china's internal defence strategy: problems and prospects

This article was downloaded by: [Cornell University Library]On: 14 November 2014, At: 18:01Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Strategic AnalysisPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20

China's internal defence strategy: Problems andprospectsSwaran Singh aa Associate Professor (Disarmament Studies) with the Centre for International Politics,Organisation and Disarmament (CIPOD) , School of International Studies (SIS), JawaharlalNehru University , New DelhiPublished online: 25 Apr 2008.

To cite this article: Swaran Singh (2001) China's internal defence strategy: Problems and prospects, Strategic Analysis, 24:12,2129-2154, DOI: 10.1080/09700160108455345

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160108455345

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

China's Internal Defence Strategy:Problems and Prospects

Swaran Singh

Abstract

Defence of the ruling regime has always been the core of China'svision of national defence, making Internal Defence the most criticalcomponent of China's national security thinking and practice. This mindset was further reinforced by the fact that the Communist Party of Chinahad liberated China from another national regime, the Guomintang,making them further suspicious of internal threats and challenges. Thefact that China did not face any external enemies between late 1930s andearly 1950s, and that it has not faced any external enemy since 1979 hasonly further circumscribed their preoccupation with internal threats tothe safety and welfare of the national regime though their vision ofInternal Defence has since expanded to include other components ofnational existence. In this, China's experiments in social engineering—like Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen Square andDeng's Economic Reforms—have created new challenges to China'sinternal peace and. stability. It is against this backdrop that this paperexamines how over the years China has evolved its Internal Defencestrategy and forces which has increasingly come to be a major subject ofdebate amongst the strategic circles focusing on China's national securityissues.1

Considering that the Communist Revolution in China had originallyevolved with a view to replacing the nationalist regime of Guomintang,their fear of subversion, from internal dissidents like the old bourgeoisie,counter-revolutionaries and revisionists has constituted the most criticalmass of their national security thinking during these past 50 years. Rightfrom its inception, therefore, internal defence does not only'constitute

Dr. Swaran Singh is Associate Professor (Disarmament Studies) with the Centre forInternational Politics, Organisation and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of InternationalStudies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Strategic Analysis, Vol. XXIV, No. 12 .© The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

China's Internal Defence Strategy 2129

the most integral, but also the most dominant component of the nationalsecurity strategies of People's Republic of China (PRC). Accordingly, theforemost task for the communist militia in all its incarnations has beento ensure the security and welfare of their Communist Party leaders whocontinue to be the torch-bearers of China's communist revolution. As aresult, this task of internal defence was never to be subordinated to anyauxiliary agencies but considered as the foremost task for China's militaryleadership that has always remained in direct control of China's policeand paramilitary forces and its internal defence operations. It is the CentralMilitary (CMC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that representsthe apex of China's military structure and' remains directly in charge ofinternal defence strategy.

Secondly, thanks to the sustained external linkages of China's internalunrest all these years, these internal contingencies have always attractedmore attention from China's leaders than could ever be expressed intheir public pronunciations. Right from the days of American supportfor the Guomintang regime, external powers have since found -manymore linkages with China's internal dissident movements and-this isespecially true of dissidence from regions like Tibet and Xinjiang. Inaddition to this, these dissident movements have since evolved manynew linkages in China's neighbourhood which include countries likeIndia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the.Central Asian Republics, thoughChinese often see big powers like the United States operating behind allthese apparent linkages. Besides, China's preoccupation with internaldefence has also been reinforced by their own experiments like the GreatLeap Forward, Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen Square, EconomicReforms all of which have played a decisive role in intensifying China'sanxieties about its internal problems. Especially, the dissidents. fromChina's Tiananmen Square crisis of June 1989 have since spread aroundthe world and found far greater visibility than support for their cause.Given the fact that China's charismatic leaders were able to carry onthese experiments full-steam irrespective of their outcome being positiveor negative, the resultant social engineering has always had a lasting andextensive impact making reversals each time a difficult exercise even inthe long run.

In more recent times, this preoccupation with internal defence hasbeen ..further reinforced by the post-Cold War trends since early 1990s,increasing trends of ethno-nationalism and easy access to informationand other technologies and weapons have made insurgencies far moreviolent and threatening while the human rights campaigns have sincefurther circumscribed the state from employing its full sovereign power"in dealing with this kind of violence within. This period has also witnessed

2130 Strategic Analysis/March 2001

such trends in China's neighbourhood becoming powerful in states likePakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. All this has sinceincreased China's anxieties about this long-standing unrest amongstChina's minorities becoming uncontrollable and exploited by its adversarypowers as it plays the delicate role of the aspirant great power for the .coming years. And finally, with no inter-state war fought during the lastthree decades, since the Vietnam War of 1979, China's strategic focus hasgradually come round to its internal.defence contingencies and othercrises around its immediate borders. As a result, expanding from itsmain concerns about ensuring the "safety and welfare" of its Partyleadership that was expected to guide the communist revolution,"defending state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security"have come to be the prime concern for China's national defence.2 It is inthis ever expanding profile of China's internal 'defence that this papertries to outline the emerging new challenges" to their existing defencethinking and apparatus and to examine the present and potential ofChina's internal defence strategies in the coming years.

Broad Trends Over Last 50 Years

Broadly speaking, these last 50 years have seen PRC change frombeing a revolutionary state to what increasingly appears to becoming astatus quo power showing signs of supporting the dominant models andpatterns of behaviour. The same has also been true of its internal defencestrategies which are no longer evolved to deal with the so-called enemiesof the communist revolution but regular criminals, corrupt officials andviolent dissidents that either enjoy the protection of the political poweror seek a share in political power. Apparently, China has no internalthreat that today seeks to undo their communist revolution, nor is Chinaplanning to obliterate capitalism and establish itself as the alternateparadigm. In a more specific manner, like other major powers, China'snational security thinking that had originated around providing protectionfor its revolutionary leaders has since expanded to include all othercomponents of nation-state profile including population, territory and itsother valuable assets, like its urban and industrial centers. China's internaldefence thinking has accordingly become a far more intensive as well asextensive exercise for its military and political' leadership as also forexperts. To cite some of the most visible trends in China's internal defenceover these last five decades one could include the following major shifts:

Firstly, going by the historical evolution of PRC's national securitythinking, the most important objective of China's communist militiassince their inception during 1920s was to ensure the safety and welfareof its Party leadership that was expected to guide their revolution and

liberate China from the Guomintang regime. And considering that it isthese communist militias that had liberated China from another internalnationalist regime, dealing with possible threats of internal subversionhas alwaysbeen.the most critical responsibility, of China's armed forces.Indeed, apart from their contributions in. their joint front against theJapanese during 1930s, it was.not until 1953 that China's armed forceswere directly involved in fighting an inter-state war with an externalenemy. This was also the only war where Chinese military operationshad been clearly successful and popular in their public expressions.Though these original objectives have continued to guide China's nationalsecurity thinking yet, safety and welfare of a whole lot of other elementsof its nation-state profile, like population, territory and other economicand cultural assets, have since come to be integral to their vision ofnational defence thus expanding the arena of. their Internal Defencestrategy which has to attend, to a whole variety of new assets.against awhole, new variety of new threats..

