airpower in three wars

8/6/2019 Airpower in Three Wars

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AIRPOWER

IN THREE WARS

GENERAL WILLIAM W. MOMYER

USAF, RET.

Reprint Edition

EDITORS:

MANAGING EDITOR - LT COL A. J . C. LAVALLE, MS

TEXTUAL EDITOR - MAJ OR J AMES C. GASTON, PHD

ILLUSTRATED BY:

LT COL A. J . C. LAVALLE

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2003


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Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely thoseof the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the UnitedStates Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.Cleared for public release.

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Air University Library Cataloging Data

Momyer, William W.Airpower in t h ree war s / William W. Mom yer ; m an aging editor, A. J . C.

Lavalle ; textu al editor, Ja m es C. Ga ston ; illu str at ed b y A. J . C. Lavalle

Reprinted.p. ; cm .

With a new preface.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1-5856 6-116-31. Airpower. 2 . World War , 19391945Aer ia l opera t ions . 3 . Korean War .

195 01953 Aerial opera tion s. 4. Vietna m ese Con flict, 1961 197 5Aerial oper-ations. 5. Momyer, William W. 6. Aeronau tics , MilitaryUnited States . I. Tit le.II. Lavalle , A. J . C . (Ar thu r J . C .), 1940 III. Gas ton , J am es C.

358 .4 / 009 / 04dc21

Air Un ivers ity Press131 Wes t Shu ma cher Avenu e

Maxwell AFB AL 361 12 -661 5

ht tp : / / au press .maxwell.af.mil


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TO . . .

a l l th ose brave airm en wh o

fought th eir ba t t les in th e

sk ies for com m an d of th e

air in World War II, Korea,an d Vietna m .

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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


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PREFACE 2003

Wh en I received th e requ est to u pd ate m y 1978 foreword to th is

book, I thought it might be useful to give my perspective of some

as pects on th e emp loym ent of airpower in th e Persian Gu lf War, th e

Air War over Serbia (Operation Allied Force), and the war in

Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). It is not my intent to

analyze air operations in these wars but to see if there are trends

th at m ight b e app ropriate for an other war. I was p articu larly in ter-

ested in th e application of esta blish ed a irpower doctrine sin ce I was

deeply in volved with it th rou ghou t m y car eer.

The Gulf War, in many respects, had many features of World

War II. The first requirement in World War II was to gain and

maintain air superiority to have freedom of action to carry out

th e destr u ction of Germ an ys a bility to wage war a n d to creat e

th e m ost favorable con ditions for th e in vas ion of Eu rope (Opera tion

Overlord). It was mandatory to establish air superiority so that

th e Germ an air force wou ldn t be a ble to att ack t h e h ighly vu l-

nerable landing force and the subsequent breakout. A vigorous

in terdict ion cam pa ign was in it ia ted 60 da ys prior to th e in vas ion

to seal off th e lan ding areas . J u st p r ior to the as sa u lt , a l l a ir-

power was tu rn ed to direct s u pp ort of th e lan ding force. As h is-

tory records , a ir su periority was esta blish ed an d m ainta in ed; th e

ar ea was su ccessfu lly sealed off from Germ an forces tryin g to get

at the landing force; and all Allied airpower was directed to close

a ir su ppor t u n t il the m ain force ha d landed an d opera t ions were

u n derway to en gage the m ain forces of th e Germ an s. It is of spe-

cial interest that the German air force was able to fly only a few

sorties, and those had no significant effect.

The Gulf War followed the same general pattern. First, we

destr oyed th e air defens e system an d gained con trol of th e air prior

to the introduction of ground forces. We exploited that air superi-

ority by systematic attacks on the command and control system,

the governmental supporting structure, and the deployed military

forces. Particular attention was given to the mechanized forces of

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the elite Revolutionary Guard. All of these attacks, as in World War

II, were inten ded to pa ve th e way for ou r grou n d forces. As t h e in va-

sion approached, the major effort was devoted to attacks against

the lines of communication that would be used by the reserve

forces. As the assault on enemy defense lines began, all of the air-

power was d evoted t o h elping our grou n d force breach th e defens e

and begin the exploitation. Airpower was a dominant factor

throughout the campaign, in which there were fewer casualties

th an in all of ou r pr eviou s wars .

Every war has i t s own charac ter is t ics , but a common thread

on t h e emp loym en t of airpower seem s t o emerge. As in dicated in

th is br ief review of World Wa r II a n d th e Gu lf Wa r, th ere s u r fa ces

a comm on opera t iona l doctr in e. To be su re, th e tact ics were n ot

al ike b u t th e resu lts obtained ap pear very s im ilar . Air s u perior-

i ty made i t possible to sustain at tacks against the core of the

enem ys s tren gth an d a bility to wage war a n d, a t t h e sam e t im e,

to su pport a t tacks again st en emy forces in th e fie ld.

In the Air War over Serbia, the first requirement again was to

n eu tra lize th e Yu goslavian Air Force an d r en der t h e air defen se

system in effective. In m an y ways, th e air defen se s ystem was far

more sophis t ica ted than the one in Opera t ion Deser t Storm.

Although the number of enemy aircraft was not large, i t pos-

sessed some state-of-the-art jet fighters. The elimination of this

flying force was quickly accomplished, but the air defense sys-

tem, with its large nu m bers of rad ar , presented a m u ch m ore dif-

ficu lt p roblem. Th e problem was m ad e m ore com plicated b y the

large number of antiaircraft artillery and air-to-surface missiles,

including the man-pack infrared ones. The air defense system

was never wholly eliminated, but it was neutralized to the extent

that All ied airpower could carry out i ts mission without unac-

ceptab le loss es or in ter feren ce. Significan tly, however, the enem ys

m u ltifaceted d efen ses forced operat ion s a bove 15 ,00 0 feet wh ere

th e th reat of th eir weapons was m in im ized.

With air superiority, the Allied Air Force could devote a major

effort to the strategic objective of destroying the capability and

will of th e Yu goslavian govern m en t t o contin u e th e war. Th is was

m u ch like th e objective of th e St ra tegic Air Force in World Wa r II.

Alth ou gh Germ an y didn t su e for peace as a r esu lt of airpower

attacks, a irpower did weaken the German economy and infra-

s t ru c ture to the exten t th a t th e cou n try could no longer su s ta in

its military forces in the field at a strength needed to defeat the

oppos in g Allied force. Some eviden ce in dicated t h e sa m e tren d in

Yu goslavia, even th ou gh s u pp ort of m ilita ry forces was n ot an

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issue since the bulk of its ground forces were not engaged in

combat. Consequently, the airpower at tack there should be per-

ceived a s a st ra tegic att ack on t h e n at ions a bility to fu n ction .

Since no Allied ground forces were involved, most of the air

a t tacks were aga ins t grou n d force bases an d rou tes u sed to move

uni ts f rom the nor thern par t of the country into the combat

areas of Kosovo. Hence, there was no interdiction effort in the

tradit ional sense s ince there were not that many targets .

However, significant effort was devoted to small engagements

throughout the area. Many of these at tacks were in close prox-

im ity to civilian s, an d, t h erefore, requ ired a forward air con troller

to con tr ol s trikes . With on ly a s m all por tion of th e Yu goslavian

army in the f ie ld, only a small number of tanks, armored per-

son n el vehicles , an d s u pp ly trucks were destroyed. Bu t th ese air

at ta cks were of su ch precis ion th at an y large-scale deploym ent of

Yu goslavian grou n d force clearly wou ld h ave met t h e sa m e fat e

as befell th e Ira qi ar m y. Airp ower, in m y view, wa s t h e comp ellin g

force th at br ou ght th e war to a close. Airp ower d id in Yu goslavia

wh at a irm en h ad h oped i t would be able to do aga ins t Germ an y

in World War IIavoid a ground war.

The Afghanistan War, Operation Allied Force, exhibited some of

the features of previous wars, but in many ways it was entirely dif-

ferent. Control of the air was the first requirement, but air opera-

tions were made difficult by the long distances to bases and the

location of th e Navy car rier ta sk force. Fortu n at ely, the Taliba n air

force con sisted of on ly a few fighters , which were destr oyed, a n d th e

air defense s ystem in n o way in tegratedwas r ap idly n eu tra lized.

