american lessons learned – european future …

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AMERICAN LESSONS LEARNED – EUROPEAN FUTURE RETHOUGHT

Assist. Prof. Āorđe Gardašević * UDK: 342.5(73:4) 323.2:340.5 Izvorni znanstveni rad Primljeno: lipanj 2015.

The most notable feature of the notion of states of emergency is the assumption of their unpredictability. As such, it has been both normatively and positively deeply embedded in constitutional thought and practice to this day. However, notwithstanding its unavoidable advantages, I try to claim that it represents a so-mewhat outdated concept that stands in opposition to the normative development of constitutions in general, and more specifically to the development of the notion of fundamental rights and freedoms. Taking the American history of the evolution of fundamental (constitutional) rights and freedoms as the starting point, I focus on two comparative examples (France and Croatia) which offer some emergency experiences, but which both belong to the period well before these two countries actually started to construe their own constitutional vision of fundamental rights and freedoms (from 1971 and 1999, respectively). My central argument is that the French Constitutional Council and the Croatian Constitutional Court have since then developed a significant body of case-law which must be taken into account when evaluating contemporary constitutional limitations of emergency measures.

Keywords: States of Emergency, crisis, emergency, constitutional review, Fun-damental Rights and Freedoms

I. THE UNPREDICTABILITY OF CRISES AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The long history of political and constitutional thought related to states of emergency seems to constantly confirm one rather crucial conclusion: that

* ĀorđeGardašević,Ph.D.,AssistantProfessor,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofZa-greb,TrgmaršalaTita14,Zagreb;[email protected]

Ā. Gardašević: American Lessons Learned – European Future Rethought62

crisisinitselfcannotalwaysbeproperlyanticipated.Asaresult,legalregulati-on,seeingasitpertainstoboththecausesandconsequencesofemergencies,is facedwith strong conceptual limitations. This approach is by nomeansacontemporaryphenomenonbecause itcanbefoundasearlyaswithsuchclassicalauthorsasJ.Locke1,J.J.Rousseau2,A.Hamilton3,C.Schmitt4 and C.L.Rossiter5tonameafew.Atthesametime,theinfluenceofthislineofreasoningisclearlyvisibletothisdaywithmodernwriterswhotendtocha-racterize,forexample,themodern“terroristthreat”assomethingessentiallynew,astateof“suigeneris”originwhich,forinstance,canbequalifiedneitherasa“war”nora“crime”,consequently requiringtheadoptionofnewtoolsofresponseunrestrainedbyprevioushistoricalexperiencesandconstitutionallimitations,andwhichtoooftenleadstotheadoptionofsomesortof“extra-legalmodels”,orresultsinvariousattemptsofinterpretingtheconstitutionasaflexibledocumentsubjectprimarilytopoliticalinterpretations.6 It must be admitted,however,thatconstitutionaltheoryinthatrespectisnotcompletelyisolatedinitsreasoning,sinceitistruethatvariouscomparativeconstitutionalarrangements also follow the same linewhendefining emergencies inquite

1 See:Locke,J.,The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, 12thed.,London,Rivington,1824,Vol.4.,ChapterXIV:OfPrerogative,par.159,160.Availableat:http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/763,March26th 2014.

2 See:Rousseau,J. J.,The Social Contract,NewYork,HafnerPublishingCompany,1951,BookIV,ChapterVI:OftheDictatorship,p.110.

3 See:FederalistNo.23(A.Hamilton),The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union,December18,1787.

4 See:Schmitt,C.,Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty,Chica-go,UniversityofChicagoPress,2005,pp.6–7.Ontheotherhand, forexam-ple,see:Machiavelli,N.,The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, tr. from Italian byChristianE.Detmold,Boston, J.R.Osgood andcompany,1882,pp.170–171.

5 See:Rossiter,C.L.,Constitutional Dictatorship – Crisis Government in the Modern De-mocracies,Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,1948,p.302.

6 Seegenerally:Ackerman,B.,Before the Next Attack – Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism,NewHaven&London,YaleUniversityPress,2006;Ackerman,B.,The Emergency Constitution,YaleLawJournal,no.5,Vol.113,2004,pp.1029–1091;Posner,E.A.andVermeule,A.,Terror in the Balance – Security, Liberty and the Courts,NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,2007;Posner,R.A.,Not a Suicide Pact – the Constitution in a Time of National Emergency,NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,2006;Yoo,J.,The Powers of War and Peace – the Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11,ChicagoandLondon,TheUniversityofChicagoPress,2006;Gross,O.andNíAoláin,F.,Law in Times of Crisis – Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice,NewYork,CambridgeUniversityPress,2006.

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broadnormativecategories.Infact,theusualapproachtoconstitutionaldefi-nitionsofemergencies,apartfromtheindispensableinvocationofthenotionof“war”,oftenusesclassificationswhich,inageneralattempttorespondtothe need of protection of the state and social order facing a serious and immi-nentthreat,endupincategorieswhichcannotbepreciselydefined.Assuch,itseems that broad definitions of emergencies necessarily operate as standards.7

Ontheotherhand,itseemsthatrelyingupon“standards”doesnotcom-pletelytakeintoaccountthefactthatmodernconstitutionaldocumentsareno longer pure political proclamations of social needs and desires they may havebeenatthedawnofconstitutionalisminthelate18th century. Throu-ghouthistory,constitutionshaveevolvedintolegalsourceswhichhaveasolidbindingforceupontheactorstheyaddress,includingtheprincipallawmakers(i.e. legislativebodies)themselves,whichisprobablybestseenwhenexami-ningtheevolutionofthegeneralnotionof“rightsandliberties”.Sincethisis essentially anormative,butalsoa comparative claim, someclarificationsthereof should be presented here.

Onanormativelevel,theessentialideamaybesummarizedthroughtheargument that, in their evolution, constitutional “rights and liberties” havegenerallytendedtoacquireadistinctivequalificationofbeingnot justany,butrather“basic”or“fundamental”rightsandliberties.Assuch,rightsarenotonlyconceptuallydirectedtotheprotectionofspecific,particularlyimportantinterests,thosethataredifferentfromtheinterestsprotectedby“ordinary”orlegislativelyconferredrights,buttheyalsoaimtobeprotectedonastrictconstitutional level.8Accordingly,twootherimportantfeaturesofsuchrights

7 See:Gross,O.andNíAoláin,F.,Law in Times of Crisis – Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice,op. cit.,p.45.

8 Fortheissueofahigherleveloflegalvalidityofconstitutionalrights,astheyarerelatedtoother“ordinary”,legallyconferredrights,see:Rivers,J.,A Theory of Con-stitutional Rights and the British Constitution,in:Alexy,R.,A Theory of Constitutional Rights,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2002,p.xix.Similarly,M.KonvitzstatesthatintheAmericanexampletheconstitutionalinterpretationhasproduceda“…principlethattheConstitution…containsahierarchyofvalues,someofwhicharerecognized as “fundamental” and that “…whatwehave is settled constitutionaldoctrine that there is, indeed…ahierarchyof rights, and that some rightsmustreceivemorevigilanceandprotection thanothers.”See:Konvitz,M.R.,Funda-mental Rights – History of Constitutional Doctrine,NewBrunswick(U.S.A.)andLon-don(U.K),TransactionPublishers/RutgersUniversity,2001,pp.13and17.Theconcept of a hierarchically supreme position of fundamental rights is also accepted withcertainFrenchauthors.See:Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,4e


must also be observed.The first one is a kindof “emancipation” from theparliamentarymajorityruleor,toputitotherwise,arequestthatfundamentalrightsberegulatedonlyonthehighestlevelofpoliticalandsocialconsensus,i.e.inabindingconstitutionaldocumentwhichitselfrequiresspecialprocedu-resandmajoritiestobeamended.Thesecondfeatureisarequestfortrueandefficient legalprotection,whichistypicallyworkedoutthroughthe judicial(constitutional)reviewmechanism,andwhichitselfbecomesnormativelyim-portantwhenitsatisfiestherequestthatfundamentalrightsshouldbeprotec-tednotthroughordinary,butratherastrictertypeofjudicialscrutiny.9

Historically,fundamentalrightsandlibertiesintheirfullcapacitydonotappear at the very moment of their incorporation into relevant legal docu-ments.Onthecontrary,acomparativeperspectiverevealsthatfundamentalrightshavebeenmarkedbyalongandnormativelyprogressivehistoricalpro-cessofdevelopmentwhichincludesseveralphases.Atfirst,rightsandlibertieswereprimarilyenvisagedasphilosophical,moralandsocialaspirationswhich,atonepointinhistory,werealsopoliticallyproclaimed.10 This phase is clearly expressedthroughdocumentssuchastheAmericanDeclarationofIndepen-denceof1776andtheFrenchDeclarationof1789.Thesecondphasecomeswiththeactualinclusionofrightsintolegalsystemsbywhichtheyceasetore-present only certain political and social concepts and appear as real subjective

édition,Paris,ÉditionsDalloz,2007,p.92.Thesamein:Feldman,D.,Civil Liber-ties and Human Rights in England and Wales,2nded.,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2002,p.5.

