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MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)
Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition
praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under
section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any local elective position (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad.) Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in
the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC
dismissed Marquezs Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges
before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice.
Held:
NO. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final
judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from
justice includes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be
conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
MARCOS versus COMELEC (208 SCRA 300)
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition
for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitutions one-year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not the statement in the COC determines whether an individual satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement, to warrant herein petitioners disqualification.
Ruling:
NO. Having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order
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the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.
AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703)
Facts:
Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu in the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of
the United States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmea maintained that he is a
Filipino citizen, alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late
President Sergio Osmea, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that hewas continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six
months, and (4) that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship.
Held:
YES. Osmena is still a Filipino. The court held that Aznars contention was not meritorious. Aznars argument
that Osmea is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office
of Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof
that Osmea has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for underC.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmea did not lose his Philippine
citizenship in any of the modes provided.
By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmea is a Filipino remains. In this case,
Osmea denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since
1963.
The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmea obtained certificates of
Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979,
he should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water. The court in
this case held that Osmea is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a dual
citizen.
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/comacts/ca_63_1936.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/statutes/comacts/ca_63_1936.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/statutes/comacts/ca_63_1936.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/statutes/comacts/ca_63_1936.html -
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JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the petitioner withdrew hiscertificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days
after its filing. Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost".
Issue:
Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures after he has
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.
Held:The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not
affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioners
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable
that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in
the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts
have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F.
RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
Facts:
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April
18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal
due to his close association with petitioner.
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang
Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23,
1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo,
disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to
COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed
petitioner to run.On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. In
accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not
proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of
SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was "without prejudice to any
further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran
in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.
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quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such
justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and
unconstitutional.
ELECTION LAWPre-proclamation controversies and manifest errors
FACTS
Petitioner and private respondent Fernando Cabitac were candidates for Vice-Mayor of Taytay, Rizal during the
May 2004 elections. Private respondent wonthe election and was proclaimed as Vice-Mayor.P e t i t i o n e r a f t e r
c o m p i l i n g a l l c o p i e s o f e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r c or re ct io n o f m an if es t e rr or s
in the ele ct io n re tu rn s and fo r a nul li fi cat ion of the proclamation of the private respondent as Vice-Mayor.
The COMELEC FirstDivision dismissed the petition and was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.
ISSUE
Whether or not
COMELEC is required to go beyond the face of election returnsand make the necessary correction in a
petit ion for co rrection of ma ni festerrors in the election returns.
RULING
The COMELE C, in a peti tion for co rrecti on of manifest error s, is limit ed to an examination of the
election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction togo beyond or behind the face of the returns.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari
and prohibition is
DISMISSEDforlack of merit, and the Resolutions dated June 30, 2006 and October 16, 2006 of th e CO MEL EC Fi rst
Division and
E n B a n c
, respectively, are
AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner.
[ A D E L I N A T A M A Y O -
R E Y E S , M . D . v s . C O M M I S S I O N O N ELECTIONS and
FERNANDO R. CABITAC. G.R. No. 175121. June8, 2007. Nachura, J
.]
ELECTION LAWPre-proclamation controversies and manifest errorsFACTS
Petitioner and private respondent Fernando Cabitac were candidates for Vice-Mayor of Taytay,
Rizal during the May 2004 elections. Private respondent wonthe election and was proclaimed as
Vice-Mayor .Pet i t ioner af ter compi l ing al l copies of elect ion returns f i led ap e t i t io n fo r co rrec tion of mani fest errors in the el ect ion re tu rns and fo r a
null if icat ion of the proclamation of the private respondent as Vice-Mayor. The COMELEC
FirstDivision dismissed the petition and was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.ISSUEWhether or not
COMELEC is required to go beyond the face of election returnsand make the necessary
correction in a petition for correction of manifesterrors in the election returns.RULING
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The COMELEC, in a petition for correction of manifest errors, is limited to
anexamination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction togo beyond or
behind the face of the returns.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit, and the Resolutions dated June 30, 2006 and October 16, 2006 of the COMELEC First
Division andEn Banc, respectively, areAFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner.[ A D E L I N A T A M A Y O -
R E Y E S , M . D . v s . C O M M I S S I O N O N ELECTIO
NS and FERNANDO R. CABITAC. G.R. No. 175121. June8, 2007. Nachura,J
.]