Th e ma n -pack in frared m issiles posed a thr eat th roughou t th e war,

again forcing Allied air forces to fly above the effective altitudes of

these weapons. But in a real sense, there were no restraints on

Allied u se of th e airsp ace over th e coun try.

With such complete control of the air, the objective of destroy-

ing the Taliban government and el imination of the terroris t

organization and i ts leader were pursued with minimum expo-

su re. Th e prim ary grou n d ba tt le was fough t between Taliba n an d

North ern Allian ce forces, both of which con sisted of a n u m ber of

indigenous forces. These forces were deployed along a defended

line of trenches, bunkers , and other obstacles that the Northern

Alliance was unable to break through. Without airpower, i t is

quest ionable whether the Northern All iance would even have

been able to hold its position. To complicate matters, various

warlords were fighting among themselves and with Taliban ele-

men ts th roughou t the res t of the cou n try.

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It was in this setting that the Central Intelligence Agency and

Special Forces team s were placed in th e cou n try. Th eir ta sk was

not only the production of intelligence, but also the establishing

of frien dly relation s with th e var iou s war lords . It was th ese team s

that identif ied targets suitable for a t tack. These teams also

estab lish ed relat ion s with th e Norther n Allian ce leader a n d con -

vin ced h im wha t a irpower could be to s u pport h is forces.

In Afghanistan, a new level of close air support was developed

com pa red t o al l previou s wars . With precis ion weap ons , pa rt icu -

lar ly th e J oin t Direct Atta ck Mu n ition (J DAM) an d its Globa l

Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation, strikes could

be made extremely close to friendly troops. With all types of

str ike a ircra ft circlin g overh ead , weap ons cou ld b e on a ta rget ina matter of a few minutes . Also new was the use of unmanned

aer ial veh icles (UAV) to d eliver wea pon s an d to gen era te r eal-time

ta rgets. Th is was m an ifested in UAVs s en ding tar get da ta t o an

HC-130 overhead, which could engage without delay.

I wou ld like to con clu de th ese n ew pers pectives with th e obser-

va t ion th a t th e fu n dam enta ls tha t a irm en h ave he ld onto in the

employment of a irpower were demonstrated in our recent wars

without qualification. Airpower accomplished what it was capa-

ble of doing, and what many of us thought i t could doindeed,what many of us had hoped it would do in World War II. These

were abbreviated warsabbreviated by the wedding of estab-

lished airpower doctrine with dramatically new technologies. To

be su re, we would h ave ach ieved su ccess with out th e new tech -

n ologies , bu t it would ha ve taken m ore t im e and p recious h u m an

resources. But the doctr ine that has guided airpower employ-

ment , i t seems to me, remains an endur ing foundat ion tha t

bodes well for the integration of air and space assets into one

cohesive force.

WILLIAM W. MOMYER

General, US Air Force (retired)

December 2002

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many colleagues who have encouraged me

during the writ ing of this book. On numerous occasions I have

sought their views on their perspective of airpower from their

tours of duty in command and staff in peace and war. I t shouldbe u n derstood th at t h e views h erein express ed ar e solely those of

th e au th or an d a re not th ose of th e Departm ent of th e Air Force.

Without the use of the extensive materials from the USAF

Archives and the close assistance of the Office of History, this

st ory of airpower in th ree war s wou ld h ave been s eriou sly in com-

plete. Th e CORONA HARVES T report s were p a rticu la rly valu ab le

in docum enting m an y of th e operat iona l as pects of th e Vietna m

War. Add itiona lly, th e ser vices of th e USAF p h oto dep ository an d

the English and History departments a t the Air Force Academywere welcomed participants in the production of this book. My

sp ecial tha n ks to Major J am es C. Gaston , professor of En glish at

the Academy, for his extensive assistance in the textual editing

of the manuscript . Of course, there were othersmy thanks to

them a lso.

Finally, I wish to express special appreciation to my assistant

an d m an agin g editor, Lt Col A. J . C. Lavalle, for h is u n tirin g

efforts in every ph as e of th e prepa ra tion of th is b ook, an d to Mrs.

Donn a Ca ldwell for her p at ien ce in typin g th e ma n y dr afts it tookto reach th e fin al produ ct .

WILLIAM W. MOMYER

General, USAF (Retired)

1 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 8

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FOREWORD

I began working on th is book some month s ago wh en a n u m-

ber of colleagues asked me to record my thoughts about the

employment of airpower, especially tactical airpower, after 35

year s in th e profess ion. I ha dn t a n y illu sions of being bless edwith special wisdom, but , as they said, no one else shared

exactly my perspective on tactical airpower, and other profes-

sion al a irm en m igh t fin d i t u sefu l to kn ow h ow I sa w things, pa r-

t icularly during the Vietnam years , whether they happened to

ap pr ove of m y perception s or n ot. Very soon I rea lized t h at m y

perspective was in fact several perspectives, and none of them

could be maintained in perfect isolat ion from the others . I had

watch ed s tra tegy, tactics, an d tech n ology evolve, an d a ll th ree of

th ese evolu tion s fas cin at ed m e in recollection. I h ad seen ta cticalairpower from the viewpoints of the greenest fighter pilot (in

1939), the senior a ir commander in our longest war, and almost

every position in between: dozens of pers pectives t h ere, an d a ll of

th em seem ed valid an d im portan t to me. So my problem becam e

one of choosing from among my many perspectives the few that

seemed likely to offer the most to other airmen.

Although I take most delight in recalling my experiences as a

youn g figh ter pi lot , I h ad to ad m it th at th eres proba bly n othing

u niqu e about th a t perspec t ive . Hun dreds of others sh ared abou t

the same experiences and could describe them as well or better

than I. Thus I turned away (fellow fighter pilots will understand

how difficult this was) from the temptation to spin stories about

those days .

On th e oth er h an d, if th eres lit t le ju st ification for m y dis-

cu ss ing m an y of th e th in gs I do r ecall from World War II, th eres

little point , eith er, in a ttem pt in g to an a lyze wha t I didn t k n ow (or

kn ew on ly by readin g abou t it lat er) ab ou t a irp ower in World War

II. My exper ien ce was in North Africa a n d Ita ly; I didn t p ar tici-

pate in, for instance, the combined bomber offensive against

Germ an y or th e B-29 offens ive again st J ap an . I h ave som e

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s t rong opin ions a bout th e mis tak es an d su ccesses of those cam-

pa igns , opinions which Ill sh ar e with oth er airm en in p rivat e,

bu t I don t wan t th ose ju dgmen ts lyin g arou n d in a book like th is

one wh ere fu tu re a irm en m igh t see them an d su ppose they were

ba sed on au th orita t ive, firs th an d observation.

I examined and discarded many other approaches us ing this

sa m e filtering pr ocess avoid discu ss in g wh at I dont k n ow from

m y own experience an d th e experiences of m y compa n ions , an d

cons ider t ellin g wh at I do k n ow on ly if fu tu re a irm en m ight pr ofit

from seein g h ow th ose even ts looked from a p ersp ective th at wa s

uniquely, or almost uniquely, mine. This filtering process kept

m e away from persp ectives th at wou ld in clu de s u ch large topics

as ou r em ploym en t of th e at omic bom b in World War II (n o firs t-

h an d k n owledge of th e decis ion process), an d s u ch p ersona l top-

ics as th e ways in wh ich Presiden t J ohn son s eem ed to h ave aged

between Decem ber 196 7 when I ta lked with h im a t length a bou t

the bombing campaign and the defense of Khe Sahn as we f lew

from Korat to Cam Ranh Bay and October 1968 when I spoke

with h im for th e las t t ime a t th e Wh ite Hou se (n ot likely to be of

profession al in terest to fu tu re a irm en).

