asymmetrical federalism

7/31/2019 Asymmetrical Federalism

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Federico Faleschini (ID 10902214)

Module Convenor: Michael Burgess

Module: PO867 (Comparative Federal Political System)

9 May 2011

Essay 2 (word limit: 4000; actual words: 4150)

How Important Do You Think Asymmetrical

Federalism Is to the Survival of Federations?


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Introduction

Asymmetry is a feature of each and every political system: in its most general meaning, it

refers to all kind of differences across sub-State units. Asymmetric federalism instead is amuch more specific term, and relates to the institutionalization of these differences in the

political and legal practises of a federation. Asymmetrical federalism has long been a taboo

topic among scholars of Federalism but its practical relevance has increased enormously over

the last twenty years and so has the interest for it in the literature.

The essay is going to analyse the importance of asymmetric federalism for the survival

of federations. The literature provides mixed evidence in respect to short- and long-term

consequences of asymmetrical federalism. The essay combines on the one hand theoretical

insights on the origins and functioning of asymmetrical devices and on the other concrete

evidence from federal political systems. The main argument is that asymmetry is an

increasingly common feature of all federal and decentralized systems because it depends on

changes in the international (e.g. European integration) and internal (e.g. ethnopolitics) arena

but the overall effect on the stability of a specific federation depends on the interaction of

various factors: the extent of asymmetry itself, the demographic composition of the federation

and the party dynamics.

The essay is divided into five sections. The first one defines the concept of asymmetry

and explains why it is so relevant nowadays: the distinction between de facto and de jure

asymmetries is introduced and the concept is linked to current important international

processes. The second one illustrates two theories of asymmetrical federalism, one covering

the experience of multinational federations and the other focusing on the role of the demand

of public services. The third one provides evidence of asymmetrical practises in contemporaryfederal political systems. The fourth section concludes and assess the importance of

federalism for the survival of federations.


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The Concept of Asymmetrical Federalism and its Relevance in Contemporary Politics

and Federal Systems

In his seminal article Tarlton (1965) first defined the concept of asymmetry in federal systems.

His aim was polemical towards previous approaches to the study of federalism (legal, political

and socio-cultural) in that they all treated federal systems as a whole (ibidem: 867) not

allowing for variations among each constituent unit in its relation to the federal centre. Tarlton

instead defined asymmetry as the concept [which] expresses the extent to which component

states do notshare in [the conditions common to the federal system as a whole] (ibidem: 861;

emphasis added). He thus defines two ideal-types: the symmetrical model, where each of

the ... units would ... be miniature reflections of the important aspects of the whole federal

system (ibidem: 868), and the asymmetrical model, where each unit would have about it a

unique set of features ; federal systems will be somewhere between these two extremes.

Tarlton links the concept of asymmetry to the federal-state conflict: where asymmetry

between one or a few of the units and the rest of the federation is acute there is the potential

for federal-state conflict, or even for secession. He goes as far to say that the workability of a

federal system for a group of units is only a function of the level of symmetry: if the elements

of asymmetry prevail over the ones of symmetry, the system won't work at the optimum level

of harmony then it follows that a unitary system would be better (ibidem: 873). This

pessimistic conclusion over the conflict resolution potential of federalism back then was a

lone voice.

In his attack to the legalistic approach to federalism, Tarlton overlooked the important

distinction between de facto and de jure asymmetries1. The former refer to differences among

units in the economic, social and political domain and are common to practically all

federations, while the latter relate to asymmetry embedded in constitutional and legal

processes (Watts 2005: 2). It is fundamental to keep these two concepts separated because de

facto asymmetries do not always translate into de jure asymmetries. Indeed, as Burgess (2005:

430) recalls, political scientists can only work with social reality having political salience:

so asymmetry is relevant only when it finds a political expression. In addition, not all conflicts

have the same salience, with cultural-ideological conflicts usually harder to solve than socio-

1 It is also important not to confuse the concept of de facto asymmetry with the preconditions which lead tosuch asymmetries. For a quick overview of de jure asymmetries in federal political systems see Watts (2005);

for an in depth overview see McGarry (2006).


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economic ones because the former are inherently less bargainable (ibidem: 431). Tarlton's

conclusion was indeed simplistic: there are many types of asymmetry and not all of them have

the same impact on the federation.