9 Particularelementsofthedefinitionareinsuchawayintertwinedthatitcanbeconcluded that a formal condition of a constitutional level of protection of rights mustnecessarilybecombinedwiththefulfillmentofthe judicialreviewrequest.Onlybysatisfyingbothelements,wemayarguethataproperemancipationfromtheparliamentarymajorityrulehasbeenachieved.See:Allan,T.R.S.,Law, Lib-erty, and Justice – The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism,Oxford,ClarendonPress,1994,pp.143–144.Onacomparableuseoftheseelements,seealso:Favo-reu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,p.85;Starck,C.,Constitutional Definition and Protection of Rights and Freedoms,in:Starck,C.(ed.),Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law according to the German Basic Law,Baden-Baden,No-mosVerlagsgesellschaft,1987,p.24.

10 Inthissense,theevolutionofthenotionofrightsandlibertiesisreflectedinbothdoctrinalandpoliticaldevelopmentsandcanbefoundwithanumberofclassicalauthors(J.Locke,Ch.L.Montesquieu,J.J.Rousseau,Voltaire,J.R.d’Alembert,M.deCondorcet,Th.Paineetc.).Onthis,see:Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,pp.19–23;Colliard,C-A.andLetteron,R.,Libertés publiques,8eédition,Paris,ÉditionsDalloz,2005,pp.19–46.

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rightsaddressedtowardsstatebodies,butforalongtimeduringtheclassicalliberalismperiodonlythroughlegislativeregulation.Itisonlywiththethirdphase,andmostly inthesecondpartof the20thcentury, thatrights,alongwiththerecognitionofthelegallybindingforceofaconstitution,acquiredatrue and effective constitutional meaning.

Fromthatpointofview,theexperiencesoftheUnitedStatessurelydeser-ve primacy because the process of development of rights as briefly described herefirststartedinthatcountry.TheAmericanexampleissomewhatspecificbecausetheoriginalversionoftheUSConstitutioncontainedonlyafewgu-arantees of individual rights and freedoms11,withthefirstsignificantturningpointfollowingshortlyafterwardswiththeenactmentoftheBillofRightsin1791,andtheintroductionofthejudicialreviewmechanism,affirmedinthefamouscaseofMarburyv.Madison.12Butnotwithstandingthefactthatthesetwopreconditionsforthedefinitionoffundamentalrightswerethusfulfilledveryearly,arealstepforwardoccurredonlylater,althoughstillprecedingtherestoftheworld.13IntheAmericanparadigm,thedecisivehistoricalpointofthefundamentalrightsdevelopmentwastheperiodaftertheCivilWarandthe enactment of the 14thAmendmenttotheUSConstitution.Theessenti-al relationshipbetweenthe14thAmendmentandfundamental rights intheAmericanconstitutionalsystemarosefromtheDueProcessClause,accordingtowhichnostateshall“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”.Overtime,itwasrecognizedthattherewasaneedtointerpretthenotionof“liberty”referredtointheclauseand,accordingly,toresolvetheissueofwhethersucha“liberty”alsopertainedtoindividualrightsenumera-tedinthefirsttenamendments(BillofRights),whichboundtheFederation,butnotthestates.Thisway,alonglastingprocessofso-called“incorporation”ofthefirsttenamendmentscommenced:followingthelogicthatthroughthe

11 Onindividual,particularguaranteesofrightsandfreedomsenumeratedintheori-ginaltextoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica(prohibitionsonthebillofattainder,expostfactolaws,lawsimpairingtheobligationofcontracts,sus-pensionofhabeascorpus),amongothersources,see:Nowak,J.E.,Rotunda,R.D.andYoung,J.N.,Constitutional Law,3rdedition,St.Paul.,Minn.,WestPublishingCo.,1986,pp.314–315.

12 Marburyv.Madison,5U.S.(Cranch1)137(1803).13 However,itshouldbenotedthat,forinstance,M.Konvitzpointsoutthatthefirst

practical steps in the evolution of fundamental rights concepts could be observed alreadywithJ.MadisonandintheopinionofthejudgeB.Washington,formulatedinthecaseofCorfieldv.Coryellin1823.Onthis,see:Konvitz,M.R.,Fundamental Rights – History of Constitutional Doctrine,op. cit.,pp.8–10.


DueProcessClause particular rights and freedoms contained in theBill ofRightscouldbeapplieddirectlytothestates,meaningthattheyareinsuchaway“incorporated”,itwasnormativelyacceptedthatthiscouldrelateonlytothoserightsthatareinacertainway“fundamental”,orsuchasthey“…repre-sented the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty…principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”.14

Apart from the process of incorporation, it should also be stressed thatthedecisiveadvancementintheprotectionofrightsintheAmericanconsti-tutionalschemecamewiththedistinctionbetweenvariouspossiblelevelsofjudicialreview,which,inshort,resultedwithtwobasictests:the“rationality”review and the “strict scrutiny” review.The latter category, as a formof astrongerjudicialreviewtest,atthesametimerepresentsthebasicparameterinqualifyingthefundamentalrights,eventhoughitsapplicationisnotmerelyboundto them,but isalso related to theassessmentofmeasuresbywhichparticular“suspectclassifications”ofsubjectsareintroduced.15

14 Palkov.Connecticut,302U.S.319,325(1937).Also,theexplanationofthenoti-onof“fundamental”wasfirstofferedinthecaseofGitlowv.NewYorkin1925.See:Gitlowv.NewYork,260U.S.652(1925).Onthis,seealso:Konvitz,M.R.,Fundamental Rights – History of Constitutional Doctrine,op. cit.,pp.11–13.Ontheprocessof“incorporation”ofparticularrightsandfreedomsfromtheBillofRightsthrough the 14thAmendmentandontheresultingnotionof“fundamental”rights,seealso:Nowak,J.E.,Rotunda,R.D.andYoung,J.N.,Constitutional Law,op. cit.,pp.361–372;Stone,G.R.,Seidman,L.M.,Sunstein,C.R.andTushnet,M.V.,Constitutional Law,4thed.,NewYork,AspenLaw&Business,2001,pp.702–710;Sullivan,K.M.andGunther,G.,Constitutional Law,14thedition,NewYork,Foun-dationPress,2001,pp.433–450.

15 Inthesenseofadirectrelationshipbetweenfundamentalrightsandstrictscrutiny,M.Konvitzstatesthefollowing:“Itisthistestofstrictscrutinythatgivesadvanta-ge to the fundamental rights as distinguished from claims that are not fundamental rights.”See:Konvitz,M.R.,Fundamental Rights – History of Constitutional Doctrine,op. cit., p. 17. For the same conclusion, see also:Killian, J.H.,Costello,G. A.,Thomas,K.R.(eds.),The Constitution of the United States of America – Analysis and Interpretation,Washington,Congressional Research Service, Library ofCongress,2004(suppl.2004and2006),p.1763.Fromthepracticalpointofview,thestrictscrutinytestisthuslinkedtoboththeDueProcessClauseandtheEqualProtectionoftheLawsClauseoftheUSConstitution.Inbothcases,themethodologyappliedbythecourtsisbasicallydirectedtowardstheassessmentofwhetheraparticularactwhichplacesrestrictionsuponfundamentalrightsandfreedoms,orwhichin-troduces“suspect”classificationsorclassificationspertainingtotheenjoymentoffundamentalrightsandfreedoms,isnecessaryforthefurtheranceofaparticularoverriding/compellingstate interest.Atthesametime,thegovernmentbearstheburdenofprooftojustifythemeasure,i.e.todefendtheconstitutionalityofalaw.

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WhensummarizingtheserathershortobservationsrelatedtothenotionoffundamentalrightsingeneraltheoreticalperspectiveandinthespecificAmeri-canperspective,onemightderivethreecrucialconclusions:first,thatthroughhistory rights and liberties actually did achievethequalityofconstitutionallybindingcategories;second,thattheyachievedsuchastatusonlyin the developed 20th century16;andthird,thatitwasdoneneitherbylegislativenorexecutivebodies,butratherbycourts,andprincipallysothroughtheinventionofspecial“tests”ofjudicialreview.17

It seems clear that these conclusions stand in a normative opposition to principal historically embedded assumptions about emergencies, namely theirpreviously mentioned presumption of unpredictability and an additional (and re-sulting)ideathateverythingshouldbesomehowlefttothediscretionary power of regulation by the executive.Letmesaysomethingaboutallofthesethreedi-mensions of the problem.

