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« The adaptive governance of natural
disasters: Insights from the 2010
Mount Merapi Eruption in Indonesia »
Darine BAKKOUR,
Geoffroy ENJOLRAS
Robert KAST
Jean-Claude THOURET
DR n°2013-11
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The adaptive governance of natural disasters:
Insights from the 2010 Mount Merapi Eruption in Indonesia
Darine Bakkour*, Geoffroy Enjolras**, Robert Kast** *, Jean-Claude Thouret****
* Université Montpellier 1, UMR5474 LAMETA, 34000 Montpellier, France
Av. Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, Richter, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France
bakkour@lameta.univ-montp1.fr
** IAE- CERAG, Université Pierre Mendès, Grenoble 2 Sciences Sociales, France
Domaine universitaire, B.P. 47, 38040 Grenoble, Cedex 9, France
geoffroy.enjolras@iae-grenoble.fr
*** CNRS, UMR5474 LAMETA, SupAgro, 2 Place Viala, 34060 Montpellier Cedex 2, France
IDEP, 2 rue de la vieille Charité, 13002 Marseille, France.
kast@supagro.inra.fr
**** UMR 6524 “Magmas et Volcans”, Université Blaise Pascal
5 rue Kassler, 63000 Clermont-Ferrand, France
J.C.Thouret@opgc.univ-bpclermont.fr
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Abstract
An adaptive governance system strives to enhance the capacity of institutions to better coordinate
between them. As such, the main objective of an adaptive governance system would be to put
learning by experience processes in place, and thus to improve the adaptive capacity of the
concerned system. The contribution of this paper is twofold: (1) to establish an assessment
framework of the adaptive capacity of a system in the field of natural disasters and (2) to explore
the governance system of Mt. Merapi, Indonesia.
Firstly, this paper establishes an assessment framework for the adaptive capacity of a system in the
field of natural disasters. This assessment framework contains six key parameters as follows: (1)
context description, (2) institutions, (3) infrastructures, (4) economic and financial resources, (5)
technology, and (6) information and skills.
Secondly, using a field survey, which was conducted after the 2010 volcanic eruption and rain-
triggered lahars on Mt. Merapi, Indonesia, we underline a number of barriers, such as lack of
appropriate infrastructures, complex interactions across institutions, dependence on funds from
external parties, and rudimentary quantitative documentation on both human and material loss, that
weaken the adaptive capacity of the rescue system. More efforts are therefore needed in order to
improve the adaptive capacity and, thus, the adaptive governance at Mt. Merapi system.
This study constitutes a significant step toward enhancing our understanding of the adaptive
governance approach in the context of natural disasters in developing countries.
Keywords: Adaptive governance, adaptive capacity, natural disasters, discourse analysis,
Indonesia.
JEL Classification Codes: D02, D81, H12, Q54, G38.
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1 Introduction
Natural hazards have the potential to impose significant social and economic costs. The literature
usually makes the useful distinction between natural hazards, which are geophysical events such as
volcanic eruptions, and disasters, which involve the interaction of natural hazards with social
systems (Alcántara-Ayala, 2002; Cohen and Werker, 2008; Henstra and McBean, 2005; McEntire,
2001; Mileti, 1999; O’Keefe et al, 1976). While hazards cannot be prevented, the damage induced
by these extreme events may be disastrously huge, if they cannot be significantly reduced.
In the field of natural disasters, the adaptive governance (adaptive management, cooperative
management, collaborative governance or even adaptive co-management) is able to create better
coordination between institutions (Dietz et al, 2003; Folke et al, 2005). This governing paradigm
aims to improve the adaptive capacity of a system by promoting learning processes from the results
of management strategies that have already been implemented (Baker and Refsgaard, 2007;
Holling, 2004; Olsson, 2003).
Our case study considers Indonesia, a volcanic country that contains about 130 active volcanoes and
among them, Mt. Merapi, an andesitic composite volcano which is located in Central Java (Thouret
et al, 2000). We are particularly interested in the October–November 2010 volcanic eruption of Mt.
Merapi which is recognized as the most voluminous eruption since 1872. This volcano displaced at
least a third of a million people, and nearly ended 400 lives (Surono et al, 2012). According to De
Bélizal et al (2013), damages related to this volcano include: 860 houses damaged, 14 sabo-dams
and 21 bridges destroyed. However, after the eruptive phase, another threat endangers local
communities: rain-triggered lahars. The Indonesian term ‘‘lahar’’ is used for a mixture of debris and
water, other than stream flow, that flows from a volcano at relatively high speed (Lavigne and
Thouret, 2002).
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The Mt. Merapi case study is of major interest as it broadens our knowledge regarding the adaptive
capacity in developing countries that face natural disasters. Mt. Merapi volcano has been studied
extensively by Indonesian and international teams, leading to improved understanding of many
aspects of the volcano’s landforms and process. However, to our knowledge, none of these studies
has explicitly highlighted the governance system that might affect the way in which local
community cope with volcanic eruptions. This paper aims to assess the adaptive capacity, and thus
the adaptive governance around Mt. Merapi system. In particular, we focus on local communities
around Mt. Merapi, such as villages and sub-villages.
The methodology consists of a literature review and a qualitative analysis. Our field survey is based
on 18 face-to-face interviews, conducted from January to April 2011, right after the eruption in the
Mt. Merapi area. The collected information was analyzed both manually and by using the text
analysis software Tropes. The software’s statistical and linguistic algorithms enable researchers to
see connections and relationships in respondent’s answers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the adaptive governance paradigm and the
assessment framework of the adaptive capacity in the field of natural disasters. Section 3 presents
our case study. Section 4 shows main findings of our discourse analysis. Section 5 discusses our
findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 State of the art
In the field of natural disasters, we highlight the adaptive governance paradigm which aims to
improve the adaptive capacity of a system by promoting learning processes.
