In case you may need --- Case Digests for Statcon (HW for Jul 12) 1) Caltex v. Palomar-Caltex Hooded Pump Contest DECLATORY RELIEF & CALTEX HOODED PUMP CONTEST DOES NOT TRANSGRESS POSTAL LAW PROVISIONSFACTS: In the year 1960 the Caltex conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Named "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex, its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. 1st Level “Dealer Contest" ---1st -3-burner kerosene stove, 2nd -thermos bottle and ray-O-Vac hunter lantern, 3rd -Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. 2nd Level "Regional Contest", 1- three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, 2-500, 3-300. "National Contest". , 1- P3,000, 2- P2,000, 3- P l,500 and Consolation - P650. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. Caltex filed the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". RTC ruled in favor of Caltex. Respondent Appealed.ISSUES: 1) Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; 2) whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law.HELD: This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute “lottery”, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, form the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 41 N.M., 258 (25 Words and Phrases, perm, ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied). We find no obstacle in saying the same

respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof. Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law. 2) Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan FACTS: Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore and a contractor of Paper industries Corp of Phil (PICOP). Also, engaged services of ANCLA (subcontractor) whose trucks were left at petitioner’s premises. In May 1983, Warrant of Distraint of Personal Prop was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Reg Director Batausa commanding him to distraint the goods, chattels or effects of other personal property of Ancla, subcontractor of Azarcon and delinquent taxpayer. The warrant of garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to surrender, transmit, or remit to BIR the property in his possession. Warrant was received by Azarcon in June 1985. Azarcon signed the “Receipt for goods, articles and things seized under authority of the National Internal Revenue” which stated that he promised to faithfully keep, preserve, to protect goods articles and things seized and will produce and deliver all said goods, articles etc upon the order of any court in the Phill or upon demand of Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any agent of BIR. Azarcon wrote letter in 1985, November which stated that Azarcon ceased his operations and surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from custody. Incidentally petitioner reported taking of truck to security manager of PICOP and requested him to prevent truck being taken out of the PICOP concession. By the time the order was given, it was too late. In 1986, Calo, Revenue Doc Processor of Revenue Region sent a progress report about the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain contractor, Cueva, at PICOP, the same company which engaged pet earth moving services. She suggested that a warrant of garnishment be reissued against Mr. Cueva (PICOP) for whatever amount of rental is due from Ancla until he has paid his tax liabilities. Instead of doing so, Batausa filed a complaint against Pet. Prov Fiscal forwarded to Tanodbayan and then prelim invest was conducted. Ancla and Azarcon were charged before SB of malversation 217 in relation with 222. The charge states that since the private individual voluntarily offered himself as custodian of the truck and has become resp and accountable for said prop to satisfy the tax liability, the truck became public prop and the value thereof as public fund. Petitioner defense: 1. was not present during the prelim invest 2. not a public officer. SB ruled that pet is guilty of malversation.ISSUES: Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. Corollary to this is the question of whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.HELD: The petition is meritorious. On jurisdiction: SB has no jurisdiction over the individual. Jurisdiction must appear clearly from the statue law or it will not hold to exist. Jurisdiction determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. Applicable prov. PD 1601 amended by 1861 but prior to their amendment by RA 7975. SB jurisdiction: a. Violations of 3019, anti-graft and corrupt practices b. other offenses by public officers and employees. C. In

case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with public officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly with the public officers and employees. Therefore, jurisdiction of SB is hinged on WON Azarcon is a public officer by the meaning of law. 3) Republic v. CFIFACTS: The instant appeal by certiorari seeks (1) to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 26,1968 and March 1, 1969 of the then CFI entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Bank of America, et al., Defendants," which orders respectively dismissed herein petitioner's complaint for escheat as against private respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank for improper venue and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of such dismissal order; and (2) the re instatement of the aforesaid against private respondent. The antecedents are as follows: Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3936, otherwise known as the Unclaimed Balance Law, some 31 banks including herein private respondent Pres. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines in January of 1968 separate statements under oath by their respective managing officers of all deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the names of such depositors or creditors known to be dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more. In the sworn statement submitted by private respondent Bank, only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91. Upon receipt of these sworn statements, the Treasurer of the Philippines caused the same to be published in the February 25, March 3 and March 10, 1968 issues of the "Philippines Herald", an English newspaper, and the"El Debate", a Spanish newspaper, both of general circulation in the Philippines.’Thereafter, or on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines instituted before the CFI of Manila a complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks, including herein private respondent. Likewise named defendants therein were the individual depositors and/or creditors reported in the sworn statements and listed in Annex "A" of the complaint. Summonses were accordingly issued to defendant banks and the creditors/depositors requiring them to file severally their answers to the complaint within 60 days after the first publication of the summons with notice that should they fail to file their answers, plaintiff would take judgment against them by default. The aforesaid complaint, list of depositors-creditors (Annex "A"of the complaint), summons and notice were duly published in the August 25, September 1, and September 8, 1968 issues of the "Philippines Herald" and "El Debate."On October 5,1968, private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of improper venue. Opposed by the petitioner, the motion to dismiss was granted in the first assailed Order. Its motion for reconsideration of said dismissal order having been denied in the second assailed order, petitioner interposed the instant appeal on pure questions of law, to wit: ISSUES: a. Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings or in Civil Case No. 73707 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. b. Whether or not venue of action in Civil Case No. 73707 has been properly laid in the City of Manila, since all defendant banks, wherever they may be found, could be included in one single action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3936. c. Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on venue, likewise, governs escheat proceedings instituted by the Republic in the