Notwithstanding its high practical relevance, the topic of asymmetrical federalism has

long been ignored after Tarlton's article. Indeed scholars have long been concerned only with

classical federations which abode to the early modern doctrine of symmetric state rights:

asymmetries (as Tarlton's pessimistic pitch suggests) were seen with suspicion (Von Beyme

2005: 433). In recent years, however, changes at the level of domestic and international

politics have coincided with the widespread diffusion of asymmetrical mechanisms in many

federal and decentralized systems and scholars' interest in the subject has been growing,

especially since the publication of the important volume Accommodating Diversity:

Asymmetry in Federal States (Agranoff 1999).

There is a number of reasons for this surge of interest in asymmetrical federalism. Among

others (see e.g. van Houten 2007: 548-51), Von Beyme (2005: 434) highlights four main

factors:

The revolt of regions and ethnic groups, more concerned with identity issues rather

than redistribution ones and thus more inclined to accept differences in life conditions;

The economic imbalances created and nourished by the processes of globalization,

European integration, migration, etc.;

The shift from participatory federalism to a federalism of competition caused by the

dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm and by economic competition;

The diffusion of Post-modernist thinking, not obsessed with order and rationality as

classical modernism was.

Before getting on to the next section a quick look at the influences of the process of

European Integration is due. Many scholars have looked at the implications of the process of

European Integration on sub-national demands for self-government and a burgeoning

literature exist on the topic of Europe of the Regions2. For example, Dardanelli (2002) shows

how Scottish Nationalist lites exploited the advantages offered by European Integration (i.e.

access to foreign markets and the systematic bias towards small member States in the

decision-making process of the EU) to make independence a more attractive solution than it

2 See e.g. the special numbers on this topic by Publius (volume 26/4, Fall 1996) and by Regional and Federal

Studies (volume 18/5, October 2008).


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used to be and hence boost support for independence in Scotland.

More in general the process of European Integration has opened the new electoral arenas, the

European itself and the regional one: political parties and lobbies have targeted their strategy

on the territorial dimension (Hepburn 2008) and this is and will continue to be an importantfactor behind the Europe-wide push towards decentralisation and increasing asymmetry.

Theories of Asymmetrical Federalism

This section will expound two theories of asymmetrical federalism in order to try to

understand what are the most important drivers of asymmetrical federalism (Brown 2005:

4).

Zuber (2011) focuses on multinational federations. Building on a game-theoretical

foundation, she wants to understand why multinational federal systems (hence MFSs) develop

asymmetrical institutions and what are the consequences of such a choice on the stability of

the federation in the long run.

Following Kimlyca, she defines the multinational State as the one which comprises in its own

territory one or more national minorities (i.e. cultural groups voicing claims to self-

determination on a territorial basis (ibidem: 547): this kind of minorities represent a great

threat to the unity of the federal State given their territorial concentration. The author frames

the MFS as a three players game: National-Based Units (NBUs) where national minorities are

the majority of the population, Regional-Based Units (RBUs) where the the majority of the

population is part of the national majority, and obviously the federal Centre. Asymmetry is

thus defined as the characteristic of MFSs through which NBUs de jure enjoy more rights

than [RBUs] and maintain a differentiated relationship to the centre ( ibidem: 548).

The author addresses the question of why asymmetry develops in MFSs by focusing on the

problem of secession. She makes the following assumptions: first, that the starting point

(status quo SQ) is a symmetric MFS, and second, that the (eventual) military confrontation

between a national minority (hence MI) and the Centre is characterized by asymmetric

warfare (ibidem: 551) (which lowers the cost of insurrection for MI). Secession hence can

framed as a prisoner's dilemma game: each player can obtain its own most preferred option

(i.e. secession for MI and maintenance of the SQ for the Centre) if it defects and the other


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player cooperates (e.g. if the MI secedes and the Centre sticks to the SQ i.e. doesn't do

anything). However this is not the Pareto-efficient outcome: indeed that can be reached only if

both players cooperate (i.e. negotiate an institutional change). Institutional change

nevertheless necessarily leads to asymmetry: indeed the Centre will give NBUs morefavourable conditions than the average Unit in order to increase the say of the MI in the

decision-making process (therefore lowering the cost of cooperation for the MI and indirectly

raising the cost of defection).

After having demonstrated that accommodation of a MI's claims leads to asymmetry, the

author turns to the question of the effect of asymmetry over the stability of the MFS. In the

new asymmetrical setting, the goals of NBUs and RBUs diverge: the former wants

asymmetric deals to be maintained (since it represents the MI's guarantee of equal status with

the National Majority hence MA), while the latter engages the Centre in an Upgrade Game

(i.e. asks for an upgrade of its powers to the level of NBUs' ones). Following Tsebelis, the

author models the situation as a Nested game: the asymmetrical deals weaken the relative

status of RBUs and thus changes the rule of the federal game not only in respect to Centre-

NBUs relations but also in respect to Centre-RBUs relations. The final outcome depends on

the Centre's preference ordering (whether it values more the Upgrade Deal with the RBU or

the SQ) and on what player makes the first move3. The most important conclusions to

underline are the following:

The Upgrade Game pushes the system towards symmetry again and makes it

inherently unstable, no matter what strategy the Centre chooses;

Asymmetry is not a self-enforcing institution since it prevents an alliance of the

subordinated units against an oppressive centre; indeed the Centre is able to exploit its

position of potential coalition partner to increase its authority.