2.1 Adaptive governance and adaptive capacity of a system
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In general, governance is about forming institutional structures, and is concerned with the different
ways in which societies can organize themselves to accomplish their goals (De Loë et al, 2009).
Moreover, the adaptive governance consists of social structures and processes that link individuals,
organizations, agencies, and institutions at multiple organizational levels (Gunderson and Light,
2006). This governance paradigm considers policies and management approaches to be part of a
knowledge accumulation process (learning process) that results in new approaches that are better
able to accommodate uncertainty and surprise (Baker and Refsgaard, 2007; Holling, 2004; Olsson,
2003). Therefore, an adaptive governance approach is put forward as an alternative method of
managing complex social-environmental problems including disasters (Dietz et al, 2003; Folke et
al, 2005).
In this respect, the idea of an adaptive capacity of a system has emerged from a conceptual
distinction between “exploitation”, that is, the capacity to benefit from existing forms of collective
action, and “exploration”, that is, the capacity of governance to nurture learning and
experimentation (March, 1991; March and Olsen, 2005). In other words, the improvement of the
adaptive capacity of a system seems to be the main objective of an adaptive governance paradigm.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) defines adaptive capacity, as the
ability of a system to adjust to climate change, to mitigate potential damages, to benefit from
opportunities, or to cope with the consequences.
In this study, institutions are viewed as the most important component in assessing the adaptive
capacity of a system. However, developing countries often lack the backbone components of
institutional capacity, namely: (1) the assets, i.e. the knowledge bases and structural conditions for
effective management, (2) the skills, i.e. the quality of institutional and human performance in
exploring, anticipating and dealing with existing and emerging risks, and (3) the capabilities, i.e. the
institutional framework necessary to translate assets and skills into successful policies (Paquet,
2001; Renn, 2005).
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According to Holzmann et al (2003), there are three types of institutional arrangements for dealing
with risk. Firstly, informal arrangements represent the response of individual households to risk by
protecting themselves through informal (family or community) or personal arrangements (self-
protection and self-insurance). Secondly, market-based arrangements offer a range of solutions to
increase the capacity of individual households (including the poor) to manage risk. These solutions,
which are made possible by the use of legally binding contracts, may take different forms, such as
financial assets (cash, bank deposits, bonds and shares), insurance contracts or microfinance.
Thirdly, public arrangements involve a number of solutions, such as social assistance, social
insurance programs, transfers, subsidies, and public works, which a government can provide for
dealing with risks. Public arrangements are relatively scarce in developing countries for budgetary
and other reasons. While informal or market-based arrangements can often handle common or
repetitive risks, they seem to break down when facing a large-scale hazard.
Furthermore, time is particularly critical when matching the institutional component of risk
governance to disasters (Baker and Refsgaard, 2007). While it takes a long period of time (years)
for the appropriate institutions to be established, we note that, in most disasters, there is relatively
little time between the warning about the potentially disastrous event and the event itself. However,
little is known on the adequate design of institutions for disaster regulation. Institutions do vary
significantly across systems.
2.2 An assessment framework of the adaptive capacity of a system
Adaptive capacity is context specific (local) since it varies from one system to another (from
community to community) among social groups and over time (Smit and Wandel, 2006; Yohe and
Tol, 2002). It is critical to determine whether a social group has the capacity to deal with challenges
it may encounter, either through its own internal resources (e.g. infrastructures, solidarity, building
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codes) or through its ability to access external sources of support (e.g. medical assistance, funding).
However, our emphasis on the local characteristic of an adaptive capacity system does not suggest
that local community governance must respond alone to natural disasters, it rather suggests that
adaptive capacity requires local solutions. These local solutions are provided by local governments
and organizations, which have the legitimacy and power to decide on behalf of their locality.
Füssel (2005) developed an assessment framework for defining vulnerability concept by combining
three components: (1) a terminology for describing any vulnerable situation (in terms of the
vulnerable system, the valued attributes of that system, the hazards the system is exposed to, and a
temporal reference); (2) a classification scheme for vulnerability factors according to their scale and
disciplinary domain; and (3) a terminology for vulnerability concepts that is based on the
vulnerability factors included.
Starting from this seminal grid of analysis and existing literature, we develop an assessment
framework of the adaptive capacity of a system (1) which contains six key parameters as follows:
(1) context description, (2) institutions, (3) infrastructures, (4) economic and financial resources, (5)
technology, and (6) information and skills. Such typology indicates the extent of input (e.g. internal
and external resources, formal and informal arrangements, technological level and knowledge) that
the local administrative unit and those responsible for its governance have at their disposal, while
dealing with natural disasters.
Table 1: Key parameters for an assessment framework of the adaptive capacity of a system.
Hence, the availability of critical infrastructures or the use of appropriate technology is likely to
promote an adaptive capacity of the system. Furthermore, information and skills may enhance the
adaptive capacity of a system by improving forecasting.
3 Case study presentation
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Our study has focused on the island of Java, Indonesia, a developing country which has been deeply
affected by a range of disasters in recent years, and has a great “potential” for future disasters. In
particular, we are interested in the October–November 2010 volcanic eruption in the Mt. Merapi
(Figure 1) which was attributed a Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) of 4.
Figure 1: Location of Merapi volcano in central Java.
The system we are interested in is the local organizations around Mt. Merapi, on Java Island. The
potential hazards are volcanic eruptions and lahars. Valued attributes are mainly human lives,
public health, income and infrastructures. The temporal reference is October–November 2010 as
well as the long-term (LT) consequences of volcanic eruptions and rain-triggered lahars.