Asforthepresumption of unpredictability,evenifoneacceptsthatcauses of emergenciesmaynotalwaysbeproperlyanticipatedorregulatedinadvance,there is no valid reason to assume that the same can be said generally of their consequences. Since, contrary to earlier historical periods, contemporary legal

Contrarytothat,wherethereisalegislativeorotheractwhichdoesnotregulatethedomainoffundamentalrightsandfreedoms(ordoesnotintroduce“suspect”classifications),thecourtsapplyalessrigidtestreferredtoastherationalityreview.Insubstance,therationalityreviewconsistsofanassessmentofwhetherthereisarationalbasisforconcludingthat,throughenactmentofsuchactswhichrestrictrightsandfreedoms,thegovernmentwantedtopursueaparticularlegitimateaim.Accordingly,theburdenofproofhereisonthesideoftheoneclaimingtheuncon-stitutionalityofalaw,whilethelawitselfispresumedconstitutional. The general overviewoftherationalityandstrictscrutinytestsinthisplaceisderivedfromthefollowing sources:Nowak, J.E.,Rotunda,R.D. andYoung, J.N.,Constitutional Law,op. cit.;Stone,G.R.,Seidman,L.M.,Sunstein,C.R.andTushnet,M.V.,Con-stitutional Law,op. cit.;Sullivan,K.M.andGunther,G.,Constitutional Law,op. cit.

16 Accordingly, it seems that the American doctrine reached a consensus on theconclusionthatthedecisiveturningpointinestablishingthestrictscrutinyreviewwasintroducedinthefamousfootnotefourbythejusticeH.F.Stone,addedtotheopinioninthecaseofUnitedStatesv.CaroleneProductsCo.in1938.See:UnitedStatesv.CaroleneProductsCo.,304U.S.144(1938).However,someinitialtracesofmorerigorousformsofreviewcanalreadybefoundshortlyaftertheFirstWorldWar(see:Abramsv.UnitedStates,250U.S.616(1919)).Onthis,see:Konvitz,M.R.,Fundamental Rights – History of Constitutional Doctrine,op. cit.,pp.16–17.

17 Onacomparativesideofthestory,theFrenchandCroatianexamplesrevealsigni-ficantconceptualsimilaritiestotheAmericanexperience.Ontheseexamples,seethefollowingtext.


systemsare“filled”withjudiciallyenforceable“constitutional”or“fundamen-tal”rightsandfreedoms,itseemsthatthereisquiteaplausiblereasontoarguethatconsequencesofcrises(emergencymeasures)nowadayshavetodealwithexactlysuchrightsandhavetotakeintoaccounttheirspecial(constitutional)status and their special (judicial) protection.18

Astothespecialemergencyposition of the executive,itisnotcompletelyclearwhyitshouldhavecompletecrisispredominanceoverthecourts.Onceaga-in,theAmericanexampleinthissenserevealsanextremepotentialbecauseitshowsthatevenincaseswherenofull-blownemergencyregimehasbeendeclared (i.e. the suspension of the habeas corpusprivilege)andwhereatleastnominallyallthegovernmentalbranchesareincludedintotheconflict,thereisstillenoughroomtoargueaboutpossiblerelativeadvantagesoftheexecu-tiveandcourts.Theargumentsputforwardbydifferentauthorsrepresentingopposingpositionsinthisrespectdependonnumerousfactors,including,forinstance,theoverallnormativeattitudetowardshistoricalemergencyexperi-ences19,relevant,butoftenopposingprecedents20,particularadvantagesofthe

18 Inthatsense,evenifinprevioushistoricalperiodstheexecutiveinitsemergencyroleofthelegislator(i.e.,asagenerallaw-makinginstitution)wasabletodealwithrights and liberties just as easily as it could have generally been done by parliaments in“ordinarytimes”,nowadaysitisfacedwithadditionalobstaclesarisingfromtheconstitutionalstatusofrights,whichisalsofacingtheregularparliamentarymajo-rity-rule.

19 Thus,forexample,seeexplanationsontwodifferingviews(“politicalandconstitu-tionalfailure”and“politicalandconstitutionalsuccess”)onhistorywhichconsequ-entlyledtotheadoptionofeither“civillibertarianism”orthe“deferential”view,in:Posner,E.A.andVermeule,A.,Terror in the Balance – Security, Liberty and the Courts,op. cit.,pp.3–4.WhilePosnerandVermeuleaffirmthedeferentialviewexplainingthatthroughouthistoryitwassuccessful,othersargueinthedirectionofcriticismofemergency“overreactions”andclaimthatitlaterledtoregret.Inthiscontext,forexample,see:Stone,G.R.,War Fever,MissouriLawReview,Vol.69,2004,pp.1131–1132;Stone,G.R.,Perilous Rimes – Free Speech in Wartime (From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism),NewYork,W.W.Norton&Comp.Inc.,2004,pp.12–14;Cole,D.,No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and Constitutional Constraint,University ofChicago LawReview,Vol. 75,2008,p.1329.Seealso:Cole,D.,The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,HarvardCivilRights-CivilLibertiesLawReview,Vol.38,No.1,2003,pp.1–30.

20 Intermsoftherelevanthistoricalcase-lawoftheUSSupremeCourt,theseprece-dentsmostoftenincludeargumentsderivedfromthefollowingcases:UnitedStatesv.Curtiss-WrightExportCorp.,299U.S.304(1936),YoungstownSheet&TubeCo. v. Sawyer, 343U.S. 579 (1952), Ex parteMilligan, 71U.S. 2 (1866) and

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executive21 or disadvantages of courts22.Amongsuchargumentsarethat,whenitcomestoemergencies,constitutionalinterpretationsmustbe“flexible”andtake into account the “Hamiltonian” logicof inherent executivepowers, aswellasunspecifiedjudicialpowers23,thatlegislativebranchinemergencieshasalso usually played a deferential role24andsoon.However,itseemsevident

Korematsuv.UnitedStates,323U.S.214(1944).Anexcellentoverviewoftheuseoftheseprecedentsbyvariousopposingapproaches(the“Milliganthesis”andthe“Crisisthesis”)andconsequentadditionalargumentsthereof(e.g.invocationof judicialdeferenceasexplainedbyinterpretationsof“warpowers”constitutio-nallygiventopoliticalbranchesofgovernment,advantagesofexpertiseofpoliticalbranchestodealwithemergencies,relianceuponthe“politicalquestionsdoctrine”)isgivenin:Epstein,L.,Ho,D.E.,King,G.andSegal,J.A.,The Supreme Court during Crisis: How War Affects only Non-War Cases,NewYorkUniversityLawReview,Vol.80,2005,pp.1–116.

21 SeetheargumentsfurtheredbyA.Hamiltonin:FederalistNo.70(A.Hamilton),The Executive Department Further Considered,March18,1788;FederalistNo.74(A.Hamilton),The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive,March25,1788.

22 See,forexample,theargumentputforwardbyR.Posner,E.PosnerandA.Verme-ulethat,basically,judgesarenotexpertsinnationalsecuritymatters,in:Posner,R.A.,Not a Suicide Pact – the Constitution in a Time of National Emergency,op. cit.,pp.9and35;Posner,E.A.andVermeule,A.,Terror in the Balance – Security, Liberty and the Courts, op. cit.,p.49.However,one shouldalsonote theopposing “civillibertarian”argumentsstressedbyG.StoneandD.Colethat,forexample:courtshave the advantage of not being politically accountable and as such are not under thepressureofthemomenttoactquicklyanddecisively,asitisexpectedfromthepoliticalbranches;thatcourtshaveanadvantageovertheotherbranchesbecausethey“…assessthelegalityofmeasureslongaftertheyhavebeenadopted(which)meansthatcourtsmaybringmoreperspectivetothequestionthanthoseactingin themidst of the emergency”; that “…the fact that legal decisionsmust offerastatementofreasonsthatthenbindsfuturecasescontributestothejudiciary’sabilitytoexertcontroloverthenextemergency”;thatcase-law“…inthelongrun…establish[es]principlesthatarecriticaltocheckingfuturegovernmentabuse”;andthat“…theformalitiesofthejudicialprocessmandatethecreationofanofficialrecordthatmayfacilitatereachingajustresult”and“…maymakesubsequentasse-ssments,beyondtheheatofthemoment,morereliable”.Onthis,see:Stone,G.R.,National Security v. Civil Liberties,CaliforniaLawReview,Vol.95,2007,p.2209;Cole,D.,Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis,MichiganLawReview,Vol.101,2002-2003,pp.2575–2577.

23 See:Yoo,J.,The Powers of War and Peace – the Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11,op. cit.,pp.11and18.Itseemsthatthe“executiveunilateralists”particularlyfavourtheargumentoninherentpowersastheyderivefromArticleIIoftheUSConstitutionandwhichwasfirstarticulatedbyA.Hamilton.

