“an eye for resemblances”: metonymy, metaphor, and the cognitive bases of similarity

Figurative Thought and Language ConferenceThessaloniki, April 25, 2014

Dan StrackThe University of Kitakyushu

“But yon chief, ancient, who is he, Car-borne, who sways the reins of horses white? (…) How calmly, how soberly ever he driveth on, One after other goading his team!” (Euripides (Way) , 357, 359)

[πώλοις μεταφέρων ἰθύνει] (Euripides, 358)

From Euripides’ The Phoenician Maidens (ca. 408 BC)

Ironic?: The earliest historical record of the word “metaphor” was not, in fact, metaphorical. (Especially to the ponies!)

In modern Greek, some literal meanings for μετάφέρω include: “carry, transport, convey; transfer; carry over (in accounts); move house.” (Pring, 119)

Ironic?: The earliest historical record of the word “metaphor” was not, in fact, metaphorical. (Especially to the ponies!)

In modern Greek, some literal meanings for μετάφέρω include: “carry, transport, convey; transfer; carry over (in accounts); move house.” (Pring, 119) → move house!!!

“Metaphor is the application of a strange term either transferred from the genus [γένους] and applied to the species [εἶδος] or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy. An example of a term transferred from genus to species is "Here stands my ship." Riding at anchor is a species of standing.” (Aristotle (Fyfe) , 81)[“νηῦς δέ μοι ἥδ᾽ ἕστηκεν”] (Poetics, 80)

Aristotle’s “categorization” system was logical and so naturally his analysis of metaphor also characterized it in terms of logicality.

Good metaphors are logical and bad metaphors are not.

While there certainly is some truth to this idea, how far can we take it?

Let’s look at the example that Aristotle himself used to illustrate his theory…

“But in all cases the metaphor from proportion should be reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things of the same genus; for instance, if the goblet is the shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly be called the goblet of Ares.” (Aristotle (Freese), Rhetoric III, 369, 371)

“ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν, οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπὶς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἁρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην Ἄρεως.” (Aristotle, Rhetoric III, 368, 370)

Superficial logic is straightforward: both shield and goblet are things “held in hand”

But what if we try to find a deeper meaning?

Goblet is the shield of Dionysus – Holding a wine glass protects him from verbal attack (?)

Shield is the Goblet of Ares – Just as alcohol makes one overconfident, Ares becomes overconfident when holding his shield (?)

Changes in order alter the meaning.

If cognitive science has made anything clear, it is that the brain itself and the systems that account for language comprehension in the brain are exceedingly complex and nuanced.

Consequently, both metonymy and metaphor, whether they seem like different phenomena or not, cannot be analyzed apart from the system in which they function.

Conceptual Metaphor Theory asserts that the system they both function in is a “concept”-oriented system.

For example, this conceptual comparison of words for furniture (excerpted from Taylor, 1995: 44, 57. Original research in Rosch 1975: 229.)

A Good example of “furniture”? Chair 1.04 Bed 1.58 Lamp 　　 2.94 Piano 　 3.64 Television 4.41 Telephone 6.68

Which is more “bird-like,” a bat or penguin?

Which is more “bird-like,” a bat or penguin?

What’s the difference between a zebra and a horse?

Which is more “bird-like,” a bat or penguin?

What’s the difference between a zebra and a horse?

Photo by Victoria Seavey (Bay Area Equestrian Network Website)

“Prototype categories have a flexibility, unknown to Aristotelian categories, in being able to accommodate new, hitherto unfamiliar data. With only Aristotelian categories at our disposal, new data would often demand, for their categorization, the creation of new categories, or a redefining of existing categories.” (Taylor, 1995: 53)

Photo by Victoria Seavey (Bay Area Equestrian Network Website)

The greatest strength of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is not its shorthand formulation of metaphors but rather its insistence on flexible, ad hoc domains (frames) that explain various idiosyncrasies of language that classical categories cannot.

Human intuitions are not always “logical.”

Is metonymy primarily a “logical” feature of language? Some Japanese examples…

「手を貸して下さい。」 (te wo kashite kudasai) [hand lend please ] 「人手不足」 (hitode busoku) [person hand not enough= “labor shortage”]Do we interpret these phrases in a logical,

deterministic way? (mathematical positivity?)Or, do we interpret such phrases according to

logically loose, rough but ready coherences?

But what does it mean?

So the next time you want to “metaphor ” your stuff across town, just ask this company to “lend a hand and a foot.”

Strictly speaking, metonymic function (e.g. PART FOR WHOLE or WHOLE FOR PART) is either logically false or inexact.

Further examples: 1. Indiana Jones marries Ally McBeal

(News story headline; FOXNews.com 2010) 2. Washington rejects proposed base expansion 3. Washington edges Detroit in overtime

Readers triangulate the meaning of “Washington” in context by attending to words such as “ base” or “overtime” which cue understanding of the most salient alternative.

Initially, all senses of the metonymic words are activated. The triangulation process occurs through subsequent lexical activation of context words. This follows the “exhaustive access model” of lexical access. (c.f. Giora 2003: 40-41 and Cutler and Clifton 1999:140)

Experimental evidence shows metaphorical comprehension to be a highly complex process.