In the disaster management field, institutions are the main coordinators before, during and after a
crisis. However, they work in association with other governmental and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
3.1 Organizational structure in the face of Mt. Merapi volcano
The Law of the Republic of Indonesia Nr.24/2007 defines objectives of risk mitigation, roles and
responsibilities of government and stakeholders as well as funding sources for disaster management
(Enjolras et al, 2012). According to this law the entire management system is placed under the
supervision of the President of the Republic (Figure 2). Furthermore, the power and legitimacy to
act is given to the National Board for Disaster Management (BNPB), which was established by the
same law. BNPB is represented by local agencies named BPDB (Local Disaster Management
Agency) and located at different institutional scales (Province, Regency, District and Sub-District).
While resources and financial compensations are provided by a top-down approach (down arrows,
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Figure 2), communications for alerts and emergency requests are assured by both top-down and
bottom-up approaches (dashed arrows, Figure 2).
Figure 2: Flow chart showing the institution relationships in the area of Mt. Merapi
Accordingly, the information of volcanic activities obtained from Merapi Volcano Observatory is
transmitted to the Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation (CVGHM) and
regularly reported to local governments (i.e. head of district). In the case of an emergency situation,
the information can be directly reported to the head of district. Thus, the head of district together
with BPBD will coordinate each department involved in the crisis management at regional scale. At
the local scale, head of village together with the head of sub-villages and local organizations, with
the help of army, police, NGOs and volunteer prepare the emergency and evacuation plan (Mei et
al, 2011).
From an organizational perspective, differences in the flow of information and money among
institutions persist beyond what is traditionally the responsibility of governments. One of the
underlying reasons for the formation of NGOs is to enable better participation and coordination of
interested members in the management of volcanic eruptions, as common concern.
During the 2010 Merapi eruptive crisis, the local authorities have well managed the crisis until the
main eruption on the night of November 4th. After the extension of safety zone up to 20 kilometers
from the summit, the local authorities were overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster and the
number of people to be evacuated. Hence, the local governments could no longer use the
contingency planning because it was not prepared to anticipate such a major eruption of Merapi
volcano (Mei et al, 2011).
3.2 Chronological phases of the Mt. Merapi volcanic eruption
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Mt. Merapi volcano eruption in October 2010 has generated voluminous pyroclastic flows, surges,
and tephra-falls at the beginning of the rainy season, deposing more than 150 millions m3 of
volcanic material on its slopes. Moreover, lahars (rain-triggered volcanic mudflows) have occurred
since November 2010, with higher intensity than those after usual eruptions. Three phases
characterize Mt. Merapi volcanic eruption: pre-eruption phase, eruption phase, and post-eruption
phase (Table 2).
Table 2: Chronological events in the eruption phases.
3.2.1 Pre-eruption phase (20 September–25 October, 2010)
The pre-disaster phase was marked by a dramatic increase in all monitored parameters. Based on
these changes, CVGHM raised on 20 September 2010 the alert from level I (normal background
conditions) to level II (increased activity). On 25 October, the alert was raised to its highest level IV
and CVGHM warned that there was a high probability of an unprecedented explosive eruption
(Surono et al, 2012).
3.2.2 Eruption phase (26 October–5 November, 2010)
The initial volcanic eruption of Mt. Merapi exploded on 26 October. This eruption generated an ash
plume that reached 12km altitude, released SO2 emissions, and produced pyroclastic density
currents (PDC’s) that extended 8km down the Kali Gendol and Kali Kuning drainages (Figure 3).
Figure 3: PDCs’ and lahars deposits after the explosive eruptions.
On 4–5 November, the tremor increased again which prompted the decision to extend again the
exclusion zone from 15 to 20km on the southwest and south (Surono et al, 2012). Besides, every
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explosive eruption of Mt. Merapi volcano is followed by frequent rain-triggered lahars, which occur
weeks to years after an eruption. Triggered lahars show the long term impacts of explosive
eruptions.
3.2.3 Post-eruption phase (6 November–30 December, 2010)
On 6 November, tremor amplitude decreased slowly in parallel with decreased explosive activity.
On 14 November the exclusion zone was relaxed from 20 to 15km on the south and western flanks
and to 10km on the less-exposed north and eastern flanks of the volcano.
Over 240 rain-triggered lahars were recorded during the 2010–2011 rainy season (from October
2010 to May 2011), and 42 at the beginning of the 2011–2012 rainy season (from October 2011 to
January 2012) (De Bélizal et al, 2013; Surono et al, 2012). As a consequence of rain-triggered
lahars, 678 houses were damaged, most of them along Kali Putih. Twenty sabo-dams and 12
bridges have been taken away by lahars, and some major roads have been frequently inundated,
such as the main road from Yogyakarta to Magelang and Semarang (Surono et al, 2012).
Furthermore, lahars generated avulsions (sudden shift of the river channel) on the distal slope of
Merapi volcano (Figure 4), potentially creating major disasters on densely populated areas (De
Bélizal et al, 2013).
Figure 4: Formation of the Opak lahar corridor on the distal slope of Merapi.
3.3 Methodology
The methodology of our case study consists of a manual and a computer-based analysis from the
content of a questionnaire (Appendix 1). Our data set includes 18 face-to-face interviews,
conducted in Javanese and other Indonesian languages between January and April 2011. In order to
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control the analysis of the data, we proceed on a three levels analysis: of each question, of each
theme and of all questions.
Our respondents (16 males and 2 females) aged 25 to 60 (average 45 years old) consider volcanic
eruption as the most important hazard related to their environment. Their education level ranges
from primary school to university. The general profile of our respondents (Table 3) shows that they
live in Mt. Merapi and nearby localities. In addition, they hold positions that are related to risk
management process (e.g. Chief of village, planning or rescue staff in local institutions).
Table 3: General profile of the respondents (age, sex, address, work, task, and education).