Secondly, in terms of their recent experience and memories that guideChina's current policy priorities regarding national defence, the Chinesearmed forces have not experienced any-inter-state war'dttring'thelastthirty years..This.means, that a whole generation of China's military hasnever been exposed to an experience of dealing with external threats totheir national defence. Also, given the fact that during that.fast war withVietnam during 1979 the Chinese military had to accept a retreat withoutvictory makes.that war.a sensitive issue thus taking it;avvay from thedomain of their popular public debates on national defence. Even theirexperience during the Sino-Soviet skirmishes of 1969 was not worthprojecting in such national debates and the last military operation whichChina felt proud of was their involvement against the United States inthe Korea War of early 1950s. This lack of victory during their militaryoperations during the last.two wars .and absence of war during the lastthree decades has gradually turned their .focus towards threats frominside. Taiwan has been one such subject which is projected as China'sinternal affair yet, given its unique status and the special linkages withexternal powers like the United States, the Taiwan question .is not thesubject which can be understood strictly within the framework of China'sinternal defence; neither have Chinese security strategies accepted it aspart of China's Internal Defence contingencies. . ,. ,

Thirdly,, the most fundamental change in China's internal defencehas been the transformation in its very faultlines, the.basic determinantsof which have been completely transformed during this period underDeng Xiaoping's economic reforms. The focus of China's Internal Defence,during this period, had clearly shifted from external to internal

determinants. Broadly speaking, while the initial period of internal chaosduring the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution was seen as thecreation of outside powers who wanted to undo China's communistrevolution, the new challenges to China's Internal Defence since mid-1980s have all evolved out of China's economic reforms which were stillto evolve their strong global network. The internal unrest since this periodhas not been guided by any ideological irreconcilable differences, but onthe basis of distribution of resources as also the perceived deprivationthat had not evolved any decisive external linkages for a very long time.Accordingly, being neither ideological nor linked to external containmentunder the old framework, none of the old instruments of ideologicalslogans or charisma were of any effect on these new contingencies forwhich new apparatus and thinking had to be recast and rebuilt. Thisprocess has become all the more complicated during these last twentyyears as China's economic boom which has.created its own new demandsand pressure points on what still remains essentially a centrally controlledpolicy juxtaposed with a fast decentralising economy. These new faultlinesand their new expressions have since been goading China to recast itsinternal defence strategy. '

Fourthly, during this more recent period, since the end of the ColdWar era, China has not only not experienced any external threat, but isleft with no imminent external threat for its future. This has againfacilitated diversion of its attention to threats from internal faultlines. Infact, China had officially admitted to this shift way back during June1985 when the enlarged session of China's Central Military Commissionhad concluded that China no longer felt threatened by any "early, total,nuclear war" for the rest of the 20th century. The focus was, therefore,sought to be shifted to China's internal contingencies and limited' localwars. Two factors have particularly endorsed such thinking since thattime. Firstly, end of the Cold War since early 1990s was followed by therise of smaller threats from terrorism, insurgencies, ethrio-nationalismwhich had developed strong linkages with Western campaigns on humanrights, making China extremely sensitive to its minorities seeking secessionor autonomy from Beijing. Secondly, in China's own periphery, as Sovietforces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, China's long involvementwith anti-Soviet Mujahideen has since backfired with Afghan groupsproviding strong linkages to China's Muslim unrest with internationaljehad. Besides, the creation of five new Central Asian Republics broadlyon the basis of their ethnic identities across China's borders have alsorevived their hopes and aspirations as also had their spillover effect onChina's internal unrest. This has since'witnessed internal unrest becomingincreasingly uncontrollable forcing China to increase its own dose of

state violence and making internal defence uncontrollable by conventionalstrategies.

And finally, in more recent years of China's economic slowdownfollowed by the East Asian financial crisis and reforms in China's StateOwned Enterprises (SOEs), the allure of economic boom and hope forquick results have begun to lose their charm in containing grievances ofvarious sections of Chinese society, especially economically deprivedsections and minorities. To look at a few indicators since the later half of1990s, China's foreign direct investment (the locomotive of its economicboom) has slid 'from $111 billion for 1993 to under $40 billion for 1999,its foreign trade has slid from $325 billion for 1997 to $316 billion for1999, its foreign exchange reserves have hovered around $150 billion andmoved from $145 billion for 1997 to $155 billion for 1999 and Chinaremains the third largest debtor and its foreign debt alone stood at 140billion as of December 1997. Similarly, its unemployment has beenestimated from 5 to 15 million people and about 110 million people seemto be floating at a given time from rural to urban centers for better jobopportunities. While China is saturated in its exploitation of fast rewardingopportunities, unemployment in this society of full-employment arid Stateownership of resources has since come to be the major challenge to itsconventional internal defence strategies. ".'•"

Perennial Concerns: Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

China's Xinjiang region has been one of the major flash-points and,in more recent times this region had witnessed major anti-China uprisingsduring 1933,1944 and 1949, all in the name of setting up what has beenreferred to as the Republic of East Turkestan. The. Qing Dynasty hadannexed this region in 1759 and given it the name of Xinjiang (NewDominion) though successive Chinese rulers had "never directlycontrolled its new province because of the dearth of Han Chineseavailable to govern this land."3 The Uighur Muslims trace their firstindependent state to 744 AD. They claim to have repeatedly protectedweak Chinese kingdoms, though they always had prickly ties with theChinese empires. According to them, over tine years the two sides hadcome to an understanding of allowing native Muslims to independentlyrule by themselves under the supervision of Chinese representatives aslong as they continued to owe allegiance to the Chinese Emperor. Giventhe volatile history of this region, upon liberating mainland China in1949, Mao had kept this issue in abeyance while he was busy withunification of Tibet. And it was only during 1955 that Mao declared thisregion as China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) grantingit special concessions in terms of religious and cultural freedoms. Over

the years, however, Uighurs and other Muslims have continued to nursetheir grievances against issues like re-settlement of Han Chinese, Turkishnot being allowed in higher education and other restrictions in theirmosque building and child bearing. The Uighurs, as a result, havecontinued to raise their sporadic rebellions and their unrest and resistancehas never actually completely disappeared during these last 50 years.4

At first look, China's XUAR comprises 530,000 sq.km of landmassthat constitutes one-sixth of the entire mainland landmass which remainshome for much of China's hydrocarbon and other mineral resources asalso houses China's nuclear facilities including its nuclear test site at LopNor. Nevertheless, it has a population of only 15 million and has remainedextremely backward in terms of various indices of social development.But what makes it critical to China's internal defence is the fact that it isthe home of the majority of China's total population of 18 million Muslims.XUAR's Uighur Muslims alone constitute 7.2 million according to China'scensus for 1990. The Huis who constitute the second largest Muslimcommunity number 682,000 and have historically played the bufferbetween Uighurs and Hans with the latter having increased their strengthin XUAR from a mere 250,000 in 1949 to over 6 million by 1990.5 As Huishave been spread around the whole of China and have completely mergedthemselves with the Hans, Uighurs often view them with suspicion whichhas created fissures within China's Muslims thus weakening theirmovement. Besides,, the Muslims in China also have their historicallinkages across the current Chinese borders which has had both its positiveand negative implications. In XUAR alone, there are over 1.1 millionnomadic Kazakhs, and because they have their kin in Central Asia'slargest country, Kazakhstan, they have been playing a strong politicalrole in XUAR. Similarly, XUAR has a nomadic Khyrgyz population ofabout 141, 000 who have, kin in Kyrgyzstan and they only add to theinfluence of China's Kazakhs as they remain culturally and linguisticallyrelated to Kazakhs. XUAR also has a small number of Uzbeks (14,500)who have linkages with politically powerful Uzbekistan and it is onlyChina's 33,5000 Tajiks who remain distantly related to Tajikistan. Simply,by providing an example and also by strengthening their historicallinkages by other means, the formation of these Central Asian Republicsbroadly on the basis of their religious identities has revived Muslimunrest in Xinjiang.6