Court of First Instance of Manila. HELD: 1) A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. 1 There can be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under this definition for the escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such deposits. It is in this sense that it stands to be "injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is for this reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 specifically provides that the bank shall be joined as a party in the action for escheat, thus: Section 3. Whenever the Attorney General shall be informed of such unclaimed balances, he shall commence an action or actions in the name of the People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where the bank is located, in which shall be joined as parties the bank and such creditors or depositors. All or any member of such creditors or depositors or banks, may be included in one action. (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature would not have provided for its joining as a party in the escheat proceedings. Besides, under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, private respondent bank is a real party in interest as its presence in the action is necessary for a complete determination and settlement of the questions involved therein. Private respondent bank being a real party in interest, it may and can file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. 2) Petitioner points to the last sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 above-quoted as authority for saying that the venue of the escheat proceedings was properly laid in the City of Manila. Petitioner's reliance on said sentence is patently misplaced, the same having been obviously read out of context instead of in relation to the sentence preceding it.  The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 directs the Attorney General, now Solicitor General, to commence an action or actions in the name of the People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where the bank is located. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant. It manifests awareness on the part of the legislators that a single action to cover all banks wherever located in the Philippines would not be legally feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such action under the same section, i.e., the province where the bank is located. Thus, the addition of the last sentence, which the lower court had correctly interpreted to mean "that for escheat of unclaimed bank balances all banks located in one and the same province where the Court of First Instance concerned is located may be made parties defendant "in one action" 2 was clearly intended to save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as authority for the lumping together of all banks wherever found in the Philippines in one single escheat proceedings. 3) Suffice it to say that Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot govern escheat proceedings principally because said section refers to personal actions. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city where the rem in this case the dormant deposits, is located.We note that while private respondent bank's motion to dismiss was granted, the trial court in a subsequent order dated November 16, 1968 declared private respondent bank's depositors and co-defendants Jose Ydirin and Leonora Trumpeta in default for failure to file their answers. Considering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 73707 states a common cause of action against private respondent bank and its depositors-co-defendants, and considering further that the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent bank alleged facts 3 that would warrant dismissal of the complaint against said co-defendants, we apply by analogy Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, 4 thereby decreeing the benefits of the dismissal of the complaint to extend to private respondent bank's co-defendants Jose Ydirin and Leonora Trumpeta and their successors- in-

interest. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal by certiorari is hereby denied. No costs. CESARIO URSUA v. CAFACTS: This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases." Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction. The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one

(1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00. ISSUE: W/N Ursua is charged with proper violation HELD: An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows: Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefore in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register. The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads: Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the persons baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrants name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the christian name and the alien immigrants name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry. The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The pertinent provisions

of Act No. 3883 as amended follow -Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract agreement, business transaction, or business. For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a Respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12

Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. SANTOS V. HON. CRUZ-PANO FACTS: Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven years and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and four months of prision mayor, as maximum. 1 He appealed to the Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to one year and eight months as maximum. Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he filed a petition for probation 3with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds: (a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed, and (b) petitioner is not a penitent offender. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the respondent judge, the present proceeding was resorted to, petitioner averring that the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for probation despite the recommendation for its approval by the Probation Office. We find for the petitioner. At the outset, it might be stated that the Solicitor General whose comment was required by this Court, recommends the granting of probation. As he points out, petitioner is not among the offenders enumerated in the probation law (Presidential Decree No. 968) from availing of the benefits of probation. Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are the following: (a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years; (b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State; (c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos; (d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; and (e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree became applicable, pursuant to Section 33. ISSUE: W/N it is sufficient to grant probation HELD:  We cannot but find respondent judge's reasons for his denial of the petition for probation insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law should be applied. The first reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed." According to him, the State has shown serious concern with the above of checks as a commercial paper, as shown by various measures taken to curb the pernicious practice of issuing bouncing checks. For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the probation system has been established, such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to maintain his place in society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at least as to one who has not committed a very serious