Our data set is based on a questionnaire including 41 questions. This questionnaire is subdivided
into six themes as follows: (1) the risks of lahars to which the region is exposed (6 questions), (2)
the management of lahars risk (3 questions), (3) the occurrence of a volcanic or lahars disaster (10
questions), (4) the improvement of the financial responses to lahars damages (4 questions), (5) the
decision making process of lahars risk (5 questions) and (6) the projects which encompass
preparation and planning as well as population and stakeholders (13 questions). After entering each
answer in a text file, we used the text analysis software Tropes version 8.1.
4 Results
The assessment framework for the adaptive capacity around Mt. Merapi system shows the
facilitators and barriers elements. The grid of analysis we detailed in section 2 is applied to the 2010
eruption (Table 4) following six key parameters: (1) context description, (2) institutions, (3)
infrastructures, (4) economic and financial resources, (5) technology, and (6) information and skills.
Table 4: The assessment framework of the adaptive capacity around Mt. Merapi system.
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4.1 Context description
Communities living in villages located near to the Merapi’s summit are aware of lahar risk. The risk
of lahar is enhanced due to the high population density around Mt. Merapi, the expansion of
settlements and poor infrastructures. All respondents confirm they have already faced a mudflow
directly (mostly in 2010 and 2011). The text analysis of our respondents’ answers highlights the
critical context in which communities operate (Table 5).
Table 5: The most recurrent “References”, “Verbs” and “Adjectives” in the themes “Early warning and risk monitoring” and “Improvement projects”, as generated by Tropes.
Monitoring and warning systems have been implemented in major rivers around Mt. Merapi, such
as Putih, Gendol (Figure 3). In addition, an emergency plan has been developed to ease evacuation.
However, population awareness does not guarantee a suitable management of the perceived hazard.
One respondent stated that “People live very close to the lahar. People with limited funds do not
want to move from there”.
The observers who are located along every large river, are the first to see the lahar flow and thus to
deploy the alert signal (alert alarm, talkie-walkie or radio) in order to inform the affected population
(e.g. public, local authorities, public departments and sand miners working in the river channel).
The emergency plan around Mt. Merapi consists of: issuing the alert signal, applying the evacuation
plan and rescuing others. CVGHM took several measures to predict lahars occurrence and intensity,
to assess lahars pathways, etc. The alert level (I, II, III or IV) is declared to the public through
BNPB and local governments. For each level, CVGHM gives recommendations of what the people
living around the volcano are supposed to do.
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4.2 Institutions
Coordination among institutions is mainly oriented towards relief operations (e.g. disseminating
information, financial compensation) and repairing damages (e.g. building shelters) resulting from
volcanic eruptions and rain-triggered lahars. However, institutions involved in the evacuation
management should have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.
Our respondents mentioned three categories of institutions (Table 6) as follows: Local Government
(LG), Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and Community Representatives (CR). Furthermore,
respondents underline the presence of International institutions and NGOs, e.g. the Indonesian Red
Crescent.
Table 6: The three categories of institutions acting around Mt. Merapi.
Our respondents find that LG and CR are the most important institutions since they are linked to
other administrative institutions (Regency, Central Government, etc.) and have the legitimacy to
act. In addition, some of our respondents consider that the Indonesian Red Crescent is the most
important institution since it maintains partnerships with other international institutions such as
Denmark Red Cross. Moreover, others chose CSO over LG or CR since they have no bureaucracy
constraints and can provide quick support (money, food) to local inhabitants.
Apart from the central role of LG, the emergency plan depends to a large extent on CSO and CR
with a growing involvement of NGOs and private organizations. In this respect, a respondent
explained that “Cooperation with youth volunteers and community leaders is needed to evacuate
residents (especially children, women and elderly people) and to keep them away from the flood
plains of the river”. However, orders to the public such as evacuation orders are given by BNPB
and local governments, which also organize evacuations.
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When lahar disasters occur, relief is usually provided by a wide variety of institutions, namely:
Regency (30%), Local institutions (villages) (22%), Sub-Regency (16%), Province (10%), Private
companies (10%), Central government (6%) and International institutions (6%). Other stakeholders
involved during the state of emergency (level III and IV) are volcanologists (CVGHM), regional
disaster management agency (RDMA or BPBD) including army, police, health department, public
work department, social department. According to our respondents, the institutions that should first
react when lahar occurs are mainly: neighbors, local authorities (village chief, rescue team,
personalities), Sub-District authorities and Regency. This indicates a participatory approach that is
facilitated by strong social networks and bottom up relationships.
Coordination among institutions constitutes an important social capital for managing risks.
However, a number of limitations persist: bureaucracy, illegal constructions or absence of proof of
property rights for the compensation of victims.
4.3 Infrastructures
The lack of infrastructure facilities (e.g. dams, bridges, public bathing, and shelters) remains a
major concern for Mt. Merapi community. Infrastructure facilities are not adequate to cope with a
large-scale disaster. In the aftermath of 2010 volcanic eruption, large number of bridges and roads
were destroyed, isolating many villages. For the first time, Merapi eruptions resulted in major
disruptions of air traffic in Yogyakarta (e.g. about 2000 flights were canceled).
In order to improve this poor infrastructure, a number of projects have been conducted, especially in
2011. Our respondents provided information about seven projects (Table 5) and indicated their
location. These projects aim to improve the capacity to face future volcanic eruptions, such as
building a temporary shelter, evacuating villages, providing clean water, mapping, reducing
numbers of victims and determining evacuation routes. Improvement projects are co-financed by
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national, and NGOs, such as the Government, the Indonesian Red Crescent, the Denmark Red
Cross, Japan and private bodies as the Indonesian Government cannot bear all the costs on its own.