A narrative of the first 8 years of the Russian Federation (1990-1998) corroborates this theory.

The fact that from 1999 President Putin started to roll back asymmetric deals (Watts 2005: 4)

proves that the Centre's political lite thought asymmetry had gone too far: such a

development is not in contrast with Zuber's theory.

The theory to which we turn now is more general in scope but adopts the same rational

framework (more specifically public choice theory). Congleton et al. (2003) analyse how and

3 The Centre could for example be tempted to break back only the strongest RBUs by proposing to each one ad

hoc upgrade deals, like so following the classic divide et impera strategy among RBUs.


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why policy-making authority is transferred from one level to the other. They conceptualize the

demand of devolved policy-making powers by regional authorities as the answer to a demand

of public services by the population of the region concerned. The authors look at three

scenarios:

Decentralisation from an over-centralized State: a revenue-maximizing over-

centralized central government is akin to a monopoly provider (in this case, of services

and policy-making powers) and is unlikely to provide the adequate level of public services

for each region. Regional governments which are pressed by their electorate to provide a

specific level4 of public service(s) must purchase policy-making power at a price5.

Assuming that the central government does not apply price discrimination (i.e. requires

the same price to all regions), asymmetry is likely to emerge when there are substantial

regional differences in the demand for local autonomy ( ibidem: 173), which in turn

depends on the demand for the public service(s) concerned. The historical example

provided refers to city-states in Medieval Europe, which were far richer than the rest of the

country and thus asked for higher levels of public services than could be centrally

provided: therefore they frequently obtained stronger-than-average policy-making powers

(e.g. special charters);

Centralisation from an over-decentralized State (or group of States in the case of

international organizations): such a scenario refers to the creation of a new central or

supranational functional authority/organisation, which is conceptualized as a club

which provides excludable public services [and whose membership is voluntary].

Outsiders (regions and States still out of the new organisation) use two criteria to assess

the expected net benefit of entering the organisation: first, an economic one (anticipated

advantage from the increased scale or scope of centralized production or regulation), and,

second, a political one (expectations about the manner in which those net benefits are to

be distributed among member[s]) (ibidem: 177). To reduce the political risk of

centralisation run by weaker members under symmetrical membership (i.e. they face an

all-or-nothing offer) the organisation can use institutional devices such as supermajority

voting rules and generality rule in the provision of services. Asymmetry is another such

instrument: by allowing heterogeneous levels of service (both among member states and

4 Such a level would of course be higher than the centrally provided one.5 Such a price would be a political one: for example, central government could ask the regional government to

force through a policy viewed unfavourably by the region's population.


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across different services) it potentially expands both membership and the range of

centralized services provided (ibidem: 179). The example provided is, not surprisingly,

the European Union, which ticks all the boxes (supermajority and generality rule,

asymmetry in the level and extension of services e.g. opt-out agreements).

The third scenario (Constitutional convention) basically follows the same logic.

To sum up, Congleton et al. make the transfer of policy-making authority depend on, first, the

potential gains which could be realised out of further decentralisation/centralisation, and,

second, the disparity in public services demand among regions/States. The biggest difference

between Congleton et al.'s theory and Zuber's one is that the former ignores security issues

(ibidem: 188, note 12) and therefore fails to account for the increased risk for the Centre posed

by National Minorities. In addition, Congleton et al.'s do not make any claim on the effects of

asymmetry on the stability of the federation. However, their model is dynamic (because takes

into account history by devising the three different scenarios and accounts also for change in

the number of component units) and can better explain processes based above all on economic

cooperation, e.g. the process of European integration.

Asymmetrical Federalism on the Job: Evidence from EU Countries

The theories presented in the previous section do not relate to in-depth case studies and are

missing comparative evidence and quantitative analysis. The essay now looks precisely at this

category.

