
estimated $1bn from bank vaults across Syria
and Iraq. Despite the fact that Daesh has cut in
will continue to remain as an adaptable
adversary, bringing terror to the groups it 115
wants to subjugate to its rule .
At the time of writing, the capitals of Daesh,
Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, still remain
under Daesh control. Even with reduced
salaries, Daesh collects hundreds of millions 116
of dollars by taxes and extortion . There is no
simple way to remove its vast funds.
Since October 2015, the United States and its
Western Allies have targeted oil fields and
refineries, cutting Daesh’s oil revenue about a
third. With the support of Kurdish forces,
Daesh has been weakened significantly,
resulting in the capture of the Sinjar in 117
northern Iraq .
Current estimates put the population under
Daesh’s control from 4 to 5 million people,
meaning there are lots of sources for taxation 118
and extortion . This factor, along with the
thousands of weapons looted from tanks to
armoured vehicles means that Daesh is still a
capable and well armed fighting source.
These strategies have worked to a certain
extent to reduce the military and financial
capabilities of Daesh. However, further
questions need to be asked about what may
happen if and when Daesh is eliminated from
Syria and Iraq. In particular, who will be
expected to fill the power-vacuum left by the
half the salaries for fighters in the last year, it 115 ibid
113 Rosenberg, M., Cooper, H. & Kulish, N. (2016)
“ISIS Expands Reach Despite Military and Financial
Setbacks”, Available from The New York Times at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/world/middleeast/i
sis-iraq-syria.html?_r=0 [Accessed on 29/07/16] 114 ibid
116 ibid 117 ibid 118 Lister, T. (2016) “Is ISIS going broke?”, Available
from CNN at:
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/04/middleeast/isis-finan
ce-broke-lister/, [Accessed on 29/07/16]
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37
group? And will these groups be peaceful, or
will they preach the same ideology of terror?
Even if Daesh is defeated, its extremist
ideology will be difficult to eliminate, even
over a long period of time.
Kurdish Independence
For many Kurdish groups in Iraq, Syria and
Turkey, Kurdish independence is a vital
starting point upon which peace and
disarmament can occur. Whilst some member
states support an independent Kurdish state, as
Kurds have been historically repressed by the
countries in the region, there are numerous
obstacles and threats which must be
considered when discussing peacebuilding and
disarmament in the region.
Firstly, many Kurdish parties are divided on
the viability of independence. Massoud
Barzani, the president of the ruling Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraqi Kurdistan
has pushed for a referendum. The main
opposition party, the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) has remained unconvinced.
Another movement called the Gorran (Change)
movement is concerned by the absence of
democratic institutions which a 119
state could be built .
The PKK in Turkey has been sceptical of the
KDP’s push for independence due to different
119 Al, S. (2014) “Prospects for an independent Kurdish
state are hampered by security challenges, internal
competition, and insufficient international support”,
Available from the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/56374, [Accessed
on 30/07/16]
political beliefs, resulting in a strained 120
relationship between the PKK and the KDP .
Outside of Iraq, the Turkish government has
been fearful of Kurdish independence due to
the precedent it could set for the millions of 121
Kurds who live in Turkey .
Turkey is not the only member state who has
expressed concerns on this matter. The United
States favours a united Iraq and it is unlikely
that the United States will accept the
referendum on Kurdish independence.
Similarly, if the central government in
Baghdad is unwilling to let Iraqi Kurdistan go
then it is extremely unlikely that the other
members of the Arab League recognize an
independent Kurdistan.
Iran has other concerns regarding an
independent Kurdistan. Firstly, Tehran has
close links to the government in Baghdad and
secondly, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu expressed support for an
independent Kurdistan, stating that it would a 122
moderate country into the region . The fear
that Israel would have an influence on the
domestic politics of an independent Kurdistan
is a substantial factor in Iranian policy.