24 Onthis,forexample,see:Posner,E.A.andVermeule,A.,Terror in the Balance – Se-curity, Liberty and the Courts,op. cit.,p.47.


thatinthecontemporaryAmericanexperiencesrelatedtothe“WaronTerror”itwasaffirmedthatcourts really do have a significant role and that rights as such cannot be simply rejected asobstaclestoeffectiveexecutive“warmaking”.25Addi-tionally,despitetheseratherseriousdisagreementsinAmericantheory(andpracticeaswell),Ibelieveitsdiscoursemightalsobeinspiringforothercoun-triesexaminedhere,notwithstandingtheirdifferencesasregardstheconcreteroles played by their (constitutional) courts in emergencies.26

Andastothehistorical perspective,twoseparateargumentsmaybemade.Asithasalreadybeenshown,historyrevealsthatthecourtsreallyhaveplayedasignificant,ifnotdecisive,roleinthedevelopmentofrightsandthatithashappenedonlyinthelastfewdecades.However,evenifthisatthesametimedoesnotdirectly support theclaimthat thecourts shouldhaveexactly thesameroleasregardsrightsinthespecialcontextofemergencies,thereisstillsolidgroundtoarguethattheyindeedmighthavesucharolewhich,additio-nally,mightinfactbeeffectiveandquitesupportiveofrights.27

25 ThiswasrecognizedintheprincipalcaseIamusingheretoillustratetheproblemofdetention(Hamdiv.Rumsfeld),butthejudicialrolewasalsoaffirmedinotherpost-9/11USSupremeCourtcasesaswell(Rasulv.Bush,Hamdanv.RumsfeldandBoumedienev.Bush).

26 Thus,bothinFranceandCroatiathe(constitutional)courtsperformingthefuncti-onof judicial reviewof laws reallydohave an emergency function, although inFranceitisofaratherlimitedscopeandinCroatiaitis,atleastnominally,envi-sagedasafulltypeofreview.Andthefactthatinthesetwocountriesthecrisisjudicial reviewdoesexistmakesthemtheoreticallycomparabletothepreviouslydescribedAmericandiscourseonthoseemergencieswhicharenotqualifiedbythesuspensionofthehabeascorpusprivilege,butratherassituationswhereparticularattitudestowardsthepracticalroleandimpactofcourtsmaybeadvanced.Howe-ver,inanattempttomakerelevantcomparisons,Iamnotcoveringalltheargu-mentsdevelopedintheAmericanexample,butamratherfocusingonthetwomosttypical(generaldevelopmentofrightsandlibertiesandtheroleofjudicialreviewthereof).

27 Inthatrespect,notableAmerican“civillibertarians”(forinstance,G.StoneandD.Cole)argue,basically,thatthelong-standingpracticeofAmericanjudgestodefertoothergovernmentalbranchesinmattersofwarornationalsecurityingeneral,characteristicforperiodsuntilthe1950’s,waslaterreversedeitherthrough“rejec-tion”of the“logical”presumptionofdeferencebythenewlydevelopedcase-laworthroughvariousformsofpoliticalexcuseforpastmistakesoroverreactions.Onthis,see:Stone,G.R.,National Security v. Civil Liberties,op. cit.,pp.2203–2212;Cole,D.,Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis,op. cit.,pp.2565–2595.

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II. A NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGY APPLIED

SofarIhavebeenfocusingmainlyontheAmericanexample,notonlybe-causeofitsunavoidableprimacyinreferencetocontemporarycrisisexperien-ces,butalsobecauseofitsoveralltheoreticalandnormativesignificancewhichmightserveasaguidelinetoothercountrieswhichinthefuturemaybefacedwithchallengessimilartotheonesposedbythe“WaronTerror”.Accordingly,andinlightoftheAmericanexperiencesinconstitutionalcoststhatarosefroma broad definition of terrorism and in an attempt to predict the possibility of similardevelopmentsinacomparativeperspective,Iamusingtheexamplesofdetentionandprohibitionoftortureandfocusingontwocountries(FranceandCroatia)28 that also dispose of broad constitutional provisions regarding emergenciesandhavesomeexperiencesinthearea29butwhich,duetothefactthatsinceafter9/11theyhaveprimarilybeen“accommodating”onalegisla-tivelevel,havenotreallyyettestedthemaftertheystartedtoundertakethe“rightsrevolution”30,aspreviouslydescribed.

Myprincipalpointisthat,sincetheadoptionofaconstitutionalregulationof statesofemergency in thecountries Iamexamininghere,constitutionalprotectionof“fundamental”rightsandfreedomshasconstantlybeenevolvingin the way as to (contrary to previous historical periods when it generallyamounted to proclamation of merely politically binding standards) give those rights a position of judicially enforceable constitutional rules.31Moreover, ifthatisthecase,theninthecontemporaryenvironmentemergencypowers–whenoperating ina legislativecapacity–mustbemeasuredagainstexactlysuchaconceptofrights.Consequently,“sovereign”crisisprerogativesarenotnormativelyunlimitedanymore:iftheyclaimtobeoperating“within”,andnot“outside”,ofthelaw,they,atleasttoacertainextent,mustconformtootherelementsofthelegalsystemtowhichtheyclaimtobelong.

However,inanattempttomakecomparisonsbetweentheAmericanexpe-rienceandpossiblefuturedevelopmentsintheothertwocountries,myaimis

28 Inthatrespect,theFrenchexamplewillbefocusingontheissueof“detention”,whiletheCroatianwillbedealingwith“torture”.

29 TheFrencheventsof1961andtheCroatianWarof1991-1995.30 From1971and1999onwards,respectively.31 Inotherwords,myprincipalconclusionwouldbethatconstitutionalrightsandfree-

domshavegenerallybeenasubjectofaprogressivehistoricaldevelopment,leadingtotheirgradual“emancipation”fromthesupremewillofthelegislatoralone,afactbestseenthroughtheirprotectionintheformofa“judicialreviewmechanism”.


not to produce a comprehensive and completely comparable theory of modern emergenciesinalloftheirrelevantaspects.Rather,IamfocusingonparticularparametersjustinordertoshowthatFrenchandCroatiancourtsmighthaveageneralrolesimilartotheirAmericancounterpartsandthatsofartheyhave produced certain rulingswhich in this respect shouldbe taken intoaccount.Moreprecisely,Iamfocusingonthosecourtsthatperformthetaskofconstitu-tional review of lawsthroughwhichtheybindthelegislatorandatthesametimecreatemodernconceptsofrights.Consequently,myresearchfocusesontheunderstanding of rights as they develop within a particular constitutional order and as they depend upon the interpretations of national courts.Therefore,myapproachinthefollowingpageswilltry:first,toshowthatFranceandCroatiahavehadexperienceswithemergencies in thepast; second, thatafter theseexperiencestheconceptsofrightsandlibertiessignificantlyevolvedthroughjudicial interpretations; and third, that thesemodern conceptions of rightsmight be relevant for future emergencies. The main normative reason for that ismyattempttoshowthatthereisenoughgroundtoarguethatnationalcon-stitutionalsystems,throughtheirrespectiveinstitutionsandconsideringtheirhistoricaldevelopments,areableinthemselvestodealwith“hardquestions”arisingfromemergencies.Therefore,myapproachnecessarilyincludescertain“methodologicalreductions”.First,Iamnotcoveringallthenationaljudicialinterpretationswhichmightberelevantfor“shaping”constitutionalrightsandfreedoms.Suchisthecase,forinstance,withthoserulingsofconstitutionalcourtswhichareaddressedtoparticularindividualmeasuresaffectingrights(e.g.thecaseoftheCroatianinstitutionof“constitutionalcomplaint”).Rather,byfocusingonthestrictreviewofconstitutionalityoflaws,Iamconcernedwiththemostgeneralinterpretationsofrightswhichregularlybindthelegisla-torandwhich,assuch,mightbindtheemergency(executive)institutionwhenitactsinthecapacityofalegislator.Second,sincemyprincipalaimistoshowthat in contemporary constitutional systems there is solid ground to argue in favoroftheroleof(constitutional)courts,bothinthegeneraldevelopmentsof rights and in their possible influence on the position of rights in emergen-cies,Iamnotdealingwithparticularguaranteesgiventorightsbylegislativebodies.Theseguaranteessurelydoexistandtheydoevolveasthetimepasses.But“ordinary”law-making(asopposedtoconstitutionallaw-making),sinceit pertains to a sphere of the “ordinary”majority rule, does not reveal thetrue constitutional meaning of rights. This particular constitutional meaning ofrights,asshowninpreviousdescriptions,conceptuallyarisesprimarilyfrominterpretationsofconstitutionalcourtswhichruleonwhatisbeyondthere-

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achofamajorityruleandwhatisorwhatisnotconstitutionallypermissible.Therefore,myproposalisthat,oncetheconstitutionalcourtshaveproclaimedaspecificguaranteeofaright,suchaguaranteemaynotbecompletelyrejec-tedfromthe(emergency)analysisoftherestrictionofaright.Andthird,thismeansthatIamnottryingtodevelopargumentsinvokedfrominternationallaw,whichitselfiswithoutanydoubtquiterelevant,butwhich,atleastformypresentpurposes,doesnotnecessarilyshowthatnationalconstitutionalsystems and their national institutions can themselves offer relevant responses toemergencyissues.Otherwise,therecertainlyareinternationallegalstandar-ds(suchas,fortheEuropeancountriesespeciallyimportant,thestandardsoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsandthecaselawoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights)thatshouldofferadditionalargumentsinresolvingthose issues.

III. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE – THE EXAMPLE OF FRANCE

The central position in the French constitutional approach to states ofemergencyisfoundinArticle16oftheConstitutionof195832,aprovisionthathassofarbeenusedonlyduringthe1961crisis.However,takingintoaccountthat,despitesomeeffortsinthatdirection,ithasnotyetbeenremo-vedfromtheConstitution,itmaywellbepresumedthatitsfutureapplicationisnotentirelyprecluded.Iftheapplicationcouldonlytakeplaceincasesofthe gravest dangers33,thereisquiteaclearindicationthatthiswouldconcernthephenomenonof“modernterrorism”.34

32 IamfocusinghereonArticle16(andnotArticles35and36)ofthe1958Consti-tutionbecause it combines all the important elementsof analysis in theFrenchcase:itisbyfarthemostpowerfulemergencyprovision;itisatypical“executive”power; it is adirect constitutional emergencyprerogative; ithasonlybeenusedonce(in1961)andwellbeforethedevelopmentof“fundamental”rightsandfree-domsactuallybegan(in1971).

33 For instance, in recent years, France has dealt with emergencies primarily byapplyingthe1955LawontheStateofUrgencyor,especiallyafterSeptember11th

2001,bywayofspeciallegislation.ThemodernlegislativeregulationofterrorisminFrancestartswithonelawenactedin1986.See:http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/,March25th2014.OnmodernFrenchanti-terrorismlegislation,seealso:Lamothe,O.D.,French Legislation Against Terrorism: Constitutional Issues,2006,availableat:http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/pdf/Conseil/constitutionalterrorism.pdf,March25th 2014.

34 Inthissense,see:ComitéderéflexionetdepropositionsurlamodernisationetlerééquilibragedesinstitutionsdelaVeRépublique,Une Ve

République plus démocra-


Theexperiencesintheapplicationofemergencymeasuresfrom1961mightnotcoveralltheissuesthatcouldappearnowadays,althoughanumberofpro-blemsrelatedtotheinterpretationofArticle16hadalreadybeenaddressedatthattime.Amongthese,itshouldbeclearlynotedthatArticle16,asinterpre-ted,envisionsaratherlimitedroleofthejudicialbranch.35

Ontheonehand,theFrenchConstitutionalCouncil(Conseil constitutionnel) actsprimarilyby“consulting”thePresidentonthepossibilitytointroduce(orrevoke)astateofemergencyandby“consulting”himonparticularmeasurestobeundertaken inparticularsituations.Thisdivisionofroles isofcrucialimportancesinceintheformercasetheCouncilactuallyonlyverifieswhetherthe conditions for the application ofArticle 16have really been fulfilled.36 However, although its “opinion” (avis)on thematter ismandatory, itdoesnotreallytouchupontheveryissueofbalancingtherightsthatsubsequentlymightberestrictedandthepublicinterestwhichisintendedtobeprotected.ThisspecificissueshouldthusberesolvedbytheCouncilwhenitconsultsthePresidentonparticularmeasures,butinthatinstancenorealcontrolispresentsincetheCouncilcannotannulthePresident’sdecisionsforthereasonoftheirpossible unconstitutionality.37

Ontheotherhand,theroleoftheFrenchStateCouncil(Conseil d’État) in relationtoArticle16wasprincipallyclarifiedinoneimportantdecisionfromthe era. In the case of Rubin de Servens and others38theCouncilfirststatedthatithadnocompetencewhatsoevertodealwiththeinitialpresidentialdecision

tique,pp.20–21,availableat:http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics//074000697/0000.pdf,March26th 2014.

35 TheoverviewoftheexperiencesrelatedtotheuseofArticle16ofthe1958Consti-tutionisgenerallyreproducedherefromthefollowingsources:Favoreu,L.andPhi-lip,L.,Les grandes décisions du Conseil constitutionnel,13eédition,Paris,Dalloz,2005,pp.131–138;Lamarque,J.,La théorie de la nécessite et l’article 16 de la Constitution de 1958,RevuededroitpublicetdelasciencepolitiqueenFranceetal’étranger,Vol.LXXVII,No.3,1961,pp.558–628;Hamon,F.andTroper,M.,Droit constitution-nel,Paris,LibrairieGénéraledeDroitetdeJurisprudence,2007,pp.636–642.

36 SeeArticle16paragraph1oftheFrenchConstitution.37 SeeArticle16paragraph2oftheFrenchConstitution.Moreover,thereisnorealknowledgeofhowtheCouncilreactedtopresidentialmeasuresin1961,sinceitsopinions relatedtospecificmeasureshavenotbeenpublished(contrary to that,itsopinionastotheintroductionoftheArticle16regimeispublished;see:Laloiorganiquen°58-1067du7novembre1958,article53).

38 CEAss.2mars1962,RubindeServensetautres,Rec.143.OnthisdecisionoftheFrenchStateCouncil,seealso:Long,M.et al.,Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative,15eédition,Paris,ÉditionsDalloz,2005,pp.546–555.

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toputintoforceArticle1639 and then concluded that it had the competence toreviewonlythosepresidentialdecisionsthatweretouchinguponmatterswhicharenormallydefinedthroughregulations,andnotlaws.40Sincethepo-sitionofrightsandfreedomsintheFrenchConstitution–andamongthesealsotherulesgoverningcriminalprocedureandthesettingupofnewcate-goriesofcourts–isreservedtoberegulatedbylaws(statutes),theCouncil’sinfluencewasthereforesignificantlyrestricted.41Thiswasespeciallyimportantin the present case due to the fact that the applicants contested the presiden-tial decision establishing a special military tribunal and prescribing its rules of procedure,designedtotrycrimesandoffencesagainstStatesecurityandarmydiscipline.Asaresult,theCouncildidnotdeliveritsopiniononthespecificallegationssubmittedbytheapplicants,includingtheargumentthattheesta-blishedproceduresinfringedthedefendants’rightthattheinvestigationofacrimeshouldbeundertakenbyanauthorityindependentfromtheexecutive.42 In the case of Canal, Robin and Godot43,nevertheless,theStateCouncildec-laredthatthe“essentialguaranteesofdefense”beforethenewlyestablishedMilitaryCourtofJusticewereinfringedbecausetheprescribedprocedurede-niedanypossibilityofappealagainsttheCourt’sdecisions.However,despiteits significance, thisparticular casedidnotexactlydealwith specialArticle16powers,butratherwithpowersgiventothePresidentbymeansofalaw.44

39 Inthatparticularcase,theCouncilactuallyqualifiedtheinitialpresidentialdecisi-onasthe“actofgovernment”,notsusceptibletoanyjudicialreviewofitsown.

40 Additionally,theStateCouncilcontinuedtoruleinthecaseswheretheapplicantswerenotcontestingpresidentialemergencydecisionsthemselves,butspecificmea-sures issued on the basis of such decisions.

41 TheapproachoftheStateCouncilrelieduponthedivisionofregulatingauthorityasitisenvisionedinArticles34and37oftheFrenchConstitutionof1958.

42 Theothertwoargumentsoftheapplicantswerethattheestablishmentofthemili-tarytribunalwasnotjustifiedsincetheconditionsfortheapplicationofArticle16didnotexistanymoreatthetimethepresidentialdecisionwasissuedandthatthedecisioninfringedtheprincipleofnon-retroactivity.Buttheargumentemphasizedinthemaintextabovemeritsthemostattentionbecauseofitsdirectlinktotheproblemofthe“rightsofdefense”.AfterthedecisioninthecaseofRubin de Servens and otherswasdelivered,theCouncilalsoissuedseveralotherdecisionsinthesamemanner,denyingthatithadthecompetencetoreviewpresidentialdecisions,forinstance,touchinguponindividualliberty.See:Long,M.et al.,Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative,op. cit.,pp.551–552.

43 CEAss.19octobre1962,Canal,RobinetGodot,Rec.552.See:Long,M.et al.,Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative,op. cit.,pp.556–562.

44 See:Loin°62-421du13avril1962concernantlesaccordsàétabliretlesmesuresàprendreausujetdel’Algériesurlabasedesdéclarationsgouvernementalesdu19mars1962.


