asymmetrical federalism
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Federico Faleschini (ID 10902214)
Module Convenor: Michael Burgess
Module: PO867 (Comparative Federal Political System)
9 May 2011
Essay 2 (word limit: 4000; actual words: 4150)
How Important Do You Think Asymmetrical
Federalism Is to the Survival of Federations?
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Introduction
Asymmetry is a feature of each and every political system: in its most general meaning, it
refers to all kind of differences across sub-State units. Asymmetric federalism instead is amuch more specific term, and relates to the institutionalization of these differences in the
political and legal practises of a federation. Asymmetrical federalism has long been a taboo
topic among scholars of Federalism but its practical relevance has increased enormously over
the last twenty years and so has the interest for it in the literature.
The essay is going to analyse the importance of asymmetric federalism for the survival
of federations. The literature provides mixed evidence in respect to short- and long-term
consequences of asymmetrical federalism. The essay combines on the one hand theoretical
insights on the origins and functioning of asymmetrical devices and on the other concrete
evidence from federal political systems. The main argument is that asymmetry is an
increasingly common feature of all federal and decentralized systems because it depends on
changes in the international (e.g. European integration) and internal (e.g. ethnopolitics) arena
but the overall effect on the stability of a specific federation depends on the interaction of
various factors: the extent of asymmetry itself, the demographic composition of the federation
and the party dynamics.
The essay is divided into five sections. The first one defines the concept of asymmetry
and explains why it is so relevant nowadays: the distinction between de facto and de jure
asymmetries is introduced and the concept is linked to current important international
processes. The second one illustrates two theories of asymmetrical federalism, one covering
the experience of multinational federations and the other focusing on the role of the demand
of public services. The third one provides evidence of asymmetrical practises in contemporaryfederal political systems. The fourth section concludes and assess the importance of
federalism for the survival of federations.
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The Concept of Asymmetrical Federalism and its Relevance in Contemporary Politics
and Federal Systems
In his seminal article Tarlton (1965) first defined the concept of asymmetry in federal systems.
His aim was polemical towards previous approaches to the study of federalism (legal, political
and socio-cultural) in that they all treated federal systems as a whole (ibidem: 867) not
allowing for variations among each constituent unit in its relation to the federal centre. Tarlton
instead defined asymmetry as the concept [which] expresses the extent to which component
states do notshare in [the conditions common to the federal system as a whole] (ibidem: 861;
emphasis added). He thus defines two ideal-types: the symmetrical model, where each of
the ... units would ... be miniature reflections of the important aspects of the whole federal
system (ibidem: 868), and the asymmetrical model, where each unit would have about it a
unique set of features ; federal systems will be somewhere between these two extremes.
Tarlton links the concept of asymmetry to the federal-state conflict: where asymmetry
between one or a few of the units and the rest of the federation is acute there is the potential
for federal-state conflict, or even for secession. He goes as far to say that the workability of a
federal system for a group of units is only a function of the level of symmetry: if the elements
of asymmetry prevail over the ones of symmetry, the system won't work at the optimum level
of harmony then it follows that a unitary system would be better (ibidem: 873). This
pessimistic conclusion over the conflict resolution potential of federalism back then was a
lone voice.
In his attack to the legalistic approach to federalism, Tarlton overlooked the important
distinction between de facto and de jure asymmetries1. The former refer to differences among
units in the economic, social and political domain and are common to practically all
federations, while the latter relate to asymmetry embedded in constitutional and legal
processes (Watts 2005: 2). It is fundamental to keep these two concepts separated because de
facto asymmetries do not always translate into de jure asymmetries. Indeed, as Burgess (2005:
430) recalls, political scientists can only work with social reality having political salience:
so asymmetry is relevant only when it finds a political expression. In addition, not all conflicts
have the same salience, with cultural-ideological conflicts usually harder to solve than socio-
1 It is also important not to confuse the concept of de facto asymmetry with the preconditions which lead tosuch asymmetries. For a quick overview of de jure asymmetries in federal political systems see Watts (2005);
for an in depth overview see McGarry (2006).