What the filtering left me with were the perspectives you find

in this book, the major preoccupations of my years as a senior

comm an der : s t ra tegy, comm an d an d control, cou n ter a ir opera-

t ions, interdict ion, and close air support . Most of my unique

opportu n it ies to perceive airpower occu rred d u rin g my tenu re as

Com m an der of 7th Air Force in Vietna m from J u ly 1966 u n til

Au gu st 1 968 , an d you ll see h ere mostly wha t I sa w then . But

some of my perceptions from earl ier and la ter years must be

recorded, too, to place my observations from the Vietnam years

in context . My perspective on command and control when I ran

7th Air Force wa s certain ly affected b y m y earlier obs ervat ions in

19421944 when I was a f ighter group commander in North

Africa an d t h ose in 1 94 4194 6 when I was Ch ief of th e Arm y Air

Forces Board for Combined Operations. While I was Assistant

Chief of Staff at Tactical Air Command headquarters between

194 6194 9, I u n dou btedly picked u p m an y of th e ideas reflected

in m y appr oach to close air su pp ort in Vietna m . Also, as a m em-

ber of the faculty of the Air War College from 19501953, I was

ideally s i tuated to observe the command and control re lat ion-

sh ips an d th e com plexit ies of th e in terdict ion, c lose air su pport ,

an d cou n ter air miss ion s d u ring th e Korean War. After a s eries of

tours in which I commanded the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing and

the 314th Air Division in Korea, and the 312th Fighter-Bomber

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Win g an d th e 83 2n d Air Division in th e U.S., I served as Director

of Plans, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, from 1958 unti l

1961. There I saw firsthand the effects on our tactical air forces

of both th e Eisen h ower adm in istra t ions em ph as is on n u clear

weapons an d th e Kenn edy adminis t ra t ions enth u s iasm for the

weapons and techniques of sub-l imited war. During my tour in

the Air Staff from 19611964 I was directly involved in the dis-

cu ss ion of cou n terin su rgen cy an d th e forces th at were needed for

the developing war in Vietnam. My assignment in Vietnam was

preceded by a two-year tour as Commander of Air Training

Command. As Commander of Tactical Air Command from the

time I re turned from Vietnam in 1968 unti l I re t ired in 1973, I

rem ained in tima tely in volved in t h e plan n in g for all of ou r ta cti-cal air operations in Vietnam.

What I offer in this book, as fairly and as clearly as I can, is an

account of the way airpower looked to me from the perspectives I

th in k will m at ter m ost to airm en . I don t record th ese views in th e

h ope th at a irm en , even m y frien ds , will ap pr ove them . In fact I h ope

that all of our airmen who examine them will do so critically. We

m u stn t r ely ent irely u pon yest erda ys idea s to fight tom orrows

wars, a fter all, bu t I h ope our airm en won t pa y the p rice in com ba t

again for what some of us have already purchased.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

CHAPTER I: STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Nu c lea r Wea p on s a n d Ta ct ica l Air For ces . . . . . . . 1

Kor ea n Wa r A Dilem m a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Ya lu Con t a in m e n t of MIGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Im p a ct of Kor ea n Wa r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Th e Fr en ch In In d och in a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

S EATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Wars of Libe ra t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

J u ng le J im Fir s t Com ba t D ep loym e n t . . . . . . . . 11

J oin t Ta s k F or ce 1 16 Res p on s e t o Cr is is in La os . 1 2

A Cha n ging RoleThe U.S . To Figh t . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Bom b t h e Nor th ? No Agr eem e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6

The G u lf of Tonk in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

St ra tegyReta lia tory At tacks in North Vie tna m . . . 17

G ra du a l Es ca la t ion R ep la c es Re ta lia t ion . . . . . . . . 20

Air C a m pa ign Pla nPr opos ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Grou nd Forces DeployedPr ior ity Set . . . . . . . . . . 23

Reque s t To S tr ike Air fie lds C on t inu es . . . . . . . . . . 24

S t ra t egy Slowly Cha n ges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

TETStra tegy Cha nged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

A Ne w S t ra t egy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Air S t ra tegy Adopted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Footno tes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

CHAPTER II: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER . 43Prior to Vie tna m War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Nor th Afr ica The Fou nda t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

OVE RLORDTh e Ar gu m en t s Ab ou t C om m a n d . . . 5 0

Air m a n Dep u t y Th e a ter Com m a n d er . . . . . . . . . . 5 4

Com p on en t Com m a n d sCon t in u in g Is su e . . . . . . 5 6

Kor ea St ru c tu r e of a The a t er of O pe ra t ions . . . . . 58

Ta r get ingJ u r is d ic tiona l Qu es t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

O per a t iona l Con t r ol With in FEAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Con tr ol of St ra tegic Air F orces in a

Th e a ter of Op er a tion s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2

Con trol of Naval Avia t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

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Page

Control of Marine Aviation In A Theater

of Opera t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Footno tes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

CHAPTER III: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER

IN THE VIETNAM WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Com m a n d S tr u ct u r eTh e Begin n in g . . . . . . . . . . 7 4

2n d Air Division ADVONTh e Beginn ing of a n

Air Com p on e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5

MACVA S u b -Un ified C om m a n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8

PAC AF Vie w Of Com m a nd Or ga n iza t ion . . . . . . . . 79

J TF-116A New Elem e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 n d Air Divis ion E xp a n d ed Au t h o rit y . . . . . . . . . 8 2

Air m a n As D epu ty MACV Pr opos e d . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

MACV As Un ified Comm a n d Un der

J C SA Pr opos a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

D epu ty Com m a nde r For Air Oper a t ions . . . . . . . . . 85

Role of CINCPAC Com p on e n t Com m a n d s . . . . . . . 8 8

Air Dep u t y Pos it ion E s ta b lis h e d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1

Cont ro l of Arm y Helicopter s an d Mar ine Airc ra ft . . 91

Fu rt h er Defin ition of 2n d Air DivisionRespons ib ilit ie s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

C on t r ol Ar r a nge m en t s For Oper a t ions In La os . . . . 95

Control of Navy Strike Aircraft Diverted

F rom Nor th Viet n a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9

Cont ro lling The S t r ikes Up Nor th . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Coordina t ing Au thor ity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Rou te Pa c ka ges A Con t r ol Ar r a ngem e n t . . . . . . . 104

Com m an d of Bom ber ForceCon tin u in g

Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

CHAPTER IV: THE COUNTER AIR BATTLE (AIR

SUPERIORITY) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5

Air Su per iority, World War II8t h & 9t h

Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Air Su per ior ity Korea5th Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Air SuperiorityNorth VietnamA New

Dimen sion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

The North Vie tna mese Air Defense Sys tem . . . . . . 133

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Nor th Vie tna mese Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

An ti-Aircra ft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4

SAMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6C ou n te r m ea s u r es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Wild Wease lIron Han d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

SAM Opera tors Cou nte r tact ic s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Ru les of En gagem en tA Cont in u in g SAM

Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Losses to SAMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

MIGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

MIG Airfie lds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7

MIG Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8Seventh Air Force Deals With the MIGs . . . . . . . . . 162

BOLOA Figh ter Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

The Battle ChangesMissiles And

Hit -and -Ru n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Cont ro l In The Targe t Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Con siderat ions Affectin g Kill Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5

Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

CHAPTER V: INTERDICTION (World War II, Korea,

CHAPTER V: an d Vie tna m 19641968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

OVERLORD An d Interdict ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3

OVERLORDs Lesson s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7

Re trea t to Pu san . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Chinese Cross the Ya lu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

In te rd ic tion Begins Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Nor th Vie tna mese Logis t ica l Sys tem . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Var iab les Influ enc ing the In te rd ic tion Campa ign . . 197

All-Weath er Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 0

Ear ly Deve lopment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

F-111 O per a t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

Ra ilroad Sys tem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Road Ne tworkKey Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

In terdic t ion Zon es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Sor t ie Frequ ency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

C om m a nd a nd Con t r ol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Some Tact ica l In n ovat ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Nigh t Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

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Page

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

CHAPTER VI: INTERDICTION (Vietn am 19 68 19 72 ) . . . . . 23 7Lase r & AC-130sNew Sys tems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

1968 B om bing Ha ltIm pa c t on In t e r d ict ion . . . . . 241

Str ikes Below Th e 20th Para lle l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Bomb in g In Route Package VI A (Hanoi Area) . . . . 246

St r ike Force Compos it ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Pene t ra t ing The Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

Impor tance of Tan ker Supp or t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Wea the r Informat ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Lack of Su rpr ise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259Reconn aissa n ceCover in g Th e Targets . . . . . . . . . 261

Reconn aissa n ce Tact ics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Fina l Days1972 Bombing Offens ive . . . . . . . . . . 266

Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

CHAPTER VII: AIRPOWER AND THE GROUND BATTLE . . 277

Inc reased U.S . Involvement in Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . 277

Deve loping The Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280FARM GATEA Force For Coun ter in su rgency . . . . 282

Tac t ica l Air Cont ro l Sys tem Bui lds . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

