ahrari - america's search for a post-cold war grand strategy (1994)

This article was downloaded by: [Arizona State University]On: 02 July 2012, At: 13:54Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

European SecurityPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/feus20

America's search for apost‐cold war grand strategyM.E. Ahrari aa US Armed Forces Staff College, Professor ofNational Security and Strategy,

Version of record first published: 19 Oct 2007

To cite this article: M.E. Ahrari (1994): America's search for a post‐cold wargrand strategy, European Security, 3:3, 417-440

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839408407181

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or makeany representation that the contents will be complete or accurate orup to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publishershall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/feus20

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839408407181

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012

America's Search for a Post-Cold WarGrand Strategy

M.E. AHRARI

The end of the Cold War in 1989 also brought about an end to contain-ment, which evolved as a post-World War II grand strategy of the UnitedStates. Now American foreign policy appears to be in quest of a new grandstrategy, one that is in pace with the revolutionary changes that haveoccurred in superpower relations since 1985 - a year that witnessedthe accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the former USSR. Whenthe US-led international coalition dismantled the military machine ofSaddam Hussein in 1991, former President George Bush - who previouslyadmitted that he lacked 'the vision thing' - started to share with theworld his vision of an emerging new world order (NWO), and began todescribe, in general terms, the modalities of America's role in it. Atleast for a while, it appeared that this discussion of the NWO was alsosymbolizing America's quest for a new grand strategy. Thus far, PresidentBill Clinton has been too busy with the domestic agenda to spell out hisown vision of America's strategic purpose in the post-Cold War world.Even when he is forced to focus his attention on world affairs - as hewas on several occasions - his own perspective on America's strategicpurpose is not likely to deviate too far from what we have understoodabout the generalities of the NWO. A new world order or not, in thisessay, I will examine problems and prospects that await US foreignpolicy in the 1990s and beyond.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

'Grand strategy' is one of those concepts whose meaning, though not atall clear, is taken for granted. Barry Posen describes it as 'a political-military means-ends chain, a state's theory about how it can best "cause"security for itself. He further posits that a 'grand strategy must identifylikely threats to the state's security and it must devise political, economicmilitary, and other remedies for those threats."

Paul Kennedy's definition perhaps is most succinct. 'Grand Strategy',he writes, is 'the highest type of strategy ..." which so integrates thepolicies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is eitherrendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of

European Security, Vol .3, No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp.417-440.PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012

418 EUROPEAN SECURITY

victory. It is pursued by a nation during peace and war times. The 'cruxof grand strategy lies .. . in policy that is in the capacity of the nation'sleaders to bring together all of elements, both military and non-military,for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term .. . bestinterests.'2

A comprehensive analysis of the American grand strategy is not possiblein an essay. Instead, I will largely focus on the military aspect, whilepointing out the complementarity of military policies to other politico-economic aspects of this grand strategy.

Posen treats military doctrine as a 'sub-component' of grand strategy'that explicitly deals with military means'. I contend that in order fora grand strategy to be effective at a given time, it has to be based on anexplicit military sub-component. Such an assigned significance to thissub-component was perhaps most relevant to the Cold War environmentwhen the common enemy (i.e., international communism) was easy toidentify for the non-communist industrial world. The post-Cold Warenvironment, on the other hand, is devoid of such a visible enemy. Thismight also account for the difficulty in developing a grand strategy onthe part of the United States, the only remaining superpower.

A standard definition of a doctrine is that it spells out 'fundamentalprinciples by which military forces guide their actions in support ofobjectives.'3 I am using the term military doctrine in a broader sensethan that. Fritz Ermarth's description of 'strategic doctrines' comes closeto what I intend military doctrine to mean in this essay. According tohim, strategic doctrine may be defined as 'a set of operative beliefs,values, and assertions that in a significant way guide behaviour withrespect to strategic research development, weapons, choice, forces,operational plans, arms control, etc.'4 It is true that, as Aaron Friedbergnotes, 'by any reasonable definition of the word, this country has neverhad a strategic doctrine.'5 By, military doctrines, I am referring to broadpolicy statements (i.e., a set of operative beliefs and assertions) that weremade by various administrations - from Truman to Bush - conveyingthe essence of potential American military response to similar Sovietactions in those areas regarded as part of its vital interests by the UnitedStates. Two elements that are necessary preconditions for any militarydoctrines (as the term is used here) are sufficient visibility of militarypreparation and credibility.

Containment evolved as a grand strategy for the United States, especiallyin National Security Council Directive 68, which was prepared duringthe Truman administration. Since then, all presidents, including the lastCold War president, George Bush, pursued it without doubting its validityor relevance to the national security of the United States.6 Even when

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012

US SEARCH FOR A GRAND STRATEGY 419

detente emerged as a major tactical characteristic during the Nixon-Fordadministrations, the United States did not abandon containment. Thetemporary abandonment of detente during the Carter administration wasfollowed by a resuscitation of the Cold War rhetoric, which lasted throughthe first Reagan administration. This resuscitation was in response to theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan that took place in the final year of theCarter presidency.

The notion of continuity, which is a crucial condition for a grandstrategy, was also a characteristic of containment between 1947 and1989 - the year the Berlin Wall came down, symbolizing the end of theCold War. Of course, one can expect a fine-tuning of various aspects ofa grand strategy as well as tactical variations that are warranted fromtime to time (or from one President to the next). However, its abandon-ment is not expected unless such a radical change is necessary because ofequally significant mutations in the international environment. Accordingto Paul Kennedy, grand strategy 'relies... on the constant and intelligentreassessment of the polity's ends and means... '7

Another concept that is worth defining is the 'new world order'(NWO). It should be noted that no precise definition of this conceptexists. What follows is its broad outline based upon statements made bynumerous officials of the Bush administration - the last Cold Waradministration - and on the thinking of various foreign policy specialists.As the Bush administration perceived it, the NWO is likely to have thefollowing characteristics. First, it was to be a system of US dominanceof world political and economic scenes - a benign Pax Americana on aglobal scale. Second, the US security capability under such a system wouldserve as a protective umbrella against the shenanigans of a potentialaggressor in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. However, in the wakeof the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and after the dismantlementof the military might of Saddam Hussein, no one seemed to have a clueas to who the potential aggressors of the coming decades were likely tobe. Third, the NWO was envisioned as a system where disputes amongnations would be settled amicably and without resort to violence. TheUnited Nations would be playing an active role in mediating and settlingdisputes. In the final analysis, the potential US intervention would be us-ed to deter the aggressive designs of a nation. Fourth, the NWO would bea system where economic cooperation - as opposed to disfunctionaleconomic nationalism - would be a dominant modus operandi amongnation-states. International trade was expected to continue its expansionbased on market-oriented economies. Fifth, in the realm of politics,democratic ways of governance in the non-democratic parts of the worldwere expected to be promoted in the NWO. Finally, the NWO would

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


be characterized by cooperation among all great powers on majorinternational issues.