In terms of containing and resolving these perennial problems ofMuslim unrest the Chinese had traditionally tried to treat this as theirinternal law and order problem. Also, China has tried with its populationtransfer policies by bringing in Han population into XUAR. According toa 1990 census, XUAR had about six million Han and according to experts

they have since become the largest single ethnic group surpassing theUighur which was the largest earlier.7 But, this has had more negativethan positive implications and has further helped these Muslims to sustaintheir Sunni Islamic traditions of fiercely defending their independencethereby complicating all chances of resolving China's internal defencechallenges in this region. As a result, starting from early 1980s, Chinahas been following a more liberal and pragmatic approach to: religiousand cultural affairs amongst, its 18 million Muslims. Besides, beginningfrom early 1980s, Beijing has also evolved a new "go west" policyapproach where it has begun to divert foreign direct investment andother infrastructure development initiatives towards these less developedregions. China has since tried to forge a special relationship with theCentral Asian Republics as part of its solution. They have established aShanghai Five forum that has not only successfully resolved much oftheir ihter-state problems but also ensured that these Central-AsianRepublics do not encourage or provide any support to China's Muslimdissidents. Encouraged by its past record, China has major plans to findingsolutions to the continuing Afghan problem that has a direct linkage toChina's internal Muslim unrest in Xinjiang.

Perennial Concerns: Tibet and its India-Connection .

Apart from Tibet's continuing internal dissidence it is its India-connection, that remains at the core of China's internal defence thinkingin its Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). To briefly recall the evolution ofthis linkage, the Tibetans, apart from being physically inaccessible, hadhistorically preferred to shun all external contact. It was only in times ofdistress that they would turn to seek help from whosoever was friendly,powerful and willing. Their India connection, therefore, had survived forthe following two reasons: One was that unlike both Russia and China,the favourable topography of the Ihdo-Tibetan frontiers had greatlyfacilitated regular Indo-Tibetan trade and commerce since ancient times.And two, that India was the birthplace of Lord Buddha. As a result, evenduring the 13th century, when Lamaism spread to Mongolia and Mongolsassumed control over Protectorate of Lamaists Buddhism, they exercisedtheir authority over Tibet through an Indian saint, Sakya Pandita.8 Bycomparison, Tibetan ties with China were irregular and came much later.But, while Tibet's ties with India had always involved cultural andcommercial interactions, their interactions with China were military andadministrative. The first recorded instance when the Tibetans voluntarilyinvited China's military help was in 1724 when they invited the Chineseforces against the Mongols and, in 1728, they accepted Chinese Amban(Resident) and accepted China's protection. Soon the Chinese presence

became too powerful to handle and in 1733, the Chinese put an end tothe institution of Kingship combining both spiritual and temporalauthority under the Dalai Lama.9 The last time Chinese forces werevoluntarily invited to Tibet was in 1790 to deal with aggression by theGurkhali forces from Nepal since when the Chinese forces were neverwelcome in Tibet. .

China may have experienced ups and downs during its presenceinside Tibet, yet until the rise of the British and Russian empires in the19th century, it had never felt threatened by any foreign presence inTibet. This was partly because, by this time, the colonial onslaughts hadmade China weak and vulnerable. China not only lost its presence inTibet, but Tibet became the buffer zone of the Anglo-Russian powerprojections and Britain used their Indian Empire to; implement their vision.Therefore, in 1840, when King of Punjab and Ladakh, Raja Gulab Singh,sent his general Zorawar Singh to conquer Tibet there was ho Chinesepresence to be seen in Tibet. From the British Indian side, following thefailure of George Bogle mission in 1774, the British tried to enter Tibet byusing official permission from Peking which they obtained in their ChefooConvention of 1876 at the end of the Opium Wars. But as Tibetans didnot honour China's permission, this resulted in the famous Younghusbandexpedition of 1905 and followed by the treaties of 1904,1906,1908, Britainapparently became Tibet's de facto suzerain power. It was in 1910 thatChinese forces again entered Tibet, this time without invitation from theDalai Lama who-decided to take refuge in India. The crisis was resolvedby the Chinese revolution of 1911 and taking advantage of the situationthe Dalai Lama declared Tibet's independence in 1913. As always;"nosooner had the new Republic re-asserted its claim over Tibet that theBritish offered to mediate and this resulted in the Simla Conference of1913-14. Later, this British-India, connection of Tibet was furtherstrengthened when the British began arming the Tibetan resistance and,in 1920, Sir Charles Bell had signed an agreement to export to Tibet 10mountain guns, 20 machine guns and 10,000 rifles with ammunition.

It was these British policies that were to later influence China'sperceptions about Tibet's India-linkage. Accordingly, soon after theCommunists came to power in Peking in October 1949 and "liberation"of Tibet became the top priority for Mao, the year 1950 was officiallydesignated as the year for Tibet's liberation. The rest, of course, is wellknown how Chinese forces marched into Tibet in 1950 and independentIndia surrendered all its military and administrative presence in Tibet ina trade pact in April 1954. However, as China continued its socialengineering, violent protests broke out inside Tibet and, in November1956, when Dalai Lama visited India in connection with celebrations of

Buddha Jayanthi he is reported to have asked Prime Minister Nehru ifhe could take asylum in India. Despite guarantees between the two PrimeMinisters, Nehru and Zhou Enlai the Dalai Lama finally fled to India inMarch 1959. This was later followed by the India-China war of October1962 that made China forever skeptical of India's intentions in Tibet.

As regards PRC's security concerns in Tibet, the geography andhistory of this region were to make Tibet Mao's most important securityconcern. Geographically speaking, Tibet largely constitutes a high plateauof nearly half-a-million square miles bound by the Kuen-Lun mountainrange in the north and by the Himalayas in the south. Beijing's access tothis soft-underbelly was very difficult and restricted to two routes: fromXinjiang from the northwest and Sichuan from the southwest. Conversely,the routes through India's Chuinbi Valley and Tawang region were farmore accessible and until the People's Republic of China (PRC) finallybuilt its own highways in mid-1950s, the Chinese had often accessedLhasa from these Indian routes. And the fact that India endorsed theMcMahon Line was read aS India pursuing the same British imperialpolicies and this made the Chinese very uncomfortable about Tibet'sIndia connection. This suspicion about British India that had been themost influential factor in Tibet for nearly 100 years was furtherstrengthened by what followed in terms of the Dalai Lama's asylum inIndia. This external linkage of Tibet has greatly complicated China'soptions. Moreover,'the Anglo-American 'containment' policy hadparticularly fueled their suspicions about China's vulnerabilities if the"backdoor" of their mainland lay open for intervention.10 As a result,Communist China's military takeover of Tibet was based on their strategiccalculations and had absolutely nothing to do with either China's historicalcontacts dr its ideological fervour.11

During the first 25 years, Beijing spent most of its resources towardsthe development of strategic and military-oriented transport andcommunication facilities. This was also the period when China sortedout Tibet's borders with Burma, Nepal and Pakistan. A similar packagedeal with India could not happen as India insisted on recognition of theMcMahon Line and, for China, it meant recognising Tibet's treaty-makingpowers that would jeopardise its military presence in Tibet. This wasfollowed by the China-India war in October 1962 which made China allthe more concerned about India's connection with TAR. China also spentthis time in building four major strategic highways that not only linkedTibet to the rest of mainland China, but its northern and western highwaycomplexes run almost parallel to its Himalayan borders at an averagedistance of about 35 km. Starting in 1955, China had completed 12 airfieldsin Tibet by 1963, once again all located next to their Himalayan frontiers.