Insum,onehastotakeintoaccountthatrelevantFrenchexperiencesrela-tedtoArticle16are,forthepurposesofthepresentdiscussion,thereforequitelimitedandaboveallembeddedinaperiodwellbeforetheFrenchconstitu-tional system generally started to provide more sophisticated protection of fundamentalrightsandfreedoms.Thispartofthestory,whichbeginswiththefamousdecisionoftheConstitutionalCouncilin197145,iswellknownandsurelygoesinlinewithgeneralconclusionsonthegradualandprogressivede-velopment of constitutionally (and judicially) protected rights and freedoms. Despitesome inevitableproceduralobstacles thatexisteventothisday46, IwouldarguethatthelineofprotectionofrightsandfreedomswhichtheCon-stitutionalCouncilhasbeenconstruingthroughthe“constitutionalityblock”

45 TheFrenchexamplerevealssignificantresemblancetothegeneralpatternofdeve-lopmentofrightsandfreedomsdescribedearlierinthistext.AlthoughthefamousDeclarationof theRightsofManandof theCitizenwasproclaimedasearlyasin1789,ittookalmosttwohundredyearsbeforeitwasactuallyraisedtoatrueconstitutionallybindinglevel,alongwithothersourcesofwhatisnowadaysknownasthe“constitutionalityblock”.Additionally,allthiswasdoneneitherbythePar-liamentnorthePresidentoftheRepublic,butinfactbytheFrenchConstitutio-nalCouncil.Additionally,thedevelopmentofFrenchconstitutionalreviewreflectsanotheroneratherimportantelementshowingitsqualifiedapproachtowardsle-gislativedeliberations.Analogue to theAmerican test of judicial reviewand theCroatianproportionalityprinciple,theConstitutionalCouncilhasgradually,andnotablywellaftertheexperiencesof1961,developedspecialcontroltests,calledthe“manifesterror”and“proportionality”,bothofwhicharerelevantforreviewoflegislationpertainingtorightsandfreedoms.Onthis,seealso:Colliard,C-A.andLetteron,R.,Libertés publiques,op. cit.,pp.121–124.

46 Asithasalreadybeenshown,fromtheproceduralpointofview,theConstitutionalCouncilhasnocompetence to review the constitutionalityofpresidential emer-gency decisions in the strict sense. There remains a possibility that this could be done through the institution of the “priority preliminary ruling on the issue ofconstitutionality” (question prioritaire de constitutionnalité - QPC), introducedwiththeconstitutionalrevisionof2008.ThepresentArticle61-1oftheFrenchConstitutionprovidesforthepossibilityofaposteriorireviewof“legislativedispo-sitions”(dispositionlegislative).Theinterpretationofthisnotionsofarhasshownthatitincludesallpromulgatedlaws,bethey“ordinary”or“organiclaws”,orlawsenactedinNewCaledonia,aswellasordinancesratifiedbytheParliament,butitseemsthatnocase-lawsofarhasmadeanyreferencetopossibleapplicationoftheQPCtoArticle16decisions.Onthis,see:Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit constitutionnel,op. cit.,p.343;Verpeaux,M.,La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité,Paris,HachetteLivre,2013,pp.47–49.However,itshouldbestressedthatsomeFrenchauthorsexplicitlyarguethattheQPCprocedurecouldbeusedforareviewofArticle16me-asures.See:Gaïa,P.et al.,Les grandes décisions du Conseil constitutionnel,17eédition,Paris,Dalloz,2013,p.591.

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since1971shouldwellbetakenintoaccountwhenanticipatingpossiblefu-tureArticle16measures.Inmoreconcreteterms,ifjudicialreview,whichinbalancing public and individual interests finds its basis in various constitutio-nallyentrenchedstandardsastheyderivefromthe“constitutionalityblock”,bindsthelegislator,thenthereisgoodreasontoclaimthatitalsobindsthePresidentwhoactsinthesameroleduringanemergency.Consequently,thereimmediatelyarisesaseparatequestion:whichspecificconstraintsinthatres-pectcouldbedrawnfromthecase-lawoftheFrenchConstitutionalCouncil?As to theproblemof detention, theprincipal paradigm Ihave taken to

explaininreferencetotheFrenchcontext,itmaybenoticedthatanumberof significant constitutional interpretations have been developed in the last decades, and,mostnotably, it tookplace after the1961 crisis experiences.InFrenchconstitutionalphilosophy,protection fromarbitrarydetentionorarrest isprincipally linked to thenotionsof“security”and“liberty”,whichfind theirbasis in several sources thatmakepartof theFrench“constituti-onalityblock”.Therefore, includedaretheFrenchDeclarationof1789,theConstitutionof1958andthe“fundamentalprinciplesrecognizedbythelawsoftheRepublic”.47 Frenchdoctrinesees“security”asoneofthemostimportantelementsof

rightsandfreedomswhichprimarilyfindsitsfieldofapplicationinthedoma-insof substantiveandproceduralcriminal law.Moreover, indirect relationto the comparable notions of “Due Process of Law” and “Habeas corpus”,proceduralguaranteesofsecurityareusuallylabeledasthe“rightsofdefense”which,inturn,nowadaysextendwellbeyondthenarrowfieldofcriminallawinto other domains.48Andalthoughtheirfirstpracticalapplicationwasinau-guratedbytheFrenchStateCouncilasearlyasin1945(theAramu decision)49,theConstitutionalCouncildefinitelymadethempartofthe“constitutionalityblock”throughthreedecisionsfrom198150and1993.51Moreover,inthesen-

47 SeeArticles1,2and7oftheFrenchDeclarationof1789,Article66oftheConsti-tutionof1958andthedecisionoftheConstitutionalCouncil:75DCdu12janvier1977 (Fouille des véhicules).On this, see also:Colliard,C-A. andLetteron,R.,Libertés publiques,op. cit.,p.166;Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,p.176.

48 See:Colliard,C-A.andLetteron,R.,Libertés publiques,op. cit.,pp.183–185;Favo-reu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,pp.322–323.

49 See:Colliard,C-A.andLetteron,R., Libertés publiques,op. cit.,p.182.50 80-127DCdes19et20janvier1981(Sécuritéetliberté).51 93-326DCdu11aout1993(Gardeàvue);93-325DCdu13aout1993(Maitrisedel’immigration).Apartfromthat,someauthorsemphasizethat“individualliber-


seofthelattertwodecisions,therightsofdefensehavebeeninterpretedas“arighthavingaconstitutionalcharacter,opposabletothelegislator”.52Ontheotherhand,itmustalsobeemphasizedthat,inthefieldofanti-terroristlegi-slation,theFrenchConstitutionalCouncilfirstinvokedtherightsofdefenseinitsdecisionfrom1986.53

Andgenerally,inthecontextofwhatexactlyconstitutes“rightsofdefen-se”, it could be advanced that “essential guarantees” of sorts, as theyhavesofarbeenconfirmedbytheConstitutionalCouncilinitscase-law,includeatleastthefollowing:aneffectiverightofcommunicationinanappropriatelanguage;therighttobenotifiedaboutclaimsfiledagainstoneself,including,byhavingaccesstotheclaim;therighttobeinformedonmeasuresthatco-uldpossiblybeappliedagainstsomeone,includingthe“righttobeheard”aswellastherighttohaveappropriatetimeforthepreparationofdefense;theright to an attorney,which extends to thephase of initial detention (garde à vue),relatedtocriminal investigations;therighttohavearecoursetothecourts,includingtherighttoacourtdecisionthatsuspendstheexecutionofaparticularpriordecisionissuedbyanotherbody;and,finally,therighttoanadversarial procedure and a procedure that satisfies the conditions of justice andequalityofparties.54

Ontheotherhand,whenoneapproachestheproblemfromthepointofviewofindividual“liberty”55,someotherimportantstandardsshouldbebor-

ty”wasrecognizedasoneofthe“fundamentalprinciplesrecognizedbythelawsoftheRepublic”asearlyasin1977(75DCdu12janvier1977(Fouilledesvéhicu-les)).See:Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,p.176.

52 See:Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,p.322.Seealso:Col-liard,C-A.andLetteron,R.,Libertés publiques,op. cit.,p.183.

53 Décisionn°86-213du3septembre1986.54 SeethefollowingdecisionsoftheConstitutionalCouncil:248DCdu17janvier

1989(Conseilsupérieurdel’audiovisuel);89-268DCdu29décembre1989(Loidefinancespour1990);93-326DCdu11aout1993(Gardeàvue);93-334DCdu20janvier1994(Peinesincompressibles);80-127DCdes19et20janvier1981(Sécuritéetliberté);224DCdu23janvier1987(Conseildelaconcurrence);95-360DC du 2 février 1995, (Injonction pénale); Cons. const., 2mars 2004, n°2004-492DC,PerbenII;Cons.const.9janvier1980,n°79-109DC,Préventiondel’immigrationclandestine.Onthis,see:Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamen-tales,op. cit.,pp.201–202and323–325.Seealso:Colliard,C-A.andLetteron,R.,Libertés publiques,op. cit.,pp.193–196.

55 Inthatcontext,thereferenceto“liberty”isconnectedtotheterminawaythatitisguaranteedbyArticle66ofthe1958Constitution,whichprovidesthatthejudi-ciaryisthe“guardianofthefreedomoftheindividual”.Forthislineofargumenta-

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neinmind.First,atotalabsenceofjudicial interventioncreatesasituationofunacceptablearbitrarinessofameasureaffectingliberty.Also,thelegisla-torcanstillestablishakindofa“hierarchy”ofjudicialinterventions,whichdependsontheconcreteimpactofameasureaffectingliberty.Further,onlyprofessional judges are included in cases involving liberty. Judicial intervention mustbe“effective”,whichmeansthatitmustbedonewith“theshortestpo-ssibledelay”,itmustevaluatethe“necessity”ofaparticularmeasure,andhaveanopportunitytoformallyexplainthereasonsjustifyingnecessity.Finally,theprinciple of proportionality must be applied.56

Althoughitistruethattheabovestandardsarederivedfromawidevarietyofcaseswhichthemselvesarenotexclusively linkedtothefieldofcriminallaw, theyneverthelessmight generallybeusedas theFrench “counterpart”of“DueProcess”andthustheymightbeapproached/understoodas“essential constitutional promises (that) may not be eroded”ifoneintendstoframea“basic system of independent review”.57Iwouldproposethatthestandardsassuchmightserve as guidance for other future situations.58

Furthermore,andonamoregenerallevel59,sincethecoreofsuchareviewwould,accordingtotheAmericanexperiences,presumablyincludetherightofrecoursetoa“neutraldecision-maker”,itshouldbestressedthattheFrench

tion,whichisexplainedfurthermoreinthemaintext,see: Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,pp.194–202.