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economic ones because the former are inherently less bargainable (ibidem: 431). Tarlton's
conclusion was indeed simplistic: there are many types of asymmetry and not all of them have
the same impact on the federation.
Notwithstanding its high practical relevance, the topic of asymmetrical federalism has
long been ignored after Tarlton's article. Indeed scholars have long been concerned only with
classical federations which abode to the early modern doctrine of symmetric state rights:
asymmetries (as Tarlton's pessimistic pitch suggests) were seen with suspicion (Von Beyme
2005: 433). In recent years, however, changes at the level of domestic and international
politics have coincided with the widespread diffusion of asymmetrical mechanisms in many
federal and decentralized systems and scholars' interest in the subject has been growing,
especially since the publication of the important volume Accommodating Diversity:
Asymmetry in Federal States (Agranoff 1999).
There is a number of reasons for this surge of interest in asymmetrical federalism. Among
others (see e.g. van Houten 2007: 548-51), Von Beyme (2005: 434) highlights four main
factors:
The revolt of regions and ethnic groups, more concerned with identity issues rather
than redistribution ones and thus more inclined to accept differences in life conditions;
The economic imbalances created and nourished by the processes of globalization,
European integration, migration, etc.;
The shift from participatory federalism to a federalism of competition caused by the
dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm and by economic competition;
The diffusion of Post-modernist thinking, not obsessed with order and rationality as
classical modernism was.
Before getting on to the next section a quick look at the influences of the process of
European Integration is due. Many scholars have looked at the implications of the process of
European Integration on sub-national demands for self-government and a burgeoning
literature exist on the topic of Europe of the Regions2. For example, Dardanelli (2002) shows
how Scottish Nationalist lites exploited the advantages offered by European Integration (i.e.
access to foreign markets and the systematic bias towards small member States in the
decision-making process of the EU) to make independence a more attractive solution than it
2 See e.g. the special numbers on this topic by Publius (volume 26/4, Fall 1996) and by Regional and Federal
Studies (volume 18/5, October 2008).
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used to be and hence boost support for independence in Scotland.
More in general the process of European Integration has opened the new electoral arenas, the
European itself and the regional one: political parties and lobbies have targeted their strategy
on the territorial dimension (Hepburn 2008) and this is and will continue to be an importantfactor behind the Europe-wide push towards decentralisation and increasing asymmetry.
Theories of Asymmetrical Federalism
This section will expound two theories of asymmetrical federalism in order to try to
understand what are the most important drivers of asymmetrical federalism (Brown 2005:
4).
Zuber (2011) focuses on multinational federations. Building on a game-theoretical
foundation, she wants to understand why multinational federal systems (hence MFSs) develop
asymmetrical institutions and what are the consequences of such a choice on the stability of
the federation in the long run.
Following Kimlyca, she defines the multinational State as the one which comprises in its own
territory one or more national minorities (i.e. cultural groups voicing claims to self-
determination on a territorial basis (ibidem: 547): this kind of minorities represent a great
threat to the unity of the federal State given their territorial concentration. The author frames
the MFS as a three players game: National-Based Units (NBUs) where national minorities are
the majority of the population, Regional-Based Units (RBUs) where the the majority of the
population is part of the national majority, and obviously the federal Centre. Asymmetry is
thus defined as the characteristic of MFSs through which NBUs de jure enjoy more rights
than [RBUs] and maintain a differentiated relationship to the centre ( ibidem: 548).