Most of these were used for carrying military personnel and other essentialgoods and for a long time, these air routes were not open for civiliantraffic. During the late 1980s, PRC undertook a historic five-yearexperiment of flying 400 civilian aircraft sorties from various destinationsin the mainland to Tibet airlifting PLA forces, and to support such heavyair traffic the runway at Gonggar airport was expanded, making it thelargest in China.12'As of today China has 23 airfields most of which arelocated next to either Tibet's borders with India or its other military andadministrative centres.13 To add to this China also began deploying itsnuclear weapons in.Tibet from 1971 and Tibet plateau today is suspectedto have between three to five nuclear missile sites.14 China also did notopen Tibet for foreigners until late 1970s.

This is because China for long had continued to face dissidence atthe highest level. According to a recently "discovered" 123-page petitionthat was submitted by the Panchen Lama to Prime Minister Zhou En-laiduring the summer of 1962, the author had investigated and detailedChina's brutal suppression o£ the 1959 Tibet rebellion.15 As a result, untilthe early 1980s, Tibet.continued to witness preponderance of the People'sLiberation Army (PLA) in its administrative set up and during this period,even the conservative estimates put PLA's presence in Tibet between120,000 to 300,000 troops. China also sought to resolve the Tibet issueby their policy of Sinicisation of Tibet. China's strategy during this periodwas also primarily focused,on the influx of Han Chinese population intoTibetan regions .thereby altering ..the social and cultural balance of theTibetan ethnic fabric. Thanks to the attention provided to it by Westernpowers during, the 1990s, Tibet has once again emerged as a major issuein international debates*:;Thouglv mostly it has been used only as aninstrument for anti-China human rights campaigns by Western powersyejt, this has brought Jback the spotlight on Tibet, reviving debates aboutTibet's future. And the Chinese have gradually improved, their controlover Tibet and have gradually moved from applying pure force tofocusing on social development though Tibetans still continue to haveproblems with Beijing's social development models. Here again, Chinahas adopted a mixture of carrot and stick policies and while it has focusedattention on social development of Tibet it has continued to play toughin making any concessions in spheres of autonomy or self-governanceand especially in dealing with the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile. And going by their past record the passage of time seems tocontinuously reinforce Chinese control in Tibet.

New Faultlines for Future

Apart from these perennial problems as also these broad trends, the

new transformation of China during these last two decades has sinceresulted in creating a series of more immediate challenges which havethe potential for creating crises in case these are not attended to andresolved in time. These new faultlines may not appear to be very explosiveat first glance yet, given the nature of China's evolution during these last50 years, China does not seem fully prepared to deal with suchcontingencies and it will have to devise more sophisticated strategiesand channels of expression to redress rather than suppress these issues.Therefore, depending exclusively on the framework of the law and orderproblem and on its instruments of state suppression its conventionalapproach to internal threats will only further aggravate the situation.Thus it is China's difficulties in containing the spread and implosionfrom these new issues while also working on long-term solutions thatmakes China's internal defence so threatening in its potential. Some ofthe more specific threats to China's internal defence come from thefollowing activities and processes:.

Uneven Regional Development—A recently published book, ThePolitical Ecorio7ny of Uneven Employment—A case of China, writtenjointly by Hu Angang of the Chinese Academy of Science and WangShaoguang, a professor at the Yale University, notes that the inter-provincial economic gap in China has been growing at a rather rapidpace. According to these authors, in 1978, only 15 provinces, municipalitiesor autonomous regions belonged to either the high (i.e. per capita GDPhigher than 150 per cent of the national average) or low (i.e. per capitaGAP lower than 75 per cent of national average) income groups, comparedwith 22 in 1994. In 1994 no province or autonomous region in westernChina had a per capita GDP higher than the national; while in east Chinathe per capita GDP in all provinces with the exception of Hebei rankedhigher than the national average. China's inter-provincial GDP gap issignificant even by international averages. In 1994, Shanghai's per capitaGAP was 14 times higher than that of Guizhou, far greater than theincome gap between the poorest and richest provinces in most othercountries. The figure for France was 2.15 in 1988, 1.43 for the UnitedStates in 1983, 4.0 for Indonesia in 1983 and 3.26 for India in 1980.Similarly, in terms of its rural-urban divide, while the average urbanhousehold income in China stands at above $3,000 per year the averagerural household income stands less than $950 per year.16 According toone 1997 report by the World Bank, China's income inequality rankedamong the worst in the world. Reasons for this lie in rapid loosening, ofcontrols and preferential treatment for faster development. But this hasalso seen provinces and other sub-state actors becoming increasinglyfinancially autonomous of Beijing and these growing income gaps can

have grave political consequences in the long run. Already, regionalconflicts have become frequent, threatening national unification andpolitical stability that has since come to be Beijing's prime concern.17

Regional Imbalance: East versus West—The most basic grievancewhich then finds a variety of expressions has been China's continuedregional imbalance which has further complicated ground realities ofChina's minorities' continued unrest since centuries. Especially, China'sWestern Region18 has been particularly neglected even during China'seconomic boom of the last twenty years. Western China accounts for 56per cent of the country's land mass and 23 per cent of its population.According to China Almanac, for 1997, the income for farmers in thewest averaged at $168 while.it averaged at. $362 for those in the east.19

West China, which is the home for China's mineral and hydrocarbonresources, houses their nuclear facilities and nuclear test-site also housesover 80 per cent -of China's minorities. But it remains land-locked andshares borders with countries that remain unstable both internally as-also in their ties with-Beijing. As a result, indices of its developmentactually show a negative growth during the 1990s. Its per capita incomefor example, has fallen from being 56 per cent to that of east China in1983 to becoming just 40 per cent by 1999. And with 23 per cent ofChina's population, therefore, this region now accounts for only 13 percent of China's consumer spending.20 This situation has been created bythe fact that Deng Xiaoping had chosen to.go for a "get rich fast" policywhich has resulted in confining China's economic boom to coastal cities.Similarly, of $300 billion EDI actually invested in China, its WesternRegion has received, only 3 per cent of it while the bulk of this has beenconcentrated in China's coastal provinces.21

Floating Population: M/gratfon—Traditionally, Mao had perceivedof *a policy where all Chinese were tied down to their communes andmobility was not really a great strength of Chinese society. From there,China today has changed into a highly mobile society which has beenpartly forced by the inherent requirements of a rapidly growing industrialeconomy. But the Chinese institutions and polity have still to learn todeal with this new reality. Demographic estimates, for example, indicateChina's urbanisation rate will reach 50 per cent by 2030, when China'stotal population is expected to stabilise at 1.6 billion. Factoring in sucha calculation, approximately 15 to 16 million itinerant farm workers willannually head to the cities in the next 30 years. China's urbanisation ratenow stands as low as 30 per cent, compared with the world average of40 per cent. According to a sample survey by China's DevelopmentResearch Centre, in Beijing's Haidian, Chaoyang and Fengtai districts,110 primary schools were found teaching 20,000 children from the migrant

families. Forced by the grave unemployment situation from thereadjustment of the industrial structures of State-owned Enterprises, manybig cities have been trying hard to control the inflow of farmers, mostlythrough economic and administrative means.22 As a result, 5 millionpeople leave Sichuan province alone every year to seek opportunities inthese coastal cities.23 This floating population has been' particularlyresponsible for integrating China's deprived sections and exposing themto the rapid development and riches of the other parts of their countrythus enlightening them of their deprived status.