The dynamics of conflicts in the post-Cold War years are such that newmodes must be devised to tackle them. Unlike the supposed monolithiccommunism of the Cold War years, the bad guys are hard to disciplineeven when they are identified as such. The United States has the militarycapabilities to fight conventional conflicts of the Cold War years. How toresolve the new ethnic conflicts that are based on chauvinistic nationalismin Europe, for instance, is an issue no one has come to grips with. Moreoverthe bad guys of the 1990s defy the kind of solution a policy like contain-ment was aimed at imposing. Unlike the Cold War years, US leadershipis not going to be accepted by European allies with the single-mindednessof the Cold War years to defeat an enemy. Most important, the post-Cold War world is a place where America lacks a strategic purpose - agrand strategy — for its foreign policy.

In Part I of this essay I will present an overview of the evolution ofContainment as a grand strategy and its attendant military doctrinesbetween the 1940s and 1980s. The dominance of security-related threatsin the international political system to Western Europe and the US playeda crucial role in the evolution and pursuit of Containment. The superpowermilitary competition during these years was also equally significant infocusing on, and targeting, an enemy - the USSR.

In the second part I will underscore how the emerging realities of theinternational political and economic systems in the 1990s and beyondare posing new challenges to the US dominance.

I. FORTY YEARS OF CONTAINMENT: AN OVERVIEW

A. The Jelling of Containment: 1945-1970The Cold War, which lasted from 1945 to 1989, provided reasons forstability and continuity in American foreign policy. Under the three-pronged approaches of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, andcontainment, the United States set out to rebuild Western Europe in itsown image, and minimize the chances of takeover of that region by theSoviet Union through overt or covert actions.

International communism had been perceived as a monolithic threat todemocratic pluralism since the 1920s. However, with the emergence of theUSSR as a major military power in the 1940s, the United States developedan exaggerated perception of its capabilities. Of course, Stalin's maneuversin Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II convinced Americandecisionmakers that the ultimate aim of that communist state was to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


continue destabilizing European countries, thereby extending its controlwestward.

The reconstruction of Western Europe in order to stabilize it econ-omically, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) to protect it militarily, were the two chief responses of USforeign policy. American resolve in creating a post-World War II orderin Western Europe through these actions had left no doubt for the Sovietleaders as to how far the United States would go in defending it. Theshort-lived American nuclear monopoly in the 1940s - in tandem withits demonstrated willingness to use nuclear weapons in Hiroshima andNagasaki - also served as a decisively credible deterrent against anyprecipitous Soviet measures in Europe.

But Asia was still an open arena for US-Soviet rivalry. The successof the communist revolution in China in 1949 and the outbreak of theKorean conflict in 1950 served as persuasive evidence of the threats posedby international communism to political stability in northeast Asia. Asfar as the United States was concerned, the noncommunist political orderin East Asia was threatened by the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC)and North Korea. The American inheritance of the Vietnamese conflictafter a decisive French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (1954) was rationalizedthrough the Domino Theory. Amplifying on this theory, President DwightEisenhower, in a letter to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,noted, 'If . . . Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists theultimate effect on our and your global strategic position with the conse-quent shift in the power ratios through Asia and the Pacific could bedisastrous.'8

In the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration followed a policyof 'pactomania' to contain the Soviet Union. This phrase describes thefeverish pitch with which the United States was seeking allies to combatinternational communism in the Third World. Even though this policycreated several alliances, its effectiveness to deal with various Third Worldcountries remained questionable, at best. For instance, this policy ofseeking allies brought the Cold War and Containment to the Middle Eastwith a vengeance. There was to be no difference between those nationswhich sided with the Soviet Union and those who wished to remainnonaligned.

The only serious challenge to American interests in the Middle Eaststemmed from (at least as perceived by the American policy-makers) thepolitical and diplomatic maneuvers of President Gamal Abdel Nasser ofEgypt. Yet in reality, the struggle between the Nasserite and monarchicalforces in the 1950s and the 1960s was a natural outcome of that region'sgaining of independence from Western colonial subjugation. However,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


the near-obsession of American decision-makers with the global con-tainment of Communism kept them from understanding the real natureof this struggle. It should be noted that the Eisenhower administrationcame to this realization in the last two years of its tenure in office (1959—60).9

Washington's involvement in Vietnam continued to escalate in theKennedy and Johnson administrations (1961 -68). The growing Americanfrustration with the intractability of this war was manifested in a risingstorm of public protest. This was also the beginning of a new congressionalassertiveness marked by the public prosecution of this war by SenatorWilliam Fulbright in his capacity as the chairman of the Senate ForeignRelations Committee. The political unwillingness of America to win amilitary victory in effect drove President Lyndon Johnson from office.His successor Richard Nixon sought an end to this war through a dual-track policy of graduated escalation and continued negotiations with therepresentatives of North Vietnam.

In Nixon and in his European-born National Security Council AdviserHenry Kissinger, the United States had two individuals who were seekinga political resolution of the Vietnam war without damaging Americanpreeminence on the world scene. Both of them perceived their countryas a declining power. As such, the dynamics of bringing about an endto American involvement in Vietnam was to have long-range implicationsfor US strategic interests worldwide. In their complex world-view,Washington's disengagement from Vietnam had to be brought about ina way that would render that superpower's dominance in Europe intact.The United States had also been losing its economic dominance betweenthe 1940s and the 1970s.10 This was dramatized in no less an eventthan in the imposition of the oil embargo by the members of the ArabPetroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).11

B. Detente and the 'new Cold War': 1970s-1980sNixon and Kissinger definitely saw an international decline of Americanpower and prestige, more in the economic sphere than in the militaryone. However, from their perspective, these erosions could be arrestedif Washington deliberately attempted to manage the world order along withthe USSR, Western Europe, Japan, and the PRC. This pentagonal manage-ment could be in the best American interests if all the other managers,but most importantly the Soviet Union, could be persuaded to go along.12

This could only be done by creating a web of interests for the Soviet Unionas a quid pro quo for its cooperation. As one can imagine, the manicheanAmerican perception of the Soviet Union as an evil force had undergoneconsiderable changes since the days of John Foster Dulles. Now Soviet

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


behavior was being judged on the basis of interests, a more realistic anda hard-nosed approach. The complex thinking of Nixon-Kissinger even-tually led to an equally sophisticated policy of detente between the UnitedStates and the USSR. In order for detente to succeed, however, it had notonly to be managed at different levels, but coordinated among differentactors, and on a variety of issues. Its sheer complexity doomed it fromthe very beginning because it contained enormous points of confusion,potential for mixed signals, garbled messages, and misunderstandings.