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party GO!
GO Philippines, et al[G.R. No. 147589. G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001]
Facts:
On the registration period, the COMELEC approved the accreditation of 154 parties and
organizations but denied those of several others in its assailed Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Moreover, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a petition to delete from
the Certified List of Political Parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions and that said
certified list be accordingly amended. Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petitionfor cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some herein respondents.
Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party filed a petition assailing the COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. Also, Bayan Muna filed a petition challenging the said resolution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections
3. Whether or not party-list system is exclusive to marginalized sectors.
Ruling:
1. From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, COMELEC failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of
the law and the Constitution in connection with the due process clause. Basic rudiments of due
process require that the organizations or parties should first be given an opportunity to show that
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they qualify under the guidelines promulgated before they can be deprived of their right to
participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
2. Yes, political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly
states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
3. No, the state policy focused mainly on proportional representation by means of Filipino-style
party-list system.
Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in
a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute
are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related.
PANGKAT LAGUNA VS. COMELEC ET AL.
G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002
Facts: On January 30, 2001 then Vice Governor Teresita Lazaro succeeded to the office of the
Governor of Laguna when then Gov. Jose Lina was appointed Secretary of the DILG. Upon
assumption of office as Governor, Lazaro publicly declared her intention to run for Governor in the
coming May 2001 elections. Subsequently, she ordered the purchase of trophies, basketballs,volleyballs, chessboard sets, t-shirts, medals and pins, and other sports materials worth P4.5
millions. Gov. Lazaro bidded 79 public works projects on March 28, 2001. Pangkat Laguna, a
registered political party, filed a petition for disqualification of Gov. Lazaro for premature
campaigning.
Held: 1. The act of Gov. Lazaro in ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent
distribution thereof of Laguna, in line with the local government units sports and education
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program is not election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly
prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds were released,
disbursed, or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and
implementing rules. Absent such clear and convincing proof, the factual findings of the COMELEC
cannot be disturbed considering that the COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked to decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections.
Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T. Yorac, G.R. No.93867, December 18 1990Brillantes vs. YoracG.R. 93867, 18 December 1990
FACTS:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact findingcommission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate hischairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes thenquestioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall anymember of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantesclaimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matterthat should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violatesthe independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.
ISSUE:Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of
the COMELEC.
HELD:The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive innature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. Thedesignation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quoteadministrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification,it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and unconstitutional.
10. LABO VS. COMELECGR No. 86564, August 1, 1989
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who,through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance asan Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled.Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of hisPhilippine citizenship.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD:
Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lostthrough naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath ofallegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.
11. Caasi vs. Comelec
FACTS:
Mateo Caasi is seeking the disqualification of Merito Miguel as candidate for municipal mayor ofBolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he (Miguel) is a green card holder, hence, a resident of theUnited States. Miguel admits possessing a green card but contends that he only uses it forconvenience to freely enter US for his medical treatment and to visit his children. He also alleges
that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratificationof the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987.
ISSUE:
WON a green card is a proof that the holder is a US resident
HELD:
In Miguels Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230,Department of State) which he filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy inManila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21
therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,"Permanently." On the green card itself, it identifies Miguel as a Resident Alien. Miguels immigrationto the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in thePhilippines. To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that thecandidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident orimmigrant of a foreign country. Also, Miguel only resided in Bolinao for 3 months after returning tothe country which is in violation of the 1 year residency requirement.
12. DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC258 SCRA 483, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission on Elections from running forthe position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited by theCOMELEC was Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said section provides thatthose sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offensepunishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence aredisqualified from running for any elective local position. It was established by the COMELEC that thepetitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. It wascontended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is not applicable to him because he was granted
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probation by the MTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)s applicability.
Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that propertyreceived is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as thatwhich animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.Anent the second issue, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend theexecution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of fencing which already declared as a crime ofmoral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40(a), subsistsand remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
*Miguel is disqualified to run for mayor.
Grego vs COMELEC [274 SCRA 481]
Facts:Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code) which took effect on
January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for any elective position on the ground that had been
removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of
serious misconduct in an administrative complaint.
He ran as a candidate for Councilor, won and assumed office for three terms during the Elections
of January 18, 1988; May 11, 1992 and May 8, 1995. As in the past, respondents right to officewas contested.
On May 13, 1995, petitioner, seeks for the respondents disqualification, pursuant to the above
provision, contending that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an
administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the
Code, the disqualification applies.
Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief because Section 40 par. b of
the LGC may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do
so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested
rights
Issue:WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed
from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992.
Held:No. It is a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any
retroactive effect. Laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively.
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ruling inthe case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a
bar to his disqualification.
Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes, intervened, contending that
because Reyes was disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc
denied Garcias prayer.
ISSUES:
1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not beenserved a copy thereof.
2. WON petitioners reelection rendered the administrative charges against him moot and
academic
3. WON the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to
the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been
made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused toreceive the decision. If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable
to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly
served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not
for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyess refusal to receive the decision may,therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he shouldhave received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with
R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final
30 days after the first service upon petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision ofthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing of a petition
for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An
original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the
principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari
proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the
appellate court directed to the lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restrainingorder was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued.
The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no
more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.
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2. No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a
public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his
reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition
questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, theterm of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannotextend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official
is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter
reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an
action to question the decision in the administrative case, thetemporary restraining order issued
in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and itthereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the
President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar
to 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground
that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed todo so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that
he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date
set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for
postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the patternof delay heemployed to render the case against him moot by his election.
3. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner
in case the winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of thevoter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would
have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under thecircumstances. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes
was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent
finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the
votes cast for him.
Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and judgments
either personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery,which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it
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in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known.
Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioners counsel in his
office in Manila on March 3, 1995.
In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by registered
mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was notclaimed by him, service was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March27, 1995.
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service isdeemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it
can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his
counsels refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been
rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
not to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in theRegional Trial Court was pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be
construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading,order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests,
i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision
becomes final.
In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or other papers in
a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to its legal
effect.
In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence required that,rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the
Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. But petitioner did not do so.
Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service uponpetitioner.
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Mercado vs . Manzano
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Eduardo B. Manzano won with a total of 103,853 over Ernesto S. Mercado with only 100,894
votes.
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not acitizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under LocalGovernment Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position.
The petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of
Vice-Mayor of Makati City was filed before May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Issue:
Whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Held:
http://www.thelawchic.com/mercado-vs-manzano/http://www.thelawchic.com/mercado-vs-manzano/ -
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To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli;(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are consideredcitizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing anyact, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he isnot a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced hisprofession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
1. Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The
recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that underSec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no
recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one
year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
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ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be
considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par.
(b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the
phrase regularlocal election toinclude SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for
there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the
Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should
be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.
2. LUCERO VS. COMELEC
DAVIDE, JR.,J.:
After the issues had been joined in these consolidated cases, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petitions therein and to decide the cases on the merits. It can no longer allow the
parties to delay these cases. Their legal skirmishes, which have unduly magnified uncomplicated
issues, have effectively deprived the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar
of representation in the House of Representatives for more than two years now.
These cases are sequels to G. R. No. 105717, entit led "Jose L. Ong, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
and Wilmar P. Lucero," which we finally resolved on 22 April 1993. 1The petitioners were two of
the five candidates 2for the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar in the synchronized
national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.
The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L.
Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes.