SOE Reforms and Unemployment—Rapid reforms of China's StateOwned Enterprises (SOEs) and the resultant laying off of workers andunemployment has been another major subject of debates during morerecent years. This has especially come to notice due to regular reports ofriots and demonstrations that, at first look, appear completely alien toChina's communist ethos. Across the country, these recently laid offdemoralised and impoverished workers have been reported to beattacking their Communist Party managers and looting their ownfactories.24 With China's rapid development during these last threedecades and its increasing integration with the global market includingits expected entry into the World Trade Organisation, China has beentrying to restructure its economic institutions, industries and infrastructureto make it commensurate to global expectations- Pollution, for example,has lately come to be one major issue that has affected the close down ofvarious industries. This reflects the changing profile of economic priorities.According to figures provided by China's State Economic and TradeCommission, by the first half of the year 2000, China had closed down36,000 badly maintained and illegal coal mines which is expected toreduce this year's production by 302 million tons as also dislocate largenumbers of its beneficiaries. Similarly, by June this year, China has closeddown 5,600 oil refineries for their faulty and environment damagingpractices.25 These SOEs have also been the main culprit for China'sunemployment trends. China officially admits that as on June 2000, theystill had 11.2 million laid-off workers from its SOEs as unemployed. Ofthese 5 million had been laid off from SOEs during 1999 alone.26 Thoughmany of these have also been rehabilitated yet, these new trends arebeginning to create their own pressure points for China's domestic peace.

Drug Trafficking and its By-products—Apart from the flaws inChina's developmental strategies and initiatives leading to imbalancesand side-effects, some of these trends have also actually encouragedcriminal activities as means of making fast money. Thanks to the externallinkages of these activities, they have also become difficult to control andbegun to threaten China's domestic peace. The external linkages of China's

internal unrest have since brought in difficulties of expanding drug-trafficking, spread of small arms, money laundering and AIDs epidemicwhich had all evolved as by-products of China's internal unrest. To quotefrom the speech by China's Vice Minister for Public Security, Zhao Yongji,delivered at the national conference in Shenzhen in January 2000, "Ifeffective measures are not adopted, the illegal activity poses a threat tosocial stability. Last year, 2,011 cases of smuggling involving drugs, gunsand other goods valued at 680 million yuan ($82 million) were uncoveredby border police, ninety-one military weapons were seized along China'ssouthwestern borders and more than 1,600 kilograms heroin seized and2,027 arrested during 1999.27 According to China National NarcoticsControl Commission, the number of 'registered' drug addicts in Chinaitself stands at 682,000 for 1999.28 AIDS, which does not appear a nationalsecurity problem at first glance has also since developed a threateningprofile by its sheer rapid spread in certain sensitive regions like Yunnanand Xinjiang. This happens to be another problem closely linked to drug-trafficking. In China, AIDS has been spreading especially around its borderwith Myanmar and from there moving to its major cities obtaining forChina the notoriety of being the fourth largest in Asia and the 17thlargest HIV carrier in the world. In Asia only Thailand, India, Myanmarhave been counted as ahead of it. At a function organised to kick offChina's AIDS Alert campaign during December 1999, Vice Minister forHealth, Yin, Dakui, confirmed that by September 1999, China hadaccounted for 15,088 HIV positive cases of which Yunnan province aloneaccounted for nearly 60 per cent of this figure. According to outsideexperts, however, these HTV carriers in China have been shooting upfrom 10,000 in 1993, 30,000 in 1994,100,000 in 1995, 300,000 in 1998 and500,000 in 1999.2* Other Chinese experts put the figure as likely to hitupto 1 million by year 2000.30 This prediction is based on the argumentthat, like all other countries> there will be time of rapid increase in thenumbers of HTV carriers following a preliminary period of slow spreadand that China seems now in this second phase already.

Overreaction to Corruption and Crime—Though China has sinceallowed ten political parries to exist and express their opinions, Chinacontinues to be very sensitive to any expression of dissidence, of anykind. Especially, following their experience of student demonstrations atthe Tiananmen Square during May-June 1989, Chinese leadership hasbecome increasingly skeptical of any gatherings or associations. Theirhard-handed treatment of the religious group, Falun Gong, has been onesuch example in more recent years. Going by the fact that Chinese history'sbloodiest rebellions, the Boxer Rebellion and the Taiping Rebellion, hadboth begun with a charismatic religious figure preaching on non-political

issues, explains China's over-reaction to Falun Gong during recent times.Falun Gong, which was founded by one Li Hongzhi in 1992 has gatheredmillions of followers over these years and to indicate their commitmentto this sect, over 1,500 are believed to have died by refusing medical helpwhich seems to be at the core of their preaching.31 Starting from their gettogether sessions from the historic day of China's 50th anniversarycelebrations on October 1,2000 at Tiananmen Square, Chinese authoritieshave acted tough and sent thousands of their followers to labour campsfor "education and reform through labour."32 In fact, AmmestyInternational has already documented 190 executions of Falun Gongfollowers during January 1997 to March 1999, with thousands of othershaving been detained.33 Similarly, corruption is another issue that hasgradually come to be a hyper issue for the political elite. Recently, inAugust 2000, China heavily publicised the death sentence handed downto a former vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, Cheng Keijiefor accepting bribes worth $4.9 million.34 Similarly, China's mayor andparty secretary, Chen Xitong, had also been sentenced to death foraccepting bribes during 1997. While all these things may not portend anyimmediate national crisis yet, in the longer-run these must be seen assymptoms of a deeper malaise in China's management of its InternalDefence. . •

China's Response to New Challenges

All this partly explains how internal defence had absolutely noindependent profile during Mao's period. It is only from the era ofeconomic reforms and four modernisations under Deng Xiaoping thatChina's internal defence thinking has gradually evolved its own contoursand content which shows some sinews of obtaining it an autonomousprofile. And these trends have only been further strengthened during thethird generation leadership under Jiang Zemin. This is primarily because,beginning from early 1980s, the very basic determinants of China's internaldefence have transformed making all those old prescriptions ineffectivein resolving these new situations. And it is in the process of thinkingafresh that China's internal defence strategies have begun to evolve theirautonomous profile. No doubt, experts have repeatedly alluded to China'sTiananmen Square crisis of 1989—kicked off primarily by price rise sincethe mid-1980s—as the most critical turning point in the evolution ofChina's internal defence thinking and apparatus.35 The same has alsobeen the period from when China's internal defence has evolved its newmilitary apparatus and new strategic doctrines which still continue toevolve and very often their official expression generally lags behind theiractual implementation.

Emerging New Military Apparatus

The most visible indicator of China's changing focus in internaldefence lies in the historic shift in the nature of its internal defencecontingencies and responses that have witnessed the People's LiberationArmy (PLA) being downsized from 6 to 7 million at the time of liberationduring 1949 to 2.3 million by 2000. By comparison, the police and para-military forces have been modernising, mushrooming and expanding allthe time to take newer, bigger and more autonomous profiles. Especially,the People's Armed Police (PAP), the single largest of China's para-military forces, was created during 1983 and has since increased itsstrength from 0.5 million to over 1.2 million by 1996.36 Since then manymore police and para-military forces have also been put in place andtheir total is today estimated to have reached upto 2.5 million thus makingthem bigger than the PLA that was once known to be the king-makers.157

Officially/ this shift has been explained as streamlining the PLA andmany of the officers and men in PAP have been ex-PLA men. Accordingly,the PAP has continued to be fully controlled by PLA generals though ithas begun to evolve its separate organisational profile and has alreadybegun to be discussed as a parallel center of power. Some even seemotives in it, by arguing that this split has been deliberately planned byChina's third generation leadership which, being non-military themselves,have had their difficulties in dealing with PLA cadres.