The American defeat in Vietnam was brought about as a result of alack of political will on the part of the American leadership to win thewar. How the openness of a democratic system could become the verysource of its defeat in a unpopular war could have never become moreapparent than it was during the American involvement in the Vietnamconflict. The public protestations and grumblings between 1965 and 1968,and the public prosecution of this war by the Congress, were only manifesta-tions of the declining American resolve to emerge victorious. PresidentJohnson's decision not to run for a second term of office was the mosteffective public signal that the United States' extrication from Vietnamwas only a matter of time. The congressional and presidential tug-and-pull on this issue conveyed to the North Vietnamese that their intransigenceat the negotiating table was bound to pay off.

The Watergate scandal of 1973 - that simultaneously brought aboutthe end of the 'imperial presidency' and marked the beginning of the'tethered presidency' - was a major setback to Containment.13 Nixon'soften-repeated 'peace with honor' lost its popular reception; the assertive(according to some scholars, 'imperial') congress was in no mood to goon financing an American presence in Vietnam or Cambodia.

The humiliating American withdrawal from Vietnam and Cambodiaalso seriously tainted detente. Nixon - the President who, along withKissinger, clearly masterminded this complex relation with the SovietUnion - resigned from his office in disrepute. President Gerald Ford,his successor, had the difficult task of continuing the Nixon legacy ofdetente, which was coming under increasing scrutiny between 1973 and1975. In the American domestic arena, the Soviet Union was not makingthe matter easy for the supporters of detente either.

One of the major reasons detente became so controversial within theUnited States was that it was based on a system of reward and punishment- a notion that was often described as 'linkages'. This type of relationshipcan indeed become problematic between any two nations. For superpowers,with their intricate and manifold interests, these problems were magnified.First of all, there was a definitional problem. What exactly did each sidewant from the other before it considered its counterpart in violation of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


detente? Second, and related to the preceding, was a perceptual or boun-dary problem. What were the mutually acceptable boundaries of behavioron issues of strategic concern? Third, it was assumed by the UnitedStates that cooperation in one area should be linked to others, whilethe USSR had a vision of a compartmentalized relationship. Accordingto this view, each superpower was to act on different issues solely inpursuit of its best interests. Such a pursuit might not strictly be in thespirit of detente, however. Fourth, the notion of linkages also came intoconflict with the separation of powers that is a constitutional realityof American government. For instance, while Nixon and Kissingerwanted use the granting of the most-favored-nation (MFN) status to theUSSR as a carrot, in order to receive Soviet cooperation on the on-goingVietnam negotiations and arms control, the US Senate, on the contrary,linked the granting of MFN status to Jewish emigration from the SovietUnion.

The most contentious problem related to detente was Moscow'sinvolvement in the Third World. The 1970s was a troubled decade fromthe perspective of US foreign policy. A significant idiosyncrasy ofAmerican politics is that foreign policy successes have accompanied aperiod of great exhilaration and an attendant exaggerated notion ofAmerican capabilities in the world arena. At the same time, foreign policyfailures - and Vietnam certainly falls in this category - led to a periodof pessimism that was also accompanied by a debate of gloom and doomunderscoring American impotency. The American withdrawal fromVietnam, as can be expected, triggered a period of pessimism. Sovietforeign policy activism in the Third World - which was labelled as'adventurism' — created within the United States demands for abandoningdetente and becoming 'tough' with that country. The American defeat inVietnam also convinced the foreign policy specialists of that country'sdecline. Containment as a grand strategy fell also into disrepute. Apessimistic debate also ensued in the domestic arena, whose purpose wasto find 'new creed, taking account of the failure in Vietnam' and to offer'a new direction' for American foreign policy in the coming years.14

Even though Containment as a grand strategy came under heavycriticism, and detente as a tactical maneuver drew a lot of fire, there wereno alternatives to these. The world of the 1970s was too cumbersome tolook for easy solutions to intricate international problems. Americanstakes were too high, and they involved too many allies, for that super-power to wallow in any form of neo-isolationism. The European detente,started by the Ostpolitik of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt,remained intact. It was felt in Washington that Western Europe was notabout to abandon detente or put it in a deep freeze merely because

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


it became unpopular in America. For the United States, the choice wasrather straightforward, that is, to deal with the Soviet Union strictly inpursuit of its own and allied interests and stakes. However, since thenature of Soviet involvement in the Third World had become such alightning rod of controversy in the domestic arena, it was becomingincreasingly difficult for Washington to justify the continuation of detenteunless Moscow made suitable reciprocative gestures. The Soviet invasionof Afghanistan could not have come at a more inappropriate time fromthe perspective of a continued policy of detente.

One of the major contributions of the Nixon administration to Contain-ment was the Nixon Doctrine. Through this, the United States was to relyon regional powers to defend the noncommunist world order. In essence,the enunciation of this doctrine may also be viewed as only a new wrinkleto the policy of pactomania that was adopted during the first Eisenhoweradministration (1953-57).

The application of the Nixon Doctrine in the Persian Gulf facilitatedthe emergence of the Shah of Iran as a defender of the pro-Western statusquo in that region, especially since Great Britain's decision of 1970 to pullout of that area. American dominance remained unchallenged in thatregion until the twin-developments of 1978-79 - the Islamic revolutionin Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Shah of Iran's ruleended along with the monarchy. The Islamic revolution emerged as ananti-superpower and anti-Western phenomenon. The Soviet Union invadedAfghanistan in December 1979, and that conflict lasted until 1988 whenit announced it intended to withdraw.

Even though the United States never attached much strategic value toAfghanistan, its Soviet occupation in tandem with the end of monarchyin Iran initiated a turn toward a military buildup. It was felt in the UnitedStates that since the hostile forces in the international arena understood thelanguage of power, Washington must pay attention to supplying moremuscles to its military might. Now the United States was to indulge itselfin a massive military expansion and active involvement in different regionsof the world. The Reagan administration, which soon succeeded the Carteradministration, also resuscitated the Cold War rhetoric of depicting theSoviet Union as an 'evil empire' and as the 'focus of evil'. Declaring thatthe United States allowed the Soviet Union a military edge in the StrategicArms Limitations (SALT) talks, President Ronald Reagan announced amilitary buildup of $1.6 trillion over a period of the next five years andrefused to continue arms control negotiations until America militarilycaught up with it. His rationale was that Washington was going to negotiatefrom a position of strength. Thus, Containment took a new turn to thepre-detente days of heated rhetorical exchanges and renewed arms buildup.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


The hardline stance of President Reagan - especially his insistence onnegotiating with the Soviets from a position of strength and his refusalto negotiate on arms control as agreed by the NATO Council in 1979 -caused considerable friction among the European allies.