In this respect, the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works suggests that a total of 16 million USD has
already been invested for lahar recovery at Merapi volcano. BNPB has invested 640,000 USD to
build a new bridge on the Yogyakarta–Semarang highway, in order to prevent flooding by lahars
from the Putih River. Moreover, 10 bridges have been rebuilt in 2011–2012. The new bridges rely
on suspension between consolidated walls on the riverbanks. Moreover, the government plans to
replace and refurbish the water piping in Sleman district for a total of 1.5 million USD, which will
facilitate access to water for about 56,000 people in areas where local wells, springs and irrigation
channels were destroyed by lahars (De Bélizal et al, 2013).
4.4 Economic and financial resources
The lack of economic and financial resources weakens the adaptive capacity at Mt. Merapi. The
availability of financial resources constitutes the most important challenge after an eruption in order
to repair damages (e.g. improvement projects, financial compensation). The financial compensation
process is channeled with a top-down approach as follows: the Regency, the Sub-District, the
village, then to the victims (Figure 2). Moreover, it is critical to have a well-documented knowledge
of the loss. Such knowledge will enable the Indonesian government to allocate resources for the
reconstruction and rehabilitation of areas affected by lahars.
Data from BNPB indicate that a total of 367 people were killed, 277 injured and 410,388 people
were displaced (Surono et al, 2012). Moreover, the 2010–2011 rainy season lahars damaged 860
houses on the distal slope of Merapi including Yogyakarta City, destroyed 14 sabo-dams and 21
bridges, cut the main road from Yogyakarta to Semarang and buried at least 70 ha of land (De
Bélizal et al, 2013).
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A large amount of our respondents (59%) do not have any estimate of the human losses that a lahar
can cause. Besides, 56% of our respondents claim they have an idea of the material losses generated
by lahars, but they could not communicate any precise figures. This material loss, which depends on
the intensity of rainfall, can range from personal loss (e.g. modest furniture), and agricultural land
loss to infrastructural and public facilities loss. In order to estimate the amount of material and
human loss, inhabitants refer to maps which indicate the number of houses located near the river.
However, such estimation reflects a lack of public awareness of both human and material loss.
According to our respondents, financial compensation may take different forms (Table 7). In
addition, financial compensation can be delivered in the form of direct cash funds and basic
requirements (food and clothes).
Table 7: Financial compensation forms after Mt. Merapi disaster.
4.5 Technology
Monitoring and warning systems exist in all rivers that drain the flanks of the Mt. Merapi volcano.
The early warning system around Mt. Merapi is based on the analysis of instrumental and visual
observations. On the 26 October and 4 November eruptions, CVGHM recognized the precursory
activity as signaling that large explosive eruptions were imminent and issued warnings that saved
many thousands of lives.
When heavy rainfall occurs, the ground vibration produces a recognizable signal alerting watchers
of possible lahar activity, and allowing them to issue evacuation orders. Rain-triggered lahar
frequency depends firstly on rainfall intensity, and secondly, on the total amount and duration of
rainfall (Lavigne and Thouret, 2002). This process affects the speed and the effectiveness in
responding to an emergency situation. In fact, risk assessment, for the majority of our respondents
(94%), relies on indicators, such as rainfall level (river water level) and delivered information by
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local residents to the public. These indicators allow them to identify the intensity and the likelihood
of the expected hazard. A respondent stated that flood can happen whenever the rain falls heavily.
Another respondent added that “As an indicator, there is a water level gauge, measured in high and
low river, using a light bulb. If the bulb is broken, it means that the water is high”.
Furthermore, the use of quantitative techniques (e.g. Digital Elevation Model (DEM) analysis,
remote sensing, statistical analysis, numerical codes, analog experiments and dating methods) has
proven to be powerful in understanding impacts from eruptions on landscape evolution, and short-
and long-term erosion of volcanoes and their surroundings (Surono et al, 2012). However, the
effectiveness of such technologies may be decreased by some technical constraints, (e.g. absence of
electricity, seismographs out of order, large-scale eruptions).
4.6 Information and skills
Information and skills at Mt. Merapi are generated by a beneficial cooperation between scientists
and communities by using reliable scenarios and instruments. Communities (e.g. village) have a
self-organization that allows its inhabitants to obtain pertinent information about the volcano
activity and lahars arrival.
In order to improve their early warning systems, some communities (e.g. residents of the Southern
Boyong River) have formed associations to discuss risks generated by lahars and to explain security
measures (e.g. evacuation roads). They organized monitoring system run by local people who
provide regular reports on the general state of the near river (color, depth, velocity, etc.). They send
these observations to people living near the river, and their data is published online (e.g. social
networks), as happened in the 2010 eruption. This self-organization facilitates the dissemination of
warnings among people living in hazard-prone areas before the arrival of a lahar. Hence, maps and
evacuation plans are regularly updated and posted in villages where lahars represent a risk.
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The dissemination of information among institutions and population is provided by a wide variety
of means, persons and localities (Table 8). Respondents confirm being well informed on the safety
measures to be followed when lahars occur. The majority of our respondents (89%) believe in the
correctness of the delivered information. However, we note a number of limitations, such as a
rudimentary quantitative documentary for both human and material loss, a lack of awareness of
public institutions and incompleteness of the delivered information.
Table 8: Means and localities for the dissemination of information, as generated by Tropes.
5 Discussion
The results presented above show that, although number of actions (e.g. infrastructure building,
evacuation simulations) has been undertaken, number of barriers (e.g. lack of facilities, poor
documentation) still persists. More efforts (by local institutions) are needed (e.g. bottom-up
approach, infrastructures, buildings code, etc.) in order to improve the adaptive capacity and, thus,
the adaptive governance at Mt. Merapi system. We provide a discussion centered on risk-taking
attitudes of the inhabitants and the failure of contingency plans.