However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos,
where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible; of
Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was
held; and of Precinct No. 16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the election returns were
missing.
On 22 May 1992, Lucero asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in SPA No. 92-282, to:
1. Forthwith order Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar
to suspend the proclamation of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.;
2. Direct Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to
correct the Certificate of Canvass (CEF 20) for Las Navas and, accordingly, to
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correct the total votes so far counted by it for Petitioner from 24,068 to 24,088,
thus reducing the margin it found in favor of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.
from 204 to 184 votes only;
3. Order a special election in Precinct 13, Barangay Gusaran, Silvino Lobos,
pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;
4. Order a recount of the votes for Representative of the Second District of
Northern Samar in Precinct 16, Barangay Tubgon, and Precinct 7, Barangay
Camayaan, both of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 234 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
5. Order a recount of the votes for Representative in the 52 precincts herein
above enumerated in order to correct "manifest errors" pursuant to Section 15 of
Republic Act 7166 and for this purpose order the impounding and safekeeping of
the ballot boxes of all said precincts in order to preserve the integrity of the ballots
and other election paraphernalia contained therein. 3
On 2 June 1992, the COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the PBC todesist from reconvening until further orders.
On 8 June 1992, Ong moved to lift the suspension of the proceedings by the PBC, which Lucero
opposed on 10 June 1992 on the ground that the canvass could not be completed even if the
PBC were to reconvene because no election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of
Silvino Lobos and there was no canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camayaan)
and Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) both of Silvino Lobos.
On 13 June 1993, the COMELECen bancpromulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Accordingly, the Commission hereby orders the Provincial ElectionSupervisor of Northern Samar to bring to the Commission within three (3)
days from receipt hereof the ballot boxes from Precinct 7 and 16 of Silvino
Lobos, to be escorted by representatives from the petitioner and the
respondents as well as other parties who have an interest to protect, and
to notify said parties hereof. The Municipal Treasurer of said town is
directed to turn over custody of said ballot boxes to the Provincial Election
Supervisor, and the keys thereof shall likewise be turned over by the
appropriate officials in custody thereof to the PES, who shall in turn give
one key for each ballot box to the duly authorized representatives of the
petitioner and the respondent.
The Commission likewise orders the Election Registrar of Silvino Lobos,Northern Samar, and the Chairman and members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors of Precincts 7 and 16 of said municipality to appear
before the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof.
Below the signatures of the Chairman and the six Commissioners, however, Chairman Christian S.
Monsod and Commissioners Haydee B. Yorac, Dario C. Rama and Regalado E. Maambong
directed as follows:
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We vote in favor of this resolution except that portion which denied the
correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas. Correction of the
Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas is in order in view of the testimony of
the election registrar of Las Navas to the effect that Wilmar Lucero
garnered 2,537 votes for Las Navas and not 2,517. Petition for correction
was duly filed by Lucero with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Northern Samar on May 19, 1992. The Provincial Board of Canvassers ofNorthern Samar is therefore directed to retabulate the total number of
votes for Las Navas for Lucero and enter the same in the Provincial
Certificate of Canvass. 4
On 15 June 1992, Lucero filed an urgent motion to constitute a Special Board of Election
Inspectors (SBEI) to count the votes of Precincts Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. 5
On 20 June 1992, Ong, in a special civil action for certiorarifiled with this Court and subsequently
docketed as G. R. No. 105717, questioned the order for the recount of ballots in Precincts No. 7
and 16. Despite the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC ordered the recount of the ballots
in Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43 votes for Lucero and 2 votes for Ong. 6
On 25 June 1992, this Court issued in G. R. No. 105717 a temporary restraining order against the
implementation by the COMELEC of its Order of 2 June 1992 and its Resolution of 13 June 1992.