Reagan also wanted to increase the cost of military activism for theSoviet Union by arming anti-Communist forces in Afghanistan, Mozam-bique, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. This policy,dubbed the Reagan Doctrine, proved to be controversial for the USCongress regarding the two Central American states.

Reagan's policy of 'global, all continents, coercive containment"5

also raised a storm of controversy in the Middle East. It was either hisadministration's lack of understanding of the intricacies of that region,or its preoccupation with anti-Sovietism, or a combination of both thatresulted in the misguided policy of seeking a 'strategic consensus' amongthe Middle Eastern states. This policy, in tandem with a high priority formilitary assistance that was continuously pursued by the Reagan admin-istration, did little to contain the rising spirals of arms races in the MiddleEast. The Iran-Iraq war was only one reminder of how deadly theregional conflict was becoming in that area in the 1980s.

One witnesses a modicum of realism regarding the Soviet Union inthe second term of President Reagan (1984-88). It was this realism thatresulted in the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)treaty in December 1987. Yet one should realize that by that year,Mikhail Gorbachev already had been at the helm of the Soviet Unionfor almost three years (he came to power in March 1985). Gorbachev's'new political thinking' will go down in history as one of the majorreasons underlying the eventual conclusion of the Cold War. Consequently,Containment as a grand strategy became less relevant (if not irrelevant).One can only enumerate some of the iconoclastic changes that werebrought about as a result of this thinking: the liberation of EasternEuropean countries, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moscow'sretrenchment from the competitive and confrontational conflicts of theThird World, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the INF treaty, reunificationof Germany, etc.

C. Military Doctrines of the Containment Era: 1940s-1980sThe use of military strength as an instrument of power is as old as humancivilization. As one of the dominant nation-states of the post-WorldWar II era, the United States remained quite sensitive to this reality.Appropriate military doctrines were required to pursue the politicalobjectives of Containment - that is offering credible evidence to theSoviet Union that in the areas of vital American interests, no precipitous

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


act aimed at altering the political status quo would be tolerated. Of course,not all areas of the world could have been labelled as part of vitalinterests. George Kennan's writing became a sort of a blueprint of whatthe United States regarded as its vital interests. As Kennan saw it, 'onlyfive centers of the industrial and military power in the world' are importantto the United States 'from the standpoint of national security'. Theseincluded the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany,and Japan. Only these regions had 'the requisite conditions of climate,of industrial strength, of population and of tradition which would enablepeople there to develop and launch the type of amphibious power whichwould have to be launched if our national security were seriouslyaffected.'16 The primary focus of Containment and its economic counter-part, the Marshall plan, was on these regions. NATO was specifically estab-lished to defend Europe militarily from any overt Soviet actions. TheJapanese-American Security Treaty of 1951 (revised in 1961), which is abilateral pact, made the United States responsible for the security of Japan.

Even before the atomic bomb became a reality, the focus of debateamong the top American decision-makers was not whether it should be usedas an instrument of policy, but how, when, and where to use it.17 This wasthe genesis of the military doctrines the United States developed in supportof its grand strategy. The fact that it used the atomic bomb on Japan in1945 not only established a precedent but also served as unquestionableevidence that it would use it again if and when its vital interests areperceived to have been threatened. Moreover, even though the bomb wasused on Japan, its real audience was the Soviet Union, and the intent wasto make that country 'more manageable in Europe'.18 Thus, the bombbecame an instrument of Containment. American reliance on nuclearweapons also was in harmony with a strong historical tradition of notmaintaining a large standing army in peacetime. American militarycapabilities 'were to be developed and maintained to assure the effective-ness of President Truman's Cold War policies'.19 The United States alsodeliberately made its military capabilities 'sufficiently visible to deter anypotential aggressor'. This was the beginning of what was later on knownas the strategy of deterrence.20

According to Henry Kissinger, 'Deterrence requires a combination ofpower and the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potentialaggressor. ' He goes on to observe that... 'deterrence is a product of thosefactors and not a sum. If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails.'21

The Truman administration's decision to use the bomb as an instrumentof deterrence, emerged as a tradition of complementing the grand strategyof Containment with a variety of military doctrines. Successive admin-istrations followed it as a creed.22

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


During the first Eisenhower administration there emerged two significantconcepts. First, the United States remained preoccupied with protectingits territory against a potential strategic bombardment. The second conceptwas the administration's sustenance of massive retaliation capabilities,which was perceived as a deterrent to any potential Soviet aggressivedesigns. Even in terms of seeking allies in Asia and the Middle East, inorder to contain the USSR, the United States relied on security (noteconomic) assistance. The rationale was to enhance the military capabilitiesof its Third World allies and to stabilize their respective regions. Theadministration's insistence on massive retaliation notwithstanding, theUnited States 'had as early as 1956 accepted the essentials of mutualstrategic deterrence as an operational guide'.23

The Soviet entry into space in 1957 caused considerable consternationwithin the United States. However, by 1958, with the development of1,500-mile range Thor and Jupiter missiles, which were to be deployedin Britain. Italy and Turkey, the two superpowers closed whatever long-range ballistic missile gap might have prevailed between them, therebyestablishing a delicate 'balance of terror'.

The perception of progress that the Soviet Union had created bylaunching its Sputnik in 1957 created a widespread suspicion among theUS foreign policy elites that America was somehow lagging. The Eisen-hower administration did its utmost to assure the absence of a deterrencegap; however, the seed for what later turned out to be a pseudo 'missilegap' debate were already sown. By 1961 a newly-orbited reconnaissancesatellite proved that the 'Soviet ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile]force was in fact much smaller than the US forces.'24

As the Soviet Union enhanced its own retaliatory capabilities in the1960s, the United States moved away from massive retaliation to 'flexibleresponse', which involved 'a range of appropriate responses, conventionaland nuclear, to all levels of aggressions or threats of aggression'.25

During the Kennedy administration (1961 -63), the US-Soviet strugglewidened into Third World countries. Under Nikita Khrushchev, theUSSR, at least rhetorically, was focusing on 'wars of national liberation'.Since many Third World countries had either become independent fromcolonial rule or were about to do so, the United States believed thatthey would be more sympathetic to the anticolonial rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism espoused by the Soviet Union.