Evolu t ion Of Sys tem For Air Su ppor t . . . . . . . . . . . 287

North Afr icaTh e Class room For Vie tnam . . . . . . . 287

Eu ropeRefinement Of The Sys tem . . . . . . . . . . . 288

Adapting The Air-Ground Operations System To

Vie tnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

The B a tt le Cha n ge s Ne w De m a nds . . . . . . . . . . . 295

No Batt le Lin esFACs Come Of Age . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8

J e ts Are Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304

Th e Air - Gr ou n d O per a tion s S ys t em E xp a n d s . . . . 3 0 6

2n d Air Divis ion Becomes 7 th Air Force . . . . . . . . 308

Employing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

Advan tages Of Aircraft Ordn an ce Over Artillery . . . 31 3

Daylight Figh ter Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4

Night an d Bad Wea the rSpec ia l Techn iques . . . . . 315

B-52s And The Grou nd Ba t tle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

Navy and Marin e Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320

Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

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Page

CHAPTER VIII: BLUNTING THE ATTACK WITH AIRPOWER

CHAPTER VIII: (J UNCTION CITY, Kh e Sa n h , Tet, Ea s ter

CHAPTER VIII: Offens ive) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327Air Operat ionJ UNCTION CITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8

En emy Probes For An Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

KHE SANHAirpower in the Forefront . . . . . . . . . 340

Prelu de To Tet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

TetTh e Offens ive Begin s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 0

Prepa r ing For Withdrawa l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

Excurs ion In to Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

Withd rawalAn Un easy Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363

Easter Offens iveA Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364The As s e s s m en t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374

CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 7

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

1 . Nor th Kor ea n In va s ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 . Dien B ien P h u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3 . Air Com m a n d o an d H is Air cr a ft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3

4 . 94 -Ta r get S t ra t egy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

5 . P-40s In Nor th Afr ica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

6. North west Africa Air Force After Cas ab lan ca

6 . Confer enc e (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

7 . Pr op os ed Or ga n iza tion F or Th e In va s ion o f E u r op e . . . 5 2

8 . B-1 7 s Wit h Th eir Figh t er E s cor t E n rou t e To E u r op e . . 5 4

9 . O rga n iza t ion For O VERLORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

10 . F ina l Or ga n iza t ion Aft er Inva s ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

1 1 . Com m a n d O rga n iza t ion Kor ea (1 9 5 0 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9

1 2 . Fa r Ea s t Air For ce Com m a n d (1 9 50 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2

13 . NAVFE View Of Areas Of Respons ib ility . . . . . . . . . . . 68

14. J oin t Policy Agreemen t For Con trol Of

14 . Air cr a ftKor ea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

15. Military Ass is ta n ce Advisory Grou p

14 . (Air E lement )1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

16 . MAAG To MACV (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

17. Proposed Organ iza t ion For Vie tnam And

14 . Tha ila nd (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

18 . CINCPAC Com m a nd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

19. Target Request An d App roval Net For North

14 . Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

20 . Air Comm an d Arrangements Sou theas t As ia

14 . (19661972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

21 . Heavy Tra ffic Along Ho Chi Minh Tra il . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

22 . U.S. Navy A4-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

2 3. U.S.S. Cora l S ea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

24. U.S. Navy A-7 Bombing Bridge In North Vie tna m . . . . 105

25 . Rou te Pa c ka ge Sys t em . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

2 6 . Ta r get Req u es t S ys t em t o Wh it e Hou s e . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3

27. MACV Proposa l For Contr ol Of Rou te

14 . Package II (1966 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

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Page

2 8 . Com m a n d a n d Con t r ol Of Air Op er a tion s (1 9 7 2 ) . . . . 1 2 0

2 9 . MIG-1 5 Bein g Sh o t Down Over Nor th Kor ea . . . . . . . 1 2 9

30 . F -86s Pa t rolling The Sk ie s of Nor th Kor ea . . . . . . . . . 13031. Ya lu Rive r Fighte r Sweeps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

32. Gaggle Of F-86s En ter in g MIG Alley . . . . . . . . . . . 132

33 . Nor th Vie tna m es e Ra da r C over a ge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

3 4 . S ta t u s / AAA In Nor th Viet n a m (Ma r ch 1 9 6 8 ) . . . . . . . 1 3 7

35. North Vie tna mese 57mm AAA Ba t te ry (1965) . . . . . . . 138

36. Soph is t ica ted AAA Emplacement (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . 138

37. SAM Sites And Coverage , Nor th Vie tna m (1969) . . . . . 140

38 . Ene m y SAM S it e Ne a r Ha no i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

39. Close-Up Of Early North Vietna m ese SAM14. Site (1965 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

40 . Typ ica l St r ike For m a t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

41. Chaff Cor r idorLinebacker I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

42. Chaff C lou dLinebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

43. Air -To-Grou nd Miss ile S t reaking For Ta rge t . . . . . . . . 14944 . AAA Em pla c em e n t s O n D ike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15144 . [S ic] SA-2 Miss i le Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

45. North Vie tna mese SAM Effect iveness (19651972) . . . 154

46. USAF F-4 Being Hit By SA-2 Miss ile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15547. MIG 21 Over North Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

48. MIGs In Revetments At Phu c Yen Air fie ld . . . . . . . . . . 158

49. North Vie tna mese Air fie lds (1966 & 1972) . . . . . . . . . 16050. Nor th Vie tnam ese Air Force Comb at In ventory14 . (1964 1972 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

51. F-105s In F ligh t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

52. F-4s In F ligh t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

53 . MIG-17 Ma k ing Fir ing Pa s s a t U SAF F-105 . . . . . . . . 167

54. Rada r CoverageITACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17055 . Sou the a s t As ia S t r ike Con t r ol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

56. WATERBOY At Dong Ha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

57. EC-121 College Eye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17258. F-4 Retur n ing To Home Base In Tha ilan d14 . After Miss ion Over Nor th Vie tnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

59. USAF Air -To-Air Weapons Kills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

6 0 . Bom b D a m a ged Ra ilr oa d Ya r d s In Fr a n ce . . . . . . . . . 1 8 461. Bom b Dam aged Mars h allin g Yard , Folligny,

14 . Fran ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18562 . The Tr a ns port a t ion P la nIn t e r dict ion In Eu r ope . . 18663. Resu lts Of AAF Figh ter Attacks On Retreatin g14 . Germ an Colu mn s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

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Page

6 4 . Nor th Kor ea n S u p p lies B u r n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9

65. S tab ilized Line Of Contac tKorea (Dec 1950) . . . . . . 190

66. F-51s From th e 18th F ighte r -Bomber Wing,14 . 5th Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

67. Sm oke Billows From Bomb in g Of Targets In

14 . Pyongyan g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

68. Result s of S t r ikes On Machine FactoryPyongyan g . . 193

69. Sm oke Billows From Bomb in g Of Kep Mars h allin g

14 . Yard April 196 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5

70. North Vie tna ms Ra ilroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

7 1 . Res t rict ed Zon e s Ar ou n d Ha n oi An d H a ip h on g . . . . . 2 0 9

72 . Por t ions O f Pa u l D ou m e r Br idge Des t r oyed . . . . . . . . 21073 . Re bu ild ing Of Sever a l Spa ns Of D ou m e r Br idge . . . . . 210

74. The Key Bridges In North Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

75. Direct Hit s On Tha i Ngu yen S teel Mill . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

76. Enemy Tra ffic F low (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

77 . Ba n La boy In t e r d ict ion Poin t , Ba n Ka r a i Pa s s . . . . . . 215

78 . Clos e -u p O f B a n La boy In t e rd ict ion Poin t . . . . . . . . . 215

79 . Sou thwe s t Mons oon En e m y Tr a ffic Flow . . . . . . . . . . 217

80. En emy Road Network Th rough Laos An d

14 . South Vie tnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2188 1 . Tr u ck Con voy On Rou t e 13 7 , Ba n Ka ra i Pa s s . . . . . . 2 1 9

82. Areas Of Opera t ion In Laos (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

83 . Ar ea s o f O pe ra t ion In La os (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

84 . Ar ea s o f O pe ra t ion In La os (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

85 . USAF C-130 Air bor ne C om m a nd Pos t (AB CCC) . . . . . 227

86 . S t a tions Ins ide ABC CC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

8 7 . B-5 7 On B om b R u n In S o u t h Viet n a m . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 2