56 Inthissense,seethefollowingdecisionsoftheConstitutionalCouncil:Cons.const.25février1992n°92-307DC(Zonesdetransit);80-127DCdes19et20janvier1981(Sécuritéetliberté);93-326DCdu11aout1993(Gardeàvue);Cons.const.n°93-323DCdu5aout1993(Contrôlesd’identité);Cons.const.,29aout2002,n° 2002-461DC, Loi d’orientation et de programmation pour la justice; Cons.const.,20février2003,n°2003-466DC,Loiorganiquerelativeauxjugesdeproxi-mité;Cons.const.,29decembre1984,n°84-184DC;Cons.const.9janvier1980,n°79-109DC,Préventiondel’immigrationclandestine;Cons.const.,2mars2004,n°2004-492DC,PerbenII;Cons.const.,3septembre1986,n°86-216DC(Entréeetséjourdesétrangers).Onthesesources,see:Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,pp.194–196and200–201.

57 Hamdiv.Rumsfeld,542U.S.507(2004).58 Inthatrespect,itshouldbestressedthattheAmericanexperience,asshowninthe

Hamdicase,revealsthatinnovelsituationstheremaybesomespaceforapplyingthestandardsofbalancingastheyevolvedfromdomainsoflawoutsideofthepro-perscopeofcriminallawparadigm(e.g.Matthewsv.Eldridgetest).

59 Inthatsense,thegeneral“righttoajudge”examinedhereextendsbeyondspecialguaranteesofjudicialinterventionastheyareconnectedtoArticle66oftheCon-stitutionof1958andastheyhavebeenpresentedbefore.


ConstitutionalCouncilhasalsosofar“constitutionalized”the“righttoajud-ge”andtheprincipleof“independenceofthejudiciary”.Astotheformer,andsimilarlytopreviouscases,the“righttoajudge”,inthesenseofArticle16oftheDeclarationof178960,inwhichajudgegenerallyprotectsorguaranteesfundamentalrights,hasonlybeen“constitutionalized”throughtheConstitu-tionalCouncil’scase-lawfrom1980onwards.61Andastothelatter,eventho-ughtheprincipleof“independenceofthejudiciary”wasexplicitlyproclaimedintheConstitutionof1958,itsreal“constitutionalvalue”62wasrecognizedbytheCouncilonlyin1970.63

IV. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE – THE EXAMPLE OF CROATIA

SimilarlytotheFrenchexample,thedraftingoftheCroatianConstitutionof1990wastoasignificantextentinfluencedbythecontextofcrisis.Thiswasoneofthemainreasonsitincorporatedrelativelystrongpresidentialpowers,includingtheonesdirectlypertainingtoexecutiveemergencyprerogatives.Ontheotherhand,therelevantprovisionsregulatingstatesofemergencyadop-tedanapproachthroughwhichbothparliamentaryandjudicialmechanismsofreviewoverpresidentialemergencydecreeswerepreserved.WithinaveryshortperiodoftimeaftertheadoptionoftheConstitution,theexecutivecrisispowerswereusedthroughtheenactmentofanumberofemergencydecreeshavingtheforceoflawandregulatingawidevarietyofissues,includingthere-strictionsofconstitutionallyprotectedrightsandfreedoms.However,thepre-sidential response to the crisis did not escape the constitutional challenge and soonthereaftertheCroatianConstitutionalCourtdelivereditsopinioninade-cisionin1992.64Technically,theCourtwasdealingwiththreeprincipalissues:theexecutivepowertounilaterallyproclaim/declareanemergency;thepowerto restrict rights and freedoms regardless of the fact that the Parliament is in session;andfinally,thepowertoenactmeasureswithretroactiveapplication.

60 TheFrenchDeclarationof1789thusstates:“Asocietyinwhichtheobservanceofthelawisnotassured,northeseparationofpowersdefined,hasnoconstitutionatall.”(article16).

61 Onthis,see: Favoreu,L.et al.,Droit des libertés fondamentales,op. cit.,pp.314–317.62 See:Colliard,C-A.andLetteron,R.,Libertés publiques,op. cit.,p.178.63 Onthis,see:Colliard,C-A.andLetteron,R.,Libertés publiques,op. cit.,pp.177–

178.64 See the decision of theCroatianConstitutionalCourt:U-I-179/1991, June24th

1992.

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Insum,theConstitutionalCourtrejectedallargumentssubmittedbytheapplicants,arguingthatthePresidenthadthepowertoactdespitethefactthattheParliamentwasinsessionwhentheemergencymeasureswereenac-ted, that hehad an independent constitutional power todeclare a state ofemergencyandthathisdecreeswerenotrestrainedbyconstitutionalprovisi-ons regulating retroactivity.

The most interesting point of the case arises out of its comprehensive the-oreticalpotential:notonlythatthepresidentialdecreesthroughwhichtheserestrictions were actuallymade had been enacted contrary to specific con-stitutionalprovisions,buttheirsubsequentvalidationbytheConstitutionalCourtalsoreliedonthefactthattheywereinthemeantimeratifiedbytheParliamentaswell.65Atthesametime,itmaybearguednotonlythattheCro-atianexamplethereforeonceagainconfirmedtheclassicalpatternofnatural“institutionalconsensus”withinasystemconfrontedwithaseriousthreat,butalsothatitwasessentiallyalogicalresponseofaconstitutionalsystemthatwasatthetimeonlyrudimentarydevelopedandinwhich,despitetheformalconstitutionalproclamations,thereexistedneitheratrueconceptof“funda-mentalrights”noraneffectivesystemoftheirjudicialreview.66Additionally,italsoseemsthatthiswasatypicalexpressionofacertain“liberalmodel”ofemergencypowers.67

Todate,thishasbeentheonlyCroatianexperiencewithemergencies.Sin-ce then,however, constitutional protectionof fundamental rights and free-domsintheCroatianexamplehasundergonesomesignificantdevelopments.Ontheonehand,andalthoughtheinitial“Billofrights”68of1990already

65 Intheoreticalterms,theexamplethusconsistsofthefollowingelements:clearuni-lateral executive exception; subsequent parliamentary ratification; deferential(“process-based”)judicialvalidation.

66 Additionallytowhathasalreadybeenmentioned,itshouldbeemphasizedthatinitsDecisionfrom1992theCroatianConstitutionalCourtdidnotactuallyapplyabalancingbetweenrightsandfreedomsontheonehandandpublicinterestontheother.TheonlyrelevantconclusionthereofwasthatthePresidenthadthepowertoenactemergencydecreesaffectingconstitutionallyprotectedrightsandthatitwassignificantthattheywerelaterratifiedbytheParliament.

67 See,e.g.,Lobel,J.,Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism,YaleLawJournal,Vol.98,No.7,1988-1989,pp.1385–1433.Inthisrespectnotsurprisingly,thepossibilityofadirectcomparisonbetweentheCroatianexampleandtheAmericanexperiencegoesasfarbackastheCivilWarperiod.See:thePrizecases,2Black(67U.S.)635(1863).

68 See:theConstitutionoftheRepublicofCroatia(OfficialGazette56/1990),partIII.


includedaclassicallistofcivil,political,economic,socialandculturalrights,thismayalreadybeseeninsomesubsequentamendmentstotheoriginalCon-stitutionof1990which,generally,aimedatbothdefiningrightsasuniversalconcepts belonging to all (the citizen and the man) and at the strengthening oftheirprotectionthroughmoreprecisedefinitionsandprocedures.Ontheotherhand, itmightbearguedthat themost significant impactcamefromthebodyofconstantlyevolvingcase-lawoftheConstitutionalCourt.Inthatrespect,atleastfiveseparateclaimsmaybeadvanced.First,thatthemodernCroatianConstitutionalCourthasgraduallyabandoneditsinitialpracticetoreviewonlythelegalityofcertainlegalactsandadoptedamorecomprehen-siveapproachtowardsareal“constitutionalreview”oflawsingeneral,thusaiming at positing real restrictions on the legislator itself. Second, that theCourthasalsoincreasinglybeenapplyingrelevantstandardsofinternationalprotectionofrightsandfreedoms,includingtheEuropeanConventiononHu-manRights.Third,itseemsthatthedecisive“break”wastheadoption,asageneralruleofconstitutionalreviewoflegislation,oftheproportionalityprin-ciplewhichenteredtheCroatianconstitutionalsystemnotthroughaformalamendment,butinfactthroughinterpretationsoftheCourtattheendofthe1990s.69Fourth,theCourtseemstohavedeveloped,especiallyintherecentyears,someratherspecialconceptsofconstitutionalinterpretationrelatedto,besidesothervalues,protectionofrightsandfreedoms,amongwhichtheno-tionof“objectiveorderofvalues”and“structuralunity”oftheConstitution.Andfifth, theConstitutionalCourtveryrecentlyofferedaspecialconstitu-tional interpretation thataims to introduce the theoryof“unconstitutionalconstitutionalamendments”.