The author addresses the question of why asymmetry develops in MFSs by focusing on the
problem of secession. She makes the following assumptions: first, that the starting point
(status quo SQ) is a symmetric MFS, and second, that the (eventual) military confrontation
between a national minority (hence MI) and the Centre is characterized by asymmetric
warfare (ibidem: 551) (which lowers the cost of insurrection for MI). Secession hence can
framed as a prisoner's dilemma game: each player can obtain its own most preferred option
(i.e. secession for MI and maintenance of the SQ for the Centre) if it defects and the other
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player cooperates (e.g. if the MI secedes and the Centre sticks to the SQ i.e. doesn't do
anything). However this is not the Pareto-efficient outcome: indeed that can be reached only if
both players cooperate (i.e. negotiate an institutional change). Institutional change
nevertheless necessarily leads to asymmetry: indeed the Centre will give NBUs morefavourable conditions than the average Unit in order to increase the say of the MI in the
decision-making process (therefore lowering the cost of cooperation for the MI and indirectly
raising the cost of defection).
After having demonstrated that accommodation of a MI's claims leads to asymmetry, the
author turns to the question of the effect of asymmetry over the stability of the MFS. In the
new asymmetrical setting, the goals of NBUs and RBUs diverge: the former wants
asymmetric deals to be maintained (since it represents the MI's guarantee of equal status with
the National Majority hence MA), while the latter engages the Centre in an Upgrade Game
(i.e. asks for an upgrade of its powers to the level of NBUs' ones). Following Tsebelis, the
author models the situation as a Nested game: the asymmetrical deals weaken the relative
status of RBUs and thus changes the rule of the federal game not only in respect to Centre-
NBUs relations but also in respect to Centre-RBUs relations. The final outcome depends on
the Centre's preference ordering (whether it values more the Upgrade Deal with the RBU or
the SQ) and on what player makes the first move3. The most important conclusions to
underline are the following:
The Upgrade Game pushes the system towards symmetry again and makes it
inherently unstable, no matter what strategy the Centre chooses;
Asymmetry is not a self-enforcing institution since it prevents an alliance of the
subordinated units against an oppressive centre; indeed the Centre is able to exploit its
position of potential coalition partner to increase its authority.
A narrative of the first 8 years of the Russian Federation (1990-1998) corroborates this theory.
The fact that from 1999 President Putin started to roll back asymmetric deals (Watts 2005: 4)
proves that the Centre's political lite thought asymmetry had gone too far: such a
development is not in contrast with Zuber's theory.
The theory to which we turn now is more general in scope but adopts the same rational
framework (more specifically public choice theory). Congleton et al. (2003) analyse how and
3 The Centre could for example be tempted to break back only the strongest RBUs by proposing to each one ad
hoc upgrade deals, like so following the classic divide et impera strategy among RBUs.
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why policy-making authority is transferred from one level to the other. They conceptualize the
demand of devolved policy-making powers by regional authorities as the answer to a demand
of public services by the population of the region concerned. The authors look at three
scenarios:
Decentralisation from an over-centralized State: a revenue-maximizing over-
centralized central government is akin to a monopoly provider (in this case, of services
and policy-making powers) and is unlikely to provide the adequate level of public services
for each region. Regional governments which are pressed by their electorate to provide a
specific level4 of public service(s) must purchase policy-making power at a price5.
Assuming that the central government does not apply price discrimination (i.e. requires
the same price to all regions), asymmetry is likely to emerge when there are substantial
regional differences in the demand for local autonomy ( ibidem: 173), which in turn
depends on the demand for the public service(s) concerned. The historical example
provided refers to city-states in Medieval Europe, which were far richer than the rest of the
country and thus asked for higher levels of public services than could be centrally
provided: therefore they frequently obtained stronger-than-average policy-making powers
(e.g. special charters);
Centralisation from an over-decentralized State (or group of States in the case of
international organizations): such a scenario refers to the creation of a new central or
supranational functional authority/organisation, which is conceptualized as a club
which provides excludable public services [and whose membership is voluntary].