88. AC-130 Spect re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

89. Close -u p Of AC-130 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

90. En emy Sup ply Areas Developed After Bomb in g

14 . Halt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

91 . USAF EB-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

92. EB-66 Radar (ECM) Pa t te rn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

93 . Typ ica l S t rike Pene t ra t ion And Egr es s . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

94 . F -105s B om bing Unde r Ra da r Con t r ol . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

95. Bas ic Miss ion Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

96 . Air R efu eling Tr a cks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

97 . F -105s Refu eling Fr om KC -135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

98. F-4s Approaching Refu e ling Boom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

99 . Nor th Vie tna m es e Ea r ly Wa r n ing Sys t em . . . . . . . . . . 261

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100 . Rec onn a is s a nc e Clos e-u p O f 57m m AAA S it e . . . . . . 264

101 . RF-4 B eing Rea d ied For Re cce Mis s ion . . . . . . . . . . 265

102 . Mom yer s In t e r d ict ion Fun ne l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268103 . 20 th Pa r a llel In t e rd ict ion Fun ne l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

104. Major Target AreaLin ebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

105 . Clos e-u p O f H a noi Ra il Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

1 0 6 . Bom b D a m a geGia La m R ail Ya r d An d S h o ps . . . . 2 7 3

107 . U-10 Psychological War fare Aircraft Over S out h

14.7 Vie tnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

108. USAF A-26 Await ing Days Miss ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

1 0 9 . C-4 7 Us ed By Th e Air Com m a n d o Un it s . . . . . . . . . 2 8 4

110 . USAF T-28Ear ly Mains tay Of Air Com m an do14.7 Figh ter Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

111 . Monke y Mou n ta in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

112. Organ iza t ion For Air Opera t ions , Nor th Afr ica . . . . . 289

1 1 3 . J oin t O p er a tion s Cen t er, Kor ea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 1

114. USAF A-lE Loaded To Th e Hilt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

115. USAF A-lE En rou te To Suppor t Groun d

14.7 Opera t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

116. Sou th Vie tna ms Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

11 7. O-1 Bird Dog Wat ch in g Over U.S. Arm y14.7 Specia l Forces Cam p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

118 . Air - Gr ou nd Sys t em , U .S . And Vietna m es e (1968) . . . 307

119. P-40s Taxiing In to Pos it ion , North Afr ica . . . . . . . . . 309

1 2 0 . B-2 4 s Bom b in g Ger m a n P os it ion s In F r an c e . . . . . . 3 1 1

121 . USAF AC-47 And Cr ew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316

1 2 2 . B-5 2 s Bom b in g Su s p e ct ed Viet Con g Pos it ion s . . . . 3 2 0

123. U.S . Mar ine A-6 In t ru de r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

124. War Zone C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

125. F-100 Delive ring Iron Bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

126. J UNCTION CITY, Ph ase I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

127. J UNCTION CITY, Pha se II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

128 . The B a tt le For Ap Sou i Tr e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

129. Opera t ions TALLY HO An d NEUTRALIZE . . . . . . . . . 339

130 . USAF C-130 La nd ing At Khe Sa nh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342

131. Khe San h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

132. U.S . Organ iza t ion (In I Corps ) For TET Offens ive . . . 352

133. 1968 TET Offens ive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353

134 . La m Son 719 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

135 . 1972 Spr ing Offe ns ive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

136. USAF A-37 Bombing Vie t Cong Pos it ions . . . . . . . . . 367

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Page

137 . USAF C-130 Deliverin g Sup plies to Vietna m ese

14.7 Troops At An Loc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

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Chapter I

STRATEGY

My vantage point in World War II, as Commander of the 33rd

Figh ter Grou p in North Africa, Sicily, an d Ita ly, gave m e a good view

of m ore Germ an an d Italian Figh ters th an I really cared to see, bu t

n ot ma n y opport u n ities to witn ess t h e ma king of Allied air str at egy.However, every pilot knew that our strategy embraced two funda-

m enta l featu res: attacks a gains t th e en emy heart lan d (with which I

had little to do, either in Europe or the Pacific) and participation

with su rface forces to destroy th e opposin g forces or ca u se th em t o

surrender. The first priority of our air strategy was to gain control

of the air. Then we concentrated our efforts on isolating the battle-

field an d pr oviding close a ir s u pp ort. Th is air s tra tegy pr ovided flex-

ibility to the Allied armies in their ground campaigns and guaran-

teed a m in im u m of in terference from th e Germa n Air Force. By th etime I returned to the U.S. in 1944 to become Chief of Combined

Operations on the Army Air Forces Board, our Airpower had virtu-

ally destr oyed th eLuftw affe in th e Mediterran ean th rou gh a ir -to-air

engagements and attacks on airfields and logistical bases; and we

h ad repeatedly cu t th e enem ys a ir, sea, a n d lan d lin es of com m u -

n ication, en ab lin g ou r a rm ies to ca ptu re North Africa a n d Sicily an d

to in vad e sou th ern Italy.

At about the time I was leaving Europe, our B-29s in the Pacific

were begin n in g th eir atta cks against J ap an from ba ses in Ch in a. InNovemb er 194 4, B29s from Ch in a a n d th e Marian as raided Tokyo,

an d in March 194 5, Major General Curt is E. Lema y began th e deci-

sive cam pa ign of n ight, low-level in cend iar y att acks. Th e a ir wa r in

th e Pacific culmina ted with th e dropp in g of atom ic bomb s on 6 a n d

9 August, events which profoundly affected U.S. air strategy.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES

With n u clear weapon s a reality in th e lat e forties an d early fifties,

many strategists urged that we evaluate all military forces in light

of their ability to contribute to a general nuclear war.1 But other

planners disagreed. A reduction in the size of U.S. armed forces,

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and our increasingly heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons,

prompted a debate which brought out basic differences among the

service chiefs and within the Air Force itself, I was uniquely situ-

ated to view this debate. Having been assigned as Assistant Chief

of Staff of Tactical Air Command in 1946, I was at Hq TAC when

the Air Force separated from the Army in 1947, and I remained

with TAC u n til goin g to th e Air War College in 19 49 .

Th e Arm y mainta in ed th at s u bs tan tial conven tiona l forces would

be needed to fight limited wars. To evaluate all forces on the basis

of th eir cont ribu tion to a genera l n u clear war with th e Soviet Union

would be imprudent, they said. Several air strategists replied that

with nuclear weapons, it no longer made sense to maintain large

conventiona l forces since su ch forces cou ldn t su rvive in a n u clear

war. Fu rth erm ore, Airpowers cap acity to elim in at e the com m an d

centers of an enemy made extensive surface campaigns unneces-

sary. Airmen conceded that some conventional forces would be

needed for limited wars, but said that these forces need only be

large enough to force the enemy into tactics that would produce a

target for our nuclear weapons. They doubted, too, that a limited

war cou ld rem ain lim ited ind efin itely. Either th e employm en t or th e

threat of nuclear weapons would halt the conflict, or the conflict

would rapidly expand to a general war.

Bu t even with in th e Air Force du rin g the la te 19 40s an d ear ly

19 50 s, th ere was fu n da m en ta l differen ce of views on lim ited war.

Many tactical airmen, including Lieutenant General Elwood R.

Quesada and Major General Otto P. Weyland, believed that non-

nuclear war was the most probable type of future conflict. These

airmen argued that l imited wars of the future would be fought

with out n u clear weap ons becau se n ation al leaders wou ld real ize

that once nuclear weapons were introduced, i t would become

impossible to prevent the escalation of any conflict into general

nuclear war: If the initial employment of small nuclear weapons

didnt p rodu ce the d esired effects , comm an ders wou ld s u rely

str ike add it iona l targets with m ore an d larger weapons . With th e

explosion of a n u clear device by th e Soviet Union in 19 49 , it was

clear th at n u clear weapon s were no lon ger a U.S. mon opoly, an d

tactical a irm en a rgued t h at we h ad to prepa re for lim ited wars in

which both s ides would voluntari ly refrain from using nuclear

weapons. We had to maintain sizeable tactical forces capable of

fightin g with conventiona l weap ons .