The period of the early 1980s witnessed Chinese leaders recastingtheir new.interrtal security apparatus. This was primarily guided by theirnew thinking of. separating China's internal defence contingencies andits.national defence and, therefore, creating a buffer between China'sincreasing urban unrest and the PLA, that China's leaders had createdthe PAP by amalgamating a large number of the PLA units involved ininternal defence duties. Similarly, a new Ministry of State Security wascreated in 1983 and put in charge of counter-espionage and intelligencegathering exercises. Another Public Security Police was created underthe Ministry of Public Security which again comprised several sub-unitslike criminal police, traffic police, household registration police, patrolpolice, fire brigades and so on. Similarly, railroad police under Ministryof Railways and the public security police under Ministry of Justice andjudicial police under the Supreme People's Court were also set up andnew linkages and responsibilities were evolved to ensure theircoordination. Another Entry and Exit Border Defence Inspection GeneralUnit was created by the Ministry of Public Security in June 1998. Someof the older organisations also continued to serve and some of themgradually became dysfunctional without being either disbanded or closed.

This was especially true of China's intelligence and enforcement agencies.38

Also, of all these police and para-military forces the PAP has been growingmost rapidly both in its numbers as also in its power profile.

In terms of its organisational profile, the PAP comprises primarilythe PLA soldiers either directly transferred or recruited after their beingrelieved from service. But the PAP has also been recruiting new cadreswhich is what obtains for it an increasingly autonomous vision and culturethough many of these new recruits continue to hold only lower positions.More so, this growing independence has resulted from its graduallyincreasing financial autonomy from the PLA. Until the mid-1980s, thePAP as also these other police and para-military forces used to befinancially dependent on their administrative authorities i.e. the PLA, orthe CMC or die State Council. Strong participation and hold of PLA inall these decision-making bodies had allowed them to exercise completecontrol on how the national budget was spent on ensuring the securityof the nation. But from the mid-1980s, the PAP received its funds fromthree different sources: the central government, the local governmentsand its business operations.39 Especially, following the Tiananmen Squarecrisis of June 1989, their poor performance resulted in a major shake-upof its leadership. General Ba Zhongtan, the PAP commander then, hadresigned on pretext of age (he was 65) and so did the political commissar,•Zhang Shutian, and many other important officials also resigned. MajorGeneral Zhou Yushu, who was in-charge of Beijing based 24 Group Armyof the PLA was appointed as the new commander of the PAP and MajorGeneral Xu Shouzneg (then director of Beijing MR) as the new politicalcommissar of the PAP.40 But at the same time, the PAP in particular andmost other police and para-military forces in general, also became themost critical component in CMC's new found zeal for exercising directcontrol over China's internal defence strategies and force planning andthese forces were soon to be refurbished and provided with betterequipment and other facilities. Since then the PAP has also been involvedin regular regimental and unit-level field exercises, long-distancedeployments, night manoeuvers, and other types of sophisticatedsimulated combat operations just like the PLA forces.41 During 1992, theCMC had authorised the PAP for the deployment of a military airshipfor surveillance and this airship had already been inducted by the year1995.42 Nevertheless, according to the PAP, the PLA assumes theoperational command of the PAP during the period of national crisis orwar-time. •

Devising New Strategies for Internal Defence

To put it at the very outset, despite these apparent and material

changes in their force structures, equipment and training manuals, theofficial expressions of China's internal defence strategies have continuedto swear by old expressions of the earlier leadership. Especially, the PAP,which constitutes the most visible force dealing with internal defence,has continued to play cautious and has not shown any overt enthusiasmin outlining their internal defence strategy as different from that of thePLA forces. However, going by above empirical trends in their equipmentmodernisation force structures and training etc as also following thetrends in China's internal debates on these issues, experts have outlinedthree major objectives that seem to guide China's current internal defencestrategies. These include: (a) guaranteeing the absolute leadership of theCommunist Party; (b) safeguarding national security and maintainingsocial stability; and (c) ensuring that the PLA does not have to berepeatedly called in to deal with China's internal defence contingencies.Apparently, this appears very similar to. the doctrinal expressioaof thePLA, but.one has to begin reading between the lines and match thesewords with their actual initiatives to plot some broad trends. To quotethe PAP's political commissar, Zu Yangqing:

Right now, we are at a historic juncture when one century is about to giveway to another. On the whole, the international situation is easing off, butpeace is not breaking out all over the world. Hostile forces in the West havenever given up their political schemes to "Westernise" and "divide" China.The domestic situation is good overall, but there are also destablisingelements."All this puts additional demands on the PAP's sacred mission ofsafeguarding" national security and socialist stability.'"13

But there are also practical difficulties why the new ethos of the PAPstill finds it difficult to break out from its parent organisation, the PLAwhich still continue to determine the broad contours in the new thinkingevolved within PAP's internal defence perimeters. This is so because notonly does the leadership of the PAP still continue to be provided by thePLA, but a large number of soldiers also continue to come from thatforce which continues to control PAP in its operational terms. Moreover,even when some sinews of fresh thinking may be emerging within thePAP leadership, the PAP has often behaved just like the PLA, especiallywhen it comes to brass-tacks in turning their new thinking into trainingprogrammes and actual combat missions. Besides, this may also be dueto the fact that given PLA's suspicions about the new political leadersand their intentions to rein the PLA, other agencies have to treadcautiously lest they begin to be seen as trying to cut into PLA's mainbastion. But going by their actual operations these limitations of the PAPappear more natural and inherent than deliberate. During one of theirlargest independent exercises in Xinjiang in 1995, for example, the PAP

troops standing on a hill had assembled 11 sets of 82 mm non-recoilartillery and mortars, and bombarded a target platform occupied by"criminals" which was a very military approach to a war-like situation.44

This is despite the fact that PLA's January 1996 regulations on use ofweapons to deter illegal and criminal activities clearly prescribe that allsuch missions must "avoid injury to citizens and damage of property."45

All the police and para-military forces, especially the PAP, have alsoto perennially maintain a balance between their autonomy and theirsubordination to the PLA operations. As they are only expected to operateas a buffer between more regular internal defence contingencies and thePLA they have to keep training themselves to support the PLA as andwhen PLA takes over the command to deal with crises of internal defence.In PLA's so-called "high-tech regional warfare" operations, which remainfocused primarily on dealing with internal defence contingencies, thePAP as also police and para-military organisations have been visualisedas a critical component in PLA's military operations. The PAP, indeed,regularly participate in PLA's military exercises in such missions whichhave greatly influenced PAP's own methodologies in dealing with internaldefence. Besides, such methodologies are also the result of PAP'scontinued dependence on PLA's transport and communications networksas also other facilities which it shares with the PLA in such Joint exercises.With the rising tide of unrest during the 1990s, the PAP thinking seemsto very much emulate the original PLA thesis of (a) using force and (b)ensuring the safety of the Party elite in the ultimate case.

Nevertheless, President Jiang Zemin, has since tried to turn the focusof ID doctrines towards the maintenance of social stability" and askedPAP to provide top priority to promptly stamp out any "sudden incidents"of urban unrest that may flare up at any given time.46 Therefore, thepolice and para-military forces have basically come to be the Party's firstline of defence against any form of urban popular protests and they-areexpected to operate as a critical buffer between the PLA and civil unrest.47

This can, of course, only control and contain internal defencecontingencies, but China still has to work towards finding lasting solutionsto its internal defence problems. Despite major initiatives in this direction,China's grievances redressal remains the weakest link in its InternalDefence strategies and apparatus.