Outsiders (regions and States still out of the new organisation) use two criteria to assess
the expected net benefit of entering the organisation: first, an economic one (anticipated
advantage from the increased scale or scope of centralized production or regulation), and,
second, a political one (expectations about the manner in which those net benefits are to
be distributed among member[s]) (ibidem: 177). To reduce the political risk of
centralisation run by weaker members under symmetrical membership (i.e. they face an
all-or-nothing offer) the organisation can use institutional devices such as supermajority
voting rules and generality rule in the provision of services. Asymmetry is another such
instrument: by allowing heterogeneous levels of service (both among member states and
4 Such a level would of course be higher than the centrally provided one.5 Such a price would be a political one: for example, central government could ask the regional government to
force through a policy viewed unfavourably by the region's population.
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across different services) it potentially expands both membership and the range of
centralized services provided (ibidem: 179). The example provided is, not surprisingly,
the European Union, which ticks all the boxes (supermajority and generality rule,
asymmetry in the level and extension of services e.g. opt-out agreements).
The third scenario (Constitutional convention) basically follows the same logic.
To sum up, Congleton et al. make the transfer of policy-making authority depend on, first, the
potential gains which could be realised out of further decentralisation/centralisation, and,
second, the disparity in public services demand among regions/States. The biggest difference
between Congleton et al.'s theory and Zuber's one is that the former ignores security issues
(ibidem: 188, note 12) and therefore fails to account for the increased risk for the Centre posed
by National Minorities. In addition, Congleton et al.'s do not make any claim on the effects of
asymmetry on the stability of the federation. However, their model is dynamic (because takes
into account history by devising the three different scenarios and accounts also for change in
the number of component units) and can better explain processes based above all on economic
cooperation, e.g. the process of European integration.
Asymmetrical Federalism on the Job: Evidence from EU Countries
The theories presented in the previous section do not relate to in-depth case studies and are
missing comparative evidence and quantitative analysis. The essay now looks precisely at this
category.
In his comparative analysis of regional demands for autonomy in six EU countries
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), van Houten (2007) verifies eighthypotheses drawn from the literature on regional demands for autonomy. In respect to the aim
of this essay, the most interesting results are that, on average, culturally distinct and relatively
rich and economically powerful regions are most likely to [demand autonomy] (ibidem: 561);
however these structural factors do not explain alone variations in demand for autonomy
among similar regions (e.g. similarly culturally distinct and relatively rich). Such a role is
instead performed by the variable related to the dynamics of party competition at the regional
level: the analysis indeed shows that, all things being equal, regions where competition is
largely among regional-based parties (and not against national-based ones) are more likely to
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voice substantial demands for autonomy because in such an electoral arena all or most issues
will be framed in territorial terms.
The relevance of party dynamics are confirmed also by Swenden (2002) in his article
on Belgium. He focuses on the way party dynamics hinder and soften many of the numerous
asymmetries typical of the Belgian federation. Indeed de facto asymmetries encompass:
The concurrence of three territorially defined regions (Flemish region, Walloon region
and Brussels capital region) and of three linguistically defined communities (Dutch-
speaking, French-speaking and German-speaking6);
Disparities in economical performance among the three regions (with the Flemish
having back in 1996 the highest GDP per capita, the biggest population and the lowest
unemployment);
Asymmetries in the party system in two respects: variation of support of each big
party family across regions as usual and, more importantly (and unique to Belgium), a
dual party system (one for the French-speaking and one for the Dutch-speaking).
De jure asymmetries in the strict sense are relatively limited, the most relevant being the
slightly lower status of Brussels capital region vis--vis Walloon and Flemish ones and the
inconsistencies in community policy due to the imperfect congruence between regional and
community borders (ibidem: 74).
The combination of the double party system, the pervasive consociational practises, the parity
rule (which prescribes for an even number of Dutch- and French-speaking ministries in the
Brussels capital region and federal governments that is, for symmetry between the two
communities) and the practice of congruent government coalitions (i.e. to build governments
out of the same coalition at all levels of government, both in Wallonia's or Flanders's ones and
in the Brussels capital region's and federal ones). The end result is that such party dynamics
almost always form symmetric and congruent governments, therefore making the Belgian
system much less asymmetric than it could appear at first glance.