The anti-Soviet alliance-formation, so heavily emphasized during theEisenhower administration, caused considerable controversy and ampledivisions in different regions of the world. However, the Kennedyadministration did not have a decisively different response. The SovietUnion had to be contained in the Third World countries that covered

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


the three continents and were considerably more diversified than WesternEurope, where NATO as an alliance had become such an effective sourceof deterrence.

In the absence of a military doctrine that would have been suitable toany particular region of the Third World, the United States respondedto the Vietnamese conflict in a manner that was not only perceived asprudent, but was also developed with a view to avoiding the disastrousFrench experience. Yet, between 1961 and 1968, widening the scope of itsinvolvement in Vietnam was the only option which the United Statesproceeded to adopt.

President Nixon's pragmatic contribution to American involvementwas 'Vietnamization' of this war. The Nixon Doctrine was globalizationof Vietnamization. It was also a tacit concession to the growing realitythat was otherwise labelled as the 'Vietnam syndrome'. According to this,the United States would no longer get involved in a land war in order tosave a pro-Western regime.

No definitive statement can be made of the success or the failure of theNixon Doctrine. It was issued during a time when the prestige of theUnited States was waning as a result of the Vietnam debacle. Because ofits timing, a rather charitable characterization of it would be to call it apragmatic option. Perhaps, a more realistic assessment would be todescribe it as a sort of a last-ditch attempt of the executive branch tosave face in areas of the world that were no longer considered vitalinterests by the US Congress. In the Persian Gulf, however, the NixonDoctrine and the Shah of Iran's ambitions to dominate the region weremutually complementary. So, while one may suggest that Americanstrategic interests were preserved in that area, it cannot be said with anycertainty that the Nixon Doctrine played a decisive role.

The emergence of strategic parity between the United States and theSoviet Union in the 1960s played a crucial role in the realization thatAmerican military power was no longer sufficient 'for containing the SovietUnion within its current sphere of dominance .. . '26 This realization, firstmentioned through the concept of 'strategic sufficiency' during the earlydays of the first Nixon administration (1969-73), also played a crucialrole both in the emergence of detente and the superpower agreement tolimit nuclear weapons. Of course, the congressional insistence on reducingdefense expenditures also drove Nixon and Kissinger to seek a realisticsolution to the continuing arms race. The end result was the conclusionin 1972 of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and the Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks (SALT I) treaties.

Neither detente nor these treaties resulted in lowering the superpowercompetition in the Third World, however. In fact, as was previously

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


noted, detente fell prey to: perceptual differences, a chasm between (whatthe superpowers regarded as) the 'code of conduct' governing detente,and varied expectations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved to bea turning point in the resuscitation of the Cold War and the Containment-related rhetoric of the 1950s and the 1960s. The greatest problem of theUS-Soviet relationship regarding the Third World was that neither ofthem could develop a uniform policy as they had in Europe. The verygeographic size, and the multi-dimensional diversity of the Third Worldcountries were chief obstacles to uniform American or Soviet policiestoward them. Moreover, not all Third World countries or regions wereof equal strategic significance to them.

Strategic sufficiency would have remained operational, at least as faras the United States was concerned, but for the Soviet invasion andoccupation of Afghanistan. President Jimmy Carter's abandonment ofthe ratification of the controversial SALT II treaty by the Senate, whichwas negotiated by his administration, was a partial response to the Sovietaggression. By invading Afghanistan, the USSR only substantiated agrowing criticism by the American conservative policy community thatWashington was pursuing the arms negotiations from a position of weak-ness. In response, Jimmy Carter, a President who pursued a comprehen-sive test ban treaty in the beginning of his administration, initiated asignificantly large military buildup toward the end of his term. Anotherimportant aspect of the final days of his administration was what wasdubbed the Carter Doctrine, which committed the United States tocontaining Communism and other regional trouble-makers in the PersianGulf region. It elevated the security of this region to that of Europe andthe Pacific.27

The weakened American approach toward Containment, as perceivedby the conservatives, was corrected with the election of Ronald Reaganin 1980. Under his administration, the United States abandoned detente,initiated a policy of unilateral reassertion of American leadership in theinternational arena, and started rebuilding its military strength. NationalSecurity Decision Directive 75 confirmed containment and a limitedaspect of confrontation with the USSR.28

One of the most significant contributions of the Reagan administrationto military doctrine was the shift in focus of the arms race from theoffensive to the defensive side. Rejecting the premise underlying the SALTtalks, which were focused on limiting offensive weapons on the basis ofparity, President Reagan advocated a reduction of arms - thus, a shiftfrom SALT to START (i.e., Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). This washis stated rationale. In reality, however, Reagan wanted to attain a militaryedge for the United States. This fact did not go unnoticed by the Soviet

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


leadership, especially in Reagan's decision to initiate the largest US militarybuildup in peacetime.

To add more intensity to the growing Soviet frustrations, PresidentReagan, in March 1983, also announced his commitment to the StrategicDefense Initiative (SDI), whose purpose was to alter radically the long-established thrust of the superpower arms race from offensive to defen-sive weapons. Even though SDI was not to be realized as a viabledefensive shield in the foreseeable future, the Kremlin leadership founditself at a considerable disadvantage. Their own research breakthroughsin this area were considerably more rudimentary than those attainedby American scientists. However, that was not the significant problem.Under Reagan, superpower relations, as seen from the Soviet side, haddeteriorated considerably. In Reagan, they encountered a President whodid not share the sophisticated perspective of superpower relations, whichhad been the basis of US-Soviet policy since the days of Richard Nixon.Despite slight fluctuations since the Nixon presidency, superpowerrelations essentially remained quite complex during the Ford and Carteradministrations. Whereas his immediate predecessors paid homage to thegrowing complexity of the international system by allowing Soviet Unionadvantages in some areas while retaining (or seeking) advantages for theUnited States in others, Reagan revolutionized the superpower relationsby bringing them down to a lower plane where the pendulum of advantagewas to clearly swing in favor of Washington.

President Reagan remained quite consistent in his approach of limitedconfrontation with the USSR. His response to what he perceived as thegrowing boldness of the Soviet Union in the Third World - as manifestedin its direct or indirect involvement in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozam-bique, Nicaragua - pursued an activist policy of furnishing militaryassistance. This policy (i.e., the Reagan Doctrine), definitely raised theeconomic stakes for the Soviet Union. Consequently, the cost of supportingpro-Soviet forces rose substantially for Moscow, especially in Afghanistan,Cambodia and Mozambique.