In his comparative analysis of regional demands for autonomy in six EU countries

(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), van Houten (2007) verifies eighthypotheses drawn from the literature on regional demands for autonomy. In respect to the aim

of this essay, the most interesting results are that, on average, culturally distinct and relatively

rich and economically powerful regions are most likely to [demand autonomy] (ibidem: 561);

however these structural factors do not explain alone variations in demand for autonomy

among similar regions (e.g. similarly culturally distinct and relatively rich). Such a role is

instead performed by the variable related to the dynamics of party competition at the regional

level: the analysis indeed shows that, all things being equal, regions where competition is

largely among regional-based parties (and not against national-based ones) are more likely to


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voice substantial demands for autonomy because in such an electoral arena all or most issues

will be framed in territorial terms.

The relevance of party dynamics are confirmed also by Swenden (2002) in his article

on Belgium. He focuses on the way party dynamics hinder and soften many of the numerous

asymmetries typical of the Belgian federation. Indeed de facto asymmetries encompass:

The concurrence of three territorially defined regions (Flemish region, Walloon region

and Brussels capital region) and of three linguistically defined communities (Dutch-

speaking, French-speaking and German-speaking6);

Disparities in economical performance among the three regions (with the Flemish

having back in 1996 the highest GDP per capita, the biggest population and the lowest

unemployment);

Asymmetries in the party system in two respects: variation of support of each big

party family across regions as usual and, more importantly (and unique to Belgium), a

dual party system (one for the French-speaking and one for the Dutch-speaking).

De jure asymmetries in the strict sense are relatively limited, the most relevant being the

slightly lower status of Brussels capital region vis--vis Walloon and Flemish ones and the

inconsistencies in community policy due to the imperfect congruence between regional and

community borders (ibidem: 74).

The combination of the double party system, the pervasive consociational practises, the parity

rule (which prescribes for an even number of Dutch- and French-speaking ministries in the

Brussels capital region and federal governments that is, for symmetry between the two

communities) and the practice of congruent government coalitions (i.e. to build governments

out of the same coalition at all levels of government, both in Wallonia's or Flanders's ones and

in the Brussels capital region's and federal ones). The end result is that such party dynamics

almost always form symmetric and congruent governments, therefore making the Belgian

system much less asymmetric than it could appear at first glance.

The European country which has taken de jure asymmetry farthest is Spain. As

Cangleton et al. (2003: 185) predict in the scenario of bargain in a constitutional convention,

the outcome has been an highly asymmetrical one (Agranoff 2005; Moreno 2004).

6 The German-speaking community is so small only 70000 people that it will be no longer taken into

consideration in the rest of the paragraph.


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Asymmetry builds on the history of Spain: the historical heritage and previous experiences of

self rule by the Basque, Catalan, Galician, Navarran Minority Nations allowed them to claim

extensive policy-making powers (i.e. NBUs' powers) right during the '76-'79 transition to

democracy and to obtain those powers much faster than the others regions. In these regionsthe regional-ethnoterritorial identity is stronger than in the rest of Spain and this makes them

more willing to pay the price for autonomy. Even today, 32 years later, although the central

government has relentlessly pursued symmetry of powers for the Comunidades Autnomas

(CAs i.e. the regions) and all regions now enjoy substantial policy-making authority, there

are still huge differences among NBUs and RBUs, especially in respect to the Basque and

Navarre CAs vis--vis the other CAs.

The process of federalization of Spain has developed in an inductive manner, step by step

(Moreno 2004: 3). Indeed both the central government and Minority Nations' lites have

favoured centre-periphery bilateral relations, the former to keep spread of power to the (other)

CAs as narrow as possible (Zuber's theory here is helpful in explaining such a behaviour), the

latter to better control the pace of decentralisation. Therefore no overall framework of

federalization has emerged yet and the second Chamber has yet to become a true territorial

chamber: such a development would no doubt encourage the involvement of the CAs in state-

wide decision-making (ibidem: 12) but for the moment the struggle between NBUs, RBUs

and the Centre continues in a purely political form.

An example of how far-reaching are the powers granted to Basque Country and Catalunia is

their intense paradiplomatic activity (see Agranoff 2005: 5; on the Basque Country see

Lecours et al. 2001; for a general overview of paradiplomacy i.e. diplomacy by sub-state

units see Lecours 2002).

On the other (symmetric) side of the spectrum, the case of Germany shows that

cultural-ideological and political variables can seriously curb the rise of asymmetry (Jung

2005). Germany has two notable de jure asymmetries: on the one hand different voting

weights of Lnder in the Senate and on the other strong fiscal revenue-based equalization,

with the poorest Lnder getting up to 77,5% of the gap between their revenue capacity and

the national average [back in 2005, while in 2004 such a percentage was up to 90%!] ( ibidem:

4).