Irrespective of the presence of well trained and
well organised Kurdish militias and fighting
forces, the current security situation in the
region will continue to exist. These risks will
continue to threaten the establishment of a
Kurdish state. The rise of Daesh has also
caused a split in policies between the
120 ibid 121 ibid 122 ibid
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38
government in Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad
who now practice different foreign policies,
even towards Syria and also control separate
armies. As a result, for many Kurds, the fight
against Daesh is a war of independence due to 123
the failure of the Iraqi army to stop Daesh .
Previous UN Action
The UN has promoted peace and disarmament
in the region by passing numerous Security 124
Council resolutions specifically on Syria .
The UN has acted as a mediator between
opposition groups and the Assad regime,
especially after the use of chemical weapons
by the Assad regime. However, the UN has
not been able to address the Kurdish question
due to the extremely complex situation in the
region.
Whilst the UN has aided the creation of the
Kurdistan Regional Government, it has been
limited in addressing the Kurdish question
along with the future of the Kurdish people if
the referendum on Kurdish independence
occurs in October. France unsuccessfully
attempted to insert a clause in Resolution 687
regarding the Kurdish issue when Saddam
Hussein’s forces were targeting Kurds in Iraqi 125
Kurdistan .
123 Ahmad, A. (2016) “The Time for an Independent
Kurdistan Is Now”, Available from Foreign Policy at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/04/the-time-for-an-ind
ependent-kurdistan-is-now/?wp_login_redirect=0,
[Accessed on 30/07/16] 124 OpCit, n.107 125 Yildiz, K. & Breau, S. (2010) “The Kurdish Conflict:
International Humanitarian Law and Post-Conflict
Mechanisms”, Available from:
https://books.google.it/books?id=F0hgBwAAQBAJ&pg
=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=un+involvement+in+kurdist
an&source=bl&ots=JES3BYsLvM&sig=3E5YghzUbCj
Unfortunately, the final text of Resolution 687
focused on the dismantling of Iraq’s chemical
weapons and the abuse of human rights.
Subsequent, Security
Council Resolutions 986 (1995) and 1546
(2004) only addressed the need for
humanitarian aid and the respect of human 126
rights of the new Iraqi government .
The lack of action regarding the Kurdish
question in the Security Council has been key
evidence of Security Council politics. The
Security Council has been unwilling to
condemn the actions of either the PKK or the
Turkish government as the wider concern has
been the ongoing violence in Syria and Iraq.
By addressing the Kurdish question, the
Security Council would have to address the
issues of Kurdish self-determination.
The hindrance to the Kurdish issue has been
under the UN Charter as article 53(1) which
states the following: “no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or
by regional agencies without the authorization
of the Security Council, with the exception of
Bq205SUUTCYjPh5o&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj
1mpz4-ZzOAhUBrhQKHa7RB2k4ChDoAQgiMAE#v=
onepage&q=UN&f=false, [Accessed on 31/07/16] 126 ibid
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
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127
measures against any enemy state” . This has
demonstrated that while member states can
attempt to solve this issue, the Security
Council, and consequently the UN, has been
limited in passing resolutions due to the cross-
boarder nature of the Kurdish question.
THE FUTURE
With instability, violence and widespread
human rights abuses in the region, the future
of all peace and disarmament missions is
extremely uncertain and fraught with risks.
The Assad regime
For any disarmament and peacebuilding
missions to be successful, the future of Assad
needs to be considered. For many member
states worldwide, the actions of Assad in using
chemical weapons against civilians along with
countless human rights abuses have meant that
a different government will need to be formed.
However, supporters of the Assad regime have
also fairly pointed towards the need for the
Syrian people to decide who should govern
them rather what would be considered to be an
imposed “western” government, which is not
likely to have the support of the Syrian people.
Officials representing the Syrian government
in peace talks held in Geneva earlier in 2016
refused to discuss future of President Assad. A
factor which was described as a “provocation”
127 OpCit, n.68
128
by Western governments . The peace talks
organised by the UN and the International
Syria Support Group failed. Firstly, numerous
different groups, including the Kurds, were
excluded from the negotiations (in part due to
the Turkish Government’s refusal) and
secondly the refusal of the Syrian government
to discuss the future of Syria without Assad.