At a t ime when the Air Force was shrinking and funds were

sh ort, th ou gh, it was n t eas y to fin d m oney for conven tion al tac-

tical weapon systems. Understandably, most of the Air Force

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budget was earmarked for that part of the force which would

have to deter or win a general nuclear war with the Soviet

Union.2 Strategic forces received most of the Air Force dollars,

an d on ly those ta ct ical forces th at h ad a n u clear cap ab ility could

deman d a n d get su bs ta n t ia l fu n din g. Other e lements of th e tac-

tical force h ad to forego m odern izat ion .

Despite our n ation al em ph as is on s tra tegic nu clear forces, tac-

t ical a irmen continued to press for the restorat ion of a non-

nuclear capabil i ty such as we had possessed during World War

II . They stressed that the type of command and control system

needed in a th ea ter n u c lear war was th e sam e as th a t n eeded for

non-nuclear war. If the tactical air force were to conduct a the-

ater n u clear cam pa ign , it wou ld requ ire a m odern ized com m an dand control system and procedures for c lose coordination with

ground forces, irrespective of the intensity and duration of the

conflict. To carry out a theater nuclear strategy, precise control

of Airpower would be essential to prevent fallout and casualties

to ou r own air an d groun d forces.

It seemed to th ese airm en th at th e ess entia l e lemen ts of a ta c-

tical air force wou ld b e th e sa m e wheth er th e force were des igned

for a nuclear or non-nuclear situation. They believed, further,

th at a l thou gh ad dit iona l a ircrew trainin g wou ld b e n ecessa ry forsome aspects of nuclear operations, basic tactical skills would

remain the same. Tactical training would simply omit certain

aspects of non-nuclear weapons delivery and emphasize a few

basic techniques such as dive bombing and low alt i tude bomb-

ing which were common to tact ical nuclear and non-nuclear

weapons delivery. Thus it would be feasible to maintain non-

n u clear pr oficien cy with ou t d egra ding a n aircrews ab ility to

deliver tactical nuclear weapons.

In th e year s pr ecedin g th e Korean War, ta ctical air forces werebeing cu t b ack in accorda n ce with th e overall n at iona l policy fol-

lowing World War II. Even with these reduced forces and the

emp h as is on n u clear operat ions , however, there rema in ed a h igh

residuum of experience in non-nuclear operations from World

War II. Despite a shortage of equipment, the high level of experi-

ence permitted expansion and modernization of the tact ical a ir

forces when they were needed in Korea.

KOREAN WARA DILEMMA

When the North Koreans invaded South Korea on 25 June

1950,3 U.S. defense planners carefully evaluated our strategy for

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cond u ctin g lim ited n u clear wa r: Was th e str at egy feas ible in Korea?

Would it be acceptable to our allies? On both counts the strategy

was deficien t. There were few at tra ctive ta rgets for ta ctical n u clear

weapons because of the lack of concentration of North Korean

forces and the many alternative routes of advance afforded the

enemy by the Korean terrain. Further, the Allied forces were

retreating in such disarray that it was unrealistic to suppose that

we cou ld pr omptly tur n them arou n d for a cou n terattack in which

nuclear weapons could provide the basic firepower.

By the time the Allied forces had withdrawn into the Pusan

perim eter, th e employm ent of n u clear weapon s was n ot a r ealis-

t ic option because of the poor targets and the at t i tude of our

al l ies toward these weapons. Air s tra tegy, then, was based onnon-nuclear weapons , and i t comprehended the same miss ions

that tactical air forces had performed in World War II. With the

North Korean Air Force neither a significant threat nor within

range of the retreating Allied forces, air strategy focused initially

on choppin g off the su pply lin es to the Nor th Korean groun d

forces, m ak in g it imposs ible for th ese divis ion s to m ou n t a su s-

tained offensive against the Pusan perimeter. Also a part of this

stra tegy, of cou rse, was a d irect a t tack a gains t as sa u lt in g grou n d

forces. American airmen maintained complete control of the airfor the Inchon invasion and the subsequent advance into North

Korea. Air s tra tegy was an ess en tial pa rt of th e join t s tra tegy.

When the Chinese communists invaded Korea in October

1950 ,4 however, the Allies had to make major revisions in their

strategy. As the enemy forces moved across the border, i t

appeared that Airpower would have to be employed much more

broadly to reduce the numerical superiori ty of the Chinese.

MacArthur proposed that the bridges and l ines of communica-

t ion used by Chinese entering North Korea be subjected to sus-

tained air attack. He felt i t imperative to deny these forces the

san ctua ry they then enjoyed.

Among airmen the question of how Chinese and Soviet Air-

power cou ld b e con ta in ed a lon g the Yalu was deba ted with vigor.

Som e airm en , in clu ding Majors Genera l Em m ett ODonn ell, J r.,

believed it would be necessary to strike the airfields and engage

th e fighters deep in t h e rear a rea s if contr ol of th e air were to be

estab lish ed. (All agreed th at su ch con trol was ab solu tely essen -

t ia l to ou r retreat ing grou n d forces, who were so ba dly out n u m -

bered t h at m an y Am erican s were qu est ioning wheth er th e Allies

could h old a n y position in Korea.)5 ODonn ell an d oth ers ins isted

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5


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tha t the enemy mu st n ot be perm it ted a san c tua ry from which to

attack the Allied air forces and our forward bases.

After cons idera ble delibera tion , th e J oin t Ch iefs r ecom m en ded

th at Far Eas t Comm an ds a ir offens ive n ot be exten ded b eyond

th e Yalu into Man chu ria u n less th e en emy lau n ched m as sive air

at tacks against our forces, in which event American airmen

would destroy the airfields from which the attacks originated.6

For airmen in Korea, the recognit ion of an enemy sanctuary

acros s th e Yalu posed a terrific pr oblem : How were we to conta in

a numerically superior enemy fighter force when all of our for-

ward bases and l ines of communication were open to at tack?

YALUCONTAINMENT OF MIGS

Clearly we had to shift from an air strategy oriented primarily

towar d close su pp ort of ou r groun d forces to a n ew strategy featu r-

in g (1) offen sive figh ter p a trols a lon g th e Ya lu , (2) at ta cks agains t

forward st agin g bas es from which MIGS m ight s trike 5th Air Force

airfields and the 8th Army, and (3) intensive attacks against the

m ain s u pp ly lin es of th e advan cin g Ch in ese ar m y. Th ese air opera-

tions becam e th e prim ary m ean s of preventing th e enem ys a ir a n d

ground forces from pushing the Allied army out of Korea. The 8th

Arm ys ob jective was to h old, ra th er th an to defeat or d estr oy, th eoppos in g grou n d forces. This objective evolved from t h e pr agm at ic

observation that a much larger ground force would be needed to

defeat the enemy. Such a ground campaign would be too long and

too cos tly.

Main tain in g contin u ous pressu re on th e enemys rear ar ea, his

lines of communication, and his engaged troops, Airpower helped

persuade the enemy to cut his losses. The North Koreans were

finally persuaded that they should seek an end to the war at the

conference table rather than on the battlefield, and negotiationsended the conflict on 27 July 1953 after three years of fighting. 7

IMPACT OF KOREAN WAR

With th e end of th e Korean War, defen se plan n ers r eevalu at ed

our s tra tegy for employing Airpower. Perhaps the paramount

qu estion of th e t im e was wh ether we sh ould pr epare to figh t l im -

ited as well as general wars. After the agony and expense of

Korea, an understandably popular posi t ion was that we would

never fight, nor should we prepare to fight, another war like

Korea. Add in g to th e popu lar ity of th is p osition wa s t h e fact th at

it could be used to justify a reduction in defense forces and

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expen ditur es . If a l im ited war sh ou ld br eak ou t , proponen ts s aid,

nuclear weapons could end i t quickly. But the way to prevent

such wars would be to maintain mil i tary and poli t ical pressure

against potential instigators. If the outside support for a limited

conflict were neutralized, the conflict itself would soon die for

lack of weapons and other resources. Most a irmen consented to

the idea th a t n u c lear weapons sh ould be the ba s is of our d efense

strategies , but the Army and Navy maintained that l imited con-

flict was most likely and that limited wars would, at least ini-

tially, be fou ght with con ven tion al weap ons .