On 23 December 1992, this Court promulgated its decision in G. R. No. 105717, 7the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorariis GRANTED and a writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby ISSUED directing the COMELEC to
CEASE and DESIST from implementing its order of June 2, 1992, and
its resolution dated June 13, 1992, and the same are hereby
declared NULLIFIED. Consequently, the election returns based on
the recounted ballots from Precinct 16 are hereby DISCARDED andin lieu thereof, authentic returns from said precinct should instead
be made a basis for the canvassing. The Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Northern Samar is hereby directed to PROCEED WITH
DISPATCH in the canvassing of ballots until completed and to
PROCLAIM the duly elected winner of the congressional seat for
the Second District of Northern Samar.
This decision is immediately executory. 8
Acting on the motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively filed by the COMELEC
and Lucero, this Court, on 22 April 1993, modified 9its aforesaid disposition in G. R. No. 105717 as
follows;
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the dispositive portion of the December 23, 1992
Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows;
"WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE JUNE 2, 1992 ORDER OF
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN SPA NO. 92-282 IS
HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. ITS JUNE 13, 1992 RESOLUTION
THEREIN IS LIKEWISE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE INSOFAR AS IT
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AFFECTS PRECINCT NO. 7 OF SILVINO LOBOS, THE RECOUNT OF
VOTES IN THE 52 OTHER PRECINCTS AND THE CORRECTION OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OF LAS NAVAS, BUT IS AFFIRMED WITH
RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF HOLDING A SPECIAL ELECTION IN
PRECINCT NO. 13 AND THE RECOUNT OF THE BALLOTS IN PRECINCT
NO. 16.
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS HEREBY DIRECTED
TO ASSIGN SPA NO. 92-282 TO ANY OF ITS DIVISIONS PURSUANT TO
ITS RULE ON RAFFLE OF CASES FOR IT TO RESOLVE THE PRE-
PROCLAMATION ISSUES THEREIN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
ABOVE PRONOUNCEMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR
IN SECTION 15 OF R. A. NO. 7166.
WHENEVER WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
COMMISSION MAY (A) CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO.
13 OF SILVINO LOBOS, NORTHERN SAMAR, AND (B) RECONVENE
THE SPECIAL MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS AND THE SPECIAL
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IT HAD EARLIER CONSTITUTEDOR CREATE NEW ONES.
ALL THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE DONE WITH PURPOSEFUL
DISPATCH TO THE END THAT THE WINNING CANDIDATE FOR
CONGRESSMAN REPRESENTING THE SECOND CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICT OF NORTHERN SAMAR MAY BE PROCLAIMED AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE." 10
As to the certificate of canvass of the municipality of Las Navas, this Court explicitly stated;
The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even
though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error isallowed under Section 15 of R. A. No. 7166. 11
Conformably with the aforesaid modified judgment in G. R. No. 105717, SPA No. 92-282 was
raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC which conducted hearings thereon and received the
arguments and evidence of both parties who then submitted their respective memoranda on 25
June 1994. However, during the consultations on the case by the Members of the First Division,
the concurrence of at least two of them could not be obtained; accordingly, pursuant to the
COMELEC Rules, the case was elevated for proper disposition to the COMELEC en bancto
which the parties submitted their respective memoranda on 19 November 1993. 12
On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en bancpromulgated a resolution 13whose dispositive portion
reads as follows:
1. To direct the special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar (a) to
include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the forty-three (43)
votes of petitioner Lucero and the two (2) votes of private respondent Ong as
reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared
by the special Board of Election Inspectors constituted by the Commission to
recount the votes (ballots) in said precinct, as canvassed by the special
Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (b) to include in the municipal
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certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos, the sixty-one (61) votes of private
respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the
election returns (MBC Copy submitted as "Comelec Copy") of Precinct No. 7
(Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of
Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (c) to retabulate the total number of votes of
petitioner Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas and to enter in the provincial
certificate of canvass the correct total which is two thousand five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes (C. E. Form 20-A) prepared
and submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Las Navas; and (d) to
submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties
including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and
private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos and the total
votes of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas as corrected. However,
under no circumstances should the Board proclaim any winning candidate until
instructed to do so by the Commission;
2. To issue an Order calling for a special election in the last remaining Precinct No.
13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by the result
of the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and tonotify the parties of the schedule of election activities for that precinct; and
3. After including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct
No. 13, to decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7
of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, to resolve
the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such
discrepancy of votes of the candidates concerned would affect the over-all
results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall
have been determined.
Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by way of separate special civil actions
for certiorarito challenge the Resolution.
In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his
chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the returns
for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.
In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions (1) the authority of the COMELEC to order the correction of
the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas despite the
absence of any appeal; and (2) the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in
Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.
As we see it, the core issues in these consolidated cases are:
(1) Whether there should first be a count of the
ballots of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos before
determining the necessity of holding a special
election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos:
(2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the correction of the
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alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate
of Canvass of Las Navas; and
(3) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in calling for a special election in
Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more
specifically after one (1) year and ten (10) months,following the day of the synchronized elections.
We shall take up these issuesseriatim.
I.
The answer to the first issue is in the affirmative.
We find the COMELEC's disposition regarding Precinct No. 7 to be unclear. In the first paragraph
of the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, it directs the Provincial Board of
Canvassers "to include in the municipal certificate of canvas of Silvino Lobos the sixty-one (61)
votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in theelection returns (MBC copy submitted as "COMELEC Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay
Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos," and
"to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including
therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in
Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. . . ." On the other hand, in the fourth paragraph of the
said dispositive portion, it orders the Provincial Board of Canvassers, after "including in the
tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13," to "decide the issue of the
recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code [and] to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the
same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidate concerned would affect the over-all
results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been
determined."
Obviously, instead of ordering an outright recount of the ballots of Precinct No. 7, the COMELEC
would first give full faith and credit to the questioned election returns thereof, which it describes
as the "Comelec Copy," and, accordingly, direct the PBC to include in the municipal certificate
of canvass of Silvino Lobos the 61 votes for Ong and the uncertain votes for Lucero29, 30, or
31. The recount would only be made if after a special election in Precinct No. 13 shall have been
held, it shall be determined that such a recount would be necessary.
We fail to grasp the logic of the proposition. First, it is clear to us that the COMELEC, which has in
its possession the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the questioned election returns of Precinct No. 7
and heard the witnesses who testified thereon, doubts the authenticity of the so-called
"Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7;14
hence, it authorizes the PBC todecide the issue of a recount "pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code." Since it
doubts such authenticity, it could not, without arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, order the
inclusion of the "votes" of Ong and Lucero found in the doubtful "Comelec Copy" of the election
returns in the municipal certificate of canvass. Second, it is an uncontroverted fact that an
election was held in Precinct No. 7. None was held in Precinct No. 13 for reasons the parties fully
knew. Pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a special election may
be held in Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the election therein "would affect the result of the
election." This "result of the election" means the net result of the election in the rest of the
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precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his
closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where
there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the election";
hence, a special election must be held. Consequently, the holding of a special election in
Precinct No. 13 can only be determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7 shall have been
included in the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
We may further state that the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7
can by no means be validly included in the municipal canvass. The summary of the evidence in
the "preparation" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7, both in the challenged Resolution and
in the separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall,
leaves no room for doubt that there was actually no countingof the votes in Precinct No. 7.