5.1. Risk-taking attitude of Mt. Merapi inhabitants
Despite their awareness of volcanic eruptions and rain-triggered lahars, Mt. Merapi’s inhabitants
keep living in volcanic eruption areas. They show risk-taking behaviors, in the sense they engage in
behaviors that have the potential to be harmful or dangerous.
Risk-taking attitude are studied by experimental economics results. An experimental investigation
by Abdellaoui et al (2011) concludes that subjects become more risk tolerant to delayed lotteries. In
the context of volcanic eruptions, Bchir and Willinger (2013) suggest that an individual’s
20
environment determines to some extent his risk attitude. These findings suggest that individuals’
preferences are partly shaped by their social, institutional or natural environment. In particular, they
state that poor individuals living in exposed areas are significantly more risk seeking and more
impatient than those living in unexposed areas. Hence, Javanese people who have been living for a
long time in areas where they are threaten by natural hazards are likely to have adapted in various
ways to their hazardous environment. Another explanation of Mt. Merapi inhabitant’s attitude is
well formulated by Maskrey (1989) who argues that the majority of people live in dangerous areas
and unsafe buildings for pragmatic reasons. The available choices are perceived to present greater
threats to survival than the threat posed by natural hazards. Javanese people’s behavior in the face
of volcanic threats is shaped by the complex interaction between perception of risk associated with
volcanic hazards, cultural beliefs and socioeconomic constraints. The need for securing daily
livelihoods prevails over volcanic risk perception while religious beliefs enable people to cope with
the threat by providing alternative explanations at the time of a disaster (Lavigne et al, 2008).
Furthermore, lahars of Merapi volcano bring a valuable resource to communities (e.g. villagers),
which are ready to increase their exposure to hazard by quarrying deposits on lahar corridors. For
twenty years, hundreds of trucks and thousands of workers have traveled daily through areas of high
lahar hazard, because they can earn four times the daily income of a farmer (De Bélizal et al, 2013).
5.2. Contingency plan failure around Mt. Merapi
The 2010 volcanic eruption revealed failures in the contingency plan of Mt. Merapi where short-
term planning is performed by local government. A week after the eruption, local authorities were
overwhelmed by the disaster (Mei et al, 2011). Hence, the crisis management plan was not adequate
to overcome the largest volcanic eruption since 1870s.
21
The coordination among governmental and non-governmental institutions, in regard of information
dissemination around Mt. Merapi, is not constrained by the hierarchical structure (Figure 2), which
leads to an improved reactivity. In contrast, decisions regarding financial compensations are made
by Central Government then channeled down through the hierarchy.
Besides, contingency plan around Mt. Merapi reflects an emergency management (so called
response-based disaster management or emergency response). Findings of our qualitative analysis
highlight a number of barriers, such as lack of appropriate infrastructures, complex interactions
across institutions, dependence on funds from external parties, and rudimentary quantitative
documentation on both human and material loss. This entails a weak adaptive capacity of Mt.
Merapi system. These barriers must be taken into consideration while preparing for future
evacuation and contingency planning in Merapi. Apparently, the community involvement is an ideal
solution to improve the participatory approach (bottom-up), and to minimize the gap between the
government, scientists, NGOs, and other stakeholders.
In the aftermath of the 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts have
produced some successes. A precise mapping of Mt. Merapi area was conducted in January 2011 by
using a radar remote sensor technology called Lidar. World Bank Indonesia, in cooperation with
BNPB and local administrations in Yogyakarta and Central Java, are implementing a green
construction program, which will build new housing for victims displaced by the disaster.
Moreover, the government of Indonesia hosted the fifth Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster
Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) in Yogyakarta. Nevertheless, more efforts are needed to develop
eruption scenarios and to ensure better volcano monitoring.
6 Conclusion
22
This work represents a contribution to interdisciplinary research, in particular the management of
natural disasters. In this respect, literature recognizes the adaptive governance system as being able
to enhance the capacity of institutions to better coordinate between them. Adaptive governance aims
to increase the adaptive capacity of a system by putting learning by experience processes in place.
Within this theoretical framework, we advanced a grid of analysis for the study of natural disasters
by using six key parameters as follows: (1) context description, (2) institutions, (3) infrastructures,
(4) economic and financial resources, (5) technology, and (6) information and skills.
This assessment framework was used to provide insights into the governance system around Mt.
Merapi located in the island of Java, Indonesia. The choice of this case study appears relevant
because the last eruption of Mt. Merapi in Indonesia which lasted from late October until early
December 2010 generated many casualties and a large amount of losses. We were able to perform
surveys with the main actors of the Mt. Merapi rescue system a few months after this major event.
Given the range of disasters that affect Indonesia overtime, the population and the institutions get
prepared to their occurrence. For instance, the monitoring of the volcano could probably save
thousands of lives. Yet, findings of our qualitative analysis show that Mt. Merapi governance
system fails to cope adequately with natural disasters. Although a number of actions have been
undertaken such as a reinforced collaboration between institutions and the implementation of a
contingency plan, a number of barriers such as the lack of appropriate infrastructures, dependence
on funds from external parties, and rudimentary quantitative documentation still persist.
We could identify efforts that local institutions could make to improve the efficiency of their action:
bottom-up approach, creation of infrastructures and buildings regulations. Such measures could
improve the adaptive capacity and, thus, the adaptive governance at Mt. Merapi system.
Despite the generality of our grid of analysis, one must notice that results provided by this study
may be very context-dependent. Any attempt of generalization of the study outcomes should be
understood with care since it has only focused on Mt. Merapi. Moreover, our sample of 18 face-to-
23
face interviews with key actors of the management of Mt. Merapi volcano does not pretend to be
representative of the concerned population. Despite these potential limitations, our results
corroborate other recent studies providing scientific observations of the eruption and its
management (Jenkins et al, 2013; Surono et al 2012). In addition, this paper offers trails for new
research perspectives regarding ways by which the adaptive capacity, and thus the adaptive
governance, of a system can be improved.