This resulted in the Syrian Opposition’s chief
negotiator, who represented the Free Syrian
Army and other non-Kurdish resistance groups,
resigning by stating “the three rounds of talks
were unsuccessful because of the stubbornness
of the regime and its continued bombardments
and aggression towards the 129
Syrian people.” At the time of writing, this
resignation was followed by
a failure by all parties to agree when the peace
128 Wintour, P. (2016) “Future of Bashar al-Assad
remains ‘red line’ as Syria peace talks begin”, Available
from The Guardian at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/future
-of-bashar-al-assad-remains-red-line-as-syria-peace-talk
s-begin [Accessed on 31/07/16] 129 Wintour, P. (2016) “Syria peace talks in peril after
opposition’s chief negotiator quits”, Available from The
Guardian at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/29/syria-
oppositions-negotiator-resigns-over-failure-of-un-peace-
talks [Accessed on 31/07/16]
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
40
talks should re-commence, meaning that there
are no peace talks at the present time.
While member states like the UK have
provided humanitarian aid, opposition groups
have stated that Assad has been using
starvation as a weapon of war against the 130
opposition groups .
support the regime. Russia recently called for
the swift recommencement of peace talks.
Russia supports a political settlement under
which Syrian opposition groups would be
brought under a Syrian unity government.
However, opposition groups and critics claim 132
that this does not go far enough .
The future of the Assad regime remains
entirely uncertain. With the lengthening of the
conflict in Syria and the failure of peace talks,
peace and disarmament in the region is far
from certain amidst violence and the complete
destruction of infrastructure in Syria and Iran.
BLOC POSITIONS
The United States and other NATO
members have been key supporters of
Kurdish groups in the region. This support has
been convoluted by American-Turkish
Alliance. The USA has failed to exert any
pressure on Turkey to cease its repression of
the Kurds.
Whilst NATO members have vocalised their
strong disapproval of human rights abuses
against Kurds in Iraq and Syria, there has been 131
a failure to condemn them. The main
priority for NATO members at present has
been the elimination of extremist groups like
Daesh.
The Russian Federation has been a strong
ally of the Assad regime and has been
attacking opposition groups in an attempt to
130 ibid 131 OpCit, n.110
Aleksei Goltiaev, a senior Russian counsellor
to the UN Human Rights Council stated: "the
only way to find a solution to the Syria crisis
and stop the massive violations is to promptly
convene talks with a broad spectrum of Syrian 133
opposition which includes Syria Kurds" .
Turkey’s position has been extremely
convoluted. Whilst the Turkish government
has historically been against the Assad regime,
it has also been hindered by the threat of an
independent Kurdish state. Turkey has also
used its alliance with the USA to stop the
representation of Kurdish groups at the failed 134
peace talks in Geneva .
The recent failed coup in Turkey could also
result in a change in Turkish foreign policy
with regards to Syria and other groups in the
region. In the meantime, Turkey has been
completely against the possibility of a Kurdish
state.
Iran remains a key ally of the Assad regime.
Iranian military and security experts have been
key advisors to the Assad regime since the
132 Nebehay, S. (2016) “Russia calls for swift
resumption of Syria peace talks”, Available from
Reuters at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-u
n-idUSKCN0Z70WH [Accessed on 31/07/16] 133 ibid 134 OpCit, n.110
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
41
start of the civil war and have also provided 135
financial assistance to the regime . Whilst the
regime has supported Kurdish militias in Iraqi
Kurdistan, it has remained sceptical of the
possibility of an independent Kurdish state.
Saudi Arabia has been a key opponent of the
Assad regime and has supported Kurdish
groups in Iraq and Syria. Saudi Arabia also
supports the creation of an independent 136
Kurdish state .
POINTS RESOLUTIONS SHOULD
ADDRESS
● How can the Syrian peace-talks be
restarted? Which major obstacles need
to be confronted for the peace-talks to
be successful?
● Which role should Kurdish groups
have in the future if and when peace is
brought back to the region?
● How can the flow of weapons to the
region be stopped? Which major
international conventions need to be
abided by?