Once again nuclear forces were accepted as the dominant ele-

m en t of ou r n at iona l defens e, an d a ll forces were evalu at ed in light

of th eir u sefu ln ess in th e event of n u clear conflict. Resou rces a llo-cat ed to n onn u clear forces were s u fficien t on ly to fight a b rief, very

lim ited war. Th rou ghou t th e m id-fifties, all of th e services a ccepted

the nuclear war premise in their yearly budget arguments. The

Army, however, continued to press for sizeable forces capable of

fighting a limited non-nuclear conflict. Army spokesmen feared

tha t th e domina nt con cern abou t n u clear war was oversha dowin g

the need for ground forces capable of fighting in situations other

th an n u clear b att lefields in Eu rope. Neverth eless , th e su rvivab ility

of forces on a nuclear battlefield continued to be a major concernof m ost s trategists du rin g the p eriod.

THE FRENCH IN INDOCHINA

In 1953 on the eve of Dien Bien Phu, U.S. defense planners dif-

fered widely in th eir op in ions ab ou t t h e a pp ropr iat e role of Airpower

in low sca le conflict. Severa l Ar m y plan n ers felt th a t Airpower cou ld

opera te on ly as a su pp ortin g force. Th e m ain role of Airpower was ,

in their view, the delivery of supplies, equipment, and personnel,

and the support of civic action measures. Whatever firepower was

requ ired to dea l with gu errilla actions wou ldn t d ema n d th e soph is-

ticated weapons of our Airpower arsenal. Based on these views of

Airpower, and the experience of ground warfare in Korea, the pre-

vailin g view in th e U.S. milita ry esta blish m en t was th at U.S. forces

sh ould n ot becom e engaged in Vietna m an d Laos; rath er, we sh ould

continue to support the French in their expansion of Vietnamese

forces to cou n terbalan ce the Viet Min h th reat.

However, some elements of the U.S. military were not con-

vinced the French were making sufficient progress in building

self-sufficiency into the Vietnamese armed forces. They felt that

the French were placing too much emphasis on tra ining for a

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m it m ilitar y forces, it left t h e way open if th e Congress su pp orted

su ch a n action. In one respect, the treaty was essen tially a war n -

in g to the North Vietn am ese th at if th ey att emp ted m ilita ry action

in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, the members of the treaty

organization might respond with military force. U.S. policy at this

point, therefore, was to provide assistance to the French while

th reaten in g to u se greater force if th e North Vietn am ese continu ed

their effort to undermine the governments of South Vietnam and

Laos by covert and overt military actions. Our strategy was based

on th e hope tha t the in su rgen cy wou ld be con tained by the Sou th

Vietna m ese an d Laotian forces a n d th at th ese coun tries of Sou th -

east Asia would eventually achieve a peaceful political accommo-

dat ion a m ong them selves.Contrary to our hopes, it soon became clear that the Soviets,

Chinese, an d North Vietna m ese were not ab out to discontinu e their

support of the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong. Military supplies and

weap ons from th e Peoples Repu blic of Ch in a an d th e Soviet Un ion

made their way through North Vietnam into Laos and South Viet-

n am with in creased frequ ency. By th e begin n in g of 196 1, th e situ -

ation in Laos and South Vietnam had become so critical that

deployment of U.S. forces was under serious consideration.9 Ou r

level of logistical and training support was no longer adequate toh alt th e enemys a dvan ces in Laos a n d Sou th Vietnam , an d th e

th rea t of re ta lia t ion con ta in ed in th e SEATO trea ty was h avin g

little in flu ence on th e North Vietna m ese-ba cked insu rgen ts.

WARS OF LIBERATION

In 19 61 , Kh ru sh ch evs sp eech pr oclaiming wars of libera tion

as th e wars of th e fu tu re an d Presiden t Kenn edys con fronta tion at

Vienna with the Soviet leader led to a vigorous re-examination of

U.S. milita ry str at egy.10 Presiden t Kenn edy then directed t h e expe-

ditious development of U.S. forces with special skills in the con-

duct of counterinsurgency or sub-limited wars. The intention of

his planners was that indigenous forces would suppress guerrilla

activities while our specialists did the training and assisted in

n ation bu ilding.

This reorientation of our defense priorities toward smaller con-

flicts prompted considerable debate about how best to cope with

th ese wars. In th e Arm y, m ost believed th at it was n ecess ary to cre-

ate Special Forces (Green Berets) specifically trained and organized

for counterinsurgency activities. In the Air Force, many believed

th at existing tactical forces cou ld a djus t to coun terin su rgen cy war-

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for gu errilla wa r fa re s in ce World War II. Man y sen ior a ir m en st ill

quest ioned the wisdom of invest ing in such units , but Secretary

McNam ara s ta ted th at th e Vietna m ese con flic t sh ould be a lab -

oratory for the development of organizations and procedures for

the conduct of sub-limited war,13 an d we respon ded with an al l-

out effort to put together a unit of World War II aircraft capable

of fightin g su b-lim ited war s. Ou r efforts were spu rred , too, by th e

visit of Walt W. Rostow and General Maxwell D. Taylor to South

Vietna m in October 19 61 . Th ey recom m end ed m ore aid for Sou th

Vietnam and supported the decis ion made earl ier in the month

to deploy U.S. troops for logistical support and training. By

November, we were ready to deploy a combat unit of Air Com-

m an dos equipped with T28s , 1J -26s , an d oth er vin tage aircraft .J UNGLE J IM was th e nickn am e given th is u n it , an d th e detach-

ment that deployed to South Vietnam was dubbed FARM GATE.

FARM GATEs pu rpos e was to tr ain Sou th Vietn am ese p ilots,

bu t ou r crews soon fou n d th ems elves flyin g comb at m iss ions in

response to emergency requests . The South Vietnamese Air

Force (VNAF) simply could not provide all of the help that was

urgently needed by the South Vietnamese Army. FARM GATE,

therefore, was engaged in combat operations before the close of

196 2, an d U.S. forces p as sed from t h e gray area of tra ining in toa lim ited com ba t r ole in a su b-lim ited wa r.

JOINT TASK FORCE 116RESPONSE TO CRISIS IN LAOS

Most U.S. defense planners considered Laos to be an area of

s t ra tegic imp or tance becau se of it s loca t ion b e tween Chin a an d

Th ailan d. In th e event of war b etween th e U.S. an d Ch in a, Laos

could delay Chinese forces seeking to overrun Thailand. Realis-

tically, we cou ld n ot expect Laos to be ou r a lly, bu t Laotian n eu -

trality, at least, was essential to the security of Thailand. How-

ever, by the spring of 1962, the North Vietnamese supported

Pathe t Lao appeared about to capture most of the impor tant

ar eas of th e cou n try. Th rea ts of U.S. in terven tion , im plicit in th e

SEATO Treaty, ha d n o sign ifican t imp act on th e con flict or on t h e

peace n egotiat ion s th en tak in g place in Geneva.

The Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) had developed var-

iou s cont in gen cy plan s for Sou th eas t Asia, one of which ad dres sed

precisely th e situ at ion t h en existing in Laos. Increas in gly alar m ed

by events in Laos, President Kennedy activated the plan, thereby

directing th e deploymen t of a J oin t Task Force to Th ailan d. J TF-

11 6 cons isted m ostly of air u n its, a n d th e possibility th at th is force

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migh t be emp loyed again st th e Path et Lao was, an d was in tend ed

to be, appa rent to all. Wh ether a cau sa l relation sh ip or m ere coin -

ciden ce was at work, th e Com mu n ist n egotiators in Gen eva foun d

th e proffered pea ce agreem en t in creas in gly attra ctive as J TF-l 16

moved into Thailand. An agreement to abide by the 1954 Accord

was sign ed on 23 J u ly 196 2. Th e U.S. had n ot been a s ignatory to

th e Accord, b u t we agreed to accept its p rovision s.

Unfortu n at ely, th e North Vietn am ese willin gnes s t o avoid J TF-

11 6 far exceeded t h eir willin gnes s to comp ly with th e Geneva Agree-

ment. Our own efforts to comply now seem almost pathetically

naive in comparison with the open contempt for the agreement

dem ons trat ed by th e North Vietna m ese. Wh ile we began with dra w-

in g ou r a dvisors from Sou th east Asia in accorda n ce with th e agree-

m en t, th e North Vietn am ese were with dr awin g n one of th eir forces.

Furthermore, based on our interpretation of Articles 17-19 of the

original accord, we deferred the modernizing of FARM GATE units

in South Vietnam with jet aircraft. Basically, the articles restricted

th e replacemen t of worn -ou t equipm ent with n ew types of ar m s a n d

materiel to a piece-by-piece basis. These articles were particularly

troublesome to our Air Force planners, but much less so to the

North Vietna m ese who s im ply ign ored th em from th e out set.