To account for fuzzy logic, relativity, and complexity, Gibbs & Cameron (2008) have suggested that metaphorical understanding may occur according to the Dynamic Systems Theory principles explained in Spivey’s “Attractor Basin”-oriented theory of cognition. (Spivey, 2007)

For more information, read Spivey’s The Continuity of Mind (OUP, 2007).

Although metonymy is common in everyday language, it generally tends to go unnoticed.

Why? Because metonymic connections are instantiated not artificially through language but organically as concepts develop by way of an individual’s embodied experiences.

Metonymy is possible because of the way in which various cognitive parameters cohere to form concepts, networked sets of mappings that make spreading activation possible.

In that concepts cohere according to spreading activation principles, metaphor relies crucially on metonymy to inform the details of metaphorical correlation.

This is not a “bug” but a “feature.” The fact that metaphors are informed by

metonymy reflects the “rough but ready” ways in which the embodied details of concepts cohere.

Metonymy linguistically reflects the organically instantiated idiosyncracies of “conceptualization.”

The root for the part of a neuron we call a “dendrite” is the Greek word for “tree.” (δένδρον→ δενδρίτης)

This nomenclature is based on superficial visual resemblance.

Creation: The scientist (W.S. Hall) credited for first using the term “dendrite” in 1900 (OED IV, 454) confirmed that the visible structure of certain parts of nerve cells have “arborescent” (extensively branched) structures. The noticing of structural resemblance resulted in the creation of a linguistically instantiated image metaphor.

Such a discovery could not have been made without exposure to two specific domains of experience: “trees” and “magnified images of neurons.”

Failed coining instance: Schäfer, 1893: “Neuron, axon, dendron.” (OED IV, 455)

“…but by far the greatest thing is the use of metaphor. That alone cannot be learnt; it is the token of genius. For the right use of metaphor means an eye for resemblances.”

(Aristotle (Fyfe), Poetics, XXII, 89, 91)

“μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ᾽ ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυΐας τε σημεῖόν ἐστι: τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν.”

(Aristotle, Poetics, XXII, 90)

How are novel metaphors intuited? Activation linking naturally unconnected

domains of experience (e.g. the visible structures of “neurons” and “trees”) requires a mind with sufficient domain elaboration of both conceptual domains to allow detection of similarity to be possible and also simultaneous activation of both domains sufficient to spark attention and noticing.

When we talk about “resemblance” or “correspondence,” practically speaking, what are we talking about?

Answer: We are talking about (extra-linguistic) neural parameters that have correlations across domains of perceptual and conceptual experience.

E.g., “Bacon frying in a pan sounds like a heavy rain.” (Auditory metaphor)

Unique Production: If either of these domains of experience (tree and neuron) had been lacking in the observer or if the noticer lacked language skills, the noticing and subsequent communication of this resemblance would not have been possible.

Ubiquitous Communication: After coining, however, everyone aware of the word’s Greek etymology will have (linguistic not visual) access to this hint regarding structural correlation between the two concepts.

“…τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν”

(Aristotle, Poetics XXII, 90)

Fyfe translation quoted by Richards: “For the right use of metaphor means an eye for resemblances.”

(Aristotle (Fyfe), Poetics XXII, 89, 91)

“But we all live, and speak, only through our eye for resemblances…as individuals we gain our command of metaphor just as we learn whatever else makes us distinctively human. It is imparted to us from others with and through the language we learn, language which is utterly unable to aid us except through the command of metaphor which it gives.“ (Richards, 89-90)

“…τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν” (Aristotle, Poetics, 90)

Strack translation: “For doing metaphor well depends on the ability to consider similarities.“

That is, creating apt, novel metaphors from experience depends on having conceptual domains extensive enough to elicit noticing and then consider inter-domain resemblances.

→ Rich conceptual domain elaboration is gained through extensive embodied experience.

In the end, then, we find that both Aristotle and Richards were correct. With respect to Aristotle’s view, creating novel metaphors does require domain elaboration sufficient to spark keen insight . And with respect to Richards’ objection, interpreting such metaphors when linguistically exposed to them is often an unremarkable endeavor that may be accomplished by most people.

Interestingly, Richards’ most important contribution to metaphor theory (his ubiquity claim) would not have been made had it not been for Fyfe’s loose translation (mistranslation?) of Aristotle.

“right use of metaphor” (Fyfe trans., Poetics, 91)

“εὖ μεταφέρειν” (Aristotle, Poetics XXII, 90) Richards mistakenly assumed Aristotle was

referring to metaphor use in language general rather than novel metaphor creation.

Are present-day metaphor scholars still failing to distinguish metaphor use from metaphor creation?

Thank you for your attention.

Figurative Thought and Language ConferenceThessaloniki, April 25, 2014

Dan StrackThe University of Kitakyushu

“Sometimes no word for some of the terms of the analogy can be used all the same. For instance, to scatter seed is to sow, but there is no word for the action of the sun in scattering its fire. Yet this has to the sunshine the same relation as sowing has to the seed, and so you have the phrase “sowing the god-created fire.”

(Aristotle (Fyfe), Poetics, 83)

Radiation?