Acknowledgements
This study was undertaken with the support of the French National Research Agency within the
project « Laharisk ». The article reflects the authors’ views.
We are grateful to Pr. Budi Prihatminingtyas (Brawijaya University, Malang, Indonesia) for her
help in carrying out the surveys and Pr. Jean-Claude Thourret (Laboratory of « Magmas et
Volcans », University Blaise-Pascal Clermont II, France) for his valuable comments that improved
the manuscript. We wish to thank Alix Hague for the English editing.
24
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Tables Table 1: Key parameters for an assessment framework of the adaptive capacity of a system. Key parameters Parameters explanation 1. Context
description It is intended to show whether or not populations are aware of the risk at stake. It comprises the geographical component (locality), the community (region or population group), the hazard at stake, the valued attributes (human life, properties, and agricultural land) and the time scale (short or long-term consequences).
2. Institutions It consists of detecting the existence of formal and informal arrangements. It consists also of detecting for what purpose institutions exist, and for whose interest they exist, persist, or change. Examples of institutions are: land-use planning and management to prevent settlement in dangerous areas, enforcement of building codes and, enforcement of property right laws.
3. Infrastructures It consists of listing whether or not appropriate infrastructures are available. Such listing may contain: improved engineering for buildings, dams, shelters, hospitals, sanitization facilities or bridges.
4. Economic and financial resources
It indicates whether or not a system is able to cover possible losses from disaster. Among economic and financial resources, we can count: available funds, budgetary situation, compensation, risk-sharing through insurance and reinsurance and other sophisticated financial products (bonds, actions, credits, and derivatives).
5. Technology It indicates the technical side of a system. It consists of the implementation and the use of technology while dealing with hazards, such as warning systems, detection instruments, programs, maps and communication tools.
6. Information and skills
It indicates the knowledge and the capacity level of a system to face future disasters. A key element is that the likelihood of a disaster, i.e. its primary signal, is sufficient to warrant the mobilization of resources (e.g. the precautionary principle).
28
Table 2: Chronological events in the eruption phases.
Warning
level*
Threatened communities living
around Remarks
Pre-eruptive phase
September 20th I to II
10 km radius No human and material loss; Evacuation of tens of thousands of people
October 21th II to III
October 25th III to IV
Volcanic eruption phase
October 26th
IV
10 km radius First explosive eruption, 35 to 40 killed, 22,599 refugees
October 30th 10 km radius Second volcanic eruption
November 3rd 15 km radius Third volcanic eruption, 76,031 refugees
November 4th-5th 20 Km radius Fourth volcanic eruption for 24 continuous hours, 399,403 refugees
Post-eruptive phase
November 6th IV 15-20 km radius Decrease of the explosive activity of the volcano
November 14th IV 10-15-20 km radius
December 3rd III 10-15 km radius
*Volcanic activity is expressed by four warning levels from I to IV: normally active, on guard, prepared, and beware conditions.
29
Table 3: General profile of the respondents (age, sex, address, work, task, and education). Sex Address Institution Task Education M Randusari
argomulyo Cangkringan
Local Intitution office, Agomulyo village
Head section social and management
University
M Lumajang SAR Lumajang Regency Engineer
University
M Jl. Madyogondo Ngeblak Magelang regency
Kesbangpol PB Magelang regency
Head of SAR Magelang
Senior High School
M Curah, Kobo’an, Pronojiwo
Local institution Entrepreneur
Unknown
M Pasrujambe village, Sub-District of Pasrujambe
Local institution
Chief village on Pasrujambe Sub-District
University
M Bulaksumur PSBA UGM
Head of PSBA University
F Kaliurang village Srumbung Magelang regency
Local Government
Head Kaliurang village Srumbung
University
M Jrakah hamlet, kaliurang village
NGO SIBAT (Siaga Bencana Berbasis Masyarakat)
Head of SIBAT kaliurang village
General School
M Njarit, Candipuro Laboratory Semeru Project
Planning Staff Senior High School
M West Kaliurang Yogyakarta
Local institution Retired Senior High School
M Bakesbangpol PB/SATLAK Lumajang Regency
Bakesbangpol PB/SATLAK Lumajang Regency
Control for improvement and expansion
University
F Blongkeng, Ngluwar Local Institution Blongkeng village and management shelter
Secretary of the local Institution
University
M Supit urang, curah cobokan hamlet, Lumajang
Local Authority Head of Kamituwo Hamlet
Primary School
M Pasrujambe village PU staff on Besuksat River, Pasrujambe Sub-District
Flood Information Official and member of rescue team
Senior High School
M Lumajang District Military Command
SAR Trainer Senior High School
M Bronggang suruh Argomulyo
Local institution Head of Bronggang hamlet, Cangkringan
Senior High School
M Mt. Sawur PUMBG / PU Lumajang regency
Staff on Mt. Sawur Senior High School
M Pasrujambe village and Sub-District
Pasrujambe Sub-District Staff on Pasrujambe Sub-District
Senior High School
30
Table 4: The assessment framework of the adaptive capacity around Mt. Merapi system.
Key parameters Facilitators to an adaptive capacity around Mt. Merapi
system
Barriers to an adaptive capacity around Mt. Merapi system
1. Context description
- Well-defined system. - Perception of volcanic eruption
as a potential risk.
- Complex interactions across institutions of different scales (e.g. local institutions).
- Complex, uncertain and ambiguous risk.
2. Institutions - Presence of International institutions (e.g. Indonesian Red Crescent).
- Coordination among institutions especially when disasters occur.
- CSO provide quick support to local inhabitants.
- Coordination among institutions for the dissemination of information.
- Training of disaster management units (national and local levels).
- Social networks among the population.