13

An Air Commando poses in front of his U-10 Psywar aircraft somewhere in the

heart of South Vietnam.


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So desp ite th e Geneva Agreemen t, it was eviden t th at th e s i t-

u ation in Sou th east Asia was n ot im provin g. By m id-196 2, ma n y

other senior a irmen and I were of the opinion that a ir s tr ikes

against the North Vietnamese homeland would be necessary if

th e war in Sou th Vietna m were to be en ded. Th e only al tern ative,

in our view, would be the deployment of numerous American

ground forces. But even as early as 1962, opinion was sharply

divided on th e iss u e of Airp owers a bility to s top th e figh tin g in

South Vietnam. Among those who disagreed with our posit ion

was Secretary McNamara, who said that while naval and air

su pp ort ar e desirab le, they wont win th e war.14 Par ad oxically, a

figure who offered cons iderab le su pport to our con tention ab ou t

the importance of the revolutionary base in North Vietnam wasGen era l Vo Ngu yen Giap , th e ar ch itect of th e victory at Dien Bien

Phu an d in 196 2 Comm an der of th e North Vietna m ese Arm y. He

was a lways clear ab out th e facts th at North Vietna m was th e rev-

olu tiona ry ba se an d th at th e su ccess of com m u n ist m ilitar y oper-

at ions in Laos and South Vietnam depended direct ly upon the

support and employment of North Vietnamese forces. In 1962,

however, relatively few senior DOD officials thought seriously

about a strategic air offensive against North Vietnam. For the

time being, our efforts and our strategy were limited to SouthVietnam.

Th rou ghou t 19 63, th e Nor th Vie tna m ese con t in u ed to in fil-

t r a t e pe r s onne l a nd e qu ipm e n t . Fu r the r m or e , t he im pr ove d

qua l i ty of the i r weapons ind ica ted tha t more modern a rms

were be ing shipped f rom China and the Sovie t Union. Most

sen ior U.S . comm an ders with whom I t a lked in 19 63 fe lt su re

tha t the war in South Vie tnam was rap id ly expanding in to a

conven t ion al conflic t , a lth ou gh a n u m ber of DOD plan n ers s t ill

be l ieved the war was pr imar i ly an insurgency tha t could bebrou ght u n der con t ro l with in Sou th Vie tna m if we t ra ined a n d

equipped t h e Sou th Vie tna m ese pr ope r ly. Sec re ta ry McNam ara

sa id th a t Sou th Vie tna m i s a t e s t cas e for the n ew Com m u n is t

s t ra tegy,1 5 by wh ic h h e s e em e d to m e a n tha t Sou th Vie tna m

would be a tes t case , too, for his s t ra tegy of graduated

respon se to pr ovoca t ion .

A CHANGING ROLETHE U.S. TO FIGHT

Early in 19 64, th e J oin t Ch iefs of Staff recom m end ed th at t h e

U.S. take over the fighting in South Vietnam. They had previ-

ously directed Admiral Harry D. Felt, CINCPAC, to update con-

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t ingency plans and to propose a s tra tegy for an air campaign

against North Vietnam. Felt proposed a series of measures

designed to seal off North Vietnam by mining harbors and

atta ckin g sh ipping an d s elected l in es of com m u n ication. 16 Senior

airm en a greed with Felts p roposals bu t a dded th at i t wou ld a lso

be n ecessa ry to cu t off th e in filt ra t ion of m en an d equ ipm ent in to

South Vietnam by at tacking the North Vietnamese homeland.

Cutting lines of communication (LOCs) would be relatively inef-

fective because most of them were hidden by jungle growth and

becau se th e North Vietna m ese cou ld m u lt iply th em a lm ost in def-

initely simply by pressing more porters into service. In accor-

da n ce with DOD policy, h owever, Felts s tr a tegy was requ ired t o

be one of graduated response: Air strikes would begin on targets

close to the DMZ, gradually working toward the North Vietnam-

ese hear t lan d with an in creasing sort ie ra te .

Alth ough th e J oin t Ch iefs a greed th at th e U.S. wou ld h ave to

intervene if South Vietnam were to be saved, they were not in

complete agreement on precisely how we should intervene. Gen-

eral Curtis E. LeMay, USAF Chief of Staff, argued for a concen-

trated at ta ck again st t argets in th e hea rt of North Vietna m . In di-

rect a t tacks in South Vietnam and Laos, in his judgment, were

n ot ap t to be d ecisive.17 He recomm ended tha t a min imu m n u m-

ber of troops be deployed to South Vietnam immediately to

secure the main airf ie lds and other s tra tegic areas. Then we

should conduct a swift, devastating air offensive against North

Vietn am s st ra tegic ta rgets. All of h is experien ce h ad ta u ght h im

th at su ch a ca m pa ign would end th e war. If th is s tra t egy fai led,

h e sa id, we sh ould th en h ave to cons ider wh ether we were will-

ing to deploy a large ground force to Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, General Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of

Staff , thought i t necessary for U.S. t roops in South Vietnam to

take on more of the combat role. An air campaign, he believed,

sh ould be directed at th e lin es of com m u n ication n ear th e border

of Sou th Vietna m , bu t n ot a t th e hea rt lan d of North Vietna m . Th e

m ain emp h as is s h ou ld be on th e Ho Chi Min h Trail an d th e logis-

tical network south of Vinh. Most senior Army officials believed

tha t the war had to be won in South Vie tnam and tha t the a i r

campaign should support the in-country war chiefly through

close air su pport .18

The Army view was essentially that of Secretary McNamara. He

believed th at th e war s h ould be fought in Sou th Vietnam an d th at

the main roles of Airpower should be close air support and inter-

diction of lin es of com m u n ication sou th of th e 20 th pa rallel an d in

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Laos. The Secretary felt that the threat of air attacks on military

and industrial targets could influence the North Vietnamese to

restrain their support of the Viet Cong, but he disagreed with

LeMay and other senior airmen who insisted that the only way to

end the North Vietnamese pressure on South Vietnam was to

destr oy th e war -related in sta llation s in North Vietna m .

On 1 June 1964 a top-level strategy conference convened at

CINCPAC Headqu arters in Hon olu lu . Th ose in atten da n ce in clu ded

General William C. Westmoreland who was about to replace Gen-

eral Paul D. Harkins as Chief of Military Assistance Command,

Vietn am (MACV); Genera l Maxwell D. Taylor, Cha ir m an of th e J oin t

Chiefs of Staff; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge; Secretary of State

Dean Rusk; and Secretary McNamara. Before the conference,LeMay an d Gen eral Wallace M. Green e, J r., Com m an da n t of th e

Marine Corps, had been pressing the view that air attacks against

the North Vietnamese were essential to halting the war in South

Vietnam.19 Admiral David L. McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations,

agreed ess en tially with LeMays a n d Green es view, bu t h e wou ld

have placed more emphasis on sealing off North Vietnam from

external support, and less emphasis on attacks against industrial

targets. At the conference, however, Taylor questioned whether we

sh ould a ttack North Vietna m at all. He agreed with th e Secretar y ofDefense that our main efforts should be designed to bolster the

forces of South Vietnam and to cut the lines of communication in

Laos. If attacks were to be made against North Vietnam, Taylor

believed th ey sh ou ld b e n ear th e DMZ, u sing U.S. an d Sou th Viet-

n am ese aircraft to demon stra te ou r join t resolve to expa n d th e con-

flict if it continued in Laos and South Vietnam.

BOMB THE NORTH?NO AGREEMENT

The U.S. strategy that emerged from the June 1964 Honolulu

Conference differed in no important way from our pre-Conference

strategy: We would build the South Vietnamese armed forces; pro-

vide combat support when the South Vietnamese were unable to

handle the situation; and, if air attacks against North Vietnamese

targets should be necessary, we would select only targets near the

DMZ an d would u se both U.S. an d Sou th Vietna m ese aircraft.

Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, who replaced Admiral Felt as

CINCPAC shortly after the Honolulu Conference, believed that

this s tra tegy would not force the North Vietnamese to s top the

fightin g in Sou th Vietna m an d Laos. Th u s h e add ed h is voice to

those of LeMay and Greene, urging that Airpower and naval

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power be applied directly against North Vietn

airpower in three wars

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