The death of Brezhnev in 1982, which was followed by the short andindecisive tenures of his two successors - Yuri Andropov and KonstantinChernenko - did not allow the Soviet Union enough time to bring aboutpolicy or doctrinal adjustments as proper responses to Reagan's approachto the superpower relations. The top leadership in the USSR was stabilizedin 1985, when Gorbachev came to power. After remaining in office fora very short time, he realized that the military aspect of superpowercompetition had doomed the Soviet Union to remain as a fifth-rateeconomic power. Gorbachev quickly concluded that if his country wereto emerge as an economic power, it had to seriously reexamine its

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


commitment to military competition against the United States, a super-power whose military might the Soviet Union could barely match, butwhose economic power was way beyond its reach.

It can be argued that Gorbachev wanted his country to become simul-taneously a military and economic power, à la the United States, in theforeseeable future. However, as the initial step toward this long marchto attain these powers, he had to convince Washington that he was seriousin abandoning the age-old Soviet-American military competition andits attendant worldwide manifestations.

The resurgence of the superpower detente took place between 1985 and1989 not because the United States and the USSR succeeded in resolvingtheir intricate differences regarding the Third World. Rather, it was aunilateral Soviet decision that radically altered the hierarchy of Sovietstrategic objectives under Gorbachev. In the late 1980s the Soviet Union'sprimary concern became restructuring of its economy {Perestroika), anda new and refreshing openness (Glasnost) in domestic and, especially, inforeign policy areas. The burden of military competition, which had keptits economy at the level of a Third World country, had to be unloaded,at least for the foreseeable future.

Thus, Containment as a grand strategy and its attendant militarydoctrines led to the emergence of a cooperative Soviet Union between1985 and 1989 largely because Gorbachev made a determined effort toassign primacy to economic cooperation between Moscow and Washington.The Reagan administration's inordinate military buildup may have drivenhome the futility of military competition and its deleterious spillovereffects for the Soviet economy for Gorbachev much sooner than if thesuperpower military competition had been sustained at its conventionalpace. The forces that he thus unleashed swept the Soviet Union itself tothe dustbin of history. Long before the collapse of the USSR as a super-power on 25 December 1991, the Bush administration started the rhetoricof the emergence of the NWO. Nevertheless, a relevant question at thispoint is: what kind of a new world order awaits America in the 1990sand beyond?

//. The NWO and the Search for a New Grand Strategy: Problemsand ProspectsThe international system that existed in the immediate aftermath ofWorld War II was ideal for American leadership. Europe and Japanwere in ruins economically, politically, and militarily. The internationaleconomic arrangements that prevailed before the war proved inadequateand were in dire need of radical alterations. The United States was theonly power whose economy remained intact, and whose military might was

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


also largely unaffected by the ravages of war. It was the most naturalactor to take charge. After all, it had played a crucial role in bringingWorld War II to a successful end, and its leadership faced no seriouschallenges.

Perhaps the most ideal variable that sustained the American leadershipin the Cold War years was the emergence of the Soviet Union as a threatto Western European stability. It had already subjugated Eastern Europe;and the Western countries of that continent needed no persuading aboutthe imminence of the Soviet threat to their freedom. The hyperboliclanguage of the Truman Doctrine, describing the Soviet threat, wasprimarily aimed at creating domestic support for Containment. TheKorean conflict, the Soviet military actions in Hungary (1956) andCzechoslovakia (1968), the erection of the Berlin Wall, and the Vietnameseconflict were some of the examples of what the West European countriesperceived as outcomes of a potential takeover by the Soviet Union. So, inthe final analysis, the very evolution of Containment as a grand strategy,its sustained implementation by Washington, and its eventual success hadmuch to do with the nature of the threat itself. In other words, the con-spiratorial and expansionistic nature of Soviet Communism enabledContainment to remain focused on its activities, and was responsible forthe evolution of numerous military doctrines that were aimed at sustainingAmerican military power to contain the Soviets.

In the 1990s American military power is intact, but the internationalsystem has undergone radical changes, thereby creating a mixed bag ofrealities whose cumulative effects favor no particular actor or groupof actors. In some areas, the United States retains its preponderance,but in others, it no longer remains that significant. Similarly, WesternEurope - most importantly Germany - and Japan have acquired newsignificance in some areas, but in others, they must look to the UnitedStates for leadership.

The fractious post-Cold War world is marked by increasing conflictsthat are related to ethno-nationalism, and religious fervor. There is agrowing search for regional trade blocs, a marked preoccupation withdomestic problems by major powers - including the United States - atthe expense of forestalling progress on such proven significant issues asthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This preponderanceof conflict has led some thoughtful observers of international relations tocategorize these conflicts along the continuum of the 'West and the rest',or even the 'clash of civilizations'.29

What is significant in the post-Cold War world is that the primacy ofthe industrial West (as opposed to western civilization per se) is beingchallenged. The foremost example of this challenge is coming from the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


Asia-Pacific world. Even the Islamic challenge cannot be labelled purelya civilizational clash, for Muslim countries are trying to come to gripswith the obdurate issue of how to modernize (i.e., adopt an extremelysignificant trait of the West) without Westernizing themselves (i.e., avoidthe multitude of sociocultural aspects of the West that are anathemato their religion). One such aspect of the technological culture inevitablycarries such values as, what Kishore Mahbubani describes as 'the beliefin scientific inquiry, the search for rational solutions, and the willingnessto challenge assumptions'. Yet, the application of such an inquiry to thestudy of Islam has remained a powerful source of controversy in Muslimcountries. In the 1990s, this issue is likely to cause within borders muchcontroversy and its attendant political uncertainty, and even instability.. The conflicts of the post-Cold War world require the attention of the

only remaining superpower. However, the type of solution that they deserverequires the creation of consensus on a regular, if not on a case-by-case,basis. For instance, when President Saddam Hussein took over Kuwait inAugust 1990, the United States opted for coalition warfare. Toward thatend, President Bush played a role whose hallmarks were high visibility,decisiveness, and a resolve aimed at reversing the aggression. And theinternational coalition followed the lead. However, when the Yugoslaviancrisis worsened from June 1991, the United States opted to let the Europeansplay a leading role in resolving it. Even when European haplessness (orunwillingness to resolve it) became apparent, Washington did not wantto take the lead.