The European country which has taken de jure asymmetry farthest is Spain. As
Cangleton et al. (2003: 185) predict in the scenario of bargain in a constitutional convention,
the outcome has been an highly asymmetrical one (Agranoff 2005; Moreno 2004).
6 The German-speaking community is so small only 70000 people that it will be no longer taken into
consideration in the rest of the paragraph.
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Asymmetry builds on the history of Spain: the historical heritage and previous experiences of
self rule by the Basque, Catalan, Galician, Navarran Minority Nations allowed them to claim
extensive policy-making powers (i.e. NBUs' powers) right during the '76-'79 transition to
democracy and to obtain those powers much faster than the others regions. In these regionsthe regional-ethnoterritorial identity is stronger than in the rest of Spain and this makes them
more willing to pay the price for autonomy. Even today, 32 years later, although the central
government has relentlessly pursued symmetry of powers for the Comunidades Autnomas
(CAs i.e. the regions) and all regions now enjoy substantial policy-making authority, there
are still huge differences among NBUs and RBUs, especially in respect to the Basque and
Navarre CAs vis--vis the other CAs.
The process of federalization of Spain has developed in an inductive manner, step by step
(Moreno 2004: 3). Indeed both the central government and Minority Nations' lites have
favoured centre-periphery bilateral relations, the former to keep spread of power to the (other)
CAs as narrow as possible (Zuber's theory here is helpful in explaining such a behaviour), the
latter to better control the pace of decentralisation. Therefore no overall framework of
federalization has emerged yet and the second Chamber has yet to become a true territorial
chamber: such a development would no doubt encourage the involvement of the CAs in state-
wide decision-making (ibidem: 12) but for the moment the struggle between NBUs, RBUs
and the Centre continues in a purely political form.
An example of how far-reaching are the powers granted to Basque Country and Catalunia is
their intense paradiplomatic activity (see Agranoff 2005: 5; on the Basque Country see
Lecours et al. 2001; for a general overview of paradiplomacy i.e. diplomacy by sub-state
units see Lecours 2002).
On the other (symmetric) side of the spectrum, the case of Germany shows that
cultural-ideological and political variables can seriously curb the rise of asymmetry (Jung
2005). Germany has two notable de jure asymmetries: on the one hand different voting
weights of Lnder in the Senate and on the other strong fiscal revenue-based equalization,
with the poorest Lnder getting up to 77,5% of the gap between their revenue capacity and
the national average [back in 2005, while in 2004 such a percentage was up to 90%!] ( ibidem:
4).
Overall nevertheless Germany is characterized by a de jure symmetric federalism: Lnder
have the same rights, there is no opt-out from redistributive policies, etc. In addition, thanks to
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linguistic homogeneity, relatively small territory no serious marginalisation of the periphery
, nation-wide political parties and NGOs, there are no strong structural differing pressures
for autonomy and there still is a strong commitment to the (in)famous equality [was
uniformity before 1993] of conditions of life (ibidem: 2-3). However pressures for asymmetryare increasing even there.
Conclusion
The essay has expounded the concept of asymmetrical federalism and has linked it to
significant contemporary developments in the international arena and in the domestic one. In
respect to the former it has been said that globalisation and the process of European
Integration increase competitive pressure in a different way for each sub-state unit (even inside
the same country) and provide opportunities to exploit economy of scale and/or scope for the
most entrepreneurial sub-state units. Instead in the domestic arena the rise of ethnopolitics has
increased the significance of the regional arena in the political competition. Asymmetrical
federalism is here to stay and is an increasingly important feature in almost all federations.
However the analysis has showed that its importance and extent vary widely in different kind
of federations. The impact of asymmetry on the stability and ultimately on the survival of a
federation is dependent upon many variables.