offense, when he is not mixed with hardened criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him that second chance to continue in peaceful and cordial association with his fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of reformation in him. If, therefore, reformation is what the law is more, if not solely, concerned with, not the prevention by means of punitive measures, of the commission of the offense, it is readily seen that the respondent judge has fallen into a wrong obsession. He would, in effect, disqualify all those who commit estafa through bouncing cheeks from enjoying the benefits of probation. He would thereby add to the crimes expressly mentioned in the law which are not subject to probation. Thus, the only crimes mentioned in the law based on the nature thereof are those against national security (Section 9, paragraph b), the other crimes being those punished by more than six years imprisonment. Respondent judge would thus be writing into the law a new ground for disqualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation, based on the nature of the crime, not on the penalty imposed as is the main criterion laid down by the law in determining who may be granted probation. That crime would be estafa only by issuing bouncing check, but not all forms of estafa, which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal liability for which is generally separated by a thin line from mere civil liability.  For those who would commit the offense a second time or oftener, or commit an offense of manifest gravity, it is the long prison term which must be served that will act as deterrent to protect society. In protecting society, the family of the offender which might be dependent or the latter to a greater or lesser extent for support or other necessities of life should not be lost sight of, it being the basic unit of that society. By the relative lightness of the offense, as measured by the penalty imposed, more than by its nature, as the law so ordains, the offender is not such a serious menace to society as to be wrested away therefrom, as the more dangerous type of criminals should be. The second reason of respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bid for probation, is that petitioner is allegedly not a penitent offender, as shown by his protestation of innocence even after his conviction by the trial court and the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals. We find the respondent judge, likewise, in error in assuming that petitioner has not shown repentance in committing the crime of which he has been found guilty by both the trial and appellate courts. If petitioner appealed the decision of the respondent judge to the Court of Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insisting on his version by which he could hope either to be acquitted or at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of probation. The recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His penalty was reduced on appeal which placed him within the benign purpose of the Probation Law. By the move he took by which to achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being within reach, petitioner cannot be said to be a non-penitent offender, under serving of probation benefits. Once the opportunity was laid open to him, he grasped it; for instead of appealing further to the Supreme Court, he promptly applied for probation, made possible only by the reduced penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. The penalty imposed by respondent court placed petitioner beyond the pale of the Probation Law. How can he be said to be a non-penitent offender, as the law would judge one to be so, just because he appealed, as he could not have them applied for probation even if he wanted to? Who knows but that if the penalty imposed by the trial court is that imposed by the Court of Appeals petitioner would have applied for probation forthwith? Under the

circumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient justification for respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We find, instead, that the liberality with which the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the applicant for its benefits affords the better means of achieving the purpose of the law. WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set aside, and petitioner is hereby declared admitted to probation, subject to the terms and conditions as are prescribed by the law, and recommended by the probation officer. De Guzman v. SubidoFACTS: All persons appointed to positions covered by the civil service law are required by regulation to accomplish an information sheet on the prescribed form. The information sheet provides in summary outline the personal date, eligibilities, education, experiences, and other qualifications of the appointee. Included in the information sheet is a query on any criminal records of the applicant, which in later versions of the prescribed form asks if he has ever been arrested, indicted, or convicted of any crime or accused in any administrative proceeding. The issue in this petition for review is whether or not a person otherwise qualified but who admits having violated a city ordinance on jaywalking and another ordinance requiring a cochero to occupy only the seat intended for a cochero in a calesa is disqualified for appointment to the Quezon City Police Force. Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman was appointed patrolman in the Quezon City Police Department by Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto on August 16, 1965. He was a civil service eligible having taken and passed the civil service patrolman's examination given on November 24, 1962. He had also passed the usual character investigation conducted before appointment. As a newly appointed patrolman, the petitioner went through and successfully completed the police training course. On March 21, 1966, the petitioner's appointment was forwarded to the Commissioner of Civil Service. On August 18, 1966, or a year after the appointment and with no action on the appointment papers being taken by the respondent commissioner, the respondents city treasurer and city auditor stopped the payment of the petitioner's salaries. On May 12, 1967, the respondent commissioner returned the Petitioner's appointment papers, without action thereon, to the respondent mayor on the ground that Mr. de Guzman was disqualified for appointment under Republic Act No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966, which provides: (d) SEC. 9. General Qualifications of Appointment. -No person shall be appointed to a local police agency unless he possesses the following qualifications: (5) He must have no criminal record.'(SEC. 9 (5), Police Act of 1966) The above finding was based solely on the petitioner's own answer to question No. 15 in the information sheet: 15. Have you been accused, indicted, or tried for the violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation, before any court or tribunal? The answer given by the petitioner was: Yes. Jaywalking-paid fine P5.50; Municipal O.d. (Mla.) Sect. 1187 (cochero) paid fine of P5.00. On September 7, 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon city. On May 29, 1969, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the petition. According to the court, the requirement of "no criminal record" means without any criminal record and makes no distinction whether an act violates a state law or only a municipal or city ordinance.ary ISSUE: W/N violations and/or convictions of municipal ordinances, one, for 'Jaywalking' and the other, constitute 'CRIMINAL RECORD' to disqualify the petitioner under the Police Act of 1966 (Rep. Act No. 4864) from appointment to the Quezon City Police Force.HELD: We are constrained to grant the petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual

law libraryThe former Civil Service Act, Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, stated in its Section 23 that opportunity for government employment shag be open to all qualified citizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service. The same policy is reiterated in the Civil Service Decree, Presidential Decree No. 807, at Section 19, which superseded Republic Act No. 2260. The requirements for applicants to a policeman's position may be quite stringent but the basic policy of attracting the best qualified is not served by automatically excluding any person who in an absent minded mood or while hurrying to an urgent appointment may unwittingly have crossed a street or stepped down from the curb in violation of a jaywalking ordinance. The same thing is true of a person who may have worked his way through college as a cochero and, who, pitying his horse struggling up an incline or a bridge, leaves his seat to stand after and forward to balance the calesa load or who, alone on his way home, sits in the seat intended for passengers only to be fined for violating an obscure municipal ordinance. The petitioner cites decisions of American courts in support of his arguments: By weight of authority, the violation of a municipal ordinance, enacted by a city under legislative authority, as in the case of ordinances prohibiting and punishing gaming and the keeping of gaming houses, etc., is not a crime, in the proper sense of the term, for such ordinances are not public laws, and the punishment for their violation is imposed by the state. The common-law definition of a 'crime' as given by Blackstone, is 'an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law,' ... giving the accused the right to be heard in all 'criminal prosecutions' relates exclusively to prosecution for violation of public laws of the state, and a city ordinance is not a public law of the state, but a local law of the particular corporation, made for its internal practice and good government. There are other federal decisions which state that prosecutions to enforce penalties for violations of municipal ordinances are not criminal prosecutions and the offenses against these ordinances are not criminal cases.  We do not go so far as to sustain the arguments that only violations of statutes enacted by the national legislature can give rise to "crimes" or "a criminal record" as these terms are used in our law on local governments or the law of public officers. However, we take cognizance of the distinction in the law of municipal corporations which distinguishes between acts not essentially criminal relating to municipal regulations for the promotion of peace, good order, health, safety, and comfort of residents and acts in, intrinsically punishable as public offenses. A penalty imposed for the breach of a municipal regulation is not necessarily an exercise of the sovereign authority, to define crimes and provide for their punishment, delegated to a local government. In many cases, the penalty is merely intended not to render the ordinance inoperative.The phrase "criminal record" governing qualifications for appointments could not have been intended by the legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a "crime" must involve at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the public office. Automatic and perpetual disqualification of a person who in one unguarded moment threw a cigarette butt on the street, spat in public, deposited house garbage in a market receptacle for garbage, exceeded the speed limit for vehicles. blew his car horn near a school or hospital, or, as in this case, jaywalked, and who has paid the fine imposed by ordinance as commensurate deterrence for the act, would be unreasonable, if not oppressive. Respondent

Subido should have gone deeper into the nature of the petitioner's acts instead of taking every "Yes" answer in Question 15 of the information sheet as an automatic disqualification. Under Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the respondent commissioner had 180 days from receipt of the appointment papers to act on them. Inaction means the appointment is approved as properly made. The papers were returned more than a year by the commissioner after he received them. The appointment, not having any defect of record except the matter in issue in this case, must be deemed complete and properly made after the 180 days period. The termination of the petitioner's services was, therefore, an illegal and invalid removal. The petitioner should be reinstated, assuming he meets the physical and other requirements of the Integrated National Police under the new legislation and procedures governing police forces. In addition to being paid any salaries for services actually rendered but not paid, the petitioner, following the formula in cases of illegal dismissals is entitled to five years backpay. WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is set aside. The Integrated National Police and the respondent officials are directed to reinstate the petitioner to the Quezon City Police Force provided he meets the age, physical, and other qualifications and eligibilities for patrolman under present legislation and rules. The city government of Quezon City and the incumbent Mayor, Treasurer, and Auditor of the city are ordered to pay the petitioner any unpaid services and allowances for services actually rendered and five years backpay from the date his services were actually terminates. SO ORDERED.  BRUNO O. APARRI V. CAFACTS: On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January 116, 1960. On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent general manager until March 31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.ISSUE:  Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.HELD: It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction. The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.