- Presence of bureaucracy in LG. - Lack of respect for law
enforcement. - Limitation of CSO to project and
short-term activities. - Coordination efforts among
institutions are oriented towards relief (emergency management).
- Time wasting in coordinating different institutions.
- Absence of continuous contact between institutions.
- Population relies on informal local networks (neighbors) for rescue.
3. Infrastructures - Infrastructural projects have been conducted (e.g. build temporary shelters, provide clean water, and determine evacuation routes).
- Lack of adequate infrastructure (e.g. dams, bridges, soil protection, roads, river excavator, public bathing, shelters).
4. Economic and financial resources
- Financial compensation is provided by a wide range of institutions.
- Financial compensation can take different forms.
- Absence of sophisticated financial coverage, such as bonds.
- Time wasting in delivering the compensation.
- Dependence on funds from external parties.
- Limited commercial, industrial and agricultural activities.
5. Technology - Monitoring and warning systems exist in all rivers that drain the Mt. Merapi volcano.
- Mapping using GPS.
- Electric shortage. - Seismograph out of order. - Lack of advanced technology.
6. Information
and skills - Information dissemination with
a variety of means and localities. - Preparation of evacuation maps
and emergency simulations. - Education of disaster
management.
- Emergency plan depends to a large extent on CSO and CR.
- Lack of public awareness in reacting to emergency simulations.
- Rudimentary quantitative documentation.
- Primitive indicators for lahars prediction (water level).
31
Table 5: The most recurrent “References”, “Verbs” and “Adjectives” in the themes “Early warning and risk monitoring” and “Improvement proje cts”, as generated by Tropes. “Early warning and risk monitoring”
theme “Improvement projects” theme
References - Crisis: Lahar (60), Volcano (19), River (25), Calamity (22), Alarm (20).
- Dates: 2010 (10), 2011 (9). - Locations: Village (17), Merapi (14),
Area (10). - Communication & Medias: Information
(14), Guard (8), Instruction (4). - Social Groups: People (12), Leader
(11), Refugee (7) and Inhabitant (5).
- Locations: Villages (36), District (5), Location (3).
- Crisis: Calamity (9), Victim (8), Emergency (4), Risk (3).
- Health, Life & Casualties: House (16), Health (3).
- Business & Industry: Economy (3), Electricity (3), Cost (5), Benefit (10).
Verbs - Verbs of state: to Be (50), to Know (5), to Happen (4).
- Verbs of action: to Face (18), to Evacuate (8), to Announce (6).
- Verbs of state: to Be (47), to Have (11).
- Verbs of action: to Build (5), to Support (5).
Adjectives - Warning (5), Dangerous (4), Public (4), Local (7), Urgent (5).
- Temporary (19), Public (6), Local (3), Urgent (3).
Numbers in brackets indicate number of occurrences. Table 6: The three categories of institutions acting around Mt. Merapi.
Institutions Examples 1. Local Governments (LG) Regency, District & Sub-District, Local institutions,
Police & army, Department of public work, Department of health.
2. Civil Society Organizations (CSO) Rescue team, Private companies. 3. Community Representatives (CR) Village chief.
Table 7: Financial compensation forms after Mt. Merapi disaster. Respondents percentage Reserve funds devoted to cases of emergency 46% Solidarity funds 29% Donations 21% Individual insurance policies 4%
Table 8: Means and localities for the dissemination of information, as generated by Tropes.
Dissemination of information Examples Means Public meetings (17), Radio (15), Television (14), Evacuation
simulation (13), Press (12), Posters (11). Localities Public places (15), Mosques (12), Schools, Work places,
Police stations, Houses (11), Health centers (9) and Associations (sport, politics) (5).
32
Figures Figure 1: Location of Merapi volcano in central Java.
Source: Auberta et al. (2000). White triangles represent active volcanoes and black triangles denote Merapi volcano.
33
Figure 2: Flow chart showing the institution relationships in the area of Mt. Merapi. BNPB : Badan Nasional Bencana Daerah (National Disaster Management Agency) BPBD : Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (Local Disaster Management Agency) : Flow of money : Flow of information
Central Government
Regional Government
Local Government
Civil Society organizations
Community Representatives
International organizations
Indonesian Red Crescent
Research centers
Foreign countries
Press
President Republic of Indonesia
Chief of BNPB (Minister level)
Chief of BPBD (Provincial level)
Chief of BPBD (Regency level)
Chief of BPBD (District level)
Chief of BPBD (Sub-District level)
Citizens (Community)
34
Figure 3: PDCs’ and lahars deposits after the explosive eruptions.
Source: De Bélizal et al. (2013).
35
Figure 4: Formation of the Opak lahar corridor on the distal slope of Merapi.
Source: De Bélizal et al. (2013).
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DR n°2013 - 01: Estelle MIDLER, Charles FIGUIÈRES, Marc WILLINGER
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DR n°2013 - 02: Charles FIGUIÈRES, Ngo Van LONGY, Mabel TIDBALL
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DR n°2013 - 03: Agathe ROUAIX , Charles FIGUIÈRES, Marc WILLINGER
« The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment» Do the poor need Robin Hood or the Sheriff of Nottingham? »
DR n°2013 - 04: Mohamed ALI BCHIR, Marc WILLINGER
«Does the exposure to natural hazards affect risk and time preferences? Some insights from a field experiment in Perú. »
DR n°2013 - 05: Magali JAOUL-GRAMMARE, Brice MAGDALOU
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« Partial enclosure of the commons » DR n°2013 - 08: Marc WILLINGER, Mohamed ALI BCHIR, Carine HEITZ
« Risk and time preferences under the threat of background risk: a case-study of lahars risk in central Java. »
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Contact :
Stéphane MUSSARD : mussard@lameta.univ-montp1.fr
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