The theoretical analysis has shown that demographic patterns (both in terms of
distribution in the territory and across ethnic groups) matter more than everything else. The
presence of national minorities increases both the scope and the risk from having recourse to
asymmetrical federalism to curb secessionist claims. Zuber's theory proves to have good
explanatory power both in respect to Russia and with regards to Spain. The young age of these
federations, however, does not allow to draw a definitive conclusion on the stability of such a
system. What can already be said, however, is that, in the case of multinational federal
systems, asymmetrical federalism can be a quite successful means to prevent the breaking up
of the State but does not secureper se a stable institutional equilibrium.
The case of the European Union, conceptualised as a process of centralisation from a
status quo of excessive decentralisation, shows that instead in such a case, with voluntary
subscription, asymmetric federalism can be an efficiency- and stability-enhancing instrument.
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The case of Belgium instead demonstrates that to assess the real influence of
asymmetric constitutions it is mandatory to look at the wider picture of the whole political
process. Indeed the incredibly complex inner workings of Belgian party politics, characterized
overall by all-permeating consociational practises, risk to limit the gains to be realized throughasymmetry. It could be said that the fact that Belgium is still a united State speaks up for the
effectiveness of asymmetrical federalism in making federations survive: however the current
government crisis (329 days without a central government on the 8 May 2011 and still going
strong (Falter 2011)) does not hint at a happy ending. The responsibility of asymmetrical
federalism in such a crisis however is not clear nor linear.
Finally, the case of Germany shows that when the federal system is not put through
excessive centrifugal pressures and sticks to a strong egalitarian commitment, asymmetry can
be limited. However not even Germany can completely avoid the pressure to asymmetry
wielded by the opposite movements of globalisation and regionalisation.
Asymmetrical federalism is important for the survival of federations because is one of
the most common answers to risks and opportunities of the contemporary
globalised/regionalised world. It is however a double-edged sword and its impact on long-term
stability should be carefully valued for each federation in the light of its specific demographic,
political and historical patterns.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY (in alphabetical order)
Agranoff R. (ed.) (1999), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States, Baden-
Baden: Nomos
Agranoff R. (2005), Federal Asymmetry and Intergovernmental Relations in Spain ,
Asymmetry Series, Kingston: Queen's University Press
Brown D. (2005), Whos Afraid Of Asymmetrical Federalism?, Asymmetry Series, Kingston:
Queen's University Press
Burgess M. (2005), Managing Diversity in Federal States: Conceptual Lenses and
Comparative Perspectives, in Gagnon A.-G. (2009), Contemporary Canadian Federalism:
Foundations, Traditions. Institutions, Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated
Congleton R.D., Kyriacou A., Bacaria J. (2003), A Theory of Menu Federalism:Decentralization by Political Agreement, Constitutional Political Economy, 14, pp. 167-90
Dardanelli P. (2002), Does Supra-national Integration Fuel Sud-national Demands for Self-
government? Evidence from a Comparaive Analysis of Scotland Over Time, paper presented at
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Falter R. (2011), In the Summertime, in Crisis in Belgium,
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Hepburn E. (2008), The Rise and Fall of a Europe of the Regions , Regional and Federal
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Jung S. (2005), German Federalism Still a Model of Symmetry? , Asymmetry Series,
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Lecours A., Moreno L. (2001), Paradiplomacy and stateless nations: a reference to the
Basque Country (Working paper 01-06), Unidad de Polticas Comparadas (Consejo Superior
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Lecours A. (2002), Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International
Relations of Regions , International Negotiation, 7, pp. 91114
McGarry, J. (2006).Asymmetrical federalism and the plurinational state, in F. Geerkens (Ed.),
Third International Conference on Federalism. Federalism: Turning diversity into harmony.
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Swenden W. (2002),Asymmetric Federalism and Coalition-Making in Belgium , Publius: The
Journal of Federalism, 32/3, pp. 67-87
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Zuber C.I. (2011), Understanding the Multinational Game: Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical
Federalism, Comparative Political Studies, 44/5, pp. 546-71
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