In sum, these linesofdevelopment in thepracticeof theConstitutionalCourtaffirmtheconclusionthatavisionof“fundamentalrights”hasfounditswayintotheCroatianconstitutionalscheme.Ontheotherhand,andindirectreferencetotheparticularissueoftheprohibitionof“torture”and“ill-treatment”,severalobservationsmaybemade.

Inthefirstplace,bothofthesecasesareexplicitlyprohibitedbytheCro-atianConstitution.Moreover,thisprohibitioniscontainedintheprovision

69 See,for instance,thedecisionsoftheConstitutionalCourt:U-I-673/1996,April21st1999;U-I-1156/1999,January26th2000.Onthis,seealso:Bačić,P.,Konstitu-cionalizam i sudski aktivizam – ustavna demokracija između zahtjeva za vladavinom većine i protuvećinskog argumenta,doktorskadisertacija,Split,PravnifakultetSveučilištauSplitu,2009,pp.359–360.

Zbornik PFZ, 66, (1) 61-86 (2016) 83

relatedtotheregulationofotherwiseconstitutionallypermissiblerestrictionsofrightsandfreedomsinthecontextofemergencies.70However,sinceveryrecently,thisprovisionhasnotbeenusedintheCourt’sinterpretations,inclu-dingtheone,asalreadyreferredtoabove,from1992.71

Additionally, there are a number of other constitutional provisions thatare inherently relevant to the problem of “torture” and “ill-treatment” butinthisarea,againsinceveryrecently,theCourthassofarbeendeliveringitsdecisions mainly in reference to the constitutionality of particular individual measures,andnotlegislationingeneral.72However,sincetheseinterpretationsweredeliveredinaconstitutionalcomplaintprocedure,theycannotbeseenas directly binding on the legislature and, consequently, cannot bedirectlyrelevant for the concept of fundamental rights as it has been described above. Similarconclusionsmaybemadeinreferencetootherconstitutionalprovisi-ons relevant here.73

Finally,in2012theCroatianConstitutionalCourtissuedaparticulardeci-sionwhichisofutmostimportanceforthebroadproblemof“torture”and“ill-treatment”.74ReviewingtheconstitutionalityoftheCriminalProcedureAct,theCourt,amonganumberofotherarticles,dealtwithaparticularprovisionregulating the inadmissibility of illegal evidence. The category of illegal eviden-ce,apartfromthat,forinstance,obtainedbyaninfringementofconstitutio-nal,legalandinternationallawprovisionsguaranteeingprohibitionoftortureor cruel and inhuman treatment, extended also to caseswhere itwouldbecollectedinaninfringementofconstitutional,legalandinternationallawgua-ranteesoftherighttoadefense,therighttodignity,reputationandhonorandtherighttoinviolabilityofpersonalandfamilylife.However,totheselattercases,theActprovidedonenotableandrathercrucialexception:suchevidence

70 SeeArticle17/3oftheConstitutionoftheRepublicofCroatia(OfficialGazette56/90,135/97,113/00,28/01,76/10,5/14).

71 Inthatsense,Article17/3reappearedinthedecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtfrom2012whichwillbeexplainedlater.

72 See, for instance, the decisions of the Croatian Constitutional Court: U-III-64744/2009,November3rd2010,U-III-4182/2008,March17th2009.

73 SeeArticles25/1,29/3and29/4and35oftheCroatianConstitution.74 SeethedecisionoftheCroatianConstitutionalCourt:U-I-448/2009,U-I-602/2009,

U-I-1710/2009,U-I-18153/2009,U-I-5813/2010,U-I-2871/2011,July19th 2012. Foracommentaryofthisdecision,see:Krapac,D.,Kazneno procesno pravo, Prva knji-ga: Institucije,V.izmijenjenoidopunjenoizdanje,Zagreb,Narodnenovine,2012,pp.38–40.


waspermissibleincasesinvolvingseriouscrimesandwheretheinfringementofaparticularright,takingintoaccountitsseverityandnature,wassubstanti-allylesserthanthegravityofthecrime.Sucha“balancing”procedurewasdec-laredunconstitutionalbytheCourt,whichfirstinvokedtheexplicitargumentthatillegalevidenceprincipallythreatenstoinfringe“fundamental”rightsandthen reasoned that even though some of the rights contained in the contested provision (the right toadefense, reputationandhonorand inviolabilityofpersonalandfamilylife)allowedfortheirweighingagainstpublicinterests,thesamecouldnotbeacceptedfortherightto“dignity”.Concludingthat,con-trarytoothercasesinthiscontext,therighttodignityrepresentsanabsoluteandnon-derogativeright,theCourtinterpretedthatsuchaconclusionderivesimplicitly from constitutional provisions already mentioned here75,including,mostnotably,theoneprohibitingtortureandcruelandinhumantreatmentinthecontextofemergencies.76

V. CONCLUSION

Comparing different countries carries the risk of oversimplification andsurely not every aspect of a certain experience can directly be applied toanother environment.However, despite rather important differences in va-riouslegalsystems,socialactorsoftentendtoactinthesamewaywhentheyareconfrontedwiththesameorsimilarproblemsand,seeninacomparativeperspective,thegeneraldevelopmentofinstitutionsrevealsmoresimilaritiesthan differences.

Among these institutions, rights and liberties serve as a good example,showingthatdifferenttraditionsnotwithstanding,ageneraltrendinthissensedrivestowardstheadoptionofaconceptof“fundamental”rightsandliberties.Atthesametime,thiscreatessomeveryimportantfunctionalandsystemicconsequences,amongwhichtherisingroleofthe(constitutional)courts.

Ifinafuturescenariothetwocountriesthatwerethefocusofthispaperwere to face a grave emergency comparable to theAmerican example, it isbeyond doubt that the application of their “strongest” constitutional crisisprovisionswillbeputintoacontextcompletelydifferentfromtheexperien-cesofthepastandwillhavetotakeintoaccountthat,overtime,theirlegalsystemshave“evolved”inacertainway.

75 SeeArticles23,25/1and35oftheCroatianConstitution.76 SeeArticle17/3oftheCroatianConstitution.

Zbornik PFZ, 66, (1) 61-86 (2016) 85

Therefore, possible future invocation of constitutional emergency prero-gatives inFranceandCroatiawillhavetodealwithtwocrucialarguments:anormativeone(thattheexecutiveisnolongertobeseenastheonlycrisisactor)andahistoricalone(thatanapproachtohistoricalexperiencemustnotberelative,butrathercomprehensive).


Sažetak

Āorđe Gardašević *

AMERIČKA ISKUSTVA – PROMIŠLJANJE EUROPSKE BUDUĆNOSTI

Ključna karakteristika pojma izvanrednih stanja jest postavka o njihovoj nepred-vidivosti. Kao takva ona je do današnjeg dana duboko ukorijenjena u ustavnopravnoj misli i praksi. Ipak, bez obzira na eventualne prednosti koje takvo viđenje može pružati, ono u jednoj mjeri predstavlja prevladani koncept koji stoji u opreci prema normativnom razvoju ustava općenito, a posebno prema razvoju pojma temeljnih ljudskih prava i sloboda. Polazeći od američke povijesti razvoja temeljnih (ustavnih) prava i sloboda, u ovom tekstu obrađuju se dva primjera (Francuska i Hrvatska) koji nude određena praktična iskustva u području izvanrednih stanja, ali koja su u obama slučajevima ve-zana uz povijesno razdoblje koje u znatnoj mjeri prethodi početku izgradnje suvremenih koncepcija temeljnih prava i sloboda (u Francuskoj od 1971., a u Hrvatskoj od 1999. godine). Središnji argument je da su francusko Ustavno vijeće i hrvatski Ustavni sud u međuvremenu razvili značajan korpus sudske prakse koja se mora uzimati u obzir prilikom procjene odgovarajućih ustavnih ograničenja izvanrednih mjera koje bi se u tim državama mogle pojaviti u budućnosti.

Ključne riječi: izvanredna stanja, stanja krize, temeljna prava i slobode, ljudska prava i slobode

* Dr.sc.ĀorđeGardašević,docentPravnogfakultetaSveučilištauZagrebu,Trgmar-šalaTita14,Zagreb;[email protected]

american lessons learned – european future …

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