Quoted in the challenged Resolution is a portion of the testimony of Sabina T. Jarito, Precinct
Chairman of Precinct No. 7, which clearly shows that on questions by COMELEC Chairman
Christian S. Monsod and Commissioner Vicente B. de Lima, the witness candidly admitted that
the election returns were prepared at the"munisipyo"or municipal building and not at the
polling place of Precinct No. 7 in barangay Camaya-an. 15This "munisipyo"is located at
the poblacionof Silvino Lobos. Under the law, the board of election inspectors shall prepare the
election returns simultaneously with the counting of votes in the polling place.16
There is noevidence whatsoever that the COMELEC had, for valid reasons, authorized the transfer of venue
of the counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7 from the polling place in barangay Camaya-an to
the municipal building and that the counting did in fact take place at the latter. Although in the
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall there is a reference
to Exhibit "E," the Joint Affidavit of Sabina Jarito and Mevilyn Surio wherein they declare that after
the voting the Board of Election Inspectors unanimously approved to transfer the counting of
votes to the Municipal Building in the Poblacion of Silvino Lobos, which was allegedly concurred
in by all the watchers of political parties and the candidates present, the alleged "counting" at
the municipal building was denied by no less than the Municipal Election Officer of Silvino Lobos,
Antonio Tepace, and the Municipal Treasurer thereof, Mr. Gabriel Basarte, in their affidavits
marked as Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "G,"
respectively. 17
Since there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, no valid election returns could be
made and any copy of election returns purporting to come therefrom is a fabrication.
Arecountthereof, which presupposes aprior count, would obviously be unwarranted.
Only a count then of the votes of Precinct No. 13 would heretofore be in order. Sections 234,
235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are thus still inapplicable. And, in the light of what
we stated before in relation to the holding of a special election, such a count of the votes of
Precinct No. 7 must, perforce, precede the special election in Precinct No. 13.
II.
Ong's first grievance in G. R. No. 113509 is without merit.
The order of the COMELEC for the correction of the manifest error in the municipal certificate of
canvass of Las Navas was made pursuant to the declaration made by this Court in G. R. No.
105717 (Ong vs. COMELEC) 18that:
The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise
in order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the
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Lucero24,272 as against 24,068will be reduced to either 175
or 173 depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29
or a high of 31 votes as reflected in the election returns of Precinct
No. 7.
Without preempting the exact figures which only the special
Provincial Board of Canvassers can correctly determine,undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election will have to be
held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of
Silvino Lobos.
. . .
Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over
petitioner Lucero, We answer in the affirmative. According to
Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No.
13 istwo hundred thirteen (213).Since the lead of respondent Ong
is less than the number of registered voters, the votes in that
precinct could affect the existing result because of the possibilitythat petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in that
precinct and that majority might be more than the present lead of
Ong. 19
On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, 20the following computation is
in order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of
24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from
Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is
admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13. 21
The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
have indeed been met.
In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the
election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The
second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant
case, the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the
electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in the
opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of
the petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that G. R.
No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this Court. 22Considering then that the
petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into account the fact that
since the term of the office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a special
election in Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered "reasonably close
to the date of the election not held." Ong's postulation should then be rejected.
In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible application,
by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no special election in
the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called if the
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vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election," and
of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House
of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of
the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to
fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer thanninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in
case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the
underlying philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy
occurred within a certain period before the next presidential election or the next regular
election, as the case may be, is obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred
in the holding of a special election when a regular election is, after all, less than a year
away. The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and statutory
proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which may be called under Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code. First, the special election in the former is to fill permanentvacancies in the Office of the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress
occurring after the election, while the special election under the latter is due to or by
reason of a failure of election. Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail
minimal costs because it is limited to only the precincts involved and to the candidates
who, by the result of the election in a particular constituency, would be affected by the
failure of election. On the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the
President, Vice President, and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a
Representative, district-wide. Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant
case, presupposes that no candidate had been proclaimed and therefore the people
of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar would be unrepresented in the House
of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately determine the winning
candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation until the end of
the term. under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected officials
have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office.
Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the
holding of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section
4 of R. A. No. 7166.
Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the COMELEC's disposition of
Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would then be declared and proclaimed the
duly elected Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar despite the fact
that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and the results of
the district elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the election in
Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an incomplete
canvass where the final result would have been affected by the uncanvassed result of PrecinctNo. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people of the
Second Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the very
least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
I. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G. R. No. 113509; and
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II. In G. R. No. 113107, DIRECTING the respondent Commission on Elections to:
(1) Reconvene, in its main office of Manila, within five (5) days from notice hereof,
the Special Board of Canvassers of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, Northern
Samar, which shall then, as a special Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No.