Given the new realities of the post-Cold War world, it was possiblefor the United States to lead the debate about utilizing NATO in some wayin the Yugoslavian imbroglio. This would have served the purpose ofAmerica's insistence on continued primacy for NATO in a post-SovietEurope. After all, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE) lacked even the institutional capability to take a decisive action.The WEU was too fledgling to act as a military alliance. That left onlyNATO to be visibly involved, a organization that is most well-equippedto respond to the post-Cold War military exigencies within and outsideEurope.30

Presidential candidate Bill Clinton found it easier to criticize PresidentBush over his indecisiveness over Yugoslavia; however, when the policyimpasse over this conflict continued in 1993 because Britain and Francedid not support an American preference for limited military actions againstthe Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Clinton labelled itthe greatest disappointment of his fledgling presidency.

It is not that Washington lost its will to take military actions when itdeemed necessary. Regarding Saddam Hussein, the United States expressed

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


its willingness to deal firmly during the last few weeks of George Bush'spresidency when Iraq was pounded for violating the so-called no-flyzones, and for stalling the entry of the UN team into Iraq for on-siteinspection. The American action in Iraq proved that the resolve to actwas there, but it was to be used on a selective basis, thereby triggering theArab charge that Washington was exercising a 'double standard'. So, ina unipolar world, America demonstrated that it would impose its will inthe Middle East, but not in Europe.31

The other radical changes of the international system are manifestingthemselves in the increased competitive challenge from the robust economiesof the Pacific and Western Europe. However, in Eastern Europe and inthe Commonwealth of Independent States, the main question that is facedby the United States and the industrial countries is how to rebuild theeconomies of these nations, and how to integrate them in the internationaleconomic system. Under the following two rubrics, challenges of the post-Cold War world will be briefly examined

(1) Altered Nature of International Security and Growing EconomicPolycentrism:International security in the 1990s promises to be very different from thekind that prevailed during the Cold War years. There is no more inter-national communist conspiracy that can be used as a rallying cry in theWest. There is no more highly visible enemy whose power and capabilitiesthe United States can overstate or understate in order to unite its alliesor calm their fears. In the coming years, the threats to regional securityare most likely to emanate from growing ethnic, religious, and economicrivalries, and nuclear proliferation. What profound military doctrinescould be imagined to deal with these threats?

As the Soviet Union collapsed, an uppermost question was 'againstwhom does the United States defend itself? ' Russia inherited the Sovietnuclear assets, to be sure, but the ideological bone of contention betweenthe United States and Russia has gone. Regarding the Yugoslavian conflict,Western Europe tried to take the lead. The Europeans also hoped toevolve the Western European Union (WEU) as a relevant entity to controlthe rising flames of conflict, but after two years of indecisiveness, aconsensus emerged on the peacekeeping role of NATO to enforce thesettlement reached by the warring parties.32

The European performance during the Yugoslavian conflict underscoresthe fact that American leadership in Europe will remain significant inthe 1990s. Even if the CSCE were to emerge as a major entity for peacefulresolution of conflicts, it is the presence of military power that is likelyto make any political solution enforceable. And the United States already

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


possesses that power. The evolution of WEU as a military organizationof any substance depends on the evolution of the European Union (EU)as a politico-economic reality. In the absence of the latter reality, theformer is likely to remain an idea whose time has yet to arrive.

Another characteristic of the 1990s is growing economic polycentrism.This reality is likely to make the international affairs of the 1990s lessmanageable. The economic potential of the United States in this decademight persuade one that this nation is 'bound to lead', but certainly notthe shape of its current deficit, and the state of its declining economic com-petitiveness.33 Japan and Germany are the ascending economic powers,but neither wants to lead. The political baggage of their militaristic pastis likely to cause considerable consternation among their neighbors if theybecome too assertive. Germany is too busy integrating former EastGermany in its economy. Even the EU, when it finally emerges as anintegrated entity, does not exactly appear exuberant about the prospectsof helping out the erstwhile Soviet satellites. Besides, the United Statesmight still reclaim its leadership role once it puts its economy in order.

Given the rising primacy of economic affairs, the trend of the 1990sappears to be the formulation of regional free trade agreements (FTAs).The United States has already signed a limited free trade agreement withIsrael in 1985. The growing economic challenge from Europe only inten-sified American resolve to conclude the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) with Mexico. Immediately after passage of theNAFTA bill by the House of Representatives, President Clinton embarkedon another equally ambitious project. In a meeting of Asia-PacificEconomic Cooperation (APEC) on 20 November 1993 in Seattle,Washington, he proposed that members of that organization become afree trade zone. This is another bold departure from a long-held Americancriticism of the European Economic Community as a regional fortress.In the 1990s America was also busy creating such fortresses, hoping toremain the leader, and intending to use such fortresses in dealing withWestern Europe on trade issues.

President Clinton's visible involvement in the passage of the NAFTAbill and his activism at the APEC meeting in Seattle was his recognitionof the 'seamless connection' between economic (read trade) policy andforeign policy. His description of the 'alphabetic shift' in the post-ColdWar years, from NATO, START, and SALT to NAFTA, APEC, andGATT, was a defining moment in the American foreign policy in thepost-Cold War years.34

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


(2) America's Quest for a Post-Cold War Grand Strategy: SomeConcluding Observations:

American perception of the NWO, as depicted in the opening pages ofthis essay, is partially correct. The newness of the NWO includes thedemise of the Soviet Union, independence of Eastern Europe, and re-unification of Germany. It is also new in the sense that there is no moresuperpower military competition based on ideology. One of the mostsignificant developments of the post-Cold War world is the upsurge of aparadoxical competition between the forces of 'integration' and 'frag-mentation'.35 The rise of nationalism as a divisive force resulted in thefailure of the EC to emerge as a politico-economic union toward the endof 1992. The main reason underlying this development was largely thedecisions of various European countries either to reject the Maastrichttreaty as a basis for monetary union, vote for it only by a tiny majority,or vote 'yes without consequence . . . '36

There are other forces of fragmentation, to be sure, whose impacton the international system is quite deleterious. Some examples of theseforces are the outbreak of ethnic hatred in the form of 'ethnic cleansing'in Yugoslavia; eruption of violence against foreigners in the unitedGermany, France, and even Vienna; the rise of protectionism in the UnitedStates, Japan, and France; the 'peaceful divorce' between Czechs andSlovaks; and the tightening rather than relaxation of intra-EU borders.During the Cold War years, the United States and the USSR only went tothe brink of war once, in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Otherwise, theirmilitary competition was a highly managed one, but one cannot statewith certainty that the emerging interstate competitions and confrontationsin" the 1990s are likely to be similarly manageable. Economic competitionhas a potential of getting out of hand. Then what? The United States andother great powers have to keep their wary eyes on the potential nastinessof the growing economic competition, which is destined to become acutein the coming decades.