Overall nevertheless Germany is characterized by a de jure symmetric federalism: Lnder

have the same rights, there is no opt-out from redistributive policies, etc. In addition, thanks to


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linguistic homogeneity, relatively small territory no serious marginalisation of the periphery

, nation-wide political parties and NGOs, there are no strong structural differing pressures

for autonomy and there still is a strong commitment to the (in)famous equality [was

uniformity before 1993] of conditions of life (ibidem: 2-3). However pressures for asymmetryare increasing even there.

Conclusion

The essay has expounded the concept of asymmetrical federalism and has linked it to

significant contemporary developments in the international arena and in the domestic one. In

respect to the former it has been said that globalisation and the process of European

Integration increase competitive pressure in a different way for each sub-state unit (even inside

the same country) and provide opportunities to exploit economy of scale and/or scope for the

most entrepreneurial sub-state units. Instead in the domestic arena the rise of ethnopolitics has

increased the significance of the regional arena in the political competition. Asymmetrical

federalism is here to stay and is an increasingly important feature in almost all federations.

However the analysis has showed that its importance and extent vary widely in different kind

of federations. The impact of asymmetry on the stability and ultimately on the survival of a

federation is dependent upon many variables.

The theoretical analysis has shown that demographic patterns (both in terms of

distribution in the territory and across ethnic groups) matter more than everything else. The

presence of national minorities increases both the scope and the risk from having recourse to

asymmetrical federalism to curb secessionist claims. Zuber's theory proves to have good

explanatory power both in respect to Russia and with regards to Spain. The young age of these

federations, however, does not allow to draw a definitive conclusion on the stability of such a

system. What can already be said, however, is that, in the case of multinational federal

systems, asymmetrical federalism can be a quite successful means to prevent the breaking up

of the State but does not secureper se a stable institutional equilibrium.

The case of the European Union, conceptualised as a process of centralisation from a

status quo of excessive decentralisation, shows that instead in such a case, with voluntary

subscription, asymmetric federalism can be an efficiency- and stability-enhancing instrument.


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The case of Belgium instead demonstrates that to assess the real influence of

asymmetric constitutions it is mandatory to look at the wider picture of the whole political

process. Indeed the incredibly complex inner workings of Belgian party politics, characterized

overall by all-permeating consociational practises, risk to limit the gains to be realized throughasymmetry. It could be said that the fact that Belgium is still a united State speaks up for the

effectiveness of asymmetrical federalism in making federations survive: however the current

government crisis (329 days without a central government on the 8 May 2011 and still going

strong (Falter 2011)) does not hint at a happy ending. The responsibility of asymmetrical

federalism in such a crisis however is not clear nor linear.

Finally, the case of Germany shows that when the federal system is not put through

excessive centrifugal pressures and sticks to a strong egalitarian commitment, asymmetry can

be limited. However not even Germany can completely avoid the pressure to asymmetry

wielded by the opposite movements of globalisation and regionalisation.

Asymmetrical federalism is important for the survival of federations because is one of

the most common answers to risks and opportunities of the contemporary

globalised/regionalised world. It is however a double-edged sword and its impact on long-term

stability should be carefully valued for each federation in the light of its specific demographic,

political and historical patterns.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY (in alphabetical order)

Agranoff R. (ed.) (1999), Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States, Baden-

Baden: Nomos

Agranoff R. (2005), Federal Asymmetry and Intergovernmental Relations in Spain ,

Asymmetry Series, Kingston: Queen's University Press

Brown D. (2005), Whos Afraid Of Asymmetrical Federalism?, Asymmetry Series, Kingston:

Queen's University Press

Burgess M. (2005), Managing Diversity in Federal States: Conceptual Lenses and

Comparative Perspectives, in Gagnon A.-G. (2009), Contemporary Canadian Federalism:

Foundations, Traditions. Institutions, Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated

Congleton R.D., Kyriacou A., Bacaria J. (2003), A Theory of Menu Federalism:Decentralization by Political Agreement, Constitutional Political Economy, 14, pp. 167-90

Dardanelli P. (2002), Does Supra-national Integration Fuel Sud-national Demands for Self-

government? Evidence from a Comparaive Analysis of Scotland Over Time, paper presented at

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Studies, 18/5, pp. 537-55

Jung S. (2005), German Federalism Still a Model of Symmetry? , Asymmetry Series,

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Lecours A. (2002), Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International

Relations of Regions , International Negotiation, 7, pp. 91114

McGarry, J. (2006).Asymmetrical federalism and the plurinational state, in F. Geerkens (Ed.),

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asymmetrical federalism

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