7 of said municipality, within forty-eight (48) hours from its reconvening, count the
ballots of said Precinct No. 7, and deliver to the special Provincial Board ofCanvassers of the said Province a copy of the election returns;
(2) Reconvene, in its main office in Manila, within the same period as aforestated,
the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar which shall then,
within seventy-two (72) hours from its reconvening:
(a) Include in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Silvino Lobos
(1) the total number of votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and for
petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr., respectively, in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos as recorded in the election returns submitted by the
aforementioned special Municipal Board of Canvassers, and (2)
the forty-three (43) votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and thetwo (2) votes for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. as reflected in the
election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared,
after a recount of the ballots, by the special Board of Canvassers;
and after such inclusions to enter the new totals of the votes for
the petitioners in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;
(b) Retabulate the total number of votes for Wilmar P. Lucero for
the Municipality of Las Navas, Northern Samar, which shall be two
thousand and five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the
Statement of Votes (C.E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Las Navas, and to enter the
same in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;
(c) After the accomplishment of all the foregoing, to sum up anew
in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass the canvassed municipal
certificates of canvass of all the municipalities of the Second
Legislative District of Northern Samar and if the same would
establish that the difference in votes between petitioner Wilmar P.
Lucero and petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. is less than two hundred and
thirteen (213), hence the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13
would unavoidably and inevitably affect then the result of the
election, to report to the Commission on Elections such fact and to
furnish the latter with a certified photocopy of the Certificate of
Provincial Canvass;
(3) Within three (3) days after receipt of the aforesaid report from the special
Provincial Board of Canvassers, to CALL a special election in Precinct No. 13 of
Silvino Lobos, which shall be held not later than thirty (30) days from such call; a
copy of the election returns of said special election shall forthwith be transmitted
to the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, which shall then
enter the results thereof in its canvass and make a final summation of the results in
the Certificate of Provincial Canvass, and thereafter, pursuant to the Omnibus
Election Code, pertinent election laws and rules and resolutions of the
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The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to
join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayanng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of
the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar
of Activities for
local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution
No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes an amendment of a national law
ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of
Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law.
HELD:
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1.
YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private
respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM
only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum
Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat,
not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise
is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose
bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly.
On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or
measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without
action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct
of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot
control or change the substance or the content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the
people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights
and obligations can be enforced or implemented there under. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.
Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical
questions or cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review
Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not
been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or
action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of
and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
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4. PERALTA vs. COMELEC
Facts:Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The
period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election,
excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the
constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President
and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the
period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the
Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of
election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
Issue:Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional
Held:The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in
the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang
Pambansa is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on
Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate
the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the
interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent
President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law
shall have been lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is
an election in a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President
has the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the
country within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the
nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the
period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the
Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978
Election Code.
5. Occena vs. Commission on Elections
Facts:The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang
Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing
their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of
the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the
present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is
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the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Issue:Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang
Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held:It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In
the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition
and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to
four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to
the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful
purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It
made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect.
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinalpostulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be
obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were
resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be
too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative
aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme
Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the
acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an
affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere
dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in
Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case
in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of theeffectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
6. Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino vs COMELEC
Facts:
The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) informed the COMELEC by
way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized
representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The
same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General,
Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador
Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.
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However, Rep. Aquino filed his comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have
the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation
filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard
the same.
Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided
because of a struggle of authority between Party Chairman Edgardo Angara and Party
Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two different sets of candidates
under the same party, LDP.
The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution has recognized the
factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets
of nominations and endorsements by the same party.
Held:
Yes. The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by
the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized.
7. Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec
Facts:Herein case involves two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
Issues:
1.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. 2.Whether or not the
party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.
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Held:
1. Yes. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. Yes. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the
purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. (e.g. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution)
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-
list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a
statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the
words and the phrases with which they are associated or rela
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