135 Fulton, W., Holliday, J. & Wyer, S. (2015) “Iranian
Strategy in Syria”, Available from the Institute for the
Study of War at:
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strateg
y-syria [Accessed on 31/07/16] 136 Ekurd Daily (2015) “Why Saudi Arabia seek to
establish Kurdish state in Iraq?”, Available from Ekurd
Daily at:
http://ekurd.net/saudi-arabia-seek-to-establish-kurdish-s
tate-2015-09-01, [Accessed on 31/07/16]
● How have previous UN actions been
hindered by the position of member
states?
● Is it possible to consider peacebuilding
and disarmament missions without
tackling the political obstacles?
● If a Kurdish state is to be formed, what
will be the political impact on
neighbouring member states?
● What is the impact of the failed
Turkish coup on Kurdish rights and
politics?
● Can Kurdish rights be protected in the
region without political reform?
FURTHER READING
● For a good understanding of the
obstacles to peace in Syria:
Fearon, J. (2013) “Obstacles to Ending Syria’s
Civil War”, Available from Foreign Policy at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/10/obstacles-
to-ending-syrias-civil-war/, [Accessed on
29/07/16]
● For an understanding of the impact of
the Syrian war on Kurdish politics:
Gunes, C. & Lowe, R. (2015) “The Impact of
the Syrian War on Kurdish Politics Across the
Middle East”, Available from Chatham House
at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chat
hamhouse/field/field_document/20150723Syri
aKurdsGunesLowe.pdf [Accessed on
22/07/16]
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
42
● For a comprehensive understanding of
the Kurdish Issue:
Roy, S. (2011) “The Kurdish Issue”, Available
from the Foreign Policy Journal at:
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/
22/the-kurdish-issue/ [Accessed on 19/07/16]
● For an understanding of weapons flows
from Europe to the Middle East:
Angelovski, I., Patrucic, M. & Marzouk, L.
(2016) “Revealed: the £1bn of weapons
flowing from Europe to Middle East”,
Available from The Guardian at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/
27/weapons-flowing-eastern-europe-middle-ea
st-revealed-arms-trade-syria, [Accessed on
27/07/16]
● For an understanding of the
humanitarian costs to the Syrian Civil
War:
Al Jazeera (2016) “Syria death toll: UN envoy
estimates 400,000 killed”, Available from Al
Jazeera at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffa
n-de-mistura-400000-killed-syria-civil-war-16
0423055735629.html [Accessed on 28/07/16]
● To understand the obstacles to an
independent Kurdish state:
Al, S. (2014) “Prospects for an independent
Kurdish state are hampered by security
challenges, internal competition, and
insufficient international support”, Available
from the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/56374,
[Accessed on 30/07/16]
● To gain a full understanding of
Kurdish history:
Brunner, B. (2015) “Kurdish History
Timeline”, Available from:
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kurds3.html,
[Accessed on 22/07/16]
● For an understanding of the current
military and financial capabilities of
Daesh:
Rosenberg, M., Cooper, H. & Kulish, N. (2016)
“ISIS Expands Reach Despite Military and
Financial Setbacks”, Available from The New
York Times at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/world/mi
ddleeast/isis-iraq-syria.html?_r=0 [Accessed
on 29/07/16]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmad, A. (2016) “The Time for an
Independent Kurdistan Is Now”, Available
from Foreign Policy at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/04/the-time-f
or-an-independent-kurdistan-is-now/?wp_logi
n_redirect=0, [Accessed on 30/07/16]
Al Jazeera (2016) “Syria death toll: UN envoy
estimates 400,000 killed”, Available from Al
Jazeera at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffa
n-de-mistura-400000-killed-syria-civil-war-16
0423055735629.html [Accessed on 28/07/16]
The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference
43
Al, S. (2014) “Prospects for an independent
Kurdish state are hampered by security
challenges, internal competition, and
insufficient international support”, Available
from the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/56374,
[Accessed on 30/07/16]
Angelovski, I., Patrucic, M. & Marzouk, L.
(2016) “Revealed: the £1bn of weapons
flowing from Europe to Middle East”,
Available from The Guardian at:
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