Grievances Redressal Mechanisms

Recent years have witnessed China working on more sophisticatedmethods like expanding access to information about its new developmentinitiatives undertaken in China's backward regions and regarding

grievances of various groups. Of the most visible of such initiatives is theOffice for Western Development set up under the State Council. This isheaded by Minister of State. Development and Planning Commissionwhich is expected to publish a document on preferential policies forinvestment in western China before the end of this year.48 In conformitywith such a shift in its list of priorities China has since launched its "gowest" strategy which has sought to divert foreign direct investmenttowards these backward regions. Endorsing this new strategy in his workreport to the National People's Congress, Premier Zhu Rongji had outlineda whole series of such plans of infrastructure projects in western China.In December 1999, the State Development Bank had earmarked funds toprovide loans worth $50 billion for various projects to build railways,hydro-power stations, oil and natural gas fields and other infrastructureprojects in China's west. Similarly, the state also plans to contribute $0.6billion towards revamping of 20 airports, eight highways and 3,000 kmrailways in this region.** Provinces and autonomous regions within Chinahave also been encouraged to build linkages with western China and toinvest in various projects in that region. Guangdong, for example, whichremains energy deficient has bought power worth $0.5 billion fromwestern, grids, and it has directly invested about $03 billion in variouspower grid projects in that region. With Guizhou alone it has signedagreements to buy 2 million kilowatts of- power by 2003 and about 4kilowatts by 2004 and it is on this assured market that Guizhou hasbegun to expand its power generation capacity from the current 5.25million, kilowatt to 8.3 million kilowatt during the next five years.50

Similarly,, in June 2000, China initiated a new $2.8 billion constructionproject for a new 945 km railway line that will run through Anhui,Henan,. Hebei, Shaanxi and shorten the distance between China's eastand west-.This is expected to be ready by 2004.51

Similarly, China has recently published a whole series of white paperson issues like Tibet, Taiwan, drug-trafficking and national defence ingeneral and publicised them both outside and within. The InformationOffice of China's State Council had recently issued their second WhitePaper on Tibet titled New Progress in Human Rights in the TibetanAutonomous Region. According to this document, the Tibetans constituteabout 95 per cent of the total population of China's Tibetan AutonomousRegion (TAR). It explains how during the last 40 years (1953-1993),. thetotal population of TAR has nearly doubled, from under 1 million to 2.3million. By 1996, the population of TAR had reached 2.44 million. It alsodetails various special measures that have been taken and funds providedin ensuring the preservation of Tibet's special culture and religiouspractices. According to it, at present, TAR has 1,787 sites for Buddhist

religious activities and over 46,380 Buddhists monks and nuns inmonasteries and all Tibetans enjoy religious freedom.

Similarly, China has published another major White Paper on DrugTrafficking in June 2000 and another White Paper on National Defencewas released in October 2000. Despite their limited credibility with theoutside world and question marks on the many facts arid figures, suchrepeated publicity has had definite acceptance in many quarters.According to the White Paper on Drug Trafficking, the number of drugaddicts registered with the public security organs in 1991 was 148,000, afigure that rose to 520,000 in 1995 and to 680,000 in 1999 with drugaddicts currently making up 0.054 per cent of China's total population.Of China's expanding numbers of AIDS patients, 72.4 per cent get infectedthrough intravenous drug injections.32 This is clearly reminiscent ofChina's Opium War and the threat of AIDS and also linkages with spreadof small arms and money laundering make the problem far morecomplicated. China had set up a National Narcotics Control Commission(NNCC) in 1990 which coordinated activities between the State Council's25 departments including Ministry of Public Security which, during 1998,had established a specialised Drug Control Bureau, that operates as anagency of the NNCC. Meanwhile, the other Public Security organs likePeople's Armed Police, judicial departments, Customs, pharmaceuticalcontrol agencies and administration departments for industry andcommerce as also anti-drug policy squads in all the provinces,autonomous regions, municipalities and cities have been geared up foranti-drug law enforcement tasks. In fact in 1998, the State Council hadset up a China Narcotics Control Foundation to raise funds for its drugcontrol projects. China has enacted and revised a whole series oflegislations in this respect as also revamped its anti-drug campaigns.China has also expanded its bilateral and regional cooperation withneighbouring countries and United Nations' Drug Program (UNDCP).

Simultaneously, China has also increased its publicity of dealing withcrime and corruption in high places. This is expected to generate popularsupport and trust for the current leadership and its policies. Under China'sCriminal Law, for example, trafficking in more than the 50 grams ofheroin, or more than 1 kg of opium is sufficient to administer deathpenalty on the guilty.5-1 It has also been publicising death sentences forcorrupt party leaders to project high standards in public life that has hadits own contribution in enhancing the stature of the current leadershipand its policies. Nevertheless, China still remains far from having resolvedits internal defence problems and very often the increasing publicity andviolence levels of internal unrest have to be matched by officialpublications and violent suppression which further distorts China's image.

Especially between the relatively invisible mass unrest and the very visibleState and that to the rising aspirant state of China, the policy makershave to cautiously tread the path between continuing to evolve grievanceredressal mechanisms while also seeking lasting solutions to both thelong-standing and newer challenges to their internal defence. And it isin this precarious balancing act, that external linkages of these internalmovements often create major pressure points by providing them greatervisibility and strength to survive both the carrot and stick of the Chineseinternal defence strategies and apparatus.

Conclusion

China continues to face a whole lot of inherent and new internaldefence challenges which have their external linkages and as aconsequence, these challenges continue to grow as China evolves itselfas the next global power. Also, given the fact that China is not known tohave any system of checks and balances to its power, either from withinor outside, it is this internal unrest that has often been seen as the onlyway of containing China's unbridled behaviour. Among many othermotives, this often provides a convincing rationale to most externallinkages of China's internal unrest which keeps its internal challengesalive despite China's ever rising power and profile. Besides, the rapidpace of China's modernisation has itself created new faultlines for whichit has to evolve commensurate new institutions and regulations. Apartfrom these external linkages of its problems of internal defence, Chinaalso continues to have a set of its inherent internal dynamics that continueto put up additional hurdles. These include its traditional ethos whichcontinues to block any rapid shifts in its thinking and initiatives. Butgoing by its track record in handling internal problems there seems verylittle likelihood of any of these challenges getting out of hand. The worstthat one can predict is that its internal circumstances and motivatedexternal actors might again force China to undergo a round of suppressionwhich surely remains its weapon of last resort to ensure it's survival asa nation. The current state of China's forces and doctrines show all signsof being in a position to re-enact Tiananmen Square type of suppressionin case the need arises again.

NOTES1. Though China regards Taiwan as its renegade province this paper does not

include Taiwan whilst dealing with China's internal defence strategy. This isbecause Taiwan is a unique case and involves strong and obvious inter-statelinkages and profile.

2. China's National Defence in 2000, (Beijing: White Paper The Information Office

of the State Council, October 16, 2000) printed in Summary of World Broadcast-Far East/3973, October 17, 2000, p. S1/1.

3. Felix K. Cheng, "China's Central Asian Power and Problems", Orbis (NewYork), vol. 41, no. 3 (summer 1997), p. 406.

4. Sultan Mahmut Kasgarli, "The Uighur Turks of Central Asia," Central AsiaMonitor (London), no. 4, 1999, p. 29.

5. Justin Ben-Adam, "China" in David Westerlund and Ingvar Svanberg (eds.),Islam Outside the Arab World, (London: Curzon Press, 1999), p. 191; also DruGladney, "The Muslim Face of China", Current History (Philadelphia, USA:September 1993), vol. 92, no. 575, p. 29.

6. Ross H. Munro, "Central Asia and China", in Michael Mandlebaum (ed.),Central Asia and the World, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press)1989), pp. 224-226.