How orderly is this new world order likely to be? A persuasive discussionof the rising disorderliness (if not its increasingly chaotic nature) isprovided in the 'clash of civilizations' theme developed by SamuelHuntington in his aforementioned essay. Just look at the 11 republics ofthe Commonwealth that replaced the USSR. The acuteness of economicproblems, ethnic tensions, and religious differences among them aremind-boggling. Then, there are ethnic and religious tensions in some ofthe East European states. Who is going to pay for the economic recon-struction of that region? If no one is willing to bear the financial cost,then, are the Europeans or the Americans willing to pay the political price?

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


Certainly not, but then no one seems to know what other alternatives areavailable.

The security-related threat of the Cold War years was the glue that keptthe alliances with NATO countries and Japan intact. There is no moreunifying threat. How is one to develop a grand strategy for the post-Cold War World? How would one go about defining the threat? If thethreat is defined along the lines of economic competition among nation-states, then no one nation is to be blamed for it. All nation-states arepotential culprits in future conflicts. How is one to develop a strategyagainst such a potential? If the threat is defined along the lines of ethnicand religious differences, then the question still remains as to how nation-states are to cope with these threats. How can one develop a strategy tomake sure that these differences do not lead to sectional or regional wars?

Looking at another troubled, if not the most troubled, region of theworld - the Middle East - one is more baffled about the newness or theorderliness of the NWO. Political instability still lurks on the horizons ofthe Persian Gulf. So do regional rivalries between Iran and Iraq, SaudiArabia and Iran, and Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The arms race is stillcontinuing at an escalated pace. The Palestinian question, despite thesigning of a historical agreement between Israel and the PalestinianLiberation Organization governing interim self-rule in the Gaza Stripand the town of Jericho on 13 September 1993, is still far from beingresolved.

In this rising wave of multiple conflicts, the most serious challengefor the United States is to find a new purpose for its power, a new focusfor its foreign policy. The greatest challenge for the United States in the1990s is to adjust itself to the new emerging realities of the internationaland economic systems. It must learn to look for multilateral responses toproblems of economic competition and to security-related challenges,without necessarily ruling out unilateralism if its vital interests are threaten-ed. The world of this and ensuing decades is a world characterized bypolycentrism. Its problems should be tackled by a collective leadershipof nations. Regional solutions to problems must be secured and promoted,with regional actors playing a leading role in resolving them. The greatpowers must serve only as facilitators and peacemakers, assuming thatthey can manage to stay away from starting wars of their own. Americanpower must be asserted in this regard. The problems of the 1990s do notneed a grand strategy. They should be managed by developing tedious andcumbersome strategies evolved through regional approaches and collectiveleadership. As the sole surviving superpower, the United States shouldsee to it on a sustained basis.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


NOTES

1. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Betweenthe World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1984), p. 13.

2. Paul Kennedy, 'Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition', inPaul Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT & London:Yale UP, 1991), pp.2-6, passim.

3. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC:USGPO, 1989), p. 118.

4. As cited in Aaron Friedberg, 'The Evolution of US Strategic "Doctrines", 1945 to 1981',in Samuel Huntington (ed.), The Strategic Imperative (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982),pp. 53-99.

5. Ibid., p. 56.6. Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from

Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Instn., 1985); also Stephen E. Ambrose,'The Presidency and Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 70/5 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 120-37.

7. Kennedy (note 2), p, 6.8. As cited in Seymon Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in UnitedStates

Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan (NY: Columbia UP, 1983), p. 80.9. Brown, p. 129.

10. For an overview of the decline of American economic power, see Joan Spero, ThePolitics of International Economic Relations, 4th ed. (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

11. See M.E. Ahrari, 'OAPEC and the "Authoritative", Allocation of Oil: An Analysisof the Arab Oil Embargo', Studies in Comparative International Development 14/1(Spring 1979), pp. 9-21.

12. For a discussion of the pentagonal order see Terry L. Diebel, Public Opinion andPower: The Nixon, Carter and Reagan Years (NY: Foreign Policy Assoc. HeadlineSeries, 1987).

13. For a classic discussion of the evolution of imperial presidency see Arthur Schlesinger,Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983). For an overview ofthe tethered presidency see, Robert Franck (ed.), Congressional Restraints on ExecutivePowers (NY: NY UP, 1981).

14. Carl Gershman, 'The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign Policy Establishment', in CharlesW. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, Perspectives on American Foreign Policy(NY: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 174-95.

15. Brown (note 8), p. 590.16. As cited in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (NY: OUP, 1982), p. 30.17. Henry T. Nash, American Foreign Policy: A Search for Security, 3rd ed. (Homewood,

IL: Dorsey Press, 1985), pp. 26-8.18. Louis Morton, 'The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb', Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1957,

pp. 334-53.19. Nash (note 17), p. 68.20. Ibid.21. As cited in James Daugherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of Inter-

national Relations (NY: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 376.22. The first occasion when the bomb option was publicly mentioned was by President

Truman in Nov. 1950, immediately following the Chinese intervention in Korea. Thesecond time this option came up was in early 1951 when Gen. Douglas McArthur urgedthe President to consider using it. The third occasion was in early 1953, when theEisenhower administration expressed its willingness to use atomic weapons against thePeoples' Republic of China. See Nash (note 17), pp. 55-6.

23. Brown (note 17), pp. 118-19.24. Arms Control and National Security: A n Introduction (Washington, DC: Arms Control

Assoc, 1989), p.23.25. Ibid., p.24.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012


26. Brown (note 17), p. 335.27. Dore Gold, America, the Gulf, and Israel: CENTCOM and Emerging US Regional

Security Policies in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).28. Garthoff (note 6), p. 1012.29. Kishore Mahbubani, 'The West and the Rest', National Interest (Summer 1992),

pp. 3-12; Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs 72/3(Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.

30. Charles L. Glaser, 'Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe',International Security 18/2 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50.

31. This seeming double standard has been described in the Muslim world as an anti-Islamic bias of American policy in the post-Cold War years.

32. 'NATO Steps Up Plans for Bosnian Force', New York Times, 18 March 1993.33. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (NY:

Basic Books, 1990).34. 'Clinton Preaches Open Market', Washington Post, 21 Nov. 1993.35. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward the Post-Cold War World', Foreign Affairs 70/1 (Spring

1991), pp. 102-22.36. Josef Joffe, 'The New Europe', Foreign Affairs 72/1, 'America and the World' (Spring

1993), pp.29-43.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Ari

zona

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

54 0

2 Ju

ly 2

012

ahrari - america's search for a post-cold war grand strategy (1994)

Documents