7. Diane L. Smith, "Central Asia: A New Great Game?", (Department of Army,Defence Department, United States), <http://www.writersg.com/milnet/pentagon/centasia/cenasap5.htm> also Lillian Craig Harris, "Xinjiang, CentralAsia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World", ChinaQuarterly (London), no. 133, March 1993, p. 9.

8. Amar Jasbir Singh, "How the Tibetan Problem Influences China's ForeignRelations", China Report, vol. 28, no. 3 (New Delhi, 1992), p. 262.

9. Ram Gopal, India-China-Tibet Triangle (Lucknow: Pustak Kendra, 1964), p. 5.10. Premen Addy, Tibet on the Imperial Chessboard, (New Delhi: Academic

Publishers, 1984), p. 156.11. Dawa Norbu, "Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region",

Strategic Analysis, vol. xii, no. 4 (July 1988), p. 375.12. Stephen Bowers, "The Tibetan Resistance Movement", Jane's Intelligence

Review, vol. 6, no. 6 (June 1994), p. 284.13. These are located at the following places: Kartse, Kantse, North Koko Nor,

Lithang, Jekondo, Tachienlu, Nakchukha, Chamdo, Drachi-Dranang, Nyathangin the Eastern Tibet; Lhoka, Lhasa, Gyantse, Stigatse, Ghonkhor, Dzong inCentral Tibet; and at Phari, Chusul, Tram, Gartok, Kassu and Thingri in WesternTibet.

14. For details see, Nuclear Tibet, A Report by International Campaign for Tibet,(Washington, DC: 1993).

15. Teresa Poole, "Lost Tibetan Text Exposes Chinese Brutality", The Korea Herald(Seoul), February 23, 1998, p. 8.

16. John Bryan Starr, Understanding Cliina, (London: Profile Books, 1998), p. 130.17. Xi Mi, "Narrowing Regional Gap", China Daily (Hong Kong), November 16,

1999, p. 4.18. This underdeveloped region of western China comprises 19 provinces,

autonomous regions and municipalities: Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin,Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, Sichuan,Guizhou, Yunnan. Tibet. Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang

19. Bian Yi, "Western Growth needs State Help," China Daily (Hong Kong),December 25, 1999, p. 4; also "Shao Zongwei, "Moslims Vow to Defend Unity",China Daily (Hong Kong), January 28, 2000, p. 1.

20. Bruce Gilly, "Saving the West", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong),vol. 163, no. 18, May 4, 2000, p. 22.

21. Bruce Gilly, "Saving the West", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong),vol. 163, no. 18, May 4, 2000, p. 23.

22. Zheng Ying, "Quicken Urbanisation Pace", China Daily (Hong Kong),November 18, 1999, p. 4.

23. Bruce Gilly, n. 21.24. Susan V. Lawrence, "China: Mercury Rising", Far Eastern Economic Review

(Hong Kong), vol. 163, no. 17, April 27, 2000, p. 26.25. Zhao Huanxin, "Nationwide Crackdown on Polluting Enterprises", China Daily

(Hong Kong), September 5, 2000, p. 2.26. "Social Security System Unemployment Provisions Assessed", Summary of

World Broadcasts-Far East Weekly/0662, dated October 18, 2000, p. WG/9.27. "Hit Harder at Border Crimes", China Daily (Hong Kong), January 24, 2000,

p. l.28. Meng Yan, "China Turns up the Heat on Illegal Drug Ice", China Daily (Hong

Kong), September 9, 2000, p. 2.29. "New AIDS Campaign Kicks Off," China Daily (Hong Kong), December 2,

1999, p. 2; also Xing Zhigang, "Researchers Warn of Coming AIDS Crisis",China Daily (Hong Kong), September 7, 2000, p. 3.

30. He Sheng, "Long Road Ahead in Fight against AIDS", China Daily (HongKong), August 21, 2000, p. 9.

31. Susan V. Lawrence, "China: Faith and Fear", Far Eastern Economic Review(Hong Kong), vol. 163, no. 16, April 20, 2000, pp. 16, 18.

32. "Hong Kong Paper on Decision to send Falun Gong Members to Labour Camp",Summary of World Broadcast-Far East/3972, October 16, 2000, p. G/5.

33. Erling Hoh, "China: Hear Our Prayer", Far Eastern Economic Review (HongKong), vol. 163, no. 5, April 13, 2000, p. 24.

34. "Death for NPC Official", China Daily (Hong Kong), August 1, 2000, p. 1.35. Tai Ming Cheung, "Guarding China's Domestic Frontline: The People's Armed

Police and China's Stability", China Quarterly (London), no. 146, (June 1996),p. 527.

36. "Of Numbers and Quality", China News Analysis, (Taipei, Taiwan), no. 1610,May 15, 1998, p. 7.

37. Dongxiang Monthly (Hong Kong), no. 8, 1996, p. 19.38. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Models of Historical Change: The Chinese State and

Society 1839-1989", in Kenneth Lieberthan et al (eds.), Perspectives on ModernChina: Four Anniversaries, (London: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1991), p. 90.

39. The business operations, however, have come under scrutiny since August1999.

40. "Official's Murder by Paramilitary Guard 'isolated incident", Foreign BroadcastInformation Service-China-96-044, March 4, 1996; also Eva Chen, "MilitaryCuts Increase Importance of Police in Mainland", Foreign Broadcast InformationService-China-97-258, September 15, 1997.

41. Tai Ming Cheung, op.cit., p. 535.

42. "Gaining Importance: The People's Armed Police," China News Analysis,(Taipei, Taiwan), no. 1610, May 15, 1998, p. 7.

43. Xu Yongqing, "Guidance for Improving People's Armed Police," ForeignBroadcast Information Service-China-98-027, January 27, 1998.

44. "Gaining Importance: The People's Armed Police", China News Analysis, no.1610, May 15, 1998, p. 5.

45. Ibid.46. Tai Ming Cheung, China Quarterly, p. 535.

47. Michael D. Swaine, "The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership,Institutions, Beliefs", Rand Paper R-425-AF, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation),p. 127; also "Many Problems Still Plague the People's Armed Police Force,"Inside Mainland China, vol. 20, no. 1, January 1998, p. 29.

48. Xing Zhigang, "Investors Told: No Casinos in Western China," China Daily(Hong Kong), August 2, 2000, p. 1.

49. Zhou Li, "Go West: Exploring a Vast Expanse", China Daily (Hong Kong),August 10, 2000, p. 10.

50. Wang Rong, "Guangdong Turns on Western Power", China Daily (Hong Kong),August 4, 2000, p. 8.

51. Zhang Feng, "US$2.8b Railway Project on Track", China Daily (Hong Kong),August 22, 2000, p. 2.

52. Narcotics Control in China, (Beijing: The Information Office of the State Council,June 1999).

53. Zhao Zongwei, Jia Hepeng and Wang Rong, "Ten are Executed for Traffickingin Drugs", China Daily (Hong Kong), June 27, 2000, p. 1.

china's internal defence strategy: problems and prospects

Documents

prospects for development of bulgarian model for r&d...

significance and prospects of the...

china's economy

a south american defence structure: problems and...

enhancing support for the european security and defence ·...

prospects for global defence export industry in indian...

thayer china's defence cooperation with south east asia

china's economic

china's defence spending

china's airpocalypse

china's gold market: progress and prospects gold... ·...

china's rise and global communication: problems and...

china's future

china's rise and global communication: problems and...

prospects for future indo-european defence industrial...

a primer to collaborative defence procurement in europe ......

china's investment in african industrial...

china's crossroad

china's future energy prospects: nuclear energy

china's past, china's future energy, food, environment